The Utah Black Hawk War 1865-1871

Deloy J. Spencer
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Spencer, Deloy J., "The Utah Black Hawk War 1865-1871" (1969). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 600.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/600
THE UTAH BLACK HAWK WAR 1865-1871

by

Deloy J Spencer

A report submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Social Science

Plan B

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

1969
Black Hawk and his redskin band,
    Was a terror in the land,
Proud he was the Indian chief,
Who could live on Mormon beef.

F. Christensen
PREFACE

From 1865 until 1871 the Territory of Utah was the scene of a little-known war. The Ute and Piute Indians responding to pressure of white settlers devastated much of Utah south of Spanish Fork. During the first three years of warfare the Mormon Settlements south of the Utah Valley struggled to exist. The next three years saw improving conditions but a continuation of raids by the Navaho in the south.

This was a private war. Attempts to get government aid were futile. The settlers and the Mormon Church provided the men and equipment necessary. While the problems faced by the settlers were similar to those of all frontier areas they were compounded by remoteness and lack of preparation.

Because of the oft repeated phrase attributed to Brigham Young, "It is cheaper to feed them than to fight them," little attention is given to the Indian problems. Indian troubles are lightly covered or ignored in the general belief that the Mormon settlers were able to develop cities and towns without Indian problems. Yet, in 1866 some 2,500 men were under arms attempting to secure the Mormon frontier.

It is hoped that this paper will help in completing the picture of this phase of Utah history. To those who guided and aided in the preparation I would like to express thanks and appreciation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Chapter

I. MORMON-INDIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1865

Ute-Indian Relations
Events Leading to War

II. THE WAR

Indians Involved
The White Militia
Types of Warfare
Major Conflicts
The War in the South
Heber Valley
Forts
Peace Attempts

III. PROBLEMS OF THE SETTLERS

The Economy
Settlement Distruption
The Cost
Summary

BIBLIOGRAPHY
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Forts used in the Black Hawk War</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Utah Indian Reservations</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Settlements evacuated during the Black Hawk War, 1865-71</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Major depredation areas in Utah, 1865-71</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

MORMON-INDIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1865

When the Mormons settled in the Salt Lake Valley they found that it was considered a no-man's land. The valley was an uninhabited area between lands occupied by the Shoshone Indians to the North and the Ute Indians to the South.

The Ute Indians constituted one of the poorest tribes of Indians in America. The land they occupied was one of rugged mountains with short swift streams leading into arid deserts. The Ute struggled to survive in a land where even today man with his technical and scientific know-how often finds the winters severe. The Ute depended on all animals for food and gathered berries, grapes, roots, pinion nuts and fish. In some areas he also harvested wild grass seed in the fall to supplement his diet.

With the Mormon philosophy that each individual was to do all he could for himself as well as participate in the cooperative ventures of the community, an attempt was made to provide every man his own land. With thousands of families coming into the region every year it was necessary that new areas be explored for settlement. Exploration teams were sent in all directions from

---

1 S. Lymon Tyler, "Before Escalante: An Early History of the Yuta Indians" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1951), p. 34.
Salt Lake City seeking sites that were suitable for settlement. With the Mormon leadership interested in settling the good lands in the territory and with several good valleys within a short distance of Salt Lake City, it was not many years until settlements were established in them.

The valleys suitable for settlement were also the homelands of the Ute Indians. With the Ute already having subsistence problems it was inevitable that the incursion of the Mormons would result in more problems.

The Mormon policy proved to be not much different from that of the United States. In 1849 the first group of settlers to move into Utah Valley south of Salt Lake City were stopped by a band of Timpanogoes Ute who showed concern about the large number of white settlers. The settlers were required to enter into a treaty that they would not drive the Indians from their lands nor deprive them of their rights. Dimick B. Huntington, the Indian interpreter, was required to seal the treaty by raising his right hand and swearing by the sun. Yet, the gradual increase of settlers had forced the Indians from the valley by 1865, except for a few who lived on the reservation farm at Spanish Fork.²

Brigham Young, while advising that every effort should be made to cultivate the friendship of the Indians, believed that the whites should definitely remain above them. His philosophy, as expressed in 1849, was "If you consider them your equals you cannot raise them up to you."³ In giving instructions to

²"History of Provo," Tullidge's Quarterly Magazine (July, 1884), 23.

the colonists at Fort Utah on October 18, 1849, he said:

Tend to your own affairs, and let the Indians take care of themselves. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and the Indians stay out; but, while you mix with them promiscuously, you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they please to give . . . be familiar with the Indians and they will be more familiar; and the more familiar, you will find the less influence you will have with them. If you would have dominion over them, for their good . . . you must not treat them as your equals. 4

Young had no illusions about the Indians. He knew it would take years to teach them the ways of the white people. He also knew that if the two peoples were to exist side by side relations had to be good between them. He urged the Mormons to do what they could to feed and clothe the Indians. He expressed the feeling that more lives would be saved by feeding and clothing the Indians than through military pressure. 5 Travelers in the territory during the late 1870's and early 1880's expressed the feeling that they traveled in safety because of the good relationships between the two peoples. One traveler said, "The Mormon policy became, it is cheaper to feed them than to fight them."6 Young wanted the Indians kept in their place, and felt that trouble could be avoided if caution were used.

4 Ibid., p. 458.


6 Phil Robinson, Saints and Sinners (Boston, Massachusetts: Roberts Brothers Press, 1883), p. 126. This was expressed by Robinson after he traveled the Utah Territory as being the policy of the settlers.
Relations between whites and Ute were often strained. The white men had driven many Indian groups to new fishing locations by the damming and diverting of streams. The white man had fenced meadows and plowed the fertile areas that provided much of the berry and root food supply of the Indians. The white man also introduced cattle and sheep into the area. They spread over the unfenced areas eating the grass and driving the wild animals higher into the mountains. The sheep and cattle ate the grass that provided the winter supply of seed. Food was usually scarce for the Indian and he found it becoming more scarce as the increasing number of settlers spread, and fenced the new land. The white man's cattle, horses and sheep looked like a better way of life for the destitute Indian. As early as 1850 an Indian agent accused the Mormons of causing the problems by taking the best lands.

The white man, not knowing, or caring, was doing the same thing that other Indian tribes had faced everywhere white men settled. Indian removal was not a stated policy until the elimination of the Indian farms at Spanish Fork and Twelve Mile Creek in the 1860's. Nevertheless, the practice of pushing the Indians into the remote areas was a de facto removal policy. The white settlers saw good land going to waste and were determined to utilize it. The Indian Agency in the Utah Territory appeared to be concerned only with keeping the Indians pacified.

The Ute, finding that the semi-domesticated cattle and sheep were easier to kill than wild animals, often killed for food. Within the white man's concept of "thou shalt not steal" this became a crime that had to be punished.
Many white settlers were nearly destitute themselves and could not afford the loss of livestock. Both sides had problems and nothing was done to help either. Most Indian troubles in Utah resulted from livestock theft.

Military force was used several times against the Indians before 1865. The only prolonged difficulties however, were those in connection with the Walker War, 1853-54. 7

One attempt to upgrade the Indian was that of the Indian farm. Following the council of Governor Young, five small reservations were established in the counties of Utah, Juab, Sanpete, Millard, and Iron. 8 These reservations became known as Indian farms because some attempts were made to teach the Indians farming and ways of a sedentary life.

With the arrival of Johnston's army in 1858 the farms were neglected and allowed to deteriorate. As settlers increased in the Sanpete and Utah County area, pressure was applied to the Indian Agency to close the Spanish Fork and Twelve Mile Creek areas and turn them over to settlers. In May, 1860, the Federal Government appropriated $53,000 to pay for past Indian agents and costs of surveying and mapping the farms. 9 The farms existed until a treaty between the Indians and Government was negotiated in June,


8 Names of these farms were: Spanish Fork, Utah Co.; Corn Creek, Millard Co.; Twelve Mile Creek, Sanpete Co.; Deep Creek, Tooele Co.; Pinto, Iron Co.

9 Gustive O. Larson, p. 152.
1865, when the Ute gave up the two farms for the Uintah Reservation.

Ute-Indian Relations

While Indian problems continued to increase within the Mormon settlements, events were shaping on the Western plains that may have contributed to further difficulty. The start of the Civil War drew from the plains the best of the military units. Indian problems were largely ignored during the war, but efforts were made shortly after its conclusion to solve them. The Ute who ranged over Colorado and Eastern Utah had communication with the Plains Indians. Military actions against the Plains Indians and the losses suffered by the Indians may have added to the belligerence of Black Hawk and other braves who were not happy with the conciliatory policies of their leaders. Surely the Ute and Navaho knew of the Sand Creek Massacre.

One of the major problems with the Indians during this period was the indecisiveness of the U.S. Government concerning Indians. Control over the Indians was shifted from one governmental department to the other. Frontier officers often never knew what the policy toward the Indians would be. The Government defaulted on several treaties. Payments were not made or agreements live up to. Chief Spotted Tail of the Sioux said, "All men from Washington are liars." 11

10 Rex Curry, Administrative Officer, Ute Indian Tribe, Fort Duchesne, Utah, "Background History of the Ute Tribe," Manuscript in this writer's possession. n.d. (Typewritten)

Perhaps during the 1860's the greatest Indian leaders of the plains developed. The plains saw Indians win major victories. The defeat of Captain W. B. Fetterman and his company by Crazy Horse on December 21, 1866, could have furnished example to all Indians and increased the hostility of the Ute.

