

SWIFT, COMEDY, EVIDENTIALITY

Words without Speakers and *A Tale of a Tub*

*Journalists say that when a dog
bites a man that is not news.
But when a man bites a dog that is
news. This is the essence of the
language instinct: language conveys
news--Steven Pinker. ¹*

Readers have always been mystified, and at odds sometimes with each other, on to how Swift intended *A Tale of a Tub* to be received. Did he intend for it be a pure work of comedy, "tending chiefly," as William Wotton observed in 1705, "to make Men laugh for half an Hour, after which it leaves no farther Effects behind it." z Or was it intended, like William King, or Francis Atterbury thought, to ridicule the learned professions, including the clergy, and, consequently, to weaken order and morality? Modern scholars, while acknowledging the humor of *A Tale*, tend to read it either as a skirmish in the battle between the ancients and moderns or as prime example of one of Swift's *bagatelles que tout cela*. In this, the division is, roughly, between readers who take a purely historical view of the text or those who give it a more ahistorical reading . The latter are readers who admire *A Tale*, not for what it may reveal about certain controversies of the day, or its archival value, but for its structure and linguistic fireworks.

My approach here falls, generally, into the linguistic and ahistorical. I want to attempt to show that much of the humor of the text comes from how information (about the world, modern literature or the theories persons hold in the narrative) is mismanaged-or, in more general terms, *how unreliable* it becomes. How such unreliability becomes known, I will argue, is through something I will call "words without speakers." These in themselves do not, as Swift makes clear in *An Apology to A Tale*, constitute the "Humour" of the text but are the humorous means to the intelligibility of the whole. Swift, who held a normative view of language, regarded speaking (and, by implication, writing) as essentially a truth-telling activity. And since Swift believed that speaking imply agency, that is, action performed with some truth-finding in mind, a word without a speaker would always presuppose some person with faulty human agency.

On this view then humor in *A Tale* is essentially the result of the opposition between two kinds of "words," words with speakers and words without speakers. With the first, the "flow" of information, initiated and sustained by the speaker, occurs between sources and evidence of sources. In the second, words without speakers, there is no "flow" between sources and evidence of sources. This assumes, although all information can have sources, that the *evidence* for the sources either does not appear in discourse or, when it does appear, it has a weak and intermittent quality. A further assumption is that the reader of *Tale* is in possession of an "intact" mind. This means that the reader can ask questions of the speaker. As I will try to show in minute, the questioning reader "models" some of the dialogue in *Tale*, especially that between Lord Peter and his brothers.

All sources of information lie in the past but the reader receives information in present time. This relates to Swift's point, emphasized over and over in *A Tale*, that all information is essentially a function of the conjunction between real, as versus imaginary, sources and the speaker's memory of them. Moreover, sources are normative to Swift inasmuch as all sources, for reliable information to arise, ought to be sensory—they ought to arise either directly from the senses (seeing, hearing and so on) or gesture unambiguously toward them.

Before I proceed to put more flesh on these bones, I need to say something about Swift's general position on the authority of speakers.

SPEAKER AUTHORITY

From Swift's (largely) non-ironic works, for example, the *Correspondence*, *Project for. . . Advancement of Religion*, or the *Sermons*, one gets a fairly consistent picture of what he took as a cardinal rule of public language: namely, ACCEPT NO STATEMENT WITHOUT AUTHORITY. Accept no statement without *first*, knowing who, or what, is making it, why it is being made, on what "grounds" it is being made. Otherwise, there is always the danger of being cheated or deceived. Salient in this, as one form of AUTHORITY for, and in certain contexts, is EVIDENCE .³ Writing to Knightley Chetwode, for example, Swift denies, on the grounds of no written evidence, the "slander" that Harley administration had plans of "bringing in the Pretender" (Corr, 2:175);⁴ to Samuel Gerrard he says that buyers should always be aware of the "characters of men" before buying from them; that getting a good title to a piece of land lies in obtaining evidence of the title's authenticity, apart from what the seller may have said about the it (Corr, 4:292-3); and recommending a "hopefull, honest Boy," to be admitted to the Blue Coat Hospital in Dublin, he gives proof of the boy's good character not only from his own experience but also from that of Lady Elizabeth Brownlow, "from her own knowledge" (Corr, 4:292).

