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War, Gender, and the Polarization Process: Gender as an Intervening Variable in Attitude Formation toward Outgroups

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War, Gender, and the Polarization Process:
Gender as an Intervening Variable in Attitude Formation
toward Outgroups

by

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War, Gender, and the Polarization Process: Gender as an Intervening Variable in Attitude Formation toward Outgroups

Introduction

War and the consequences of war have long been a subject of study in the field of political science. In addition, much debate and disagreement has centered around which factors are most important in determining the onset of war. Based on previous literature that has established fairly consistent gender differences with respect to the gendered role of warfare (Goldstein, 2001; Marini, 1990), I speculate that gender may also influence polarization attitudes, which are thought to act as precursors to war. Whenever the attitudes of ingroups rapidly polarize and their members become extremely fearful of an outgroup, begin to dehumanize outgroup members, treat them as inferior, and begin to perceive the outgroup as morally depraved, we may be witnessing a process that primes individuals to participate in violent actions, including war, directed at members of the outgroup. Traumatic events, such as murderous acts against members of an ingroup, may trigger a polarization process. Similarly, hate speeches, that is, attempts by elites to convince members of an ingroup that there is an imminent and real threat posed by outgroups, may also trigger polarization. After exposure to one of these traumatic events, undergraduate students at Utah State University were asked to report their fear, dehumanization, and moral depravity attitudes towards three distinct outgroups - Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants. These results were compared to students who were not exposed to a traumatic event and examined for statistically significant differences. Results were also broken down by gender within each treatment group in order to indicate if men and women reacted differently in their attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to traumatic events. Results indicate that gender may act as a mediating variable in the polarization process, particularly after exposure to hate speech.

Catalysts of Attitudinal Polarization

A key step in this polarization process is the creation of groups based on attributes such as religion, race, ethnicity, and gender, and subsequent characteristic identification based on membership in these groups. In a discussion of how group categorization occurs, Miller, Maner, and Becker (2010) explain that individuals divide the social world into categories- “us”, also
known as ingroups, and “them”, or outgroups. Those who are seen as belonging to one’s own ingroup are viewed favorably, while those seen as a “source of potential harm” are more likely to be categorized as belonging to an outgroup (Miller, Maner, and Becker, 2010: 64). When examining the process through which polarizing attitudes such as fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism are formed, particular types of events seem likely to influence the onset of these polarizing attitudes. Traumatic events that portray individuals or groups as harmful, then, would be expected to influence the creation of group categorization or polarization. One such event would be the murder of members of the ingroup by members of an outgroup. Any ambiguity as to the intentions of the outgroup is eliminated by such extreme acts. Clearly, the actions of the outgroup show that they mean harm to the ingroup. Another event which could influence the onset of these attitudes is the use of hate speech by leaders; throughout the speech, the speaker portrays certain groups or individuals as a threat to the ingroup, actively trying to demonstrate that they will harm the ingroup if the ingroup does nothing to stop them.

9/11 Terrorist Attack

The act of killing members of an ingroup by an outgroup seems an obvious catalyst for this polarization process. An example of this type of traumatic event is the terrorist attack of 9/11 by Al Qaeda. More American citizens died that day at the hands of a foreign entity than any other day since the creation of the nation, including the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Imperial Japanese Naval force. The attacks were unexpected and seemingly unprovoked in the eyes of the average American. An event such as this would be expected to cause strong emotional and psychological reactions from members of the ingroup, or U.S citizens. Outward demonstrations of loyalty, such as flags and participation in rallies, increased dramatically after 9/11 in part of a “cycle of solidarity” (Collins, 2004). In addition, Galea et al. (2002) report severe and lasting psychological effects in the aftermath of 9/11, most significantly PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) and depression for individuals living within New York City at the time of the attack. Schuster et al. (2001), Schlenger et al. (2002), and Silver et al. (2002) found increased levels of anxiety, stress, and depression nationwide post 9/11; Wadsworth et al. (2004) conclude that these widespread psychological reactions indicate that such effects are not dependent on direct exposure to the event. While these studies are informative in establishing the reactions of U.S. citizens to the attacks of 9/11, they do not indicate subsequent attitudes towards outgroups in the aftermath of this traumatic event.
Questionnaires measuring aggressive attitudes are more indicative of this relationship between 9/11 as a traumatic event and attitudes towards outgroups. One study linking fear as a reaction to perceived threat and aggression was conducted within a week of the 9/11 attacks. For the study, over 1,500 adults were interviewed over the phone during a six month period. It found that those who reported a high level of perceived threat stereotyped Arabs more negatively and supported more aggressive measures against Arabs (Huddy et al., 2005). Argyrides and Downey (2004) measured aggression, prejudice, and person-perception in college students and found significant increases in aggression the day of 9/11, and a spike in aggression a year later, indicating an anniversary effect. In addition, the study found that while aggression scores rose significantly immediately after the 9/11 attacks and then gradually decreased (with exception of the spike in aggression noted earlier), prejudice gradually increased. The author indicated that this may show a difference in attitude formation; aggression may be an instinctual reaction to harm towards one’s ingroup, while general prejudice and discrimination towards the outgroup may be a prolonged and slower process.

Quite a bit of literature after 9/11 appears to be dedicated to measuring fear after the attacks. Saad (2004) conducted research on the day of 9/11 and reports that 58% of people were “very worried” or “somewhat worried” about being victimized by terrorists. Schildkraut (2002) found that fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack was correlated with an inclination to make life difficult for a particular ethnic group, specifically Muslims or Arabs. Measuring longitudinal effects of 9/11, Holman and Silver (2005) ascertained that future orientation over time was associated with lesser levels of fear of a terrorist attack. Postulating based on the cross-sectional selection of participants in these studies, Argyride and Downey make a compelling argument that the attacks of 9/11 were traumatic even for those not directly affected by the attacks, and that media exposure may have influenced the extent of these effects (2004).

**Flashback Memory through Repeat Observation of a Traumatic Event**

There are indications that traumatic events are emblazoned in the memory of people in a process called “flashbulb memory”. Traumatic events, such as the assassination of President John F. Kennedy or Martin Luther King Jr., are events that affect the collective identity of an ingroup. Along with creating vivid recollections of where individuals were when they heard the news and what they were doing, such traumatic events have been hypothesized to create incredibly strong emotions in reaction to the event, emotions which are felt again when the
memory is invoked (Brown and Kulik, 1977). Research on “flashbulb memory” is inconclusive in most regards except for one; the confidence people feel in their ability to consistently remember specific details of an event is much greater than their actual ability to remember specific details of the event (e.g. where they were when they found out, what they were doing; Talarico and Rubin, 2003; Conway et al., 2009). However, Conway et al. (2009) found that more consistent “flashbulb memory” was associated with higher levels of reported anxiety after the 9/11 attacks. As the most recent event that would be likely to foment a “flashbulb memory”, the attacks of 9/11 are a logical traumatic event to investigate, particularly when studying the effect of such events on attitudes towards outgroups.

Research indicates that the viewing of an event vicariously through media has a significant effect on the observer (Everstine and Everstine, 1993; Lerais and Byrne, 2003; Pennebaker and Harber, 1993; Stone and Pennebaker, 2002). Studies involving exposure to clips showing the attacks of 9/11 report a correlation between repeat exposure to the events of 9/11 and attitudes. Participants’ SADS (social avoidance and distress scale) scores measuring fear increased after exposure to media clips from 9/11 (Masters, 2005), and high levels of stress were positively correlated with the amount of television people reported watching after 9/11 (Schuster et al., 2001). The reasoning behind using a clip of 9/11 would be to evoke emotions similar to those found in an “anniversary effect” observed in previous studies; this “effect”, seen on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, lead to increased aggression levels in one study and increased symbols and rituals of solidarity in the other (Argyrides et al., 2004; Collin, 2004). While other studies find no support for this anniversary effect, there is still some indication that emotions observed directly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred again on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks (Conway et al., 2009). Thus, there is some indication that repeat exposure to a traumatic event such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 may have an impact on attitudes such as aggression and outward expressions of solidarity, although available literature is inconclusive on the strength of “flashbulb memory” in eliciting emotions.

Hate Speech

Attempts by an elite member of an ingroup to convince others in the group that there is an imminent and real threat posed by an outgroup may provoke the onset of a polarization process. In such speech, typically an elite attempts to persuade members of the ingroup that the outgroup will cause harm to members of the ingroup if left alone and that action is necessary to
prevent harm to the ingroup by the outgroup. One way in which this is done is by using hate speech to elicit negative emotions towards outgroups. Cowan and Khatchadourian (2003: 300) explain that the purpose of hate speech is to “attack a person or group based on their gender, sexual preference, or their membership in a racial, ethnic, or religious group.” In examining the violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Vollhardt and associates (2007) found that hate speech used in the presidential election campaigns in 2006 contributed to polarization in the country. Citing a series of authors and previous studies, Cowan and Khatchadourian (2003: 300) argue that “it is clear that hate speech is not innocuous; it causes harm to individuals, groups, and society…Hate speech is the rhetoric of hate crimes and perpetuates racism, heterosexism, and sexism.” In a rather bold assertion, Peter Zvagulis (2010: 8) argues that “no collective violence has ever happened without hate speech preceding it.” One purpose of hate speech is to inform the ingroup of the threat which an outgroup poses to their survival (Parekh, 2006; Vollhardt et al., 2007).

Dehumanization as a Particular Component of Hate Speech

Dehumanization- the denial of qualities to an individual or group that set humans apart from animals or objects (Lammers and Stapel, 2011)- appears to be an important aspect of hate speech. In fact, Vollhardt et al. (2007:16) indicate that “a central characteristic of hate speech is that it is dehumanizing and defaming, and is used to denigrate and harm the target.” Using the Rwandan genocide as an example, Zvagulis (2006: 9) demonstrates that a key goal of an extremist leadership is to gain control of the media so that it can disseminate an “endless repetition of a message that dehumanizes the scapegoat.” In this case, the Tutsi in Rwanda were likened to “cockroaches” over the Radio Television Mille Collines before and during the genocide (Vollhardt et al., 2007). Further strengthening the connection between dehumanization and hate speech, Genocide Watch (in Vollhardt et al., 2007) indicates that dehumanizing speech is one of eight steps leading up to genocide. Cowan and Khatchadourian (2003) provide evidence that humanizing the targets of hate speech increases empathy towards the targets and thus decreases the effectiveness of the hate speech and underscores that a main characteristic of hate speech is to dehumanize the target.
Defining Components of Hate Speech

There are specific characteristics that define a hate speech and separate it from other types of speech, most notably free speech. In an analysis of the difference between hate speech and other forms of offensive speech, Bhikhu Parekh finds that hate speech has three distinct features.

