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The Revolutionary Climate: Applying Theories of Revolution to Assess Political Stability in Contemporary Brazil

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Arden Andrew Nicholls

**The Revolutionary Climate: Applying Theories of Revolution to Assess Political Stability in
Contemporary Brazil.**

24 April 2014

Professors, Ward, Brasileiro and Furlong

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Chapter I: Introduction

Sitting on a bus somewhere between São Paulo and Curitiba, I began an inquiry into the modernization and future stability of Brazil. This evolved into the subject of my thesis. Ten hours into the journey, still not halfway to Curitiba; I curiously looked around the bus--not a single person seemed upset or even mildly concerned. Due to two traffic accidents and a police stoppage (where two criminals and their luggage were apprehended) the expected six-hour trip took nearly twenty hours. Overly anxious, I turned to the well-dressed passenger sitting next to me. "Is this normal? What in the world is going on? What's taking so long?" The man smirked and calmly replied, "This is Brazil friend."

Rapid modernization has throughout history presented unique challenges for developing countries. Generally judged to be a good thing--but if too rapid--modernization can strain a government if that governmental system is unable to keep up. Historically concrete social classes begin to blur or shift as massive capital investments are injected--often unequally. Proliferation of the middle class is commonly seen as a country modernizes quickly; with the new middle-class comes rising expectations and modern demands on government. Social programs, infrastructure, political and social equality and general societal advancements are all expected to increase at roughly the same pace as the economy. Social strata may begin comparing their relative wellbeing to that of their regional or global counterparts; if perceived as being less well off, societal discontent is more likely (social media and the technology revolution have greatly facilitated this).

Theories of Revolution provide the tools needed to assess the dangers of modernization and its destabilizing effects on developing countries. As we will see there is—in some way—always an element of modernization or westernization at the heart of a revolution noticed from both a historical and theoretical perspective. Modernization theory is the broadest and possibly most telling theory but cannot be fully understood without utilizing Psychological Theories such as Relative Deprivation Theory (RD) and Rising Expectations Theory (RE). These two theories are the most well tuned Theories of Revolution to the case of modern Brazil, but again must be understood within the more general context of revolution.

Theories of Revolution are many, complex and span multiple disciplines. The most trying task of this thesis will be to survey as much of the existing scholarship as possible and compile a concise and easily understandable literature review. A well-tailored literature review will provide the author and reader with needed perspective and a path to understand and aid the investigation at hand. After a comprehensive survey of the literature is complete the author will attempt to apply the theoretical foundations to the case of Brazil.

The purpose of this paper is not to suggest that revolution is imminent in Brazil, but rather to utilize revolutionary literature to measure stability and provide a general outlook for the future of stability in Brazil. If this thesis does its job the reader will be more able to ask informed questions: If Brazil appears to meet the theoretical requirements of revolution, is revolution a legitimate possibility; what makes Brazil different from other pre-revolution states of the past? Are last summer's recent protests and social movements more relevant when observed within revolutionary models; do they signal more problems to come?

Because this is a Plan B thesis, the methodology will simply be a survey of literature that attempts to identify commonly occurring agents of revolution within the respective camps and apply those deemed most salient to the case of modern Brazil. Further research beyond the existing revolutionary literature will analyze the current state of Brazil. Particularly the grievances from this past summers' social protests will be utilized as well as the failed promises of the Brazilian government to modernize infrastructures and social programs in preparation for the coming World Cup and Summer Olympics. Changes in the general sentiment and expectations of the middle-class will also be addressed—measures such as increased spending habits are readily available through multiple sources.

The reader may ask, why does all this proposed research matter? The social unrest and recent developments in Turkey and Egypt may be one answer. Yes the cases of Turkey and Egypt do have substantial differences to the case of Brazil, but one can opine that the events were unnecessarily unexpected and understudied. Both Turkey and Egypt's, internal polity and public exhibited many worrying indicators prior to the respective mass protests. Research provided by works like this thesis, shed extra light onto such situations and can potentially avert some of the strain caused by the unexpected nature of social movements.

Furthermore when there is a legitimate possibility of political violence, such situations should be addressed prudently. If at the end of this research the reader decides that total revolution is less than probable but political violence seems worryingly imminent, this thesis will have served its purpose.

There is the case of the Tlatelolco Massacre to compare Brazil's situation. The massacre occurred only ten days before the 1968 Mexican Olympics and presents eerie parallels. The

demands of the 40 confirmed dead student protestors were not overly demanding and extremely similar to those expressed in Brazil. In 1968 a new middle class was emerging throughout Mexico; the new middle class subsequently came with an increase in university enrollment—these new students demanded more and their expectations rose. Many of the social movements of the 1960's were middle class student protests, but the case of Tlatelolco proved deadly.¹ “1,000 bullets” later we ought to question whether enough was done to understand the voices of the Mexican protestors and to prudently approach such situations of public discontent.

This thesis may be criticized for its over simplification of complex theories; however in defense of the methodology any attempt to simplify theories of revolution is a daunting task. If the reader is left in the end with an answer to a complicated question rather than befuddled due to terminology or overly verbose theoretical explanations, the reader will nonetheless be informed. Theories of revolution are complex and the issues facing Brazil are too. There is not enough space in a single thesis to fully elaborate upon the literature but attempting to provide as much of the picture in a straightforward and comprehensible way should prove useful to the reader and serve the aims of this thesis.

¹ Richman, Joe, and Anayansi Diaz-Cortes. "Mexico's 1968 Massacre: What Really Happened?" *NPR*. NPR, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.

Chapter II: Review of Revolutionary Literature

Natural History

Focusing on the three major revolutions or “great revolutions” Crane Brinton illuminates striking similarities between the events leading to revolutions in France, Russia, and China. (The American Revolution being the outlier which he admits does not conform to his model.) The explanatory model chosen by Brinton is simple, direct and provides a rudimentary approach to highlight preliminary signs of revolution. This model will serve the aims of this thesis well due to its ability to illuminate presages to Revolution.²

1. Government deficits
2. More than usual complaints over taxation
3. Conspicuous governmental favoring of one set of economic interests over another
4. Administrative entanglements and confusions
5. Transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals
6. Loss of self-confidence among many members of the ruling class (conversion of many members of that class to the belief that their privileges are unjust or harmful to society)
7. The intensification of social antagonisms
8. The stoppage at certain points (usually in the professions, the arts, perhaps the white-collar jobs generally) of the career open to talents
9. The separation of economic power from political power and social distinction.

One can accurately opine that most societies then and now possess many or all of the preliminary signs listed above to some degree. That is not however to say that these factors are

² Brinton, Crane. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage, 1965. Print.

not important indicators of a revolution in the making. Virtually all societies prior to revolution exhibited most or all of these signs, but in their most extreme form. It is important to note that Brinton references the necessity of the most extreme form but fails to elaborate upon what he means by the most extreme form and how to identify it.³

Brinton's model succeeds in highlighting all of these uniformities, but fails to clarify at what point these uniformities will result in revolution. Measuring the level of intensity that is sufficient to ignite revolution is difficult. Psychological theories, which will be discussed in following sections, aid in this endeavor. Judging relative intensity rather than simply stating a general trait of pre-revolution societies is more well suited for psychological approaches such as rising expectations theory and relative deprivation theory.

It is important to stress that though the strength of Brinton's natural history approach lies in its parallel sequencing of processes from historical samples, it is also its weakness. Brinton's model does convincingly identify parallels such as the nine listed above and historical generalizations do yield useful data, but generalization or uniformities from history cannot alone predict revolution. Brinton's models are by no means exhaustive, but the general framework proves valuable when applying any theory to any set of revolutions. In the case of revolutions, there are few cases to study—making any valid and identifiable parallels useful and should be utilized rather than criticized.

³ Crane Brinton. "Anatomy of Revolution."

Classical Marxian Theory: Class Conflict & Modernization

Dubbed by William Friedburg, “the philosophical basis for revolutionary action”⁴ Classical Marxian theory has been criticized as antediluvian and overly simplistic. However when attempting to comprehensibly understand revolutions, the Marxist camp still proves useful and handily generalizable. Similar to Brinton, Marx’s manifestation model is simple, generalizable and contextually founded in similar thought.

Marx foresaw revolution as an inevitable evolution from the inequality of capitalism to socialism; predominately rooted in class conflicts as well as a response to inequality in capital dispersement lie at the core of Marx’s philosophy. It is difficult to find a revolution absent of class conflict. Marx and Engles argued that the bourgeois working class is the only class capable of igniting total revolution and of successfully recreating a new political order.⁵ Throughout history there are numerous examples that evidence this. Crane Brinton also stresses the importance of the middle class's involvement in creating revolution. All of the revolutions surveyed by Brinton came about first by the middle class and were then carried out fully by the lower classes.

Marxian theories of revolution apply remarkably well to a few case studies that seem to appear frequently in the literature, and can be thought of as the most complete revolutionary theory. Though the Marxian theories have been applied to virtually every revolution, the great revolutions studied by Brinton and Marx have provoked the least controversy, are cleanly

⁴ Friedland, William H., and Amy E. Barton. *Revolutionary Theory*. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982. Print

⁵ Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, and E. J. Hobsbawm. *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition*. London: Verso, 1998. Print.

tailored to the framework and happen to be the same case studies utilized by the majority of revolutionary scholars. The utility of generalization provided by the Brinton's Natural History approach and the Marxist camps are useful for the structure and scope of this thesis due to their emphasis of class.

Of the four major tenants of revolution highlighted by Marx (listed below) the first two are represented well within Brinton's Uniformity Model, and also hold solid predictive relevance for this thesis.

1. Alienation
2. Concentration of Capital
3. The Falling Rate of Profit and Immiseration
4. Anarchy of Capital

Marx saw the alienation of people as a product of modernization in production techniques (machines began replacing human workers) whereas Brinton saw an equally important element of alienation but in the alienation or stoppage of white-collar professions openness to the masses. The two are clearly speaking on different aspects of alienation but the focus is the same. When a people become alienated from a desired profession or social status a strong sense of societal discontent is likely to follow.

Marx saw the concentration of capital as a product of modernization resulting from the monopolization in the production sector. Brinton on the other hand sees a similar grievance, but it is caused by administrative entanglements and economic governmental favoring. The two were active at different times in history and both pointed the finger at different agents. The similarity

more so than the difference of this casual factor is the perception of a greater entity amassing either too much power or too much capital while the peasantry watches in misery from below.

The notion of class-conflict and the significance of modernization will suffice to supplement the following sections. Class conflict is in some way always at the heart of a revolution. Despite the glaring differences between Brinton and Marx, the most distinguishing thought is that everyday misery will not alone cause revolution. Friedberg states “Of course, the daily experience of exploitation, alienation, and deprivation do not automatically create a revolutionary force. Initially, the contradictions of capitalism are experienced by each person as an individual problem”⁶. The basic assumption of all Marxian analysis is that “one class exploits and one class is exploited”.⁷With the assumption, that revolutions generally exhibit a class conflict but that the actual path to revolution is better understood from an individual level of analysis, we will move to other more modern theories of revolution. Psychological and Structural approaches fill the gaps where Marx and Brinton were incomplete.⁸

Structuralism: Defunct Administration & Modernization

Any survey of revolutionary literature would be incomplete without mentioning the seminal work of Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution*. Skocpol claims that “revolutions are not

⁶ William Friedland, “Revolutionary Theory” P 13

⁷ Cohan, A. S. *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction*. New York: Wiley, 1975. Print.

⁸ Carl Marx, “The Communist Manifesto.”

⁹ Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979. Print

made they come.”⁹ Similar to other theorists she uses comparative methodology to explore the great revolutions of China, France and Russia.

Theda Skocpol continues and greatly expands upon Marxian analysis. Skocpol is influenced by Marxian ideas of class struggle but in the end pioneers the structuralist argument, which labels the state an autonomous actor within society and certain breakdowns within that actor result in revolution. Her definition of revolution differentiates her work from the previous two theories mentioned. Skocpol chooses a very strict and very precise definition. “Social revolutions are rapid fundamental changes of societies state and class structure. Sociopolitical conflict--rather than class alone--that fundamentally alters the political and social structure of a society is a true revolution not to be confused with revolts, rebellions or simple protests”.¹⁰

Agents of revolution must work symbiotically to result in revolution. No one agent alone can cause a total revolution; even a break down of the military will not result in a true revolution unless that breakdown occurs in the midst of an administrative breakdown. Without a functioning administration or military the society becomes vulnerable to economic breakdowns and class strife--there is no particular order in which the agents of revolution must manifest themselves it only matters that they all occur in a relatively short period of time.

Again like the Marxist and historical approaches, Skocpol chooses the cases of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Also like Brinton and other students of revolution, any comprehensive theory of revolution is hamstrung by the few modern cases of total revolution from which to draw quantifiable or sufficient comparative data.

¹⁰ Theda Skocpol, “States and Social Revolutions.”

Lastly this section will draw on Skocpol's valuation of rapid modernization and its effects on revolutions. Because revolutions are rarely "hermetically sealed events unaffected by the outside world"¹¹, Skocpol spends significant attention emphasizing the importance and the role of the international community in a globalizing world. A state's relationship with the international community largely determines if the state will have any outside help to stave off revolution.