Perhaps Swift's fullest discussion of ACCEPT NO STATEMENT WITHOUT EVIDENCE, one he pushes forward with a great deal of passion, appears in his sermon, *On False Witness*. Recall that what distinguishes a false witness from a faithful witness for Swift is the presence or absence of evidence, or "Ground of Truth," a "Ground" always given with the statement. Whereas the false witness withholds evidence, or repeats the words of someone else (who also withholds evidence), the faithful witness either remains silent or only speaks when he has grounds for speaking (PW, 9:188): "the strictest Truth is required in a [faithful] Witness" (PW, 9:188).⁵

All this has a high resemblance to what linguists call "evidentiality"; or, more formally, the study of how a speaker encodes, in his or her statements, *the sources* of evidence for information. Was the source near or remote? Was it seen or heard? Was the source direct (the experience of the speaker) or indirect (quoted from someone else)?⁶ As such, it is a salient feature of what I earlier called "words without speakers." A word without a speaker, like everything else, is initially defined by its opposite, words with speakers. The general difference, in a fast-forward mode, are the following:

WITH SPEAKERS: 1) Sources given for evidence of information 2) Sources "findable"

3) Non-metaphorical; conveys "news" of sources

WITHOUT SPEAKERS: 1) Sources of evidence of information not given 2)

Sometimes sources given but not "findable"

3) Metaphorical words; conveys information that the words of the speaker conveys no "news" of sources

#3 means, in a general sense, that to make metaphors from words, as the narrator of *A Tale* constantly does, is to weaken, suppress or destroy sources of evidence of information; and, consequently, render information unreliable, suspect, unacceptable--to the intact mind. Or, just as likely, make the reader with an intact mind laugh.

Gulliver who spends a lot of time describing human nature and human ways to the Dapple Grey Houyhnhmn has him reject the whole as "saying the thing that is not." This, Gulliver tells us, is the way the Houyhnhmns describe lying. Here, it appears, Swift is drawing on his knowledge of Greek and the tradition of truth grounded in being, in what is (*einai, estin* ["to be"], *on, ousia*). I plan to give a fuller account of this elsewhere. But suffice it to say here

that lying, as the absence of being, of *what is*, had its beginning with ancient authors Swift knew, notably, Parmenides, Plato and especially Aristotle. The last, we recall, defines truth with his famous "correspondence theory": "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true" (Metaphysics 1011b25; cf. *Categories* (12611, 14614)). But a skeleton form appears in Parmenides "The Way of the Truth" and a virtually identical formulation in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).

EVIDENTIALITY

There are two major (overlapping) representations of sources of evidence in *A Tale* that call for comment. One has to do with sources from experience; the other with sources from the imagination and "madness." As an example of experienced sources first consider Lord Peter's statement, and those of his brothers, about the wearing of gold lace, an article of dress not warranted by their father's will.

For Brothers, if you remember, we heard a Fellow say when we were Boys, that he heard my Father's Man say, that he heard my Father say, that he would advise his Sons to get Gold Lace on their Coats, as soon as ever they could procure Money to buy it. By G---that is very true, cries the other; I remember it perfectly well, said the third (51-52).

Obviously, all this is information unacceptable to an intact mind; or, put another way, inadmissible as evidence in any court made up of a judge and jury (spectators?) with intact minds. But how it becomes that way is largely a matter of the markers of "evidentiality." There are essentially four. All have to do with how Peter represents his sources of information-essentially by offering weak evidence of their existence.

TIME: Remote (as versus recent): "when we were Boys." No specific time given *when* the father said it.

PLACE: Nowhere. Note that the father did not say it at any place, in the dining room, in the garden, etc.

No place given where either "a Fellow" or "my Father's Man" said it.

MANNER: "Heard" (as versus "seen").

Indirect (as versus direct): "Heard ...heard that...."

PERSON: Nobody (as versus someone with a proper name, title, cultural context, etc.): "a Fellow. "7

A variation on this, one I alluded to earlier, occurs when the audience, questioning the speaker about his sources, demands evidence of their existence and nature-their sensory qualities, shape, size, color and so on. Peter, for instance, converses at length on the food he serves up to his brothers

Bread, says, he, Dear Brothers, is the Staff of Life;

in which Bread is contained, inclusive, the Quintessence of Beef, Mutton, Veal, Venison, Partridge, Plum-pudding and Custard (72).