1. Singles out an individual or a group of individuals on the basis of certain characteristics
2. Stigmatizes its target by ascribing to it a set of constitutive qualities that are widely viewed as highly undesirable
3. Target group is placed outside the pale of normal social relationships. Thus, they can’t be trusted to observe the rules of the governing society

(Parekh, 2006: 214)

A more detailed deconstruction of the components of hate speech is found in an article studying hate speech in the DRC. The framework is as follows

1. Contains instigating elements of the continuum of violence
   A. Distinction is made between “us” and “them”
   B. Individual or group is blamed for misfortunes of the country
   C. Accused of disloyalty, treachery, alliance with other countries (in particular with an enemy) or previous regime
2. Derogatory and violates standards of argumentative integrity
   A. Insults and attacks on the integrity of an individual are involved, communication is defaming and derogatory
   B. arguments are unbalanced and not objectively verifiably
   C. legitimacy and ability of individual or group to hold political power and influence is questionable
   D. targeted group or individual is denied distinct characteristics of human nature
   E. individual or group is threatened
3. Suggested strategies do not offer real or constructive solutions to existing problems and serve the self-interests of the speaker and/or his group while only harming another group
   A. speaker attains direct political gain by harming target
   B. focus on individuals or groups instead of on issues
   C. focus on one alleged source of problems and blaming targeted group or individual
   D. offered solutions are destructive rather than constructive in nature, based on the exclusion of certain individuals or groups from political power or society in general
   E. communicated ideas and suggested solutions for problems are not inclusive of all society, but benefit a specific group while excluding others

(Vollhardt et al. 2007: 29-30).
Summary

As indicated by the review of literature above, traumatic events can lead to difference reactions, both in behavior and attitude. Specifically, the attacks of 9/11 appear to have led to higher levels of depression, PTSD, anxiety, and symbols of solidarity. In addition, 9/11 appears to have had a long-term impact, and while “flashbulb memory” strength has been disputed, there are some indications that repeat exposure to the events of 9/11 through media clips are correlated with increased depression. Further, at least two studies found an anniversary effect – evidence that reminding people of the events of 9/11 does bring back similar emotions as those experienced when the traumatic event first occurred. In addition, perceived threat seems to influence attitudes towards specific outgroups. Fear of a terrorist attack increased substantially after the attacks and corresponds to an increase in aggression.

Hate speech appears to be a precursor to acts of violence towards outgroups; in fact, some argue that genocide and other acts of ethnic violence would not occur without the dissemination of hate speech throughout an ingroup. In contrast to an act such as 9/11, it appears that hate speech is part of a prolonged process which helps create an environment where violence towards a specific group becomes acceptable (Parekh, 2006). Continued exposure to such speech may lead to a polarizing attitudes towards outgroups targeted in the hate speech. Recent ethnic conflicts and genocides, including those in Rwanda, Darfur, Nazi Germany, and the Balkans have all been used as examples of the potential harm hate speech can do to those systematically exposed to it. In particular, the use of hate speech in the Rwandan genocide has been implicated in the implementation and prolongation of the genocide.

However, this literature does not examine how gender may act as a mediating variable in the reaction of men and women to traumatic events such as those analyzed above. In addition, it does not indicate how this reaction may lead to a differential formation of attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to these events. An examination of gender differences in reaction and attitude after these traumatic events should help indicate if these attitudes form differentially in men and women.
Polarization and Gender

Does gender act as a mediating influence on the formation of polarizing attitudes after exposure to traumatic events? The idea that gender differences may exist in the formation of these attitudes and is a subject worth investigating can be derived from examining available gender difference literature, particularly war literature in a gendered context (Goldstein, 2001; Jones, 1997).

War as a Gendered Occupation

One of the traditional roles of men in tribal societies is that of the warrior (Sanday, 1981). Men have traditionally had a more active role in violent actions towards outgroups than women. While gender roles outside of warfare and forms of war vary across time and culture, the gender roles within warfare are “more stable, across cultures and through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of war itself” (Goldstein, 2001: 9). Examples of women in warfare (for an extended discussion, see Goldstein, 2001; Elshtain, 1987; and Jones, 1997), point more to the anomaly of women fighting – not their standard participation in warfare. Historians have noted exceptional male leaders and warriors, but have not generally made extensive note of the common male soldier. However, we do find considerable documentation and mention of women fighting, whether in positions of leadership or as common soldiers, because it was and still is considered abnormal and contrary to social norms. The full integration of women into front-line combat units has been met with resistance, particularly in the United States (Goldstein, 2001).

Throughout history, men have participated more directly and more extensively in warfare than women, particularly front-line war. Explaining reasons for this marked difference in gender participation in warfare is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this thesis, the most important point to derive is that there is a difference. With few exceptions, men have been the primary fighters on the frontlines, although women have participated as nurses and spies, as well as combatants in war (for an extended discussion of women in warfare, see Jones, 1997). In fact, women during the American Civil War contributed substantially to the war effort in both the North and the South as medical assistants and spies, successfully took over the running of factories, plantations, and home businesses, and impeded the advancement of the opposing army by withholding or fabricating information (Heimerman, 1999; Brockett and Vaughan, 1867).
Despite historical examples which demonstrate the active role of women in warfare, more men have engaged in frontline warfare as the culminating act of the polarization process than women through history. Moreover, it seems likely that more men than women engage in the polarization process since polarization precedes warfare and men preponderantly assume the role of warrior and perpetrator of violence. Examination of support for violence and warfare would seem a logical place to start an investigation of if attitudinal differences in the polarization process exist.

**Gender as a Mediating Variable in Support for Violence**

An examination of gender differences in the support of war provides preliminary support for this assumption. Attitudes towards warfare provide additional support that men and women differ in attitudes towards outgroups leading to war. An important finding is that men tend to be more pro-war than women (Lester, 1994). In general, women tend to be less belligerent than men in foreign and domestic policy (Page and Shapiro 1992), which Capriole and Boyer (2001) have traced to socialization processes. Women tend to be more peace oriented than men in some Western nations (Conover and Sapiro 1993) and appear to be less supportive of the use of violence to resolve conflicts, particularly in the United States (Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Frankovic 1982; Mueller 1973, 1994).

Nincic and Nincic (2002) review explanations for gender differences in the support of war, violence, and force. Reasons for these differences divide into two main camps: ‘social constructivist’ and ‘essentialist’. The social constructivist uses culture and society to explain gender roles in society. In contrast, the essentialist argument uses gender differences such as higher levels of testosterone and mothering differences to explain gender roles. This argument finds support in marginal but consistent differences in aggression in men and women, a body of literature discussed more in-depth below.

A third explanation, known as ‘consequentialist’, explains gender differences for violence in terms of victimization (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). While women do not usually engage in warfare, they are often the primary victims. Brownmiller (1975: 32, 35) argues that one such act of victimization, rape, was and still is a “common act” and “reward” of war. Indeed, “rape may be viewed as part of a recognizable pattern of national terror and subjugation”, the effect of which “is indubitably one of intimidation and demoralization for the victims’ side”
(Brownmiller, 1975: 37). Because of the humiliation, disgrace, psychological, social, and physical effects of rape, it is in the self-interest and self-preservation for women to be against warfare and violence, during which times rapes are more likely to occur.

Whether the reason for such differences is one, all or none of the possible explanations given above, substantial evidence still exists that men and women differ in preferences of force and violence (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). In addition to the large difference in participation in warfare seen in men and women throughout recorded history, the gender difference in preferences for violence is another indication that attitude differences may exist in the formation of polarizing attitudes.

**Gender as a Mediating Variable in Response to Traumatic Events**

*Gender as a Mediating Variable in Response to events of 9/11*

Some reactions to traumatic events such as 9/11 differ along gender lines. Women were likely to be more sympathetic and use emotion-focused coping than men in the aftermath of 9/11 (Grossman & Wood, 1993; Diener, Sandvik, and Larsen 1985; Ptacek, Smith and Dodge, 1994; Tamres, Janicki, and Helgeson 2002; Wadsworth et al., 2004). Chu et al. (2006) found that, after the 9/11 attack, women were more likely to express sympathy for victims and express emotion while men were more likely to advocate action against those responsible for the attacks, particularly through violent means. In a web-based survey, Silver et al. (2002) found that women were significantly more likely to express high levels of posttraumatic stress disorder, while Lindsey et al. (2007) report higher levels of depression for women one week after the 9/11 attack and again eleven weeks after the attack.

*Gender as a Mediating Variable in Response to Hate Speech*

Literature examining gender differences in response to hate speech is sparse, although some differences have been found. Cowan and Mettrick (2002), McClelland and Hunter (1992), and Cowan et al. (2005) indicate that women are less tolerant of hate speech than men. A specific example of this is found by Cowan et al. (2005) when investigating heterosexual attitude towards gays and lesbians; results demonstrate that support for hate crimes and hate speech against gays and lesbians was significantly related to the type of heterosexism they ascribed to and the gender of the participant. While men scored higher than women in evaluating the importance of speech, women scored higher in the perceived harm and offensiveness of hate
speech (Cowan et al., 2005). Related research found that the gender of an individual making racist or sexist comments influenced how individuals rated the offensiveness of the comment. Comments made by a man were 2.4 times more likely to be considered offensive than the same comments made by a woman (Cunningham, Ferreira, and Fink, 2009). Thus, gender of the individual making the comment and gender of the person receiving the comment both seem to be significant indicators of the influence that hate speech has on an individual.

Summary

The literature examining gender differences in the aftermath of 9/11 indicates that women react to traumatic events such as 9/11 with more stress, anxiety, and depression than men; they also appear to express more emotion than men and use emotional coping mechanisms more than men. Men, in contrast, appear to react with a more active coping mechanism, including the support of action against those responsible for the attacks through violent means. Research on gender differences in hate speech are somewhat more difficult to find. However, these studies are very instructive in creating a groundwork of how gender interacts with hate speech; in particular, it appears that the gender of both the instigator of hate speech and the recipient of the hate speech influence the reaction of individuals to hate speech.

Both bodies of literature examine how the subsequent effect of a traumatic event is influenced by the individual’s gender. However, they do not examine how the traumatic event influences the recipient’s consequential attitude towards members of specific outgroups, particularly the outgroup associated with the traumatic event. Specifically, this literature does not show how gender may influence the formation of fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to these traumatic events. Examination of the gender differences in the polarization attitudes of fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism may give indications of how men and women will develop these polarizing attitudes in response to traumatic events.

Polarization Attitudes of Fear, Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism

Fear as a Response to Threat

Research on the brain indicates that the amygdala may be the area of the brain where determination of threat and response preparation initially occurs. This process occurs rapidly,
appearing to not even require recognition of the stimulus in order to elicit reaction by the amygdala. Davis and Whalen (2001) concluded that the amygdala has connections to areas of the brain that control physiological and behavioral responses usually associated with fear and anxiety, directionality of these connections suggests that these responses originate in the amygdala. Ohman et al. (2007) indicates that the emotion of fear may be used as a hard-wired coping mechanism to deal with threat to one’s survival, in which fear elicits varying responses including escape, attack, or freezing (Fanselow, Decoa, and Young, 1993).