Skocpol states Modernization often changes a people's value orientation, their value expectations and temperament. "Hasty and disorderly economic expansion" can disturb general expectations to a point of "unanimous dissatisfaction"¹². Such unanimous dissatisfaction can turn into social upheaval or political violence, which can destroy a government. Psychological approaches like Rising Expectations and Relative Deprivation elaborate on Skocpol's idea of unanimous dissatisfaction.

Psychological Theories:

Both Classical Marxian theories and Natural History approaches focus predominately on society as the independent variable where structural theorists such as Theda Skocpol claim the structure of a state should be the variable under examination. Psychological approaches claim it is men and women alone who make revolutions. Societal approaches are useful in their ease of use and the quantity of available data. Psychological approaches will often suffer from the possibility of limited information. Nonetheless psychology as an agent of revolution should be attempted if

¹¹ Ibid. 9

¹² Ibid. 9

possible. Generally psychological approaches are divided into four sub-categories:¹³ Studies that deal with the background of individual revolutionaries; theories which are concerned with the repression of instincts; the theory of rising expectations; and the theory of relative deprivation.


Throughout time histories have been written by the victors, this is also true in some part with revolutions. That is to say it is very difficult to accurately measure what the public sentiment was in hindsight. We can with some confidence find successful revolutions and determine who made them happen and why, but we are inevitably missing a great deal of psychological analysis—partly because the data simply doesn't exist. Today social media and communication technology allows scholars a more intimate look at a strata's individual psyche. Public opinion polls have also come along way in credibility and scope. The wealth of information now available clearly facilitates such an approach, but that is not to say psychological approaches are easy.

The author believes the relative lack of modern scholarly attention in contemporary studies of revolution to theories like RD is still due to the lack of information and resources. This being said psychological approaches can and should be approached within the context of general revolutionary theory. Psychological approaches may in the end be the last missing piece of the puzzle. Harnessing the power of psychological theories may make the daunting task of predicting revolutions more manageable and accurate. We will never know when or if a revolution is to occur but if we can identify a revolutionary climate and then apply psychological theories we will in the end find ourselves substantially more informed.

¹³ Al S. Cohan, "Theories of Revolution." P. 177

When a social strata's expectations (generally most strongly manifested in the middle-class) are rising at an accelerated pace there is a likelihood that a government will be unable to meet those expectations—especially in cases of a weak state. If a government fails to meet its peoples expectations to a substantial degree and it happens amidst other revolutionary agents the possibility of revolution greatly increases. Because of the ambiguities of this approach and its difficulty to measure, it has fallen out of favor with many theorists. However for the sake of this thesis the author is convinced it remains salient—it is insightful regarding the recent protests and will be given significant attention. The author claims that Brazil's situation is unique and the heightened level of expectations is quite evident in Brazilians lifestyle changes noticed in entertainment forums, buying patterns, increased and refined consumer demand, popular protests and social media. (Evidence for these supercharged rising expectations in Brazil will be a presented in the thesis).

Ted Gurr argues that Relative Deprivation (RD) is the foremost indicator and explanatory tool in understanding revolutions. Similar to rising expectations theory, RD is concerned with



what ought to be as opposed to what is expected to be. In a most basic sense RD is the gap between what people receive and what they believe or expect that they should receive. Defined by Gurr , “actors’ perception of discrepancy between

their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and

conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled”¹⁴. Aberle provides a similar definition, “a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality.”¹⁵

Ted Gurr is predominately concerned with economics and their effects on social stability, however his applications of RD can also explain more general sentiments of deprivation such as the want for functioning infrastructure, social programs or legitimate political systems. Gurr labels such the “goods of life” which are food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts. This thesis will liberally add multiple other “goods of life” to the model, because as humans and societies evolve so does their perceived valuation of goods. Health services for example can be thought of as a modern addition--17th century collectivities were probably unlikely to rebel due to lack of health care.

Runciman states, “if people have no reason to expect for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful simply be able to hold on to it”.¹⁶ Often referred to as “reference groups” a collectivity needs another group with which to compare their situation or status. Social media and advances in technology have made reference groups readily accessible to those in Brazil.

Brinton states that the Russian and Chinese revolutions came about incredibly slowly despite their deprivation in relation to other collectivities such as the United States was remarkably low. Had they more or clearer information as to the relative well being of others their revolutions may have come about much quicker. The United States on the other hand revolted

¹⁴ Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton UP, 1970. Print.

¹⁵ David Aberle. “A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory,” In Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed.). *millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study*. The Hague: Mouton, 1962

¹⁶ Runciman, W. G. *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-century England*. Berkeley: U of California, 1966. Print.P 9

hastily to what, by relative international comparisons, was minimal deprivation. Prior to the American War of Independence, Americans enjoyed a relatively high quality of life. A simple tea tax resulted in violence, which spiraled into all out war.

Olson's empirical studies suggest, "the demonstration or evidence of higher consumption patterns in one's neighbors will increase one's desire for additional consumption, in the sense that it leads to saving a smaller proportion of income."¹⁷

Modernization:

Effects of Modernization have been the focus of intense scholarly debate for decades. The scholarship can be roughly grouped into two camps—proponents of the benefits and stability caused by modernization and the critics who presume the opposite and opine the proponents are overly optimistic. This thesis aligns more with the critics and is skeptical in regard to the stabilizing and democratizing effects of modernization—at very least modernization is not a one glove fits all style solution. Post Cold War Latin American history evidences the latter.

Samuel Huntington stressed the importance of stability over rapid modernization throughout the developing world during the cold war era. His argument has been supported and expanded upon by Francis Fukuyama. Perhaps the most telling argument regarding the future of Brazil is that of modernization. In agreement with Skocpol, Hunting says that a legitimate and wholly functioning government is the only safeguard to the effects of overly rapid modernization.

¹⁷ Mancur Olson, Jr. "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, (1963), P 538.

According to Huntington “revolution is a characteristic of modernization”.¹⁸ For a revolution to occur the **correct climate for revolution must be present**, and modernization provides such a climate. Huntington strictly defines revolution similar to Skocpol as being a fundamental change in a country’s social and political structure, which inevitably must include violence. For this thesis the author will utilize their methodology but will opine that a revolution does not need not be violent and can result in a fundamental change of either social or political structure. Huntington, Skocpol and others stricter definition of revolution will be labeled by this thesis classical revolutions.

Definition of Revolution:

This thesis will use the following definition of revolution: A mass mobilization, peaceful or violent, which results in enduring and fundamental political, economic, and/or social change where the government conforms to the demands of the populace. Because this definition is more open and flexible than that of the leading revolutionary scholars, criticism is expected. However, differentiating between classical revolution and a contemporary revolution will leave us in the end similarly informed. Simply because a revolution does not mirror that of the few classical revolutions of history, does not mean that a less drastic contemporary revolution is still not significant.

A broader definition allows the author to apply theories of revolution to a wider array of contemporary case studies like Brazil where a total French-style classical revolution is not extremely likely. Instances of political violence or social protest that don’t leave an entirely new

¹⁸ Samuel Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies.”

country in their wake are still worthy of study. Rather than retrospectively defining what was and what was not a revolution, the making of revolution or the process of revolution is similarly important. For that matter, most scholars do not label the American Revolution a textbook revolution, but most would agree that in spirit it was nonetheless revolutionary.

The following three chapters apply theories of revolution to Brazil; it will follow a logical path that should help frame the assumed societal discontent in a manner that will aid in assessing political stability. The path will begin by providing general economic data to show that Brazil has begun to modernize at an incredible pace. Secondly the middle class will be isolated, as the social strata deemed most important for further examination. Then thirdly a simply cultural topography of the middle class will be utilized to facilitate applications of psychological approaches. Lastly section III will discuss which agents of revolution are present and which are not and will assess whether Brazil shows symptoms a revolutionary climate.

Note on Data Gathering:

Whenever possible, public opinion polls and other forms of quantifiable data are utilized within this thesis; however such quantifiable data needed for the task at hand are often difficult or impossible to obtain and may lack credibility. The less than perfect availability and quality of data often plague the social sciences and become particularly problematic for psychological theories of revolution. If deemed applicable and reputable, public opinion polls are used to supplement the theories at hand. If such data does not exist, other mediums are utilized to gauge public sentiment. Social media, interviews, general country information and personal experiences all provide relevant data when gathered and implemented appropriately. Neither

quantitative nor qualitative data alone portray a perfect picture of a society; for that reason the following research strives to utilize both but will rely on one or the other if necessary.

Chapter III: Modernization and the Middle Class

Upon completing the literature review, it became evident that the first piece to answer the Brazilian puzzle is modernization and its effect on contemporary Brazil. This section will begin by showing that modernization facilitates the creation of a climate for revolution and how revolution is as stated by Huntington a “characteristic of modernization”¹⁹. Aside from scholarly debates regarding the positive and negative effects of modernization, we can posit that there are certain less than controversial truisms regarding modernization and revolution: first modernization has in almost every instance given rise to a new middle class, and second (by generating new wealth and upward mobility) modernization raises a populace’s expectations. As stated by Brinton, Marx, Graham and others, revolutions throughout history have spawned within the wealthier more educated bourgeois or middle class not the peasantry. Much of this revolutionary fervor results from the independent and self-improving nature of the middle class paired with their supercharged and difficult to meet rising expectations. Being that the author finds a strong theoretical correlation between modernization, the middle class and relative deprivation, this section will begin by putting Brazil to the test and assessing the recent and potential future effects of modernization by illustrating Brazil’s degree of modernization.

¹⁹ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies

Modernization in Brazil:

First we need to ask, is Brazil experiencing rapid modernization? The answer to that question is a resounding yes! The following presents data to evidence this. Beginning with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's (Lula) ascension to the Brazilian presidency, Brazil has seen an unprecedented decade of economic growth. Federal spending programs like *Bolsa Família* (Family Purse) have shown incredible success by lifting millions out of poverty and reducing the poverty level to 7.9%. Today Brazil spends about US\$ 4,000 per person per year in assistance programs to combat poverty. The 2008 financial meltdown affected Brazil only slightly compared to Europe and the US and its recovery was much quicker. Brazil's currency the Real has stabilized after decades of fluctuating value. Brazil's selection to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics demonstrate how far their economic clout has come, practically overnight. Brasilia promised to ramrod tens of billions of dollars worth of infrastructure developments (which will be discussed more later). The infrastructure was needed to modernize the nation and appease its new middle class, which now accounts for about half of the overall population at 118 million.²⁰

Traditionally, social mobility has not been a trait of Brazilian society, but recently entrance into one of the two middle classes (Classe-B and Classe-C) has become much more possible. Credit has become much easier to obtain making these people with new found disposable income candidates for new non-essential consumer products. (Consumer spending patterns will be addressed in the following section.)

When concerning modernization the most important aspect in need of consideration is the rapidity in which Brazil sprang to economic prominence. Under the military junta Brazil

²⁰ "Country Spotlight: Brazil." *Public Finance International*. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

(1964-1985) was the second most unequal country in the world. Inequality in Brazil as measured by the GiNi coefficient fell remarkably fast from .63 in 1989 to .56 in 2004 and .53 in 2007.²¹

The Brazilian miracle began in 2004 with a 5.7% growth in GDP. Economic success continued year after year with impressive GDP growth. 4% in 2006, 6.1% (2007), 5.1% (2008), and most impressively, 7.5% in 2010. Additionally from 2004 to 2007 the unemployment rate shrank by 22%. For illustrative purposes the United States averages just over 3% GDP growth.²²

According to the International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (ICP) the reasons for this accession were straightforward. Improvements in education such as the promotion of equal access to education and universal admission to primary school educated the workforce allowing them more upward mobility. Demographically speaking, family size trended downward. Possibly the most important factor was the creation of a direct cash transfer system. Simply put the government gave the people money, which resulted in them being less poor thereby substantially decreasing inequality rates in under a decade. Most notably *Bolsa Família* transferred enormous sums of money directly to the poorest sectors of Brazilian society. Such precisely targeted social programs were able to stimulate aggregate consumer demand and consumption. According to the ICP the transfer program was a “virtuous cycle of increases in the income of poorer families, together with wage growth, has enlarged the domestic market. Greater consumption of mass-market goods has led to growing labour demand for these same families, spurring further increases in their income and purchasing power”.²³

²¹ Ferreira, Francisco H. G., Phillippe G. Leite, and Julie A. Litchfield. "The Rise And Fall Of Brazilian Inequality: 1981–2004." *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 12.S2 (2008): n. pag. Print

²² "What Explains the Decline in Brazil's Inequality." *International Centre for Inclusive Growth* (2009): n. pag. Web. <<http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager89.pdf>>.

²³ Ibid. 21

The social policies were then paired with massive openings of international markets; waves of foreign direct investment created an economic juggernaut. On average Brazil received a substantial US\$20 billion from 1996-2010, but in 2011 that number swelled to US\$68 billion.