One brother, however, identifies Peter's food as only a "Crust of Bread": My

Lord, said he, I can only say, that to my Eyes, and Fingers,

Teeth and Nose, it [Peter's food] seems to be nothing but a Crust of Bread (73) Peter, who represents the Roman Catholic Church in the allegory, falls into a rage and demands that they eat the food as mutton:

Look ye, Gentlemen, cries Peter in a
Rage, to convince you, what a couple of
blind positive, ignorant, wilful Puppies
you are, I will use but this plain
Argument; by G---, it is true, good,
natural Mutton as any in leaden-Hall
Market; and G---, confound you both
eternally, if you *offer* to believe
otherwise (73)

The issues here go, of course, far beyond the scope of what the senses, as sources of information, tell Peter and his brothers. But, insofar as the senses lie at the *beginnings of* information about the world, they enter directly into the conflict between Peter and his brothers. Conflict about what different people see, smell, touch, etc. helps to generate all other, more general, conflicts-like theological and political ones.

In much the same way, the author's explanation of the title of his work, "A Tale of a Tub," relies on sources of information from nowhere--or from anywhere. "They are such as will equally suit any Age, or Country, in the World" (142). Recall that certain persons ("Grandeets") in the church and government, seeking a way to divert attacks on their institutions, decide to follow the

example of sailors. Something analogous to a tub will be flung out to detract something like a whale from attacking their institutions represented as something like a ship (24). But is there any tub, any ship, any whale? Note that the speaker's source for all this is, first of all, a "Grand Committee," set up "some Days ago" from the report of a "certain curious and refined Observer." No mention of name, title, when the "Observer" reported (his?) information to the "Committee," when it met, or the names of those who composed it. Notice also that "A Tale of a Tub," because of the double use of the indefinite article, "A ... a," seems to intensify the obscurity of the text by that name of its own origins. An "A" denotes a whole array of similar things, "immense Bales of Paper" and "copious Titles" (21), things which could have come, along with an infinite number of other things, from anywhere. Insofar as everything is like everything else, in part because of their number, neither their origin nor their destination can be distinguished or remembered.

The sense of coming from nowhere, or anywhere, is also made intelligible by the footnotes added to the 1710 edition of A Tale. Unlike traditional footnotes, ones that authorize text information by reference to external authorities, A Tale's footnotes often sound as if they belonged somewhere else, or nowhere else. Some explain the obvious, for example, the correspondence between the history of Christianity and the story of the three brothers; some of them seem to eavesdrop on an ignorant reader of the text: "I cannot tell whether the Author means any new Innovation by this Word, or whether it be only to introduce the new Methods of forcing and perverting Scripture" (51); some, as in the example of "Holy Water," appear to parody the scholar's search for the meaning of a word without first fixing the existence of the thing it supposed to refer to (67).⁸ But none of the notes, and it is an important point about "evidentiality" in A Tale, go toward establishing textual authority by means of reliable source information. Absent from them as sources, as in Peter's discussion of gold lace, are the specifics of TIME, PLACE, MANNER AND PERSON.

The second main "source" of "information" represented in A Tale is that from imagination and "madness." Unlike information from an external source, written documents, persons, "common Forms," or experience, imagined information is internal, subjective, eccentric. Swift always represents it by

means of short scenes of containment: persons affected by imagined (or "mad") information are always set in a contained space; neither receiving useful information from external sources (which might alter their behavior) or functioning themselves as a source of useful information for others. Jack is one example. After his breach with his brothers, he goes off to live by himself in "New Lodgings" (88); he stops hearing any other voice besides his own; he walks alone at night--he goes mad. Others, mostly from *A Digression Concerning Madness*, include lawyers, generals, kings, and philosophers. With these contained space becomes *constricted* space, often behind a "Grate" (111, 112) or in a "garrat" (27, 106).

WORDS WITHOUT SPEAKERS

Language offered Swift several ways to represent "words without speakers." One way, one we all use occasionally, is to use the passive voice without its agent, "I am informed," "I am told," "I am advised," and the like. Swift's version of such forms comes from a combination of strategies, forgetfulness of the speaker, digressions, the negative. But he also relies on a heavy use of the passive-voice forms of verbs like "inform," "tell," "heard:"

*I am told by a very skillful Computer ...(92)

*I have been told by Wise Men.... (15)

*Nor has anyone heard it objected by any body else (8)

*I am informed, Our two Rivals (39)

*We are informed that A. B. remains (70).

*I am credibly informed that this Publication (17)

Insofar as "sources" like "skillful Computer," "Wise Men" and the like cannot be identified (and never re-appear in the text) the reader is effectively stopped from knowing more about who they are and their sources of alleged information.