*Gender as a Predictor of the Expression of Fear*

Studies examining fear of crime have found that women are consistently more fearful than men (Ferraro, 1995; Fisher and Sloan, 2003); in Nellis (2009), women reported more fear of terrorism than men, indicating that gender differences in fear seem to extend beyond fear of crime. One reason for this difference in fear includes physical vulnerability (Skogan and Maxfield 1981), which is backed by physiological differences between men and women. Men in the US are 8% taller than women on average and consistently stronger, particularly in upper body strength (Fausto-Sterling, 1985; U.S. Army 1982). Men are also faster and can run longer than women on average, although women may be *constitutionally* stronger than men (Goldstein, 2001). Warr and Stafford (1983) argue that gender differences in fear are due to women’s focus on the outcome rather than likelihood of occurrence, while Gordon and Riger (1991) use women’s subordinate role in society to explain gender differences in the expression of fear. Socialization processes have also been used by Goodey (1997) and Sutton and Farrall (2005) to argue that men suppress the expression of fear, not that women actually have a greater amount of fear. Maccoby (1998) found that social processes encourage women and girls to be more emotionally expressive than men, while Levant (1995) indicates that men are less emotionally expressive with the exception of anger.

*Dehumanization as a Subhuman or Non-Human Classifier*

In a review of dehumanization literature, Haslam (2006) makes an important distinction between those perceived as subhuman and those perceived as non-human. Subhuman groups are generally depicted using animalistic images and symbols and are associated with such characteristics as amorality. Non-human groups, in contrast, are represented by mechanistic characteristics such as distant, foreign, cold, and emotionally inert (Haslam, 2006).
Dehumanization literature often focuses on the use of animal, particularly vermin, comparisons made of the Tutsis in Rwanda, Bosnians in the Balkans, and the Jews in the Holocaust. O’Brien (2003) found similar usage of these metaphors in images of immigrants. Attributes given to the outgroup, including lack of culture, amorality, rigidity, inertness, and coldness, are all associated with characteristics that are not uniquely human (Haslam, 2006).

*Ethnocentrism and Moral Depravity as Relational Attributes of Dehumanization*

Ethnocentrism and moral depravity attitudes are relational qualities associated with dehumanization attitudes. Sumner ([1906] 2002: 13) defined ethnocentrism as the “view in which one’s own group is the center of everything.” This view includes pride, vanity, and a feeling of superiority over others and an equal view of scorn and contempt for other groups (Sumner [1906] 2002). Ethnocentrism by an individual can be found by measuring the strength of stereotypical beliefs held by an individual towards an outgroup (Kam and Kinder, 2007). If an ingroup truly thinks of an outgroup as subhuman, as defined by dehumanization, it is not difficult to make a reverse directionality argument i.e. if an outgroup is subhuman and an ingroup is human, then the ingroup is superior to the outgroup because it is human. This is supported by Bar-Tal’s analysis of dehumanization, in which delegitimizing beliefs are used to provide a sense of superiority over another group (Bar-Tal, 2000). This feeling of superiority would be even easier to achieve if the members of the outgroup were thought of as non-human, or not even possessing human qualities.

A similar argument can be made for a strong relationship between moral depravity and dehumanization attitudes. Esses et al. (2008) argue that an important component of dehumanization appears to be the perception that members of an outgroup are immoral or unjust. If members of an outgroup are considered subhuman or nonhuman, then there would little expectation that members of the outgroup would adhere to moral dictates followed by the ingroup, who are human. In fact, Jahoda (1999) writes that historically others or members of an outgroup have been depicted as subhuman through their lack of “moral sensibility”. Thus, the general feeling of superiority over others, which is characteristic of ethnocentrism, is specifically demonstrated through a feeling of moral superiority of the ingroup and subsequent moral depravity of the outgroup. Dehumanization, moral depravity, and inferiority of the outgroup are all attributed as characteristics inherent in the outgroup in order to lower inhibitions of violence normally felt when killing other human beings. Because of this close relationship, it would be
expected that a strong correlation would exist between moral depravity, dehumanization, and ethnocentrism attitudes.

**Dehumanization as a Catalyst for the Reduction in Inhibitions to Violence**

Dehumanization appears to be an attitude that prepares an individual for action, particularly violent action towards the outgroup to eliminate the threat of the outgroup (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008). A common assumption behind dehumanization is that the outgroup poses a threat to members of the ingroup; because the non-human or subhuman outgroup violates moral norms, it is believed that the outgroup will adversely affect the ingroup. Because of this, action is needed before the outgroup does harm the ingroup. Lammers and Stapel (2011) describe how emotions normally elicited toward other human beings are suppressed when those in an outgroup are seen as having non-human or subhuman characteristics. Haslam further expounds on this process by demonstrating how identification with the victim is blocked if the victim is seen as being a sub-human object, thus disengaging the perpetrator’s moral self-sanctions (2006). Smith (2011) and Costello and Hodson (2009) postulate that it becomes easier to kill members of the outgroup when emotions such as moral self-sanctions are suppressed, and it is easier to suppress these emotions when members of the outgroup are seen as subhuman or non-human. Such depictions as these are thought by Bandura (2002) to facilitate inhumane acts of discrimination such as genocide. This is supported by research done by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008: 877) in Darfur, which shows that “racial and ethnic epithets conveying contempt and denying humanity to targeted group members are effective instruments of dehumanization that make it easier for ordinary people to permit and participate in genocide.”

**Aggression as an Indicator of Gender Differences in Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism**

Surprisingly, there is little literature which explores gender differences in the expression of dehumanization, and by extension moral depravity and ethnocentrism. However, a link between dehumanization and indiscriminately aggressive behavior found by McFaul (2011) indicates that the two are related. This implies that a study of aggression differences in men and women may shed light on dehumanization attitudinal differences in men and women as well.
Aggression is one of the most well-documented gender differences in men and women (Marini, 1990). A common argument is that higher levels of testosterone in men make men more aggressive than women. While both men and women have testosterone and estrogen, men have five to ten times more testosterone than women (McDermott et al. 2007); women, on the other hand, have three to twenty five times more estrogen than men (Goldstein 2001). Although McDermott et al. (2007) cite literature that has linked testosterone to aggression, violence, and antisocial behavior, directionality of the relationship between aggression and testosterone has yet to be established. In their study of testosterone and confidence, Johnson and associates found that increased testosterone levels were linked to higher self-valuations of confidence in war games, but these results were not confined along gender lines (2006). Despite these difficulties, studies which measure aggression behaviors indicate fairly distinct gender differences in expression of aggressive behavior. In a review of hundreds of gender studies, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974: 351) found fairly established gender differences in aggression for children starting as early as 2 years and “although aggressiveness of both sexes declines with age, boys and men remain more aggressive through the college years.” Meta-analysis of studies examining aggression differences in adult men and women find that men are consistently more aggressive than women, although Eagly and Steffen (1986) and Hyde (in Hyde and Linn, 1986) stress that the size of the difference was often small. While results may indicate differences at the margin, these consistent aggression differences in gender indicate that any attitudes leading to aggression i.e. dehumanization, ethnocentrism, and moral depravity may be higher in men than women.

**Summary of the Polarization Process**

Certain attitudes may act as primers that lower inhibitions which normally restrain individuals from engaging in violence, including war, ethnic conflict, and genocidal acts, towards other human beings. These inhibitions can be lowered by certain events which trigger a polarization of attitudes towards an outgroup. This polarization process is one in which an ingroup, in response to some perceived threat, undergoes rapid and extreme attitudinal change towards an outgroup. Four such attitudes, fearfulness, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism, have been identified as potential precursors to war mobilization (Van der Dennen, 1986). One of the ways this polarization process is triggered is through traumatic events, such as murderous acts committed by members of an outgroup. Another traumatic event likely to
trigger these attitudes is when elites convince members of an ingroup that there is an imminent and real threat posed by outgroups through the use of hate speech. Once the threat has been established, these attitudes are triggered, formed, or developed as a means to justify violence towards the outgroup and thus ensure survival of the ingroup.

Engaging in warfare is the culminating act of the polarization process. As it has been indicated by historical record that more men engage in this culminating act of the polarization process than women, a corollary assumption of this indication is that more men than women would engage in this polarization process. It is a logical assumption that men would engage in this polarization process more often than women before violent action toward the outgroup because of their role as warrior and perpetrator of violence. Preliminary support for this assumption is found by an examination of gender differences in the support of war. Additional support for this assumption is found in the examination of reactions to traumatic events in a gendered context. Existing literature indicates that men and women respond differently to traumatic events; women appear to respond to traumatic events such as 9/11 with more anxiety and anxiety-related attitudes, while men seem to respond with more aggression. This would seem to indicate that men and women will differ in attitudes towards outgroups, particularly those associated with the traumatic events. Gender differences in reaction to hate speech indicate that women are less tolerant of hate speech. After 9/11, a fairly consistent difference in the expression of fear was found among men and women. However, a paucity of literature appears when examining gender differences in the formation of dehumanization and moral depravity attitudes. The analysis below synthesizes the intersection of this literature and indicates specific hypotheses to test the relationship of traumatic events and their influences on the formation of fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes when tempered by gender.

**Exposure to Events as an Indicator of the Formation of Attitudes toward Outgroups**

**General Hypotheses Due to Pre-existing Attitudes before Exposure to Traumatic Events**

The attacks of 9/11 defined a point of change for the American way of life, including the introduction of terror on U.S. soil by foreign entities within this generation, a shift in foreign policy with the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq, as well as shift in lifestyle including more stringent security measures for travelers. Members of Al Qaeda committed an act of terrorism
against U.S. citizens when they attacked the Twin Towers on 9/11. Based on Al Qaeda ideology, the decision to kill these particular American citizens was not motivated by any personal insult or slight perpetrated by victims of the attack to members of Al Qaeda. Rather, the justification of killing these individuals lay in their classification as members of a specific ingroup, that of citizen of the United States and members of the broader Western world. It would be expected that after such an event, fear among members of the identified ingroup would express high levels of fear, particularly towards the outgroup that perpetrated such an act. In addition, the actions of members of Al Qaeda violated norms and rules which are associated with uniquely human traits. Because of this violation of norms, it would be expected that citizens of the United States would see members of Al Qaeda as less than human or non-human; thus, it would be expected that citizens of the United States would attribute higher levels of dehumanization to members of Al Qaeda than other outgroups which had not committed similar violations of social norms. As corollaries of dehumanization, moral depravity and ethnocentrism would also be expected to be higher for members of Al Qaeda than other outgroups.

Study of the media coverage of terrorist attacks including and following 9/11 indicate a difference in how terrorist attacks are portrayed, dependent on whether the act of terror was perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or not. In research investigating how media has portrayed terrorist attacks since 9/11, Powell (2011) found that

“…fear of international terrorism is dominant, particularly as Muslims/Arabs/Islam working together in organized terrorist cells against a ‘Christian America’, while domestic terrorism is cast as a minor threat that occurs in isolated incidents by troubled individuals.”

