1979

A Forest Kingdom Unlike Any Other

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A FOREST KINGDOM UNLIKE ANY OTHER

by

Kurt F. Ruppel

A senior thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
Wildlife Science
(Honors)

Approved by:

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
1979
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people were instrumental in the formation and completion of this study. I would specifically like to thank Dr. Bernard Shanks and Dr. Douglas D. Alder for their guidance, counsel, and patience during the course of this research. My gratitude also to the USU librarians who guided me through the maze of government publications on this subject.
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CHRONOLOGY OF OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK*

1897: Grover Cleveland creates Olympic Forest Reserve (General Land Office, Department of Interior).

1900: William McKinley reduces size of OFR.

1905: OFR transferred to Forest Service (Department of Agriculture), becomes Olympic National Forest.

1909: Theodore Roosevelt establishes Mount Olympus National Monument out of ONF lands (both still administered by FS).

1912: William Taft reduces size of MONM.

1915: Woodrow Wilson reduces size of MONM by half to allow mineral exploration for World War I.

1929: Calvin Coolidge again reduces size of MONM.

1933: All national monuments, including MONM, transferred to National Park Service (Department of Interior).


1938: Bill passes, signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

1943: Pressure put on park to harvest Sitka Spruce for war needs.

1947: Loggers cite dwindling timber supplies and sagging economy of Olympic Peninsula to have timber lands excluded from park.

1953: Harry Truman adds final installment of land to park.

1955: Lumber industry campaign for access to park timber, NPS logging of dead and down timber.

1959: Proposed coast road defeated.

1966: Boundary Study Committee suggests redrawing boundary lines to coincide with hydrographic lines, elimination of some timber lands, and conversion of the Ocean Strip to a national seashore.

1974: NPS recommends 834,890 acres of wilderness in ONP.
"A FOREST KINGDOM UNLIKE ANY OTHER"1

I. INTRODUCTION

Olympic National Park (ONP), a natural area 15% larger than Rhode Island2 located on the Olympic Peninsula in northwestern Washington State, is a land of diverse contrasts and impressive beauty. It is also a land rich in natural resources (e.g. timber, water power, and recreational potential) that are strongly coveted by man. This dichotomy has led to a number of conflicts during the past hundred years over the policies directing the control, management, and use of this area. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the factors that have shaped that policy and to follow the changes that policy has undergone from the initial establishment of Olympic Forest Reserve in 1897 to the present day national park.

Uniqueness

The list of attributes that led people to suggest a federal preserve on the Olympic Peninsula include this hemisphere's finest temperate rain forest and the last wilderness beach in the contiguous forty-eight states.3 Olympic is home to world record sized specimens of Douglas Fir, Western Red Cedar, Western Hemlock, and Sitka Spruce;4 eight endemic species of wildflowers; and the world's largest protected population of Roosevelt (Olympic) Elk.5 An article appearing in Colliers in 1902 described the area's wildlife as consisting of five-thousand each of elk and deer; thousands of bear, cougar, and "wildcat";
and "other varmints so numerous that the Government officials are already considering a hunting expedition for their extinction."  

The forests of the Olympics contain billions of board feet (BBF) of timber (estimated in 1902 to be 37.1 BBF) including such commercially valuable species as Sitka Spruce and Douglas Fir. They support a large timber industry which at one time employed over half the peninsula's work force. Since automobile access to the peninsula was provided in 1931 recreation and tourism have been growing and, of late, stable industries that depend heavily "on a few environmental factors" such as "the virginal, rugged mountains; tall, giant trees; mountain streams; and deep blue lakes."  

Although many of the natural features of the Olympic region were much less unique before the large scale logging of the Pacific Northwest, in many cases the park has become the last bastion of such features. For example, in 1907 there existed 469 million acres of virgin forest on the Olympic Peninsula by 1923 this had been reduced to 138 million acres, and by 1955 the number was down to 44.6 million acres. Considering the chances of any logged area's being left undisturbed for the five hundred years that it took the Olympic forest to develop to its present state (and the vastness of this time frame compared to the human lifespan) the magnitude of this region's uniqueness becomes apparent.  

**Survival**  

One might ask how an area with the Olympic Peninsula's resource potential escaped exploitation for so long. As Weldon F. Heald noted in *Natural History* in 1954, "The fact that we own such a remarkable
untouched area is due to a combination of good luck, considerable foresight, and plain hard fighting.\textsuperscript{12} The luck was that although it lay close to the early settlements of Seattle, Victoria, and Vancouver the Olympic Peninsula remained relatively inaccessible. It was a land of treacherous coasts, jungle-like lowlands, and rugged mountains.\textsuperscript{13} Also, the exploitableness of the resources was not initially apparent. The only commercially exploitable fishery was in the coastal waters,\textsuperscript{14} and agricultural prospects were poor because of the ruggedness of the land and the thick forests that needed to be cleared.\textsuperscript{15} Though small amounts of gold and copper were found they were insufficient to support any mines, and even logging was seen as impractical because of the unnavigable rivers and lack of harbors on the Pacific coast.\textsuperscript{16}

Footnotes to Section I


\textsuperscript{5}"The Olympic Wilderness," p. 67.

\textsuperscript{6}"The New Olympic National Park," \textit{Colliers}, April 10, 1902, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{7}John B. Yeon, "The Issue of the Olympics," \textit{American Forests}, June 1936, pp. 256-257.


