Situating Structural Violence Within Peace: A Critical Study of Peacebuilding in Rwanda and Cambodia

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SITUATING STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE WITHIN PEACE:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING
IN RWANDA AND CAMBODIA
by
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
Political Science
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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
2015
ABSTRACT

Situating Structural Violence Within Peace:

a Critical Study of Peacebuilding in Rwanda and Cambodia

by

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Utah State University, 2015

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Many peace agreements fail despite external mediation and intervention, prompting a deconstruction of the predominant conceptions of peace and methods of peacebuilding. Of the weaknesses of these conceptions, the lack of concern for post-conflict structural violence is one of the strongest, and the main focus of this research. Infant mortality rate variations demonstrate the salience of structural violence in post-conflict situations. Further, to look deeper at the weaknesses of the hegemonic ideals on peace and its implementation by external actors, the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia are analyzed using the comparative method, and situated within critical peace literature. The comparison finds that rapid military integration may cause violence to restart, and that non-state entities appear more likely to be disarmed than recognized states during the post-conflict phase. This research also suggests that not disarming rebels in the peace process is an indication of a move towards a more just and inclusive society that will lead to a decrease in both direct and indirect violence, including a decrease in structural violence as indicated by a decline in the infant mortality rate.
Many peace agreements fail despite external mediation and intervention. This research delves into why that may be, by scrutinizing UN involvement in the resolution of two conflicts, Rwanda and Cambodia. These conflicts were selected due to their similarly high death rates, and their official cease-fires in the early 1990s. Further, the agreement in Cambodia was successful, while the one in Rwanda failed, resulting in the 1994 genocide. Through comparative analysis, it is found that structural problems in the agreements lead to discontent. The issue that appears most salient in the failed Rwandan agreement is the fast timeline for military integration. Thus this research concludes that immediate or rapid military integration or demobilization, may destabilize the peace process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Colin Flint PhD, as well as my committee members Ronnie Ward PhD, and Eddy Berry PhD for their patient assistance, and for not accepting mediocre work. In addition I would like to thank Kai He PhD, Damon Cann PhD, and Peter McNamara PhD, for their help with specific questions during the planning process, as well as several colleagues at large, Zuhir Bodalal MD & PhD in Benghazi, as well as Briony Jones PhD in Basel, and Stina Högbladh PhD in Uppsala for their assistance via correspondence on this research project.

I give special thanks to my partner Cynthia, and cohort members Aina Niaz & Chong Chen, as well as Mandy Hoggard and Matthew Anderson, for being my proxies while I was away.

S.L. Reeder
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INTRODUCTION

There is a problem with the way we have been pursuing peace: our efforts have not broken the cycle of violence. Evidence can be found in the continuing violence in Israel/Palestine, or the recurrence of violence for generations in African nations such as Liberia, or the particularly haunting genocide in Rwanda. The United Nations and others often intervene in conflicts, or assist in implementing cease-fires, but the cease-fires are all too often short lived. Our ability to ensure lasting peace appears to be failing.

One part of the problem, is the focus on old practices intended for interstate war. Since the trailing end of the Cold War, internal conflict, rather than interstate conflict, has been predominant. From 1975 to 2011, 173 conflicts were logged by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), of which 150 were intrastate (Högbladh, 2011, p. 43). These conflicts may be less sensational than major interstate wars, yet are particularly problematic due to their common recurrence, even following peace agreements.

The current “liberal” model does produce positive results on occasion. Truly, violence has declined overall, yet local dissatisfaction has increased. “So far the liberal peace project has not been subject to a concerted ethical consideration over the last two decades. Instead, its legitimacy tends to rest on past glories or on the praxis of already peaceful liberal polities” (Richmond, 2009, p. 558).

In an effort to ameliorate, break, or at least attenuate, the aforementioned cycle of civil war the United Nations has implemented new programs such as DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), and has pushed for rapid democratization and liberalization. Nonetheless, many of the conflicts in which these
programs have been tried have fallen prey to the same cycle of recurrence. Clearly, either the programs are either poorly designed or the resources to properly undertake such programs are inadequate. For instance, despite multiple peacekeeping operations in Liberia, conflict kept reoccurring, as the goals the UN set for themselves did not reflect the breadth and severity of the conflict (McFate, 2010). This research suggests that disarmament has a negative effect on the post-conflict stage, increasing indirect and direct violence, and particularly structural violence, as seen in infant mortality rate increases.

The Comparison

In this research, two well-known, but little understood, conflicts resolved in recent decades will be compared. This comparison will demonstrate some of the problems to which the current paradigm of peace making is subject. First among these is Rwanda. Two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, were often in conflict. In 1990, exiled Tutsi invaded Rwanda from the refugee camps in Uganda to reclaim their homeland, leading to a short and bloody war, before a cease-fire in 1993. In 1994, before the Arusha Accords could be implemented, Hutu militias broke the peace, and began a mass genocide of Tutsi. In response, the invading Tutsi exiles resumed their war and had subdued the whole country within four months. Interestingly, after the takeover, the conflict never restarted. Moreover, Rwanda has since distinguished itself from other sub-Saharan states by reducing its infant mortality rate drastically, as well as becoming a shining beacon to
the world by having more than fifty percent female representation in parliament, the highest in the world (World Bank, 2015).  

The second is Cambodia. Cambodia underwent continual upheaval after its independence from France in the 1950s, including mass killings in the 1970s. From 1978 to 1990, Cambodia experienced a civil war, which is the focus of this study. The 1990 Paris Accords ended the conflict, and it did not restart. Unlike Rwanda though, infant mortality actually rose for some time after the conflict ended, before eventually beginning to reduce again (World Bank, 2015).  

These two conflicts show an interesting mix of failure and success. Particularly, the lack of improvement in conditions, proxied by infant mortality rates, in the supposedly peaceful Cambodia, suggest that there may be more to peace than just a lack of direct violence. Indeed, other scholars such as Galtung (1969) and Farmer (2004) have suggested that another type of violence exists, known as structural violence. Structural violence is the systematic disadvantage experienced by the individuals and groups within a country due to the social, political, and economic structures of that country. This research analyses structural violence through infant mortality rates, finding that infant mortality rate increases are often indicative of significant short to medium-term political turmoil in the periphery of the world economy.  