FDI increases by three fold are exceptionally rare and it goes without saying exceptionally fast. (See Figure

So how could all this growth bad? Until very recently Brazil experienced unprecedented growth, which seems obviously good, but as




written earlier, rapid growth can actually be cause for problems. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stated that Brazil will need to grow at four percentage points every year to maintain previous poverty reduction levels and much more than that to continue business as usual.

If Brazil is able to continue growing economically and modernizing at this pace there will likely be little to talk about other than more success. However, after 2010's peak growth the economy has become volatile and trended abruptly downward. 2012 reported a dismal .09% GDP growth, and the World Bank forecasts very minimal recovery over the next few years. (See Figure 3) Many economists believe that "income transfers and consumption stimulus policies are no longer sufficient to ensure sustainable growth in the future".²⁵ Industrial production has

²⁴ "Global Macro Trends." KKR. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

²⁵ Ibid. 19

reduced significantly and inflation is again an ominous reality. Regardless of what the future holds for the Brazilian economy, the effects of this modernization will continue. A gradual upward tread however would be the most stable. For the sake of this paper we need to assess the creation of Brazil’s new middle class to evidence Brazil’s true modernization and to isolate a strata to which psychological theories may be applied.




Brazil’s Middle Class on the Rise:

Francis Fukuyama writes that the protests in Brazil, Turkey and to the past Arab Spring are all in some part due to the new “global middle class”, stating, “everywhere it has emerged a modern middle class causes political ferment”. Admittedly none of the protests proliferated into classic revolutions or anywhere close, but the correlation still provides valid insight into what makes a revolution. Simply put modernization creates a middle class which becomes much more demanding and if those demands go unmet societal unrest is more likely.²⁶

²⁶ Fukuyama, Francis. "The Middle-Class Revolution." *The Wall Street Journal*. Dow Jones & Company, 28 June 2013.

Goldman Sachs defines the middle class group as earning US\$ 6,000-30,000 a year (roughly US\$ 16-80 a day),²⁷ whereas MIT economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo define



the range between US\$ 2-10²⁸ while economist Homi Khara of the Brookings Institute finds the middle class at the other end of the spectrum at US\$ 10-100²⁹. Brasilia however provides more complicated socioeconomic classification, which reports 50% of the Brazilian population as being

middle class (a result of the somewhat controversial socioeconomic classification). Despite the difference in classification, the Brazilian C class (lower-middle) makes anywhere from US\$ 1,746 to US\$ 6,114 (roughly the same as Banerjee and Duflo's US\$ 5-17 a day) and alone makes up 50% of the population.^{30 31}

For the sake of this thesis Brasilia's classification will be used. This thesis is more concerned with relative wealth or poverty than absolute or objective poverty. Though the dollar amount is much smaller than what many assume a middle class should make, the Brazilian

²⁷ Wilson, Dominic, Alex Kelston, and Swarnali Ahmed. "Is This the BRICs Decade?" *BRICs Monthly*. Goldman Sachs, 20 May 2010. Web.

²⁸ Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. "What Is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the World?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22.2 (2008): 3-28. Print.

²⁹ Kharas, Homi. "THE EMERGING MIDDLE CLASS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." *OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE*. N.p., Jan. 2010. Web. <<http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/44457738.pdf>>

³⁰ Herédia, Thais. "Classe Média Ainda Ganha Pouco, Mas Se Diverte." *Globo*. N.p., 18 Feb. 2014.

³¹ "Vozes Da Nova Classe Média." *Estratégias da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE)*, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014. <<http://www.sae.gov.br/vozesdaclassemedia/>>.

middles classes have access to the basic needs of life such as food and water and adequate education, transportation and healthcare. Most importantly the middle class in Brazil at the end of the day has all the necessary goods of life and has some disposable income left over. Many Brazilians are just now in the market for anything from deodorant to a new car; generally speaking both sectors of the middle class, Classe-B and Classe-C, are relatively much better off than they were.

“Socioeconomic groups in Brazil are classified into five groups: *Classe-A* (wealthy) to *Classe-E* (poor). The greatest expansion occurred in the *Classe-C*. Between 2003 and 2009, *Class-C* gained 30 million Brazilians from Classes D and E, making it the largest segment of the total population, at 50%. The new *Classe-C*, is 95 million strong and has more purchasing than Classes A and B *combined*.³²

Brinton fondly writes of the middle class, he writes that it is a unique social class deeply invested in a society’s success. Brinton describes the middle class as educated, compassionate, hard working, more likely to own property and most importantly very political. Marx attributes revolutionary ambition to “middle class values”. Fukuyama elaborates upon this with a similar description. Fukuyama explains that because the middle class is more likely to be property owners they have a much greater stake in politics, because “these are things that the government could take away from them”. Middle class people generally pay taxes, which results in their increased demand of government and an elevated sense of accountability.³³ According to Huntington “the true revolutionary class in modernizing societies is, of course, the middle class”.

³² Ibid.23

³³ Ibid. 25

this is due to their difference in political outlook of white and blue collar professions and as the group grows it becomes more conservative and politically conscious. Huntington continues “the creation of a middle class, like economic growth, however, is often a highly destabilizing event”. Lastly Huntington explains how the unique disposition and hard working middle class is much more susceptible to rising expectation and act based on their relative depravity—he labels this phenomenon “the gap”, which similar to RD and RE is the gap between what a polity can provide and what the strata desires or demands. This will of course be covered in full detail in the last section of the thesis.

Despite the aforementioned generalizations of global middle classes, who and what are Brazil’s middle class? Brazil’s middle class must first be separated into the upper and the lower (*Classe-B* and *Classe-C*) which together comprise the generally reported 52%. Substantially smaller, *Classe-B* lives a life comparable to middle class and upper middle class people in Europe and North America. They experienced lower levels of economic advancement relative to *Classe-C*. This class is usually highly educated, well traveled and generally informed. Additionally *Classe-B* has experienced an enormous boom in their overall purchasing power. Credit has become much easier to obtain in Brazil making second homes, vacations and luxury automobiles much more common. Like much of Latin America, many Brazilians have recently become acquainted with their new purchasing power for basic consumer goods, things like “internet access, healthcare services, beauty and luxury products, electronics and leisure goods”³⁴, If anyone is invested in the Brazilian economy it is the *Classe-B*. They have spent and borrowed the most comparative to income and adversely they stand to lose the most (making

³⁴ Ibid.2 3

their stake in politics high). Their tourism dollars and unprecedented spending sprees are reported to have single handedly saved Miami during the past recession.

The lower middle class shares many of the characteristics of the upper middle class. *Classe-C* has sprung upward socioeconomically extremely fast, but is substantially less wealthy than *Classe-B*. Commenting on the new Brazilian *Classe-C* the Brazilian journalist Paulo Prada writes “The very notion of the middle class in Brazil is quite different from the standards of North America and Western Europe. No tree-lined suburbs and Volvos for the newly empowered masses here.” he continues, “The term is used broadly to include almost anyone able to pay rent, put food on the table and perhaps pay a monthly installment on the refrigerator, microwave or television that Brazil’s government often touts as a sign of their emergence.”³⁵

Brazil’s lower middle class is completely new to the idea of disposable income. Many of this group have seen drastic lifestyle improvements. Generally this group resides in close proximity to the lower D and E class they live interwoven throughout Brazil’s cities, adjacent to within high crime areas, which in turn means they are newly concerned with extra security measures. A particularly strong reliance on infrastructure is evident in this group. Much of Class-C heavily relies on public transportation, public health care, and public schools.

Demands of the New Middle Class:

According Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign relations Isobel Colemon "Brazil's rising middle class has been the backbone of this protest movement. As their economic prospects have improved, their expectations for better public services have grown. Expectation may have grown

³⁵ Paulo Prada, “Why Brazil’s New Middle Class is Seething.” Reuters 2013

but they are not being met.”³⁶ The following will provide statistics and other information that shows the environment in which the Brazilian middle class lives. The information below will evidence why Coleman says expectations are not being met.

So, what does the middle class want? The two groups of middle class though distinct are becoming more connected. It is in their demands and frustrations where they have found common ground. Infrastructure, societal advancements and security demands became cohesive causes that promoted the entire middle class to protest. The demands of the middle class are not unlike those seen in Egypt, Turkey, Ukraine and others. Simply put, the middle class feels they deserve a better life.

In an interview with Reuters news agency Sr. Tamandaré illustrates the general middle class sentiment, “All you need to do is walk around a little to see how undeveloped we still are. Take a bus, go to the health clinic—it’s all shabby, slow, dangerous and infuriating.”³⁷ Sr. Tamandaré’s concerns resonate throughout the middle class. To supplement this section and support Sr. Tamandaré’s comments the following lists will highlight several key factors that are a source of middle class frustration: security, cost of living, infrastructure and corruption.


Security:

Middle class Brazilians have found themselves in a sort of limbo, too affluent to live in favelas but excluded from high rent areas. Unlike the rich, who are often isolated in high-security compounds, the middle class is geographically woven throughout high-crime urban areas. With

³⁶ Coleman, Isobel. "Inclusive Economic Growth and Brazil's Protests." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 20 June 2013.

³⁷ Prada, Paulo. "Special Report: Why Brazil's New Middle Class Is Seething | Top News | Reuters.com." *Special Report: Why Brazil's New Middle Class Is Seething*

newfound wealth to buy new things the middle class consequently must invest more time and money in security. The good life is accessible in Brazil, but it is expensive and difficult to protect. Unable to afford the costly security measures of the wealthy the middle class often lives in fear. Figure 4 shows favela distributions in Rio de Janeiro in 2010.³⁸



Gallup reported only 36% of Brazilians felt safe walking alone at night (in Latin America only Venezuelans are less likely to feel safe).³⁹ Fourteen of the world’s most dangerous cities are found in Brazil; São Paulo has even been dubbed “the kidnap capital of the world”.⁴⁰ Brazil happens to be the foremost consumer of bulletproof automobiles and new drivers can opt to take

³⁸ Jairo Nicolau, Política e Dados PUC-Rio

³⁹ Sonnenschein, Jan. "Opinion Briefing: Brazilians' Growing Discontent." *Opinion Briefing: Brazilians' Growing Discontent*. Gallup, 26 June 2013.

⁴⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Global Study on Homicide 2011." N.p., 2011.

courses in evasion techniques. Carjacking is so commonplace; most cities in Brazil allow drivers to ignore stop signs after dark. Brazil is a dangerous place; the middle class is frustrated with this and feels their security concerns are not being addressed. The following provides evidence that violence is a severe problem in Brazil. Police forces are inefficient and often corrupt. Gangs like Comando Vermelho (Red Command) possess far too much power and influence—the middle class is stuck.

Violence:

- 1.) The UN continually ranks Brazil as having one of the world's highest homicide rates; in 2009 it topped the list.
- 2.) The UN reports 11 of the most violent cities in the world are in Brazil.⁴¹
- 3.) Janice Perlman found in an extensive multi-decade survey that Brazilians have become much more concerned with crime. In 1968 only 18% of Rio de Janeiro residents reported violence as a pertinent concern compared with 86% in 2010.⁴²
- 4.) Murder rates rose 10% in 2012 and 7.6% in 2013 where 50,000 people were murdered in that year alone.⁴³

Police:

- 1.) State police forces are grossly underpaid (Usually well below US\$ 6,000 per year) and consequently regularly invite bribes; many Brazilians will openly admit to having experienced this in their lives.⁴⁴

⁴¹ REMIGIO, MARCELO. "Brasil Tem 11 Das 30 Cidades Mais Violentas Do Mundo, Diz ONU." *O Globo*. N.p., 10 Apr. 2014. Web. 22 Apr. 2014

⁴² Perlman, Janice E. *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio De Janeiro*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.

⁴³ Sachsida, Adolfo Cardoso, and Mario Jorge. "EVOLUÇÃO E DETERMINANTES DA TAXA DE HOMICÍDIOS NO BRASIL." *IPEA* (2013): n. pag. Web.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 19

2.) In the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro only 3% of murders are solved. Many of the poor simply do not report murders for lack of faith in the police and for fear of being targeted themselves.⁴⁵

3.) In the last decade over 60,000 murders have gone unsolved in the city.⁴⁶

4.) 76% of the population believe that the police employs death squads, 65% believe the police implement illegal torture and only 12% of respondent reported that they would go to the police for assault, rape or robbery.⁴⁷

Gangs and Militias:

1.) The *New York Times* estimated that in 2008 around 100 militias have risen to control favelas throughout Brazil.⁴⁸

2.) In 2007, US\$ 1.7 billion was spent to counter the presence of organized crime within favelas, which Brasilia reports as being a success—30 of the most dangerous favelas are now under police or military control.

3.) 1,500 Military Police and Fuzileiro Navals (Marines) were needed in 2012 to “pacify” a single favela in Rio’s Zona Norte.⁴⁹

Taxes, Tariffs and Cost of Living:

Aside from the aforementioned security concerns the new middle classes have money and want to spend it but are hindered in doing so. Many of most pertinent problems holding the middle class back from the good life are found in Brazil’s absorbent tax laws and import tariffs. Joe

⁴⁵ Ibid.19

⁴⁶ “Rio De Janeiro Has 60,000 Unsolved Murders in 10 Years.” *NY Daily News*. N.p., n.d. Web.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 19

⁴⁸ Barrionuevo, Alexei. "Militias Replace Gangs as Rio's Crime Lords." *New York Times*. N.p., n.d.