(Powell, 2011: 91)

Because of media portrayal linking Islam and terrorism, the outgroup of Muslims would be expected to elicit similar feelings to those felt for Al Qaeda, though not to the same magnitude. This indicates an ordering of attitudes, conceptualized as follows:

**Hypothesis 1**: Within each treatment group, the most negative fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism attitudes will be towards members of Al Qaeda

**Hypothesis 2**: Within each treatment group, the second most negative fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism attitudes will be towards Muslims
Exposure to Events as an Indicator for Fear Attitudes towards Outgroups

9/11 Attacks as a Catalyst for Fear towards Outgroups

Fear appears to be a hard-wired mechanism in the brain which prepares an individual for flight, attack, or freezing in response to a perceived threat. In their study of ethnic conflict, Lake and Rothchild (1996) indicate that a key factor in the initiation of violence against an outgroup is fear of the future, particularly fear for the safety of the ingroup. Because of this, it would be expected that exposure to traumatic events which have harmed members of an ingroup would elicit a fear response. This assertion is backed by Saad (2004), Schildkraut (2002), and Holman and Silver (2005) in studies examining fear after the 9/11 attacks. Murderous actions committed by an outgroup based on characteristics of the ingroup would elicit fear because of the potential that the outgroup may kill others, including the individual, within the ingroup as well. It would be expected that such a threat to one’s survival by the outgroup would elicit feelings of fear towards this outgroup.

Members of Al Qaeda committed an act of terrorism against U.S. citizens when they attacked the Twin Towers on 9/11. The decision by Al Qaeda to kill these particular American citizens was not motivated by any personal insult or slight perpetrated by victims of the attack towards members of Al Qaeda. Rather, the justification of killing these individuals lay in their classification as members of a specific ingroup, that of citizen of the United States and members of the broader Western world. It would be assumed that repeat exposure to the 9/11 clip would evoke similar emotions as those felt when the attack first occurred. One of these emotions, as found in surveys, was fear. It would be expected that after such an event, fear among members of the identified ingroup would express high levels of fear, particularly towards the outgroup that perpetrated such an act. In the case of 9/11, this would indicate increased fear of Al Qaeda. Members of Al Qaeda are also followers of the Muslim faith, and the two are often used together in the same sentence. As such, it would also be expected that fear towards Muslims would increase.

Hate Speech as a Catalyst for Fear towards Outgroups

Manipulation by elites in which they successfully convince members of an ingroup that an outgroup poses a real and imminent threat to the ingroup’s survival may also elicit a fear response. The speaker may use past incidents when the outgroup has threatened the survival of
the ingroup, and make the argument that they will harm the ingroup once again. Pat Condell uses the example of 9/11 to show how Al Qaeda threatened Americans before; this argument may be made by using specific characteristics of the outgroup which violate social norms of the ingroup (Vollhardt et al., 2007). In the hate speech given by Pat Condell, he uses the religion of Islam to unite all Muslims under the umbrella of potential terrorists and conquerors. When it is indicated that an outgroup poses a threat to the survival of the ingroup through past and possible future actions they may take (especially if they have violated social norms and behavior in the past and may do so in the future), fear for survival of the ingroup as well as the individual may be triggered. Drawing upon past examples of Islamic conquest, Condell makes an argument that the proposed mosque near ground zero will become a symbol of Muslim conquest over the United States if we allow the mosque to be built. In so doing, he paints a picture of Al Qaeda and more particularly Muslims as a real threat to the survival of U.S. citizens and western civilization.

Summary and Hypotheses

When an individual or ingroup is not exposed to such traumatic events, it would be expected that lower levels of fear would be expressed towards these outgroups. In terms of a gendered analysis, this would indicate that men will be more fearful of outgroups after exposure to a portrayal of murder by members of an outgroup (such as 9/11) than men not exposed to the portrayal. It would also be expected to be the case for men after exposure to a hate speech which tries to portray an outgroup as a threat. A similar line of reasoning would produce the same expectations when comparing women exposed to traumatic events to those not exposed to the events. Operationalization of these expectations indicates a batch of measurable hypotheses, as follows:

**Hypothesis 3**: Men exposed to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup will demonstrate fear attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than men not exposed to such treatments

**Hypothesis 4**: Men exposed to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat will demonstrate fear attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than men not exposed to such treatments
**Hypothesis 5:** Women exposed to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup will demonstrate fear attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than women not exposed to such treatments.

**Hypothesis 6:** Women exposed to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat will demonstrate fear attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than women not exposed to such treatments.

**Exposure to Events as an Indicator for Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism Attitudes towards Outgroups**

*9/11 Attacks as a Catalyst for Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism Attitudes towards Outgroups*

As already indicated above, an argument used behind the dehumanization process of an outgroup is that the outgroup does not follow the accepted social rules of an ingroup. Members of Al Qaeda broke such rules in the attacks of 9/11. The ingroup, or the victims of the 9/11 attacks, viewed the attacks as unprovoked, devastating, and horrific. As such, it would be expected that members of Al Qaeda would be viewed as sub-human or non-human because they violated acceptable social rules on 9/11. Association with the religion of Islam and members of Al Qaeda would indicate that dehumanization may occur for Muslims as well.

*Hate Speech as a Catalyst for Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism Attitudes towards Outgroups*

Dehumanization appears to be a central aspect of hate speech. Thus, it would be expected that dehumanization of outgroups would increase after exposure to a hate speech, particularly the targeted outgroup. A specific part of dehumanization is that the outgroup is demonized and that the ingroup is thought of as superior to the targeted outgroup; because of this, it would also be expected that moral depravity and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups would increase after exposure to the hate speech.

*Summary and Hypotheses*

When the individual or ingroup is not exposed to such traumatic events, it would be expected that lower levels of fear would be expressed towards these outgroups. In terms of a gendered analysis, this would indicate that men will be more fearful of outgroups after exposure...
to a portrayal of murder by members of an outgroup (such as 9/11) than men not exposed to the portrayal. It would also be expected to be the case for men after exposure to a hate speech which tries to portray an outgroup as a threat. A similar line of reasoning would produce the same expectations when comparing women exposed to traumatic events to those not exposed to the events. Operationalization of these indications yields the following hypotheses

**Hypothesis 7**: Men exposed to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup will demonstrate dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than men not exposed to such treatments.

**Hypothesis 8**: Men exposed to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat will demonstrate dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than men not exposed to such treatments.

**Hypothesis 9**: Women exposed to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup will demonstrate dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than women not exposed to such treatments.

**Hypothesis 10**: Women exposed to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat will demonstrate dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentric attitudes towards outgroups to a greater extent than women not exposed to such treatments.

**Gender Influence on the Formation of Polarizing Attitudes towards Outgroups after Exposure to Traumatic Events**

*Gender as a Mediating Influence on Fear Attitudes towards Outgroups after Exposure to Traumatic Events*

Gender appears to be a predictor of crime; in fact, Ferraro (1995) found that gender is a stronger predictor of fear of crime than any other variable. This appears to be supported by examination of fear of terrorism as well, in which women were more likely than men to indicate worry that they would be a victim of a terrorist attack. This gender difference literature would indicate that women will express more fear towards perpetrators of a crime than men, even when both men and women are exposed to the same traumatic event. In the case of 9/11, the literature would indicate that women will express more fear towards Al Qaeda and by extension Muslims than men. In a hate speech which seeks to identify Muslims as terrorists like members of Al
Qaeda, it would be expected that women will express more fear towards Muslims and Al Qaeda than men. A synthesis of this literature indicates that

**Hypothesis 11**: Women will express more fear towards outgroups than men after exposure to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup

**Hypothesis 12**: Women will express more fear towards outgroups than men after exposure to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat

*Gender as a Mediating Influence on Dehumanization, Moral Depravity, and Ethnocentrism*

*Attitudes towards Outgroups after Exposure to Traumatic Events*

Regardless of the inconclusive literature investigating the relationship between testosterone, gender, and aggression, a fairly large body of literature indicates that men display more aggressive behaviors than women. This would indicate that men would dehumanize outgroups more than women after exposure to traumatic events in preparation to do violent acts towards the outgroup. This indication is supported by literature examining reactions to 9/11; some studies indicate general increased aggression after the attacks, while one found that men favored aggressive actions towards perpetrators of attack i.e. Al Qaeda after 9/11 more than women. After exposure to a re-enactment of the 9/11 attacks meant to elicit similar emotions as those felt after 9/11, this literature indicates that men would dehumanize outgroups more than women, particularly members of Al Qaeda.

**Hypothesis 13**: Men will dehumanize outgroups more than women after exposure to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup

**Hypothesis 14**: Men will dehumanize outgroups more than women after exposure to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat

**Hypothesis 15**: Men will attribute more moral depravity to outgroups than women after exposure to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup

**Hypothesis 16**: Men will attribute more moral depravity to outgroups than women after exposure to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat

**Hypothesis 17**: Men will adopt a more ethnocentric attitude towards outgroups than women after exposure to a portrayal of murderous actions carried out by an outgroup

**Hypothesis 18**: Men will adopt a more ethnocentric attitude towards outgroups than women after exposure to a hate speech in which an outgroup is portrayed as a threat
An exploratory assertion of this study is that exposure to traumatic events will elicit attitudes which disperse generally towards all outgroups, although they will be strongest towards the group which is portrayed as the perpetrator of the traumatic events. In order to ascertain whether or not there is any validity to this assertion, assessments of fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, and ethnocentrism attitudes towards undocumented immigrants were included as well as assessments of Al Qaeda and Muslims.

Methods

Participants

Two hundred seventy nine students from Utah State University, 52% (n=145) male and 48% (n=134) female, participated in this study. Participants were undergraduate college students enrolled in two introductory level classes, a university-breadth humanities course (USU 1340) and an introductory international relations political science class (2200). The majority of participants (71.3%, n=199) were between the ages 18-21, with 22.2% (n=62) between the ages 22-25, 2.5% (n=7) between ages 26-30, 2.8% (n=8) 31 and over, 1.1% (n=3) under 18. Most students attending Utah State University are from Utah and the surrounding area, and are members of the LDS religion. Students in this class followed this trend. In fact, 81.7% (n=228) in these classes reported belonging to the Latter-day Saint faith, while 4.3% (n=12) selected catholic or protestant as their religious affiliation, 5% (n=14) reported as belonging to other religions, and 9% (n=25) selecting none as their religious affiliation. The vast majority of people living in Cache Valley County, where Utah State University is located, are non-Hispanic white; the largest minority living in Cache Valley is Hispanic, followed by Asian and those reporting two or more races (U.S. Census Bureau: Cache County, census.gov).