Following the analysis of structural violence, the two conflicts are compared to determine some of the reasons why one agreement failed, while the other did not.

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1 Sex ratios account for at least some of this, as Rwanda’s ratio is .87 males per female for those between 55 and 64, and .7 for those 65 and over, the ages likely to be in political roles. Nevertheless, this sex ratio is not necessarily a predictor of high female representation, as Benin has a similar ratio, but exhibits only 7% female representation, one of the lowest in the world. While this high level may not last as the sex ratios even out in the future, the progress is nonetheless remarkable.
Among the notable differences, it appears that overly rapid military integration of rebels and loyalists may make violence more likely to break out again, as happened in Rwanda. Additionally, non-state actors appear to be treated differently than those recognized as legitimate. However, in Cambodia, both sides were recognized by separate portions of the international community, breaking from the norm of the international community only recognizing the reigning government. The recognition of the non-state entity in the Cambodian conflict dyad may be important in the acceptability of the terms, and the general feeling of increased respect the effected groups would feel in negotiations, and in the post-conflict landscape.

To reach the aforementioned conclusions, the research goes through the following steps. First, the basic history of each conflict is established. Then the literature is consulted to determine the history of peace, its meaning/s, the post-Cold War applications, and the theoretical reasons why those applications are helpful or not in creating and maintaining peace. Next, the research analyzes infant mortality rates in conflict-affected countries, establishing the link between structural violence and infant mortality rate changes. Then the agreements and implementations of Cambodia and Rwanda are compared and analyzed to determine which areas are similar, and more importantly, in which causal areas the two differ. The resultant areas in which the two differ having already been detailed.

Discontent with the liberal model for peace

The “liberal” model of peace has experienced broad acceptance over the last several decades. At times, it has been considered at odds with realist ideals such as the
hegemonic peace, where peace is guaranteed by a dominant power and supposedly stable hierarchy. In the post-Cold War era though, the liberal model has extended to the view that liberal internationalist norms of individual rights supersede the realist ideal of state sovereignty (Chandler, 2004).

Individual rights and human rights are often cited by supporters of the liberal internationalist system to justify interventions, such as in Libya in 2011 by France, or even at the prospect of invading Iraq in 2003. These interventions; however, only serve to support the new balance of power (Chandler, 2004). Further, the standardization of prescriptions for peace has repeatedly failed to deliver a peace that is widely enjoyed by those in the affected areas (Mac Ginty, 2008). Hegre (2000), through his research, finds that only equally developed states enjoy peace through the liberal model of interdependence. On the other hand, less developed states often experience conflict with more developed states, due to a simple rule that Hegre (2000) discovered: The utility of occupation is negatively correlated with development levels, just as the cost of invasion is positively correlated with the same. Thus the liberal world economy, as interconnected as it is, may promote conflict with the least developed countries, and still favor the most developed, despite intentions.

Perhaps the most influential of contemporary dissenters is Richmond (2009; 2013). The failings of the model, Richmond (2013) claims, are due to the local dissatisfaction with the externally imposed process: Specifically, the assumption that whatever works in the West must work everywhere else is not valid. The liberal model also ignores the fact that the West got to where it is after long periods of very slow
change, rather than in a single sweeping change. Yet it is that sweeping change that is imposed to create more states in the West’s image (Richmond, 2013; 2009).

Sweeping change might not be an issue if changes worked exactly as planned. However, recent research has shown that democratization and marketization too early in the post-war phase lead to instability, and that instability often leads to ethnic dominance (Paris, 2004, p. 175). This does not seem as much of a problem if the hegemonic model is to be believed, where a dominant group with a monopoly on the use of force is considered inherently stable, think Tutsi supremacy over the Hutu. In spite of this claim, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 588), have shown that ethnic dominance is the most likely grievance to lead to a recommencement of violence following a peace agreement.

Richmond further argues that the peace and state building processes imposed by the United Nations and other Western entities are not tailored to the specific context. To succeed, he claims, the peace process must engage with the “everyday” (Richmond, 2009, p. 568). By this, he means that while the West stresses first security and then institutional establishment via a constitution, the everyday existence of the population either remains insecure or worsens. Thus, the West ignores human security to establish institutional security, thereby inviting structural violence, as the structures remain inadequate to meet the needs of the populace as a whole, and meet only those of the elites, or of the dominant ethnicity (Richmond, 2009).

The untailored peace process lacks both efficacy and legitimacy, leading at best to a “virtual peace” (Richmond, 2009, p. 565). Instead, what is needed is a “willingness to recognize local ownership, human rights, culture, social and grassroots resources for self-government as significant even in relation to the priorities of military or institutional
capacities and international order” (Richmond, 2009, p. 565). Hence, one could claim that where the Liberian DDR process went wrong was by working from the top down, rather than the bottom up. While the focus in Liberia was on getting the militias to demobilization areas, and to give up their weapons, which was much delayed and only with reluctance performed, the focus should have been on immediate integration of the militia into everyday life.

Origins of the conflicts in Cambodia and Rwanda

In the late 19th century, Germany finally entered Africa to colonize and administer lands like the other European powers were already doing. In the Great Lakes region of East Africa, the Germans found a small but profitable area useful for producing coffee. Based upon their European ideological heritage, the Germans felt that a hierarchical system would be beneficial to stability and to the retention of German colonial interests (Smith, 1995). To do this the German administrators looked at the existing structure, which consisted of an agricultural economy based upon farming and herding. Due to the inherent value of livestock compared to land, herders were already considered of higher status than field workers. Based upon this, the German administrators began by giving important government positions to the herders, giving them a vested interest in stability and German colonial rule. The herders became known as the Tutsi, and were much smaller in number than the farmers, who became known as the Hutu (Paris, 2004).