⁴⁹ Parkinson, Benjamin. "Army to Occupy Maré in Preparation for UPP." *The Rio Times*. N.p., 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

Harpez a Forbes columnist commented on a recent trip to Brazil's financial sector, "I can confirm that the tax complexity there lives up to the hype. The nation has developed so quickly that there is a dizzying array of tax codes from one region to the next, some of which contradict one another".⁵⁰

Every thing is expensive in Brazil. A newspaper in Manhattan costs US\$2.50 whereas in Brazil it will cost nearly US\$10. A box of noodles costs about US\$ 8.00 in Brasilia. Office space in Rio is US\$ 5.00 more per square foot than in Manhattan. In 2014, gas cost nearly US\$7.00 gal. And lastly electronics (which are in high demand for the new middle class) suffer some of the highest import taxes; an Apple iPhone costs about US\$1200 and a Sony Playstation 4 will run around US\$ 2,000.

- 1.) On average tax professionals spend 2,600 hours per year complying with Brazilian tax codes compared to a global average of 268 hours—by far the highest in the world at 1600 hours more than runner up Nigeria.⁵¹
- 2.) Brazil has one of the world's highest total tax rates at 68% compared to a global average of 43%.⁵²
- 3.) The Brazilian Federal Tax agency reported a US\$1.73 billion tax increase on imported goods for 2014.⁵³

⁵⁰ Harpaz, Joe. "Brazil Ranked Most Time-Consuming Tax Regime In The World." *Forbes*. Forbes Magazine, 17 Dec. 2013. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

⁵¹ Ibid.27

⁵² PWC. "Taxes in Brazil – Country Guides - HSBC Global Connections." *HSBC Global Connections*. N.p., n.d. Web.

⁵³ Soto, Alonso. "Brazil Plans Tax Hikes to Help Power Distributors." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 23 Mar. 2014. Web.

4.) Due to increases in subsidies and a decrease in tax revenues “eroding the country’s finances” Standard & Poor cut Brazil’s debt rating in April 2013.⁵⁴

5.) Brazilian Cars cost 44% more on average than they do in Mexico. A Jeep Cherokee costs US\$ 89,500 in Brazil whereas the same model costs US \$28,000 in the United States.⁵⁵

6.) According to the Economist’s “Big Mac Index” the McDonalds hamburger costs 74% more than it should and costs more than its Swiss, Norwegian and Swedish counterparts.⁵⁶

7.) Payroll taxes consume almost 60% of Brazilian’s salary⁵⁷

Infrastructure:

Along with soccer and samba Brazil is unfortunately known for its poor infrastructure.

Infrastructure developments have increased in Brazil but are still far behind other BRIC countries. China for example spends 48% of GDP on infrastructure developments whereas Brazil spends less than 20%—“not enough to support a rapidly rising middle class” reports KKR

Global a global asset and allocation team. Infrastructure has increased leading to the World Cup and Olympics but is still decrepit and far behind schedule. Brazil has gotten along well working around problems rather than solving them. Rather than trains, people commute by airplane, and goods are shipped by road. In an interview with the *Financial Times* a trucker driver, Pablo

Sanchez, comments on the Brazilian road ways, “We are seeing everywhere people saying Brazil

⁵⁴ Ibid. 31

⁵⁵ Rapoza, Kenneth. "Brazil's Ridiculous \$80,000 Jeep Grand Cherokee." *Forbes*. Forbes Magazine, 11 Aug. 2012. Web.

⁵⁶ "The Big Mac Index." *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 07 Jan. 2011.

⁵⁷ "Welcome to KPMG Brazil." KPMG, n.d. Web. <<http://www.kpmg.com/br/en/pages/default.aspx>>.

needs to progress and end corruption and improve our roads but we are seeing no improvements on the roads they are all equal or worse".⁵⁸

- 1.) Only 59% of Brazilians have access to proper sewage and sanitation services.⁵⁹
- 2.) 26% of the country does not have adequate and reliable access to a water supply.⁶⁰
- 3.) An educational assessment proctored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Brazilian students rank 53rd out of 65 countries.⁶¹
- 4.) According to a report by Credit Suisse, Brazilians lose 20 billion hours a year in traffic jams.⁶²
- 5.) Brazil is ranked 101st out of 144 countries for its infrastructure by the World Economic Forum.⁶³
- 6.) Farmers spend heavily on road transportation. 82% of soya is moved by road compared to 25% in the United States which equates to US\$ 145 per tonne more than the US.⁶⁴
- 7.) The shipping company Maersk reports needing 21 days for a container ship to clear port, where it should only take a few days.⁶⁵
- 8.) São Paulo is 1.5 times the population of London however São Paulo's metro system is one-sixth the size, and has less than half the tram track length of Mexico City.⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Leahy, Joe. "Brazil Tries to Fill the Potholes in Its Path to Growth - FT.com." *Financial Times*. N.p., n.d.

⁵⁹ Ibid.14

⁶⁰ Ibid.14

⁶¹ "Statistical Profile of Brazil." *Brazil - OECD*. N.p., n.d. Web.

⁶²"The Brazilian Infrastructure: It's "Now or Never" From an Economic Growth Constraint to a Plethora of Opportunities." *Credit Suisse*. N.p., n.d. Web

⁶³ "Global Competitiveness." *The World Economic Forum*. N.p., n.d.

⁶⁴ Ibid.39

⁶⁵ Ibid.35

⁶⁶ Ibid.39

9.) Only 14% of Brazil's roads are paved.⁶⁷

10.) The McKinsey Global Institute states the total value of Brazil's infrastructure at only 16% of GDP.⁶⁸

Corruption and Political Impunity:

The Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 ranks countries based on "abuse of power, secret dealings and bribery" Like all of the other factors listed above, corruption was a focal point of the protests.⁶⁹ Where infrastructure is quite easy to measure, corruption is more difficult to accurately quantify. Regardless by most accounts Brazil fairs poorly. Brazil is known for its corrupt and cumbersome government. Brazilian Political Scientist Fransisco Fonseca studies the political phenomena of corruption in Brazil which he claims has become so severe that only mass political reform can remedy it.⁷⁰ ⁷¹The following list should give some perspective to Brazil's rampant corruption.

⁶⁷ Ibid.39

⁶⁸ How Brazil Can Grow." *McKinsey & Company*. N.p., n.d. Web.

⁶⁹ "Overview." *Corruption Perception Index*. Transparency International, n.d. Web.

⁷⁰ "A CORRUPÇÃO COMO FENÔMENO POLÍTICO." IBase, n.d. Web.

⁷¹ Ramos, Luciano. "As Muitas Faces Do Controle E Da Corrupção No Brasil - Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil." *Luciano Ramos: As Muitas Faces Do Controle E Da Corrupção No Brasil - Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil*. Le Monde Dipolomtique Brasil, n.d. Web.

- 1.) Brazil is ranked at 72 out of 177 countries on Transparency International's "Corruption Index".⁷²
- 2.) Brazilian Portuguese has embraced the word "Jeitinho" to describe not following rules or doing something the "Brazilian Way". Furthermore, Dr. Mario Sergio Cortella, writes that the term, "perpetuates corruption".⁷³
- 3.) Forbes reports that corruption costs Brazil upwards of US\$ 53 billion a year.⁷⁴
- 4.) The notorious Mensalão scandal involved R\$ 100 million of tax money being siphoned from tax payers in a vote-buying scheme to support President Lula Da Silva.⁷⁵
- 5.) The Brazilian Federation of of São Paulo estimates 1.3%-2.3% of the countries GDP is lost annually due to corruption.⁷⁶
- 6.) Permission from congress must be obtained to investigate legislators or minister for crimes committed in office, and only the Brazilian Supreme Court can try them.⁷⁷
- 7.) Senator Arnon de Mello shot and killed another senator but was never tried.⁷⁸
- 8.) Measures to prevent treasury theft have been put in place, but are easily circumvented in critical times such as infrastructure building stadiums for mega events.

The elements of frustration listed above provide insight into why Brazil erupted into social protest. Security is a daily concern constantly on the people's minds. The high cost of living makes the good life so much more expensive. A decrepit infrastructure plagues business

⁷² "How Corrupt Is Your Country?" Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. N.p., n.d.

⁷³ Cortella, Mario Sergio. *Ética E Vergonha Na Cara!* N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print

⁷⁴ Antunes, Anderson. "The Cost Of Corruption In Brazil Could Be Up To \$53 Billion Just This Year Alone." *Forbes*. Forbes Magazine, 28 Nov. 2013.

⁷⁵ "O Julgamento Do Mensalão." *Veja*. Globo, n.d. Web

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 51

⁷⁷ Ferreira, Olavo Augusto Vianna Alves. "A Imunidade Parlamentar Na Emenda Constitucional NÂ° 35/2001." *Jus Navigandi*. JUS, n.d. Web

⁷⁸ "Senado Já Teve Até Assassinato Em Plenário." *Estadão*. N.p., n.d. Web

creation and makes every day tasks like commuting to work difficult. Lastly, and possibly most important, corruption lies at the core of the problems; the good old boy system in Brazil is not providing the modern law abiding system sought by the populace.

In accordance with scholars such as Brinton, Fukuyama, Huntington and Skocpol, this thesis assumes the middle class' satisfaction, or the lack thereof, is an important agent of revolution. But what will make them approach the boiling point? If the aforementioned scholars are correct in arguing that the middle class is generally where revolutionary fervor begins, an attempt to further understand the middle class must be made. Psychological approaches are helpful to understand the psyche of the middle class and what makes their demands and expectations different (and more meaningful when concerned with theories of revolution) compared to their socioeconomic counterparts.

Modernization propelled the enormous population up the social ladder in absolute terms, however they are still far from their desired livelihood, the quality of life is not meeting expectations. The protests were founded in legitimate concerns, the middle class is not being greedy, all of what is listed above should be expected to improve by any modern collectivity in a free country. Brazillians are simply demanding a lifestyle more comparable to their socioeconomic counterparts in Europe and North America.

Twenty centavos, a seemingly insignificant hike in bus fare, precipitated a nation wide social protest that brought to light the general dissatisfaction that is being felt throughout Brazil. The protesters voiced discontent with numerous issues, but they allude to something much bigger and much worse beneath the surface. Why did the protests occur only recently? It's not as though the political ineptness or decrepit infrastructure happened over night. Why wasn't there a mass

protest last decade when, socially and politically Brazil was substantially less well off than they were in 2013? What made hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets in the summer of 2013?

To answer the questions at hand this thesis will move on to applications of psychological theories. Psychological theories such as Relative Deprivation (RD) and Rising Expectation (RE) help explain why the protests happened to occur when they did and help assess future occurrences of collective action that are possibly in the making.

Chapter IV: Relative Depravity and Rising Expectations

Rising Expectations

“Many have now lost faith in the idea that their country was headed for orbit and diagnosed just another *voo de galinha* (chicken flight), as they dubbed previous short-lived economic spurts.”⁷⁹ Living situations in Brazil failed to meet expectations, which allow us to make more sense of the recent protests—Brazilians were prepared for an economic take off not a *voo de galinha*. The Rising Expectations Theory complete with its Davies J curve, help show how this chicken flight sparked a massive protests. General discontent alone did not create the protests; it was the timing that made all the difference.

Davies argued that revolutions are most likely to occur when prolonged periods of economic and social prosperity are met with a “sharp reversal” creating “an intolerable gap” between what they came to expect and what they ended up receiving. Brazilians were promised the world, the booming economy and political messages supercharged everyone’s expectations, their expectations were not met and mass public protests erupted.⁸⁰

Data presented in Chapter III demonstrates how Brazilians became much wealthier and better off over night. Many young adults were born into a military dictatorship coupled with volatile decades of economic problems, and became young adults during an unprecedented economic boom and belief that Brazil really was “the country of the future”. These incredible

⁷⁹ "Has Brazil Blown It?" *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 28 Sept. 2013. Web.

⁸⁰ JC Davies, “When Men Revolt and Why.”

changes were experienced in a single lifetime. However a problem with such incredible growth exists; it is difficult to maintain, and quite often comes to an abrupt end. Concerns of taxes, infrastructure and quality of life became much less tolerable not because they had gotten worse, but because they were expected to improve and did not.

According to the J curve (see Pg. 16) Brazil was ripe for some type of social upheaval and due to the extreme nature of the economic rise and decline, a revolt may have happened right around the recent economic downturn, but it did not. Everything seemed to fit tightly within Davies' model, in fact it was the initial theoretical backing that prompted the author to begin this research a few years ago and anticipate that some type of social unrest was bound to occur. The massive protests were in many ways a partial manifestation of Davies theory. According to RE the protests could have been expected or possibly even foreseen by a proponent of RE.