With the Indian troubles on the plains it is understandable that the Utah settlers could not get federal aid when they asked for it. The United States was still suffering from the effects of the Civil War. Debts were high and people in the East had their own problems. People who lived in the remote mountains of the West were largely forgotten by the states.

Relations between the Ute and other Indians were good enough that when the Ute began to raid the Mormon settlements, Navaho braves soon came to get in on the spoils. The Navaho also began to raid settlements in Southern Utah during this period. There are accounts of some Piede and Pavan Indians aiding the Navaho in the Southern part of the territory. Most of the Piede and Pavan Indians, however, remained neutral or aided the settlers. There are no accounts of other Indians becoming involved in the war.

Events Leading to War

In 1849 Chief Walker of the Ute tribe visited Brigham Young in Salt

---

12 F. H. Head, Indian Commissioner, Utah Territory. Letter to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, April 30, 1866. Indian Affairs Reports 1865-71 (Microfilm copy at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah).
Lake City. During this visit he asked that settlers be sent to the Sanpete region to establish farms and show the Indians how to become farmers. The first settlers were called to this region in the fall of 1849. 13

Relations between whites and Indians in the Sanpete region had been good from the year 1849 to the winter of 1864-65. There had been thefts of livestock but no serious problems had erupted. The Mormons made periodic gifts of flour and livestock but no serious attempts were made to civilize the Indians.

The winter of 1864-65 was a bad one for the band of Ute Indians camped near Gunnison on the Sevier River. The winter was severe and food was scarce. Indians of the band killed some of the settler's livestock for food. During the winter an epidemic of smallpox or measles swept Indian camps killing many. 14 Some of the spiritual leaders of the Indians began to blame the Mormons for the disease. 15 With the blame placed on the Mormons for their problems the Indians began to boast about what they planned to do to the Mormons when spring came. Mormon leaders, unfortunately, shrugged off such warnings as being incidental. 16

13 Roberts, Comprehensive History of the Church, III, p. 461.
14 Both diseases are found in sources; evidence is about equal for both.
16 Ibid., p. 334.
By early spring the problem had grown until local leaders were seeking solutions. It was felt that a treaty could be concluded with the Indians and that the problem could be solved peaceably. Arrangements were made for a meeting in Manti, April 9, 1865. The meeting at the home of Jerome Kempton was almost successful and most of the problems seemed on the verge of being solved when negotiations were interrupted.

A group of interested whites and Indians had gathered in the front yard of the Kempton home to learn what they could about the proceedings, and tempers were high. Many whites were angry over livestock that had been stolen. Indians felt that they were being cheated and robbed by the whites. One of the young Indians, a Sub-Chief Yenewood (also known as Jake Arropine), began to argue and arouse the Indians. John Lowry, one of the whites who had lost cattle to the Indians, attempted to pacify Yenewood. Yenewood and Lowry began to quarrel. George W. Bean, an interpreter and prominent citizen later stated that the Black Hawk War was caused by John Lowry. Bean claimed that Lowry (a drunked interpreter) claimed a horse an Indian had and knocked him down and beat him. Bean went on to say, "our Indian troubles have generally been brought about by some foolish act of the white men." 17

One of Lowry's friends shouted a warning that Yenewood was drawing an arrow. Lowry went to Yenewood's horse to prevent the arrow from being drawn and in the skirmish Yenewood was pulled from his horse and struck.

17 George W. Bean. Dictation. H. H. Bancroft Papers, University of California at Berkeley. (Microfilm Copy, Utah State University, Logan, Utah), Reel 2.
Seeing Yenewood attacked the other Indians came to his aid. Breaking off negotiations, the Indians returned to their camps to spread the word. Thinking whites began to prepare for the trouble they could expect.

Thus with years of misunderstanding and ignorance on both sides the stage was set for the worst Indian war in Utah history. Most accounts blame Lowry for the start of the war. Lowry did not deny his part in the war but defended himself in a statement at a reunion of Black Hawk War veterans at Manti. Peter Gottfredson later reproduced a signed copy of the statement:

The occasion of the present re-union being opportune, in order to correct an erroneous impression that has become wide-spread as to what precipitated the Black-Hawk War. I take this opportunity or means of placing the facts before the world.

But first let me state that I came here as a pioneer, and took part in the first battle fought with the Indians under command of Col. John Scott. And I have in one way or another been associated with almost every Indian trouble in the early history of this region. I served as Indian interpreter for years in Manti, and have passed through many close places in dealing with the Red Men.

In 1864 a small band of Indians were wintering at Gunnison, many of them died, and they found reason for their trouble in conclusion that the Mormons had written their names and sent them to satan, and he had caused death to come upon them. So in their councils they were directed by their Chief to stop the sickness among them by killing (Mormons) in retaliation. In February, Black Hawk informed me what the Indians were going to do when the snow went off. They would kill Mormons and eat Mormon beef. I immediately went to my Bishop with the information. He thought, as did many others that it was just Indian talk and amounted to nothing; but the Indians told me several times what they intended to do, and so I went the second time to the Bishop. My story was received by him saying "there are not enough of them."

Shortly after I learned they were killing cattle. I had some cattle on the range myself, and in my search for them I found the skull of an ox which I had owned . . . I had always been a friend to them, as had the Mormon people. I talked to them in such a way that they agreed to pay me for the animal which had been killed by fetching me a horse, and they did so the next day. I agreed to meet with them at Manti about the eighth of April and talk the matter over
of their killing our cattle. Accordingly the council took place. It appeared the difficulty would be settled amicably, but a certain young Indian present whose father had died during the winter continued to halloo and make demonstrations, saying that he would eat Mormon beef and kill Mormons when the snow went off. I told him a time or two to stop and permit me to finish my talk. Just then someone called "lookout, he is getting his arrows." I rode up to him and turned him off his horse, and pulled him to the ground. The bystanders interfered and we were separated. . . In those days it was at times imperative that harsh measures should be used. . . It was a question of supremacy between the whites and the Indian. I have patiently born the stigma placed upon me, for I knew the facts, and to those who still persist in looking upon me as guilty of precipitating the Black Hawk War, I will say this, that I appeal from their decision to a higher court--our creator, who will ultimately judge all men.

s/John Lowry
Stamped with the Commissioners of Indian War Records Seal. 18

18 Gottfredson, p. 335.
CHAPTER II

THE WAR

Indians Involved

With the misunderstandings between the Mormon and the Ute at a combustible point the more aggressive Indian leaders began to gain in influence. The friendly relations between the Mormons and the Indian leaders caused some young braves to resent Indian leadership. The Mormons, while having good relationships with the chiefs, ignored the young hot bloods. Because of this relationship the Mormons were not prepared for hostilities. The state of preparation in Mormon settlements appears to have been very low.

At the time of the outbreak of hostilities the Ute Indians were governed by four chieftains and several sub-chiefs. At the final negotiations at the Spanish Fork Indian Farm when the Indians gave up all land but the Uintah Basin Reservation all four chiefs and 15 sub-chiefs signed the agreement.¹ Of the chiefs, Kanosh, Sowiette, San Pitch, and Tabby, only San Pitch was to participate in the war. Several of the sub-chieftans became leaders of war parties. Black Hawk, for whom the war was named, was not present at this conference. He probably did not rank high enough to sign an agreement of

¹Deseret News, June 14, 1865.
this kind. With Chief Tabby leading the way, most of the Indians moved onto the reservation where they stayed throughout the war years. Most of the warriors to participate in the war were young men unhappy with the Mormons and their Indian leaders.

Black Hawk, the sub-chief who became the principle War Chief, was thought to be a Pah-Ute (Piute). He was born in the Southern part of Utah Valley, and as a youth played with the white children of the area. Black Hawk spoke English fluently as a result of his early association with the whites. His father was Synnap Pich or Tenaciono (something that hangs on). C. L. Christensen, an Indian interpreter, stated the Synnap Pich was a chief of the Sanpete area. His mother was Tanar-oh-wich (mother of boys).

Black Hawk has been described as being tall and stately. He supposedly had a long nose and looked as though he had a small mustache. Black Hawk was intelligent and could make up his mind in a hurry. It was said that more than once as a youth he sat in Mormon meetings and listened to them plan defense against the Indians.

Black Hawk showed evidence of having traits of strong conscience and loyalty. One man, Soren A. Sorensen, near Ephriam in 1867 was asked why

---

2 Josiah F. Gibbs, "Black Hawk's Last Raid," Utah Historical Quarterly, IV (October, 1931), 484.

3 C. L. Christensen, Deseret News, September 29, 1919.

4 Mary Goble Pay, Cited by Kate B. Carter, Our Pioneer Heritage (Salt Lake City, Utah: Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 1966), p. 247.
Black Hawk had let him live but killed people within sight, said, "I cannot say why, unless it was owing to the fact that when I was home with my parents, my mother took a liking to the young Indian Black Hawk."  

Black Hawk was wounded at the battle of Gravelly Ford in June of 1866. His active participation in the war seems to have stopped them. August of 1867 found him on the reservation still suffering from his wound. Those who saw him in the last months of his life attributed his death to tuberculosis caused by his wound.

In 1869 Black Hawk, a sick man, appeared in Fillmore during a Sacrament meeting and asked Bishop Callister if he could address the congregation. When given permission, he stood to one side of the pulpit and asked forgiveness for the damage he had done. He had gotten permission from military authorities to visit each town. With an escort of seven or eight warriors, Black Hawk visited every town between Cedar City and Payson, and made peace with the people. He was often provided an escort by citizens from town to town.