14 Seeman, p. 304.


16 "Olympic Forest Reserve," *Scientific American*, March 1, 1902, p. 21882.
II. COMING OF THE WHITE MAN

Exploration

Due to the Olympics' isolation white men knew little of the area, and it was not until 1855-56 that title was transferred from the nine resident Indian tribes* to the new white settlers, specifically Gov. Isaac I. Stevens of Washington Territory.¹⁷ Even with this it would be another twenty years before any extensive exploration and mapping would take place.¹⁸ In 1889 the first exploratory party was dispatched to the Olympics by the Seattle Press. These are believed to be the first men to actually traverse the Olympic Mountains, as before this even the Indians had confined their movements to the coastal plain.¹⁹

A number of private expeditions quickly followed and resulted in the first recommendations that the Olympics should become a national preserve. One such expedition was by Judge James Wickersham and his family. On his return, Wickersham sent letters to a number of publishing firms and to Maj. John Wesley Powell, superintendent of the U.S. Geological Survey, providing maps of the area and proposing a park.²⁰ Even the development minded Press party had its preservationists. A Lt. O'Neil wrote that though the "outer slope of these mountains is valuable, the interior is useless for all practicable purposes. It would, however, serve admirably for a national park."²¹

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*Clallam, Skokomish, Chinacum, Makah, Quinault, Quillayute, Queets, Hoh, and Ozette.
Early Federal Control: Confusion

On 22 February 1897, in the last month of his term of office, Grover Cleveland created Olympic Forest Reserve (OFR) by presidential proclamation, stating, "It appears that the public good would be promoted by setting apart and reserving said lands as a public reservation." The reserve encompassed 2,188,800 acres or approximately two-thirds of the peninsula. Public reaction to this move was swift and vocal, especially in the west. Many newspapers attacked Cleveland as a "lameduck saboteur", and the mildest adjective used for him was "impetuous."

However, as this public outcry foretold, the Olympics' tempestuous saga as a federal reserve was just beginning. In 1900 Congress suspended Pres. Cleveland's proclamation for nine months, opening the area to land claims by settlers; and passed the Forest Lieu Act, allowing exchange of claims within reserves for land outside them. Also, during this period, on 7 April 1900 and 25 July 1901 Pres. William McKinley, on the advice of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, reduced the size of OFR by 750,000 acres--opening the area to settlement and farming.

In 1905 the nation's forest reserves were transferred from the General Land Office in the Department of Interior to the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, at which time OFR became Olympic National Forest (ONF).

Monument Status: More Confusion

As public awareness of the Olympics grew, so did the hunting
pressure on the vast herds of Roosevelt Elk. In response to this, Rep. Francis Cushman introduced a bill into Congress in 1905 to create "Elk National Park", but the bill met with little success. The fight was then taken up by Rep. William E. Humphrey who in 1906 and again in 1908 introduced bills to establish a game preserve on the Olympic Peninsula, once more without success. Humphrey, however, did find success with the executive branch of government. He was able to persuade Theodore Roosevelt to invoke the Antiquities Act on 2 March 1909 to set aside by executive order 620,000 acres at the heart of ONF as Mount Olympus National Monument (MONM) just two days before Roosevelt was to leave office. (See Map 1.)

Roosevelt's proclamation directed that the new monument was "not intended to prevent the use of the lands for forest purposes" but that it was to be "the dominant reservation and any use of the land which interferes with its preservation was...hereby forbidden." The remainder of ONF was to remain intact with both MONM and ONF to be administered by FS.

Such preservationist sentiment was to be short lived, however; for Pres. William H. Taft on 17 April 1912, on the recommendation of FS, made the first of a long series of transfers of land from MONM back to the surrounding ONF.

Despite the fact that there had been little early success with mining in the Olympic region, when Roosevelt created MONM and closed the area to mining prospectors protested, claiming he was locking up large supplies of manganese. Such a claim was not at that time a major concern, but as the U.S. began preparing for World War I Pres. Woodrow Wilson, again on the advice of the Chief of the Forest Service,
Map 1: The Changing Boundaries of Mount Olympus National Monument, Wallgren's Park Proposals, and Forest Service Primitive Areas (from Planning and Civic Comment, January-March 1937, n. 9)
issued three separate executive orders reducing MONM to 328,000 acres (259,000 of which were above the timber line). It was their hope that the land opened to prospecting would yield a supply of manganese for the armament program, yet little was ever found there. Even as late as 1932 small scale explorations for manganese, gold, and oil were still being carried out on the peninsula, but quantities discovered were never large enough to justify commercial exploitation.

Though few minerals were ever found, Wilson's reduction by half of the size of MONM did give lumbermen the opportunity to move into much of the mid-elevation timber lands. World War I also brought another timber-related challenge to the forests of MONM and ONF. In the summer of 1918 Brig. Gen. Brice P. Disque of the Spruce Division, U.S. Army established 250 camps from the Olympic Peninsula to northern California manned by 10,000 "spruce soldiers" who cut and milled the Sitka Spruce deemed "essential" for aircraft construction. Only the swift end of the war saved most of the forest.

Aside from small adjustments in the size of ONF and another small transfer from MONM to ONF by Calvin Coolidge in 1929 the status of federal lands in the Olympics remained relatively constant until the impetus of the New Deal brought a new push for national park status. (See Map 1.)

Footnotes to Section II


23. A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, Statutes at Large 29, 901 (December 1895-March 1897).


25. Ibid., p. 168; Buck p. 226.


28. Ibid., p. 171; Buck, p. 225.

29. A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, Statutes at Large 35, sec. 2, 2247-2248 (December 1907-March 1909).


