THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE
HIGH SCHOOL IN 1970’s PHILADELPHIA

by

Brandon Rains

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Approved:

Jennifer Ritterhouse
Major Professor

Lawrence Culver
Committee Member

Barry Franklin
Committee Member

Byron R. Burnham
Dean of Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

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ABSTRACT

The Career Intern Program: An Alternative High School in 1970's Philadelphia

by

Brandon Rains, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2010

Major Professor: Dr. Jennifer Ritterhouse
Department: History

In 1971, Leon Sullivan, founder and chairman of the Board for the Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, created the Career Intern Program. The purpose of the Program was to identify and help dropouts and potential dropouts from high school graduate and select and start a career. In order to accomplish these ambitious goals, Program leaders introduced a variety of educational innovations designed to help interns succeed where traditional educational methods had not. During the Career Intern Program's operational life, CIP leaders turned to the federal government for funding, and the National Institute of Education became CIP's primary funder from 1972 to 1976. This collaboration caused several programmatic changes that simultaneously challenged and improved the Program and its ability to fulfill its purposes. When the NIE period ended, the Department of Labor funded the CIP until 1981, after which the Program failed to find further funding and ceased operation.
This thesis looks at the civil rights, urban, and economic roots of the Career Intern Program. By looking at these origins, this thesis seeks to derive the Program's original goals, and also by extension how the Program changed during its operational life, especially during the NIE period in Philadelphia. By looking at the Program, education will be identified as a part of the urban and civil rights historiographies, a topic which has largely been underdeveloped by historians of these topics. Also, the CIP-NIE period serves to shed light on private organization-federal agency collaboration during the post-War on Poverty era. Overall, this thesis hopes to contribute to an expanding historiography and help create a more comprehensive narrative of the post-World War II urban north.

(122 pages)
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Brandon Rains
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LEON SULLIVAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon Sullivan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Urban Career Education Center (UCEC)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Career Intern Program</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Typical CIP Experience</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP Implementation</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Institute of Education</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION ERA</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EPILOGUE</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC/OICA</td>
<td>Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCEC</td>
<td>Urban Career Education Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Career Intern Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoL</td>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUUA</td>
<td>Temple University Urban Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Division of Special Programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The "classical" period of the civil rights movement from 1955-1965 has received large amounts of attention from historians and society during the forty-five years since the end of that period. This narrative moves chronologically from Rosa Parks and the Montgomery bus boycott to Albany, Birmingham, the March of Washington, Selma, and eventually the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. This period contains many of the giants of the civil rights movement, individuals like Martin Luther King Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, and organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. This period of success was marked by black grassroots movements combining with the national government against the southern racist establishment, which led to successful efforts in rolling back *de jure* segregation. The movement's climax came when President Johnson pushed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts through Congress, which ended segregation and protected voting rights for minorities throughout the United States.

The traditional historical narrative marks the "decline" of the movement as beginning when Martin Luther King took the movement north to Chicago. In the north, King ran up against northern racism and a splintered northern civil rights movement, which included the rising "Black Power" movement. These influences negatively affected King's ability to rally the black community around his goals. Northern racism was not institutionalized like in the South, and therefore was harder for activists to challenge. Although civil rights was hardly a united movement in the South, the north
had much more localized centers of power, devoid of organizations like the SCLC or SNCC that reached beyond city or state borders. Since 1964, the growing influence of the "Black Power" movement behind charismatic leaders like Malcolm X challenged King's non-violence principles and provided options for black empowerment beyond King's philosophy. This localism and vastly different operational philosophies served to splinter the movement from within as an external white conservative backlash began to emerge and halt, and in some areas even curtail, African-American successes. Many historians have framed the civil rights movement as one of southern successes from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s followed by failure in the north in the late 1960s and beyond. While the classical period did see many successes, limiting the narrative of the entire civil rights era to the ten-year window in the south does little justice to those who successfully fought for equality before and after this period in other locations in the United States. Historians need to combine the best aspects of civil rights and urban history approaches to write a more accurate and comprehensive history of civil rights efforts in the North. This thesis moves in that direction by analyzing the educational work of a Philadelphia civil rights leader, Leon Sullivan, in the context of both urban and civil rights historiographies.

Before the 2000s, urban historians were the most interested in race in as it fit within the urban north historical narrative. A major theme in urban history has been explaining the causes of the urban centers' decline post-World War II. Early historical works looked mostly at cities located within the geographic Rust Belt. These cities were the industrial epicenters of the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They witnessed rapid growth as foreign-born and native-born migrants (both
white and black) moved to the cities looking for work in the factories. These cities also bore the brunt of the loss of industrial jobs because of the rise of the Sun Belt and the post-World War II deindustrialization of the United States. The decline of cities magnified racial and class tensions as groups struggled to gain control of the job and housing markets, as well as local government in order to draft policy affecting these markets. Three main lines of interpretation have developed that highlight different aspects of urban history. One examines post-World War II cities as "products of racial conservatism" at the city level, and highlights the inequalities prevalent in urban areas and the difficulties of cultivating equality. A second thread addresses federal government support and subsidies for the overdevelopment of suburban areas to the detriment of northern cities. The third and last theme focuses on black political culture as communities struggled over culture, identity, and power.¹

Urban history has several general characteristics. Its focus on structures provides a great framework through which to analyze the larger urban dynamics that influenced both whites and blacks. Urban historians have looked most at the racial, economic, and political aspects of the urban centers and people’s individual lives. The racial component looks at conflicts drawn along racial lines, economic aspects mostly dealt with jobs, pay, and workers' rights, and the political facet of urban life was mainly concerned with getting the vote and collaboration with local government. Activists believed that these political and economic efforts would directly influence the decision-making process and government policies that most affected cities' black inhabitants, such as curtailing job discrimination, community redevelopment, and investment. The rise of the urban

historiography began in the 1980s and 1990s, as the historical dynamics of urban decline became increasingly clear and the contemporary deterioration of cities deepened.

Thomas Sugrue’s book, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis*, looks at Detroit as it declined from the early 1950s through the 1960s. Sugrue asserts that Detroit’s problems arose as the car manufacturers withdrew from Detroit proper and relocated to the suburbs, as did white blue and white-collar workers. At the same time, African-Americans were migrating into the city looking for jobs. Upon arriving, these migrants ran into structural limitations that severely hindered their ability to find adequate jobs and housing. Whites shunted blacks off to poor, segregated housing and unskilled occupations while government on all levels aided the development of suburban areas. Whites also fought against black attempts to move out from the ghettos into outlying neighborhoods among the urban white middle class. Violence, protests, and ‘white flight’ all were consequences of these dynamics. Sugrue focuses on how economics shaped the urban landscape, caused the migration of racial groups, and raised ethnic tensions as blacks and whites jockeyed for space and influence within Detroit.

Even though Robert Self wrote about Oakland in *American Babylon*, therefore breaking away from the north geographically, his central narrative continued to be economic and political. Self asserted that African-Americans sought equal economic rights, which had been the focus of black political demands since the 1930’s. Robert Self, therefore, focused on the fight for political civil rights, as he believed that this was the arena of greatest confrontation, even though economic equality was the ultimate goal.

Notes:
of black political action. Self believed that blacks' political actions were the means to accomplish economic ends. He argued that blacks broke with cross-racial liberalism in favor of community empowerment and black political influence in order to achieve the economic equality that white-dominated municipal government had failed to give them. However, even though they succeeded in gaining political influence and control in Oakland, blacks struggled to fulfill their economic goals because of the decreased city population and the corresponding increasing power of the suburbs. The rise of black political power in urban Oakland caused a white suburban backlash via the tax revolt of 1978, which limited black gains. For Self, the non-southern and black political movement revolved around control of the ballot and the wallet.

In his book, *The Problem of Jobs*, Guian McKee has made a more recent contribution to the urban historiography. He expands the conversation by looking at community leaders' socioeconomic efforts to create a successful and powerful community in Philadelphia, as well as the effect of politics and local policy on economics and jobs in Philadelphia. McKee further seeks to highlight Philadelphia's African-American leadership and successes with urban liberalism. McKee proffers a radical re-definition of liberalism, in which he keeps the traditional definition of liberalism, which constitutes black leaders seeking for inter-racial alliances with white municipal government leaders, but makes a crucial addition. McKee asserts that black liberals also emphasized self-reliance, self-help, and responsibility, ideologies that are most commonly associated with conservative intra-racial and cross-class community uplift. These liberals believed that the state should make resources available to citizens, but the

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5 Self, *Babylon*, 10, Part III.
responsibility rested on the citizens to improve themselves and their community. In this sense, the government provided initial funding and community leaders worked among themselves to use these funds. Therefore, in McKee's eyes, Philadelphian liberalism was a pragmatic combination of government support and community self-uplift, of which Leon Sullivan, who is the subject of this thesis, was a part.

Although urban history approaches have been helpful, we also need to draw on the best aspects of civil rights history approaches if we want to understand the work of a Leon Sullivan. Urban history's heavy concentration on structural limitations on agency shifts the focus partially away from agency and black attempts to improve their situations. These histories almost never follow an individual narrative, but rather follow the arches of numerous influential leaders in the citywide battle for equality. Urban histories also usually concentrate on the highly influential economic and political aspects, with little discussion on other aspects of society, such as education.

Only within the last decade have civil rights historians begun to expand their narrative to include the north, partially because of the quality of urban historical works. In "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," Jacquelyn Dowd Hall called for historians to extend the chronology and the geography of the civil rights movements to include the north and step outside the classical chronology. Historians have heeded that call by looking at the nature of the northern movement both before and after the classical timeframe. Some historians have expanded the narrative to as far back as the 1920s and as far forward as the 1990s. This expanding historiography

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is becoming increasingly comprehensive as it also sheds more light on the core themes that mattered to black northern activists and on cities where individuals exhibited unusual effectiveness and originality in their efforts.

The civil rights historiography in the north is intrinsically connected with the urban histories. Sugrue and Self themselves stated that race was one of the great narratives of post-World War II northern cities. As civil rights historians have shifted emphasis to include the northern civil rights movement, they have benefited from the pre-existing frameworks of urban history. Urban history is good at bringing large-scale structure, and especially economic forces and concerns, into the picture. Civil rights historians have carried these themes, focusing on blacks' efforts in the political and economic realms. These structures provide an excellent context in which to analyze and trace the progress of civil rights in northern cities. The recent civil rights historiography is also beginning to place a greater emphasis on agency and individuals than urban history. The continuation of urban history's positive contributions and the rejection of some of its weaknesses makes the northern civil rights historiography stronger than it probably otherwise would be.

Sugrue's most recent book, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, explicitly sought to contribute an answer to Hall's desire for a longer northern civil rights movement narrative. *Sweet Land of Liberty* is a synthesis extending from the 1920s to the 1990s and broadly covers the northern civil rights movement. It asserts that the northern civil rights movement grew out of both national and local issues, and that blacks had the most success when they formed political coalitions with other groups, such as unions and Jews. The geographic scope of *Sweet Land of Liberty* is all the north, and so his focus is more on the
individual than any one location. Sugrue offers a broad definition of civil rights that is not limited to political rights, but also to housing, economic, education, and other rights of equality that blacks sought. However, Sugrue defines his book as a political history, and so political efforts dominate his narrative, and are often the means of attaining these other goals. Ultimately, Sugrue states that the surge of black political power in the 1960s until the present day was the northern civil rights movement’s most enduring legacy.8

Continuing the theme of a political civil rights movement was Matthew Countryman's book *Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia*. Looking specifically at Philadelphia from the 1940s through the 1970s, *Up South* traces the liberal-black coalition that grew out of the New Deal until the rise of the Black Power movement, black community organizations, and the conservative backlash that reacted against black advances.9 These political movements were often outgrowths of other concerns, such as work and housing discrimination. Therefore, Countryman claims that the political efforts were the pinnacle of black efforts to make gains for their community within society. This focus limits the narrative to such a degree that other efforts appear to be inconsequential. Leon Sullivan was a leader among Philadelphia's activists, and his economic efforts were arguably more important than his political ones, but since Countryman's focus is solely on civil rights, he misses the other ways that black leaders, including Leon Sullivan, fought for equality in Philadelphia.

*Sweet Land of Liberty* and *Up South* are early and vital additions to efforts to expand the civil rights historiography to include the northern narrative. These books are

doing much to push the civil rights narrative into new and exciting areas, answering questions but also opening up new ones for later research to answer. One of these areas will be to step outside the political arena and branch out further into economic history or completely unexplored areas of research, such as education and its connections with the civil rights movement.

Another place to grow for civil rights history will be to introduce greater emphasis on individuals by introducing their stories into the historiography and elevating black agency more prominently in the historical narrative. This undeveloped focus on individuals is a remnant of a main urban history weakness. Even though civil rights historians have done some work to elevate individual agency in the narrative, much work remains to be done. Whereas the southern civil rights movement historiography is loaded with biographical studies, the study of the northern movement is still a historiography defined by geography and cities. People are a greater part of the narrative than in urban history, but the scope of biographies and individual attention in the north is much more limited than the southern historiography. Too often important northern civil rights leaders receive no more than several pages, let alone chapters or books specifically focused on their lives and efforts. Leon Sullivan is one such leader whose agency had widespread ramifications on multiple levels: the political, the economic, and the educational, to identify a few. His community building ideology informs this thesis as the Career Intern Program was an extension of Sullivan's principles of neighborhood uplift via self-help and organizations run by members of the community.

Politics in the urban north took on several guises. In many cities, blacks sought to create relationships with liberal white politicians, believing that such an alliance could
succeed in reversing the trend of the decline of black neighborhoods and the cities themselves. Other efforts included attempts for African Americans to run for office and actually gain control of city government, such as in Oakland and Philadelphia. On a more local level, activists such as Leon Sullivan created grassroots community uplift organizations that wielded political and economic influence. In most of these books about the northern civil rights movement, politics are the common theme, even in books such as *American Babylon* where these political efforts had socioeconomic motives. Historians have spent most of their ink tracing out who did what in the political arena of passing laws, getting votes, and energizing the political black community. Only Guian McKee focuses especially on jobs and the socioeconomic dynamics of urban Philadelphia. Political civil rights and socioeconomic equality (via jobs, job training, and urban development) are two of the three main themes of urban history, with race being the third. This thesis looks in a different arena, not city hall or a company boardroom, but rather an educational facility in North Philadelphia that Leon Sullivan created. This paper overlaps with the socioeconomic and civil rights historiographies while focusing on a new method that Leon Sullivan introduced to improve the black community.

Because the Career Intern Program was an innovative educational program, this thesis also draws on the educational historiography. The educational historiography is a much more varied field, and in some ways, it is a more developed field than either urban or northern civil rights. Historical works address topics such as education within the capitalist system, theory of education, vocational and classical education, education structures, funding and resources, and other books that seek to connect education with the
larger societal narrative. Educational historians have addressed these issues in many different contexts, such as reaching back to the nineteenth century, or doing case studies (two are of Philadelphia and Detroit, respectively). Several of these works inform this thesis to one degree or another, such as vocational education, funding and resources, and education as a part of capitalism. Even though educational history has a broad and deep academic literature, few historical works have sought to connect education with the larger urban or civil rights narratives.

Leon Sullivan is an incredibly important figure in northern civil rights. His initial civil rights training was how to use political means to serve economic purposes, learning about political protest and community organization from such figures as A. Philip Randolph and Adam Clayton Powell. Over time, Sullivan's vision shifted from political pressure to economic efforts to attain equal opportunity and socioeconomic equality, which he hoped the black community would achieve through education and job training. To achieve this end, Sullivan created the Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) in Philadelphia in 1963. This organization offered training to African-Americans who were not able to enter the job market because of a lack of developed skills. OIC had incredible success through the rest of the 1960's and garnered local and national attention.

With the formation of the Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Sullivan switched gears to focus on community empowerment through economics. Sullivan's OIC

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was a dominant theme in Guian McKee's *The Problem of Jobs*, as it was one of the premier job-training programs in Philadelphia and the United States during the 1960s. McKee dedicated three full chapters to focus on Leon Sullivan and OIC, highlighting Sullivan's success in combining "liberal" and "self-help" approaches, both working with and accepting aid from government and pushing blacks to take the initiative within their own communities, in order to find solutions to the issues plaguing the African-American community.

By 1971, Sullivan was looking to expand his reach beyond job training to include education. He oversaw the formation of the Urban Career Education Center, which was an outgrowth of Leon Sullivan's community uplift ideology and had three components: the Career Orientation Program, the Community Career Program, and the Career Intern Program, of which CIP was the main component. The Career Intern Program worked with struggling high school students to help them stay in school, identify a career path, and place in continued education or training that would help them start their careers. COP was intended to help middle school students become aware of job opportunities and begin to identify what careers they were interested in. CCP worked with the students' parents to help them get jobs and become or stay involved in their children's learning.

Because Sullivan was so involved in politics and economics as means to achieve equality, his decision to branch out to include education speaks volumes for how important he believed education was in order to gain socioeconomic opportunity.

Sullivan knew that UCEC needed money to operate. Unable to find funding through local sources, OIC applied to the United States Office of Education for grant funding. In the fall of 1971, the Office of Education shifted funding responsibility for the
Career Intern Program to the National Institute of Education. The NIE grant period from late 1971 to mid-1976 was a time of great change and dynamism. OIC had created the Career Intern Program to be a specific and powerful piece to Sullivan's vision of creating an empowered African-American community via education. Because the National Institute of Education provided CIP with the funds it needed to operate, it also had great influence over the Program's operations.

NIE's position of strength relative to how the Program worked led to a number of conflicts that forced NIE and CIP leadership to learn how to work together. Whether they compromised or not, and the consequences of those decisions, would have massive implications for the future of the Program and determine the very viability of Sullivan's goal of promoting civil uplift through education. The New Deal of the 1930s and the War on Poverty of the 1960s made the federal government a powerful social force in Americans' daily lives. With this new role came new dynamics of public-private interaction. The expansion of government via the creation of new agencies and the introduction of vast funding offered new possibilities that local organizations and governments could seek to tap into to achieve their goals. The Career Intern Program was a black community-based initiative, while the National Institute of Education was a federal agency that provided funding and oversight. Sullivan's reliance upon government funding in order to make his programs work invited oversight of his programs, a dynamic that certainly held true for the Career Intern Program. This private organization-public agency relationship sheds light on the powerful positive and negative influences of involving government in private civil rights enterprises.
Sullivan figures in both Thomas Sugrue's *Sweet Land of Liberty* and Matthew Countryman's *Up South.* Both of them recognize Sullivan's contributions and importance as a civic leader as they trace his progression through time in his own fights for equality. Both of these historians laud Sullivan, but at the same time the amount of space they spend narrating his story does not match the quality of their plaudits. For example, Sugrue stated that "no one would transform the northern movement for workplace equality more than" Leon Sullivan.\textsuperscript{11} However, Sugrue only dedicated four consecutive pages to Sullivan's story and OIC, a small number of pages for a man Sugrue himself identified as one of the most important northern leaders. Only Guian McKee dedicated enough time in his book in order to delve into Sullivan's efforts and successes, as he spent three chapters analyzing OIC's contributions to socioeconomic equality through job training and economic community uplift. However, no historical work examines Leon Sullivan's other efforts toward attaining equality, such as the Career Intern Program. To overlook these other projects narrows the variety of ways that Sullivan sought to improve the black community.

By examining the OIC papers in the Temple University Urban Archives, this thesis looks at how the Career Intern Program was an extension of Leon Sullivan's civil rights vision and his desire for more agency for the black community, and how the NIE-CIP relationship affected the Program's ability to fulfill that goal.\textsuperscript{12} The Career Intern Program was influenced by the political and economic threads of the northern civil rights movement as Sullivan sought to use his political capital in order to create an educational program to fight for socioeconomic opportunity and equality. By analyzing the civil

\textsuperscript{11} Self, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, 126.
\textsuperscript{12} The Temple University Urban Archives are the only document repository for the Opportunities Industrialization Centers, its divisions, and programs during this period.
rights, political, economic, and education roots of the Career Intern Program, as well as how CIP and two federal agencies interacted, this thesis seeks to serve as a bridge between the urban, civil rights, and educational historiographies and help create a more comprehensive picture of the civil rights efforts in the urban north. Further, it seeks to show how education contributed to local leaders' uplift efforts as they attempted to address the issues that plagued black urban communities.