Measures

The purpose of the experiment was to measure people’s attitudes towards Muslims, Al Qaeda, and undocumented immigrants after exposure to a clip of 9/11 or a hate speech. While the main focus of the experiment was to measure attitudes towards Al Qaeda and Muslims, questions about undocumented immigrants were included in order to measure any residual effect portrayal of events may play on attitude formation towards groups not portrayed in the clips. Participants asked to fill out a 54 question survey. Three questions dealt with demographic
characteristics: age, religion, and gender. Ages of participants were divided into five categories: Under 18, 18-21, 22-25, 26-30, and 31 and over. Religion was divided into four categories: Latter-day Saints, Catholic/Protestant, Other, or None. Gender options were female or male. Three questions asked participants to self-report their knowledge level of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants, respectively, using a four point scale ranging from very well informed to not informed at all. The rest of the 48 questions were statements reflecting participants’ attitudes toward Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrant. In particular, subjects were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with each statement on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree (0) to strongly disagree (6). This was decided upon because it gave participants more variation in responses while still allowing for the operationalization of responses, which is more difficult with open-ended questions. Five attitudinal categories were selected to measure participants’ attitudes toward Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants: fear, dehumanization, moral depravity, ethnocentrism, and like/dislike. A higher score on the question indicated a more negative attitude towards that group along one of these dimensions. Questions with reverse directionality, where a higher score indicated a more positive attitude towards that group, were re-coded so that directionality of all questions remained consistent. In an attempt to avoid answer bias, question order was determined using a random number generator. A copy of the questionnaire used in this experiment can be found in Appendix A.

Measuring Fear

These questions were meant to measure if participants were afraid of Muslims, Al Qaeda, or undocumented immigrants harming them, their family, or Americans in general. Three of the fear questions closely mirror the question “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism?” used in previous studies (Nellis, 2009). These questions are meant to tap into the worry aspect of fear, which has been established as a satisfactory measure of fear (Lane and Meeker, 2000; Warr and Ellison, 2000). The other three questions were meant to tap into the safe/unsafe and trust/distrust aspect of fear for these outgroups. The second set of questions were not asked about members of Al Qaeda because, based on Al Qaeda philosophy and actions toward Western civilization and U.S. civilization in particular, it was assumed that those filling out the questionnaire would not feel safe and would
feel highly distrustful of members of Al Qaeda. Thus, including them on the questionnaire would be redundant.

Measuring Dehumanization

These questions were meant to measure if participants felt that Muslims, Al Qaeda, and undocumented immigrants were not quite human or not quite as human as they themselves are. Two of these questions tap into the subhuman aspect of dehumanization as defined by David Smith in *Less Than Human* (2011). The idea behind this concept is that dehumanization occurs when we think of people in terms of what they lack and also in terms of what makes them less than human (Smith, 2011). Specifically, dehumanization has been associated with demonization of the outgroup (Parekh, 2006). Thus, one set of statements depicted the three outgroups as “demons”. In addition, one of the tenets of dehumanization is that if these groups are not human or they are subhuman, they do not deserve to be treated as humans. Thus, two questions were included which dealt with rights. If participants truly did think that these groups were less than human, we reasoned that participants would also feel that these outgroups did not deserve to have the same rights as the participants.

Measuring Moral Depravity

Seeing an outgroup as immoral or unjust is an important aspect of dehumanization (Esses et al., 2008). The outgroup is seen as willing to cheat to get its way as well as willing to break principles of fairness and justice. Thus, the questions were designed to measure to what extent participants thought that the outgroup would follow principles of fairness, justices, and honesty. These questions were meant to measure if participants felt they were more or less moral than Muslims, Al Qaeda, and undocumented immigrants.

Measuring Ethnocentrism and Dislike/Like

These questions were meant to measure participants’ general feeling of superiority over the groups in question, and indicate how people felt about these groups in general. The like/dislike question was meant to give a measure of how strongly participants felt in their attitudes towards Muslims, Al Qaeda, and undocumented immigrants. However, a decision was made to drop these two variables after a factor analysis was performed and no statistical analysis of these variables was included in this paper.
Exposure to Traumatic Events

A major focus of the experiment was to analyze polarization attitudes toward Al Qaeda and Muslims after exposure to traumatic events. Because of this, the criteria for selecting the clips were that they 1. Evoked strong emotion, notably clips designed to evoke negative attitudes towards the targeted outgroups 2. Were related to either Al Qaeda or Muslims. As the most defining experience Americans have had with Al Qaeda, the 9/11 clip was selected to portray what had been done to Americans by members of Al Qaeda. The reasoning behind the selection was that the clip would evoke emotions similar to those found in an “anniversary effect” observed in previous studies; this “effect” lead to increased aggression levels in one study and increased symbols and rituals of solidarity in the other (Argyrides et al., 2004; Collin 2004).

The second media clip selected is a speech by Pat Condell, in which he speaks out against a proposed mosque that would be built near ground zero. Again, the clip was selected because of its association with Muslims and indirectly with Al Qaeda (indirectly because it was to be built close to Ground Zero). It was also selected because of its defining characteristic as a hate speech (for an analysis and deconstruction of the hate speech, see Appendix B).

Procedure

Participants were undergraduate college students enrolled in two introductory level classes, a university-breadth humanities course (USU 1340) and an introductory international relations political science class (POLSCI 2200). Students in each class were given a slip of paper labeled A, B, or C, which randomly assigned them to one of three groups. Once given the slip, students were directed to one of three classrooms. Group A acted as a control group and was not exposed to a media clip; they were given the 54 question questionnaire and asked to fill it out. Groups B and C were exposed to a media clip expected to influence their attitudes towards Muslims, Al Qaeda, and/or undocumented immigrants. Group B watched a clip showing the events of 9/11 when the second plane hit the Twin Towers. The clip was accompanied with instrumental background music. Group C viewed a clip by Pat Condell, a British actor who spoke out against the construction of a mosque near Ground Zero. For a complete transcript of the speech, see Appendix A. Both media clips can be accessed through YouTube, as of June 27, 2011.

URL for the 9/11 clip: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1Dg2eEhB30
URL for the Pat Condell speech: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjS0Novt3X4
After viewing the clips, participants in group B and C were given the 54 question questionnaire and asked to fill it out. Henceforth, Group A will be referred to as the control group, Group B as the 9/11 clip group, and Group C as the Condell speech group throughout the remainder of the paper.

Results

Data from each questionnaire was typed into an excel worksheet and then double-checked for accuracy. After accuracy of data input was verified, the data was transferred to SPSS for statistical analysis. Cells with missing data (questions that participants skipped over or refused to answer) were computed using the SPSS Missing Data module. The SPSS Missing Values module enters the expectations given the likelihood function, using the EM algorithm. To test the first and second hypotheses, mean scores of each treatment group were compiled and then divided by attitude. This first analysis indicates a simple ordering of participants’ attitudes towards outgroups within both treatment groups and the control group. As indicated in Table 1 below, the results support the first hypothesis that fear, dehumanization, and assessment of the moral depravity of Al Qaeda was higher than for any other outgroup. This result held across all three treatment groups.
Table 1.
Means by Treatment Group and Polarization Attitude

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Dehumanization</th>
<th>Moral Depravity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group (N=68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.7451</td>
<td>1.29947</td>
<td>2.2610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.0980</td>
<td>1.31336</td>
<td>.9449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.0343</td>
<td>1.42838</td>
<td>1.3078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Group (N=96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.6424</td>
<td>1.26883</td>
<td>2.4293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.1146</td>
<td>1.28129</td>
<td>.8984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>1.9282</td>
<td>1.27107</td>
<td>1.3464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condell Speech Group (N=115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.9855</td>
<td>1.19729</td>
<td>2.8022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.8232</td>
<td>1.37531</td>
<td>1.5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.4203</td>
<td>1.18312</td>
<td>1.7804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The score ranges from 0-6; higher mean scores indicate a more negative attitude

The mean scores for Al Qaeda in the control group indicate that fear (M=3.7451), dehumanization (M=2.2610), and moral depravity (M=3.5699) attitudes were the highest or most negative for each respective attitude independent of any treatment and can be thought of as baseline attitudes because no manipulation of treatment occurred. These results were also found in the 9/11 group; fear (M=3.6424), dehumanization (M=2.4293), and moral depravity (M=3.4818) attitudes are most negative towards Al Qaeda, with these results additionally found within the Condell Speech group (M Fear=3.9855; M Dehumanization=2.8022; M Moral Depravity=3.6777). Results of Table 1 indicate partial support for hypothesis 2, which postulated that fear, dehumanization, and assessment of the moral depravity of Muslims would be second highest, or higher than undocumented immigrants. Fear attitudes towards Muslims were second highest for the control group (M=2.0980), 9/11 group (M=2.1146), and the Condell Speech (M=2.8232). However, for the 9/11 group participants dehumanized undocumented immigrants (M=1.3464) more than Muslims (M=.8984) and thought undocumented immigrants (M=1.6423) were more morally depraved than Muslims (M=2.0843). These results were also
replicated in the control group and the Condell speech. Thus, participants in all three groups dehumanize, fear, and attributed moral depravity to members of Al Qaeda more than they did the two other outgroups. However, participants thought that undocumented immigrants were more morally depraved and dehumanized undocumented immigrants more than Muslims in all three treatment groups. The only attitude in which Muslims were viewed more negatively than undocumented immigrants was fear of outgroups, in which Muslims were feared more than undocumented immigrants in all three treatment groups.

To test the next set of hypotheses examining differences in attitudes according to treatment group and broken down along gender lines, a series of independent sample $t$-tests were done to examine relationships between exposure to traumatic events and subsequent attitude formation towards outgroups. Mean scores of men exposed to the 9/11 group were compared to mean scores of men in the control group. This was also done for women in the 9/11 group and women in the control group. In addition, men and women attitudes after exposure to the Condell speech were compared to attitudes held by men and women in the control group. Using a difference of means independent samples $t$-test, mean scores of men and women were computed for each treatment group and then compared to mean scores for men and women not exposed to any treatment. The difference of these means was then tested to indicate whether or not the difference was statistically significant.
Table 2.
Difference in Fear Attitudes of Control Group and Treatment Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men (1)</th>
<th>Women (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean change a</td>
<td>t-score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Group (N=86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condell Speech (N=97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>-0.58**</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.88**</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>-0.86**</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aNegative number indicates that exposures have generated more negative or derogatory attitudes towards the group or groups involved when compared to the control group

* statistically significant at the .10 level

** statistically significant at the .05 level

For both men and women exposed to the 9/11 clip, results in Table 2 do not support the hypothesis that those exposed to a clip of 9/11 would express more fear of outgroups than those not exposed to the clip. In fact, no statistically significant results were found when comparing men’s fear towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants in the control group to fear attitudes of these same outgroups after exposure to the 9/11 clip. While women exposed to the 9/11 clip were slightly more fearful of Muslims than women in the control group, results were not statistically significant, and fear of Al Qaeda and undocumented immigrants decreased for women exposed to 9/11 clip compared to women in the control group. As none of these results were significant, this analysis indicates that women’s fear of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants did not differ greatly from women’s fear in the control group. Based on these results, the study does not show support for the third or fifth hypothesis. Attitudes after exposure to the Condell speech indicate support for the hypothesis that men exposed to a hate speech will express more fearful attitudes towards outgroups than those not exposed to any treatment. Men expressed significantly more fearful attitudes towards Al Qaeda ($t (97) = -2.38, p <.05$), Muslims ($t (97) = -2.89, p <.05$), and undocumented immigrants ($t (97) = -3.08, p <.05$) after exposure to the Condell speech than men within the control group. While these results were not repeated when comparing women’s fear of Al Qaeda and undocumented immigrants.
after exposure to the Condell speech, women were statistically significantly more fearful of Muslims after exposure to the Condell speech ($t(78)=-2.09, p < .05$) compared to women within the control group.