32. Ise, p. 384.

33. Morgan, p. 171.

34. Seeman, p. 304.

35. Heald, p. 314.


37. An Act for the Inclusion of Certain Lands in the Wenatchee National Forest, the Olympic National Forest, and the Snoqualmie National Forest, all in the state of Washington, and for other purposes, Statutes at Large 42, sec. 1, 1036-1057 (1922); A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, Statutes at Large, sec. 2, 1982-1984 (1925).
A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, Statutes at Large 45, sec. 2, 2984-2985 (1929).
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL PARK

Impetus for a Park

As has been apparent throughout most of the preceding section the isolation and pristine nature of the Olympic Peninsula did not last long once white men began exploring the area. The peninsula became home to persistent, if unsuccessful, prospectors, small farmers on the coastal plain, and lumbermen who found the giant trees of the Olympics sufficient reward for the hardships of getting them to market. As timber supplies to the south dwindled and required more effort to harvest, the forests of the Olympic mountains became "the last extensive area of pulp timber outside Alaska". In July 1924 three men and five horses were sent out by the city of Aberdeen (the logging center at the southern end of the peninsula) to "spy out the land" in the mountainous northern portion of the peninsula.39

Other observers during this period found the potential for water power as well. By 1925 one river, the Elwha, was already producing power; the Hoh River was seen as a "future power river"; and the peninsula as a whole was seen to "possess all the essentials of a great water-power region."40

Not only was resource exploitation growing from a resident population, the Olympics were becoming a tourist mecca as well. On 26 August 1931 a loop highway was opened around the peninsula from Olympia to Aberdeen greatly increasing tourist access to the area.41
(See Map 2). This access attracted a large number of out-of-state hunters to the region, and in 1933 FS and the state game commission, citing overbrowsing of the range, held a four day open season on Roosevelt Elk. One hundred fifty elk were killed, most of them bulls. Public outcry caused closing the season until 1936 when a limited hunt was tried on one range. In 1937 an eight day open season was declared, attracting 4000 to 5000 hunters who killed eight hundred eleven elk (plus two people) which was two hundred elk more than the estimated harvest. Moreover, as many elk were killed in understocked areas as overstocked ones. As in 1902 when MONM was formed the elk again provided one of the driving forces leading to Olympic National Park.

Wallgren's Bills

In 1935 Rep. Monrad C. Wallgren, a New Deal Democrat from Everett, Washington, introduced a bill calling for a park of 728,360 acres. (See Map 1.) The House Public Lands Committee favorably reported the bill, but it was not considered on the floor of the House.

The following year Wallgren tried again, this time deleting 138,000 acres of timber land from the proposed park and adding 50,000 acres of high mountain land, resulting in a 624,000 acre proposal. (See Map 1.) Wallgren also dropped the non-development clause of his first bill which would have called for Olympic to be a wilderness park. With the deletion of the timber land from the park there still would have been six BBF of timber open to logging on the Olympic Peninsula. Yet, this bill, too, was defeated.

In 1938 Wallgren introduced a third bill calling for reservation
Map 2: The Olympic Peninsula and Olympic National Park (circa 1938) (from *Time*, July 11, 1938, p. 12)
of 860,000 acres in the mountains in the center of the peninsula plus a 50,000 acre ocean parkway along the Pacific coast. It was this bill that was destined, with much alteration, to finally bring Olympic National Park into being.

Issues and Adversaries

The antagonists in the debate over the switch from monument to park status can be fairly well split into development and preservationist camps. On the side of development were the timber interests, such as the local lumber firms and the American Forestry Association; those peninsula residents dependent on the lumber economy; miners; the local newspapers; the Department of Agriculture; its secretary, Henry A. Wallace; and the Forest Service. The preservationist camp included some of the local residents not so strongly tied to lumber; national conservationist groups such as the Emergency Conservation Committee; Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Department of Interior; its secretary, Harold L. Ickes; and the National Park Service (NPS).

Wallgren's proposals provided yet another bitter battleground in the long-standing feud between the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. A battle aided, no doubt, by the personal animosity between Wallace and Ickes. In their reports to the House Committee on Public Lands for the hearings on Wallgren's first bill they took widely divergent views of the situation. Secy. Wallace described the move to enlarge the monument and upgrade it to park status as one which was "unnecessary to preserve values of national significance, would... markedly upset the prevailing economy of the Olympic Peninsula and (was)
opposed by so representative a part of the local interests involved."  

For his part Secy. Ickes said,

> The proposed park would save from logging the finest representatives of the remaining Northwest forests... (provide) permanent protection of... Roosevelt Elk (with) sufficient winter range... It would preserve one of the most scenic, unspoiled areas within our country, measuring up in every respect to the high standards set for national parks.

But the Agriculture-Interior battle hinged as much on power as on personality. Since 1933 when FDR transferred all national monuments to NPS, FS was very sensitive to any further erosion of its power. Wallgren's move to transfer even more land to NPS control stimulated FS counter measures to prevent such a large loss.

In February 1935, just before Wallgren introduced his first bill, the Aberdeen (Wa.) Daily World ran an interview with ONF Supervisor H. L. Plumb in which he describes the possible formation of a park as a "severe blow" to the state and counties because of the loss of timber sale revenue to local governments, indicates sustained yield logging would increase income in the area, and notes that multiple use would include provisions for recreation.