Black Hawk appeared at Parowan where he was met with the town's band, and it was said that he was very pleased. He also appeared at Holden, Fountain Green and Spring City. From reports of residents of these areas Black Hawk

5 Gottfredson, p. 172.
6 This seems unreasonable in relation to our knowledge of tuberculosis causes today.
7 Gottfredson, p. 228. See also Deseret News, October 6, 1934.
was very ill. He had lost considerably weight and was in pain. 8

Black Hawk's last days were spent near Spring Lake, Utah. He died there on September 26, 1870, and was buried in the foothills east of Santaquin, Utah. 9 An article in the Deseret News, October 6, 1934, states that workers in a nearby cane field saw Ute Indians carry Black Hawk's body from his tent and place it on a horse. The burial party moved into the foothills east of Santaquin. 10

Black Hawk could not have been very old at the time of his death. If he played with Mormon boys as a youth he could not have been much over ten when the Mormons first settled the area. Any Indian boy over that age probably would not have time to play. If his association began in 1849, when the Mormons first settled Utah or Sanpete Counties, he would have been at the most twenty-five or thirty at the outbreak of the war and no older than his middle thirties at the time of his death. The active daring type of campaigns he led testify that he must have been young, not only in actions and deed, but in age. Black Hawk was survived by three wives. There is no evidence indicating descendants. The Ute tribe has no records earlier than 1947, due to fire.

Black Hawk was replaced as war chief by White Horse (Shi-Nav-Egin). White Horse was given his name by white settlers because he always preferred white horses. White Horse led many of the raids after Black Hawk was forced

8 Deseret News, October 6, 1934.
9 Ibid., September 20, 1919.
10 Ibid., October 6, 1934.
to retire. 11 White Horse died at the Hatch ranch in Grass Valley about the year 1900. 12

The Piute, a southern branch of the Ute, were also active during the war. A meeting was held in Circleville April 21, 1866, at which time the people were informed that the Piute, Ute, Piede, Pavan, and Navaho tribes had united for the war. 13 While Piute actions were few in number, evidence suggests that warriors from the tribe were prominent in the raids of the Utes farther North. Most of the Piede and Pavan Indians stayed friendly to the whites and proved valuable allies in tracking and recovering stolen stock in Southern Utah.

The Navaho, whose homeland encompasses the Arizona, New Mexico, Southern Utah and Colorado area had raided the Northern Indians for slaves before the white settler came. Now, with an opportunity to participate in raids against the whites, they became moderately active. The first evidence that they were allied with the Ute came from Indian Agent F. H. Head of the Utah Territory. In a letter to Commissioner D. N. Cooley in Washington, Head wrote:

"Sir:
"Black Hawk, a somewhat prominent chief of the Ute Indians, has been engaged for more than a year past in active hostilities

11 Ibid. See also Gottfredson, supplement, p. 3.
12 Gottfredson, supplement, p. 3.
against the settlements in the southern portion of the territory. His band consisted at first of but forty four men, who were mostly outlaws and desperate characters from his own and other tribes. During the summer and autumn of 1865 he made several successful forays upon the weak and unprotected settlements in Sanpete and Sevier Counties. Killing in all thirty two whites . . . forty of his warriors were killed. . . . On the 20th instant he again commenced his depredations . . . his band from what I consider entirely reliable information, now numbers about one hundred warriors, one-half of whom are Navahos from New Mexico.\textsuperscript{14}

In Southern Utah almost all of the Indian activities were by the Navaho, who began their raids in January of 1866 and continued until 1871. Navaho actions continued unilaterally after the Utes withdrew from hostilities in 1868. While their raids were usually small and limited in damage they succeeded in upsetting the Southern border area for several years.

\textbf{The White Militia}

The main defensive force during the war was the Nauvoo Legion, which had its beginning when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was located in Nauvoo, Illinois. After the move to Utah the legion was soon active in defense of the territory. At the outbreak of the Black Hawk troubles, when the U.S. Government refused aid, the legion became by default the instrument by which people defended their homes. The Nauvoo Legion served throughout the Black Hawk hostilities but most of the time it was a makeshift army serving with poor weapons and without pay.

\textsuperscript{14} F. H. Head, Indian Affairs Reports, April 30, 1966.
The Legion was the only military force in Utah from 1847 until United States troops settled Camp Floyd. During this period the Territory sustained sporadic Indian attacks and the Walker War. Indian troubles forced territorial officers to keep some of the militia on reserve. As the population of the area increased the Indian activities moved to the more sparsely settled and remote areas of the territory. Especially hard hit were the ranching areas. It was easy for the Indians to raid horse and cattle herds and effect escape. Often the Indians would be miles and days away before the animals were missed or enough men could be gathered to offer effective pursuit.

With the advent of federal territorial officers, any mustering and drilling of local militia units were forbidden. Federal officers preferred to place their confidence in federal troops stationed at Camp Floyd and later at Fork Douglas. Any attempt to muster the militia was met with suspicion and hostility.

The Legion eventually became essentially a social organization. Often Church of civic leaders were elected officers of the Legion for prestige or social reasons. When trouble did cause the use of the Legion many of the officers who had been promoted simply for social reasons, were not the type needed for active participation in a war. At the start of the war military units had to be mustered and equipped before action could be taken. This lack of preparedness cost the settlers in lives and livestock.

Under the Territorial law in the 1860's the Governor was the Supreme Commander of the militia. In this respect the militia of the 1860's can be
compared with the National Guard of today. Since the Governor was a federal appointee, serious problems could have been caused by his lack of co-operation. Both Governor Duane Doty and Charles Durkee co-operated as best as they could with the militia officials. No Governor except Brigham Young up to that time ever acted as the commander and authority rested in the elected Lieutenant General. During the war period this continued to be Daniel H. Wells.

The Territory of Utah was divided into military districts with a General Officer in command of each. The make up of the local military units depended upon the number of people in each district. 15

The military commanders of the Sanpete District during this war were General Warren K. Snow and General William B. Pace, who replaced Snow in 1867. General Erastus Snow commanded the Iron County district in Southern Utah.

General Warren Snow, the first General to become involved, was not a young man. While he was active he proved to be overly cautious. He scored one significant victory over the Indians at Fish Lake in the year-and-a-half he commanded the Sanpete region. He served well in organizing companies and guard units for local protection but he was not the vigorous leader the area needed at the time. General Snow was replaced by General William B. Pace in April of 1867. The only reason shown for General Snow's replacement was health. He was wounded in 1865, and did get out of a sick bed at Glenwood in

---

March of 1867, to organize a pursuit. He was cautious in several instances and may have provoked mutinous feelings in his officers. Certainly the General was no coward.

General Pace had been active in the Nauvoo Legion since the age of 15. He authored one book on military tactics in 1865. General Pace let at least one victory slip from his hands. The Gravelly Ford incident indicated that he was also cautious. The fact that his men were not able to kill any Indians in this battle and yet exhaust their ammunition suggests that his men were not well trained. By the time of this battle, June 10, 1866, the war was one year old. Surely leaders could have found time to train men in the effective use of firearms.

In the Southern end of the territory the situation was quite different. General Erastus Snow took command instantly and began effective actions. While he did not participate in any expeditions he did provide able leaders. General Snow advanced two very capable men, Colonel James Andrus and Colonel J. D. L. Pierce, from Captains because of their successful leadership and achievements in defeating Indians and recovering stolen animals.

Every able man in the war area served in some capacity during hostilities. Young men served in the cavalry or infantry and men over forty-five served in the Silver-Greys, or home guard. Each man was responsible for

---

16 William B. Pace, "Autobiography," Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. (Typewritten.)
his own weapons, and this meant that there were many different types of weapons and ammunition. Rifles ranged from the modern cap and ball to the musket of years earlier. Each man furnished his own gear; if cavalry, his horse and saddle.

During 1866 militia actions and defensive measures taken by the settlements proved to be so effective that the war degenerated into small raids on livestock herds and travelers. By 1867–68 the tide has turned and the militia and defenses began to cost the Indians more than they gained; they began to lose most of the stock stolen and suffer greater losses of men.

Even though Indian depredations continued in parts of the territory after 1870, Governor J. W. Shaffer refused to allow further musters of the militia or drills. All military units were to be withdrawn and official actions ceased on this date.

Prompt effective action in the south held the raids to a minimum while amateurish efforts in the north in 1865 only served to encourage the Indians. It was not until after serious efforts in 1866 that depredations in the north slackened.

The first military action came from Mt. Pleasant. After receiving word of the Indian raid at Twelve Mile Creek, militia units were organized that functioned as long as there was a threat to the area.

General Snow as the district commander and his most active subordinate Colonel Reddick Allred were both active leaders. Colonel Allred served until the end of hostilities.
In a reorganization of the Legion at Mr. Pleasant on July 15, 1865, two companies of cavalry were organized and one of home guard. Captain Lauritz Larson was made commander of A Company, Jacob Christensen Captain of B Company and Captain John Tidwell was made the commander of the Home Guard (Silver-Greys) comprised of older men. On October 3, on the advice of President Young, the Mt. Pleasant unit was deactivated. This move was premature and the unit was called to duty on the 17th of the month to pursue Indians who had successfully gotten away with over 200 head of cattle.

In the year 1866 the militia units of central Utah served under the command of General Wells who moved south to conduct the campaigns. The men of the central part of the territory had the double problem of serving with the militia and taking care of their homes and farms at the same time. When they were not pursuing Indians some were standing guard while the others worked in their fields. This group of men must be classed as minutemen while those who came from the Salt Lake region could be classified as military units.