### Table 3.

**Differences in Dehumanization Attitudes from Control Group to Treatment Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men (1)</th>
<th>Women (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean change$^a$</td>
<td>t-score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Group (N=86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>-0.69**</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condell Speech (N=97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>-1.15**</td>
<td>-3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-1.02**</td>
<td>-4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>-0.88**</td>
<td>-3.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$A negative number indicates that exposures have generated more negative or derogatory attitudes towards the group or groups involved when compared to the control group.

*statistically significant at the .10 level

**statistically significant at the .05 level

Results in Table 3 from the independent samples $t$-test for dehumanization attitudes indicate similar results as those found for fear attitudes. One notable exception is the dehumanization result for men exposed to the 9/11; men exposed to the 9/11 clip dehumanized Al Qaeda statistically significantly more than men in the control group ($t(86)=-2.04, p < .05$). In fact, this result is the only statistically significant result found for this series of $t$-tests when examining attitudinal differences in the 9/11 group and the control group. Thus, the hypothesis that men’s dehumanization of outgroups would increase after exposure to the 9/11 clip is partially supported. The same hypothesis for women is not supported by the evidence however. Stark differences are found when looking at men’s and women attitudes in the hate speech and control group. Men exposed to the hate speech dehumanized Al Qaeda ($t(97)=-3.60, p < .05$), Muslims ($t(97)=-4.63, p < .05$), and undocumented immigrants ($t(97)=-3.73, p < .05$) to a statistically greater extent than men in the control group. In fact, these results indicate some of the largest differences within this statistical analysis. In contrast, women’s dehumanization attitudes do not appear to differ greatly across treatment groups. These results indicate support.
for the hypothesis that men exposed to hate speech express dehumanization attitudes to a greater extent than men not exposed to hate speech; however, similar results were not shown when comparing women’s dehumanization attitudes exposed to the hate speech to those of women in the control group.

Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men (1)</th>
<th>Women (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean change*</td>
<td>t-score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Group (N=86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condell Speech (N=97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>-0.42*</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-0.86**</td>
<td>-3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>-0.38*</td>
<td>-1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A negative number indicates that exposures have generated more negative or derogatory attitudes towards the group or groups involved when compared to the control group
* statistically significant at the .10 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level

Indications that men and women thought that Muslims, Al Qaeda, and undocumented immigrants were more morally depraved after exposure to the 9/11 clip did not hold up under the independent samples t-test analysis found in Table 4. No statistically significant differences in attitude were found when examining attitudes expressed by men and women in the 9/11 group compared to those expressed by men and women in the control group. In contrast, participants exposed to the hate speech did exhibit more dehumanization of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants at a statistically significant degree compared to those in the control group. These results indicate partial support for women exposed to the hate speech; women dehumanized Muslims statistically significantly more than women in the control group ($t (86) = -2.34 \ p < .05$). Male dehumanization of all outgroups after exposure to the hate speech was marked, with statistically significant results for Al Qaeda ($t (97)= -1.85 \ p < .10$), Muslims ($t (97)= -3.37 \ p < .05$), and undocumented immigrants ($t (97)= -1.80 \ p < .10$).
To test the last set of hypotheses, a series of independent sample $t$-tests were done to examine the different effect these media clips had on men and women within each treatment group. For both treatment groups and the control group, mean responses were divided by gender and then compared to each other. The difference in the mean of men and mean of women for each attitude were then analyzed using an independent samples $t$-test to determine if men and women differed statistically significantly in their attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to the same treatment and also if they differed significantly in these attitudes without exposure to any treatment at all. This would indicate whether or not formation of attitudes towards outgroups differed according to gender after exposure to traumatic events. Female mean scores of each treatment group were calculated and then compared to male mean scores within the same treatment group using the SPSS difference of means independent samples $t$-test. While no hypotheses for the control group were developed, attitudinal differences were analyzed comparing men and women responses as an indication of whether or not there were baseline attitudinal differences towards outgroups without exposure to traumatic events such as viewing a clip of 9/11 or watching a hate speech.
Table 5.
Gender Differences of Fear Attitudes towards Outgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men (1)</th>
<th>Women (0)</th>
<th>Mean Change</th>
<th>t Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Group (N=68)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.7105</td>
<td>3.7889</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.1491</td>
<td>2.0333</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>1.8158</td>
<td>2.3111</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9/11 Group (N=96)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.6250</td>
<td>3.6597</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.0694</td>
<td>2.1597</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>1.8842</td>
<td>1.9722</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condell Speech Group (N=115)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>4.2938</td>
<td>3.6607</td>
<td>-0.63**</td>
<td>-2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>3.0282</td>
<td>2.6071</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.6780</td>
<td>2.1488</td>
<td>-0.53**</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The score ranges from 0-6; higher mean scores indicate a more negative attitude

*A positive mean change indicates that women answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than men; a negative mean change indicates that men answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than women.

*Statistically significant at the .10 level

**Statistically significant at the .05 level

Results from Table 5 summarize fear attitudes of participants divided by treatment group and then further broken down by gender. For the control group and 9/11 group, respondent’s fear of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants is not statistically significantly different in men and women. In contrast, men and women’s fear attitudes towards Al Qaeda ($t(115) = -2.93 \ p < .05$) and undocumented immigrants ($t(115) = -2.45 \ p < .05$) differed statistically significantly after exposure to the Condell hate speech.
Table 6.
Gender Differences of Dehumanization Attitudes towards Outgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men (1)</th>
<th>Women (0)</th>
<th>Mean Change</th>
<th>t Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Group (N=68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>2.1184</td>
<td>2.4417</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>.7895</td>
<td>1.1417</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>1.0789</td>
<td>1.5978</td>
<td>0.52**</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 9/11 Group (N=96)            |         |           |             |         |
| Al Qaeda                     | 2.8117  | 2.0469    | -0.76**     | -2.70   |
| Muslims                      | .8333   | .9635     | 0.13        | 0.66    |
| Undocumented Immigrants      | 1.2969  | 1.3958    | 0.10        | 0.45    |

| Condell Speech Group (N=115) |         |           |             |         |
| Al Qaeda                     | 3.2712  | 2.3080    | -0.96**     | -3.83   |
| Muslims                      | 1.8093  | 1.2768    | -0.53**     | -2.35   |
| Undocumented Immigrants      | 1.9619  | 1.5893    | -0.37*      | -1.75   |

*The score ranges from 0-6; higher mean scores indicate a more negative attitude
* A positive mean change indicates that women answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than men; a negative mean change indicates that men answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than women.
* statistically significant at the .10 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level

The summarization in Table 6 indicates some interesting relationships between exposure to traumatic events and attitude formation. The only statistically significant results in the control group were found when comparing men’s and women’s dehumanization of Muslims ($t$ (68) = 2.01 $p < .05$) and undocumented immigrants ($t$ (68) = 2.23 $p < .05$). For these two outgroups, women dehumanized both Muslims and undocumented immigrants more than men; a basic assumption was that men and women would not differ in attitude formation until after exposure to traumatic events. These results may indicate a baseline attitudinal gender difference. The only statistically significant gender difference in attitudes reported for the 9/11 clip was dehumanization of Al Qaeda, with men dehumanizing members of Al Qaeda statistically significantly more than women ($t$ (96) = -2.70 $p < .05$). Large differences in dehumanization of all outgroups by men and women were found by when analyzing participants’ responses to the Condell speech. Men dehumanized members of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented
immigrants statistically significantly more than women did after exposure to the Condell speech, although dehumanization attitudinal differences for undocumented immigrants \((t(115) = -1.75 \ p < .05)\) were less than those for Al Qaeda \((t(115) = -3.83 \ p < .05)\) and Muslims \((t(115) = -2.35 \ p < .05)\).

Table 7.

Gender Differences of Moral Depravity Attitudes towards Outgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group and Variable</th>
<th>Men ((1))</th>
<th>Women ((0))</th>
<th>Mean (^a)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mean (^a)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Mean Change (^b)</th>
<th>t Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Group ((N=68))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.6250</td>
<td>1.18941</td>
<td>3.5000</td>
<td>.97821</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1.5505</td>
<td>1.03152</td>
<td>1.5167</td>
<td>.79582</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.0263</td>
<td>.90939</td>
<td>2.3000</td>
<td>.99221</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Group ((N=96))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3.7135</td>
<td>1.22038</td>
<td>3.2500</td>
<td>.97849</td>
<td>-0.46**</td>
<td>-2.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1.6302</td>
<td>1.03655</td>
<td>1.6544</td>
<td>.84465</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.0176</td>
<td>.98298</td>
<td>2.1510</td>
<td>.80679</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condell Speech Group ((N=115))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>4.0497</td>
<td>1.04666</td>
<td>3.2857</td>
<td>1.04057</td>
<td>-0.76**</td>
<td>-3.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.4068</td>
<td>1.32767</td>
<td>2.0268</td>
<td>1.03975</td>
<td>-0.38*</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrants</td>
<td>2.4041</td>
<td>1.06648</td>
<td>1.9777</td>
<td>.82610</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
<td>-2.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The score ranges from 0-6; higher mean scores indicate a more negative attitude

\(^b\)A positive mean change indicates that women answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than men; a negative mean change indicates that men answered higher (more negatively) on the scale than women.

*statistically significant at the .10 level

**statistically significant at the .05 level

Moral depravity of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants appears to not have differed greatly between men and women in the control group, as no statistically differences were found when analyzing attitudinal indicators with a difference of means independent samples \(t\)-test. In contrast, men rated Al Qaeda \((t(115) = -3.92 \ p < .05)\), Muslims \((t\ (115) = -1.70 \ p < .05)\), and undocumented immigrants \((t\ (115) = -2.39)\) statistically significantly more morally depraved than women after exposure to the Condell hate speech. This supports the hypothesis that men exposed to a hate speech will attribute more moral depravity to outgroups than women. However, these results were somewhat inconclusive when analyzing attitudes.
towards outgroups after exposure to the 9/11 clip. While women attributed slightly more morally depraved attributes to Muslims and undocumented immigrants than men in this treatment group, men attributed statistically significantly more morally depraved attributes to Al Qaeda than women in this treatment group ($t (115)= -2.05 p < .05$).