In the summer of 1936 661,000 acres of ONF, most of it adjoining MONM (See Map 1) were declared primitive areas. This was done by departmental order of the Secretary of Agriculture, instead of through normal administrative regulations, to give the move a greater look of permanence. In an article in the September 1936 Journal of Forestry FS employee C. J. Buck cites past FS management plans that have included recreation needs. He describes the Olympics primarily as a problem of land management and suggests that a "laissez-faire policy of land..."
management leads only to disaster." While admitting that the FS primitive areas are not as secure as statutory designation as a park, he asserts that such areas "represent the best judgment of men long in public service of the justifiable needs of the public." 51

Despite their self-defense campaign, FS still found its commitment to wilderness planning called into question. It was noted that most FS recreation plans called for "strips and oasis," i.e. the preservation of alpine and valley bottom areas but allowing logging between. This system brought the comment that, "Preservation has been designated only where it does not materially interfere with conversion of the forest into lumber." 52 Another complaint about the FS campaign was that there had been no objection to adding land to ONF throughout the 1920's but that transfer of land to NPS was causing an uproar even though it required no new purchase of land. 53

Aside from the interdepartmental bickering of the government agencies other issues were also raised about creation of ONP. These centered mainly on four topics: size, economic loss, ripeness, and sustained yield. Park opponents believed a large park would remove too many trees from potential logging, resulting in mill closings and reduction in the 25% of the FS revenue that went to support local schools. They also felt that the trees were "overripe" and destined to rot and that FS would allow use of this "wasted" resource and still preserve the forest.

On the other hand, park advocates felt that a larger park was necessary to preserve wilderness values, that the lumber potential of the area was only good for four to ten years of continued logging, and felt any losses in timber revenue could be made up from tourism. They denied
that the trees could be "overripe", saying that down and rotting timber was part of a complex ecological cycle that was six hundred years old and that such a cycle would be destroyed under a forty year sustained yield rotation practiced by FS.\textsuperscript{54}

The largest of these arguments was the one over economics. Like most in the Pacific Northwest, the economy of the Olympic Peninsula depended on lumber as its mainstay. The trees were large and fast growing and the topography was much too rugged for most sorts of agriculture. So strong was this dependence on timber that one researcher found that "every town that has developed, so far, on the peninsula owes its existence to timber or timber products."\textsuperscript{55}

It was estimated that establishment of the park would cut the yields of Olympic forest by 162 million board feet (MBF), an amount sufficient to support a population of 16,650 people, bringing charges that the forests of the Olympics were "rotting" while "men of the peninsula (were) living on the dole."\textsuperscript{56} Additional estimates indicated that the proposed park would enclose 43.3\% of the total timber volume within the boundaries of ONF (including MONM) which provided 41.3\% of the sustained yield capacity and 50\% of the total capacity to provide employment.\textsuperscript{57}

The conservationists countered that as long as federal dollars were paying for management the area should meet national and not just local needs. Park proponents asserted that the Olympic Peninsula was so rich in timber that any other area would find that left outside the park a "blessing".\textsuperscript{58} They also noted that while the recreation/wilderness values of the park could not be measured in such units as board feet, grazing units, or pelts they had value nonetheless.\textsuperscript{59}
Conservationists' attacks on local control of the park brought counter charges that support for the park came primarily from "the National Park Service and scattered groups in the east, far removed from the area in question and having incomplete knowledge of the region and its problems." That many of the backers of the park were eastern is undeniable. Support came from such groups as the New York Zoological Society and the Emergency Conservation Committee, publishers of the pamphlet The Proposed Olympic National Park. Leaders in the latter group included Mrs. Rosalie Edge, a New York socialite; Irving Brant, a reporter for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat; and Secy. Ickes. However, to say that such groups were totally uninformed was undoubtedly an example of political license.

Compromise and Resolution

As the controversy roared on Franklin Roosevelt began to take an interest in it, and in September 1937 he visited the peninsula to talk to the different factions and try to work out a compromise, before the issue had totally torn apart the Washington State Democratic Party. After examining the situation FDR gave the park his approval. On the advise of Secy. Ickes he did not push for Wallgren's third bill which called for a 910,000 acre park, but instead worked for a compromise bill which called for a smaller park and allowed the President to expand the park at a later date.

On 29 June 1938 FDR signed this bill creating a 686,000 acre Olympic National Park, with the President allowed to add 212,000 acres by proclamation after consultation with the Governor of Washington, the
Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{66} (See Map 2.) The final bill was indeed a tribute to FDR's ability to obtain compromise. The "consultation" clause was more to placate park opponents such as Washington Governor Clarence Martin and Secy. Wallace, than a real constraint on the President's actions. For, the clause left the President free to add any land "which he may deem it advisable to add to such a park"; he need only "advise them (the governor and two secretaries) of the lands he proposed to add...and afford them reasonable opportunity to consult with and communicate to him their views and recommendations."\textsuperscript{67} Nowhere does the bill require the President to abide by any of the recommendations. On the other hand, the bill did allow specified areas of the park already open to mining to remain so for an additional five years with the only stipulation being that miners had to abide by general regulations set by the Secretary of the Interior.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{Footnotes to Section III}

\textsuperscript{39} O. H. Kneen, "The Olympics: Last Wilderness of the West," \textit{The Mentor}, June 1925, pp. 32, 36.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Roloff, p. 228

\textsuperscript{42} Ise, p. 385; Morgan, pp. 175, 179.


\textsuperscript{44} Ise, p. 388; Morgan, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{45} Morgan, pp. 183-184.

Ibid.

Ise, p. 382.


"Proposed Mount Olympus National Park", p. 8; Ise, p. 388.

Buck, pp. 836-838.