If the protests were to have occurred during a more perfect revolutionary climate, something more similar to a classical revolution may have been precipitated by the momentum of the movements. However the correct climate for revolution was not completely present. The following section will discuss the absence of such agents of revolution. Critics of Davies' model could say that almost every society in the world has experienced large economic and societal upswings that eventually turned downward, and rarely ever spiraled anywhere near revolution. In response to such criticism, the author opines, yes, natural economic fluctuations rarely cause more than mild discontent or satisfaction, but to understand when such fluctuations are dangerous it is important to frame them within a more general context of the relative knowledge and perceptions of the collectivity. RE must be supplemented with an understanding of the degree of the upward trend and the relative nature in which it is perceived by the strata at hand.

More emphasis will be placed on this explanation using Relative Deprivation Theory. Ted Gurr's theory of RD will elaborate upon Davies' work and will also begin to lead us to the inevitable conclusion: why did the protests not turn into a classical revolution and what is lacking that would make a future revolution or political violence a legitimate concern?

Relative Deprivation

Rising Expectations Theory, referred to by Gurr as Progressive Deprivation, is a component of Relative Deprivation, however, RD does not imply that rising expectations alone will prompt social unrest. RD looks not only at what is or what is expected to be, but what ought to be. This differentiation though subtle and difficult to distinguish is incredibly important. RD looks generally at what ought to be, which in a way is a deeper feeling that underlies rising expectations. RD is more constant and can be a product of generations of discontent. For example it is quite common for feelings of societal discontent to be passed down through families via dinner table discussions or bar room talk. Recall the quote "This is Brazil friend" (in response to an unbelievably inefficient transportation system) which shows how such discontent has become a common and recurring sentiment bred from decades of discontent; and it appears as though discontent has been normalized.⁸¹

Though the rising expectations explain what may have propelled the protests, which have now fizzled out, deep societal discontent remains very prevalent and has arguably not changed much in the past decades. In a psychological study, McClelland and Apicella found that when a subject is continually frustrated from achieving their goal, the longer they are frustrated the

⁸¹ Ted Gurr, "Why Men Rebel" P.61

further their degree of anger will increase, furthermore an increase in the degree of anger “unequivocally intensifies the response”⁸² Evidence of historical or long term deprivation will be provided in the next section.

Although RD encompasses Davies’ theory and is in many ways indistinguishable from it, RD is also distinct because it is concerned with a relative understanding of wealth, poverty and societal movements rather than an objective and temporal one. Gurr’s thorough definition will be provided, and then simplified using Runciman’s more precise terminology. As written by Gurr

Relative Deprivation:

Is defined as a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent. Among the general conditions that have such effects are the value gains of other groups and the promise of new opportunities. Societal conditions that decrease men’s average value position without decreasing their value expectation similarly increase deprivation, hence the intensity of discontent. The inflexibility of value stocks in a society, short-term deterioration in group’s conditions of life, and limitations of its structural opportunities have such effects.⁸³

Gurr’s definition of RD may sound complicated but at its core it is nothing more than an elaboration upon Frustration Aggression Hypothesis, which says that aggression is the result of

⁸² McClelland and Apicella, “A Functional Classification of Verbal Reactions to Experimentally Induced Failure.”

⁸³ Ibid.81

blocking or hindering a person's ability to attain their goal or wants. It can be explained in the most primordial sense: Subject A has widget X which Subject B wants but Subject A is unwilling to share or in some way stands in the way of Subject A obtaining widget X. There is a higher likelihood that Subject B will act aggressively to obtain widget X, and if Subject B does nothing he is worse off because he will be left without widget X. Thus not acting will leave Subject B personally deprived due to a perceived knowledge that Subject A stands in the way.⁸⁴

RD elaborates upon Frustration Aggression Hypothesis by stressing that the relative perception of the frustration is a critical component to predicting aggression (political violence, social upheaval, protest etc). The idiom, "Keeping up with the Joneses" portrays this well. Runciman states "if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have or even grateful simply to hold on to it".⁸⁵

It is not to say that it would be better off if people were poor and without stuff or widgets, of course that would be undesirable, however an understanding of relative as opposed to absolute socioeconomic status is important when attempting to understand a collectivity's psyche. The desires and frustrations of the middle class are of importance because they appear to have the most to gain, and consequently the most to lose, making them intimately tied to the future of their country. Their perceptions and relative knowledge play an important role in assessing societal stability and what factors may culminate into collective action, political violence or even revolution.

⁸⁴ Berkowitz, Leonard. *Roots of Aggression; a Re-examination of the Frustration-aggression Hypothesis*. New York: Atherton, 1969. Print.

⁸⁵ Walter Garrison Runciman, "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice" P.9

Where Gurr leaves the term slightly muddled for this thesis's purpose, Runciman differentiates RD into two sub categories: Egotistical relative deprivation and Fraternalistic relative deprivation. Gurr's more general definition encompasses and represents both of Runciman's definitions, however the categorical bifurcation provided by Runciman is particularly helpful in assessing the case of the middle class in Brazil.

What Runciman labels Egotistical RD Gurr explains as "Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent." Egotistical RD is the more common usage of RD in general terms. When referring to Fraternalistic RD Gurr writes, "general conditions that have such effects (on expectations) are the value gains of other groups and the promise of new opportunities." Both writers are refereeing to the same phenomenon, but differ slightly in their terminological categorization. Starting with egotistical RD the following section will dedicate significant attention to the two types of RD and what they tell us about Brazil.^{86 87}

Egotistical Relative Deprivation:

Gurr references the "illiterate peasant" who has limited means for obtaining economic advancement and without having experienced it will likely be less discontented without it. The literate peasant is more concerned with obtaining the goods of life like food and shelter. The "literate clerk" on the other hand has a much higher level of economic opportunity, which allows him to create a broader taste for what he needs to be happy. He has come to feel superior to the

⁸⁶ Ibid.58

⁸⁷ Ibid.61

peasant and entitled to new and better non-essential goods. The literate clerk is more likely to be of the middle class or new to it, he has a vested interest in progressing and is more concerned with societal conditions.⁸⁸

Brazil has been very effective in providing the essential goods of life to many of its poor and maintaining a tolerable standard of living by absolute measures of poverty. The poor in Brazil are the recipients of numerous social programs like the *bolsa familia*. The poor in Brazil are much less relatively discontent, the notion of this is seen throughout the world, and prompted Carol Graham to write an article for the Brookings Institute called “Happy Peasants and Frustrated Achievers?” They found it is not the wealthy or poor who are unhappy, but rather it is in the middle of the wealth distribution where relative discontent appears strongest.

Egotistical RD breeds discontent at an individual level due to experiences with or perceptions of more well off social strata. If strata A has widget X strata B is now aware that widget X exists. strata B was initially content without widget X but simply knowing it exists and is obtainable, widget X now becomes a source of deprivation simply due to Strata B not having it. Replace widget X with any tangible good that was once an unimportant nonessential good, and the result will be the same. For example one’s life may have been quite happy until the existence of the iPad was known due to an advertisement, a TV show or simply seeing someone at the coffee shop with one. (Modernization often accelerates the societal conditions that promotes consumer wants.) Now with an understanding of the existence of an iPad, the absence of one is a source of frustration; that person will be continually reminded that he or she does not

⁸⁸ Ibid.58

have an iPad, and because everyone else does and they must lead happier more fulfilled lives with their iPad.

Social media and a proliferation in communication technology have added another dimension to Egotistical RD by providing many more strata for people to compare their situation to and many more forums to display things that will eventually become perceived as necessary goods as opposed to luxury goods. The *Wall Street Journal* dubbed Brazil the “Social Media Capital of the Universe”. Social media forums like Facebook and Instagram raise the awareness of more well off social strata, by bombarding people with other’s vacation albums and pictures of their new cars. Brazil is second only to the US in usage of Facebook.

Newspapers in Brazil are targeted at those with disposable income, the middle class and wealthy, but they disproportionately advertise only to the wealthy. Magazines and newspapers in Brazil are littered with advertisements of Louis Vuitton handbags, Rolex watches, and upscale restaurants. The advent of the Internet facilitates relative deprivation as well by providing instant access to endless information about other stratas. Gurr comments on this as well, “Now the web, social networking and air travel make for much more rapid international movement of ideas and activists”.⁸⁹ How the other half lives is no longer a secret—today many people have access to the internet in Brazil and practically everyone has a TV. The director of YouTube in Latin America, Álvaro Paes de Barros affirms this and states that “Brazilians have this passion to share

⁸⁹ Gurr, Ted Robert. "Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid Are Its Arguments 40 Years On?" *ElInternational Relations*. N.p., n.d. Web.

⁹⁰ CHAO, LORETTA. "Brazil: The Social Media Capital of the Universe." *The Wall Street Journal*. Dow Jones & Company, n.d. Web.

information, to share pictures.”⁹⁰The sheer quantity of available information today, likely has some correlation with the perceived discontent noticed throughout the protests.

An often-cited illustration among RD theorists is the historical example of automobiles. In the early years of the 20th century, to have an automobile was assumed to be a luxury reserved only for the wealthy; however in present times the absence of an automobile implies one is considerably disadvantaged or less well off than the majority of society. What once was a luxury item is now a common good deemed practically necessary by contemporary societies. Creation of new wealth makes goods like automobiles exceptionally desirable--for that reason virtually every international company has expanded to the Brazilian market or wants to. There are many examples beyond this regarding egotistical RD, but for the sake of this thesis we will begin to explore how Egotistical RD and RD in general relate to the case of Brazil.

Specifically applying Egotistical RD to Brazil sheds light on the protests and general dissatisfaction in Brazil. However, a deeper understanding of long-term deprivation lends evidence to the idea that the protests were likely neither spontaneous nor ephemeral, a state of unrest that could envelop Brazil if more is not done to comprehensibly appease the protestors.. The anger met by unfulfilled rising expectations may have gone away but there is still a sense of frustration at the heart of the protest. Retrospectively psychological theories like RE were able to illuminate why the protests occurred, but are there underlying elements that could convert a future protest into a full blown revolution?

Gurr outlines measures that aid in identifying the intensity and scope of RD, which helps in understanding whether, the protests were just a single occurrence, a product of something

bigger or an indicator of something more to come. One such measure is long term or historical deprivation. A more intense or higher gap in perceived deprivation can come about due the historical duration of the frustration. There is a higher likelihood of continued political violence and a higher likelihood that it could increase in degree of severity.⁹¹ The following will illustrate that historical deprivation is deeply entwined with the story of Brazil.

Political History of Brazil—a Source of Deprivation

Brazil's recent grievances are important to understand within a general context of historical deprivation experienced in Brazil. As stated in the literature review, the US revolted relatively quickly but in China and Russian it took hundreds of years of deprivation to precipitate a revolution. In China and Russia the respective governments were able to suppress revolution for a long time, but eventually the populace could take no more. In China and Russia the grievances reached an extreme boiling point; and the revolutions that followed were particularly violent.

Brazil has experienced many mass protests all of which fizzled out and resulted in no significant change, the recent protest may simply be added to that list, but they may also be the first signs of a deeper long-term deprivation brewing underneath. Even a brief understanding of Brazil's history may prompt the reader to ask, why have they not revolted already?

To quickly explain Brazil's history in a few sentences is admittedly impossible, but this section will isolate a few examples that show how Brazil throughout history has politically dealt with deprivation and inequality. The various governments of Brazil shared in their ability to suppress the massive population by continually approaching societal or political grievances just

⁹¹ Ibid. 8

enough to make them tolerable or acceptable—they rarely solved the core problem. By promoting an idea of absolute socioeconomic wellbeing polities in Brazil were able to silence relative concerns of inequality.

Brazil has, for most of its history, been less than free and markedly unequal, both in relative and absolute terms. Portuguese colonization tactics created a system of miscegenation and institutional slavery that existed in Brazil longer than in any other country. Like many policies aimed at appeasing the populace they were done at the last minute and with little enthusiasm. Brazil implemented manumission late and as slowly as possible, giving just enough to protect against possible upheavals, and still allow the status quo to continue uninterrupted. Manumission was enacted “the Brazilian way”.⁹²

While slavery existed of course Brazil was unequal, but the abolition of slavery did not promote equality in relative or absolute terms and resulted in a continuation of a strict hierarchy of haves and have nots. Some groups like Amnesty International and the International Labor Organization (ILO) for example claim that institutionalized slavery was simply replaced with a system “analogous to slavery”.⁹³ They cite 500,000 child domestic workers, and modern instances of quasi-slavery in the Brazilian interior as evidence.⁹⁴

Brazil was arguably the most unequal it has ever been during the military dictatorship of 1969, and in no way a free country. The military dictatorship was wrought with corruption and typical dictatorial shenanigans—rampant corruption, violent police force, torture etc. The fall of

⁹² Skidmore, Thomas E. *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.

⁹³ Stokland, Ellen. "Brazil: Carnival of the Oppressed." *Amnesty International*. N.p., 10 Mar. 2003.