The War on Poverty introduced new ways for black community leaders to achieve their uplift goals, as its timing and resources gave these leaders seemingly unlimited possibilities to help urban ghettos. Studying the immediate post-War on Poverty era presents new issues because there were now government-private partnerships. In a jointly written article, Thomas Sugrue and Robert Self look at the state of the civil rights and urban historiographies until that point, as well as discuss topics that have yet to be fully or partially explored. One of these questions is the role of government within the civil rights movement and its relationship with urban community organizations. By focusing on the Institute-Program dynamics, this thesis begins to partially answer Thomas Sugrue and Robert Self's question concerning the "federal government's role in the process of building black political power." Was the NIE crucial to CIP's success, was it an ally to the Program's goals, or did the Institute hijack the Program in order to achieve its own organizational goals? These questions can help shed light on the effectiveness of community uplift through educational means, as well as how well a community project can work with the federal government to achieve socioeconomic goals.

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Chapter 2 traces the roots of the Career Intern Program by looking at the development of Leon Sullivan's civil rights philosophy from his youth through his organization of OIC, the UCEC, and finally, the Career Intern Program. Chapter 3 outlines how CIP worked by following a typical intern experience in CIP. It then looks at the early days of Program operations, and then of the first several months of the NIE-CIP relationship. Chapter 4 contains the balance of the Institute grant period and traces how CIP and NIE learned how to compromise to achieve their separate goals together. Chapter 5 looks at the period during which the Program had a grant from the Department of Labor to start operations in four new sites, as well as the winding down of CIP itself. Overall, this thesis covers the ten-year period of CIP's existence from 1971 to 1981.
CHAPTER 2
LEON SULLIVAN AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM

Leon Sullivan

The road to Reverend Leon Sullivan’s formation of the Opportunities
Industrialization Centers and the Career Intern Program covered his entire life. Born into
poverty in Charlestown, West Virginia, in 1922, Sullivan first encountered racial
discrimination when he was ten, when he entered a store to buy a Coca-Cola and sat
down, waiting to be served. The white storeowner ordered him to stand, saying, "Black
boy, stand on your feet. You can’t sit down there." Sullivan later stated that he resolved
at that moment to fight against such prejudice for the rest of his life.14 As Sullivan grew,
he began a series of individual sit-ins in local restaurants, drugstores, theater ticket
booths, and in any other establishment that he could. He counted only one restaurant, the
"Greasy Spoon," as a success.15

Around 1940, Sullivan received a scholarship to attend West Virginia State
College, where his sophomore year proved pivotal to his future. During this year,
Sullivan received word that his beloved grandmother, or "Mama" as he called her, was
dying. He travelled home, and he later described the experience:

As I looked around her room that night, I saw the misery of poverty. I noticed the wallpaper that had been plastered up layer over layer, thick and ragged, torn and spotted and damp…. And as I sat there in the faint light of the oil lamp, amidst the dreariness and the smell of death, Mama

15 Sullivan, Build Brother Build, 38.
looked up at me and said: "Leonie, help your people. And don’t let this kind of thing happen to anybody else."\textsuperscript{16}

Sullivan also stated that the week after this visit, he realized that his calling was to be a minister of God and help people who were poor.\textsuperscript{17}

Over the next several years, Leon Sullivan progressed toward that goal. By the time he graduated from WVSC in 1943, he had already been ordained into the ministry and was the pastor at two local churches. With the support of Adam Clayton Powell, an influential Harlem minister, Sullivan moved to New York City to attend the Union Theological Seminary.\textsuperscript{18} While studying at the seminary, he met his wife, Grace. They would have three children together during their marriage. One of Sullivan’s greater achievements during his time in New York was the recruitment of "a hundred colored men for the police force" in Harlem with Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s support and encouragement.\textsuperscript{19} This success highlighted Reverend Sullivan’s skill to get support from influential white local leaders, as well as his ability to rally the black community.

Just a few months after Sullivan's move to New York, he met A. Philip Randolph. In 1941, Randolph had organized The March on Washington Committee that led to President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802, which mandated the desegregation of the American war industries. Soon afterwards, Randolph changed the Committee's name to be The March on Washington \textit{Movement}, a permanent civil rights organization that sought to use the momentum from the Committee's success.\textsuperscript{20} The Movement was already on the decline when Leon Sullivan was exposed to it and Randolph. At age

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Sullivan, \textit{Build Brother Build}, 39-43.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Sullivan, \textit{Build Brother Build}, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Sullivan, \textit{Build Brother Build}, 43-46.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Sullivan, \textit{Build Brother Build}, 48-52.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Paula Pfeffer, \textit{A. Philip Randolph, Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1990), 46-55. Italics added.
\end{itemize}
twenty-one, Sullivan was voted president of the Movement, working directly under Randolph. Sullivan credited Randolph for teaching him movement philosophy and tactics during this time. Sullivan recognized Powell and Randolph as being the two most important influences during his time in New York, as they introduced him to the larger world of civil rights nonviolent action and influenced his own methods of community organization.

Within a few years, Sullivan graduated from the Seminary versed in the Social Gospel, which applied Christianity to the pressing social problems of the day. The Social Gospel had begun to emerge and grow in influence during the first couple decades of the twentieth century, reaching its pre-Civil Rights Movement heights during the Great Depression, when the deepening economic crisis gave the movement credibility and influence. During this time, proponents of the Social Gospel also forged alliances with socialists and branched out into civil rights, extending the Social Gospel's interactions into politics, economics, and social questions. By the 1950s, the Social Gospel had become an important strand of black theology, seeking to apply Christianity to the immediate and practical societal problems of the contemporary day. Social Gospel-ites often teamed up with socialists such as A. Philip Randolph because of their common views concerning unions, capitalism and industrialism, and a desire to change American society through social equality now. Both of these ideologies influenced Leon Sullivan, but he moved away from both by his method of achieving those ends. Sullivan rejected Randolph's political solutions to an economic problem, and he was willing to work with capitalism and the government to achieve his goals.

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22 Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, 42.
23 Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, 42-44.
After moving to Philadelphia in 1950 to become pastor of Zion Baptist Church, an important middle-class black congregation, Leon Sullivan began to develop more fully his particularly socioeconomic version of the Social Gospel. Sullivan eschewed critiques of industrial capitalism and support for local labor unions, but he also refrained from abstract preaching about heaven and salvation. Rather, like some other practitioners of the Social Gospel, he focused on programs to empower blacks individually and African-American society as a whole. As he said, "Some people look for milk and honey in heaven, while I look for ham and eggs on earth, as well as for heaven eventually." He yearned to "see the kingdom of God a reality in the everyday lives of men." Reverend Sullivan initially combined the Social Gospel with militant civil rights action, trying to improve life in African-American neighborhoods through black self-help and unity rather than through government aid, interracial alliances, or demagoguery. As Sullivan's efforts expanded, he eventually sought after federal funding, thereby creating a hybrid method of operation from the conservatism he espoused in the beginning of his career and the liberal requirements for the scope of his actions.

In 1953, Sullivan created the Philadelphia Citizens Committee Against Juvenile Delinquency and Its Causes (CCAJD). The Citizens Committee was a coalition of associations and neighborhood groups that eventually claimed a peak membership of 100,000 and was concerned with decreasing crimes committed by Philadelphia youth. In order to achieve this goal, the CCAJD tracked black youth, built relationships with

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24 Countryman, *Up South*, 84.
police, and pursued many other initiatives intended to get to the roots of violence, crime, and delinquency.\textsuperscript{27}

By 1957, Sullivan had shifted his focus to helping youth get gainful employment. However, his entreaties and referrals of African-Americans to local companies were consistently rebuffed and even ignored.\textsuperscript{28} Frustrated by the lack of corporate cooperation and Philadelphia’s Commission on Human Relations’ weak enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, Reverend Sullivan began the most militant protest period of his career with the 400 Ministers boycotts. Organized in 1959, the 400 Ministers' stated purpose was to negotiate with local companies to hire blacks to fill their open positions. Philadelphia companies as a whole had a horrible hiring record of African-Americans. The 400 Ministers would first approach these local companies about changing their discriminatory policies, and if the companies refused, the ministers then used their influence to encourage the community to boycott those companies. This ‘selective patronage’ campaign, as they called it, first targeted the Tasty Baking Company. Reverend Sullivan stated that it was the hardest campaign, and it was one of the longest. After the ministers succeeded in forcing Tasty Baking to give in to their demands and hire African-Americans, the boycotts gained momentum, prestige, and power. Over the next four years, the threat of a boycott was often enough to convince local companies to desegregate their workplaces. By the end of the selective patronage campaigns in 1963, Leon Sullivan claimed that the boycotts had directly opened up about two thousand jobs to blacks, as well as many thousands more in indirect consequence of the campaigns.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Countryman, \textit{Up South}, 84-85.
\textsuperscript{28} McKee, \textit{The Problem of Jobs}, 118.
\textsuperscript{29} Sullivan, \textit{Build Brother Build}, 70-84.
The end of the 400 Ministers boycotts marked the beginning of a new focus for Leon Sullivan. After boycotting twenty-nine companies in about six different industries, Rev. Sullivan and several of his closest associates identified another impediment to African-Americans being hired: a lack of training and skills. Blacks had been excluded from apprenticeship systems and other training programs and they suffered from inferior educational facilities and opportunities.\textsuperscript{30} Even though the selective patronage campaigns had been very successful, the African-American community struggled to take advantage of these growing opportunities because there was a dearth of developed talent and skills to fill those jobs. This need for education led Sullivan to develop the Opportunities Industrialization Centers, a program of "massive, militant, people-centered, people-directed, self-help initiated by the black community for the black community."\textsuperscript{31}

**Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Inc.**

In July 1963, Sullivan established OIC upon three basic principles. First, the program would teach black adults the necessary skills to gain jobs and eventually advance within companies. Second, OIC classes would address more personal topics such as self-confidence, literacy and basic education, personal problems, and motivation. Third, the program was to be rooted within the black community itself with minimal outside influence. OIC embodied Rev. Sullivan’s operating principles of self-help, self-reliance, and self-improvement.\textsuperscript{32} It aimed to lift poor and unemployed black adults by drawing on resources and talents from the black middle class and skilled black workers,

\textsuperscript{30} McKee, *The Problem of Jobs*, 124.  
\textsuperscript{31} Sullivan, *Build Brother Build*, 94.  
\textsuperscript{32} McKee, *The Problem of Jobs*, 126.
thereby crossing class lines as well as unifying and strengthening the black community from within.

One of the more innovative aspects of OIC was the Feeder Program. It was designed to prepare newly admitted OIC students by addressing "the intertwined relationships between race, poverty, and unemployment at a more fundamental level than skill-training alone." Leon Sullivan believed that merely having the skills to gain jobs would not be enough. He sought a more comprehensive program that would work to deconstruct the effects of generations of discrimination and poverty. Sullivan recognized that poor education and the lack of job opportunities had severely limited even adults’ working knowledge of basic job skills and personal presentation. Therefore, the Feeder Program addressed "literacy, self-confidence, personal motivation, and knowledge about employer expectations," as well as hygiene and grooming. The Feeder Program reflected Rev. Sullivan’s belief that preparing for a job was a comprehensive effort that involved every aspect of life.

After completing the Feeder Program, OIC participants moved on to the Job Training Program, where they received the necessary skills to gain employment and succeed in their chosen profession. After graduation from the OIC, each student had access to OIC assistance as they sought jobs in their respective chosen professions. Almost immediately, OIC rose in prominence and began to make significant gains in training blacks for employment and thereby improving industry’s perceptions of prospective black employees. By most statistical reports, OIC proved extraordinarily successful in placing students. From February to October 1965, for example, OIC

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graduated almost 600 students and just over 500 of them placed in jobs directly related to their training. External studies comparing OIC and other job training programs (including federal government programs) showed that OIC was both cheaper and more effective. Companies began to take notice of OIC graduates, citing their preparation, motivation, and attitude, and over time, *Ebony*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and other media would report on the OIC's successes. As OIC's graduates increased in experience and reputation, they found it easier to qualify for open positions and be hired. Similarly, as OIC's reputation as a job training program strengthened and grew, OIC leaders found it increasingly easier to build relationships with businesses. This progress would in turn aid OIC's spread to dozens of other cities.\(^{36}\)

Despite its successes, the OIC struggled to pay its bills. After donations from African-American individuals proved inadequate, Leon Sullivan turned to the city of Philadelphia and his business connections from the selective patronage campaigns. He continued to widen his fundraising net until OIC received federal funding from the national government’s War on Poverty programs, beginning in 1964. Sullivan apparently saw no contradiction between espousing self-reliance and accepting public funding. He recognized that any large social program located in predominantly black urban centers needed government funds to succeed, and so he pragmatically sought federal money in order to help his people become self-sufficient.\(^{37}\) Sullivan's attempts to balance these two forces makes clear the complex nature of community building, as he espoused self-help yet pragmatically embraced government support once it became available, even if he did not fully shift over to a "liberal" position seeking such aid. Sullivan recognized the

\(^{36}\) McKee, *The Problem of Jobs*, 152-166.

community's deep need for financial support and investment, but he also knew only the
government could provide such funds. Therefore, Sullivan accepted government money
in order to finance his efforts to instill self-reliance within the African-American
community.

The combination of local government and commercial backing, federal support,
and national attention in print media, led to a period of expansion and great progress.\(^\text{38}\) By 1969, Leon Sullivan could claim that the OIC was the fastest growing manpower
program in the country. There were at least seventy OIC chapters outside Philadelphia,
and an international arm was forming in Africa. Total enrollment was twenty thousand
and the organization had a great record of graduation and job placement. The combined
annual budget of OIC operations was twenty million dollars, eighteen million of which
came from federal government sources.\(^\text{39}\) Within just a few years, OIC had proven
Sullivan's vision of the black community's ability to help itself in the push for equal
opportunity in the workplace and socioeconomic success. By doing so, it provided
another option for black leaders as they expanded their efforts to effect positive change
within the African-American community.

**The Urban Career Education Center (UCEC)**

The United States in 1971 was barely emerging from the turbulent late 1960’s.
Urban riots, the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and the decline of
the War on Poverty because of the escalation of the war in Vietnam all served to create a
crisis within city centers. Unemployment among blacks and especially black youth was

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\(^{38}\) Sullivan, *Build Brother Build*, 111.

\(^{39}\) Sullivan, *Build Brother Build*, 112.
disproportionately high as discrimination, lack of education and training, and hopelessness all took their toll. By 1971, OIC had achieved magnificent success in helping African-American adults get the job skills they needed. OIC therefore was a large and influential presence in Philadelphia and beyond, not only concerning job training, but also as a civil rights and black community organization. OIC and its success proved to both the business world and African-Americans themselves that it was possible to involve blacks more fully in the economic system.

By early 1971, Leon Sullivan had begun to explore another avenue of black self-help with the goal of moving beyond the economic and into the educational realm. For some time, U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. Sidney Marland had been pushing for career education within public schools as the most viable solution to growing concerns about the quality of secondary education in the United States.\(^\text{40}\) He, like other educational leaders and administrators, had been questioning the efficacy of public schools for several years, as well as searching for alternatives to the present system that they perceived as insufficient to meet students' needs.\(^\text{41}\) Knowing this, Leon Sullivan invited Dr. Marland to attend the Seventh Annual OIC Conference, held in Seattle in February 1971. Their conversation at the conference about the problems of unskilled and unemployed youth proved the starting point of a joint OIC-United States government initiative.\(^\text{42}\) Soon after, Sullivan charged OIC staff to develop a new educational program expressly designed to address the issues that black youth faced. By the end of 1971, OIC

\(^\text{40}\) DSP CIP Research and Development Proposal for the CIP of the UCEC, 6/7/73, Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America (OICA), 16:1, Temple University Urban Archives (TUUA).

\(^\text{41}\) DSP CIP Research and Development Proposal for the CIP of the UCEC, 6/7/73, OICA, 16:1, TUUA.

\(^\text{42}\) DSP CIP Research and Development Proposal for the CIP of the UCEC, 6/7/73, OICA, 16:1, TUUA.
personnel proposed an innovative educational program to both the US Office of Education and the Philadelphia School District.43

OIC leaders believed that several factors combined to severely inhibit black students from graduating from high school and finding jobs that offered them socioeconomic stability. The factors included: 1) racial discrimination; 2) poor educational facilities; 3) an epidemic of hopelessness that effectively dead-ended blacks' goals; and 4) the growing perception that school did not actually meet black students' individual needs, thereby decreasing students' motivation to do well. Sullivan believed that OIC's unique history of success qualified it for this venture into education, and he firmly asserted that a program focused on addressing these core issues would increase graduation and employment rates among African Americans.44

After leading the initial steps of the formation of this program, Leon Sullivan left the daily administration and leadership responsibilities to established OIC staff. Until the late 1960's, Sullivan had been able to focus his energies on a small number of simultaneous initiatives. As OIC grew more complex and spread to an increasing number of locations across the United States, Sullivan, as Chairman of the Board of OIC, had to step back from a more direct managerial style, as he was unable to focus his attention to any one effort on a daily basis. Also, Sullivan was involved in several other efforts, such as Progress Plaza and other for-profit ventures, that further divided his attention. In spite of his more distanced leadership position, Sullivan did succeed in maintaining his role as visionary, public face, and ideological compass for the organization. From this point

43 DSP: Proposals--UCEC Proposal and Appendix, December 1971, OICA, 10:39, TUUA; DSP: CIP--Philadelphia CIP-School Board Resolutions 1971, 1976, OICA, 15:19, TUUA; DSP School Board Resolution to Enter into Agreement w/ OIC to start UCEC, 12/7/71, OICA, 11:18, TUUA.
44 DSP: Proposals--UCEC Proposal and Appendix, December 1971, OICA, 10:39, TUUA.
onwards, this new educational program's success would depend almost entirely on the
talents and skills of its local and immediate leaders.

The new educational organization, called the Urban Career Education Center,
proposed a new approach to education that, in theory, would not just supply "quality
education," but "guarantee that disadvantaged young people have promising
opportunities." Its uniqueness began at the very core of its organizational structure and
extended to the more minute details of its daily operations. UCEC was divided into three
smaller programs, the Career Intern Program, the Career Orientation Program, and the
Community Career Program. Each addressed a specific part of the African-American
community, in theory all working together to uplift black individuals, families, and
neighborhoods. The CIP and COP were geared toward young people in high school and
junior high respectively, while the CCP worked with the student's parents. The CCP
strove to improve parent-school relations, increase parental support and involvement for
their children, and even provide some job or educational training to increase the parents'
ability to support their families. The COP focused on fifth to eighth grade students. It
sought to help these students begin their individual preparation for their future careers by
focusing them on the career planning process and on career-oriented educational goals.
The CIP, which was the main component of UCEC and is the focus of this thesis, focused
on dropouts and potential dropouts attending Philadelphia's Germantown High School.
Its goal was to bring these students back into school until they earned a high school

46 DSP Statement of Continuation for Urban Career Education Center’s CCP and COP Components,
12/1/73-8/31/74, OICA, 11:22, TUUA; DSP: Proposals--UCEC Proposal and Appendum, December 1971,
OICA, 10:39, TUUA.
diploma or GED, help them identify and work toward a chosen profession, and ultimately place them in either a job or post-secondary education.