Yeon, p. 255.

Ibid., p. 291.

Ise, p. 387.


Buck, p. 837.

Yeon, p. 297.

Ben H. Thompson, "Why the Olympic National Park?" Planning and Civic Comment, July-September 1938, p. 3.

Curtis, p. 166.


Ise, p. 384; Morgan, p. 181.

Ise, p. 388.


Morgan, p. 186.

Ise, p. 388.

An Act to Establish the Olympic National Park in the State of Washington, and for Other Purposes, Statutes at Large 52, 1242 (1938).

Ibid.
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE PARK

Pre-World War II

The pre-World War II period was basically one of mop-up, with many odd ends of the legislative process being sorted out. The major action of this period was the addition to the park of 187,411 acres on 2 January 1940 by FDR under the terms of the original establishing bill. Included in this acreage was land the Public Works Administration (PWA) was authorized to acquire in the Queets River valley and in a strip along the coast as a public works project. (Compare Maps 2 & 3.) This action brought vehement protest from the settlers in the area who paraded in Washington's capital, Olympia, to persuade the governor to call out the National Guard to protect their homes. However, local opinion was not totally anti-park. In 1943 at the request of citizens and local officials of Port Angeles, Wa., just north of the park, FDR added the 20,600 acre Morse Creek Watershed to the northeastern section of the park.

War Effort

War again brought challenges to the territorial and philosophical integrity of ONP. As in World War I, the major thrusts of attack were mining and logging. In 1943 and again in 1945 Reps. Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson (both D-Washington) attempted to open the park to mining but failed each time. Sand and gravel for construction uses,
Map 3: Olympic National Park (circa 1947) and Proposed Deletions (from *Planning and Civic Comment*, July 1947, p. 31)
however, was mined in many acres already slated for acquisition as
park land but not yet purchased.73

Nevertheless, the major controversy was logging. Sitka Spruce
was still considered the best construction material for aircraft and
the Olympic forests were the best sources in the continental U.S. The
War Production Board called for increased production of Sitka in the
area and even called on Secy. Ickes to open the park to logging. As
with mining, designated lands still not part of the park proved a prob-
lem. Though administered by NPS, the PWA lands in the Queets River
valley were not officially part of the park and were quickly opened for
selective logging of Sitka and Douglas Fir. By mid-1943 four MBF of
lumber had been taken out of the area.74 NPS had tighter control over
land already in the park and heated debate ensued over the appropriateness
of logging there.

Logging proponents, such as Yale Professor of Forest Management,
H. H. Chapman, charged that ONP created a bottleneck in the supply of
badly needed Sitka. Of the Olympic Sitka reserves 751 MBF were within
ONP (429 MBF in the original area and 324 MBF in FDR's 1940 addition)
compared to only 283 MBF in ONF. This "bottleneck", says Chapman,
caused those who could foresee the wartime Sitka need to view ONP as a
"colossal national folly". He asserted that development of the area
as national forest would have provided both timber and recreational
land in primeval condition.75

This view was disputed by NPS and Department of Interior officials,
who felt that even a selective cut would result in loss of primeval
forest conditions and hence in park values.76 NPS Director, Newton
Drury, countered that to allow even wartime uses of national parks that
would do "irreparable damage" or "entail destruction or impairment of distinctive features" required the demand be one of "critical necessity" and "all reasonable alternatives" should have been exhausted first. This he did not feel had been done in the case of ONP. There was an abundance of Sitka in Tongass National Forest in Alaska, and Drury felt use of this lumber should be given priority. Chapman admitted that Sitka was being rafted from Alaska to mills in the Pacific Northwest, but saw it solely as an "emergency measure." Drury also explained that if the war was long the ONP Sitka supply could be exhausted and substitutes would have to be found anyway.

Also, even if the stands were not depleted, a dangerous precedent would have been set, with the local industry wanting to continue logging after the war to maintain the jobs developed during the war. Those pushing for Sitka logging admitted that such a move could alter the philosophy of inviolability that governs national parks, but they blamed the philosophical change on the conservationists. Chapman comments, "With every unwarranted overextension of national park areas, the danger of breakdown in the principle of inviolability becomes greater, until in times of war it might prove irresistible."

Secy. Ickes did allow a small amount of cutting in the park but only in cases of "absolute necessity." In the end what saved the forests of ONP was that the War Production Board found a more convenient supply of Sitka in Canada and that aluminum replaced Sitka as the preferred building material for aircraft.

Timber

Drury's prediction that the lumber industry would not be satisfied
satisfied with just wartime use of the park came true less than two years after the end of the war. As park observer John Ise has noted, "The sight of so much beautiful timber, some of it mature or even partly down and rotting was something to stir a forester's soul to battle, and to inspire a lumberman to start filing his saws." By 1947 ONP was embroiled in a controversy so thick that it pitted Ickes against Drury, caused NPS to go through two about faces, and attracted a flurry of bills from almost the entire Washington State Congressional delegation.

The controversy was in part another legacy of the war. By 1946 a severe shortage of housing for returning veterans was noted. In the same year FS, in collaboration with the American Forestry Association, issued a report entitled *Gauging the Timber Resource of the United States* which outlined shortages in the standing stock of timber then available. The trade journal *West Coast Lumberman* picked-up on these trends and opened the door to the controversy by pointing out that ONP held enough timber to build 73,000,000 five room homes (two for every family in the U.S.) and implied that it was Americans' patriotic duty to sacrifice the forests of ONP for the new "national emergency".