During World War I the German Army in continental Europe invaded and occupied neighboring Belgium. Unable to oust the German military from their homeland, the Belgian forces in Africa decided to claim German African holdings. One
of these was what is now Rwanda. Following the war, Germany forfeited all rights to overseas holdings, and thus the restored Belgium officially inherited the lands it had taken from the Germans in Africa. In order to solidify their own rule the Belgians opted to use the same already solidifying divide to determine ability to hold key positions. However, the economy had changed enough that the farmer/herder divide was no longer as salient. Instead, they kept the same names for the divides, but would make judgments based on nose measurements and height, to classify individuals (Paris, 2004).

By the time European colonies began to gain independence in the 1950s, the divide and the discontent between the two groups had grown to the point of violence. The majority Hutu had been unhappy about their political exclusion for some time, and the Belgians expected to withdraw soon, making the Hutu feel emboldened. In 1956, two years before gaining independence, a majority Hutu militia overthrew the Tutsi king, and the Belgians did next to nothing to push back. The coup also triggered a wave of violence in the country, causing at least 150,000 mostly Tutsi to flee to neighboring Uganda (Smith, 1995; World Bank, 2015)

Although most of the country's Tutsi population remained in their homes in Rwanda, the refugees who had crossed into Uganda did not feel safe coming home. Instead they stayed in Uganda, but were not welcomed there either. They were forced to live in isolated communities, which increased their levels of ideological encapsulation (Della Porta, 2013), eventually leading to the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a military organization with the intent of retaking Rwanda. The fledgling RPF often found work fighting for one side or the other in local disputes, but as the population grew, and was still not integrated, the dream of reclaiming their homeland transformed
into a necessity. In 1990, the RPF crossed the border from Uganda, intent on ousting the reigning Hutu majority government (Smith, 1995).

For two years the war continued, until a tentative ceasefire in 1992. The United Nations then began mediating talks between the two groups in Arusha Tanzania, and in August of 1993, a peace agreement was signed by both parties. This agreement failed however, when the airplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down by an unknown party in early 1994. Hutu militias in the capital city of Kigali began killing Tutsi civilians in retaliation, and the violence spread (Paris, 2004; Smith, 1995).

According to Paris (2004), the failure of the Arusha accords was due to local dissatisfaction with the terms and with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR was to ensure the security of the capital, Kigali, as well as to implement military reforms, which included demobilization. In addition, the economy had been experiencing net shrinkage since 1990 as a result of both the upheaval and the crash of coffee prices. With coffee as Rwanda’s most important export, this put them in a very tight position, yet at the same time, UNAMIR was pushing economic liberalization.

When the mission ended in 1996 after having been gutted and determined ineffective (UN, 1996), the RPF government was left without help from the United Nations (Makinda, 1996). Fortunately, many RPF members resided in neighboring countries such as Uganda, which gave those countries a vested interest in Rwandan stability. Only later did the UN assist in the “Culture of Peace” program in Rwanda and
Nicaragua, which was intended to build up private civic organizations, and has been shown to be a helpful precursor to democratization (Paris, 2004, p. 175).

Cambodia

Cambodia’s proximity to the waterway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans has led to a long history of outside influences and exploitation. This is evidenced by their historic subjugation by the Siamese, influence from the Chinese, and ultimately, the long French Protectorate of the 19th and 20th centuries. This protectorate was temporarily interrupted from 1941-1945 due to World War II, when the Japanese military occupied the territory, along with much of East Asia (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

In 1946 when the French returned after the end of the Japanese occupation, many things changed. Though independence did not arrive for several more years, a new constitution allowed for the first political parties and elections. Nevertheless, a number of Cambodian communists were not pleased with French rule, and formed the first in a string of guerrilla resistance groups which would plague the country for the next few decades (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

In 1953, the kingdom of Cambodia officially gained independence from France, and in 1955, King Siouhanouk abdicated the throne in favor of his father, but quickly became Prime Minister himself. Siouhanouk would be one of the most important figures in Cambodia for many years to come, even from exile at certain points (Kiernan, 2014). For ten years, there was relative peace in Cambodia, but in 1965, the Cambodian Government allowed the North Vietnamese guerillas to operate in their territory. This
relationship continued until 1970, when a coup established the Khmer Republic, which actively fought against the North Vietnamese (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

The coup may well have been helped along by the initial decision of the Kingdom of Cambodia to tacitly assist the North Vietnamese. As a result of that decision, the United States undertook many covert operations and bombing campaigns in Cambodia in 1969. While these were primarily against the North Vietnamese guerrillas, they likely assisted in fueling the dissatisfaction and fluidity of power that led to the 1970 coup (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

Following this coup, the former king and Prime Minister Siouhanouk escaped to China, where he formed the Khmer Rouge as a communist guerrilla movement. Meanwhile the Khmer Republic began actively fighting the North Vietnamese who were operating in Cambodian Territory. However, they did not fare well against the two enemies of the Khmer rouge (Kiernan, 2014).

In 1975, the Khmer Rouge staged a successful coup. This brought Siouhanouk back, but also brought in foreign educated intellectuals like Pol Pot. This group of intellectuals was influenced largely by the French Communists, who had taken up the cause of the Viet Minh, the Vietnamese faction recognized as the legitimate government by the USSR. Eventually these individuals worked their way into the many revolutionary groups of Cambodia, and then threw their weight behind the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan, 2014).

Following the coup, many urban citizens of Cambodia were forced to move to the countryside. This was part of an effort to return Cambodia to a more agrarian society, like it had been in the middle ages. Unfortunately there were far too many people living
in Cambodia for this to work, and many starved, while others were killed for dissent, real or suspected, leading to a death toll of approximately 1.7 million in the next few years (Kiernan, 2014).

Amidst the killing and starvation, a minority of Vietnamese descent living within Cambodia fared worse than the rest. This was partially due to Khmer Rouge government suspicion that the Vietnamese planned on creating a larger Indochinese union under the aegis of Vietnam.\(^2\) Within two years, border skirmishes had begun with Vietnam, and finally in 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

The symmetric portion of the conflict lasted only until the next year, when the Vietnamese took the capital and established territorial dominance. The Vietnamese ran the country for a short while until a pro-Vietnam government was elected in 1981. Nonetheless, the new government was not recognized, and Siouhanouk and the exiled Khmer Rouge retained the United Nations seat. Over the next eight years, the conflict between the pro-Vietnamese government and the Vietnamese still occupying the country, and the government in exile displaced hundreds of thousands of people, adding to the instability and fueling further conflict (Curtis, 1998).