**The Career Intern Program**

UCEC administrators wanted the Career Intern Program to be independent of the public school system in order to have the control they needed to implement their programs. However, they also recognized that working with no public school support would cripple the Center from the outset. Therefore, they created a semi-autonomous organization that was indeed operationally independent, but had some very important connections with the Philadelphia schools. The Career Intern Program recruited their students from within the Philadelphia School District with District help and oversight, and Program instructors taught classes that the District counted for credit toward graduation. Interns could also participate in District extracurricular activities and clubs and use District services such as lunches and transportation.48

CIP's semi-autonomous nature allowed for programmatic innovations that probably would not have been possible in a traditional educational setting. These innovations were part of the initial proposals in 1971 and some of the most important ones included:

a) Low student-teacher and especially low student-counselor ratios. These ratios allowed the teachers and counselors to provide individualized teaching and counseling, as well as a strong structural support system for these "at risk" students.

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48 DSP School Board Resolution to Enter into Agreement w/ OIC to start UCEC, 12/7/71, OICA, 11:18, TUUA.
Counselors were to meet with each intern on a weekly basis, and the entire teaching and counseling staffs met together weekly to address struggling students' problems.

b) A curriculum that combined a typical high school education with an emphasis on career exploration and preparation. This combination was designed to fulfill the local high school's educational requirements, as well as introduce career opportunities, help the students identify their desired careers, and teach self-paced, individualized lesson plans by applying basic school lesson principles to work-related situations.

c) Internship opportunities with local businesses and industry that would give students practical experience in their chosen fields and help them either solidify or change their career choices.

d) Rolling admission following an in-depth recruiting process. This allowed the Program to continuously accept qualified students, giving CIP a greater ability to fulfill its stated mission and better help students more rapidly meet their educational and work goals.

The graph below demonstrates the OIC-UCEC-CIP organization in order to show the Program's place within OIC, as well as the departments that made up CIP. This graph helps identify each departments' responsibilities and serves as a reference point as the remainder of the thesis expounds upon these duties.
On December 6, 1971, the Philadelphia School Board passed a resolution that
authorized the school system to enter into a relationship with OIC to create the Urban
Career Education Center. And even though the exact date is unclear, the Office of
Education approved OIC's request for UCEC funding sometime in early 1972. This
funding and local cooperation allowed UCEC and the Career Intern Program to begin
hiring staff, devising curriculum, and designing materials in preparation for the new
school year.

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53 DSP School Board Resolution to Enter into Agreement w/ OIC to start UCEC, 12/7/71, OICA, 11:18, TUUA.
The Career Intern Program was a direct outgrowth of Leon Sullivan's goals of advancing black community interests, which CIP sought to fulfill through a combination of self-help ideology and public funding, which also continued Sullivan's pragmatism. This federal government support ultimately resulted in long-term and wide-ranging effects upon the Program. It simultaneously challenged CIP's very purposes, changed the Program's methods, improved CIP, and helped the Program reach its goals better than it would have on its own. The next three chapters trace these changes and seek to establish how successful the Career Intern Program was in fulfilling Leon Sullivan's vision. The Program's story sheds light on the important question of how federal funding and oversight advanced or hindered blacks' own civil initiatives, as well as how education efforts from within the black community should be understood in relation to African-American socioeconomic and civil rights efforts.
CHAPTER 3

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CAREER INTERN PROGRAM

The Career Intern Program was a complex program designed to help struggling students from urban centers not only graduate, but also identify and follow a career that would help them rise out of poverty, and, in turn, raise their families and community out of poverty as well. In order to accomplish this, the CIP introduced a wealth of educational innovations. Tracking a normal intern experience is an easy way to understand how the Career Intern Program was designed to work, which the first half of this chapter accomplishes. At the same time, it is important to recognize that it took time and effort for the program to achieve the fully developed state outlined at the start of this chapter. Thus, the second half of the chapter examines how the program developed, including its growing pains both before and after the National Institute for Education became involved. The Program would experience the normal growing pains of such an ambitious and complex program during the initial implementation and the beginning of the National Institute of Education grant period, but CIP leadership ultimately succeeded in creating and sustaining a successful educational program.

This chapter seeks to juxtapose the ideal and the reality by describing a model intern experience as the UCEC leadership envisioned, and then tracing the beginning of the Program from May 1972 to August 1973 as UCEC staff worked with two federal agencies, first the Office of Education and then the National Institute of Education. This seventeen-month period witnessed a multitude of positive and negative dynamics, as UCEC leaders worked to establish the Program from scratch. The section where the
Office of Education was funding CIP concentrates on the internal difficulties that UCEC staff encountered as they created the Program and readied it for the school year, as well as the first several months of program operation. The National Institute of Education section sees a shift of focus, which rests upon the CIP-NIE relationship and demonstrates how the two organizations' personnel worked together from the beginning of that period until August 1973.

A Typical CIP Experience

Prospective interns of the Career Intern Program had either already dropped out of school or were already struggling in school and flagged as potential dropouts by their high school administration in concert with CIP counselors. Reasons for such struggles varied from intern to intern, and included drugs, gangs, caring for a child, lack of familial support, financial problems, a pervasive apathy toward school, or any number of other factors. Prospective interns generally did not believe that school was very helpful for them because of the persistent lack of career opportunities within the black community. Leon Sullivan believed that these youth were the most susceptible to the negative aspects of the ghetto, and that if CIP succeeded in elevating these troubled students above their current conditions, then the possibilities for OIC-led community uplift would dramatically increase.

After the students’ Germantown High School counselors and Career Intern Program counselors identified them as prospective interns they began the recruitment process. Program counselors set up an appointment with the prospective interns to meet at their home, along with one or both of their parents. During this interview and over the course of a few more, students would learn about the Program while the CIP counselors
would determine if the youth were qualified. They wanted to identify the prospective interns' economic need, willingness to learn, vocational aptitude, desire to achieve, and previous scholastic achievements. Counselors told the students that the Program's goal was to help them graduate and place in one of five post-graduation possibilities: 1) on-the-job training; 2) advanced skills training; 3) junior or technical college; 4) four-year college; or 5) a job. CIP staff knew that the Program's reputation would be built upon attracting capable but struggling students, and so they developed a thorough recruiting process to help identify and bring in those interns that had the most potential for academic and work success.

Another aspect of CIP's recruitment was testing. These tests tested an intern's abilities in reading, language, arithmetic, and study skills. In order to qualify for the Career Intern Program, students had to demonstrate a fifth-grade reading level and sufficient proficiency in other subjects. Tests sought to determine an intern's attitudes about school, work, and self, what career an intern was interested in, and showed the intern's progress through the program via pre and post-CIP testing. This comprehensive testing provided valuable information to CIP counselors, as they were then able to identify qualified prospective interns as well as providing them with preliminary information about interns that could help CIP staff better serve the youth.

After the youth passed the tests and CIP counselors decided to admit them into the program, students simply had to wait until classes started. If interns were in the initial group that entered the Program November 1, 1972, or one of the next several groups, they entered with many other students to fill the Program to capacity. Later, the Program

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55 Proposal for a Demonstration OIC Urban Career Center Program, December 1971, OICA, 10:39, TUUA.  
56 DSP: Correspondence-Director's Office--Joseph Rucker, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA, 21-22, 33-34, 47-51, 72-73.
shifted to rolling admission, which allowed an intern to enter CIP as soon as a previous intern graduated. Interns' first couple of days in the Career Intern Program was orientation, which they attended with their parents. Orientation was a straightforward affair, where OIC, UCEC, and CIP administration and staff introduced themselves, previewed the Program, and allowed for questions and mingling between interns, parents, and staff.

After orientation, the first twenty-one weeks of the program was called Phase I, or the Career Awareness phase. CIP instructors combined a traditional high school curriculum with career orientation, with the basic educational material including English, Social Studies, Math, and Science. Career exploration was divided into career clusters, which were:

- Business and Office
- Marketing and Distribution
- Communications and Media
- Construction
- Manufacturing
- Transportation
- Agri-Business and Natural Resources
- Marine Science
- Environmental Control
- Public Service
- Health
- Hospitality and Recreation
- Personal Services
- Fine Arts and Humanities
- Consumer and Homemaking

The challenge for the instructors was to combine the educational material with the career clusters to help interns simultaneously learn the high school curriculum and identify their desired career path. To accomplish this, either instructors dedicated part of

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57 Proposal for a Demonstration OIC Urban Career Center Program, December 1971, OICA, 10:39, TUUA.
their class time to introducing specific career options, or they applied the high school curriculum to job situations in order to connect what the interns were learning to real life. Instructors used a variety of activities and teaching methods to help the interns not only decide what career they wanted to pursue, but also to accomplish the more immediate and practical goal of helping them stay in school, get off the streets, and graduate.

Another major part of Phase I was the Career and Counseling Seminars. CIP counselors, instructors, and members of the career department team-led these weekly group meetings. Although these seminars served many purposes, they primarily provided interns with the weekly opportunity and responsibility of researching two career options on their own every week and then presenting their research to the rest of the group. Other goals of the seminars were to help interns understand CIP's rules and goals, develop group decision-making and social skills by interacting with other interns, and learn how to do research.\(^{58}\) These weekly meetings allowed interns to participate in a more informal setting than the traditional classroom, get ideas from other interns and staff, and have a dedicated time of the week to focus on their career options and plans.

The culmination of Phase I was when interns and their counselors created the Career Development Plan (CDP). The Plan would outline the additional classes that interns needed to take in order to graduate, identified their career goals, and addressed other important factors to most effectively help interns achieve their career goals.\(^{59}\) After interns and their counselors successfully developed the Career Development Plan, interns moved on to Phase II, the Career Exploration phase.

\(^{58}\) Career Intern Program Description, 1972, OICA, 15:28, TUUA.
\(^{59}\) Career Intern Program Description, 1972, OICA, 15:28, TUUA.
The interns' Phase II experience lasted for the rest of their time in the CIP, which was often until they received their high school diploma. Most interns were either juniors or seniors when they entered the Career Intern Program. A major difference between Phase II and Phase I was the CIP's method of instruction. Staff gave each intern "Individualized Learning Packets," which included pre-tests, activities, advanced projects, and post-tests, all of which helped interns work through each school topic and gain mastery at their own pace, depending on not only their abilities, but also on their schedule and other factors. This individualized learning program was a drastic departure from a traditional high school classroom experience, one that CIP leaders hoped would prove decisive in the interns' learning and lives.

The Phase II curriculum also integrated traditional academic classes and career education more fully as compared to Phase I. Instructors applied a traditional curriculum to each interns' job situations as a method to make the lessons more interesting and practical. A major curriculum focus was also blacks’ professional contributions to their respective fields in order to give the interns examples of success stories from the black community and increase their confidence for success. Such integration highlighted the Program's goals that expanded beyond the classroom and workplace to include the intern's self-image and community. By introducing Sullivan's principles of self-help and community uplift, CIP mirrored the ambitious and comprehensive desires that OIC had for itself as a "savior" of the black community, individually and collectively.

The curriculum was not the only programmatic component that helped prepare the interns for career success during Phase II. The Career and Counseling Seminars continued, as CIP staff sought to keep their interns involved and progressing through the

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60 Career Intern Program Description, 1972, OICA, 15:28, TUUA.
entire Program experience. Interns also had individual counselors with whom they met on a weekly basis. The Program did this in order to know what was going on in an intern's life, both within and outside of the Program. The Career Intern Program leadership believed that their duty was to help the 'whole person,' as CIP leaders didn't view interns just as students. The small intern-counselor and intern-instructor ratios were designed to help in this regard, where interns could develop deep and trusting relationships with their counselors and instructors, which in turn allowed CIP staff to inquire into interns’ personal lives and problems more than would be possible in a traditional high school setting. CIP staff understood that they were not just trying to raise slumping grades, but change mentalities, empower black youth to make their own future, and spread that positive influence to those around them, and thereby raising up their community themselves.

The most innovative aspect of Phase II was the Hands-On experience. The experiences were two-week long internships at companies or organizations connected to an interns' career choice. When an intern was ready for a Hands-On experience, the Program's Career Department staff used its local business community contacts to set up an internship opportunity in the intern's chosen career. At its most basic, a Hand-On experience meant shadowing a local professional to understand workplace expectations and responsibilities. Program leadership believed that this experience would either strengthen or call into question an intern's career decision. If interns wanted to change their career path, interns and their counselors created a new Career Development Plan.
However, if the interns liked their Hands-On experience, then Phase II continued until the intern neared graduation and began Phase III, Career Specialization.61

Career Intern Program leadership planned Phase III to extend beyond graduation. If interns chose a career that required post-secondary education, then CIP Career Department staff taught them college prep courses, helped them prepare for the SAT, and assisted them in applying for college. If interns chose a career that would allow them to begin a job immediately, then CIP staff helped them find a position. These efforts continued until the interns graduated from the Program. However, this was not the end of CIP's involvement. CIP counselors maintained contact with interns who enrolled in college for up to twelve months, and with other interns who entered advanced skills training programs or on-the-job training for six months after graduation.62

**CIP Implementation**

While a typical intern's experience illuminates the CIP's structure as the CIP leaders envisioned it, one of the most important aspects of its history is how the staff struggled to establish the CIP as a fully-developed and successful program. The Career Intern Program was a project that OIC started from scratch. Sullivan tapped experienced OIC staff and leaders who believed in his self-help policies to achieve socioeconomic equality to lead UCEC and CIP, but practically none of them had any significant experience in running an educational program. This lack of experience, coupled with the upheaval that accompanies the formation of any organization, caused a great deal of

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61 Career Intern Program Description, 1972, OICA, 15:28, TUUA.
62 Career Intern Program Description, 1972, OICA, 15:28, TUUA.
conflict as these leaders strove to form an organization that embodied Sullivan’s goals and had the ability to take such dramatic steps into the educational world.

The Career Intern Program began to take real operational shape when the Office of Education awarded OIC a planning grant, which ran from May 26 to October 31, 1972. The Program existed on a theoretical level before the grant, but the influx of money and resources allowed UCEC leaders time to hire personnel, finalize the curriculum, acquire equipment and supplies, and develop a proposal for its first twelve months of Program operation, which was to begin on November 1.

The five months leading up to the beginning of the Career Intern Program were a dynamic period. CIP administrators had to turn their new staffs into cohesive units, as well as bringing together the separate Instructional, Career, and Counseling Departments. UCEC leaders desired that every member of the CIP staff be on the same page so that interns received uniform and effective direction from the Program.

The planning grant introduced a number of individuals who would leave permanent marks on the Career Intern Program. Joseph Rucker was the UCEC Director and oversaw the development of the organization from the very beginning. His main assistant was Jettie Newkirk, the UCEC Assistant Director, who would be involved with the Program for most of the implementation grant’s duration. Robert Jackson was the UCEC Operations Assistant. His direct connection with CIP waxed and waned over the years, but he eventually became UCEC Director in the later 1970s. These three individuals were the most influential leaders who began with the Program and guided it during its formative months and years.
Nevertheless, local leadership was one of the greatest hindrances to the development of an effective Career Intern Program. Calvin Gault was the CIP Coordinator during the planning phase from May to October. Unfortunately, conflicts marred the whole time of his administration. His priorities were not in accordance with UCEC leadership's vision, and they frequently rebuked him for focusing on program aspects that were less central to achieving CIP's community uplift goals. Staff often complained that Gault, as well as the supervising instructor, either provided no direction or poor directions of what they expected the teachers to do. Even as late as October, staff members were still unsure about program components, and how the program was supposed to run, and UCEC leaders still had to train Gault on the effective use of his personnel and accountability.  

By November 1, the building that UCEC was modifying to house the CIP was still not ready. Even though Joseph Rucker succeeded in securing temporary facilities at Mt. Tabor Baptist Church, uncertainty about the facility's heating and lighting disrupted preparations for Orientation and Orientation day itself. Orientation reflected the state of the Program up until that point. The counselors had great success recruiting interns and instilling enthusiasm (many interns reportedly brought friends), and some presentations were good, but several key personnel, such as Leon Sullivan, were either not invited or missing. Gault seemed to have done everything himself and there was an overall lack of organization. Even though such an experience did not seem to have any permanent negative effects, UCEC leadership could not have been comforted by such an inauspicious beginning to their Program.

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63 DSP: Correspondence-Director's Office--Joseph Rucker, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
64 CIP Orientation, November 1, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
The Program experienced many problems during the first several weeks of implementation. Ultimately, Charles Gault's struggles to provide clear leadership and direction, as well as to hold his staff accountable, cost him his job in mid-November. Joseph Rucker and Jettie Newkirk felt that Gault was not helping the Program progress as much as it needed, and so they fired Gault and began the search for a new CIP Coordinator. However, the situation would continue to get worse before it got better. By November 21 intern attendance was dropping because of a possible gang presence and the poor heating in the building. Several interns had already become sick because of the insufficient facilities. Perhaps more ominous, morale among interns, staff, and administrators was decreasing. Administrators questioned staff enthusiasm and staff-intern relations, while interns criticized the facilities, curriculum materials, and called Phase I "boring, unorganized, and a waste of time." Staff in turn felt that "real" changes needed to be made to the intern roster, teaching content, and CIP's general format. For all of the Program's claims to OIC philosophies and theoretical goals, CIP leaders ultimately needed to experience running an educational program in order to learn what did and did not work and how to instill OIC's ethos in the Program as a whole, as well as in the staff and interns. In the meantime, the typical intern experience during this period was markedly different from the ideal experience described previously in this chapter.

The concerns that carried over from the planning grant and the problems that developed during CIP's first month of operations created a crisis for the Program itself. If left unchecked, this negative momentum could have made the Career Intern Program a failure, marring OIC's reputation within the African-American community and the city.

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65 Request for Personal Action Re: Mr. Calvin Gault, December 21, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
66 OIC-Philly School District UCEC Report of Intern Absenteeism and Morale, 11/30/72, OICA, 11:38, TUUA.
and diminishing OIC ability to create socioeconomic change. However, Joseph Rucker and Jettie Newkirk refused to let this happen. They opened lines of communication with staff members to allow them to criticize, ask questions, make suggestions, and be involved in decision-making. Their three major goals were to clarify the instructors and counselors' responsibilities, improve field trips to local businesses during Phase I, and make Phase I less repetitive. By 1973, OIC had existed for about a decade and had a proven model and dissemination program, and these first several months tested OIC's leaders' ability to develop leadership as well as expand their efforts to achieve equality beyond politics and economics into education.67

This inter-staff communication continued, and in the meantime, Newkirk and Robert Jackson visited the CIP site often, observing classes, talking with staff and interns, and seeing how the Program worked on a daily basis. Although the general situation seems to have improved somewhat over the last couple months of 1972, Program administration still struggled with delineation of responsibilities, accountability among staff and interns, and the creation of a formal school atmosphere that was conducive to the CIP's unique educational goals and methods of learning.68

By the end of December, Rucker and Newkirk had a pretty solid diagnosis of what was wrong with the Career Intern Program, and they were close to finalizing their plan of action to address the problems. They looked at both the positive and negative aspects of the Program and attempted to make sense of the complicated nature of the CIP. Newkirk's internal report was comprehensive, composing a four-point plan that addressed the following general points: 1) the head counselor and head instructor; 2) counseling

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67 DSP: Correspondence-Director's Office--Joseph Rucker, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
68 DSP: Correspondence-Director's Office--Joseph Rucker, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
functions; 3) instructors and teaching; and 4) administrative issues. The program had so many 'moving parts' that staff struggled to make it work smoothly, and the CIP and UCEC administrators were not prepared for the complexity of starting an educational program from the ground up. This nine-page memo proposed sweeping changes to the Program, both as an organization and for individual members. The efforts of the entire UCEC and CIP staff culminated in the memo, which proved to be a crucial moment in the Program, for the implementation of the memo improved how the CIP worked in every way. The timing of the memo was auspicious, coming at the end of a year, just as the Program's second group of interns arrived on January 2.  