⁹⁴ "Fighting Forced Labour: The Example of Brazil." *International Labour Organization*. 2009

the dictatorship brought incredible social change, but it was still evident that the poor were still poor and the rich were still rich.⁹⁵

The US experienced a war for independence, a civil war and a massive civil rights movement. All of these resulted in significant enduring and relatively quick change for the populace. Brazil has, on the other hand, had difficulty combating concerns of inequality head on, and generally opted to gradually address inequality in order to avoid interrupting the status quo. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, one of the most recognized anthropologists in Brazil, proclaims in an article titled “Slavery won in Brazil it was never abolished”⁹⁶ that Brazil never really declared independence, and the dictatorship continues. Such strong words by a member of the intelligentsia should be taken seriously. If Viveiros de Castro is right Brazil only appears on the outside much different than it did during its darker days, but there is still room for vast improvement at its core.

In Brazil not enough has changed when it comes to inequality and deprivation. The old system worked well under an Emperor or Dictator--it is easy to tell a populace what they need and deserve when you are an absolute authority. However today the majority of Brazilians are beginning to realize they deserve more than their parents and grandparents were led to believe. A variety of political systems have been tried in Brazil but none were able to address the wants and needs of the massive population in a modern world, the political systems of the past were only able to maintain an absolute understanding of poverty through a system of conformism and an

⁹⁵ Leonardo Narloch, “A Guia Politicamente Incorreto da História do Brasil.” Guia Politicamente Incorreto Da História Do Brasil. N.p.: LeYa, n.d. Print.

⁹⁶ COELHO, ALEXANDRA, LUCAS. "A Escravidão Venceu No Brasil. Nunca Foi Abolida." *PUBLICO*. N.p., n.d. Web.

institutionalized ideal that the poor or disadvantaged were part of a whole. Constantly being told everything is the way it is “just because”, eventually this condescending tone is bound to become a source of frustration in itself.

The political message portrayed to the Brazilian people was that Brazilians are a peaceful people averse to violence who should be happy they are fortunate enough to live in the land of God, after all God is Brazilian right? Or at least that is a political message often proclaimed. In the YouTube film gone viral “The Brazil that we Want” (O Brasil Que Queremos) the narrator illustrates this historically rooted sentiment, “Since the discovery of Brazil we have been known as a permissive people that love to party... We can no longer be neglected... We need to change Brazil not because of twenty cents (bus fare hike), but because of the disrespect”.⁹⁷ It was inevitable that the political system and rhetoric could only keep the Brazilian majority in servitude temporarily; eventually they would reach a boiling point. A small hike in bus fares was all it took to bring deep-seated frustrations to the surface.

Historically there has been a lack of respect shown to the majority of Brazilians by the government, but even after the protests the feeling of disrespect continues. In March of 2014 five of Brazil’s cities proceeded with bus fare increases.⁹⁸ This may signify that the government was not swayed by the protests and feels comfortable that everything will soon be back to business as usual.

Brazilians became accustomed to government impunity with less than acceptable regard for the betterment of the populace. Brazil’s governments then and now are not providing what a

⁹⁷ *O Brasil Que Queremos*. Dir. (Deivison Pedroza. YouTube, 2013. Online.

⁹⁸ "Cinco Capitais Têm Aumento Nas Tarifas De ônibus Em 2014." *Economia*. G1, n.d. Web.

modern populace demands, the only difference between now and then is that people are now beginning not just to want more but demand and expect more. What was once just the way it was, the “Brazilian Way” or the “Jeitinho” are no longer acceptable excuses for poor infrastructure, inequality and social insecurity. Now Brazilians are beginning to feel that the life of their parents is less than what they ascribe for personally. They’ve experienced success and improvement, it’s all around them now, they will likely continue to feel entitled to it and will not settle for what was acceptable in the past.

Mega Event Expenditures—Modern Source of Deprivation:

“We don’t need stadiums, we need education. We don’t need to impress the world, we need food and healthcare. We don’t need more parties; we need people with jobs and sustainable way of living. It’s proven that by all the billions we are spending that we have enough money to change the situation. Or at least we had it...until the Olympics”⁹⁹. – Carla, Protestor

It is easy to see why many Brazilians are upset with the massive expenditures caused by the coming mega events. Much of the spending leaves many with the impression that their tax dollars are being wasted. As of now World Cup expenditures are already three times over budget and are expected to cost more than the last two world cups combined. Security costs alone are expected to be US\$ 900 million, general infrastructure costs will be around US\$ 12 billion and the entire bill is expected to be almost US\$ 30 billion.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ *No, I’m Not Going to the World Cup*. Dir. Carla Dauden. Perf. Carla Dauden. YouTube, n.d. Online.

¹⁰⁰ "Finances." *FIFA*. FIFA, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski both economists and writers, wrote in their book “Soccernomics” that Brazil’s World Cup is bound to deeply affect the Brazilian taxpayer and disproportionately benefits certain interest groups. Like in the past World Cups, International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) stands to earn billions of dollars. Brazilian soccer clubs will benefit by receiving new stadiums complete with the infrastructure that comes along with it— roads, electricity, public transportation hubs etc. Lastly construction companies have profited a lot already and will continue to make enormous gains.¹⁰¹ There will be winners due to World Cup spending, however the lion’s share of the profits will not be received by the populace, but rather, by interest groups.¹⁰² This is no secret to Brazilians.

If the World Cup expenditure fulfilled the promise of necessary infrastructure improvements, the public sentiment may rightfully be different. But the protestors are correct; much of the money will be wasted. For example, Manaus the capital city of Amazonas has a population of less than two million and Cuiabá located in the heart of the Brazilian interior has a population of less than one million--both of these cities will be home to US\$ 200 million stadiums. Neither city has a top level domestic soccer team nor any comprehensible reason or future use for such stadiums. Wasted projects often come with mega events, however, the needed infrastructure programs are unacceptably far behind schedule and many will simply never come to fruition. For example two promised subway lines were financed but have been

¹⁰¹ Kuper, Simon, and Stefan Szymanski. *Soccernomics: Why England Loses, Why Germany and Brazil Win, and Why the U.S., Japan, Australia, Turkey and Even Iraq Are Destined to Become the Kings of the World's Most Popular Sport*. New York: Nation, 2009. Print.

¹⁰² "Brazil's World Cup Spending Spree." *Fusion*. N.p., n.d. Web.

abandoned. Further evidence, that the infrastructure is still far behind where it ought to be, can be seen in Chapter I.

Brazilians were told their economy was booming and Brazil was a country of the future. It must be unsettling to see massive expenditures all around yet the concerns closest to home like security, infrastructure and corruption remain unchanged. If all goes according to plan the global community will see the mega events as largely successful. 10 years down the road however, they will likely continue to be a source of deprivation—looking upon once great, but now unused, stadiums instead of rail lines or hospitals will, in the future, plague Brazilian's daily lives. It must be clear to the Brazilian populace that enormous sums of money are being made and spent in Brazil, but also questions must arise. Where is my share? What are we getting out of this?

Egotistical RD, though difficult to measure, helps explain general societal discontent. Attempting to get in touch with general sentiment is very useful when trying to anticipate collective action or social movements. To further elaborate upon this idea, we need to move onto Fraternalistic RD, which aids in explaining how RD can produce frustration between classes and make them envy or resent one another.

Fraternalistic Relative Deprivation:

Fraternalistic relative deprivation differs from egotistic relative deprivation (general dissatisfaction of one's social, political or economic position) by placing emphasis on ones unfavorable dissatisfaction in comparison to another group. Fraternalistic RD is not driven simply by the existence of something superior, but in relation to other groups that possess something superior or stand in the way of obtaining something more desirable. Karl Marx

provides an example regarding a similar notion “A house may be large or small, as long as the neighbors houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighboring palace rises in equal or even greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls”.¹⁰³

Peoples feelings are not necessarily a reflection of their objective situation, people also unfavorably compare their situation against internal and external standards.¹⁰⁴ Envy can result when a group is continually comparing one group’s inferior circumstance to another group’s. Additionally Fraternalistic RD has been linked with multiple cases of collective action.

An example of Fraternalistic RD, provided in Runciniman’s book is particularly relevant to the case of Brazil. That is the envy people may feel towards the wealthy characters (or those who wealthy characters represent) portrayed in movies and on television as being "normal" despite living a lavish jet set lifestyle clad in designer clothes and rarely seen to be doing anything other than partying or traveling. (This example may be felt by either the lower or middle class.) Anyone who has ever been to Brazil will notice the high volume of viewership telenovelas get and the influence they have. The telenovela is an important part of Brazilian life

¹⁰³ Marx, Karl, and Hans-Dieter Senff. *Wage Labour and Capital*. Newcastle, N.S.W.: Sumptibus Publications, 1996. Print.

¹⁰⁴ Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind Understanding the Nature of Fraternalistic Deprivation: Does Group-based Deprivation Involve Fair Outcomes or Fair Treatment? pp. 44-68.

and are a helpful tool to help to assess societal satisfaction. They are much different than their American counterpart, the soap opera, and are telling of many more societal issues. Any attempt to apply psychological theories to Brazil would be incomplete without an understanding of telenovelas.

Telenovela Brasileira—a source of Relative Deprivation:

The Brazilian telenovela, similar to many in Latin America, is an important part of life. Starting out as state run entertainment forums the telenovela became a vehicle for government propaganda, public safety issues and service announcements. For example, important issues like aids and contraception have been woven into story lines. However, beyond important public issues, the telenovela has in many ways incorrectly reflected the actual image of Brazil and reinforced a stereotypical one where black is synonymous with poor and poor is synonymous to lesser. The poor (usually black) are portrayed in lesser roles that serve white aristocrats.

Traditionally the stories only starred wealthy white Brazilians. Not until 2007 with the airing of *Duas Caras* did a black person assume a lead role in a telenovela. *Avenida Brasil* was the first storyline to revolve around a middle class family rather than a wealthy one and that was not until 2010.

There is little quantifiable evidence to factually say whether the telenovela affects relative deprivation, but they absolutely reflect it. There were similar programs in the US that fortified an idea of inequality. Blacks, for example, were portrayed as dimwitted by white actors using face black in the early years of the twentieth century. In the 1970's Americans beloved Archie Bunker was an obvious racist. Though these are just TV shows they reflect the state of racial inequality

at their respective times. Today any program on network TV even close to *All in the Family* would be met with public outcry. The telenovela similarly reflects society in Brazil.

Garcia Cancilini states that the Brazilian telenovela “inspires the formation of identities”.¹⁰⁵ The identities and ideals promoted by the telenovelas were in a sense telling people what they were meant to think about social and political issues, and even more importantly about their role or place in society. Today the propaganda and overt discrimination that was extremely prevalent during the dictatorship, are less discernible, but there still remains enduring images about society. The society portrayed is one where the protagonists are wealthy whites who live among marginalized others.

Veneza Mayora Ronsini presents evidence that telenovelas are intentionally aimed at promoting the ideal of mediocrity and maintaining a certain level of comfort within the status quo.¹⁰⁶ “Brazilian telenovelas have contributed to renew and reinforce hegemonic values by resignifying emerging representations in terms of the perspectives of dominant groups.

Telenovelas have become a central mass ceremony in which compelling images of the nation have been negotiated in Brazil. These images, in turn, have been deeply shaped by a middle class perspective and by hegemonic forces of Brazilian society. As a result, television fiction has

¹⁰⁵ Gonzatto, Rodrigo. “Consumidores E Cidadãos” De Néstor Canclini « Rodrigo Gonzatto.” *Rodrigo Gonzatto*. N.p., n.d. Web. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. UFRJ, 1995.

¹⁰⁶ Ronsini, Veneza Mayora. ““Many People Are Just Dreamers”: Telenovelas and the Ideology of Meritocracy.” *Television New Media* (2013): n. pag. *SAGE*. Web.

contributed to build a new social consensus that, in spite of being always challenged, was able to sustain social, economic, political, and cultural hierarchies in a deeply unequal society.^{107 108}

Racial and Socioeconomic Discrimination—a Product of Deprivation and a Source of Class Resentment:

Telenovelas help us identify one source of Fraternalistic RD. In reality the themes portrayed should be ones of racial and socioeconomic discrimination, which are very evident in modern Brazil. Even though Brazil is a democracy there is a strict socioeconomic divide, which again is a source of RD. In 1999 Tropp and Wright found that members of high-identification members in-groups are much more likely to feel deprivation towards a perceived out-group such as whites.¹⁰⁹

Fraternalistic relative deprivation can be seen quite clearly in racial and socioeconomic discrimination. Brazil in many ways suffers from institutional racism. Blacks are far less represented in politics, far underrepresented in most professional sectors and most importantly they are much poorer. Race is not the focus of this thesis but racism is nonetheless an incredibly salient issue at hand when addressing Brazil. Rather than race this section is more concerned with socioeconomic prejudice, which in Brazil is difficult to distinguish from racial prejudice. For example, instead of racism some have dubbed discrimination in Brazil “Favela-ism”.

¹⁰⁸ Joyce, Samantha Nogueira. *Brazilian Telenovelas and the Myth of Racial Democracy*. Lanham: Lexington, 2012. Print.

