Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Utah State University Department of Economics
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This paper presents a tight relationship between evolutionary game theory and distributed intelligence models. After reviewing some existing theories of replicator dynamics and distributed Monte Carlo learning, we make fonnulations and proofs of the equivalence between these two models. The relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but also by experimental simulations of the models by taking a simple symmetric zero-sum game as an example. As a consequence, it will be verified that seemingly chaotic macro dynamics generated by distributed micro-decisions can be explained with theoretical models.
Sasaki, Yuya, "The Equivalence of Evolutionary Games and Distributed Monte Carlo Learning" (2004). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 276.