There are no records of aid given by the Northern part of the territory for the year 1865. When it became evident that Indian problems were going to continue in 1866, men and equipment were soon on their way from the Salt Lake region. The first units to reach the beleagued area arrived May 5. They were used to provide guards for settlers abandoning their homes on the Upper Sevier River. By the first of June, military units had arrived from Utah, Salt Lake

---

17 Gottfredson, p. 199.
and Davis Counties. Reinforcements moved into the central area until October of the year, the last company arriving was that of Captain Robert Davis of Kaysville. The last company of Northern militia to return home was that of Colonel John Sharp who reached Salt Lake City in early November, 1866.

Northern units were involved in several major battles and proved as effective as any units in the field. Efforts this year were to be the biggest of the war. Before the years end some 2,500 men had been involved against an estimated force of 300 Indians.

Northern aid came earlier the next year. On April 15, 1867, General Wells called upon General Robert T. Burton of the Salt Lake district to raise three platoons of cavalry, seventy-two men, to march for Sanpete on the 22nd, under Captain Orson P. Miles. On May 22, Captain William L. Binder and a small company of infantry reported to General Pace. Captain Binder and his company spent most of the time they were in the area working on the never finished Fort Gunnison.

Men and supplies continued to be sent from the North but in smaller numbers as the Indian attacks diminished. By 1868 the war had degenerated into small raids on livestock that were considered normal and the war for all practical purposes considered over. Without the contribution of the Northern area it is likely that the Central part of the territory would have been abandoned to the Indians.

The major problem of the militia was that of supply. Ammunition was scarce and dependable weapons in short supply. The area in which most of the hostilities took place was remote from any large center of commerce. Military units going into the field were often limited in supplies of all kinds. The Indians had reduced the horse herd so that pack animals were often not available, the men had to depend on what they could carry. Several times the militia were reduced to dry crackers and water during a campaign. New supplies were days away and often the smallest item loomed large in importance. George W. Bean, Quartermaster of the Sanpete region had to request horseshoes and horseshoe nails more than once. One message in June of 1867 asked that they be hurried because there were now south of Salt Lake City. Supplies of this kind could have and should have been stored during the winter months.

At the start of the war the settlers gathered what lead they could find and made bullets of the different sizes needed. As is shown in a statement of Josiah Sylvester ammunition was often scarce and little could be wasted.

I was out of ammunition and was informed that Elijah B. Ward had been seen moulding bullets for his pistol, which was the size I wanted. Someone went with me to get them. It was dark and we

---


had no light. As Ward's corpse was laid out on the trunk or chest, we had to raise him up, while I searched for the bullets until I found them.21

One problem that faced not only the men in the field but those who tried to furnish supplies was money. Most of the men served throughout the war without pay. General Pace later commented that he never received a penny for his three years service during the Blake Hawk War.22 The State Legislature seemed inclined to ignore the war in their appropriations of 1866-67. Military appropriations for these two years were $1,016,36 for supplies and $3,000 to furnish the office of the Adjutant General.23 This meant that everything else used had to be furnished by the Church, settlement, or the men involved. The people of Ephraim were taxed over $6,000 just to maintain guards during the war. One citizen of Mt. Pleasant stated:

My portion was $75.00 a year. Some men could not fit themselves out and we were ordered to let them have articles they could use and receive credit for them. Besides the assessment I furnished a horse, bridle and saddle, kept them on hand for them, along with one Ballard rifle, and one cap and ball pistol, others did likewise.24

The supply problem was exclusively that of the territory. Attempts to get aid


22 William B. Pace.

23 Utah Legislative Record, 1866-67. Microfilm, Utah State University Library, Logan, Utah, p. 2.

from the Federal Government were futile.

The people of Utah, not being militant in nature, had not placed great emphasis on firearms; as a result, the war found many men to be poorly armed and in a situation where this lack could not be easily remedied.

The leaders of Utah, knowing the territory could not afford a war and did not have a trained army, looked for help. After the first Indian attack in the Mt. Pleasant area local officials appealed to Colonel O. H. Irish, the Indian Agent. Colonel Irish appealed to Colonel Patrick Connor, the commander of the California Volunteers who were stationed at Fort Douglas, near Salt Lake City. Colonel Connor replied that if the depredations were committed upon settlements remote from the mail line he could not furnish help. The Colonel has come in for much criticism because of his stand. Perhaps critics have been too harsh. A military man who had order could not completely ignore them. The Indian raids were far enough from the major East-West mail routes that his men would have been gone for weeks.

In the spring of 1866 Colonel F. H. Head, the new Indian Agent, called again on the new commander at the fort for aid. Colonel Potter wired east for instructions. General Dodge at Fort Leavenworth sent this reply May 2, 1866.

General Pope telegraphs that the superintendent of Indian affairs will have to depend for the present on the militia to compel the Indians to behave.25

General Pope's reply to Colonel Head's request sealed the matter of

25 F. H. Head, Indian Affairs Reports, May 2, 1866.
federal aid. No further appeals were made to the Government for men. There is nothing to indicate that the militia sought material from the government in the form of weapons or ammunition.

**Types of Warfare**

The type of warfare used by the Ute during the war was almost exclusively hit and run. There is only one account of Indians attacking a fixed position. The Indians did not attempt to attack the larger settlements. The settlements that were attacked were small and isolated and were limited to attempts to steal the livestock. Targets for Indian attacks were always livestock. Because of the large amounts of feed needed for the livestock the animals were grouped together and herded by assigned men or boys. These herds became the primary targets of the Indians and usually the few herders the victims. More than once the Indians attacked and escaped with herds of over 200 animals. Because of the remoteness of the herd or lack of organized pursuit the Indians were often days and many miles away from the scene before organized pursuit was possible.

During 1865 and the first part of 1866 almost every Indian raid was successful. Indians would scout a promising area and lay in wait until the opportunity came for a raid. As late as 1867 they were still using the same tactics. A memo to General Wells from General Pace, July 17, 1867, stated:

"All quiet but signs of Indian spies in the hills daily."  

There were three definite tactics used successfully by the Ute. The first was used during a successful raid. A few of the Indians would continue to drive the stolen animals while the rest prepared an ambush for the pursuing militia. This technique worked well enough that very few stolen animals were ever recovered. Usually the militia would draw off because of darkness or being outnumbered and short of ammunition, and the Indians would easily escape.

The Indians used this tactic on their first raid and it was so successful they used it everytime an opportunity arose. The frustration of constant Indian success can be summed up by Josiah S. Sylvester's statement:

That was the way it was all the time. The Indians would sit on the mountains and see where our stock were and what we were doing and making a dash would kill people that were at work in the fields or traveling the road, rush their stock into the mountains, leaving some to drive them on while others fell back and waited in ambush on the trail for those who pursued. We hardly ever met them without them having the advantage.

A second tactic was one used when the raid was unsuccessful or pursuit getting too close. The Indians would divide their party into several small groups and each group take a different route to their destination. Most militia commanders would halt their pursuit and turn back rather than spend time tracking just a few Indians or risking the threat of dividing their commands

---

27 General William B. Pace, Military Records, box 6.

28 Sylvester, p. 5.
and being ambushed. Often the Indians would kill or cripple the slow or hard to manage livestock before conceding defeat and dividing into groups for escape.

The third tactic used repeatedly was that of attacking travelers. Single wagons or small groups were game for the Indians. Several people were killed and many wounded attempting to travel without proper protection.

Until the militia was able to provide enough pressure in 1866 and 1867 to make the raids costly the Indians had things their own way. With the increased number of militia units and more forceful pursuit the Indians were forced on the defensive and eventually into inactivity.

Militia field tactics were based on standard military theory of the period. Cavalry units were assigned to settlements prone to attack and stayed ready to pursue at a moments notice. But, because of the distances and slow communication, these units were usually ineffective.

**Major Conflicts**

The first meeting between the militia and the Indians came about after a raid on the Twelve Mile Creek Indian Farm. A group of Mormons had gone to gather their cattle from the farm the day after the Manti talks of May 10, 1865. Black Hawk, leading a small group of warriors, successfully ambushed the Mormons, killed one and escaped with the cattle.\(^{(29)}\)

\(^{(29)}\) *Deseret News*, July 14, 1914.
Black Hawk led his band south to the Salina area where they joined with Indians from the Richfield area. After gathering more cattle the Indians moved into Salina Canyon and Eastern Utah. While moving through Salina Canyon they met and killed two settlers who were unaware of Indian problems.  

On May 12, a militia unit of 84 men under Colonel Reddick Allred began the pursuit. About ten miles up Salina Canyon the militia was ambushed when passing through a narrow section in single file. Surprised, untrained, and in a difficult position the men retreated leaving two dead.  

On May 14, the reinforced militia again entered the canyon where they recovered the bodies of their fallen companions. They continued to follow the Indians into the mountains between Fish Lake and the Colorado River, where they caught up with Black Hawk's party. A battle ensued and several Indians were reported killed. The Indians were nevertheless able to get away with all of the stolen livestock, and the militia returned home empty handed. The Indians struck next at a ranch in Thistle Valley. At daybreak on May 24, they killed and mutilated a sleeping family consisting of John Givin, his wife and four children. Two employees of Givin escaped because they were sleeping in a wagon box away from the cabin and had the wisdom to keep quiet when awakened by screams. After the Indians gathered their plunder and escaped the two men went for help.