¹⁰⁹ Tropp, L. R., and S. C. Wright. "Ingroup Identification as the Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27.5 (2001): 585-600. Print.

Generally, if one is poor one is more likely of darker skin color and visa versa, if one is black they are statistically more likely to be poor. For instance, well over 50% of favela residents are black and almost none are white.¹¹⁰ Hypothetically if there were to be a revolution in Brazil it is unlikely that it would be a black vs white revolution, but it would more accurate to assume a socioeconomic revolution made up of the proletariat and bourgeois.

Favela Sprawl and Relocation Programs—Evidence for Resentment of Lower Class and a Source Relative Deprivation:

Possibly the most overt instance of socioeconomic prejudice are the favela relocation programs. Practically every government of Brazil has implemented some form of relocation program. The term “Favela sprawl” is, as it sounds, a geographic expansion of the squatter developments. Favela Sprawl has been combated by mass relocation programs. The negative connotation with the term favela sprawl is an indicator that many in Brazil either resent or fear the favelados (favela residents) and the idea of favela-ism may be founded in truth.

The favela is perceived as an eyesore, something that stands in the way of upper classes having the life they desire. According to Molly Martin, Favelas irritate the urban classes because they are perceived as unhygienic, ugly and propel rapid population growth.¹¹¹ Frustration Agression Hypothesis help explain why such drastic measure like favela relocations are socially acceptable and politically feasible. Often those affected are relocated to less than desirable parts of the country in government built communities (complexos). Amnesty International reported

¹¹⁰ "Affirming a Divide." *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 28 Jan. 2012. Web.

¹¹¹ Martin, Molly. "Mega Cities and Mega Events: Lessons from the Favelas for the Future." *FMSO-KU Global Security Studies* (n.d.): n. pag. *Forth Levenworth*. Web.

“Brazil is moving families to places where they are worse off and doing so without proper compensation”.¹¹²

During the years of the dictatorship of 1969, anti-poor policies were the most extreme but still exist today. Leading up to the mega events there have been multiple instances aimed at cleaning up the city centers. Earlier this year the famed Estadio Do Maracanã was surrounded by the Favela do Metrô, today it is a ghost town, its residents have been evicted and relocated to make way for the Olympic Village.¹¹³

In a radio interview with NPR Jean Tomas a former resident of *Favela Barra Tijuca* tells her story of relocation from Rio de Janeiro to the OITO complex. She was given no choice but to sign away her home to the government for minimal compensation. Stating her discontent she said, “there is this frustration to have worked so hard, dreamed so much to leave everything behind”.¹¹⁴ Jean Tomas is not alone. The New York Times reports that 30% of Rio De Janeiro residents are marked for “removal” where their homes are marked with spray paint to be demolished with no or little warning. The houses marked with paint share one thing in common; they are the homes of the poor, not the middle class or wealthy.

¹¹² Waldron, Travis. "Brazil Relocates More Than 15,000 Families Ahead Of World Cup." *ThinkProgress RSS*. N.p., n.d. Web.

¹¹³ Ibid. 111

¹¹⁴ Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes. "As Brazil Gears Up For Olympics, Some Poor Families Get Moved Out." *NPR*. NPR, 24 Feb. 2014.

Pacification and Marginalization—Evidence for Resentment of Upper Classes and a Source of Relative Deprivation:

Similar to relocation programs, socioeconomic discrimination and class resentment are clearly evident in the “pacification” attempts that have occurred and are scheduled to continue leading up to the World Cup. Such drastic measures of pacification measures are in a way normalized because the middle class and wealthy have become threatened by the poor, and they deem it not discrimination but a necessary benefit for the whole of Brazil. The middle class deeply wants security and the poor are standing in the way of it. It is clear how such aggressive actions were legitimated.

The UPP (Pacifying Police Units) were created in 2008 to occupy 107 favelas. The most attention and funding are directed at the favelas near World Cup or Olympic venues and other wealthier areas of the city. These pacification forces are essentially military units, that storm favelas and leave behind a fortified police base.¹¹⁵

Known as the “Skulls” (Caveiras) BOPE for instance is a highly trained urban warfare police unit that storms favelas in a military style operation. BOPE has been hailed as highly effective by some members of the upper-classes and even portrayed in films such as “Tropa De Elite” as saviors of the middle class commissioned to bring security by any means and have extrajudicial power that allows them to circumvent corrupt police and politicians. Multiple human rights organizations have condemned BOPE’s repressive techniques and violations of human rights. Molly Mitton of the Foreign Military Studies office, evidences BOPE’s dehumanization of the poor by providing lyrics to BOPE’s training songs:

¹¹⁵ Saborio, Sebastian. "The Pacification of the Favelas: Mega Events, Global Competitiveness, and the Neutralization of Marginality." *Études Socialistes*, Vol 9, No 2 (2013).

“The interrogation is very easy to do, get the slum dweller and beat him till it hurts, Interrogation are very easy to finish, get the criminal and beat him till he dies.”

[“O interrogatório é muito fácil de fazer, pega o favelado e dá porrada até doer, O interrogatório é muito fácil de acabar, pega o bandido e dá porrada até matar.”]¹¹⁶

The extreme urban warfare that come about due to pacification attempts could be comparable to the US government unleashing the Marines in the Projects of Chicago. Of course it would be perceived much differently here, but after all the middle class residents of Chicago don't live in quite the same state of fear. If they did, pacification efforts may be accepted more openly.

Can Fraternalistic RD be seen in class resentment in Brazil? It appears that yes, there is a lot of resentment towards the poor and the poor too resent the upper classes. The upper classes want security; they perceive the poor to be standing in the way of it, ergo violent pacification programs. The upper classes want to live in a cleaner, more beautiful more typical urban or suburban environment, ergo favela relocation programs.

Being that the group under examination in this thesis is the middle class, the reader may ask why the author presented the discrimination directed towards favelados. That is because, providing the different sources of frustrations allows an understanding that the middle class and poor both have different frustrations directed at different things. Because of this there is no one actor to direct their frustration towards. There is a type of social disconnect between the two groups, they lack a common cause. This disconnect between the two classes actual and

¹¹⁶ Molly Martin, “Mega-Cities and Mega Events: Lesson from Favelas for the Future.”

perceived frustration is very important when concerned with revolution. This disconnect will be discussed in the following section.

The poor should rightfully resent the wealthier classes due to these aggressive actions, and the middle class has reason to be angry too, but if the middle class protestors really do intend on any revolutionary change they must reach out to the poor and form some type of general coalition. The lack of a common cause and leadership will be the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter III: Absence of a Common Cause and Revolutionary Leadership

If anything can be learned from applying psychological theories to Brazil, it is that there is a lot of frustration and resentment--the protests made this clear. Depending on whether the reader agrees with Thomas Jefferson that a "little rebellion now and then is a good thing" will determine whether the social disconnect and lack of a common cause are good things or not. The presence of such a disconnect will inevitably disallow a classical revolution. According to Huntington, the ability of the intelligentsia or the middle class to carry out revolution, "depends upon their relations with other social groups".

As stated earlier most scholars of revolution agree that revolutions begin with the middle class or bourgeois but are carried out by the lower classes or the proletariat. To do this the middle class must in some way attempt to absorb some of the frustrations of the lower class and find common ground. In Brazil the message is confusing. Everybody wants change but the message exclaimed is not being received. Gilberto Carvalho, secretary general of the presidency, spoke to this idea in an interview with *Folha de São Paulo* newspaper, "It would be pretentious for us to say we understand what is going on... "There are no known leaders who can speak for what is going on, no real demands that can be met"¹¹⁷

The protestors in Brazil have no unified message and lack any revolutionary leaders to organize them and direct them. To illustrate this the following will present an assortment of quotations from the protestors provided from an Article by Steve Hargreaves Titled "What we

¹¹⁷ "#MudaBrasil." *Foreign Affairs*. Foreign Affairs Magazine, 20 June 2013. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.

think of the protests”.¹¹⁸ The following quotations, are from the members middle class, their job titles denote that. They are teachers, businessmen and of the professional class.

“There are so many things to protest against that many people don't even know where to start; they just feel that something is terribly wrong. But people are losing focus -- most of us are going to the streets without clear intentions. As beautiful as it may seem from the outside, from the inside it's more like an 'out-of-time Carnival.' My gut tells me that we need to continue. We need to fight harder for a change in our political scenario, a political reform.” -Bruno Herzog, 26, Psychologist

“Things here in Brazil are complicated. We always wanted something to happen in this country, but now something is happening and we are not prepared for it. "The giant is awake" is what they say. But it has no leader and it is politically ignorant. I went to the protest last Thursday in Joinville, Santa Catarina, and it seemed to be meaningless. The protesters are asking for all sorts of things and don't know what they mean. Without an education to discern and make an opinion, the Brazilian people are the big joke of the moment. But at least people are on streets and learning about politics. That's really good!” -Jaciara Silva, 34, teacher

“I believe that, even though the public transport fare raise was revoked, people are still eager to go to the streets to demand better public services and a country free from

¹¹⁸ Hargreaves, Steve. "Brazilians: What We Think of the Protests." *CNNMoney*. Cable News Network, 23 June 2013.

corruption. It's clear that we are going through a political crisis, but we cannot let this turn into a rejection of political parties. That would be a great regression for our democracy. What we need is new leaderships capable of organizing new demonstrations with clear proposals. I strongly believe that these demonstrations are important for people to engage in politics, and to be conscious that politics is the only way to make a better country for everyone.” -Milton Gazzano, 25, consultant

“Millions of voices cry out in unison on the streets of Brazil. For about two weeks these people have been protesting against the prices of public transportation, corruption, the conditions of public healthcare and education, laws to be passed, and ... this is where the efforts stall. There are too many issues being discussed at once, there is no obvious focus or specific demand. Only days ago our president allowed government officials to use public money to travel and use hotels to comfortably watch the soccer games of the Confederations Cup. Then, on national TV, she promises to solve the healthcare problem by importing doctors. This is as helpful as hiring cooks to work in an empty building without a sink, stove, oven, utensils or food to cook. Do Brazilians need to demand changes? Absolutely yes. Nevertheless, for something to actually happen, people need to know why they are on the streets and what exactly needs to change first, because only specific issues can be solved one at a time.” Nicolle Regitz, 38, teacher.

“Social media is one of the ways by which the ideas are organized and disseminated, since some in the press published (and are still publishing) biased information that is, at times, not even consistent with the truth. There is a history of conformism in Brazil, and

seeing this generation finally abandoning it in order to change the country peacefully is, to say the least, rewarding. What worries me, though, is those who take advantage of the situation. They misrepresent the meaning of the protests, promote urban conflict, and trivialize the reasons for why we are fighting.” - Patricia Wagner, 25, English teacher¹¹⁹

The disorganized sentiment becomes clear after hearing these voices of the middle class. They are mad just like everyone else, but they are not sure whether their voice is being heard or mixed among the millions of other protestors. There is a feeling of frustration and helplessness paired with disorder and confusion portrayed in the quotations. They are not sure whether they are protesting on behalf of their own demands or whether their voice is lost among the myriad messages. Kathryn Hochstetler writes in *Foreign Affairs* magazine,

Yet without a single shared demand, a meaningful response from the government is highly unlikely, if not impossible, despite the hopes of the protesters, who have rallied behind the vague Twitter hashtag #mudabrasil (“change Brazil”). On the other hand, the quickest way to give them one would be a heavy-handed crackdown... Unless they can find a common cause and articulate it together, the energy of the protests will be hard to maintain and no government response will be necessary. That seems likely, even through simmering discontent will remain.¹²⁰

Pre revolution collectivities are rarely a cohesive whole. Revolutionaries range from moderate to extreme, fascist to communist and everything in-between. Mark Hagopian writes in *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, that revolutionaries can roughly be categorized into three

¹¹⁹ Steve Hargreaves “What we think of the protests”

¹²⁰ Kathryn Hochstetler, “MudaBrasil: The Protests are too Broad for Their Own Good.”

categories: moderates, radicals, and ultra-revolutionaries.¹²¹ This is not only specific to pre-revolutionary states, but collectivities in general.

Eduardo Viveiros de Castro a prominent and well respected anthropologist could be a potential ultra-revolutionary, however the protestors as a whole are closer to being considered moderates. The majority of the protestors are recent college graduates and every day middle class people. That doesn't mean though, that the spirit of their demands are any different than Viveiros de Castro. In a polemic against the government, Viveiros de Castro mentions the exact same themes as the every day protestor did. He is frustrated with the infrastructure, corruption etc the only difference between him and the middle class residents quoted above is his tone. His tone is aggressive and revolutionary, his tone could make people rally to a greater degree.

Vivieros de Castro loudly protests the same grievances as the protestors, but at the end he says yes, a revolution would be a good thing. There are many more examples of people like Vivieros de Castro that we would label ultra-revolutionaries, however they never really came to the surface. Nobody was willing or able to play the role of a revolutionary. If a revolution is to occur it will take a strong revolutionary leader to combine the causes of the poor and the middle class—the demands and frustrations of the various classes do appear quite different. Some revolutionaries promote nationalism, some are anti-statist, however, whichever ideology they choose to ascribe to must be promoted to the masses and tailored in a way to create broad support.