In 1989 however, the government opted to abandon socialism in order to attract foreign investment. This coincided with the beginning of peace talks in Paris, and with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. By 1991, the peace agreement was signed, and the peace was more or less durable. Siouhanouk returned and became King in the new regime (Curtis, 1998).

\(^2\) These fears were exacerbated by the circumstances in Vietnam immediately preceding the Khmer Rouge takeover. In 1973 the United States and North Vietnam signed a cease-fire, in 1974 the United States pulled out its remaining troops, and then from 1974 to 1975 the North Vietnamese broke the cease fire and conquered South Vietnam with impunity (Kiernan, 2014).
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Determining problems in the predominant views of peace, in addition to research, needs to be situated in the literature. Namely, the definitions of peace must be discussed, as well as what several scholars say on how peace is achieved. Defining what one means by peace might seem trivial, but the discussion to follow demonstrates that there are very different meanings and understandings.

Dietrich (2006) outlines the development of the common conception of peace. In Ancient Greece, Circa 600 BCE, the beginnings of the current understanding arose. The concepts of a singular truth, and a singular order are guaranteed by power within the city state system. The concept was reinforced by the theology of the day, where Peace was deified in the goddess Eirene. According to how peace was accomplished, Eirene was the daughter of Zeus and the titaness Themis, who represented power, and order, respectively. Thus Peace was the product of Power and Order.

As a result of this conception of peace through power and order, there is a phobic sense of security to protect the institution of the city-state. Dietrich (2006) terms this Phobos, and extends this concept to organized religions over the ages, and finally to the current states-system.

This monological and reductive variant of peace spread around the Mediterranean, but did not quickly catch on elsewhere. This allowed for an internally efficient region, but divided them from rest of the world, who still thought of truth as subjective and multiple. The divide often led to conflict, even though it reduced internal conflict. The relationship between systems can be demonstrated more recently by the
failed democratic peace theory, where democracies are less likely to fight each other, but more likely to fight non-democracies (Dietrich, 2006).

The Greek development is described as a transition from the previous, magical world view, to a mystical one; where the magical view is/was energetic. Energetic is the term Dietrich (2006) uses, but can also be read as agonistic. The magical view represented the existence of multiple competing views, all in competition with one another, but not necessarily attempting to dominate the others, simply existing in competition (Dietrich, 2006; Shinko, 2008).

The magical world may not have been entirely chaotic, as one might suspect due to the variety of views. Some level of conflict has actually been suggested to be a positive thing, keeping the social order more fluid and maintaining pluralism, which can protect from political ossification, which is a particular danger in the periphery of the world economy (Jones, 2014; Mouffe, 2005, p. 32).

In northern Europe, the magical worldview never went away, and seems to have coexisted after the introduction the mystical worldview with Christianity. The most salient example of this is the German word for peace, friede, which traditionally meant to treat as kin. This understanding of peace required the respect and recognition of the other, rather than merely toleration. Nevertheless, the northern European understanding was superseded by the more hegemonic Mediterranean one (Dietrich, 2006).

Hegemony, or the political dominance of one political entity over others as prescribed by the Greek understanding of peace, persisted for millennia as the primary manner in which peace was maintained. Additionally, though hegemony spread its
tendrils throughout the world, the country in the position of dominance, the hegemon, has almost invariably been a European power (Dietrich, 2002, p. 50).

The idea of hegemonic peace went more or less unchallenged until the mid-20th century. And only after two world wars, did challenging the hegemonic conception of peace become acceptable. The challenge did not stop there though, as it also became more common to posit the presence of a hegemon as the root cause of the recurrence of violence. One of the earliest and most influential authors to do this was Johan Galtung (1969), who introduced the idea of two types of peace: negative and positive. The newly posited model suggested that while hegemony may reduce direct violence, it ignored the negative effects of the underlying structure of the capitalist world-economy within which the processes of hegemony occur. This political structure closely mirrors the world economy through core-periphery dynamics (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 57), where the negative effects of said structure were dubbed “structural violence”, by Galtung (1969, p. 171).

While direct violence is bodily harm done intentionally, by one upon another, structural violence is the disadvantage experienced by individuals and groups due to the operation of the political and economic structures. For example, in order to achieve stability, the Germans and Belgians created a micro hegemony between the cattle herders and the farmers of the African Great Lakes Region, giving positions of power and dominance to the former. Over the years however, the descendants of those original farmers became more and more disadvantaged due to structural violence. While it may be true that this structure prevented direct violence for a time, the structural violence continued until the divide was so severe that direct violence began. Additionally,

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3\textsuperscript{a}... when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence.”
research has shown that many of the specific methods of preventing direct violence, such as sanctions, often enhance the structural violence toward already disenfranchised groups (Galtung, 1969; Høivik, 1977, p. 59). This study suggests that disarmament will do the same.

Structural violence may seem difficult to measure, but in reality, a number of common indicators can give one a sense of structural violence. Among these are natal indices like preterm birth rates, low birth weight rates, and rates of caesarian section (Bodalal et al, 2013); or post-natal infant mortality rates, as children and mothers are particularly susceptible to day-to-day stresses. Other methods, such as those used by Høivik and Galtung (1971), measure productivity and lowered life expectancy through indices like the number of days of lives lost, counting both the reduction in life expectancy and the extra time needed by some groups to accomplish life tasks as compared to other groups.

According to Galtung (1969), Negative peace is the lack of direct violence. Contrarily, positive peace is the lack of structural violence, which is much harder to achieve, let alone to measure. While negative peace can be measured easily by the lack or presence of direct violence, positive peace requires indirect measurement through indicators of increased stresses due to inequalities between groups. This is also known as horizontal inequality, differentiating it from intragroup, or vertical inequality (Galtung, 1969; Wæver, 2008, p. 103).

Additionally, unlike direct violence, which is done by a specific actor, structural violence is exerted systematically. That is, structural violence is exerted indirectly by everyone in a particular social order. This spread of blame can provoke discomfort in our
moral economy, which is still geared toward pinning praise or blame on individual actors, rather than the system (Farmer et al., 2004, p. 2).