Other ways Swift creates speaker-less words in *A Tale* are quotation (paraphrase), inference and metaphor. The mark of the first is the speaker claiming that the words he is speaking "belong," not to him, but to someone else. Think of the times in *A Tale* when the marginalia and footnotes are said to come from someone other than the "Author," from a "Wotton," or "A Welsh Gentleman of Cambridge" (79) or Xenophon (79), Luther, Calvin (84). Or of the times the "Author" claims he heard such and such from a "Friend," a "Great Wit." Some of the quotations are destructively self-referential; that is, they simultaneously affirm, and deny, the existence of the quoted source. A salient example is found in *A Digression Concerning Criticks*. Here, in order to make a point about modern criticism, the speaker quotes verbatim words from the "fifth Book and eighth Chapter" of a work "entirely lost," words that he then goes on to interpret for their "literal Sense." "This I understand in a literal Sense, and suppose our Author must mean, that whoever designs to be a perfect Writer, must inspect into the Books of Criticks, and correct his Invention there as in a Mirror" (63). Swift will later return to the destructive self-referential quotation in *The Bickerstaff Papers* when he has the speaker call in Partridge for the testimony he needs to prove that Partridge is now dead, is "not alive" (PW, 2163).

Existence and non-existence also lie at the heart of representations of speaker-inference, of inferring that X is Y on the basis of Z. Take, for instance, the speaker's attempt to infer existence of the number and quantity of works in modern literature when it is obvious that they don't exist-and never have. "*The Memorial of them was lost among Men, their Place was no more to be found*" (21). All of this, Swift would have learned in his classes in logic at Trinity College, is something the serious minded logician would never do;⁹ namely, attempt to infer that X is Y (based on Z) before demonstrating that X exists. A weaker form of this approach is to argue that the existence of X can be inferred from a potential quality of X, the character of the man from the kind of clothes he wears or the

quality (and saleability) of a book by the weather (133). It is, one might say, getting the sequence wrong, like giving a concert on a piano before learning how to play the instrument.

Quotation, inference, existence, non-existence come together with Swift's demonic use of metaphor in *A Tale*. Note that the title of the text, "A Tale of a Tub," is a metaphor: the whale stands for Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the ship the Commonwealth, and so on (24-25); man himself, as in the story of the three brothers, is a "Micro-Coat" (47); writing, like traveling, has a text for a horse, a problem with spattering people standing by (but also delightful scenes!); the writer:rider meets rabble:readers in the next town and a street "Cur" to give the whip to, and so on and on (120-21). From the point of view of evidence for the sources of information, all of this adds up to nothing, or everything, since it seems it is not the function of a metaphor, as linguistic utterance, to reveal and evaluate evidence of sources of speaker information. A metaphor is meant chiefly to show how one thing, based on something else, is like (or unlike) something else. If a speaker, in other words, intends to convey *new* information-information no one has offered before-then he must do it in non-metaphoric ways.

How information is represented, or misrepresented, is a constant theme in Swift's *Correspondence* and formal satire. He was especially angered by merchants who misrepresent the goods they sell and with politicians who make false promises (Corr: 1, 315-16; 327-28; 2, 371 74; 4, 449-50). In *Verses on the Death of Doctor Swift* truth-saying is depicted as one of the author's chief traits and every reader of Swift knows the Houyhnhnm's definition of lying, "Said the thing which is not." In *A Tale*, truth-saying, as W. B. Carnochon and others maintain, is undercut by "nothingness," or the play of negation.⁹ One thinks specifically, in this regard, of the hiatuses in the text (37-38, 107, 128), the anonymity of its author, the absence of a single focus. Like the tub thrown out to divert the whale from the ship, the text itself is "hollow, and dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to Rotation" (24). All this goes to suggest that *A Tale* should be read not only as a satire on religion and modern learning (or as an "event" in the controversy between the ancients and the moderns), but also as

a text in which a proper function of language is presented as diversion (and digression), and not as a medium for the transmission of *reliable* information, or "news."

HEARSAY

Few, if any, of Swift's contemporaries could have foreseen how *A Tale* would now, in the twentieth-first century, be read, and interpreted. For, having the general mind-set of the shocked moralist, they saw the work primarily as an attack on religion, the work of an "impious Buffoon,"¹¹ something "stuffed with curses, oaths, and imprecations."¹² Nor would they have expected the development of linguistic approaches to literary texts or the language-based criticism of Swift.¹³ For these reasons it is at least arguable that only now are we beginning to see what *A Tale* is completely about, not only abuses in religion and learning, or even authorial insanity, but also about language and language functions gone bad. How should we try to understand such functions and how they go bad?