Lenin stated, “that no revolutionary movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders which preserves continuity.” Though Lenin may not have been a

¹²¹ Hagopian, Mark N. *The Phenomenon of Revolution*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974. Print. P.265

desirable or respectable revolutionary, he was an effective one. He was effectively able to appeal to the masses and create a common cause. Lenin again comments on this, “the broader the mass which is spontaneously drawn into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and participates in it, the more urgent is the necessity for such an organization, and the more durable this organization must be.” Its essential to absorb the cause of the masses, and such attempts are only possible when the individuals that assume the role are “professionally engaged in revolutionary activities”.¹²²

Mao, similar to Lenin, agreed that leadership was necessary to guide the masses. Stuart Schram mentions the incredible leadership style of Mao, as a leader able to appeal to multiple classes. Marxist communism has very little in common with historic Chinese empires, but Mao rooted his revolutionary writing in classical Chinese history to appeal to a broader mass. Mao incorporated many classes that were originally thought to be enemies of the revolution. Castro, similar to Mao, attempted to lead as many of the populace as possible. Castro was not able to assemble a revolutionary group the size of Mao’s, but he was an effective leader of his smaller revolutionary army. By the end of the revolution Castro had appealed to the majority of the country and toppled Trujillo’s regime.¹²³

Few of the most prolific revolutionary leaders were geniuses, or masters of any scholarly application. Lenin, Castro, and Mao were all from relatively modest backgrounds. A revolutionary leader need not be an intellect, but he or she must possess the revolutionary spirit. They must utilize some type of revolutionary ideology, but be willing to bend that ideology to

¹²² Wood, Anthony. *The Russian Revolution*. London: Longman, 1986. Print.

¹²³ Mark Hagopian, “The Phenomenon of Revolution.”

conform to the people. All of the most effective revolutionary leaders did not simply tell people what to believe, but studied what the people believed to create an appropriate ideology that would transcend class and propel the movement.¹²⁴

In Brazil, as in every society, there are many who possess the revolutionary spirit. There are groups like the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT) that have in the past produced many seemingly revolutionary leaders who could have assumed the role of revolutionary leader. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his successor Dilma Rousseff were both of the PT. Dilma was even a revolutionary herself. The PT of course is not interested in revolution, they have comfortably been in power for the last decade. The PT was supposed to bring revolutionary change to the masses, but many in Brazil are now questioning the real motives of the PT. The party and Dilma have plummeted in popularity and Brazil is still left without any leader to fully incorporate the entire country's needs. The failures of PT leadership provided opportune time for a revolutionary leader to ascend, but nobody seemed to aspire to that role.

Common sentiment is noticed throughout the demands of the middle class in Brazil. First there are similar grievances—infrastructure, taxes, corruption, world cup spending. Secondly there was no organization present during the protests. There was no clear voice only a disorganized feeling of frustration. Hunting writes, “The middle class intelligentsia is revolutionary, but it cannot make a revolution on its own. Confined within the city, it can oppose the government, it can stimulate riots and demonstrations it can at times mobilize support from the working class and the lumpenproletariat. If it can also win the cooperation of some elements of within the military, it can bring down the government”.

¹²⁴ Al S. Cohan, “Theories of Revolution.”

No one group alone can cause a revolution, organization and coalition forming is essential to the implementation of a revolution. It can be confidently said that without such leadership or organization in Brazil there will likely be no revolution. Protests and nation wide frustration may continue, but without a leader, their demands will never need to be addressed. If Brazil's government was more concerned with revolutionary fervor, there would have been some meaningful discourse or political action taken. Dilma remained largely silent during the protests; one can opine the lack of response to the protestors was simply a product of indifference. Without any common cause or leadership one can assume that the Brazilian government will not make any significant changes, simply because they don't have to.

Chapter IV: Conclusion

In the beginning of this endeavor the author was confident that psychological theories and modernization theory alone would provide enough information to answer the question of revolution in Brazil. Psychological explanations do a very good job of explaining why there is discontent, frustration and talk of revolution—something is very wrong in Brazil. However, when applied, psychological theories leave us in the end asking why nothing came of the protests. Psychological theories must be understood within a broader context to answer that question. It would be incorrect to say that this research does not leave the reader informed. The reader should be left questioning whether all that was mentioned could actually culminate into revolution, and it could, but not under the current circumstances. A perfect revolutionary climate is not present in Brazil.

By most measures yes, the Brazilian people are frustrated—extremely frustrated, and with good reason. The two viewpoints of the theoretical tradition of psychological explanations are simple. Either the population reaches the boiling point and perceives its situation to be so unbearable that revolution is the only answer. Or, secondly psychological theories state that the population has some idea about where they rightfully should be. When the population has engendered a belief about what they ought to be getting or where they ought to be heading, and those expectations are not met, or the gap between what they want and what they are actually receiving is too high, revolution becomes a possible outlet for their frustration.

This thesis assumed both general deprivation and rising expectations to be the most pertinent explanatory tools at hand. There is a historical and contemporary basis to the

frustration; Brazil is a country endowed with so much—vast natural resources, a hard working and forward looking population, but in the end still hindered by third world concerns. Brazilians voiced in their protests that they have had enough, they want more out of their government.

Furthermore, modernization created a climate that was bound to increase expectations. If you give the mouse a cookie, he is going to ask for some milk, in a sense humans are like the mouse from the children's book. We are an ever improving creature, that needs an environment in which to fulfill personal advancement, and as John Adams stated, ambition is a basic human appetite.¹²⁵ Modernization is inevitable and beneficial; however rapid modernization facilitates rapidly rising expectations. Generally the populace will stay content only if all other qualities of life advance at a similar pace as the economy. This is absolutely the case in Brazil. There is a popular knowledge of a booming economy. The knowledge of that booming economy however is paired with dissatisfying societal realities.

There is need for more infrastructure; there is vast room for improvement in every part of Brazilian transportation, health care, education, sewers and even fresh water systems that have been neglected. It must leave the citizen frustrated, to live under a polity that does not value the basic goods of life and neglects general infrastructure improvements, but yet has billions of dollars to entertain the world with mega events. Maybe the politicians and representatives of FIFA and the OPC are right. Maybe these mega events will reenergize Brazil and leave it better than it was. However, the author agrees with the protestors, and that will likely not be the case. Since the completion of the body of this thesis, Brazil recently announced US\$ 10 billion in extra costs for the Olympics—again the protestors may question whether anything has changed at all.

¹²⁵ Shaw, Peter. *The Character of John Adams*. Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the U of North Carolina, 1976. Print.

Of course, security is projected to improve for the mega events, it has to. Brazil cannot allow any violence against the visitors while on the national stage. But, will these security measures last beyond the games? Many Brazilians think they won't. Many look at the security measure as only meant to appease the world community. When the party is over they may very well be left no more secure than they were.

Corruption is another dominate theme of the protests, and again it ought to be. A recent Rede Globo poll reported that corruption still tops the list of the most pertinent grievance for Brazilians.¹²⁶ To appease the protestors demands about corruption, the Brazilian government implemented a new law, "Law to Combat Corruption". Critics opine that the law is too complicated and so strict that it will only rarely be implemented.¹²⁷ Brazil passed a similar law in 1992, but Brazil was never freed from corruption. Only time will tell if the new law is able to combat corruption and produce a fairer more accountable government.

After the protests and the completion of this thesis it is not evident that enough has changed. The core of this thesis is valid and yes there is plenty of revolutionary sentiment, but this thesis alone cannot entirely answer the question or revolution. Gurr wrote about a similar topic in an article titled "Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid are its Arguments 40 years On?". He admits the same shortcomings of psychologic approaches that this research came to uncover. Individuals are likely the best "prism" from which to view the possibilities of revolution, however they must also be understood within a broader context. Critics of RD like Skocpol and Tilley provide valuable insight. Skocpol's stucture based theory is valid as well as Tilley

¹²⁶ "Brasileiro Se Preocupa Mais Com Corrupção Que Grande Parte Da População Mundial." *O Globo*. N.p., 10 May 2014. Web. 22 Apr. 2014

¹²⁷ "Brazil's New Anticorruption Law: Hard to Read." *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 29 Jan. 2014.

organizational approach. Both of the main critiques however do not provide an entirely complete picture either. They must be supplemented with individual and even cultural approaches.

All of the grievances voiced by the protestors seem to still be problematic and hindering many Brazilians pursuit of the good life. It remains to be seen whether the frustrations of the protestors will be met head on and comprehensibly addressed. There also remains the high likelihood that the government in Brazil will address the demands the “Brazilian Way”. That is to say Brazilians will be given just enough to appease them for the moment, but in the end leave them all the same frustrated.

There is a strong element of disrespect as well. The protests were not about twenty cents. However, that small raise in bus fare became a symbol that resonated throughout the protestors marches and demonstrations. Twenty cents symbolizes that the collectivity has had enough. As stated earlier five cities in Brazil, including Rio de Janeiro, went ahead with the bus fare increases. Will the protestors allow this to slide and will nothing come of it? Or will the disrespect continue to ferment animosity and frustration to the point that future violence is the only answer?

Yes the protests are over. And they were, for the most part, peaceful but psychological explanations still tell us that something is not right in the state of Brazil. Brazilians were promised their lives would improve and their expectations exponentially increased. Not enough has changed, and one can confidently assume that it may not change in the near future either. From the perspectives of RD and RE revolution seemed evident, but why then did the protests end peacefully? One could say they simply got bored and lost their motivation, but there is a far

more important reason why a classical revolution did not occur and why it is not likely in the present climate.

This thesis may have proved most importantly that the Brazilians did have a reason to revolt. Maybe Thomas Jefferson was right, a little revolution can be good from time to time. But, admittedly, this thesis is not able to say whether the protestors would have been able revolt in a significant way had they wanted to. The protestors lacked the resources needed to create anything more than unorganized protests. If the protests were led and organized more effectively they may have elicited a response. The response could have been positive, had the government addressed their demands, or it could have been heavy handed and aggressive.

The climate of revolution must occur within a state structured in a way to facilitate revolution or not strong enough to thwart it. Is the Brazilian government structured in a way that will make a classical revolution impossible? That question is the subject for another paper, however we do know that the state of Brazil has never really been tested. We don't know how the federal military, police forces or government would respond to a greater more organized and more aggressive collective action. For that reason the final chapter was dedicated to showing that despite the extreme frustrations, the protestors were not guided and their cause was not cohesive. The protestors may have all had a common cause but they either weren't aware that they did or they weren't organized well enough to make the it known.

The coming mega events provide a much bigger stage for the protestors. There are many ways this could go terribly wrong. Again we must look at the Tlatelolco Massacre, which occurred only ten days before the Mexico City Olympics. If the protestors threaten to impede the games or embarrass Brazil, there is a higher likelihood they will be met with violent force.

Furthermore, if in the next few years the Brazilians remain discontent and organize behind leadership, such an action would provide the precipitant for a much more violent incident.

In the end, a classical revolution does not seem like a very comforting path. The outcome of any such revolution could be good or bad depending on the ideology or government implemented. A revolution could end in another dictatorship or come with massive instability. It is also possible that a revolution in Brazil could leave the growing middle class content and end up finally ameliorating the deep pains of socioeconomic inequality and insecurity. If the latter is the case then yes a classical revolution may be exactly what Brazil needs. However there exists another desirable and simpler route. Brazil's government could act upon the demands of the protestors; Dilma could battle corruption and insecurity and give the people the infrastructure they demand. The political system in Brazil is a democratic one, and it's capable of change; and it may simply need to be restructured and modernized.

Final Thoughts:

Upon completion of this research the author feels more comfortable with Brinton's idea that Revolutions are in a sense living organisms. In some ways the creation of a revolution is no different than the theoretical creation of life. The presence of water, methane, ammonia and hydrogen all together charged with an electroshock have the theoretical potential to create life. The absence of one of the elements or the disproportionate amount of one ingredient will yield no result. However, if everything is perfect and the climate for life perfectly exists a shot of lightning is all that is necessary.

The perfect climate for revolution, like the primordial soup must be an abnormally perfect circumstance. More strict definitions of revolution imply a similar notion; everything must occur in a perfect series of events for a classical revolution to occur. This thesis approached the definition and general idea of revolution differently. Classical revolutions are incredibly rare and very important parts of history. But the confines of their definition are not very useful for modern applications. Approaching societal stability under the guidance of theories of revolution still provides a wealth of knowledge, even if the author comes to find a classical revolution not entirely likely.

Though this research came to the conclusion that a classical revolution is not likely to occur in Brazil, a new form of revolution or a modern revolution, is quite possible. The nonoccurrence of classical revolution doesn't make this research any less important. If the revolutionary climate is recognized and responded to then is it no less revolutionary? If these testing times leave Brazil in the end with a superior political system, advanced infrastructure and reduced inequality, it should be considered a revolution nonetheless. If such reforms are to be made without mass social upheaval and violence we may have witnessed a contemporary revolution—we may have just not noticed it.

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