



Cybersecurity Of Autonomous Vehicle Platooning

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Agenda

- ▶ What is Autonomous Vehicle Platooning?
- ▶ Pros and Cons of Autonomous Vehicle Platooning
- ▶ Platooning Challenges
- ▶ Modeling and Results
- ▶ Conclusion

Autonomous Vehicle Platooning

- ▶ **Autonomous Vehicle:**


- The car that drives itself.



- ▶ **Platooning:**

- Group of Autonomous vehicles travelling together with relatively small spacing and small/zero relative velocity of the vehicles.

Leading Companies and Projects



Pros and Cons

▶ **Pros:**

1. Safety
2. Operational Efficiency
(Increase highway capacity)
3. Driving Comfort
4. Transit time Efficiency

▶ **Cons:**

1. Computer failure
2. Degrading performance
in case of interception
3. Increase in crashes
involving pedestrians

Platooning Challenges

- ▶ Driver acceptance
- ▶ Reliability
- ▶ Legislation
- ▶ **System Security**




Cyber Security Of Autonomous Vehicle Platooning

“In fact, Munich Re, the world’s second-largest reinsurer, found that **55 %** of corporate risk managers surveyed in a recent study named **cybersecurity** as their **top concern** for autonomous vehicles. Even more alarming, **64 %** of companies surveyed say they feel completely **unprepared** to address cyber security [\[1\]](#)”

Research Works Study the Security in Platooning


- **Communication security issues [2,3]**

- ❖ Availability
- ❖ Confidentiality
- ❖ Data integrity
- ❖ Authentication




Security Attacks on Communication: Threats and Attacks on Availability

- ❖ Jamming attack
- ❖ DOS (Denial of service) or DDOS attack
- ❖ Malware attack
- ❖ Broadcast tampering attack
- ❖ Black hole attack
- ❖ Greedy behavior attack
- ❖ Spamming attack




Security Attacks on Communication: Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality

- ❖ Eavesdropping attack
- ❖ Traffic analysis attack
- ❖ Man in the middle attack




Security Attacks on Communication: Threats and Attacks on Authentication

- ❖ Sybil attack
- ❖ Tunneling attack
- ❖ GPS spoofing
- ❖ Impersonation attack
- ❖ Free-riding attack (or active free-riding attack)
- ❖ Masquerading attack
- ❖ Key and/or certificate replication
- ❖ Message tampering



Security Attacks on Communication: Threats and Attacks on Data Integrity


- ❖ Replay attack
- ❖ Masquerading attack
- ❖ Message modification attack
- ❖ Illusion attack



Research Works Study Security In Platooning

- **Control security issues**

- ❖ Destabilizing attack [4]



- ❖ High-speed Collision induction attack [5]


- ❖ Energy efficiency attack [6]

- ❖ False data injection [7]

- ❖ Traffic flow instability attack [8]

Platoon Model

► Bidirectional structure [9]:






Each vehicle receives states of the vehicles in front and behind.

$$u_i = k_p(x_{i+1} - x_i - \sigma_{\text{ref}}) + k_p(x_{i-1} - x_i + \sigma_{\text{ref}}) + k_d(v_{i+1} - v_i) + k_d(v_{i-1} - v_i)$$

with k_p position gain and,
with k_d velocity gain

System Performance



Attack Model


- ▶ Attack objective

Causing **collision** by attackers' motion and gain modification

While:

Attacker is not affected

Attacker is not detectable



$$u_i = k_p (x_{i+1} - x_i - \sigma_{ref}) + k_p (x_{i-1} - x_i + \sigma_{ref}) + k_{d_a} (v_{i+1} - v_i) + k_{d_a} (v_{i-1} - v_i) + u_a$$

k_{d_a} : velocity gain for the attacker


u_a : Attacker's input

Simulation Results





- ▶ 15-vehicle platoon
- ▶ Attackers # 1 and #5
- ▶ Gains for normal and attacker's vehicle
- ▶ Attacker's Input

$$k_p = 1, k_d = 11$$





$$k_{d_a} = 0.3$$



Simulation Results



Simulation Results



Conclusion

- ▶ Simulation results show:
 - Attacker can easily disrupt platoon performance and stay **intact** and Attacker is **not detectable**.
 - Cyber security of autonomous vehicle platooning is an important issue and it needs immediate attention.

Bibliography

- [1] <https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/18/why-a-cybersecurity-solution-for-driverless-cars-may-be-found-under-the-hood>
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