CIP's growth as an organization was plainly visible during this second orientation. It is very possible that without a CIP Coordinator, the triumvirate of Rucker, Newkirk, and Jackson took over the planning for the orientation, personally taking control and providing an example of an effective orientation. Unlike the first orientation when so many OIC leaders were not invited, Leon Sullivan was the keynote speaker, giving his talk on the first day, while Elton Jolly, the Executive Director of OIC, spoke on the second day. Other OIC and UCEC staff also participated in the CIP orientation, showing an increased effort to seek the umbrella organization's support. In addition, the orientation itself was better organized, with CIP staff leading tours of the facilities, guiding group discussions on expectations of interns, and presenting on the Program's separate components (Instruction, Counseling, and Career Departments, administration, etc). Rucker, Newkirk, and Jackson also focused on increasing interaction between Program staff, interns, and their parents, thereby creating a stronger sense of community.

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69 Observations of Career Intern Program and Recommendations Resulting from Same, December 29, 1972, OICA, 8:15, TUUA.
The months of drama and painful learning had already begun to show their positive fruits by creating a better Program that could galvanize and unite Sullivan vision, CIP staff, the interns, and the community.\footnote{UCEC Newsletter Vol 1 No 2 1/5/73, OICA, 11:32, TUUA.}

CIP's momentum continued as Rucker and Newkirk's reforms began to take effect. Instructors improved their lessons, connecting them more fully with career education, rather than the typical high school class lecture format. This, in turn, increased intern participation in class. Outside the classroom, instructors began to have team meetings twice a week to review the Instructional Program and how well they were implementing it. Newkirk's memo also helped develop a more organized attendance and record-keeping policy, and thereby increased interns' accountability. Counselors also improved at their jobs, deciding how to deal with absent or tardy interns and improve their meetings and relationships with interns. Career and Counseling Seminars were scheduled to happen every morning, and the goal to meet weekly with each intern was reiterated. One of the more expansive reforms was to require the counselors to meet twice a week to review their caseloads, interns' progress, and any concerns. Another reform within the Program was the development of a "CIP Intern Handbook," which informed the interns concerning the Program's expectations, as well as the interns' responsibilities within CIP itself. Newkirk clarified and reinforced the recruiting process and responsibilities, and she had CIP simplify the brochure that it handed out to local industries in order to get Hands-On opportunities. CIP leaders' determination and ability
to adapt and improve the Program was also shown during this time, important traits to
develop since the need to change would be a constant influence on the Program.\footnote{OIC-Philly School District UCEC 1/30/73, OICA, 11:32, TUUA; UCEC Steering Committee Progress Reports 1972-1973 OIC-Philly School District UCEC 1/30/73, OICA, 11:42, TUUA; DSP UCEC Progress Reports 1972-1973 OIC-Philly School District UCEC 1/30/73 Recruitment Efforts, OICA, 11:15, TUUA; Box 11 Folder 15 DSP UCEC Progress Reports 1972-1973 OIC-Philly School District UCEC 1/30/73 Progress Report, OICA, 11:15, TUUA.}

Over the next several months, the Career Intern Program staff continued to learn. Joseph Rucker hired a new CIP Coordinator, Edward Chaplin, who did his part in
continuing the Program's turnaround. One of Chaplin's repeated goals was to increase
staff members' (especially counselors') sensitivity to interns' needs and establish a rapport
with them. This again points to the Program's goals of taking care of each intern as a
whole person, not solely as a student, and establishing a positive influence in their lives.
Also, Chaplin wanted to increase communication within the Program's separate
components, which would allow the CIP's activities, programs, and support services to
run more effectively and efficiently to better help the interns. As is always the question
in high school, Chaplin sought to instill accountability among the interns by further
increasing oversight of attendance, establishing a student council, and becoming more of
a visible authority figure and role model.

The success that the Career Intern Program staff demonstrated in overcoming
adversity was a trait that it displayed throughout its lifetime. Its survival through the last
six months of 1972 helped mold a stronger and better Career Intern Program staff, who in
turn served the Program well as it entered into its most radical and transformative era of
its history, when it partnered with the National Institute of Education.\footnote{UCEC Steering Committee Progress Reports 1972-1973, OIC-Philly School District UCEC CIP 6/11/73 Progress Report for Period Ending 6/8/73, OICA, 11:42, TUUA.} The first half
of 1973 saw continual progress within the Program, as staff and interns began to buy into
what CIP had to offer, which was hope for a secure financial future for the interns themselves and the inner city black community.

**The National Institute of Education**

The previous several months had been a trying time for the Career Intern Program. If CIP had failed during these formative months, the effects potentially would have been devastating. Sullivan's vision of an educational program to give black youth the tools and education that they needed to find success in business would have been damaged, perhaps permanently. However, because of the especially dedicated leadership of Joseph Rucker and Jettie Newkirk, the Program survived its initial problems and began to create some stability in its movement toward attaining Sullivan's vision. The next period of the CIP's operational life introduced entirely new dynamics that OIC leaders could hardly have imagined. OIC had always received funding from the government with little oversight or mandated changes. Therefore, OIC leaders probably assumed that the same would hold true for the Career Intern Program, which it did not. The National Institute of Education became the Program's main source of funding, and with that money came more aggressive federal oversight and influence over the Career Intern Program. The two organizations' divergent policies and goals created a lot of initial tension, but eventually they created a positive working relationship that produced significant changes to the Program. These changes empowered Program staff to fulfill Sullivan's goals of community uplift by helping the interns change their community.

The U.S. Office of Education originally provided funding in 1972 to UCEC and its component parts, the CCP, COP, and CIP. By autumn, OE officials shifted responsibility for the CIP's funding to the National Institute of Education (NIE). This
switch represented a paradigm shift in government expectations for CIP. The Office of Education funded the Program with seemingly little oversight, but concerned only with OIC developing a career education program. However, the National Institute of Education personnel adopted a significantly more assertive approach to CIP's operations, demanding more from the Program than OE had. Furthermore, NIE had drastically different institutional goals for their programs than CIP. The Career Intern Program staff at all levels of the organization believed that they had a moral obligation to help any high school youth who qualified for the Program. The National Institute of Education, however, was an organization devoted to research. These divergent goals created a volatile but ultimately successful partnership for the next four years, also serving to shed light on how government agencies and organizations like CIP and OIC could work together.

By mid-December 1972, as Joseph Rucker and Jettie Newkirk continued to struggle to fix the daily operational problems within the CIP, they led the application to NIE for funding once the Office of Education made the Institute responsible for the CIP. The Institute staff responded on December 12 with their critique of CIP's proposal. NIE's response highlighted the fundamental differences between the two organizations. In a most basic synopsis, NIE reviewers criticized CIP's proposal for espousing a commitment to research that the actual proposal did not support by demonstrating actual research questions and methodology. NIE was not looking for a program that was primarily concerned with offering a service to a community. NIE personnel wanted a program with traditional research questions and motives that could contribute to a larger knowledge base and literature concerning career education. As a silver lining, the NIE critique
pointed out that the Program had inherent research potential, but CIP leadership needed to do more to develop and refine the research questions and methods.\textsuperscript{73}

On March 31, 1973, after several months of collaboration, the National Institute of Education evaluators communicated to UCEC leadership their intention to accept the CIP proposal. This grant was conditional upon CIP’s grant writers making certain proposal alterations designed to bring the Program into line with NIE’s guidelines by the beginning of the school year in September. NIE would then finalize the grant award when the Program met these requirements. These stipulations mandated that CIP serve a maximum of 150 interns at any given time, that UCEC staff redesign CIP according to NIE’s programmatic critiques,\textsuperscript{74} that CIP implement research and formative evaluation components as part of the Program, and that the Program change the data gathering activities for the entire project. Furthermore, NIE evaluators mandated that UCEC personnel send monthly progress reports concerning their development of the research and formative evaluations until the end of this grant on August 31. They also had to send the Career Intern Program grant proposal redraft and the data gathering redesign.\textsuperscript{75} The programmatic changes that these stipulations caused are instantly obvious. The Career Intern Program was now dependent upon an assertive outside organization for funding, thereby also sacrificing part of its operational autonomy and control over its own destiny. Program officials had to abandon some of their programmatic goals, such as rolling admission, which allowed them to focus on educating as many interns as possible in order to fulfill their new research mandate. These additions, and their positive and

\textsuperscript{73} NIE Research Implication of UCEC Proposal, December 12, 1972, OICA, 10:11, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{74} Ella Johnston to Jettie Newkirk, January 30, 1973, OICA, 8:13, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{75} DSP CIP Contract Modifications 1973-1974, Contract No NE-C-OO-3-0122, 3/31/73, OICA, 14:20, TUUA.
negative effects upon CIP, shed light on both major points of this thesis, namely education's ability to cause socioeconomic progress and the government-private organization relationship.

Indeed, the period leading up to NIE's March 31 decision was rocky. UCEC officials, led by Jettie Newkirk and Reverend Thomas Ritter, Executive Director of Philadelphia OIC, worked with NIE officials, most notably Dr. Corinne Rieder, Assistant Director of the Career Education Program in NIE; Dr. Lois-Ellin Datta, Director of Research-Career Education and Placement; and Al Cunningham, a member of the Career Education Task Force that directly oversaw CIP's proposal. These meetings, as well as correspondence, showed severe communication problems. The organizations were on different pages in regards to what they expected of the Program. Rieder wanted to make CIP conform to the Institute's operational standards as a research project while Rucker and Newkirk struggled to fully grasp the changes that NIE wanted to effect within CIP's organization. Compounding these differences were the numerous problems of communication that left Newkirk ignorant of what NIE wanted, and Cunningham was in the dark concerning CIP's progress and goals. Moreover, the Institute implemented a laissez-faire approach to helping the Program develop their proposals by providing little feedback to guide CIP's modifications, while CIP sought to rely heavily on NIE input and revisions in order to improve their proposal.

The late spring and early summer months of 1973 were ones of organizational transition and establishment. Joseph Rucker moved to another part of OIC, leaving a vacancy as UCEC Director. Jettie Newkirk became UCEC Director and Benjamin

Lattimore became involved in CIP as the OIC-UCEC Program Manager, or OIC's liaison to UCEC. Al Cunningham of NIE became the Institute's main point of contact with CIP to help them adapt their proposals to NIE standards—eventually becoming the Project Officer overseeing the CIP project—while Ben Lattimore became the same for CIP. These two men would figure most prominently during the NIE era of the Career Intern Program. Ben Lattimore was a strong-willed man, devoted to OIC and its goals, and very competent and able in his work. Lattimore was also somewhat prickly, as he was very quick—sometimes too quick—to defend CIP from any criticisms, real or imagined. Cunningham was a capable part of NIE's Career Education Task Force, which was the sub-group that dealt with proposals of CIP’s ilk. He eventually warmed to the Program and became an ardent supporter and advocate of CIP with NIE's leadership. However, Cunningham initial relationship with CIP personnel was rocky at best. He—along with most of NIE’s personnel—displayed a seeming lack of interest in CIP's proposal, demonstrated by minimal feedback and refusal to provide an adequate framework to guide CIP's proposal efforts. Relations had soured enough that in July, in an internal memo, Lattimore expressed the belief that NIE did not even want the CIP proposal to succeed because of NIE's research philosophy, which career education in general struggled to fulfill.77

The meetings, phone calls, correspondence, proposals, and feedback during the first four months of the research grant period did precious little to improve CIP-NIE relations. Newkirk, Lattimore, and CIP staff each described in their internal communications their difficulty in working with NIE officials like Dr. Rieder, Dr. Datta,

77 Meeting w/ Jack McCarthy 7/24/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
and Al Cunningham. They often described these meetings and site visits as unproductive and lacking in direction; Al Cunningham even once admitted to Jettie Newkirk his ignorance concerning CIP's proposal.⁷⁸ In spite of the explicit tension, the process of developing CIP's proposal continued. NIE employed five internal and eight external anonymous reviewers to critique the proposal, provide feedback to CIP, help refine it, and ultimately help the Institution determine the Program's viability as a research project.⁷⁹ The difficulty these two organizations had in meeting in the middle highlights the complex dynamics of cooperation with an outside organization. Because the Program was not really a research organization, the Institute eventually had to back away somewhat from its research demands. NIE's position of authority vis-à-vis CIP made this relationship problematic for CIP. CIP could not stand alone financially, and this dependency forced CIP to cede part of its control over its own destiny and its ability to do its part in achieving Sullivan's desires for the black community.

One of the more climactic episodes of this revision process happened on August 1, when several of the reviewers and Al Cunningham visited the CIP campus. The meeting sought to clear up questions about the nature of CIP's research plan, methods of collecting data, the program's replicability to other sites, and other points of confusion. The meeting's focus soon came to rest upon NIE and CIP's different perceptions concerning the research and the proposal. The reviewers themselves were the most confused, for what NIE had previously told them did not match with what they were hearing from CIP during the meeting. Simple details such as the length of the proposal

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⁷⁹ Meeting and Phone Conversation with Al Cunningham 7/24/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
itself, and weightier questions concerning the very nature and purpose of the proposal, for example, had to be clarified. 80 During the meeting, the evaluators became increasingly sympathetic to CIP and its proposal.

By the end of the meeting, Newkirk, Lattimore, the other present CIP staff, and even the reviewers, worried that the evaluators who were not present would not view the proposal as positively as those who had made the visit. One of the evaluators summed it up as a lack of coordination, specificity, poor and conflicting guidelines on NIE's part, and CIP's flexible interpretation of these guidelines that NIE rigidly reacted against. Another reviewer also suggested that NIE stop "playing blind man's bluff," where NIE insisted on solely reacting to CIP's efforts rather than giving them guidelines to help guide their efforts. When Al Cunningham refused to help UCEC write up a summary of the meeting to provide to the absent evaluators, Jettie Newkirk became so agitated with Al Cunningham that she accused him and NIE of being uncommunicative and even uncooperative, a strong allegation and telling demonstration of UCEC leaders' frustrations about what NIE was seeking to accomplish with the Program. 81

The meeting ended soon after with obvious positives and negatives. The Program's cause got a boost because of the reviewers' increased support and UCEC leaders' chance to present and defend their own goals. However, the NIE-CIP relationship, probably the most important dynamic during this period, was arguably worse than ever before. Both sides continued to dig their heels in deeper and deeper and

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80 Significant highlights of OICA-UCEC, consultants, and NIE Officials and reviewers meeting, 8/1/73, OICA, 9:1, TUUA.
81 Significant highlights of OICA-UCEC, consultants, and NIE Officials and reviewers meeting, OICA, 9:1, TUUA, 8/1/73.
their frustrations built up, poisoning a partnership that required a solid working relationship in order to accomplish anything of significance for either organization.

The relationship needed a massive overhaul. Near the end of August 1973, a meeting between leaders of both the National Institute of Education and the OIC-UCEC-CIP leadership produced a "Memo of Agreement." On the OIC side, this meeting involved Elton Jolly, Executive Director of OIC; Thomas Ritter, Executive Director of OIC-Philadelphia; Ben Lattimore; and Jettie Newkirk. On the NIE side were Thomas Glennan, Director of NIE; a Deputy Director; two Assistant Directors, including Dr. Rieder; Dr. Datta; Al Cunningham; and James Giammo of Contracts and Grants. The Memo of Agreement established expectations and guidelines from August 1 to December 15. It also definitely and explicitly stated what the CIP and NIE could and could not do during this time period. The Memo also established weekly high-level meetings, lines of communication, and accountability on both sides.82 This signed document effectively gave the proposal-development process and the organizational relationship as a whole a brand new start. In retrospect, the Memo of Agreement became a turning point in CIP's history, transforming the CIP-NIE relationship from a poisoned one into what would eventually become an incredibly strong and mutually supportive partnership that would last even beyond the end of NIE's grant period. Both organizations had learned the importance of communication, compromise, and working together in order to create and meet common goals.

The first year of the CIP-NIE relationship was a troubled time. Both organizations were used to power and influence in their respective spheres, with little

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82 Memo of Agreement Between OIC and NIE For Work to Take Place Between 9/1/73-12/15/73, OICA, 9-9, TUUA.
need for compromise. OIC had about seven years of rapid growth and an ever-widening public persona that rallied local industry as well as local and national political figures. OIC was very dedicated to pursuing and accomplishing its goal of community uplift. UCEC and CIP were extensions of this organizational mission statement, branching out from OIC's economic focus into the educational sphere. Congress created NIE in mid-1972 as a part of the Department of Heath, Education, and Welfare to provide funding for research-designed educational systems. Both of these organizations were young, vibrant, eager to expand their reputation and influence, and emboldened by their unique mandates and power. When they first came together, they struggled to co-exist at seemingly every turn. The Memo of Agreement reversed this negative momentum and laid the groundwork for a close and productive relationship that lasted until 1981.

This first year of the CIP-NIE association highlighted the darker possibilities of federal funding and private-public collaboration. As a branch of OIC, the Career Intern Program was very committed to socioeconomic equality and community uplift, and CIP leaders and staff deeply felt a moral obligation to help their proverbial and sometimes literal neighbors rise out of the ghetto, achieve socioeconomic success, and improve the ghetto from within. Lattimore and Newkirk therefore reacted strongly against NIE's real and perceived threats to these attempts, particularly those that hindered CIP's uplift goals, such as limiting the number in interns. As the CIP-NIE relationship continued in the coming years, leaders on both sides gradually came to understand, respect, and even appreciate and welcome what the other side was trying to accomplish. By the end of the NIE grant, the Institute leaders' oversight and changes to the Program actually made the Program better, a fact that OIC leadership all the way up to Leon Sullivan recognized and
appreciated. Meanwhile NIE officials gained a respect for OIC’s goals for CIP and the community, and became willing to compromise with CIP to help them meet their community uplift goals while not abandoning NIE's research priority. NIE eventually became CIP's biggest external advocate with other public and private institutions. The previous few months had shown the dangers of organizational collaboration, but the coming years would show the overwhelming benefits of such a relationship.
CHAPTER 4
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION ERA

The Career Intern Program entered September 1973 with a new optimism. The Memo of Agreement breathed new life into the CIP-NIE relationship because it clearly delineated what each organization was responsible for, what they could and could not do, and allowed for a fresh start toward the positive working relationship that the Program so desperately needed. Even though the Memo certainly did not fix all the pre-existing problems or prevent future issues, it provided a framework that allowed the two organizations to resolve their differences and work toward fulfilling their common goals.

The awarding of federal funding introduced federal oversight and government-mandated changes. The National Institute of Education required that the Career Intern Program institute several changes to the program in order to fulfill the Institute's research mandate. Probably the greatest change was the introduction of Gibboney and Associates to the CIP project. The National Institute of Education grant required that an impartial, external organization evaluate the Program's effectiveness, rather than relying on internal Program staff to accomplish this task. Gibboney's main task was to develop the evaluative and research designs for CIP, which CIP had heretofore struggled to accomplish, and continue as a part of the project, providing objective evaluation and research through frequent reports to both CIP and NIE. This addition was a critical development for the project as one of the biggest points of contention between NIE and CIP was research. The Program simply did not have the organizational and personnel ability to conduct research and evaluate the CIP. Also, no one within CIP had the
background to design a research proposal that matched NIE's requirements, let alone modify the program as the situation might require in the future. Gibboney and Associates was a consulting and research company that had the intellectual capital and training to develop the research and evaluation program that NIE required for the project. It also allowed UCEC-CIP leadership to concentrate solely on the daily administration of CIP, interacting and coordinating with NIE, and modifying the Program as needed. This CIP-NIE-Gibboney triangle relationship allowed for a specialization of responsibility that maximized each organization's abilities and created a balanced dynamic that helped CIP develop as a program to fulfill its organizational and communal purposes.

A second change was the termination of the open enrollment system. The Program previously introduced new interns immediately to take the place of a graduating intern, thereby serving more interns and ensuring an individualized curriculum. However, NIE required that interns enter the Program in groups, or cohorts, of about fifty interns every few months to make it easier and more effective to track interns' progress. Another alteration that NIE instituted was possibly the most controversial modification that the Institute ever made. The Institute insisted that there be control and an experimental groups associated with the CIP. The control group was made up of youth who passed the evaluations and therefore qualified for CIP, but who were not admitted into the Program. The experimental group was an equally qualified group of youth who were admitted into the Program. The Program separated the youth into either the control or experimental group via random drawing, much like a lottery or draft. This method of separating youth into either the control or the experimental groups also was incredibly incredible.