30 Longdorf, p. 95.

31 Sylvester, p. 2.
In an action they often repeated the Indians killed the small calves to allow faster movement of the stolen livestock. They escaped with nearly 200 head of cattle and horses. Militia failed to overtake the raiders.

After several weeks of relative inactivity the Indians raided the Salina area on July 15. General Snow and the newly reorganized militia accepted the challenge and moved east into the mountains. In a valley east of Salina the militia surrounded the Indian rear guard and attacked. In this battle twelve Indians were killed and two escaped. The main body of Indians continued to push the livestock into the wilderness. General Snow divided his command, sending half back to guard the settlements and pursuing the Indians with the remainder. This pursuit was well described by Andrew Madson in his journal.

Orange Seeley, N. P. Madsen, Alma Zabriskie, Myself and others from Mt. Pleasant were in Snow's company. As soon as possible we started on the trip trying to secure the cattle from the Indians. We camped the first night at the head of Salina Canyon. Then we went down the Canyon into a large valley (now Emery County). We did most of our traveling at night in order to avoid the attention of Indians. We crossed a large creek and journeyed over Buck Horn Flat where we were joined by Allred and his company who had taken the trail to the north, [Colonel Allred had brought his men from Salina to take part in the pursuit ] We camped on the Price River that night and the following morning we moved on south and east to the Green River by daylight. We did not see any Indians but could see where they had driven the cattle through the river. Here the company stopped for breakfast. On the other side of the river we could see fresh wichups made of green trees. The river was too high to ford. Dolph Bennett, John Sanders and Jens Larson were chosen as advance guards to swim across to investigate. John Sanders very nearly drowned, but was rescued by Bennett. The advance men upon reaching the other shore found a great many fresh tracks of the Indians, and called back to tell their find. After scouting about a short time they returned across the river to the balance of the company. Most of the company wanted to follow the tracks, but upon taking inventory of their supplies, which now consisted of cracker crumbs only, the officers decided on account of
the jaded condition of the horses and the lack of supplies, to give up the chase and return home. Years later, Chief Jake Arropine told that the Indians were hiding among the bushes and trees and could easily have shot and killed the advance men and others had they wanted to; when asked why they had not done so, he said that they had intended to fire when all the men were across or crossing and had gotten into the river, "then the water would have been red." We started homeward across the mountain, over rough trails, through canyons and deep washes, by way of the place called "Hole in the Rocks." We were two days and a half without food, with the exception of a spoonful of cracker crumbs dished out to each man for a meal. While we saw no Indians, we were interrupted now and again by wild beasts of the mountain. In Rock Canyon, on the other side of the mountain, we were met by a party from home who brought provisions to us, they, in attempting to reach us had been delayed by losing their way in the mountains. There was much rejoicing the following morning when we pitched our camp in Ephriam, having been gone about two weeks. 32

After returning to Mt. Pleasant the men were feted and rested. Those chosen for the standing army were then stationed in a hay field outside of town where they could march at a moment's notice.

Activities again subsided until about the middle of September when General Snow received word from Colonel Allred that the Indians intended to attack Circleville. General Snow and a company moved south to prevent the expected attack. On the 21st of September while they were camped near Fish Lake, General Snow and Colonel John Ivie were fired on. In a pitched battle fourteen Indians were killed and three militia were wounded, including General Snow, who suffered a serious shoulder wound in the first exchange of fire. During the night the militia moved to Grass Valley where they camped, and the next day returned home. 33


33 Gottfredson, p. 140.
In March of 1866, Chief Kanosh sent word to the authorities at Mt. Pleasant that a large party of Indians was camped in the Nephi hills between the towns of Nephi and Mt. Pleasant. With the help of Chief Kanosh's son, Jake, the Indians were surrounded and all but one were captured by the militia. The one refused to surrender and was killed. Jake then identified the hostile Indians who were arrested. The remainder of the group was considered friendly and released.

With Jake's testimony four of the hostile Indians were condemned to death, and the rest ordered to jail. A detail of militia carried out the executions. One of the Indians sent to jail was Sanpitch, a chief who had broken the reservation treaty that was signed in Spanish Fork in June of 1865.

Chief Sanpitch and seven companions were able to break jail March 14, 1866, and escape. The possee which pursued Sanpitch cornered him in Birch Canyon between Fountain Green and Moroni on March 18. He refused to surrender and was killed. Three of the Indians were killed while trying to get out of Mt. Pleasant. General Snow killed one with the stock of his gun as he was jumped at night. The four who escaped were trailed into the mountains between Sanpete and Juab Valleys where they were killed.

The largest Indian raid of the war occurred Sunday, June 11, 1866. Striking Round Valley (Scipio) about noon with an estimated 200 warriors

---

34 *Deseret News*, September 15, 1934.

35 Gottfredson, p. 188.
Black Hawk killed two men and swept from three to five hundred head of live-stock into the hills. 36

When General Pace, who was then in central Utah with a military command, received the news of the raid he assumed the Indians would cross the Sevier River at Gravelly Ford near Salina. While the militia was moving toward the ford a dust cloud was seen approaching from the west. Assuming the dust to be the Indians, the General knew he had to beat them to the crossing or the stock would be lost. The Indians had prepared their own ambush at the ford and fired on the approaching militia. The militia outnumbered the ambushers and were able to drive them off, only to be repulsed by more Indians coming up from the arriving stock. While some of the Indians pushed the stock across the ford and into the mountains the rest engaged the militia. For several hours, the force of seventy-five to eighty Indians and the militia fought on even terms. The Indians were able to surround the militia who retreated to the top of a small hill.

A militiaman named James E. Snow was able to get a shot at an Indian behind a horse. Guessing that he could shoot through the horse and hit the Indian, he tried. At his shot, Snow reported, both horse and Indian fell. The Indian was able to escape with the help of two companions. 37 It was not known at the time but this wounded Indian was none other than Black Hawk, who was to

36 Gibbs, p. 484.

37 Gottfredson, p. 205.
suffer from this wound the rest of his life. He was not able to lead the attacks after this date and became less important.

Just as the battle seemed to turn in favor of the militia a cloud of dust was observed in the west. Thinking that more of the raiding Indians were approaching and knowing his men were about out of ammunition, General F. ace and his officers decided to break off the action and retire. This they did, allowing the Indians to escape with all of their booty. The dust cloud was a troop of seventy cavalry from Fillmore under the command of Captain James C. Owens. Before the troops could be reorganized and ammunition distributed the Indians were so far away immediate pursuit was ineffective.

Black Hawk's raid on Round Valley so unnerved its population that they became doubly cautious, thus giving the Indians the chance to make good their escape. The first messenger from the area was not allowed to leave until after 10 p.m. to insure his safety. 38

Shortly after the departure of the messenger, Captain Owens had his men gathered and prepared to pursue the Indians. The men were instructed to take bread and fried meat for food because no fires would be allowed, nor time given to prepare food.

The Fillmore militia departed after dark in a pouring rain the night of June 11, 1866. Following the trail proved to be easy because of the Indian habit of killing the slower or hard to manage animals. 39 After fording at

38 Gibbs, p. 485.

39 Ibid., p. 481.
least one stream in flood, and riding all night, much of it in rain, Captain Owens should be forgiven of his classic statement of "What the Hell," when he saw General Pace and his men retreating at Gravelly Ford. The only casualty to be seen on the Gravelly Ford battle ground was the imported stallion of James Ivie that Black Hawk had stolen in Round Valley the day before. 40

The stage was now set for one of the largest and most prolonged attempts of the war to punish the Indians. Colonel H. C. Kimball and his cavalry from Fountain Green joined with General Snow and Captain Owens, who were near Salina the next day, to start pursuit. The militia moved up Salina Canyon. At noon they came upon the place where the Indians had camped the night before. Here General Snow, over the protest of some younger officers, decided that without heavy reinforcements a chase would be futile and withdrew.

Arriving back in Gunnison, General Snow found General Daniel H. Wells, the Commander of the Territorial Militia who had come from Salt Lake to assume command of the region. A company of Cavalry under command of Colonel John R. Winder, and one of infantry under command of Major William W. Casper were assigned to General Snow's command. General Wells ordered immediate pursuit to try and recover the stock. The militia returned through Salina into the canyons of Eastern Utah. They found later that the first pursuit

40 Ibid., p. 488.
lad put them within twelve miles of the stolen stock. The second expedition was in the hills three days when retreat was ordered. Both men and animals suffered greatly from thirst in the rough arid country. Again the Indians were successful. This raid, even though Black Hawk was wounded, could not have but provided inspiration for others.

Shortly after the Gravelly Ford battle Captain Albert Peter Dewey with a company of Infantry were ordered to establish a camp in Thistle Valley. Captain Dewey had scouts in the nearby hills to warn of Indian attack. Two of the scouts saw Indians and attempted to warn the camp. Before reaching safety one of them was wounded but he was helped into camp before dying. Another set of scouts, seeing the Indians between themselves and the camp, went to nearby Fairview for help.

Captain Dewey had fortified his camp with baggage wagons and dead trees from the area. The camp, however, was located in a grove of Juniper trees which gave protection to the attackers.

The scouts going to Fairview met Colonel John Ivie and a group of militia who were guarding a herd of cattle. Colonel Ivie and his men arrived at the scene in time to rescue Captain Dewey and his men from defeat. It was estimated that there were over 100 Indians compared to 37 militia. 41

The last battle between Indians and Militia came in the northern part of the war area. Indians struck the Spanish Fork pastures on June 26, 1866,

41 Orson F. Whitney, History of Utah (Salt Lake City, Utah: George Q Cannon and Sons Co., Publisher, 1898), Vol. II, p. 199.
stealing about 50 horses and 20 head of cattle. The Springville Militia, under the command of Colonel William Creer, followed the raiders into Mapleton Canyon. After pursuing them up the canyon and over the divide into Diamond Canyon, Colonel Creer's men caught and began firing on the Indians who returned fire.