In this research, structural violence will be measured through infant mortality rates, due to the availability of reliable historical data from the World Bank (2015). While infant mortality rates are dropping worldwide, and since 1960 there is not a single country where the rate is higher now than it was then, temporary increases are shown during and after significant political change. In the former Soviet Republics this change was due to the drastic change in government type; because these all happened at roughly the same time, it is unlikely that there is an intervening variable. Another type of political change, conflict and conflict resolution, also exhibits similar temporary increases in infant mortality rates. These correlations, while not thoroughly tested here, appear to happen in the same circumstances often enough to believe they are not spurious.

Post-Cold-War peace programs

While the omnibenevolence of hegemonic stability may be questioned now by some, it still has many proponents (Keohane, 1980). Additionally, standard programs intended to help with the peace process that were begun when the theory was unquestioned, remain, and only recently has there been a self-conscious study of how to keep conflicts from restarting once they stop.

One of these issues, which has become salient in recent decades, has been the lack of integration of former combatants into the post-conflict political, cultural, and economic scenes. Even in the framework of hegemonic security this is problematic, as these combatants may threaten the monopoly on the use of force. Additionally, a lack of
integration leaves the non-integrated groups at a disadvantage, yielding structural violence. Early programs attempted to remedy this by disarming and demobilizing combatants compulsorily, but this led to another problem; regardless of whether they had been disarmed and demobilized, former combatants without steady work in the aftermath of conflict contribute still to instability and insecurity (McFate, 2010, p. 1).

In acknowledgement of this problem, more recent cases have attempted to maintain security through either military integration or police reform, trying to keep at least some of the former combatants employed and engaged. Military integration of both sides in a conflict has better short term effectiveness according to Call (2012), as the combatants are retained on the payroll. Integration is much preferable to flooding the countryside with unemployed individuals already desensitized to violence. However, military security structures are not especially effective at maintaining the internal well-being of a state, and could thus increase structural violence, as soldiers are more likely to commit acts of violence upon citizens than are police forces.

Police reform, is more effective in the long-term at reducing structural violence, so long as each group feels equally protected. The weakness though, is that it both takes a longer time to establish a sense of security, and is not able to directly employ the former combatants without time consuming retraining and restructuring (Call, 2012, pp. 215-216)
Economics of love and fear

While Call’s (2012) examples of security cooperation are a useful starting point, it must be situated within an understanding of how the particulars of any restructuring will affect the population’s emotional, as well as physical well-being, and thus the levels of structural violence experienced. The important thing is that it is not what happens to someone that causes a violent reaction or lack thereof now or down the road, but the way they feel about what has happened to them. In order to maintain positive peace, requiring the lack of structural violence, and less directly negative peace, there must be a perception of genuine community between groups, not just within them (Lederach, 1999).

This genuine community leads to a sustainable, positive, “justpeace”, according to Lederach (1999). In Moral Imagination, Lederach (1999) attempts to shed light on how this type of community can be rebuilt, implying that the breakdown of the community was the cause of the conflict, or at least made the groups more vulnerable to conflict. The way to do this might not be obvious though. As a greater society, we are well equipped to understand and undertake efforts to stop painful and undesired things, like direct violence, but are not as well equipped to build, change, or rebuild the desired cultural norms, structures, and policies that would promote sustained cooperation, and prevent a return to violence (Lederach, 2005).

To create a theory of justpeace, and how to achieve it or not, Lederach (1999) borrows from Boulding’s (1990) work on grants economics. Boulding (1990) considered every interaction between groups of people, and even individuals, to be an economic exchange. While the motivation for the interaction could be monetary, as in traditional
Boulding (1990) outlined three types of power which motivated the exchange of grants; threat power, economic power, and integrative power. Grants are the exchange of goods, services, or concessions. Threat power relies upon the fear of punishment to elicit the exchange, economic power promises a substantive or monetary reward, while integrative power implies a deepening of connections between the parties and a mutual benefit. Metaphorically, these types of power are often referred to as “the stick, the carrot, and the hug” respectively (Boulding, 1990, p. 10).

Grants motivated by either the threat system or the integrative have opposing outcomes with regard to their emotional reception. Those motivated by the threat system foster discontent non-cohesion, and distrust, even if no physical action is taken as a result. Contrarily, integrative grant foster cohesion, contentment, and trust (Boulding, 1981, p. iv).

Lederach (2005), took these dichotomous outcomes, which Boulding (1990) often called fear and love, and extended them to a framework for the analysis of post-conflict interactions. This framework centers on the visualization of a continental divide, with water flowing in two directions away from it toward separate shores. One shore represents fear, while the other represents love. Should water flow toward the fearcoast, as it does when there is a threat based exchange, the relationship between the groups is defined by certain negative aspects. First, recrimination and the exchange of blame between parties. Second, self-justification and protection, where confirmation bias yields defensive escalation. Third, violence, as groups act on the continuing fear. Fourth,
victory, whereby the desire for dominance of the self over the other rises to its greatest degree (Lederach, 2005, p. 42).

Should the water flow toward the lovecoast, the relationship is defined by positive aspects. First, openness, as each group stops hiding what they do. Second, accountability, as they begin to feel trust, ultimately leading to self-reflection and vulnerability, which can be seen as the opposite of self-justification and protection. Where it is now acceptable to be vulnerable to possible violence, instead of protecting oneself against it to the extent that the other does not trust the self. Third, dignity, as each group feel respected and self-assured when faced by the other. Fourth, proactive engagement of the other, which is the mechanism through which the groups can maintain healthy relationships (Lederach, 2005, p. 43).

Where fear destroys, love builds. The latter must be emphasized to garner peace, but it is not always obvious which actions create which emotional reactions. A simple example of these exchanges in action is World War I, and the prior practice of extracting the cost of the war from the losing party. By doing this, the victor blames the loser for the damage, and the loser blames the victor for their subsequent poverty. This is most evident in the example of Germany, where reparations were to be paid to France and others, but the economy was subsequently wrecked. Additionally, Germany was limited in its ability to have an organized and armed military4. These terms, tied with local and world conditions, paved the way for extremist groups to vie for power, and created a deep sense of othering, helping the nationalists to take power (Carr, 1940).