It was also noted that the new attacks came after the death of FDR and the retirement of Ickes--both staunch park supporters--and before Harry Truman and new Interior Secy. Julius A. Krug had developed a power base from which to act.

Of course the condition of the Olympic Peninsula lumber industry was also a driving factor. A 1947 study by the Bonneville Power Administration showed that the economy of Grays Harbor County, south of the park, was in bad shape. The timber supplies were very depleted; in fact, the mills were already importing material from Oregon. The war
had not stimulated log production demands, and only a few sawmills were predicted to last five years. Lumbermen and sawmill owners demanded that the size of the park be reduced to help sustain the economy. Some chambers of commerce in the area wanted to reduce the size of the park by one-third (or approximately 300,000 acres.) In an article outlining the lumber industry's plan for logging ONP the Aberdeen (Wa.) Daily World reflected the mood of the local area when it asserted that people would have to learn to get along without virgin forest.

The Washington (State) political establishment quickly divided over the issue with Gov. Monrad Wallgren, the original sponsor of the bills that lead to ONP, strongly opposed to reduction while most of the state's Congressional delegation favored it. In 1947 seven bills were introduced into Congress--five to eliminate lands from the park and two to set-up commissions to study the issue--all by Washington legislators. Rep. Fred Norman was able to push through a House Joint Resolution establishing a nine member commission to study whether any areas "should be...withdrawn or excluded from the Olympic National Park." The commission membership--the West Coast Lumbermen's Assoc.; the loggers union; civic groups from Grays Harbor, Port Angeles, and Port Townsend; the Washington State Conservation Commission; FS; NPS; and the National Parks Assoc.--was strongly biased toward lumber interests, and to avoid the risks of losing vast amounts of land through the commission process, Secy. Krug initiated Interior Department and NPS support for a bill sponsored by Reps. Norman and Jackson to reduce the park by 56,396 acres. The bill would have eliminated one-seventh of the commercial grade timber and three-fifths of the rainforest found in ONP. (See Map 3.)
Little note was made of this move until former Secy. Ickes assailed it in a book review published in the *Saturday Review*, accusing Drury and Krug of wanting to "rape this unique national park." This charge set off the "greatest conservation counter offensive ever known in the United States."

On 16-17 September 1947 hearings were held by the House Public Lands Committee Concerning the Norman-Jackson bill. The general arguments presented by those in favor of the status quo were that 500 BBF of lumber still existed outside the park, and that gains in tourism would offset the "lost" lumber. The conservationists also contended that the "controlling reason" for the establishment of ONP was "preservation of the forest."

Those favoring a reduction in size countered with the assertion that this was outside the legitimate function of the park system and the withdrawal of resources is ancillary to protection of mountains, canyons, and the like. They questioned whether elimination of lowlands would reduce the recreation potential of ONP and refused to admit that the land was useful for things besides timber, again stressing the economic needs of the area.

The most influential information brought out by the hearings was the admission that the present proposal for deletion of 56,369 acres would not meet future industry demands and that the industry could not assure the committee that no further withdrawal would be sought. These admissions swung Rep. Jackson and Sen. Magnuson to support of keeping the park intact and combined with Ickes scathing attack caused Secy. Krug and NPS Director Drury to withdraw their support for the bill. Krug announced in a public statement 1 December 1947, "There will be no
changes that reduce the national park or monument areas... The areas are not larger than we need for our ultimate requirements, and the refinements we could make now... might go the limit in destroying the whole background of the park system."

**Another Addition**

The controversies over ONP fell dormant for the next half decade but were brought to the surface again when on 6 January 1953 Harry Truman, in the second to the last proclamation of his presidency, added 47,754 acres to ONP (bringing it up to the maximum allowed by Congress). The new addition was composed mainly of the fifty mile "Ocean Strip" along the Pacific coast and the corridor along the Queets River valley (the PWA lands already managed by NPS as a public works project) plus a corridor along the Bogachiel River valley as well. 101 (Compare Maps 3 & 4.)

Opposition to Truman's actions was immediate and vehement, though most of it was of local origin, including the governor, legislature, and state planning commission. 102 Gov. Arthur B. Langlie set up another committee, representing a cross section of opinions, to study ONP. It was Langlie's intention to send the findings to federal officials and possibly use them in litigation to reduce the park's size. 103 He hoped the committee would make a distinction between areas with unique natural features and those not of park caliber that could be transferred back to ONF. 104 In the end the committee was divided, eight for further study and five for keeping the present boundaries. 105

Many of the arguments against Truman's move were objections to the non-use or "lock-up" of resources in the national park setting. As the
Aberdeen (Wa.) World put it, Truman's decision left "billions of board feet of timber condemned to rot." Charles S. Cowan, secretary/treasurer of the Washington Forestry Conference, asserted, "The sooner we cut off virgin timber, the sooner we are going to have more. In this way we change a static forest into a dynamic forest." Washington State Forester, Bernard L. Orell, agreed adding that with such a cut annual growth would increase, a result "essential" to perpetuating the state forest industry.

Other arguments again centered on the local economy. According to Ise, "More than half the workers in the area were employed in the lumber industry, and local boosters wanted full employment as long as the timber would last." In 1952 the Olympic forest industry provided 12,432 jobs or 54.8% of the employment in the area. The other 45.2% were mainly service trades supported by the forest workers. Although 50.1 BBF of timber still remained outside the park, the local lumber industry in 1952 used 239 MBF more than had been cut locally and in fact the allowable annual cut fell below use by 319 MBF.