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83 Trip report—OICA Philly 9/10/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
controversial within the black community, with parents and youth getting very angry because of that method. During the recruitment process, CIP counselors had to sell the program to the youth and their parents. This obviously entailed describing the benefits that the Program offered, thereby raising the hopes of both the parents and the prospective interns, who again had already dropped out or were deemed in danger of dropping out. However, even if a young man or woman qualified for the Program and completed the tests, he or she was not guaranteed a spot. The experimental and control groups caused a negative community reaction against the Program, undercutting its declaration of civic improvement and threatened its ability to fulfill those uplift desires.

These last two changes highlighted the differences between the Career Intern Program and the National Institute of Education. Throughout the entire grant period, CIP leadership repeatedly tried to convince NIE to reverse both of these changes, to no avail. The Career Intern Program strongly believed that they had a moral obligation to help as many people in the community as they possibly could, and they saw some of NIE’s mandated changes (such as the experimental and control groups) as impediments to honoring that responsibility. The National Institute of Education’s main concern was research. They wanted also to help the community, but it was hardly the driving force behind what they did. NIE mostly wanted to ascertain CIP’s viability as an educational program, and they firmly believed that establishing cohorts and permanent control/experimental groups were some of the most effective ways to accomplish this goal.

The start of the 1973 school year and the introduction of these two modifications almost immediately put the Memo of Agreement’s worth to the test. The Memo stated
how many interns would be able to begin the school year in the Program. However, Jettie Newkirk misunderstood the number of interns. She thought that enrollment could continue for the duration of the week, whereas the Memo ended it mid-week and/or at the limit of 100 interns. By mid-week, 109 interns had already enrolled in the Program to begin or continue in CIP for fall, with the possibility for more to show up later. The Agreement also established the maximum ceiling number of interns for the Program as a whole, regardless of progress and time in CIP at 150. With this set up, NIE staff was hoping for the January cohort to be fifty interns, the difference between the maximum capacity and the current allowed enrollment. The extra nine enrollees were then cutting into this next cohort of fifty, which NIE personnel were determined to maintain in order to enable their research. The resulting excess of interns tested the validity of the Memo of Agreement as a binding document, as well as another test to see who would gain the upper hand, the Career Intern Program or the National Institute of Education.

NIE leaders stated that the Program's admission officers should take the names, addresses, and phone numbers of interns who arrived after the mid-week cut off date. If the number were small, then NIE felt that it would be bad practice to refuse the interns re-entry into the program. However, forty-three students arrived. The Institute initially refused to admit any of the late students in order to protect their fifty slots for the mid-January cohort, but within a few days they agreed to admit fifteen interns. OIC believed that such a situation threatened their relationship with the community as an

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84 Summary of Issues and Recommended Agreement, OIC Meeting-Eval Concerns Only 9/5/73, OICA, 9-9, TUUA.
85 Summary of Issues and Recommended Agreement, OIC Meeting-Eval Concerns Only 9/5/73, OICA, 9-9, TUUA.
86 Trip report—OICA Philly 9/10/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA; Rejected Intern/Placement Explanation Meeting 9/14/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
organization of uplift, and so they had a community meeting with the parents and youth who were denied entrance to the Program to try to answer questions and assuage hurt feelings. During the meeting, Dr. Ritter advised the parents to write to Dr. Thomas Glennan (Director of NIE) about their situations and ask that their children be admitted into the Program.\textsuperscript{87} Within five days, Al Cunningham reported to Dr. Rieder that Dr. Glennan had been receiving pressure letters from the rejected interns' parents. Al Cunningham, suspecting that there was a knowledgeable leak to the parents about the situation and Dr. Glennan's contact information, confronted OIC about the letters, of which Newkirk and Lattimore denied any prior knowledge. Ultimately, negotiations and the letters contributed to NIE admitting five more students into the Program, for a total of 120 interns.\textsuperscript{88} In response to the community backlash, both organizations agreed to put in writing an explanation of CIP's relationship to NIE and the experimental/research purpose of the program. This memo would be given to each prospective intern and parents to formally notify them in print of CIP's nature. The hope was that doing so would alleviate the problems that had just occurred, as well as prevent future problems by emphasizing both the NIE and the Program's experimental nature. Although this fixed the problems with confusion, it did not assuage the parents' reservations and anger about the situation.

Since CIP had such a large emphasis on research because of NIE's influence, some time should be spent discussing this important facet of the Program. CIP's in-house researchers were gradually reduced in importance as Dr. Lois-Ellin Datta insisted that

\textsuperscript{87} Rejected Intern/Placement Explanation Meeting, 9/14/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{88} OICA-NIE Staff Meeting, 9/19/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
Gibboney and Associates have an ever-increasing role in the Program. Eventually, Gibboney's evaluators and Dr. Datta were the major decision-makers on research questions, with Gibboney's reviewers implementing those decisions and CIP's researchers relegated to mere data gatherers. This professionalization of research greatly improved the Program's quality of data and analysis, and therefore drastically improved CIP's future direction.

Concerning the actual research nature of CIP itself, the Institute and the Program leaders reached a compromise. Lattimore and Newkirk did not succeed in dispensing with the research altogether, but NIE leadership agreed to take a new approach to the research. The project therefore came to focus more on evaluation than research. This change signifies NIE's growing awareness of CIP's uplift goals, and so they shifted their focus from answering questions such as "Is career education in urban cities viable?" to "How can we improve CIP and make it successful?" Evaluation made the CIP-NIE relationship more practical and created more immediate returns, rather than solely adding to the scholarly literature about career education. During the months of the development of the CIP Proposal, NIE evaluators' main point of criticism was the lack of concrete and specific research questions within the proposal itself. With the shift from research to evaluation, NIE found a new way to determine if CIP was successful and replicable, and allowed the Program to maintain more of its original shape and direction than it otherwise would have. The evaluation was split into two main periods and was mainly concerned with two things: the formation of the Program as an organization, and CIP's success as an education program. These evaluation periods were born of NIE-CIP compromises, and

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89 OICA-CIP Site Visit 9/20-21/73, Philly, 9/23/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
90 Summary of Issues and Recommended Agreement, OIC Meeting-Eval Concerns Only, 9/5/73, OICA, 9-9, TUUA.
serve as a positive example of what the two organizations could do when they did cooperate in spite of their differences.

The first period was called the formative evaluation. This period analyzed the formation of CIP and was defined as the evaluation intended to provide rapid feedback for program development and improvement. This period was to last until August 31, 1974, and a second, separate formative period went from September until January 31, 1975, when formative evaluation ended. This gave CIP leaders almost eighteen months completely dedicated to improving the Program's organization, curriculum, and administration. As of January 31, 1975, the program would be considered 'stabilized,' and the summative evaluation would begin.

Dr. Datta defined summative evaluation as an assessment of program effectiveness (both positive and negative effects) and impact. This second period of evaluation was to last for the duration of the Program's life (along with a concurrent third formative period) which would end in February 1976. In order to better mesh these evaluation periods with NIE's mandate for research, a research component defined CIP as a study to determine its long-term payoff adding to the educational knowledge base. However, NIE also explicitly stated that this research was secondary to evaluation and CIP should only attempt to conduct this research if it would not detract from evaluation.91 The switch from research to evaluation was one of the most positive changes that UCEC leaders negotiated with NIE officials. Evaluation ensured continuity to the Program

91 OICA-NIE Staff Meeting 9/19/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.
while introducing a mechanism for improvement that directly contributed to CIP's future success and helped the Program's case for replication after the NIE grant expired.\footnote{Contract No NE-C-OO-3-0122, Attachment C: Work Plan for OICA-UCEC CIP Program, 3/31/73, OICA, 14:20, TUUA.}

As with practically everything else with the Program, the standardization of assessment and data-gathering highlighted problems that would otherwise have gone uncovered. CIP evaluation staff had become progressively demoralized due to the initial problems in the Programs. The scope of the research plans weighed down on them, and the instruction and counseling staff proved difficult to convert to testing and the other tools that were imperative to CIP's research design.\footnote{OICA-CIP Site Visit 9/20-21/73, Philly, 9/23/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.} Therefore, in late 1973, while Gibboney and Associates evaluators were introducing themselves to the Program and developing the new evaluation systems per NIE-CIP directions, they had to take over discouraged CIP's research department.\footnote{Request for Reconsideration of Proposal Development Schedule, 9/30/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA; OICA-CIP Site Visit 9/20-21/73, Philly, 9/23/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.} This period of transition saw the real threat of possibly losing research data from the first few months of Program operation. This was a combination of Gibboney's newness to CIP as well as a continuation of the same difficulties that had hampered data-collection under the CIP researchers.\footnote{OICA-CIP Site Visit 9/20-21/73, Philly, 9/23/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.} Gibboney employees had to scramble to collect this data, for without it, NIE's research mandate could not be fulfilled because of the significant loss of data covering months of CIP operation.

As Gibboney staff sought to organize CIP's data collection mechanisms, NIE and CIP leaders continued to sort out the September and January cohorts. Creative selected enrollment of the late interns—now eight more, bringing CIP's September cohort
enrollment to 128—allowed these extra enrollments to not affect the Program's January cohort or exceed CIP's limit of 150. Al Cunningham estimated that forty-five interns, including thirteen of these late admissions, would graduate by the January intake, thereby leaving eighty-three students in the Program and plenty of space to recruit adequate control and experimental groups for January. Therefore, in late September 1973, NIE and CIP established their numbers for the January intake, which was to recruit a total group size of 150 students, with sixty-seven admitted into the Program as the experimental group, and the remainder as part of the control group.\footnote{Al Cunningham to Elton Jolly, 9/28/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.} This outcome served to show both the Institute and the Program that compromise could prove to be mutually beneficial, that they did not need to adhere stubbornly to their personal goals to the detriment of the other organization. Rather, each institution found that they could serve the black urban youth through compromise and consideration for each other's goals.

By the beginning of the school year, the Career Intern Program continued to make staffing improvements and fill their open positions. Newkirk decided to make another change at the CIP Coordinator position, hiring Olin Johnson. She also received NIE approval and funding to hire at least six new staff members, finally filling out the staff requirements.\footnote{Trip Report—OICA Philly 9/10/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA.} The completed staff allowed Johnson to shape the CIP into a more effective and cohesive organization, all of which pointed to increasing the Program's ability to recruit interns, fulfill programmatic goals of preparing interns for the "world of work," and by extension help Philadelphia's black community.\footnote{CIP North Philadelphia Branch CIP Proposal, OICA, 14:39, TUUA.} To meet these ends, Johnson established in early October several major objectives for the Program. These
goals included: 1) establishing measurable objectives for each component, department, and staff member; 2) improving linkages between CIP components and departments; 3) developing productive relationships with Germantown and Martin Luther King High Schools, the Philadelphia School District, local industry, colleges, and community organizations; 4) meeting the goal of 100% termination of interns via on-job-training experience, earning a high school diploma, or admission to college or technical training institutions. Johnson was explicit in his desire that these changes revolve around the interns' needs, reflecting the Program's very purpose for existence, which was to keep these kids in school and help them be successful professionally.99

The formative period had several sources of input. These included the expected sources, such as NIE and UCEC-CIP administration. Al Cunningham, as NIE Project Officer, spent the most time with the Program itself. His regular meetings with CIP administration and site visits to the Program gave him a vision of CIP's broad direction as well as the daily dynamics in the classroom. Several research specialists assigned to the Program by NIE also conducted site visits, thereby offering multiple opinions and insights on how to improve CIP. Ben Lattimore, Jettie Newkirk, and UCEC officials were the main points of contact with NIE as well as the prominent outside-CIP observers from within OIC. Meanwhile, CIP administration did not participate directly in the evaluation input process since their attention was most directly focused on the Program's daily operations.

Ingeniously, NIE and UCEC introduced another input mechanism into formative evaluation. They selected interns in the Program to serve anonymously as "Participant

Observers” to provide feedback from their unique positions within CIP concerning the ethos, ambience, and social structure within the Program. These observations and recommendations became a fundamental part of the assessment period, and Gibboney, NIE, and CIP officials all lauded their contribution to the knowledge base that these officials used to make decisions about the Program. Through the school year, these input sources gave their information and opinions to Gibboney evaluators, who then quickly consolidated that information and disseminated the criticisms and recommendations to all the organizations. The accuracy and speed of the feedback process allowed CIP staff to quickly make changes and improve how the Program worked.

The summer months of 1974 allowed for a more concentrated focus on Program development, namely preparing for the last several months of formative evaluation and the transition to summative evaluation. Several members of CIP's Career Department and NIE supervisors visited local businesses to determine the efficacy of the Hands-On experiences. The Program's Career Department staff was responsible for developing contacts with local businesses so interns could have Hands-On experiences, as well as inviting these contacts to CIP to speak to the student body as "resource speakers." These visits were with about five of these contacts, and the evaluators asked questions concerning the companies' relationship with the CIP, how good the intern was, if the business would hire an intern who graduated from the Program, and so on. The vast majority of the interviews were positive, as the business representatives had almost only good things to say about the Program and the interns. These interviews showed the

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100 Richard Gibboney, President, Gibboney and Associates and Michael Langsdorf, Vice President, Gibboney and Associates to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE, 9/25/74, OICA, 9:10, TUUA.
101 CIP Continuation Proposal, 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
102 Trip Report-NIE Reps Visit Industry Sites, 6/10/74, OICA, 9:10, TUUA.
Hands-On experiences' contribution to the Program and the value of including such a real work situation in a high school program. At least in this case, NIE's concern for research highlighted an important area of success within the Program, and showed that CIP was indeed helping prepare black youth for gainful employment.

The first formative evaluation yielded many suggestions for change based on criticisms and feedback. Some of this feedback included improving inter-departmental communication (similar to Olin Johnson's objective), meetings of the entire staff to discuss interns, improving record keeping, giving the Career Department a bigger role in the intern experience, and other suggestions designed to make the Program more effective at serving interns' needs.103 Also during the first assessment period, the curriculum and individual learning packets came under criticism by Gibboney, and so Program staff worked hard to have a new curriculum prepared in time for September.104

Also during the summer, NIE and CIP staff more fully developed the first few months of the Program's school year. Again, the largest points of conversation dealt with Program evaluation, which was becoming the dominant talking point between the Institute and the Program. As the second formative evaluation was to begin at the beginning of the school year in September, CIP needed to establish the period's purpose and scope. One of this second evaluation period's main goals was to verify the quality of this new curriculum, as well as provide feedback to CIP to help staff stabilize this new syllabus. Linked with the focus on determining the curriculum's efficacy and the other recommendations from the first formative period, was the decision not to have an experimental group in the September, thereby not admitting new interns into the

103 DSP CIP Continuation Proposal, Appendix A, 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
104 OIC Philly School District UCEC Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 10/4/73, OICA, 11:39, TUUA.
Program. This decision shows that NIE and CIP leadership believed the change in curriculum to be so important that they sacrificed a cohort to make sure that the curriculum was as good as possible. It also demonstrates Program leadership's growing realization that NIE's position on research was a positive and constructive influence on the CIP's efficacy as a career education program.\textsuperscript{105}

Gibboney and Associates went to great lengths to improve the measuring mechanisms to evaluate how effective the Program really was in helping the interns progress toward a degree and career in comparison with the public high schools. In order to achieve this, Gibboney changed the questions that they were asking, including looking at an intern's progress in the areas of cognitive development, academic achievement, vocational adjustment, future orientation, self-image, and career decision making. They also changed the tests that the Program used, in order to better objectively determine a student's progress. Each candidate to enter the Program took these exams, and after the students were divided up into the experimental and control groups, Gibboney continued to track their progress. In order for CIP to show that it was a successful and worthwhile program, interns needed to have greater academic and vocational progress and success than their peers in the control groups, who were either still enrolled in high school or dropped out, and so both groups took the tests for the duration of their high school careers.\textsuperscript{106}

After the first formative period, all the organizations had recognized that they needed to expand their research definitions to recognize the complexity of the community that the Program drew from. CIP and NIE negotiated an increase of the student body so

\textsuperscript{105} CIP Continuation Proposal 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{106} CIP Continuation Proposal 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
that 175 became the maximum number of students and 150 the minimum. Also, they added two more groups that they would track beyond the experimental and control groups, which they called the comparison and decliner groups. The comparison group was composed of students who were similar to those in the Program but were not recruited. The decliner group consisted of students who were admitted into the Program but refused the offer to participate. These two additional groups allowed a group pluralism that would further complicate and give more meaning to the project findings.

These group additions took effect immediately, and CIP finalized the cohort dates to be September 1974, January, April, and September of 1975. This cohort spacing allowed CIP to maintain its student body size at a constant and productive level, which in turn did not overtax Program staff and gave consistent evaluation data for Gibboney to analyze.107

Because of the Career Intern Program's intrinsic organizational link to OIC and Leon Sullivan's civil rights rationale, Gibboney decided that they should seek to determine how much that influence, or ethos, as they called it, permeated the Program. They wanted to ascertain how OIC's presence defined CIP's programs and procedures, ranging from recruitment and intern assessment to staff selection and performance. For example, in CIP's recruitment of interns, Gibboney wanted to see how the Program was sold to prospective students through initial recruitment, intake, orientation, and early experiences in CIP and how these techniques corresponded to OIC's ethos. These particular questions centered around the Program's replicability, an important part of NIE's research and CIP's goals. Would other organizations be able to replicate CIP's success if the program had an ethos unique to OIC? Also, Gibboney hoped to identify

107 CIP Continuation Proposal 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
whether this ethos—if it existed—actually offered anything constructive and vital to the Program itself, or if it was superfluous to CIP's operations.108

An outgrowth of this evaluation of CIP's ethos was measuring perceptions of the Program among the people involved in it. In previous interviews with staff and interns, Gibboney found that these two groups diverged in their opinions of what CIP was, as well as their individual goals. At first, new interns viewed the Program as a way to earn a diploma, though Gibboney evaluators found that this perspective tended to come more in line with CIP's goals as interns spent more time within the Program. Further, these opinions also varied from person to person, even within CIP staff. Staff differences probably dealt with differences in teaching methods and the necessity for certain innovations within the Program. Gibboney was therefore concerned about the Program's ability to create a cohesive atmosphere, OIC's ethos notwithstanding. Gibboney wanted to continue to monitor these perceptions in order to see if staff members consistently molded into a cohesive unit and if interns' views on the Program changed over time as they progressed toward graduation.109

The differences of perceptions could, in part, be easily blamed on inadequate communication. Departments were still struggling to communicate between each other and CIP administration were not doing a sufficient job to create enthusiasm and a sense of united purpose within the Program. This confusion at the upper levels of the Program seeped down through the rest of the Program to the interns, negatively affecting their performance, energy, and their views of CIP's usefulness and purpose in their lives. There seems to have been some inter-departmental factions, as some counselors or

108 CIP Continuation Proposal 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
109 CIP Continuation Proposal 9/2/74-2/28/76, OICA, 14:18, TUUA.
teachers were minimizing the other departments' contributions. Apparently, by one way or another, interns found out about these issues, which lessened the staff's standing in interns' eyes. These problems were fundamental, for they informed what interns expected to take out of the Program and influenced what staff did on a daily basis. They therefore affected what difference CIP could actually have in the interns' professional and personal lives.