4 De facto disarmament.
Poverty like that of the Germans, blamed by the Germans on the French, and to some extent the Jews, only heightens when the loser is held monetarily responsible, even while the victor becomes more and more resolute that their cause was just. That poverty was due to the structure of the peace agreement, and thus the Second World War, happened at least partly due to structural violence against the losers of the First World War. If this continues, it risks creating just the reactive protectionism in both sides that it did cause in Germany and France, and the desire of the Germans to reverse the dominance. The winner wishes to preserve the status quo by denying the vanquished the means to challenge their supremacy, while the loser becomes more and more discontented, and wishes to regain its strength and respectability (Lederach, 2005, p. 49).

Disarmament, othering, and thirdness

Throughout the aforementioned peace literature, there is mention of cleavage, and of fear, both of which are ways of explaining the self-other, or in-group out-group dichotomies, as well as the structural violence that results. Feminist understandings of peace point out the benefit of understanding the other, which can be done through the use of storytelling and listening, to create an emphatic space where violence and peace can coexist. New understandings allow one to take a step back from one’s own prejudices and the concerns of the other, achieving a state of thirdness, and ideally, a subsequent reduction in structural violence (Lau and Seedat, 2013).

The common perception otherwise is that the other is horrible, and the self is good, and thus violence, direct or structural, is perpetuated. The artificial self-other dichotomy, though useful for in-group cooperation, is the prime cause of intergroup
violence (Lau & Seedat, 2013). The empathic space concept meshes nicely with Dietrich’s conception of an energetic peace, as well as Shinko’s agonistic peace, but continues further, to show specifically how to break through the idea of a singular truth (Dietrich, 2006; Shinko, 2008).

The self-other, also known as in-group, out-group dichotomy can be both understood and deconstructed via storytelling, as stories allow us to empathize with the structural violence each group experiences. Stories allow us to understand the local view, rather than “cold” metrics of the supposed causes of conflict. The idea of empathic coexistence of peace and conflict is thirdness; a way to recognize and accommodate differences without needing to resolve the tensions first. Essentially, empathic space allows for a “mutuality of peace and violence” (Lau & Seedat, 2013, p. 485). This “mutuality” allows one to understand what the other side believes the trouble to be.

A number of types of exchanges relevant to conflict recommencement have their roots in othering. Exclusion of formerly warring parties from power is much more significant in the recurrence of conflict than the traditionally blamed factors, such as poverty, resource dependency, or state capacity (Call, 2012, p. 216). Any fear, whether or not substantiated, that former combatants are rearming, or a neighboring community arming for the first time, regardless of previous coexistence, can easily bring the peace process to a halt (Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 287-288).

Disarmament, as a tool used to enforce the monopoly on the use of force, fits nicely into this framework. Asymmetric disarmament would have the same effect as charging the losing party. Alternatively this would be considered a threat-motivated grant using Boulding’s (1981) work. So, if fear progresses, by undertaking a threat
motivated exchange such as disarmament, a group will become protective, and will find ways to arm or rearm themselves. If the group perceives a block from others to protective weapons, they will see it as an affront. They may also believe the other side is actively trying to keep them down, which they may well be, leading the losing party to the desire for their own dominance (Lederach, 2005).

Disarmament, and variable levels of access to armaments, changes the resources available to a given group in the post-conflict landscape. Dresden (2015) labels these differences in access to resources and armaments as the specific and convertible capabilities. Specific capabilities are those useful mostly for violence. Convertible capabilities on the other hand, are those which can be applied to a variety of social mobilizations\(^5\). Dresden also finds that while horizontal variation in capabilities leads to dominance, horizontal equality in capabilities almost necessarily leads to pluralism. From disarmament and non-integration, one can derive a sense of disenfranchisement or othering, particularly if it is asymmetric, or one group has greater capabilities.

If the motivations of the other side are not properly understood, then we easily fall prey to the temptation to label the other as “evil” (Cole, 2004), and deepen the othering. Othering might seem an unimportant detail, but it is key to how the in-group justifies conflict with the out-group. This is important both within the conflict and from the outsider perspective. Nevertheless, the moniker of “evil” is used quite prolifically, especially when describing one’s opponents, a term recently used to describe terrorists. Such a label is harmful to the peace process, as it is used as an excuse for not

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\(^5\) Which are actors of structural violence.
empathizing with the concerns of the other group. Only when each side can understand
the other's justification for conflict, will they be able to resolve their differences.

Thus the three methods that are likely to be the most effective are security
powersharing, thirdness, and the rejection of the label of evil. Use, or lack thereof, of
these methods, can be evaluated in addition to certain theoretical frameworks to
understand where conflicts arise, or perpetuate, from. The first two, or lack of the third,
being likely to promote structural violence, which may lead to direct violence, but at a
minimum is not ideal itself.
METHODOLOGY

To accomplish the aforementioned goal of demonstrating the problems with the predominant views of peace, and the methods with which they are implemented, this research will use the comparative method (Ragin, 1981). Ragin claims that society is the most common unit of analysis in social science. Nonetheless, many scholars do not adequately define what they consider to be a society. Society is a valid unit of analysis, but this definition only restates the conclusion as its own raison d’être. Thus, should a society be the unit of analysis, then a society must be properly defined. Wallerstein (1974) on the other hand, would claim that the only valid unit of analysis is the historical social system, contemporarily the capitalist world-economy. According to Ragin (1981), Wallerstein’s uses the system as his theoretical unit of analysis, all the while relying upon lower order units as his data unit of analysis. Thus, while Wallerstein’s extreme example situates the comparisons within a greater system, he is still performing comparative analysis, often of states, to come to his conclusions.

The strength of the comparative method rests in its ability to explore a set of convergent causal conditions. This can be useful in two situations. First, when causes are complex, the comparative method can point out these convergent conditions where quantitative analysis might achieve spurious results. Second, the comparative method is helpful again where quantitative methods are not, as it can operate on a very small number of cases and still produce valid conclusions. Essentially in both cases, there are a large number of variables, but specific combinations of these yield particular situations.