The Indians, thinking they could defeat the militia, began an attack of their own. Evidently the Indians were going to surround the militia but were surprised by another company of militia coming from Mapleton. After several hours of ineffective shooting Colonel Creer selected five of his best marksmen and had them concentrate the fire on the War Chief, an estimated 800 yards away. On the fifth volley the Chief was seen to fall from his horse. With the Chief either dead or wounded the Indians retreated behind the hill. They were allowed to escape but left behind all of the stolen livestock. This was the first time the militia had recovered all livestock stolen in any one raid.

The War in the South

The war in Southern Utah, while a part of the general hostilities, was different. There were fewer ranches and the people more isolated than in the central region. The Navaho raided both cattle and horse herds but was also successful in stealing sheep.

---

Most of the raids were by small bands of Navaho. There were some Piedes involved but it appears that they were few in number. Most of the local Indians remained loyal to the settlers and often served as guides or scouts for the militia. There is at least one account of livestock being returned by Piedes after it had been stolen by the Navaho.

Because of the difficult terrain and lack of water in much of Southern Utah the herds tended to be smaller. It was much more difficult to move livestock through the wilderness because of the deep canyons and sheer ledges. Because of this the militia actions were much more successful than they were in other areas. There were no raids in which 100 Indians got away with two or three hundred head of livestock.

General Erastus Snow, the commander of the Iron District, took positive action and was credited with limiting the scope of the war. After the first travelers were killed by Indians, travel was restricted to groups large enough to defend themselves. Martial law was declared and every available man was mustered into the militia. General Snow had scouting patrols in the hills most of the time and attempted to prevent attacks. Most ranches were ordered abandoned early and were not reoccupied until the threat was over. General Snow promoted effective leaders who were largely responsible for the positive action he advocated.

---

The major offensive action of the war was an attempt to locate the trails used by Indians in crossing the Colorado River. This expedition was in the hills 60 days during August and September of 1866, and covered an estimated 460 miles.

A second large expedition was sent to attempt the recovery of stolen livestock in February of 1869. This company returned home 16 days later after covering 384 miles and seeing neither Indian or livestock. 44

General Snow kept guards at the important river crossings and mountain passes. This was instrumental in limiting the scope of the war but was not accomplished without problems and dependence on Indian allies.

"Fort Kanab, November 5, 1869.
"Pres E. Snow.
"We have not sufficient men to guard the fort. Ten Indian warriors is all we have to depend on. We want at least ten good men well armed and if we had of had we would of prevented all of this raiding. We have two horses fit for service and twelve head which are a detriment to us. As provisions we have tolerable being at home here, but if we were to go out we would have nothing but bread to take with us. You will see from the above that we are not situated to guard the two passes. We shall start ten Indians and one of our men tomorrow morning for the north trail, we will be left with two men with a few old sick and crippled Indians. We will do the best we can until help comes. We should have some tobacco for the Indians.
"s/T. C. Judd",45

There were indications that the Navaho was getting help from other than Indian allies. E. G. Wooley, an officer in the militia, reported after one


45 Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence, 1869-1875, Utah State Archives, box 7.
skirmish that the rifle reports sounded like that of Spencers. The Spencer rifle was then one of the most modern on the market. Another report indicated that white men were involved in some actions.

'S. George, March 8, 1869.

'Indians report to J. Hamblin that a large number of Navahos are south on the other side of the Colorado—said to be aided by whitemen and well supplied with guns and ammunitions—have whipped the small tribes south of the Colorado and threatened to prey upon us—no news yet from Captain Copelan—no sign in this neighborhood.

's/Henry Ryring Adjt.'

There are no reports of white men being identified by the militia.

The Navaho raids diminished gradually and by 1871 the threat was virtually eliminated. Military vigilance and treaties concluded by the Government in New Mexico removed the threat. The southern part of the territory came out of the war with less than one-fourth the losses of central Utah.

Heber Valley

Heber Valley settlers on the northern fringe of the war zone and west of the new reservation expected Indian troubles. While Indian actions in their area were few they upset the lives of the settlers for part of three years. In April of 1866, as part of the territorial preparation plan, orders were issued by General Wells to reorganize and prepare the militia unit for possible trouble.


47 Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence, 1869-1875, Utah State Archives, box 7.
Colonel Robert T. Burton was sent from Salt Lake City to direct preparations.

The first order of business was to place guards in the most used mountain passes. Large corrals were constructed to protect the livestock and the militia reorganized. Three companies of cavalry were organized and one of Home Guard. The militia units were given two days of training and declared ready. Settlers on scattered farms were moved into Heber for the duration.

The Indians wasted little time in testing the newly organized militia. Near the middle of May, Indians were successful in stealing forty to fifty horses. The Heber Militia were no more successful than their counterparts elsewhere.

Indians raided the valley in July but lost the stolen livestock and their own horses in getting away. Three horse stealing raids in August climaxed hostilities for the year. In the spring of 1867 the valley leaders were successful in halting Indian problems. As described by John Crook:

The spring of 1867 was late and the snow deep in the hills. We put out our guards, but no Indians troubled us until the middle of July. . . A special scout, John Cummings who had on a certain occasion found in a side canyon an Indian who had skinned an ox. Mr. Cummings covered the Indian with his rifle and drove him ahead of him to Heber City where he was kept under guard three days. A court marshall decided to write a note to Chief Tabby, advising him to keep his Indians at home, and also asking Tabby to come over and make peace with us. We gave the note to the Indian and told him to go immediately to the reservation, give the note to Chief Tabby like a good Indian. Two guards went with him to see him over the ridge.

About a month later, or about the 15th or 20th of August Chief Tabby with his whole tribe, squaws, papooses and peaceable Indians that he could control came here. The Chief said that he could not control those of his Indians who were with Black Hawk.
We had a bowery in which we held summer meetings, and in this we set large tables, and the ladies furnished a good picnic for the Indians. An ox was killed and roasted, and the Indians filled up good; the pipe of peace was passed around, and the Indians after stopping a few days returned home with a few good presents. On leaving our valley these Indians stole thirty of our horses. 48

With the visit from Chief Tabby, Indian problems ended for the area. The most significant action of Heber Valley Militia units occurred when they served as escorts to Indian Superintendent F. H. Head, as he made journeys into the Uintah Basin in May and June of 1866 seeking peace.

**Forts**

The people of Utah took various measures of defense at the start of the war. One method involved the construction of several forts. Black Hawk and his followers in the hit and run attacks did not tend to bother large groups of people. Most forts did not have a shot fired from them. Some, however, did serve as holding corrals for livestock.

Fort Deseret, the first to be completed, was located about one mile south of present day Fillmore. Under direction of Apostle Amasa Lyman and Bishop Thomas Callister, construction was started in June of 1865. The fort covered about two acres. The walls of the fort were eighteen inches thick and ten feet high, made of adobe. The foundations were three and one-half feet thick and made of lava rock. There were bastions in two corners to cover

---

the surrounding area, and gun slits for rifles along the walls. The adobe used in the fort was made from clay and straw. Ninety-eight men divided into two companies finished the fort on the 25th of July. Fort Deseret was never actually used, but it did figure in the war. In the spring of 1866 Black Hawk and seventy-two warriors appeared near Fillmore. When asked if they wanted food they insinuated they could take all the food they wanted. The discussion was held within sight of the finished fort. It was felt that seeing the preparedness of the citizens influenced the Indians to change their minds about the raid. After spending the night in the area, Black Hawk and his men left peaceably. A military detachment assigned to keep them under surveillance reported they left without trouble. The visit proved to be a good scouting trip, however, for the raid on June 11. Part of the walls of Fort Deseret still stand.

Fort Sanford was constructed between Circleville and Panguitch to offer protection to the settlements of the upper Sevier River. The fort was a stockade located about seven miles north of Panguitch near Louder's Spring. It was built under the direction of Captain Silas Sanford Smith in March, 1866, by a detachment of seventy-six men, from Beaver and Iron Counties. Fort Sanford was constructed between Circleville and Panguitch to offer protection to the settlements of the upper Sevier River. The fort was a stockade located about seven miles north of Panguitch near Louder's Spring. It was built under the direction of Captain Silas Sanford Smith in March, 1866, by a detachment of seventy-six men, from Beaver and Iron Counties. 52

49 Henry Savage, "Biography," Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Typewritten.)


51 Ibid.

Sanford was occupied at various periods by troops from Beaver, Parawon, Circleville and Panguitch. It was evacuated November 30, 1866.

It was decided in 1866 to build a fort in the town of Mt. Pleasant. The fort was started June 4, and completed June 19, 1867. The walls enclosed about five acres and were made of rock and adobe. The major purpose of the fort it appears was to serve as a corral for cattle. Nothing indicates the fort was ever used for protection against Indians.

Fort Pierce, the southern most fort in Utah, was constructed during the fall of 1866. Fort Pierce was named for Colonel J. D. L. Pierce, a frontier missionary, soldier and rancher. The fort was located at the head of Warner Valley, which is situated about halfway between St. George and Kanab, just north of the Arizona state line. The Fort Pierce region was a major cattle grazing area in and around Short Creed (Colorado City, Arizona). The fort was built on the edge of Fort Pierce Wash, overlooking a large cattle corral built in the wash. It was possible for militia inside the fort to defend the corral from its protection. The fort was deemed necessary for the protection of the livestock in the area.