In *On False Witness*, Swift states that "a faithful witness, like everything else, is known by his contrary" (PW, 9: 187). It is not hard to see that Swift often uses this knowledge-of--X-by-knowledge-of-the-contrary-of-X to represent persons, events, processes--or qualities of these. Without size and shape contrarities there would have been, of course, no Gulliver, no Houyhnhnm; without opposing states of weather no poem like *Description of the Morning* or *Description of a City Shower*. *Bickerstaff Papers*, as previously noted, gains much of its force from the play of existence (what objectively is) and non-existence (what objectively does not exist but may have subjective reality in the mind of a speaker). What is the contrary of reliable information? Not just in language, but also in Swift's language? From what has been said, and from what we know about works like the *Travels* or *A Tale*, its contrary are the effects of what the legal profession calls hearsay-- plus all the conditions that make them possible. This is no place to try to list, exemplify and define, all the effects and the

conditions in all the texts. But in general they are whatever constrains a represented person (or *persona*) in Swift from knowing, and telling, where information comes from. The "Said the thing which was not" is, no doubt, the expression of one such constraint as is Tindall's incapacity (in Swift's representation) to state clearly what government is (PW, 2: 80-91). For A Tale the constraint is, not so much the loss of memory, but the profound lack of it. Without memory, there can be no knowledge of the past, no knowledge of evidence of sources of information for present utterances. The "*Memorial of them was lost among Men, their Place was no more to be found*" (21).

DESIGNING FOR HUMOR

Swift saw A Tale as a comic work, as a text that causes the reader to laugh. But he implies that the laughter is not an end itself, but a means to the end of making the text "acceptable to the World":

Wit is the noblest and most useful Gift of humane
Nature, so Humour is the most agreeable, and where
These two enter far into the Composition of any Work,
They will render it always acceptable to the World (An
Apology, 6)

Humor, as means to an end, he explains elsewhere in *An Apology*, is part of the "Design" of A Tale, which Swift understood to mean both "structure" and "purpose" (4, 6). From this we are led to believe that each of these has some correlation with the dual structure of A Tale, the story of the three brothers and the satire on modern learning.

If "words without speakers" has any validity, then it should have a salient role in making this "Design" intelligible. Like laughter itself, it would not constitute the ultimate effect but only the means to the effect-however defined. At the same time, however, "words without speakers" has to be understood as an origin and a context of A Tale. It helps the reader know where the substance of A

Tale came from and it gives him or her a way to identify how speakers within the story misrepresent reality, the "World." One can find many similar situations in other works by Swift, written about the same time as *A Tale*—such as, *Meditation upon a Broomstick*, *Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* or *The Bickerstaff Papers*. In all of these, the existence of the humor entails, as time does change, the existence of the situation. But the entailment came with a *price*. As he seems to recognize in *An Apology*, Swift was faced with the problem of designing the humor in such a way that it would not be mistaken for something he did not intend—especially an attack on religion or morality.

Part of the design was the omission of attacks on particular persons by their name, profession or rank. And much of it, as I have tried to show above, was by the use of certain linguistic structures, the passive voice, existential predicates, metaphor, and the like. But these, in themselves, would not have enough to create the humor, the "Wit," of the text. To complete the design, Swift had to rely on readers able to laugh when confronted with speaker-less words. Such capacity, in turn, presupposed a certain normative (linguistic) condition, namely, knowledge of what it means for words to have a speaker. In *An Apology*, Swift hints that "words with speakers" is always non-ironic. Since it does not entail, or presuppose, an opposite, it does not undercut, or weaken, serious discourse. Moreover, "words with speakers" is necessary, as Swift makes clear in *Proposal for Correcting... the English Tongue*, *Mr. Collins's Discourse of FreeThinking* and *A Preface To the Bishop of Sarum's Introduction*, for writing truthfully about history. This is why historians like Collins and the Bishop of Sarum fail as authoritative speakers. Their language, or "Stile," (PW, 4:69) cannot rise beyond the level of "words without speakers." Like the various speakers in *A Tale*, their words come from nowhere or everywhere and waste "an abundance of Time" (PW 4, 70).

The humorous design of *A Tale* then presupposes two kinds of words in opposition to each other, "words with speakers" versus "words without speakers." The "with" words form the normative, truth-saying, evidence-giving language Swift thought *was* necessary for all serious discourse. In itself

such language does not produce humor or irony. For these, the writer or speaker, must create "without" words and bring them into conflict with the "with" ones that come into being with a reader possessing an intact mind.