Here the unit of analysis is the scope of a conflict, rather than society. For the purposes of this research, a conflict is defined as two or more groups of people whose
disagreements with each other, within or mostly within a single country, become violent. This definition is reductive, but also inclusive. However, under this definition, each and every instance of violence between peoples would be a separate conflict. Thusly, this research will adopt the definition that a conflict is a grouping, in time and space, of the aforementioned individual conflicts. Further, this grouping must maintain the logic of similarity, such that a grouping of conflicts, particularly if not temporally and or spatially similar, must include the same groups. Additionally, this study will also only be comparing internal conflicts, rather than inter-state conflicts. In both cases, the dyad is asymmetric, with one territorial entity and one non-state entity.

While the possibility exists for a conflict to restart at a different time and in a different place, the conflict often involves the same two or more groups. However, if the groups involved are not the same, it cannot be the same conflict. It is also quite possible that a conflict will persist, with the same groups, yet have very different names and structure at different points in the conflict. In Cambodia for instance, the earliest communist guerrillas later became a political party, then the ruling regime, and then reverted to resistance. The other side of the conflict, consisted of the North Vietnamese guerilla forces operating in Cambodia during the Vietnam War, then the united Vietnamese Army, and then the pro-Vietnam government installed by the Vietnamese. Under a different definition, Cambodia might be considered a series or even simple scattering of conflicts, but for this research it is considered a single conflict. Notably, while the US-Vietnam War is very strongly related, it will not be considered a part of the Cambodian conflict (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
Finally, the term “political change” must be properly defined. For the purposes of this research, political change is restricted to the periphery of the world economy. Additionally, for this project, it must be change that yields significant turmoil, or upheaval. For example, if a new president were elected or a law were changed this would not count as political change, while a coup would, or a policy change that disenfranchised a group of people would, such as banning the use of a local language in favor of a national one.

Design

The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the problems of the prevailing methods and understandings of peace, particularly where they may lead to structural violence. To this end two small but well known conflicts with differing outcomes are compared, namely Rwanda and Cambodia. First however, it will be demonstrated that structural violence is linked to political turmoil in the periphery of the world economy. The interactions of other variables with Infant Mortality Rates, as a measure of structural violence, in the two conflicts are more complex, but the importance of the link to the periphery is reinforced by the numerous points of agreement, where each of these countries has a similar relationship with the world as a whole. Thus comparing the agreements and their implementation will be useful in determining the problems that led to the varied outcomes. Many variables between the two countries have similar values (or agreement), making it a good comparison, but most telling will be the differences (or disagreements in the variables). In order to understand the effects these differences may
have had, the terms of the agreements will be measured against the frameworks of Lederach (1999), Boulding (1980), and to a smaller extent Call (2012).

Lederach’s (1999) and Boulding’s (1980) intertwining theoretical work will be useful in determining how certain parts of the peace agreement or implementation will affect all sides. Any of the stipulations may be seen as an economic grant reliant on one of Boulding’s (1980) three types of power, and more specific to structural violence, are the more dichotomous love and fear actions, and the processes of othering. Within specific sections on military integration, Call’s (2012) research will be relied upon to extrapolate likely proximal and distal benefits and costs of specific programs. Based upon preliminary comparison, one variable stands out as clearly different between the two. That is, the question of actor legitimacy in negotiations. While both sides were considered legitimate in the Cambodian conflict, the same cannot be said of the Rwandan one. While a set of hypotheses⁶, can be drawn from these, more cases will have to be examined to determine if this is a pervasive bias, or simply an anomaly.

Points of agreement and disagreement which play no causal role

Most of the agreement between the variables, and even a number of the disagreements, do not play an important causal role with regard to the dependent variable; confirming that the comparison of the two conflicts is a valid one, and demonstrating the similar relationship to the core of the world economy. Similarities,

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⁶ H1: If each member of a conflict dyad is recognized as having legitimate territory then the rights to armament and military organization will be retained in the peace agreement.

H2: If one member of a conflict dyad is not recognized as having legitimate territory then the rights to armament and military organization will not be retained for that member in the peace agreement.
and differences deemed to be unimportant, will be discussed later in this chapter, after the
discussion of the rationale behind the case selections. The similarities are used to justify
the cases' validity for comparison using the method of difference (Ragin, 1981).

In addition to the aforementioned questions of cleavage and actor legitimacy, there are several points of agreement. These points lend validity to the comparative study, and will be detailed below. Nevertheless, there are a number of points where the two cases do not agree. These might normally render the study too weak, but do not due to certain underlying similarities. Both groups will be discussed as to whether they can be considered as playing no significant causal role in the outcome of the dependent variable.

First among points of agreement is dyad symmetry. Both conflicts occurred between a recognized state and a non-state entity. Each of the reigning governments were recognized during the 1980s, while the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Khmer Rouge held no territory through which to be recognized. Second is temporality. In each conflict the country gained independence from a European colonial power in the 1950s, with various outbreaks of violence thereafter. Additionally, each underwent a peace process and subsequent agreement in the early 1990s.

Third are the analogous relationships. In each case, the country had similar relationships with regional powers, and far away powers. Rwanda was regionally peripheral to Uganda, and had colonial relationships with Belgium and Germany. Cambodia was regionally peripheral to Vietnam, and had a similar colonial relationship

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7 While the pro-Vietnam government was not recognized by the West, it had control of the territory and was recognized by many other states, most notably the Soviet Union et al, and the officially recognized (by the West) government held no territory and was in exile (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
with France (Prebisch, 1949). Fourth, is the presence of a non-state entity in exile. In Rwanda the RPF was created by exiled Rwandan nationals in refugee camps in Uganda. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge held no territory after 1978, and operated across the Thai border (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

Finally, both conflicts exhibited a foreign invasion. In Cambodia, the Vietnamese invaded after unifying Vietnam in 1978. In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded in 1990 (Smith, 1995). These, and the aforementioned points of agreement which could be considered independent variables, are used to validate the salience of the points of disagreement to come (Ragin, 1981).