It was also charged that ONP could only provide recreation for avid outdoorsmen, naturalists, and backpackers, and the hunters, fisherman, campers, and those driving would be better served by ONF. There also were objections to the tight control NPS had over recreation and tourism on the peninsula. Long time park opponent Russell V. Mack of Hoquiam, Washington, even described such NPS control as a "grandiose experiment in socializing the tourist industry."

Not all opposed Truman's addition, however. At the same time Gov. Langlie was setting up his boundary study committee conservationists were forming the Olympic Park Association. Their president, Irving
M. Clark, noted that most reactions to the park addition "reflect an abysmal misunderstanding of the matter". He cited the fact that the additions had been discussed since 1938 and were expressly authorized by the bill forming ONP. The New York Times also brought out the point of local versus national control. They asserted, "If local Washington interests are too shortsighted to see the permanent values (commercial as well as aesthetic)...it is up to the rest of us to make sure the nation is not deprived of this priceless and unique asset."115

Proponents of the addition pointed out that ONP was not the only park with timber resources of commercial value and opening ONP to logging could set a dangerous precedent. They questioned the need for the timber as well, citing the fact that old growth had yet to be totally exploited on State Sustained Yield Forest No. 1, the single largest forest stand on the peninsula. On the matter of size, conservationists complained that ONP was only the eighth largest in the U.S. national park system and no other park had ever had its boundaries so extensively studied and argued over.117

This incident was one of the few times that a controversy over ONP remained a verbal battle, and there was no direct legislative challenge to the 1953 addition.

More Timber Problems

Despite the apparent victory by conservationists in 1953, by 1955 the lumber industry was again lobbying to be allowed access to the virgin stands of ONP. In 1955 a large forest products firm, Raynier, Inc., produced an advertising campaign in national magazines that talked of "locking-up" timber, and described ONP forests as over-mature, over-ripe,
and wasted. They also connected ONP to the high cost of newsprint and the lack of commercial timber.118

At about this same time the public relations firm of Roderic Olzendan and Associates was retained by ten Washington counties* to produce the booklet Memorandum of Facts re: Olympic National Park. The pamphlet called for Congress to transfer 245,000 acres of parkland to FS; called the park a "steal", claiming the government paid landowners too little for the area; and asserted that the park was formed by "high-pressure, un-American methods."119 In a reply to an editorial critical of the report Olzendan added that logging would increase wildlife habitat, create 10,000 to 15,000 new jobs, and $60-$80 million "new wealth".120

In response to such lumber industry claims naturalist Lois Crisler, who had spent much of her life working in ONP, charged that the forests were not a crop that would grow "overripe" and "rot" or that needed to be "harvested" and "weeded". She again observed, as did the original park proponents, that ONP timber reserves would last the local mills ten years at most in any case.121 Another author ridiculed industry claims that science was on their side by noting that the park was a "fresh green oasis completely surrounded by some of the most wasteful and destructive logging operations ever practiced in this country."122

Compounding the problem of increased lumber industry pressure was the fact that during the mid-1950's NPS developed a special program of logging dead and down timber in ONP to raise money to buy private land still within park boundaries. These operations were confined to the

*Pacific, Grays Harbor, Thurston, Clallam, Jefferson, Mason, King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Whatrom.
edge of the park in areas of no scenic value and produced $800,000 for land acquisition as well as lumber for park facilities. Initially, conservation groups were divided on the issue with the Wilderness Society opposing the plan and the National Parks Association (NPA) giving cautious approval. But, as abuse of their contracts by the logging firms hired and lack of NPS supervision began to grow so did objections, and NPA soon reversed itself.\(^\text{123}\)

The abuses included poor slash clean up, poor care of soil, and the cutting of healthy trees in addition to or in preference to dead and diseased trees. On 22 February 1957 there was large blow-down of trees in the southwestern part of the park, and after a survey by NPS personnel it was decided to sell the timber to prevent fire and insect spread.\(^\text{124}\) The decision was made so quickly and the operation supervised so poorly that a public outcry put a halt to all such operations in ONP and caused a whole new set of NPS directions to be issued on such actions in any park. These directions included cuts having to be included in a park area's master plan, with any emergency clean-up needing approval from the regional office. They also banned removal of "potential" insect hazards and altering vegetation in conflict with the original reason for establishing the park.\(^\text{125}\)

Old Fights and New Challenges

In 1966 ONP went through the latest, though probably not the last, in the series of boundary reviews. As one observer put it, "questions of how big or how small the protected area should be have caused its boundaries to fluctuate like the lines on a sales chart."\(^\text{126}\) This review was produced by the Olympic National Park Boundary Study Committee
(ONPBSC) headed by ONP Superintendent Bennet T. Gale. The committee report primarily followed the "Overly Proposal"—put forth by Fred J. Overly member of the committee, former Superintendent of ONP, and then director of the Pacific Northwest Region of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Overly's recommendation was to adjust the boundaries along hydrographic rather than section lines and to delete 69,000 acres of rain forest containing 2.6 BBF of timber in the Bogachiel and Quinault regions. (See Map 4.)