Swift would employ this confrontational structure again in *Bickerstaff Papers*, *Polite Conversation* and parts of *Gulliver's Travels*. But in none of these does it have the intensity of that of *A Tale*. Perhaps Swift had this in mind when he remarked, in old age, "Great God what a genius I had when I wrote that book. .14

NOTES

1. *The Language Instinct* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1994), p. 83; a shorter version of this paper was presented at a South Central Eighteenth Century Society meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, March 2-4, 1996.

2. Kathleen Williams, *Swift: The Critical Heritage* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), p. 37.

3. It would perhaps take another paper or two to explain fully how EVIDENCE relates (as a part does to its whole?) to representations of AUTHORITY in Swift. The issue is complicated, in part, 18
by the presumed difference between non-linguistic examples of AUTHORITY and EVIDENCE and linguistic representations of them. If we believe only what we see, then we don't need language, we

don't need evidence of sources of information or representations of AUTHORITY. But nowhere, to my knowledge, does Swift acknowledge the existence of either AUTHORITY or EVIDENCE in their non-linguistic forms. Recall that AUTHORITY, even *in* the minimal language of the Houyhnhnms is always conveyed by language: "He [the Master Houyhnhmn] neighed to them several times in a Style of Authority, and received Answers" (PW, 11: 228).

EVIDENCE, no doubt, would also have had a theological definition for Swift. Recall that the eighteenth-century commonly took the term to mean assent to a belief in God on the basis of clear, explicit, proof. Assent to belief on the basis of AUTHORITY alone was typically called "implicit faith." See Louis Landa, PW, 9:110-11 [Introduction to *the Sermons*].

4. All citations to Swift's Correspondence, by volume and page number, are to The Correspondence of *Jonathan Swift*, ed. Harold Williams, 5 vols (Oxford University Press, 1963-72).

5. PW-*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, eds. Herbert Davis, et al., 16 vols (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939-68). A Tale is in Volume 1.

6. See, for example, Talmy Givon, *Syntax* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1984): I: 306-08; "Evidentiality and Epistemic Space," *Studies in Language*, 6 (1982), pp. 23-49. Wallace Chafe, "Evidentiality in English Conversation and Academic Writing," *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986), pp. 261-72.

7. Givon has found evidence that speakers universally rank sources of information as to their "evidentiary strength or reliability" in the following ways:

a. Personal deixis hierarchy:

Speaker>Hearer>Third Party b.

Directness hierarchy:

Sensory Experience>Inference c. Sensory

Modality hierarchy: Vision>Hearing>Other

Senses>Feeling d. Space deixis hierarchy:

Near>Far

e. Time deixis hierarchy:

Present>Immediate Past>Remote Past (307-308).

8.Cf Frank Palmeri, "The Satiric Footnotes of Swift and Gibbon," *Critical Essays on Jonathan Swift*, ed. Frank Palmeri (New York: G. K. Hall & Co. 1993), pp. 37-51.

9.Cf James Rembert, *Swift and the Dialectical Tradition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 65-67; Clive T. Probyn, "Swift and the Human Predicament," in Clive Probyn, ed., *The Art of Jonathan Swift* (London: Vision Press, 1978), pp. 57-80.

10.W. B. Carnochan, "Swift's *Tale*: On Satire, Negation, and the Uses of Irony." *Eighteenth Century Studies*, 5 (1971), pp. 122-44. "In the *Tale* he engages a theme that has all manner of reverberations when we start thinking about satire. The theme is that of 'nothing,' the void, and is announced at the very end" (125); cf. John Clark's *Form and Frenzy in Swift's Tale of a Tub* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970), pp. 117-30; John Traugott, "Irony, Swift's Gift to the Reader in *A Tale of a Tub*," *Critical Approaches to Teaching Swift*, ed. Peter J. Schakel (New York: AMS Press, 1992), pp. 151-

65; cfEverett Zimmerman, 'A Tale of a Tub and Clarissa: A Battling of Books," Critical Essays on Jonathan Swift ed. Frank Palmeri (New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1993), pp. 143-63.

11 K. Williams, p.52.

12.K. Williams, p.32.

13.Frederik N. Smith, *Language and Reality in Swift's A Tale of a Tub* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1979); Ann Cline Kelly, *Swift and the English Language* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1988); Deborah Wyrick, *Jonathan Swift and the Vested Word* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988).

14A *Tale of a Tub*, ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith (Oxford, 2nd ed. 1958), p. xix, n. 2. The remark comes to us from Walter Scott by way of Theophilus Swift.