The first formative evaluation period was deeply rewarding to the Program because it identified problems that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. The problems informed Olin Johnson's programmatic objectives, Gibboney's evaluations over the rest of the Program's life, as well as informed the whole CIP staff of the problems and their roles in amending these problems. The 1974 summer months allowed Gibboney and Program staff the free time necessary to step back, bring together their observations from the previous year, and develop the needed methods to make positive changes and monitor these adjustments. As all the staff involved in CIP worked together, they identified what they needed to change in the Program. As these plans developed, Cunningham submitted CIP and Gibboney's proposals to review. These outside reviewers criticized some of these plans for the future, which in turn led to changes and improved plans moving forward.110

CIP tried to work several months ahead of the current calendar date, and so as the 1974-1975 school year was beginning, Program staff submitted its descriptions to NIE for the stabilized Career Intern Program, which was to begin in mid-February. This document shows NIE and CIP leaders' growing ambition and confidence in their ability

110 Review of OICA Proposal 8/2/74, OICA, 9:10, TUUA; US Gov Memorandum, CIP Proposal, 8/5/74, OICA, 16:2, TUUA.
to manage, teach, and analyze a fully developed educational program. The cohorts were to expand to 100 interns in the control and experimental groups respectively, thereby creating a larger research data base and increasing the Program's ability to serve the community. This expansion would therefore fulfill both organizations' goals. Also, they expanded their sources for prospective interns to include references from social service agencies, current and former interns, parents, and walk-ins. CIP leaders' goals became more individually specific and collectively comprehensive. They had learned that more specific objectives for staff members gave increased direction to the Program's activities and fostered staff unity by decreasing space for different interpretations. CIP's ambition and confidence allowed them to set more ambitious objectives in regards to the breadth and depth of changes they hoped to effect in an intern's life. None of these goals indicated a paradigm shift or any rejection of previous goals, but rather they showed maturing organizations that had learned from the past and were working together to achieve their broader purposes.\footnote{CIP Stabilized Mode Descriptions, 9/3/74, OICA, 16:10, TUUA.}

The months of September and October saw research to verify the Program's effectiveness in preparing interns for work. Gibboney evaluators sent out questionnaires to companies who offered Hands-On experiences, employers of CIP graduates to see if they were happy with the graduates, and similar versions of these questionnaires to the interns and graduates. These surveys sought to figure out how well CIP did in preparing interns for work. By asking Hands-On companies, employers, and interns, the evaluators hoped to figure out if there were any weak areas concerning the experiences. Another study compared interns who had dropped out of the Program with those who had
graduated. These studies sought to find out the Program's effectiveness in preparing its interns for the workplace and changing the direction of their lives.\textsuperscript{112}

One of the major Program modifications during the second formative period was in Phase I. Program administration continued to try to make Phase I more interesting and interactive for the interns, in order to keep them involved in the classroom and help them identify what career they wanted to work toward. CIP staff introduced new classroom activities, such as role-playing and career games.\textsuperscript{113} In addition, they established a schedule of site visits to local businesses to help interns see what these companies did, network with company leaders, and get a feel for the work atmosphere. During the course of the second formative evaluation and the summative period, CIP planned visits to sites such as Campbell Soup, the Philadelphia Mint, the Courthouse, the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and many other sites.\textsuperscript{114} Clearly, CIP leaders wanted to expose the interns to a variety of jobs and help them understand the wide array of options they had for their careers, and they believed that effective site visits would be one of the most effective ways to do that.

As the Career Intern Program's main goal was to inform interns' career decisions, Gibboney evaluators and Dr. Lois-Ellin Datta decided to develop ways to measure the quality of CIP's decision-making strategies that staff taught interns. The effectiveness of the Program's counseling and strategies was imperative to the Program's success as an institution. In order to measure the Program's ability to lead, they decided to combine

\textsuperscript{112} Formative Eval Design for collection and Reporting of Data from Employer Sites for Phase II Interns and Grads, OICA, 9:10, TUUA; II Collection and Reporting of Data from employer sites for CIP Grad (Follow Up), OICA, 9:10, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OICA-UCEC to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE, 10/7/74, OICA, 9:10, TUUA
\textsuperscript{113} CIP Stabilized Mode Descriptions, 9/3/74, OICA, 16:10, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{114} UCEC CIP Activity Calendar, Addendum, 1/75-1/76, OICA, 14:11, TUUA.
classroom observations, teacher interviews, home-grown questionnaires, and "clinical hunches." A supplemental method they used was to create anonymous case studies of random interns and supply them to CIP interns and experts in career education to get their feedback about how the Program was doing according to these studies. These reviewers then gave their input concerning the realism of these initial (Career Development Plan) and final (Phase III and graduation) career choices. This research, combined with the normal follow up of recently graduated interns and questionnaires given to employers of CIP graduates, was another collaborative NIE-CIP-Gibboney effort to better understand the intern experience, as well as increase their working knowledge of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the Program.

The second formative period from August 1974 to February 1975, had some exciting developments for the Program that demonstrated CIP's expanding opportunities. UCEC signed a contract in October with the Philadelphia School District's alternative school, called the Parkway Program. This contract stipulated that Parkway provided instruction to CIP interns in art, science, typing and media, with supplies and equipment for the same, while UCEC provided instructional space and certain equipment such as desks, chairs, a darkroom, and a wet science lab space. This agreement broadened the scope of classes that CIP interns could take. Most advantageous to UCEC was that this relationship would not interfere with the research design and would not increase the NIE's financial burden for the Program, as the Philadelphia School District funded the

115 Results of Meeting, Michael Langsdorf and James Weiler to Al Cunningham; For Circ to: Lois-Ellin Datta, Mary Ann Millsap, Ivan Charner (Research Assoc, E&W Group), Robert Wise, 1/7/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
arrangement.¹¹⁶ UCEC leaders seem to have done this without NIE's knowledge, for the Institute seems to have been concerned enough about it that Ben Lattimore had to specifically address those worries and establish that the Program's research integrity had not been compromised. Ben Lattimore reassured Rieder and Cunningham that CIP was not trying to circumvent the grant and increase the number of students in their Program, but rather improve the education CIP offered as well as better preparing the interns for the world of work.

As the Program continued to operate, news of its efforts were slowly growing. Several school districts contacted Lattimore to ask for information they could use to replicate the Program in their respective area, or at least to inform their own efforts on career education.¹¹⁷ Some OIC chapters also asked concerning the possibility of starting CIP in their local communities.¹¹⁸ On their own initiative and in response to such demands by April 1975, UCEC and NIE officials began to plan for the possible replication of the Program, both within and outside of the OIC organization. This had always been Leon Sullivan and Elton Jolly's goal for the Program, to spread out to as many communities as possible, and they hoped for support from NIE to finalize these plans, as well as the federal government to help provide funding for such an ambitious effort.¹¹⁹ Rieder and Cunningham did indeed help CIP with these plans, even going so far as preparing a report on the successes of the Program to present to high school

¹¹⁶ Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC to Jim Giammo, Contracts and Grants Officer, NIE 1/27/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC to Jim Giammo, Contracts and Grants Officer, NIE 2/28/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
¹¹⁷ Thomas Adamson, Coordinator, Career and Vocational Ed to Ben Lattimore, OIC-UCEC Program Manager, 12/26/74, OICA, 9:3, TUUA.
¹¹⁸ Michelle Barragan, PR Dir, Savannah-Chatham OIC to Zandra Maffett The Key News, OICA, 4/9/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA.
¹¹⁹ Ben Lattimore OIC-UCEC Program Manager to Michelle Barragan, PR Dir, Savannah-Chatham OIC, 5/9/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA.
principals. This shows the growing and deepening relationship between the two organizations, as NIE leaders sought ways to actively promulgate CIP to the larger community. By now, the two organizations also understood what it took to start and stabilize such a program, so they began early to address the future of CIP.

Part of this preparation for the future was the development of a monograph detailing the eighteen months of formative evaluation of CIP. This monograph was designed to serve as a NIE Research and Development progress report for distribution to "professional and informed audiences" and potential adopters of the Program. NIE intended the monograph to contain all the formative data, a review of data-gathering techniques, a literature review of other dropout prevention programs, and an analysis of the preliminary summative evaluation data. OIC writers were to provide a description of the stabilized Program, while Gibboney evaluators appraised CIP's status. NIE hoped to combine the two narratives in order to give the reader a clear picture of the Program up to that point. The report covered all aspects of the Program from recruitment to graduation, including counseling, instructional activities, curriculum, and the specific phases. It also tracked CIP's progress over the preceding months in response to Gibboney's formative feedback. External reviewers of the monograph had generally positive feedback, both of the report and of the Program itself. Most of their negative comments were small issues, and the larger criticisms were promptly taken care of. By

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120 First draft of Executive Summary 5/9/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
121 F: Al Cunningham, OIC Project Officer; T: Corinne Rieder, Assis Dir, Career Ed Program, 11/12/73, OICA, 9:9, TUUA; Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE to Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC, 7/23/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
122 Schedule For OIC Products, 7/8/74, OICA, 9:10, TUUA.
123 Review of OIC R&D Monograph, 6/19/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA; Comments of OIC Monograph 6/24/75, 6/19/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA; Al Cunningham, Career Preparation Division, Education and Work
this time of the Program's life, OIC, NIE, and Gibboney were becoming very aware of CIP's success in educating and preparing interns for work, and they each wanted to do what they could to disseminate information about the Program in the hopes that other organizations would become interested and replicate CIP and its success.

The summer months of 1975 also saw a slight expansion of the NIE-CIP relationship. The relationship had formerly been a turbulent one, with both organizations' leaders seeking to establish their dominance over the other and mandate the Program's direction. Now, however, both NIE and CIP personnel were working together as colleagues, in spite of NIE's position of influence as funder of the Program. An example where this truth seems most evident is Ben Lattimore's letter to Dr. Corinne Rieder in July. Lattimore wrote the letter to explicitly express his appreciation to Dr. Rieder, Dr. Datta, and Al Cunningham for their support and continued encouragement for the Program. Lattimore specifically singled out Cunningham for his efforts, pointing out his work as most instrumental in the Program's graduation from the problem-prone early developmental period to the present era of great effectiveness. Lattimore also expressed his confidence in CIP's future success that the summative evaluation would show.124 This laudatory communication brought the NIE-CIP relationship full circle, with the lowlight being the period immediately before the Memo of Agreement when Jettie Newkirk accused Al Cunningham of being uncooperative.

As the summer turned into the fall, this improved relationship, the positive returns of the summative evaluation, and the looming end of the grant period motivated both the

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124 Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC to Dr. Corinne Rieder, Director, CEP, 7/10/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
Institute and the Program leaders to seek to aid the dissemination of CIP. NIE adopted the official role as CIP's representative to organizations to spark their interest in adopting the Program, while Lattimore and Newkirk worked and coordinated with OIC chapters in order to expand the Program within OIC. Some organizations outside of OIC that they targeted were the state of Pennsylvania, Research for Better Schools, several school districts spread across the country, and the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, of which NIE was a part. HEW included in its periodical, "HEW News," an article about CIP, detailing it and OIC's organizational history, as well as the success they had. Such attention, including an endorsement from the NIE Director in a periodical disseminated to educational leaders across the country, was exactly what CIP and NIE leaders were hoping for as they sought opportunities to replicate CIP throughout the country. They even looked into the possibility of including the Career Intern Program in federal work and education legislation. Even though OIC leadership did not succeed in including the Program in these acts, both NIE and CIP were powerfully committed to the long-term success and replication of the Program, and they worked together to explore all their options to that effect.

125 Michael S. Van Leesten, Exec Dir, RI OIC to Ben Lattimore, OIC-UEC Program Manager 9/16/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore OIC-UEC Program Manager to Michelle Barragan, PR Dir, Savannah-Chatham OIC, 10/21/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore OIC-UEC Program Manager to Rev. Paul P. Martin, Erie OIC, 10/22/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore OIC-UEC Program Manager to Rev. Edward Hailes, Exec Dir, DC-OIC, 11/12/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore OIC-UEC Program Manager to Philip M Baptisté, Exec Dir OIC-Greater New Orleans, 11/25/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, OIC-UEC Program Manager to Rev. Mozel Sanders, Director OIC-Indiana Indianapolis, 12/15/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC to Al Cunningham, PO, NIE-CEP, 11/25/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OIC-UEC to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE, 9/11/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OIC-UEC to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE, 9/11/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE to Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, UCEC, 7/23/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Ben Lattimore OIC-UEC Program Manager to Dr. Larry McClure, NW Regional Ed Lab Portland, 11/25/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA; Monthly Report 10/75 OICA-UECECP C., 10/75, OICA, 11:10, TUUA.

126 Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OIC-UEC to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE, 9/11/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.
In January of 1976, in response to NIE’s questions concerning CIP’s future funding and operational plans, Ben Lattimore applied to NIE for an extension of the Program from February to the end of May 1976 with no additional cost to the federal government.\(^{127}\) By this time, the Program had been sufficiently operating under its budget during the previous two years that they felt they would be able to make that extension feasible with no increased funding.\(^{128}\) CIP sought this extension for at least three reasons: to extend the Program’s life as long as possible, thereby extending hopes of continuing CIP operation in Philadelphia; to finish the school year and thereby finish the education for all the interns; and to provide a larger summative evaluation period with increasingly better results.\(^{129}\) Until this point, the initial summative evaluation information had shown that the Program had a measurable impact in terms of redirecting lives and on future dropouts, as well as the ability to apply OIC’s principles to the educational process.\(^{130}\) The OIC’s principles of self-help and community uplift were not substantively altered, but repackaged in such a way as to make them more applicable and meaningful for CIP’s young audience. OIC was disappointed that this early good summative feedback had not helped them receive a commitment of funding from the Philadelphia School District or the state of Pennsylvania, but they maintained hope that they would receive funding soon, and this no-cost extension was part of that hope.\(^{131}\)

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\(^{127}\) Al Cunningham, Project Officer to Ben Lattimore, Program Manager OICA, 1/13/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.

\(^{128}\) Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OIC-UCEC to Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE 9/11/75, OICA, 9:11, TUUA.

\(^{129}\) Ben Lattimore, OICA-UCEC Program Manager to Al Cunningham, Project Officer CEP, NIE, 1/20/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.

\(^{130}\) Ben Lattimore OIC-UCEC Program Manager to Dr. Larry McClure, NW Regional Ed Lab Portland 11/25/75, OICA, 9:3, TUUA.

\(^{131}\) Ben Lattimore, OICA-UCEC Program Manager to Al Cunningham, Project Officer CEP, NIE 1/20/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.
At the beginning of 1976, NIE and CIP's attention shifted to include the drafting of the CIP Final Report. They planned for three different volumes, each directed to a different audience. Volume I was geared toward practitioners, such as school boards or superintendants. This volume's purpose was essentially to "sell" the Program to the decision-makers and help them understand the Program and its possible benefits.

Volume II targeted implementers, such as program managers and supervisors. This volume was meant to help these leaders know how to establish and stabilize the Program, and so it contained more specific analysis and detailed descriptions of the Program's inner workings than Volume I. Volume III's audience was researchers, analysts, and evaluators. Its content was much more quantitative than the other two volumes, with tables, discussion of the research approaches, and more concrete data to support the Program's assertions of success.132 Over the next several months, this report would grow in importance as it went through the reviewing and refining process, and would become the definitive source concerning CIP.

As graduation drew closer in mid-February, NIE and CIP writers continued to prepare the Report, as well as figure out what to do with the non-graduated students. When they realized that about 100 interns would not graduate in February, this caused some consternation. The summative evaluation was based heavily upon the September cohort designed to graduate in February, and so NIE and CIP administration worried that the interns' delayed graduation might negatively affect the assessment by messing up the post-graduation testing schedules.133 They also recognized that they dodged a bullet with the no-cost extension, since they would be able to see their interns through to graduation,

132 Al Cunningham, Project Officer, NIE to "Deal Colleague," 1/9/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.
133 F: Al Cunningham, Project Officer, CIP NIE; T: Ben Lattimore, OICA-UCEC Program Manager, 2/23/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.
rather than having to end mid-Program because of a lack of funding from Philadelphia schools or the state. Fortunately, by paying only Program personnel and excluding travel, communication, supplies, and other bills, CIP leaders believed they would be able to make it until the end of May and serve the 100 interns who did not succeed in graduating in February.\textsuperscript{134}

After the February graduation, funding and dissemination became the overwhelming themes for the Program in the coming months. These two topics were intertwined because they directly affected the future of the Career Intern Program. Lattimore had applied for, and Cunningham had approved, a no-cost extension to the end of May. However, the Program underestimated their monthly costs, and so they faced a financial shortage for the month of May, and the Philadelphia OIC branch solved the problem by paying the UCEC salaries and benefits for the month.\textsuperscript{135} Meanwhile, attempts to raise knowledge of and interest in the Program became more urgent, both within OIC and with outside organizations.\textsuperscript{136} These efforts stemmed from CIP's moral commitment to community uplift across the country, as well as a growing urgency to establish the Program's future, which had not yet been secured. In mid-June, the Career Intern Program applied to the Office of Education's Vocational Education program for a three-year grant. Even though the Office of Education denied this application, it is

\textsuperscript{134} Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OICA-UCEC to Thomas Ritter, Exec Dir POIC, 1/28/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{135} Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OIC-UCEC to Ken Duffan, Dep Exec Dir, OICA, 4/13/76, OICA, 9:4, TUUA.
further evidence of CIP's aggressive pursuit of funding. It was only the first of many applications for grant funding.

The graduation of the final cohort under NIE funding was on June 24, 1976. Dr. Corinne Rieder was a guest speaker at the graduation ceremony, showing the continued close relationship between the two organizations. The graduation marked the end of the Program's operational life under NIE funding and the beginning of a new period for the Career Intern Program. Around this time, the Philadelphia School District agreed to fund UCEC, albeit at half the NIE budget. This necessitated the curtailing of program operations, as well as increasing the student-teacher and student-counselor ratios, thus compromising one of the Program's important aspects. However, Ben Lattimore and UCEC believed that the decrease of the budget would not diminish the quality of CIP's services.\(^{137}\)

Two main projects remained for the Career Intern Program after the June graduation to give closure on the NIE period in Philadelphia. One was submitting a Program summary to the Joint Dissemination Review Panel (JDRP) with the ultimate goals that the Panel would designate CIP as an exemplary drop-out prevention and career education program and that the submission would automatically get the Program into the Office of Education's dissemination network.\(^{138}\) The second project was to finish the Final Report on the Program itself, which would serve as the definitive description of CIP's effectiveness. Both of these actions would last into 1977, well after the Career Intern Program had shifted into another operational phase.