**Discussion**

*Implications and Contributions*

The above results indicate several interesting relationships when compared to existing literature. Regardless of the treatment group and consistent with expectations as expressed in the literature review, men and women were more fearful of Al Qaeda than other outgroups. They also dehumanized Al Qaeda more and thought Al Qaeda was more morally depraved than the other outgroups. However, contrary to expectations, undocumented immigrants were dehumanized more and were thought to be more morally depraved than Muslims in the control group and after exposure to the 9/11 clip. It is possible that this occurred because participants have had more direct exposure to undocumented immigrants than to Muslims. While most participants have directly felt the effects of the Al Qaeda 9/11 attack (e.g. longer lines at the airports, restrictions on acceptable carry-on items, and other federal measures such as The Patriot Act), Utah residents have had little direct contact or exposure to Muslims living within the state. In contrast, the 2010 U.S. Census places the percentage of Latin Americans living in Utah at 13, higher than any other category except for non-Hispanic whites (U.S. Census Bureau: Utah, census.gov). Because of direct exposure to this particular outgroup, participants may have developed more concrete attitudes towards undocumented immigrants (a common assumption being that most undocumented immigrants are Hispanic or Latino), while attitudes towards an outgroup with which they have had little direct experience i.e. Muslims may have been more malleable and less concrete. In addition, neither those in the control group or the 9/11 clip were exposed to anything which explicitly tried to label Muslims as a threat and an outgroup. In contrast, the Condell speech specifically tried to create an image of Muslims as a threat to Americans. Results from the Condell speech, in which participants rated Muslims as more morally depraved and less human than undocumented immigrants, indicate that Pat Condell was successful in doing so.
Those exposed to the 9/11 clip expressed no statistically significant change of fear, dehumanization, and moral depravity attitudes towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants when compared to attitudes of the control group, with one notable exception. Men dehumanized members of Al Qaeda more so after exposure to the events of 9/11 than men in the control group. Since the main focus of the 9/11 clip was the terrorist attack perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda, it would be expected that if the clip was to influence participants’ attitudes towards outgroups, it would influence attitudes of Al Qaeda the most. These results confirm this expectation, although fear and moral depravity results of men and attitudinal results for women do not follow this expectation. In general, however, results of polarization attitudes after exposure to the 9/11 clip indicate that exposure to the 9/11 clip did not statistically significantly influence attitude formation towards outgroups when compared to attitudes of the control group.

There are several possible reasons why exposure to the 9/11 clip did not influence attitude formation towards outgroups. One reason could be the length of time that has passed since the initial attack. Whereas the Pat Condell speech dealt with fairly recent events, the 9/11 clip showed events that occurred 10 years ago. In the intervening time, variations of this clip were viewed numerous times by the vast majority of Americans; it could be that the impact of the event was neutralized due to desensitization because participants had been exposed to the event before. In contrast, the Condell speech had not been as widely viewed as the 9/11 clips and it could be argued that for most participants in the study, this was their first time viewing the speech. Thus, the Condell speech could give a truer indication of the impact of traumatic events on attitude formation than the 9/11 clip, despite the many lasting impacts of the 9/11 attack. In addition, ample time has passed for participants to develop attitudes towards 9/11 and those associated with the attacks, while the events surrounding the Condell speech were fairly recent and fell within what Collins (2004) describes as the second phase of solidarity. Collins found that during this second phase of solidarity, which lasted anywhere from three to six months after the event, symbols of solidarity, patriotism, and loyalty peaked, after which displays of solidarity decreased (2004). It would be interesting and worthwhile to run the experiment again with two relatively unknown events or two recent events and see if exposure to the events was correlated with increased polarized attitudes towards outgroups for both of the groups exposed to the different traumatic events.
In contrast, several statistically significant results were found when comparing participants’ attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to the Condell speech to those of participants in the control group. Men were more fearful of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants after exposure to the Condell speech. They also dehumanized and thought all three outgroups were more morally depraved than men in the control group. These were somewhat replicated when comparing fear and moral depravity attitudes of women after exposure to the Condell speech and the control group; women exposed to the Condell speech were more fearful of Muslims and thought Muslims were more morally depraved than women in the control group. Because of Pat Condell’s explicit focus on Muslims in his speech, it would be expected that if the hate speech was to have any effect on attitude formation, it would influence attitudes towards Muslims. These results reflect this expectation, although women exposed to the Condell speech did not dehumanize Muslims more than women in the control group. The absence of other statistically significant results when comparing women exposed to the Condell speech to women in the control group and the statistically significant results found across the board when comparing men exposed to the Condell speech to men in the control group supports indicates that hate speech influences women’s attitudes towards outgroups less than men.

Analysis of attitudinal differences within each treatment group and divided by gender indicates that attitudes towards outgroups did not differ greatly between men and women after exposure to the 9/11 clip. Two exceptions exist to this statement; men dehumanized members of Al Qaeda and thought they were more morally depraved than women after exposure to the 9/11 clip. However, analysis of the Condell speech indicates that men were statistically significantly more polarized than women after exposure to the Condell speech. These results support previous research indicating that women are less tolerant of hate speech than men. The only result which was not statistically significant still indicated that men were more fearful of Muslims than women, and the result just missed statistical significance.

In-depth study of each attitude and gender differences in attitude after exposure to traumatic events reveals some very interesting and somewhat perplexing results. Analysis of fear attitudes within each treatment group indicates that women did not express more fear towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants than men. In fact, statistically significant differences between men and women indicate that men were more fearful of Al Qaeda and undocumented immigrants than women after exposure to the Condell speech. These results not only fail to
reject the null hypothesis that women will be no more fearful of outgroups than men; the results suggest reverse directionality of the hypothesis would have been more appropriate. A result such as this suggests further investigation and further study in order to determine the origins for such an increased expression of fear by men after exposure to a hate speech.

Dehumanization of outgroups followed expectations for those exposed to the Condell speech; as expected, men dehumanized Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants statistically significantly more than women exposed to the same speech. However, an interesting result is found when examining dehumanization attitudes of men and women in the control group. One of the most consistent results in gender difference research is that men display more aggressive behaviors than women, and this aggression has been linked to dehumanization. With research such as this, it would be expected that men as a baseline attitude would dehumanize outgroups more than women. However, results indicate reverse directionality. In the control group, women dehumanized all three groups more than men, and for both Muslims and undocumented immigrants, women dehumanized them statistically significantly more than men. While no hypothesis was developed for examining gender differences in attitudes towards outgroups for the control group, results such as these raise interesting questions about basic gender differences in baseline dehumanization attitudes towards outgroups.

Results after exposure to the Condell speech indicate that men thought Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants were more morally depraved than women. In contrast, there were no statistically significant differences in attitudes held by men and women in the control group measuring the moral depravity of all three outgroups. These results were mostly replicated in the 9/11 clip with one exception; men thought Al Qaeda was statistically significantly more morally depraved than women did after exposure to the 9/11 clip.

Limitations and Future Directions

It should be remembered that any inferences made in this study should be treated with caution. While some statistically significant results were found in comparing mean results, it should be remember that most differences between these mean scores were not large. Several of the tests failed to reject the null hypothesis, and still others, while finding statistically significant results, suggest that reverse directionality of the hypothesis would have been more appropriate. Self-report questionnaires are subject to respondent bias, particularly with a controversial subject such as the one studied. Participants may have been influenced to give answers that do not
portray their real feelings and attitudes because of social expectations or pressures. In addition, responses given by participants in the control group were compared to responses given by a different set of participants in the 9/11 group and Condell speech. Thus, differences in response may not truly measure if exposure to traumatic events influenced individual attitude formation because responses of an individual participant were not measured before and after exposure to the event. Instead, an individual participant’s responses in the control group were compared to a different individual participant’s responses in the 9/11 group and Condell speech. However, the large number of participants who participated in the study minimizes this concern, as it is assumed that a larger N will reduce the risk of reporting results due to chance or randomness when comparing two different groups of people.

Another potential problem with making any inferences from this study is that possible confounding factors were not thoroughly examined and analyzed. One possible confounding factor may be participant’s knowledge level of Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants. Thus, it could be postulated that either greater or lesser knowledge of these groups lead to increased or decreased fear, dehumanization, and moral depravity attitudes towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants. Further analysis should be done to feather out this and other possible confounding factors.

A peculiarity of the area in which this study was conducted is the high percentage of participants belonging to the LDS faith, commonly known as the Mormons. Culture within the LDS religion has historically been somewhat conservative, with an emphasis on traditional gender roles and perceptions. This may indicate another confounding factor, and further research would do well to try and feather out effects of religion on the strength of attitudinal measurements. In addition, another confounding factor may well be the large number of participants in their early 20s. At least one study examining differences in decision-making by college age students and professionals found marked differences, particularly with the hawkishness of the decisions made by professionals; thus, measurements and results may not be generalizable to the population at large (Mintz et al., 2006). It would be useful to conduct this study in another area where demographics are more evenly spread. If results were replicated, they would strengthen the results found in this study and provide further support for the assertion that gender does act as an intervening variable in the formation of attitudes towards outgroups after exposure to traumatic events.
Conclusion

Traumatic events may well act as triggers which set off a polarization process, priming individuals to participate in violent actions towards members of an outgroup. When these events occur, members of an ingroup may become more fearful of the outgroup, dehumanize them, and perceive them as morally depraved. The above research indicates that, contrary to previous research and the author’s expectations, exposure to a clip portraying the events of 9/11 was not highly influential in the formation of attitudes towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants, with a few notable exceptions. In contrast, those exposed to the hate speech, and particularly men, expressed significantly more polarizing attitudes towards Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants. While dehumanization and moral depravity results from the Condell speech conform to previous research and literature, fear results from the hate speech indicate results contrary to previous research. Further research is needed to examine these relationships in more depth, indicate possible answers for such results, and provide increased validation for the results found in this study.


*British Journal of Criminology, 45*, 212-224.

*Psychological Science, 14*, 455-461.


Appendix A

Questionnaire: We would like to ask you a number of questions designed to find out your attitudes towards three groups: Al Qaeda, Muslims, and undocumented immigrants. Please circle only one response for each statement. The numbers next to the different responses are there just to facilitate coding of the answers. When you are finished, bring the form to the front and exit the room.