The committee decided to retain the Bogachiel and Quinault areas, but also moved to take the Ocean Strip out of the park and turn it into a National Seashore which would be considered a "recreational" rather than a "natural" area and to build a new commercial highway farther from shore leaving the present one as an access road. Overly presented the proposals during the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee hearings of 11-12 February 1966 concerning various park matters in Washington State, but the recommendations were shelved by the committee.127

Aside from part of Overly's proposal, logging has been replaced as the major threat to the integrity of the park by a new commercial force—recreation and tourism. As a case in point note the ONPBSC proposal to turn the Ocean Strip into a recreation area. From 1931 when the peninsula loop highway provided the access necessary to make tourism the "newest economic activity on the peninsula,"128 to 1938 when park opponents called timber jobs "concrete facts" and predictions of growth in tourism "vague and unsupported,"129 tourism has grown phenomenally in importance and stability compared to timber.130

Controversy broke out in 1959 when "Clallam County commercial interests" began pushing for a coastal highway from Neah Bay to
La Push. (See Map 4.) Opposition was led by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas and the Olympic Park Ocean Committee. They countered with proposals for a more inland highway site to protect the primitive, wilderness values of the beach. Douglas himself led protest hikes along the beach, and in the end the highway was diverted.

The NPS development program, Mission '66, brought forth a number of proposals for ambitious projects in ONP including the Hoh Rain Forest Museum & Visitor Center and a new campground in the Ocean Strip at Mora (both of which have now been completed) and a burro rental program out of Port Angeles (which has since been abandoned).

Of late though, NPS has been looking more kindly on wilderness than development. In 1974 in line with the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE) mandated by the Wilderness Act NPS proposed 834,000 of 896,598 acres in ONP for wilderness designation, but the issue is far from settled. Final decisions are now up to the President and Congress and one local group has offered counter proposals such as adding a new loop road within the park, adding aerial tramways, expanding accommodation facilities, and limiting wilderness to 500,000 acres at the center of the park. So it appears likely that ONP will live up to its heritage and remain a source of controversy into the foreseeable future.

Footnotes to Section IV

69 Ise, pp. 390-391.

70 Ibid., pp. 389-390; Morgan, p. 186.


73. Ise, pp. 391, 451, 474.

74. Department of Interior, p. 203.

75. Chapman, p. 16.

76. Department of Interior, p. 203.


78. Chapman, p. 16.


80. Chapman, p. 16.

81. Ise, p. 392.

82. Ibid., p. 397.


84. Heald, p. 318.


90. Crisler, p. 867.


95. Heald, p. 319.

97 Ibid.


105 Heald, p. 336.


107 Davies, sec. 2, p. 67.


109 Ise, p. 392.


111 Ibid., p. 97.

112 "Protests on Olympic Park," p. 36.

113 Heald, p. 336.

114 "Other Side of Olympic Park," p. 34.

115 Ibid.

117. Irving, Clark, Jr., pp. 31, 102.


121. Crisler, p. 867.


124. Ise, p. 555.


128. Seeman, p. 308.

129. Buck, p. 838.

130. Ise, p. 387.


V. SUMMATION AND ANALYSIS

Olympic National Park continues to be a paradox. As John Muir described it, it is indeed "a forest kingdom unlike any other,"\textsuperscript{135} containing an aggregation of various natural features and resources that are found together nowhere else on earth. And yet, the history of ONP has been, in microcosm, the history of wilderness of public lands in the United States. As with the U.S. as a whole, what wilderness that remains on the Olympic Peninsula is more the result of fortuitous circumstance than any dedicated adherence to the principle of preservation. Since the initial entry of whites into the area the focus has been on the consumptive exploitation of the resources found there. Aesthetics and wilderness have been pleasant bonuses which have been discarded when they have begun to conflict with the "higher" consumptive uses.

Consumptive use carries the vast advantage of being measurable on an absolute, objective scale (e.g. board feet, number of elk harvested, recreational user days, etc.) that is perceivable by all observers regardless of philosophy, usually because it can be converted to monetary terms. The essence of wilderness and the values it provides are much more highly subjective and personal. To some a clear difference exists between a pristine forest and a forest under sustained yield management while to others both are simply aggregations of trees, for the difference between the two lies as much in individual perception as in physical fact.
ONP shows very clearly that what is needed is an objective, "dollars and cents" method of quantifying the values that wild areas provide so they can be more easily balanced against the values of consumptive exploitation. We can state the fact that the Olympic Ocean Strip contains a large proportion of the wilderness beach remaining in the contiguous United States, but it remains just that—a descriptive fact. One has no "Psychological Contentment Factor" to weigh against the increased revenue or visitor use that would result from turning the area into a national seashore as per the ONPBSC report.

As long as such valuations remain subjective, areas such as ONP will remain at the mercy of the changing political climate of the nation. The wise use philosophy of the late 1800's perhaps saved the Olympics from the ravages of the destructive logging practices prevalent in the Pacific Northwest, but it also left the forests in the position to have to prove (earn) their worth by the resources measured in monetary terms) they could provide to man. Though public opinion has changed with time to a position counting wilderness values as legitimate inclusions in the decision making process, exactly what is meant by the term "wilderness" has yet to be adequately defined. Until wilderness and its benefits can become more than subjective perception the changing tides of public opinion could, especially in times of stress, once again condone actions that would be both destructive and irreversible.

This vulnerability is somewhat disconcerting, especially if one considers what the vast areas of wilderness in ONP have already cost in terms of political battles, public relations campaigns, and constant vigilance. But, nevertheless, the saga of ONP is basically hopeful, for these wilderness areas are still there; they have survived one
hundred years of human use and abuse; and the longer they continue to survive, the more ONP can become a paradigm for the future, a symbol of "America's growing awareness that there are times and places in which even a fine timber tree is worth more alive than dead."\textsuperscript{136}

Footnotes to Section V

\textsuperscript{135} Neuberger, "Timber Interests," sec. 4, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{136} Brooks, p. 57.
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