The last fort to be constructed during the war was at Pipe Springs. That area was one of the better grazing regions of Northern Arizona and was used as a staging area for the militia throughout the conflict. The fort was

---

53 Longdorf, p. 110.

Figure 1. Forts used in the Black Hawk War. (Marked with *)
built of native red sandstone and originally planned for 152 x 66 feet. The completed fort measured 60 x 40 feet.

Located within its walls was a spring, so water was insured in case of attack. The fort was completed in 1872 with the exception of the doors. 55 Windsor Castle, as the fort became known, still stands, today it is a historical monument supervised by the National Park Service. The fort was never used for protection from Indians.

**Peace Attempts**

On accepting the treaty of June 1865 the Ute Indians agreed to move to the Uintah Basin within one year. They were to give up title to lands in Utah Valley and Sanpete County. The Indians also agreed that they would live in peace and not steal from, or molest other whites. They promised that they would not go to war with other tribes except in self defense. The Indians were to co-operate with the Indian Department in developing farms, building homes and educating their children.

The United States Indian Department promised to give them protection from whites and other Indians. The Government was to lay out farms, build lumber and grist mills, schools, and houses. Annuities were to be paid to the principal chiefs and to the tribes in the amount of $25,000 annually for the first ten years, $20,000 for the next twenty years and $15,000 for the next thirty

55 Robert W. Olson Jr., "Windsor Castle, Mormon Frontier Fort at Pipe Springs," *Utah Historical Quarterly*, XXXIV, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), 225.
years. The Indians were given permission to hunt, dig roots, and gather berries in all unoccupied areas. They were allowed to fish in their usual places and to build drying houses. This treaty was never ratified by the Senate and, therefore, never became effective.

Until March of 1866, Colonel Irish attempted to establish peace. In that month he was replaced as Superintendent of Indian Affairs by Colonel Franklin H. Head. Colonel Irish resigned because of business and family pressures and returned East. Colonel Head had been the Secretary to Governor Durkes. The new Indian Agent began immediately to secure peace in the territory. In a letter dated March 31, 1866, to Indian Commissioner D. N. Cooley in Washington, Head said, "It is absolutely necessary to provide food and clothing for the Indians near Nephi." He also stated the need for seed grain. He said that the Indians had been promised cattle and that they would have trouble moving the Indians to the reservation without the stock. He attempted to get Federal help from the War Department. While waiting for information from General Dodge, Colonel Head and Governor Durkes paid a visit to the Indian farm at Corn Creek, Millar County on June 21. At Corn Creek, Colonel Head obtained new assurances from Chief Kanosh that the Piute Indians would abide the treaty agreements.

While waiting for a reply from the commissioner, Head asked for Indians who would seek out Black Hawk and get him to agree to meet with him.

56 Deseret News, June 14, 1865.

57 Indian Affairs Reports, March 31, 1866.
to discuss a settlement. Head expressed the thought that unless he could pacify Black Hawk and the other Indians they would all unite in the warfare. Colonel Head also paid a visit to the Uintah Basin to visit Indians that had moved there according to the treaty of 1865.

Some attempts were made by Colonel Head to carry out the provisions of the treaty. A sawmill was started in the Strawberry Valley in September of 1966. A group of men were sent from Springville to erect the mill and begin operations. The plan was to sell the lumber in Springville. Because of the lack of operating funds and unskilled personnel the sawmill never became operational. 58

Colonel Head conferred with Chief Black Hawk in the Uintah Basin in the first part of August of 1867. Black Hawk at this time, assured Colonel Head that he was ready for a peace treaty. Black Hawk was still suffering from his wound and was not able to take an active part in the war. He requested that Colonel Head cut his hair as a token of his sincerity. Colonel Head clipped Black Hawk's braids, and supposedly Black Hawk's participation in the war was over.

Black Hawk informed Colonel Head that some of the sub-chiefs were reluctant to stop the war, but that he would use his influence. It was a full year, however, before Colonel Head was to get a treaty from the sub-chiefs.

In March of 1868, a meeting was held in Mt. Pleasant. Bishops of all towns in Sanpete County and Bishop Bryan of Nephi met with Chief Joe, and

---

58 Ibid.
Figure 2. Utah Indian Reservations.
other Indian warriors. Chief Joe, a leading sub-chief of the Sanpete area had been one of the leading War Chiefs of the Piutes. Chief Joe spoke and expressed his desire for peace. Other talks in the same vein were given and finally a treaty was signed. The Indians promised to stop molesting the white settlers. As a token of good faith the Bishops had 1,000 pounds of flour sent to the Indian camp. This treaty was broken on April 4th when settlers attempting to return to their homes in Richfield were attacked. 59

On August 19, 1868, Superintendent Head met in the Strawberry Lake area with Black Hawk and several sub-chiefs. Prominent at this time were Sowahpoint, Tameritz, and Shinavegin. Tamaritz has been called the most vicious of all Ute leaders. 60 With the ailing Black Hawk's influence, Superintendent Head was able to conclude a peace treaty with the sub-chiefs agreeing to a cessation of hostilities. This treaty came about one year before peace actually came.

59 Longdorff, p. 122.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF THE SETTLERS

The Economy

The economy of the settlements of Utah in 1865 was strictly agrarian. The most important farm crops were grains and grass hay. Livestock consisting of horses, cattle, and sheep were the mainstays, furnishing, food, clothing, and power. Homes of the settlers were mostly log or adobe, and many of the settlers still lived in poor cabins or dugouts. Sawmills, however, had been established in the mountains east of Manti to furnish lumber for homes and other buildings.

New settlers coming into the territory were actively seeking new lands for farming and grazing purposes. Few of the settlers were considered wealthy but some had small herds of cattle or sheep. With transportation and communication dependent upon the horse, the settlers were mostly self-sufficient.

The war, while stimulating exploration of unknown areas delayed the settlement of these areas for years. Times remained hard throughout the war with the farmer often required to leave his crops in the field while he

\[1\] Letter of Mary Larson Ahlstrom, cited in the Family History, Manti Public Library, Manti, Utah, p. 5.
served with the militia. A militia unit moving through Circleville after the
town had been abandoned pastured their horses in a grain field and remarked
that the crops looked fine. Most of these crops were never harvested. The
loss of livestock, homes and crops severely hampered the economy of the
frontier settlements. The effects were felt long after Indian problems had
ceased.

As Indian hostilities renewed in 1866 Brigham Young advised the
people of the small settlements and scattered ranches to abandon them and
move into communities of not less than 150 families. Before the end of the
war 28 communities had been abandoned. The people left most of what they
had worked years to build. Taking what livestock remained after the Indian
raids the settlers moved into the settlements of Beaver, Manti, Ephraim and
Mt. Pleasant.

This left all of Utah bare of settlements between Manti on the north
and St. George on the south. The settlers taking just what they could load into
wagons left homes and other buildings standing. Buildings not burned by
Indians were used when the settlements were re-occupied. Crops were left
in the fields, but some attempts were made to harvest them. The evacuation
of Piute County left 700 acres of crops at Circleville plus those at Marysvale.
In the fall a group of men from Beaver returned to Circleville and were able
to harvest part of the grain.

Evacuating the scattered settlements proved to be a problem. Many
of the communities did not have enough teams left to pull their wagons. Teams
had to be sent from the larger settlements. Militia units had to be dispatched to guard the wagon trains.

The only wagon train to have serious trouble with the Indians was the one evacuating Long Valley (Orderville). While ascending a hill the train was attacked by Indians. One man was wounded in the attack as the settlers fled into the trees leaving the Indians with the wagons and livestock. Several days later men returned to gather what remained. Later some of the livestock was returned by Pieder Indians who had gotten them from the Navaho. ²

Some of the evacuated towns were not reoccupied for years after the end of hostilities. Circleville was not reoccupied for eight years and only one family of the original settlers returned. ³

Settlement Disruption

The war for sparcely settled Utah was costly. The year 1865 ended with the loss of over 2,000 head of cattle and horses from the central part of the territory. Between thirty and forty settlers had lost their lives as had an estimated forty Indians. The Indians also burned ranches and sawmills over a wide area of Central Utah. These problems were further aggravated by hundreds of acres of crops that could not be harvested.

Through defensive measures the loss of life among the settlers was reduced in 1866. Between twenty and twenty-five settlers and an estimated

² Woodbury, p. 163.
³ Allen, p. 5.
forty to fifty Indians were killed. The loss of livestock for Central Utah equaled the 1865 losses of 2,000.

With the successful actions of the militia in 1866 the livestock loss for 1867 fell to below 1,000 animals in Central Utah and was almost eliminated in succeeding years. The number killed in 1867 was between twenty and twenty-five, most were militia or travelers.

In a letter to Colonel J. E. Toutelette, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1869, the people of Washington County claimed that they had been bothered for five years by Navaho who had killed some eight or ten citizens. They recounted losses of 500 horses and mules, 500 cattle, and 2,500 head of sheep. 4 There are no sheep losses shown for the rest of the territory. The Navaho Indians in stealing sheep showed a different culture than the Ute. There are accounts of the Ute Indians riding into a flock of sheep and killing them for sport but there are no records of attempts to steal them.

Besides the loss of livestock, the settlers were responsible for financing the war. As was shown above, the settlements assessed each settler an amount to help finance the militia. Larger communities took these losses and were responsible for the care of the refugees from abandoned areas. The development of the territory was delayed several years by the war and the serious losses the settlers sustained.