About Al Qaeda, I consider myself
- Very well informed-0  Moderately informed-1  Poorly informed-2  Not informed at all-3

About Muslims, I consider myself
- Very well informed-0  Moderately informed-1  Poorly informed-2  Not informed at all-3

About undocumented immigrants, I consider myself
- Very well informed-0  Moderately informed-1  Poorly informed-2  Not informed at all-3

Compared to other groups, undocumented immigrants are:
- Very inferior -0  Inferior -1  Slightly inferior -2  Of equal status -3  Slightly superior -4  Superior -5  Very superior -6

My feelings towards members of Al Qaeda can best be described as:
- Love -0  Strong like -1  Like -2  Neutral -3  Dislike -4  Strong dislike -5  hatred -6

Muslims are demons.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

Muslims make choices based on moral principles even though those principles may differ from my own.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

Members of Al Qaeda should be denied basic human rights if it means our society is better protected.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

Muslims lie, steal, cheat, and kill to achieve their goals.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

Members of Al Qaeda lie, steal, cheat, and kill to achieve their goals.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

I feel safe around Muslims.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

Members of Al Qaeda have no respect for human life.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6

I worry that members of Al Qaeda may harm me or my family.
- Strongly agree -0  Agree -1  Somewhat agree -2  Neutral -3  Somewhat disagree -4  Disagree -5  Strongly disagree -6
I would trust a Muslim to watch my children.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Undocumented immigrants should be entitled to basic human rights.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

I worry that Muslims will harm Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Compared to other groups, Muslims are:
- Very inferior-0 Inferior-1 Slightly inferior-2 Equal in status-3 Slightly superior-4 Superior-5 Very superior-6

Muslims are
- Very corrupt-0 Corrupt-1 Somewhat corrupt-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat honest-4 honest-5 Very honest-6

Undocumented immigrants and members of my own group are equally human.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Compared to other groups, members of Al Qaeda are:
- Very inferior-0 Inferior-1 Slightly inferior-2 Of equal status-3 Slightly superior-4 Superior-5 Very superior-6

Undocumented immigrants make choices based on moral principles even though those principles may differ from my own.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Undocumented immigrants should be denied basic human rights if it means our society is better protected.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Members of Al Qaeda and members of my own group are equally human.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Muslims have no respect for human life.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

I worry that Muslims will harm non-Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Members of Al Qaeda should be entitled to basic human rights.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

I worry that undocumented immigrants will harm non-Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6

Members of Al Qaeda are no more inherently good or evil than anyone else.
- Strongly agree-0 Agree-1 Somewhat agree-2 Neutral-3 Somewhat disagree-4 Disagree-5 Strongly disagree-6
Undocumented immigrants are
- Very corrupt-0  Corrupt-1  Somewhat corrupt-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat honest-4  honest-5  Very honest-6

Members of Al Qaeda are demons.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I would trust an undocumented immigrant to watch my children.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I worry that members of Al Qaeda will harm non-Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I would feel safe having Muslims as neighbors.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I worry that Muslims may harm me or my family.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I worry that undocumented immigrants may harm me or my family.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I worry that members of Al Qaeda will harm Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Members of Al Qaeda make choices based on moral principles even though those principles may differ from my own.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I worry that undocumented immigrants will harm Americans somewhere around the world.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Muslims and members of my own group are equally human.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Undocumented immigrants lie, steal, cheat, and kill to achieve their goals.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

My feelings towards undocumented immigrants can best be described as:
- Love-0  Strong like-1  Like-2  Neutral-3  Dislike-4  Strong dislike-5  Hatred-6

My feelings towards Muslims can best be described as:
- Love-0  Strong like-1  Like-2  Neutral-3  Dislike-4  Strong dislike-5  Hatred-6

Undocumented immigrants have no respect for human life.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I would feel safe having undocumented immigrants as neighbors.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6
Muslims are no more inherently good or evil than anyone else.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Undocumented immigrants are demons.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

I feel safe around undocumented immigrants.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Undocumented immigrants are no more inherently good or evil than anyone else.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Muslims should be entitled to basic human rights.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Muslims should be denied basic human rights if it means our society is better protected.
- Strongly agree-0  Agree-1  Somewhat agree-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat disagree-4  Disagree-5  Strongly disagree-6

Members of Al Qaeda are
- Very corrupt-0  Corrupt-1  Somewhat corrupt-2  Neutral-3  Somewhat honest-4  Honest-5  Very honest-6

What is your age?
- Under 18  18-21  22-25  26-30  31-40  41 and over

What is your gender?
- Female  Male

What is your religious affiliation?
- Latter-Day Saints  Catholic or Protestant  Other  None
Appendix B

Deconstruction of the Pat Condell Speech based on a framework set forth by Vollhardt, Coutin, Staub, Weiss, and Deflander (2007)

1. Contains instigating elements of continuum of violence
   a. Distinction between us and them. People referred to by group membership, information about origin used to label them as foreigners. Achieved by pointing out affiliation with region, nationality, religion, or language group different than the majority of listeners
   b. Individuals/group blamed for misfortune of country (historical/present difficulties)
   c. Accused of disloyalty, treachery, alliance with other countries (particularly with the enemy) or the previous regime, implying threat and appealing to emotions of listeners
2. Derogatory and violates standards of (argumentative) integrity
   a. Personal attacks/insults on integrity of individual, communication is defaming and derogatory
   b. Arguments unbalanced and not objectively verifiable with facts from other sources
   c. Legitimacy/ability of individual/group to hold political power and influence is questioned, or it is claimed that this person/group has too much power
   d. Targeted group/individual denied distinct characteristics of human nature
   e. Individual/group is threatened, for example with revenge
3. Suggested strategies do not offer real/constructive solutions to existing problems, and serve self-interests of speaker and/or his group while only harming another group
   a. Speaker attains direct political gain and increase in power by harming target
   b. Focus on individuals/groups rather than issue
   c. Focus on alleged source of problems and blaming targeted group/individual, accuser offers simplistic solutions and doesn’t take into account complexity/multi-faceted nature of societal problems. Promised solution not a real solution
   d. Offered solutions destructive rather than constructive in nature, based on exclusion of certain individuals/group from political power/society in general
   e. Communicated ideas/suggested solutions for problems not inclusive of all society, but instead benefit a specific group while excluding others

(Vollhardt et al., 2007: 29-30)

Transcript of the Pat Condell speech (a transcript taken from listening to the speech on youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjS0Nvot3X4)

All you Americans who have been following the islamization of Europe from afar, with horrified incredulity, if any of you are still nursing the cozy illusion that it could never happen in your country, it’s time to wake up and rub those sleepy eyes because the moment of truth has arrived.
In case you haven’t heard, there’s a plan afoot to build a thirteen story islamic center and mosque a few yards from Ground Zero in New York. A plan that’s been enthusiastically welcomed by politicians and civic leaders, eager to show how tolerant they are at other peoples’ expense. 2c Is it possible to be astonished but not surprised?

Apparently, it’s not enough that nearly 3,000 innocent people had to lose their lives in a hideous act of religious mass murder, but now their memory has to be insulted as well, and the religion that murdered them allowed to build a towering triumphalist mosque on the ground where they died. 1a, 1b, 1c, 2d

Is America losing its mind?! It says a lot about the people behind this scheme that they have the bad taste even to propose building a mosque in such a place, but to describe it as they have as a tribute to the victims is beyond bad taste, and shows a profound contempt for those who died. 2c It would be hard to imagine a more provocative gesture short of standing on their graves and burning the American flag. 2d, 1a, 1c Yet, how typical of Islam, with its own hair-trigger sensitivity to the slightest imagined insult, to do something so arrogant and so insensitive. 2a, 1a, 3b

It’s going to cost $100 Million dollars to build this thing, but nobody is prepared to say where the money’s coming from. We do know that the Saudis fund a lot of mosque building in the West, when they are not busy trying to stamp out free speech at the United Nations or telling Fox News what to broadcast, so I guess we’ll all be paying for it every time we start the car. 1a, 1c, 2c, 3b

You know, it seems to me a much more appropriate place for a mosque in New York would be the United Nations building itself, because that organization has become so islamofriendly in recent years that frankly I’m surprised it doesn’t already have a minaret. 2c, 3b, 1a, 1c, 2a

You know, I’m not even American but it makes me sick to my stomach to think that Islam is going to be allowed anywhere near Ground Zero because 9.11 could never have happened if not for Islam and its teachings and its doctrine of jihad, and its false promise of an impossible afterlife without which none of those gullible lunatics would have been persuaded to carry out such an insane act. 1a, 2a, And also because, it wasn’t just an attack on America, but on all of us in the civilized world. As were the bombings in London, in Madrid, in Barley, the shootings in Mumbai, and everywhere else that the religion of peace decides it doesn’t like the way people do things. 1c, 2d, 2a, 3b, 1b

Any religion that endorses violence is incapable of delivering spiritual enlightenment. 1a, 2d, 3b, 1b How obvious does that have to be? And it has no right even to call itself a religion. 2d, 1a, 2b Without the shield of religion to hide behind, Islam would be banned in the civilized world as a political ideology of hate, and we have no obligation to make allowances for it anymore than we do for Nazism. 1c, 2d, 2b, 3b It’s a bigger threat to our freedom than Nazism ever was. 1b Yes, both are totalitarian, and both divide the world unnecessarily into us and them, the pure and the impure, and both make no secret of their desire to exterminate the Jews, but we were all, more or less, on the same side against the Nazis, whereas the islam-nazis have got plenty of friends among people in the West, who ought to know better. 2d, 2c, 3b, 1a, 1c American politicians
now regularly make the kind of dhimmi noises about diversity as an excuse for islamization, 1c, 2c, 2b the same kind of thing that we’ve become so depressingly familiar with in Europe. It’s true that diversity has been good for America; it’s been the making of that country, but American diversity has always been grounded in respect for the values, the individual liberties that make America what it is. Islam rejects those values and that’s the difference, and it’s a very important difference. 2d, 3b

Islam despises what America is; it rejects everything America stands for, including freedom and diversity, and any Muslim who denies that, is a liar. 1c, 1a, 2a, 2b, 2d, 3b,

The organization behind this scheme is called “The Cordoba Initiative”, and the building is to be called “Cordoba House”. And this is because Cordoba or Cordo-ba is the city in southern Spain where Muslims built their first great mosque at the start of, and as a symbol of, their conquest of Spain. 2b, 3b, 1b The Ground Zero mosque is intended to serve the same purpose in America. 1b

Building mosques on conquered, sacred ground is standard practice. It’s what Islam has always done to assert its supremacy, and that is what’s happening here. 1a And, of course, they know how insulting it is, how offensive it is. 2a, 2d Are you kidding? Why do you think they chose a site as close as possible to Ground Zero, or do you think that that was just an accident? And they also know that once it’s built, it’ll be there forever as a permanent affront to all Americans, gloating in triumph and a major bridgehead in the ongoing stealth jihad. 1a, 1c, 2d That’s how the Muslim world will see it, and that’s how they will be encouraged to see it, and to be fair to them, that’s exactly what it will be, confirming what they always suspected, that America is a soft country, a decadent country, crippled by political correctness, confused and guilt ridden with no backbone and no pride. 2c, 1c, 1a, 3b,

They plan to open it next year on September the 11th, the tenth anniversary of the atrocity. Is that tasteless enough for you? I’m surprised they haven’t organized a 757 flight past.

But you know, it doesn’t have to be this way. Here in London, we had a similar situation just recently where they wanted to build a gigantic mosque to overshadow the Olympic Games. Public opinion put a stop to that, and Public opinion can put a stop to this disgraceful plan as well, and it can tell this group, and the politicians who support them, that enough is enough, and that this is one insult too far, and that America is a big country and there is plenty of room for them to build their offensive mosque if they have to, somewhere else. 3c, Somewhere perhaps more appropriate to the spirit of their religion, like the Arizona Desert, or Death Valley. 3d Peace, and God Bless the Kafa(?)