\(^{137}\) F: Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, OICA-UCEC; T: Geneva Fuller, Exec Sec Pittsburgh-OIC 10/27/76

\(^{138}\) Lois-Ellin Datta to Bob Pruitt, Howard Lesnick, Al Cunningham, Michael Langsdorf, Ben Lattimore, ~12/1/76, OICA, 9:12, TUUA.
Indeed, in May 1977, JDRP did find the Career Intern Program to be an exemplary educational program model, and CIP entered HEW’s dissemination network.\textsuperscript{139} Also in May, Gibboney published the complete and final version of \textit{The Career Intern Program: Final Report: An Experiment in Career Education that Worked}. The \textit{Final Report} found that the Program was more successful in retaining their interns than high schools their students, therefore graduating a higher percentage of students from high school than the Philadelphia Public Schools.\textsuperscript{140} Gibboney continued to detail the strengths and weaknesses of the Program. On the whole, CIP was much more successful than high schools in helping the interns develop school skills, with interns showing progress in math and reading, as well as responsibility, attendance, work ethic, and other aspects of the school experience. However, Gibboney pointed out that even though the Program’s experimental group was succeeding when compared with the control group, it still struggled to compare favorably with absolute measurements. The Program did struggle to maintain strong attendance rates and instill standards of excellence, and even though interns showed progress, they still were below national averages and their academic deficiencies were reduced, not overcome. In essence, the Program helped the interns improve and be more prepared for post-graduation work, but their actual preparation was not a given.\textsuperscript{141} In regards to career planning, Gibboney evaluators also found that the Program helped the interns improve their career planning skills, know how to research their careers, have feelings of self-worth, have more of a

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\textsuperscript{139} CIP A Field Test and Replication of the CIP Program Proposal to US DOL, 8/20/77, OICA, 14:32, TUUA; Box 14 Folder 13 DSP Addendum to CIP Continuation Proposal 1980, Continuation of CIP Replication DSP, ~10/1/80, OICA, 14:13, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{140} DSP: CIP-Reports--An Experiment in Career Education That Worked Final Report-Volume I and II, May 1977, OICA, 15:3, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{141} DSP: CIP-Reports--An Experiment in Career Education That Worked Final Report-Volume I and II, May 1977, OICA, 15:3, TUUA.
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desire to have a career, and work to fulfill those career goals. In these regards, the Program had proven very successful in attaining its operational goals.\textsuperscript{142}

The Report found that, post-graduation, interns continued to use the same methods and strategies that the Program taught them to find work and be successful. They had more direction and motivation to attain their career goals when compared with the control group, even when they did not have the close support system of the Program with them anymore. Interns were more successful in finding employment, as well as understanding and exhibiting appropriate work environment behavior. Gibboney writers stated that the Program's real effects—or lack thereof—would only become clear five to ten years down the road, as the interns who went to college entered the work force. Gibboney reviewer also said that perhaps the most important benefit of the Program was the sense of direction, inner stability, and self-assurance that interns expressed six months after they graduated.\textsuperscript{143}

The Final Report looked at several possible reasons for the Program's success. These included: the small size of the school (200 interns at any one time) and the attending ability to focus on individual interns; the special curriculum and organization of the Program; the fact that the UCEC Executive Director was an educational leader rather than a mere administrator; generous amounts of time and money; the lack of teacher union influence; a high cost per student; thorough and demanding intern selection; good or even excellent leadership; and a large amount of evaluation and feedback.\textsuperscript{144}
Final Report also identified the CIP’s philosophy of dealing with and helping the interns improve during their time in CIP, the Program's attempts and successes and changing the interns' attitudes, and the sensible curriculum and a respected staff as reasons for the CIP's success, both inside and outside the classroom. ¹⁴⁵

One of the remaining questions was the CIP’s replicability. Gibboney believed that all of the factors that made the Program successful were necessary for that success, but also that some factors, such as OIC's ethos, might or might not be replicable in sites other than Philadelphia or by organizations other than OIC-CIP.¹⁴⁶ These uncertainties did not diminish CIP's successes as an organization, but left an important part of the research project partially unfulfilled, which could only be fully addressed when OIC leaders attempted to replicate CIP in another location.

Over the life span of the National Institute of Education's grant to CIP, the Program itself had changed dramatically. More importantly, the vast majority of these changes was positive and made the Program more effective in accomplishing its goals of community uplift. The beginning of the NIE-CIP relationship was very rocky, as each organization sought to dominate the other. However, both groups came to believe in each other's goals, and so they began to compromise and work together. The fruit of these labors was a highly effective Program that succeeded in making a difference in interns' lives and provided research information concerning the viability of a career education program. The end of the NIE grant period provided the Career Intern Program with a lot of momentum because of the very positive Final Report and the JDRP assessment, as the

Program had proven its ability to help black youth graduate from high school and be prepared for a career.

Up until this point in CIP's life, Program staff at all levels had demonstrated that they could succeed in fulfilling Leon Sullivan's original charge to combine high school education with an effective career education philosophy that would empower high school dropouts or potential dropouts with the necessary skills to identify and attain a gainful career. They could only hope that their efforts would have long-lasting effects in the youths' lives and lead to substantial positive effects within the black community as the youth reinvested themselves and their salaries into the urban ghettos. Also, CIP staff showed they had the ability to work in conjunction with federal agencies that sometimes had contradictory mission statements. The success that CIP and NIE personnel ultimately experienced during the grant period highlights the positive and possible benefits of Sullivan's pragmatic hopes of federal funding combined with African-American community uplift.
CHAPTER 5
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EPILOGUE

As early as April 1975, UCEC was already seeking post-NIE grants. By March 1977, UCEC had submitted seven grant proposals to federal agencies in an attempt to aid OIC's dissemination goals for CIP. Unfortunately for UCEC and the Career Intern Program, these agencies rejected all of UCEC's proposals.\(^{147}\) Even as late as August 1977, UCEC only had funding from the Philadelphia School District. This decreased funding was barely enough to allow CIP to operate, and dissemination outside the District with District funds was for obvious reasons outside the realm of possibility. For UCEC, this limited scope of work was not sufficient, for it did not allow the organization to fulfill Leon Sullivan's vision of community uplift on a comprehensive national level.

In August 1977, the Career Intern Program collaborated with the National Institute of Education to apply to the United States Department of Labor (DoL) for a field test and replication grant. In this proposal, CIP sought to spread to three cities and one rural location, where the goal was to copy the original NIE-grant Program and compare these new sites to Philadelphia's CIP. OIC would choose these sites internally, based upon need, the existence of a local OIC chapter, and the chapter's ability to oversee and maintain a Career Intern Program. The requested grant would last until June 1980, therefore cutting down the timeframe to less than three years, which was a more condensed period than the Philadelphia CIP from 1972-1976.\(^{148}\) The Department of

\(^{147}\) Rejected Proposal Submissions, 6/28/77, OICA, 9:13, TUUA.
\(^{148}\) CIP A Field Test and Replication of the CIP Program Proposal to US, 8/20/77, OICA, 14:32, TUUA.
Labor accepted this grant proposal, and the process of establishing the Career Intern Program in multiple locations began. This process highlighted OIC's ability, but also the difficulty, to successfully achieve funding to disseminate the Program. Now that OIC leaders had succeeded in achieving this goal, their ability to replicate and administer an education community uplift program like CIP would now be tested.

By the beginning of November, OIC had already chosen the four sites after a competitive process. These four sites were Detroit, New York City, Seattle, and the Hudson Valley in upstate New York. The geographic location of these sites reveals much concerning OIC's ambition and purposes. OIC's vision was national and not limited to the northeast. Detroit was by now a crumbling urban center, and if the Program could be successful in such a declining situation, it would give CIP extra credibility. New York was the largest city in the United States with lots of business opportunities and a thriving urban center. Seattle was a multi-ethnic city in the Pacific Northwest, and success here would highlight CIP's flexibility to find success in a geographic and demographic area that might not match up with initial perceptions of CIP's target group. The Hudson Valley posed the most unique challenge to the Program's ability, for it was a rural area with a small African American population and limited job opportunities. OIC believed that if the Program could prove successful in these locations, then surely opportunities for CIP dissemination across the country would appear.

All the previous steps that UCEC leadership undertook to create the Career Intern Program had to be copied in each of the four sites. The four sites' administrations had to work with the local school districts in order to pass a resolution allowing the Program to

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149 Rev Leon Sullivan, Founder and Chairman of Board, OICA to Patricia Graham, Director, NIE, 11/4/77, OICA, 9:13, TUUA.
operate within district boundaries. They had to negotiate with the local teachers unions in order to hire teachers loyal to OIC's operational ethos rather than the union. The sites' directors also had to build relationships with local businesses and industry, community service groups, the black community itself, and hire completely new staff.\textsuperscript{150} The creations of these sites also introduced a new level of organization to the Program. Now that CIP was on a national scale, UCEC appointed Robert Jackson to be the national CIP Program Manager. Also, UCEC had to hire the new staff in each of the locations before staff orientation began in February 1978, a short window to find a staff qualified enough and loyal to OIC's guiding principles.\textsuperscript{151} On the DoL side, Cheryl Bates became the Project Officer, overseeing CIP's progress and serving as the main point of contact opposite Ben Lattimore. At this time, Ben Lattimore was now OIC's Director of the Division of Special Programs, which oversaw UCEC and CIP. Even with this change of position, he remained OIC's main liaison with NIE and DoL, providing the Program with vital continuity in dealing with the federal bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{152}

The start of the Program was incredibly problematic. Staff was brand new and certainly not on the same page concerning Program operation. The teacher unions and Boards were extremely difficult to come to terms with—especially in Hudson Valley and Detroit—and the CIP-DoL relationship in part mirrored the early months of the UCEC-NIE affiliation.\textsuperscript{153} The Department of Labor was very heavy-handed in encouraging CIP to handle the local problems, threatening to rescind the contracts to the Hudson Valley and Detroit Program sites if they did not fix the problems. These threats encouraged

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\textsuperscript{150} Elton Jolly, Exec Dir, OICA to CIP Dir’s, CC: Leon Sullivan, Kenneth Duffan, Ben Lattimore, Virginia Hall, Milton Galamison, Roy Allen 4/5/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA.  \\
\textsuperscript{151} Ben Lattimore, Director DSP to Exec Dir CIP’s, 1/11/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA.  \\
\textsuperscript{152} Ben Lattimore Director DSP to Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE, 5/3/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA.  \\
\textsuperscript{153} Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE to Ben Lattimore Director DSP, 5/1/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA.
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Leon Sullivan and Elton Jolly to become personally involved in negotiations with the local School Boards and the teachers unions, and only then were they able to reach a consensus and move forward in the Program implementation.\textsuperscript{154}

Training and orientation of staff, recruitment of interns, and resolving the Program's myriad problems were the dominant themes of the CIP during the summer of 1978, leading up to the beginning of classes July 24. Seattle specifically faced problems with recruitment since many other DoL youth employment programs there cut into the Program's target audience. Dr. Kast Tallmadge—whose consulting company replaced Gibboney and Associates as the primary external evaluator—and CIP leaders agreed that they would admit all the qualified interns into the Program for this cohort alone, rather than the normal experimental/control group division.\textsuperscript{155}

The problems continued through the first four months of operation. The inability to recruit enough interns was a problem at all four sites.\textsuperscript{156} The lack of control groups could possibly have had large effects upon the Program itself, as the inability to truly measure the experimental group's successes and failures threatened the Program's ability to make policy decisions or to even show programmatic successes and failures.\textsuperscript{157} Ben Lattimore ascribed the recruitment problems to three main factors: the prolonged testing schedule that led many potential interns to lose interest in the Program and withdraw from consideration; opposition of the local black communities and school boards to the control groups; and the insufficient time to acquire the high schools' collaboration in the

\textsuperscript{154} Ben Lattimore Director DSP to Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE 5/17/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{155} Howard Lesnick, NIE Senior Assoc, NIE to Ben Lattimore, Director, DSP 7/21/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{156} Division of Special Programs Status Report, 11/27/78, OICA, 11:2, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{157} Robert Taggart, Administrator, Office of Youth Programs to Howard Lesnick, Chief, Project Officer, NIE 11/21/78, OICA, 9:14, TUUA.
recruitment process. As with the Philadelphia CIP, the process of compromise was an important facet of the CIP-DoL relationship, and the Department of Labor did so by allowing CIP to not have these control groups, thereby sacrificing some research potential in order to help the Program meet its goals and improve its recruitment policies and practices.\textsuperscript{158}

The fall of 1978 saw several other problems arise. A budget crisis forced the Philadelphia School District to stop funding the Philadelphia CIP. Lattimore applied to the Department of Labor, claiming that the continuation of the Philadelphia site was imperative to ascertaining the viability of the replication sites by providing a control site. Despite Lattimore's advocacy, the Department of Labor decided that the Philadelphia CIP was not imperative to their research, and so DoL refused to fund the Program.\textsuperscript{159} Even though CIP later succeeded in convincing the Department to fund the Philadelphia site, this setback damaged the Program's ability to be effective in Philadelphia and highlighted CIP's fragile existence.\textsuperscript{160} Another problem that came about was some local Program initiatives to lower the standards to admit interns, such as lowering the minimum reading level from the fifth to the fourth grade. Such a change could threaten the grant's ability to adequately assess the Program's effect on black youth, as well as challenge the sites'

\textsuperscript{158} F: Ben Lattimore, Director DSP; T: Howard Lesnick, Senior Associate, NIE 11/22/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{159} Ben Lattimore, Program Manager, Director of Special Programs to Cheryl Berry, NIE Home, Community, and Work, T&L, 8/24/78, OICA, 14:23, TUUA; Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE to Ray Palmer, Project Officer, DOL, 8/25/78, OICA, 14:28, TUUA; Robert Taggart, Admin OYP to Howard Lesnick, NIE, ~8/29/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA; Ben Lattimore, Director DSP to Howard Lesnick Team Leader Urban Career Learning Team NIE, 10/2/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA; Howard Lesnick, Team Leader, Urban Career Learning Team to Ben Lattimore, OICA, 10/12/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{160} Fletcher Amos, Jr, Director, Division of Special Programs to Raymond Palmer, Manpower Development Spec, DOL OYP, 1/23/80, OICA, 14:25, TUUA.
abilities to provide aid to such struggling youth. The Department refused to allow such a change to occur and forced the sites to go back to the previous standards.\textsuperscript{161}

The first several months of Program operation also showed serious staffing and curriculum issues. Many sites did not have full staffs, and several positions ranging from aide to site director had been filled with unqualified personnel. This problem would not be completely solved for several more months. In the meantime, such an inadequate situation hindered the development of Program ethos, good interpersonal relationships, and the other intangible parts of a successful Career Intern Program. In addition, instructional staff experienced large turnover and did not fully grasp the principle of individualized, self-paced learning, and so classroom instruction more closely resembled a traditional high school class than the desired Career Intern Program model. The learning packets were found to be insufficient; the packets were so focused on Philadelphia businesses, demographics, and unique situations that they did not translate very well to the replication sites.\textsuperscript{162} The interim report that highlighted these shortcomings proved to be an important document, as it officially described the issues facing the Program and aided CIP and DoL to take effective measures to fix these problems.

The rest of the school year saw efforts to fix this plethora of problems. Slowly, CIP began to turn around and became increasingly stabilized. However, June 1979, saw two major changes to Program operations. Ben Lattimore, long CIP’s main proponent to the federal government, left the Division of Special Programs to accept an OIC position in Washington DC, and he was temporarily replaced by Robert Jackson. Fletcher Amos

\textsuperscript{161} Howard Lesnick, Team Leader, Urban Career Learning, Cheryl Berry, PO to Ben Lattimore, Director DSP, 12/19/78, OICA, 14:31, TUUA.

\textsuperscript{162} CIP Interim Report Study of CIP: A Fidelity of Implementation, March 1979, OICA, 14:37, TUUA.
was officially hired as the Director of the Department of Special Projects a few months later, and Jackson returned to his position as the national CIP Program Manager. Amos had been involved with UCEC for a number of years, and his long history of successful leadership in the Program ensured a continuance of strong internal leadership and a positive external relationship with NIE and DoL. Meanwhile, CIP applied for a twenty-four month extension of the Program in order to better analyze CIP's replication. However, the Department only granted a nine month extension through December 31, 1980, which served to undercut CIP leaders' ambitions concerning its mandate for community uplift, introduce uncertainty into the Program, and hampered UCEC staff's ability to maintain a quality Career Intern Program. This policy of short extensions would cause several problems, as concerns about CIP's long-term health dogged the Program and served to limit recruitment and local support from all areas of the community.

The Career Intern Program was extremely interested in dissemination; a goal that was an outgrowth of Leon Sullivan's desires for a nationwide reach for his civil rights socioeconomic agenda. Sullivan believed that education was a way for blacks to attain better jobs that would ultimately help African Americans change and improve the ghettos that they lived in. This success would continue to build upon itself as blacks gained a greater voice in local economic and political decision. Sullivan, along with OIC and UCEC leaders, believed that this view of education's place in the fight for equality had been vindicated by the several years of Career Intern Program administration in

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163 Robert Jackson, CIP Program Manager to Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE 6/6/79, OICA, 14:23, TUUA; OICA Third Quarterly Report 9/1/79-12/31/79, OICA, 11:12, TUUA.
164 Robert Jackson, CIP Program Manager to Cheryl Berry, Project Officer, NIE 6/6/79, OICA, 14:23, TUUA.
Philadelphia. However, for all of Ben Lattimore and the other UCEC leaders' efforts, they succeeded in replicating the Program in only five instances. Four of these areas came through the Department of Labor replication grant, and the fifth was the only external replication that CIP succeeded in starting. This was with the program SER-Jobs for Progress, a Latino work training organization that also benefitted from a separate federal agency grant for a career education program. SER turned to OIC for help to start the program in the summer of 1979, and relied heavily upon the expertise of Ben Lattimore and other UCEC leaders to establish their program, which was modeled after the Career Intern Program. Over the next couple of years, SER developed a program that resembled CIP, but they also introduced SER's own operational ethos and some of their programmatic changes according to what they believed to be the best options, much to Lattimore's frustration. In this regard, CIP officials ironically played the part of a supervising agency, overseeing the establishment of a program that a young, 'upstart' organization was seeking to change and make its own. In his efforts with SER, Ben Lattimore was assuming the administrative role that NIE had inhabited relative to CIP. OIC's experience with SER shows the complexity of uniform replication, especially with outside organizations, and brings to light OIC's ability to disseminate the Program on a national scale outside of the OIC chapter network.

Meanwhile, compromise ruled CIP and DoL's attempts to fix the Program replication sites, especially in regards to the real and perceived programmatic weaknesses of recruiting, attendance, and staffing. This process was painful and full of

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165 Anthony Gomes, Director, Division Youth Programs, SER to Robert Jackson, Program Manager, OICA 6/21/79, OICA, 16:4, TUUA; Ms. Maria Tukeva, Program Specialist, SER to Robert Jackson, Program Manager CIP 7/6/79, OICA, 16:4, TUUA; Letter Contract Between SER-Jobs for Progress and OICA 8/8/79, Robert Jackson, Program Manager to Ms. Maria Tukeva, Acting Coordinator HCIP, 8/8/79, OICA, 16:4, TUUA.
misunderstandings and differences of interpretation, opinion, and vision. However, both organizations continued to work together and compromise, which ultimately repeated the CIP-NIE experience and caused the improved operation of the Program sites. The turnaround came quickly. The fall of 1979 was already beginning to show improvement. All the sites made recruitment a higher priority, utilizing all the staff, interns, and any other sources for referrals they could, to increase the number of interns enrolled in the Program. Detroit and Seattle were particularly hampered by ineffective enrollment at their respective high schools, which forced these two sites to focus more on community and intern referrals to meet their quotas. Because of this, Detroit switched its feeder high school, and CIP leaders were very optimistic that this change would improve the Program's recruiting and create a more positive and supportive relationship. Slowly, each of the four sites began to show progress in their ability to recruit sufficient numbers of prospective interns.

By the end of the year, each of the sites had also finally fixed their staffing issues. Positions were almost all full, save two or three in all the sites combined, and the quality of the staff seems to have improved, as well as their commitment to the Program's ethos. Only Detroit had attendance below the programmatic goal of seventy percent, and they were actively developing other ways to raise attendance. Classroom instruction also showed improvement and staff even introduced new and creative teaching methods, even

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166 Robert Taggart, Admin OYP to Howard Lesnick, Team Leader, Urban Career Learning NIE 7/6/79, OICA, 14:31, TUUA; CIP OICA Response to DOL Request for Corrective Action Plans for the CIP Replication Sites 7/79, OICA, 14:40, TUUA.
167 OICA Third Quarterly Report 9/1/79-12/31/79, OICA, 11:12, TUUA.
though OIC still wanted instructors to use the instructional packets more.\textsuperscript{168} These changes again showed CIP's ability to adapt to needed changes and work with the Department of Labor to produce effective positive change.

Even as CIP began to show programmatic success, the Program's viability began to come under question. Internally, turnover began to create some instability. Fletcher Amos left the Division of Special Programs in February, after only eight months as Director, and was replaced by Lenora Thompson. Thompson had been involved with UCEC since the very beginning, starting as the COP Coordinator and eventually moving over to CIP.\textsuperscript{169} She was a very competent administrator, but the lack of continuity affected CIP's influence with NIE and DoL. This influence is important, as Ben Lattimore's longevity allowed him to push for change or resist DoL-led influence. With the loss of Lattimore, his successors, albeit competent and effective, struggled to have as much success as he did in their negotiations with the federal agencies.