---

4 Reid, p. 165.
The Cost

The dollars and cents cost of the war are significant. Costs figured for the war in Central Utah were broken down into militia, livestock losses, and settlement abandonment. Costs for militia services were set at $45,000 for 1865, $695,000 for 1866 and $450,000 for 1867. Livestock losses were estimated at $75,000 for 1865, $60,000 for 1866 and $35,000 for 1867. Estimated loss by breaking up and vacating settlements in Sanpete, Sevier, Kane, Summit, Wasatch and other counties was placed at $175,000. Total expenses for the three years came to $1,535,000. Cost figures are not available for the activities in Southern Utah. 5

In January of 1869, General Clawson, the Adjutant-General of the Territory, submitted a claim of $1,121,037.38 to the Adjutant-Generals' office in Washington, D.C. 6 The amount claimed covered the war for the three years, and if costs for 1868 and Southern Utah had been added the amount would have been over two million dollars.

The Government, in spite of repeated requests from Utah Officials, refused to appropriate the money. With one exception there seems to be no valid reason why claims were never paid. Acting Governor Edwin Higgins, in transmitting the claim to the Government, wrote, 'I am unable to find from

5 Andrew Love Neff, History of Utah 1847-1869, edited and annotated by Leland Hargrave Creer (Salt Lake City, Utah Deseret News Press, 1940), p. 408.

6 Ibid.
Figure 3. Settlements evacuated during the Black Hawk War, 1865-71.
Figure 4. Major depredation areas in Utah, 1965-71.
the records of the executive office that the militia was ever authorized by the Governor of the Territory or of their being employed in the Indian War." 7

In 1869 the Utah State Legislature appropriated $11,407 to reimburse those who stood the brunt of the expense of relief expeditions. Ten thousand dollars of this amount went to Sanpete and Sevier Counties. 8

In later years pensions were secured for the Veterans of the Black Hawk War. Because of inadequate records many men could not prove they participated in the war and were not eligible when pensions were granted. With the exception of the appropriation from the State Legislature the entire cost of the war was borne by the people of the area. Most of the militia served without pay.

Summary

When one seeks to evaluate the results of the Utah Black Hawk War, many factors must be considered.

On the positive side of the war one finds several benefits or results that tended to aid early Utah. Perhaps the most important and least recognized is the fact that the people of Southern and Central Utah were once again drawn together to meet a common challenge. Since the settling of the territory in 1847 only the Johnston's Army threat and the Walker War had provided an external stimulus to hold the people together. One cannot ignore the Mormon

7 Gustive O. Larson, p. 158.
8 Ibid.
Church's influence in Utah, however, the threat of danger tended to unite the people in a more determined body.

The second benefit may well have been the hurried completion of the Telegraph to the Central and Southern part of the State. The telegraph, in spite of threats, were rushed through Indian country without attack on construction workers or damage to constructed lines.

A third benefit may have been the exploration and discovery of favorable valleys for future settlement. Military units penetrated into the eastern half of the state from as far south as Kane and Garfield counties, to as far north and east as Uintah County. After the war, the retracted Mormon frontier in Southern Utah and the Arizona strip was soon reoccupied, and quickly extended into other areas. One community to result from military exploration was Escalante in 1887.

On the negative side one finds the usual results. Although the seventy lives lost seems small when compared to those in other Indian wars, the figure, nevertheless, proved large for the sparsely populated area. The fact that these people were killed one or two at a time, and often in cruel or barbarious fashion, is indicative of the horror that accompanied this war. People of the settlements had to group together for every small chore. No one dared be alone very far from help.

A second item may well be the cost. The Utah Territorial Congress petitioned the United States Government unsuccessfully to defray the cost of compensation of services, supplies and transportation. The cost of this war
seems insignificant in the light of later war costs. The citizens who bore the brunt of this war were from small outlying communities. Many of these communities were abandoned for the duration causing expenses to the people involved not counted in military campaigns.

The disruption of normal growth and life for several years severely hampered the economic development of the region. This caused many of the settlements to remain on unsteady footing for many years after the war. Many new settlements were evacuated for the duration of the war, some were never resettled. Some communities had to be rebuilt before they could be reoccupied. Circleville was rebuilt as were several communities located in Sevier and Washington Counties. The need for every man to defend his home and family let few find the time to explore or seek new home sites.

The thousands of livestock lost to the Indians represented a major portion of the losses suffered. In a day where the horse was man's means of transportation and furnished the power for his agriculture the loss of a horse could not be estimated. Without the necessary horses the residents were unable to work their farms or to gather the cattle and sheep that had to be pastured in the mountains for feed.

The lack of rapid communication severely hampered the war effort. The telegraph was extended to Manti in 1866, but by then the attacks were occurring far from Manti. The fact that the small communities of Sanpete, Washington, Sevier, Millard and Piute Counties did not have a telegraph decreased the value of it. Without rapid communication the settlements were alone. The Indians struck and were gone before help could be summoned. By
the time help arrived, the Indians were hours and miles away. There is nothing to indicate that other systems of communications were tried. It seems probable that signals of some type could have been used. Mirrors, smoke, or other signals had been used by the U.S. Military successfully by 1865. The Manti Telegraph was used to get help from the north so it must be classified as successful.

The war was largely fought by an amateur army. Its equipment was poor at best. Most of the officers were elected and inexperienced.

Letter excerpts show some of the frustrations and feelings expressed by two leading figures in the war.

"Report to General D. H. Wells
"Manti, Sept. 8th, 1868
"There has nothing particularly transpired since the unfortunate occurrence at Warm Creek on the night of the 4th of which we telegraphed you on the fifth. I very much reject the necessity of saying that this affair, as has been the case in almost every other disaster, was no more, no less than the result of carelessness... It seems impossible for some of us to learn or remember anything except through sad experience.

"Gen. W. B. Pace"9

"Letter to General D. H. Wells
"March 1, 1867
"Just over from Glenwood, Alma, and Richfield where I have been laboring for the past few days. I think with much profit.

"In the military capacity the people there are like sheep without a shepherd. It is said that Colonel Smith has command of the forces in that county but he is a nonresident, and for all advice and efficient aid to that people he might almost as well reside in St. Louis, Liverpool or London. As to live on the opposite side of the mountains with

9 Military Records, Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence, box 6.
whom they can have no communication by reason of snow and lack of roads. The people want him right with them in their midst, family, bag, and baggage.

"They think they could fight better and are sure he could if residing with his family in their midst. If fighting should be necessary. And, I am of the same opinion and knowing no source more proper to apply to than yourself for a word direct to him to repair with his family forthwith to any one of the three settlements on the Sevier. The people there are anxious not knowing how soon they may be attacked by Indians.

"I may be mistaken in my impressions launching the design or 'Brother Smith' having charge of that district, if so, I ask pardon, if not, I wish him urged over as soon as possible, each one of the three settlements has a copy of the President's last letter to me which I think will serve as a general order, and instructions to Colonel Smith with any additional instructions or orders that you may think proper to give him.

"I remain Very Respectfully

"Orson Hyde

"Scipio, Round Valley"10

With conditions like these existing two or three years after the war had started, one cannot but wonder how or why the Indians decided to stop raiding.

Neither side in this war won a clear victory. The Indians only placed their relations with the settlers on a more difficult footing. The whites were able to move the Ute Indians onto the reservation but at an extremely high cost. The cost of the war, if counted in sacrifice, inconvenience and loss of life proved high.

10 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Carter, Kate B. *Heart Throbs of the West*. Salt Lake City, Utah: Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 1946.

———. *Military Life in the West*. Salt Lake City, Utah: Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 1940.


Pace, William B. Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics. Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News Print, 1865.


Tullidge, Edward W. History of Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City, Utah: Star Printing Co., 1886.


**Periodicals**


________. "Indian Reservations in Utah."*Utah Historical Quarterly,* III (October, 1930), 26-31.

________. "John Crooks Journal."*Utah Historical Quarterly,* VI (April, 1933), 50-62, 110-112.

Christensen, C. L. *Deseret News.* September 29, 1919.


*Deseret Evening News,* 1865-1940.

Gibbs, Joseph F. "Black Hawk's Last Raid." *Utah Historical Quarterly,* IV (October, 1931), 484

*Herald Republican,* 1916-17.


Salt Lake Telegram, 1923-30.

Salt Lake Tribune, 1903.


The Improvement Era. XVI (1913).


Manuscripts

Allred, Redick N. "Mormon Battalion Experiences." Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah.


Harris, William J. "Biography." Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.

Jennings, James H. "Diary." Church Historians Office, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Jeppeson, James. "Diary." Church Historians Office, Salt Lake City, Utah.


McAllister, William James. "Life History." Church Historians Office, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Pace, William Bryan. "Diary." Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Richards, Samuel Whitney. "Diary." Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.


Unpublished Material


Curry, Rex. Indian Administrative Officer, Ute Indian Tribe, Fort Duchesne, Utah. Personal Interview, Summer, 1967.

_______. "Background History of the Ute Tribe." Manuscript in this writer's possession. n.d. (Typewritten.)


Indian Affairs Reports. Letters received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1865-1871. Microfilm, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.

L. D. S. Church Historians Office. Files pertaining to Black Hawk War and Nauvoo Legion. Salt Lake City, Utah.


Territorial Military Records, Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence, 1867-68. Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah, box 6.

Territorial Papers, 1864-69. Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah, boxes 3, 7, 8.

Utah Legislative Record, 1866-67. Microfilm, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.