NIE had continued to be involved with the Program via an Interagency Agreement with the Department of Labor, which gave NIE personnel daily oversight of CIP while working to achieve DoL's goals. However, the NIE-DoL agreement was a verbal one, and had not been signed even going in 1980. In January, this tenuous situation began to negatively affect CIP's operations as the DoL and NIE relationship began to experience some difficulties. For about two months, DoL staff did not release any funds for the Program, preventing site coordinators from meeting the sites' financial obligations. This situation threatened to close CIP in all the sites, and Robert Jackson

\textsuperscript{168} OICA Third Quarterly Report 9/1/79-12/31/79, OICA, 11:12, TUUA.; Cheryl Berry Gaines, Project Officer, NIE to Robert Jackson, Attached Review and Critique of Site Corrective Action Plans, OICA 9/12/79, OICA, 14:23, TUUA;

\textsuperscript{169} Lenora Thompson, Dir, DSP to Kenneth Duffan, Dep Exec Dir, OICA DSP 5/80 Monthly Report, May 1980, OICA, 11:5, TUUA.
questioned NIE and DoL's motives concerning the Program. Also, Department personnel were very slow to process CIP's request for an extension of CIP's operation. Even though DoL leaders eventually agreed to the extension, this caused concern among CIP leadership about the Program's existence going into the future. Department staff also began to demand more justification for funds and probe more deeply into the Program's monetary status. These moments seemed to mark a turning point in the CIP-DoL relationship and a gradual distancing by the Department from the Program, putting the Program long-term health in question.

The summer of 1980 had several important highlights. Meetings continued with federal agencies in an attempt to get funding beyond August. Dr. Kast Tallmadge gave the Program a ringing endorsement, calling it "the best thing out there" among educational programs in a meeting with NIE and potential adopters of CIP, even though progress was not manifested in all the sites in all measures. Dissemination efforts of the Program continued, highlighted by OIC's efforts to include the Career Intern Program in national legislation, namely President Jimmy Carter's Youth Bill. However, in spite of these positive steps, the Program was beginning to fail on several fronts. The Philadelphia site, which had succeeded in again opening, once more had to close because

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170 Robert Jackson, Program Manager, OICA to Cheryl Berry-Gaines, Project Officer, NIE, 2/29/80, OICA, 14:24, TUUA; Division of Special Programs, 3/18/80, OICA, 11:2, TUUA; F: Robert Jackson, CIP Program Manager; T: Janice Mapp, Director of Youth Programs, DOL 3/17/80, OICA, 14:25, TUUA.

171 Fletcher Amos, Jr, Director, Division of Special Programs to Raymond Palmer, Manpower Development Spec, DOL OYP, 1/23/80, OICA, 14:25, TUUA; Joel B Anthony, Grants Officer to OICA, 4/29/80, OICA, 16:14, TUUA.

172 Victor Westbrook, Contracting Officer to Fletcher Amos, Director of Special Program, OICA, 3/6/80, OICA, 14:21, TUUA.

of lack of funds.\textsuperscript{174} The Department of Labor, in response to UCEC's request that DoL step in with funds, mandated that the Philadelphia location had to receive $150,000 in funds from other sources in order for the Department to match. Also, DoL only agreed to fund the other Program sites at fifty to sixty percent of full funding through August 1981. In order to operate at full capacity, the four sites would have to find local and/or state funding.\textsuperscript{175} DoL's rationale for what amounted to a financially limited, short-term extension is unclear, though it is possible that Department leaders did not want the Program to fail, but also believed that it was time for CIP to find other funding sources. This funding period very well might have been a compromise designed to buy the Program time to find these sources. Through its now demonstrated frugality and tenacity, CIP leadership continued to find ways to make the Program survive, limping along hoping to find a solution to their funding problems.\textsuperscript{176} The Youth Bill was a large piece of these hopes. By the end of the summer, OIC had succeeded in including the CIP into the Youth Bill, which would legislate funding for the CIP as a viable educational program, and during the summer OIC was confident in the Bill's ability to pass.\textsuperscript{177} However, progress in Congress and its subcommittees was slow, and the Program's financial difficulties continued.

During the rest of 1980, Lenora Thompson led the development and application of two proposals to DoL for the continuation of the Program. However, even though Thompson felt that the proposals met DoL criteria, the Department did not award the

\textsuperscript{174} OICA DSP 7/80 Monthly Report, July 1980, OICA, 11:5, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{175} OICA DSP 8/80 Monthly Report, August 1980 OICA, 11:5, TUUA; Kenneth Duffan, Dep Exec Dir; Lenora Thompson, Dir, DSP; OICs/A Division of Special Programs Board Report, 10/31/80, OICA, 11:2, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{176} DSP CIP Continuation Program Proposal, 10/80, OICA, 14:19, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{177} OICs/A Division of Special Programs Board Report, ~9/30/80, OICA, 11:2, TUUA.
grants. Meanwhile, OIC continued its lobbying in Congress for the Youth Bill, adopting increasingly direct methods to influence members of Congress, but progress and results were still mixed.\textsuperscript{178} By October, the Philadelphia CIP was still not operational, but OIC was still working hard to determine how the Program was going to operate going into the future, as well as preparing another Joint Dissemination Report Panel submission for the Program. By November, CIP had succeeded in opening the Philadelphia site again, but the other locations were still struggling with the severely limited funds that the Program was receiving even though staff at each site was determined to continue to do their best until CIP found funding.\textsuperscript{179} In fact, these same dynamics continued all the way through May 1981, as the Program tried to survive until it found funding and while it prepared its JDRP submission.\textsuperscript{180}

By this time, the source material becomes very sparse, with only a few documents each month. Educated conjecture becomes important in sorting out what happened during the next year of CIP's life. In June, each of the sites graduated interns in groups ranging from thirty-four to forty-three.\textsuperscript{181} The small size of these graduating classes shows how the lack of funding had taken its toll on the Program's ability to aggressively recruit and maintain CIP at full capacity. After graduation, the summer programs of classroom instruction, Hands-On experiences, and summer employment began, but recruitment ceased because of the lack of post-summer funding.\textsuperscript{182} Interns continued to

\textsuperscript{178} OICA DSP Monthly Reports 10/80, October 1980, OICA, 11:5, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{181} Monthly Reports 6/81, June 1981, OICA, 11:6, TUUA.
\textsuperscript{182} Monthly Reports 7/81, July 1981, OICA, 11:6, TUUA.
progress within the Program as they sought to graduate with a depleted staff and before each site closed. By the end of the summer, only the New York site had succeeded in acquiring local funding to extend its operations. After August, all the four other sites closed operations, leaving any un-graduated interns short of reaching their educational goals. 183 Even though each of the sites had closed, they continued to seek local funding in order to reopen and resume operations. OIC and each site still hoped that they could bring the Program back to operation, a hope that the Philadelphia site had accomplished with mixed results during the Department of Labor years. Also during this time, CIP's submission to the JDRP was still ongoing, as were attempts to include the Program in the Youth Bill, which was still at the congressional subcommittee level. 184 By this time, Program leaders knew the difficulty of finding adequate local funding for CIP, and so they turned to the largest and most powerful source of funding and support, the national government. Including CIP in national legislation would make the Program much more secure, as its agenda would be institutionalized at the national level and CIP could cease to worry about funding or support issues.

In March 1982, seven months after the CIP sites—excluding New York—closed, the paper trail for funding, legislation efforts, the JDRP submission, and the process of closing the sites ended completely. 185 After the sites closed and as time passed with no progress, OIC administrators almost assuredly reassigned CIP personnel to other OIC departments or let them go completely. As this occurred, the skill, experience, and knowledge that the core staff had accumulated scattered, leaving the Program

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183 Monthly Reports 9/81, September 1981, OICA, 11:6, TUUA.
184 OICs/A Division of Special Programs Board Report, 10/22/81, OICA, 11:2, TUUA.
increasingly incapable of starting back up again with any of the expertise and ability it had built up over the Program's four years of operation. After March, the only documents of consequence that dealt with the Career Intern Program were about the continued efforts to include CIP in national legislation in a last effort to institutionalize the Program. These efforts lasted until at least September of 1982, when the process was still ongoing and the paper trail ends inconclusively. Either the Youth Bill with CIP included did not pass, or Congress left the Program out of the Bill. Either way, the Program's last attempts at national legislation failed. The already existing decline of the Program's ability to operate, combined with the lack of successful lobbying of Congress would lead to the conclusion that CIP soon dwindled away into programmatic non-existence. As time passed, the end of the Program became increasingly concrete, as staff moved on, all momentum was lost, and government contacts dried up until eventually the Career Intern Program became a historical example of black efforts of community uplift through education.

In many ways, the decline of the Career Intern Program mirrored that of the Opportunities Industrialization Centers. For a myriad of reasons, OIC had already begun to struggle at both the national and local levels by 1980. Several local chapters closed or broke off from the national organization, and OIC itself struggled to find new support and maintain their already existing funding sources. The economic problems of the 1970's and Reagan's government cuts in the 1980's tightened the external noose around OIC. OIC's effectiveness and viability as an organization was under severe attack as the OIC regression continued into the 1990's. By this time, more than half of OIC's 1980 high of

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186 OICs/A Division of Special Programs Board Report, 9/13/82, OICA, 11:2, TUUA.
local chapters had ceased to exist. Leon Sullivan's other efforts, such as his Progress Movement for-profit organizations, also failed during this time, as the quality of training declined and the lack of money continued to exact its toll. OIC leaders eventually succeeded in halting its decline, and OIC still continues to exist today, though smaller, less influential with the black community and white business leaders, and with a less secure future role in society.\textsuperscript{187}

Leon Sullivan continued to be a highly influential figure, even while OIC began its decline. He started the OICI—Opportunities Industrialization Centers International, which sought to spread OIC's principles to Africa. Although his for-profit ventures ultimately closed, they served as proof of African Americans' potential in the capitalist marketplace, and as examples of how blacks could achieve economic empowerment. In 1971, Sullivan joined the General Motors Board of Directors, thereby becoming the first African-American on the board of a major US corporation. He remained on the board for more than twenty years. During the 1980's, Sullivan used his influence as a member of the GM Board to fight against South Africa's apartheid policies. In 1997, Sullivan developed the Global Sullivan Principles, which called on multinational companies to work for human rights and social justice, which the United Nations supported and issued in 1999. Leon Sullivan continued as an influential and respected leader in human rights until he died from leukemia in 2001.

OIC continued beyond his retirement and death, today operating with 42 affiliates in 22 states across the country. Education continues to be an emphasis, as OIC has several current programs focused specifically on at-risk high school youth, namely the Career & Academic Development Institute, the Integrated Career & Education Program,\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{187} McKee, \textit{The Problem of Jobs}, 204-210.
and the Quantum Opportunity Program.\textsuperscript{188} These programs could easily be considered direct or indirect descendants of the Career Intern Program, thereby helping to cement CIP's legacy as an important educational program and model for emulation.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The Career Intern Program changed substantially over the ten years of its existence. These alterations were born of several factors. The simple process of having to implement the Program led to many changes, as UCEC leaders realized that the original design was simply not feasible or realistic. However, the greatest amount of programmatic change happened when the National Institute of Education assumed the funding responsibilities for the Program. NIE staff ended rolling admission and introduced the concept of cohorts. They forced UCEC to introduce control groups into the project, which served to act as a comparison for the Program's interns but was also a source of friction between CIP and the local African-American community. NIE also insisted that the Program subcontract its testing and evaluation to an outside organization, which led to the addition of Gibboney and Associate to the grant. Gibboney standardized and professionalized all the assessment procedures, which led directly to many improvements made to CIP during the NIE grant.

The Career Intern Program and the National Institute of Education had at first glance nearly irreconcilable differences. The Career Intern Program espoused Leon Sullivan's principles of self-help and community uplift, while the National Institute of Education was explicitly a research organization. At first, the leaders of these two groups struggled to work together because of bad communication and a feeling that they were stuck with each other against their will. Relations reached such a low point that a meeting of upper-level management had to occur, out of which came the Memo of
Agreement. The Memo of Agreement cleared the air of animosity and frustration, and empowered the two organizations to begin to work together.

As time went on during the grant, the Program-Institute relationship continued to strengthen. Ben Lattimore and Al Cunningham were the main points of contact between the two organizations. Their professional and congenial relationship allowed for frank communication and quick decisions that deeply benefited everyone. Also, both organizations came to understand that they were 'in it for the long haul,' and everyone decided to do what they could to make the relationship work. By the end of the grant period, NIE, CIP, and Gibboney had established a close working relationship that produced a wealth of positive results. Overall, the Career Intern Program showed that focusing on potential dropouts in high school and offering them a hybrid high school and career education curriculum and other innovations could be more successful than traditional high schools.

The Career Intern Program's story did not end with the National Institute of Education. The Joint Dissemination Review Panel and Gibboney's Final Report established CIP as an exemplary educational program and raised its profile among professional educators. From 1975 to at least 1980, dozens of education officials contacted CIP requesting further information about the Program, seeking to possibly implement CIP in their respective schools or districts.

Also, starting in 1976, CIP received a dissemination grant from the Department of Labor. The main thrust of this grant was to see how well the Program could be replicated in sites other than Philadelphia. This grant allowed UCEC to spread CIP to four new sites: Hudson Valley, Detroit, Seattle, and New York City. These new sites presented
distinct challenges to CIP. CIP became a national organization, with new levels of management and increased distances that made oversight and changes harder to accomplish. They also had to find adequate personnel for four sites in a very constricted time frame, a fact that severely taxed their ability to find staff and administrators who bought into OIC’s operating principles and civil rights vision. However, by the end of the DoL grant, CIP again showed its ability to create a cohesive organization that made results.

Soon after the Department of Labor grant expired in 1981, the Career Intern Program folded. Its closing raises many concerns and questions about the efficacy of the Program, as well as about its place in the historiography. The ultimate end of the Program might lend credence to the idea that the Program failed. However, such a sweeping conclusion would not do justice to the CIP staff’s accomplishments. All the organizations associated with the Career Intern Program, the National Institute of Education, the Department of Labor, Gibboney and Associates, and Dr. Tallmadge's consulting group, praised the Program. The examinations that the Program conducted in order to compare the control and experimental groups showed that interns had statistically significant advantages in reading, math, and school and employment status over high school students in the control groups. CIP succeeded in positively affecting the interns that attended the Program, as interns progressed educationally at a faster rate and had higher graduation and employment rates than normal high school students. Considering the struggles that the Program encountered to become established and effective during both grant periods, these results are all the more impressive.

On the individual intern level, the Career Intern Program proved to be very successful. Also, Program leaders did create relatively smoothly-operating local programs, even though the process was fraught with troubles. Most problematic was the hiring of staff, but the local CIP Directors persevered and succeeded in finding adequately qualified personnel to fill open positions. By the early 1980's, OIC was also struggling with the quality of its personnel and training, so CIP's problems were hardly isolated from its parent organization.

The Program's biggest failing was leaders' inability to find new funding. For the duration of CIP, the NIE and DoL grants were predicated on the Program's experimental nature, to verify whether CIP was a viable educational program. Once the specific grant periods expired and Program leaders had adequately shown CIP's efficacy, the Program was no longer experimental and could not extend the grants, and OIC was not able to find other government agencies willing to fund the CIP as a non-experimental program. OIC leaders also struggled to include OIC and CIP in national legislation, as Nixon's New Federalism caused a shift in the political climate away from national organizations like OIC, while OIC was simultaneously declining in influence. The 1970's also saw a massive recession that crippled the American economy, which limited private funding options for the Program, and so even supportive organizations such as the Philadelphia School District could only partially fund CIP's operational cost. The election of Ronald Reagan introduced a wave of government cuts that was the final nail in CIP's coffin.

The legacy of the Career Intern Program is mixed. It struggled throughout its operational life and eventually died off. It would be easy to label CIP as a failure. However, to label it as such would overlook the successes that it did accomplish. In this
regard, the Program mirrors other African-American efforts that caused positive change but were limited by external factors. One example is the black political efforts in Oakland, which were pushed back by the white suburban tax revolt in 1978. As has often been proven the case, African Americans did not experience unmitigated success, but rather sought for ways to empower their communities while having to fight against external currents that threatened their gains. The same holds true for the Career Intern Program.

The number of interns the Program serviced does not measure the importance of CIP. During the whole of its operational life, the Program might have served roughly around 1,000 interns, possibly a couple hundred more. This total represents a significant minority of the underprivileged black urban youth during that period. The Career Intern Program, although small, ties into long-standing historical issues that are intrinsic parts of the urban landscape. Blacks had worked for civil rights and equal economic opportunity for decades, and the Program was part of those efforts. More specifically, the CIP was an outgrowth of Leon Sullivan's civil rights efforts, which had predominantly been political and economic in nature. His desire to cultivate a strengthened black community built upon self-help and self-reliance led to the creation of the Opportunities Industrialization Centers, a job-training organization that became a premier national job-training program. Expanding his vision, Sullivan sought to reach high school students, and so he led the creation of the Career Intern Program and expanded his efforts into education.

The Career Intern Program also sheds light on the federal government's role as part of the civil rights movement. Initially, CIP had a very explicit mandate to help black youth stay in school and choose a profession. These objectives fit firmly within the self-
help ideology that Leon Sullivan and OIC leaders hoped to introduce into the urban black community. However, the resulting Program relationships with the National Institute of Education and the Department of Labor at times threatened CIP's main purpose. Still, CIP's operational goals were at the very center of all of the changes that the government and Program staffs made to CIP itself. At times, these organizations greatly disagreed on how to serve best the Program's target population, but overall, these partnerships highlight the positives that can come out of private organization-government agency collaboration. While the Program serves to show the positive role that the federal government can have within the black community and efforts for improvement, it also serves as a warning. CIP's story highlights the overwhelming importance of funding to any program's success, as well as the dangers of seeking for the institutionalization of change. Sullivan's initial vision was for the Program to be disseminated across the country with funding by a combination of local, state, and federal sources. However, the developed over-dependence on the federal government and an inability to foster working relationships with local private and public groups narrowed the Program's financing pool. This ultimately aided in the death of CIP as its lone source of funds ceased to bear fruit.

On an ideological level, the Career Intern Program is exceedingly complex, mirroring OIC's. Leon Sullivan sought to blend liberal traditions of working with government and conservative self-help strategies to uplift the black community. Both contributed to CIP's success, as liberalism opened the door to federal funding and oversight, both of which gave the Program mechanisms to exist and improve over time. Meanwhile, self-help appealed to the black community's political environment of the 1970's, increasing its appeal to African-American families and youth. In addition, it
introduced a powerful sense of purpose and meaning to the Program, which helped create its unique ethos and *esprit de corps* among its staff and interns. However, both these ideologies also had their negatives and clashed against each other, creating an enduring irony of a black organization for blacks, run by blacks, but not funded by blacks.

As previously noted, the CIP's dependence on the government for money made it vulnerable to a changing national political climate. These circumstances at times threatened the Program's existence and at other times introduced undesired changes. CIP's strong mentality of self-reliance was sometimes difficult to cultivate within the Program itself, especially during the Department of Labor grant period, as the long distances between sites inhibited central authority and uniformity. When there was disunity among staff concerning CIP's goals and methods, the Program's ability to operate was negatively affected because CIP relied so heavily on the idea of a staff fully dedicated to the Program's operating ethos. The Career Intern Program helps to show how these two competing ideologies extended into education and the roles they played in the complex world of the 1970's.

While its closing highlights the dangers of dependence upon public organizations for funding, CIP's operational period was a success. It shows that blacks could succeed at least in part in community uplift and positively change their locales. The Career Intern Program also shows that civil rights action in the north extended beyond just the political and economic into the educational realm. It helps to extend the civil-rights movement chronology to include black efforts to work with government in the post-War on Poverty era. Such efforts are perhaps less visible or dramatic than marches, but they deserve attention as part of the long civil rights movement, for their efforts shaped the community
they aimed to serve. Education had at least some part in the civil rights struggle in northern cities, a part that deserves a larger place in the civil rights historiography. Furthermore, the Career Intern Program invites a reassessment of how government and private organizations interacted in order to attain socioeconomic equality goals. By looking again at these dynamics, historians will better understand if the Career Intern Program was unique in its success or if it is part of a larger and yet untold dynamic in the civil rights narrative.
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