In addition to these points of agreement are the two points of disagreement that have no significant outcome on the dependent variable. These are the relationships between the country and their respective colonial powers, and the regional context in which each country existed. Both can be regarded as unimportant in this study due to their analogous relationships. Both countries were peripheral to Europe, and to their more dominant neighbors, and so are similar despite their actual distance, and different colonial powers. Due to their underlying similarities, these will also be used to validate the salience of disagreements (Ragin, 1981).

Case selection

Both Rwanda and Cambodia underwent peace talks and subsequently had agreements in the early 1990s, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. In both cases, the United Nations was heavily involved in the process. The countries are far apart, but both states can be considered peripheral within their own regions, as well as the world.
The simplest explanation of the core-periphery relationship is offered by Wallerstein (2004, p. 11), via Prebisch (1949); that it is expected by powerful [core] states that the weaker [peripheral] states will follow an established world order; to open their borders to the goods and materials of the powerful states, without granting reciprocal access or a voice in the establishment of the world order. Regionally, both Rwanda and Cambodia are weak compared to their neighbors, such as Uganda and Vietnam, and subject to the will of the UN, the United States, China, Europe, and the Soviet bloc.

A possibly problematic difference is the cause of the conflict. While any conflict has multiple causes, it may often be linked to one cleavage more than others. In the case of Rwanda this is upon ethnic lines, while in Cambodia it is upon class lines. The cleavage difference is not as severe as it might seem however, as the Rwandan ethnic divide is recent, artificial, and originally class based. In the 19th century, German officials administering the territory selected as leaders the cattle herders who became known as the Tutsi. The bulk of the population though, was engaged in plant-based agriculture, and was generally poorer (Paris, 2004). What the Germans, and later the Belgians, did in the name of hegemonic stability, created an ethnic divide. In normal circumstances however, ethnic divides are much older, as each group has a separate heritage. For instance, the Greeks and Turks have been at odds for far longer than few generations, even if at a certain point they too shared certain parts of history. Too the Kurds with Sunni, Shia, and Turk. Thus it is concluded that this difference in cleavage does not constitute the problem it might.
### Figure 1

Variable comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable:</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Non-causal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporality?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad symmetry?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state entity in exile?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign invasion?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World core v. periphery?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regional core v. periphery</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border conflict with non-state entity?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial power?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleavage?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor legitimacy?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success of Agreement?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMR reduction?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military integration?</td>
<td>Y&amp;N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament?</td>
<td>Y&amp;N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
INFANT MORTALITY: A DEMONSTRABLY USEFUL TOOL TO GAUGE STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

In an effort to measure how structural violence can play into conflict resolution, a proxy variable was necessary. Some scholars have previously attempted this by treating immediate deaths as the result of direct violence, while other premature deaths are considered the result of structural violence (Høivik & Galtung, 1971; Köhler & Alcock, 1976). Premature deaths are not measured simply as a number of lives lost, rather, Galtung and Høivik (1971) to measure the number of years lost. Alternatively, Koehler and Alcock (1976) measure the number of lives lost due to lack of access to amenities. While more specific in cause, this method does not account for age at death as does the previous one.

This research however, is more concerned with daily stresses and structural inequality than adult mortality, often the result of direct conflict. The most demonstrative variable of stress on the populace, that is also widely available over several decades, is infant mortality. Infant mortality can often be seen increasing for a short time as a result of the frequent stresses of conflict and its concurrent hardships, as well as the stresses of political upheaval and class differences, especially in the periphery of the world economy.

Infant mortality has decreased in every country for which there is data in the World Bank database, which tracked the rate from 1960 to 2013 (World Bank, 2015). Even in countries, like Sierra Leone, where it is estimated that infant mortality remains above 100 deaths per 1000 live births within the first year of life, the rate has declined from nearly 1 in 4 fifty years earlier. The rate of Sierra Leone is in stark contrast to
Iceland, which has the lowest infant mortality rate with 1.6 deaths before age 1 per one thousand children born. There are also more than 60 countries of the 190 listed with single-digit per thousand rates. While much of this trend can be attributed to the availability of medical advances, the short term-changes during times of upheaval denote stress and lack of access to resources (World Bank, 2015).

In addition to the differences between countries, infant mortality has also declined at varied rates based on class. In many cases certain groups have retained high rates of infant mortality despite the national level declining. When high rates are retained in the face of overall decline, these high rates are suggested to be the result of either a lack of capital assets, a lack of social mobility, or simply a time-lag (Antonovsky and Bernstein, 1977). The first two of these could easily be correlated with structural violence, while the third is vague as to the cause, but suggests that it will improve for every class given enough time.

For example, the rate of black infant mortality in the United States has not only been historically higher than white infant mortality, the gap has broadened further over the last few decades (Singh and Yu, 1995, p. 964). This however, is not wholly due to racial difference, but rather the average socioeconomic differences between the two groups. Even controlling for this, black infant mortality rates remain higher than white rates, indicating structural violence (Williams and Collins, 1995).

As shown in figure 2, the world infant mortality rate has declined from above 120 as of 1960, to below 40 per thousand by the year 2013. Even in the case of Sierra Leone, which retains the highest rate, there has been a steady decline, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 2 World mortality rate, infant

(World Bank, 2015)

Figure 3 Sierra Leone mortality rate, infant

(World Bank, 2015)

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 Deaths between 0 and 364 days of life per 1,000 live births.
Despite the steady decline shown by most countries, as well as world and regional aggregates, spikes and plateaus can be seen in a number of individual countries during times they were undergoing political change. Such significant political change in the periphery is most clearly illustrated by a number of post-Soviet states in the early and mid-1990s, as these states had increases in infant mortality rates at the same approximate time due to similar changes from the breakup. Figure 4 shows the aggregated post-Soviet states, Figure 5 shows the same after removing Romania which proved anomalous, while Figure 6 shows the trajectory of select cases within the group.

While the Soviet breakup did not represent cases of othering, with the exception of Yugoslavia, due to its low IMR at the time of the change, the effect of non-violent political upheaval is clearer than it is in cases with higher IMRs. For instance, Sierra Leone underwent very large political upheavals, and experienced large-scale structural violence. However, the IMR was and is so high that the change is visually indiscernible. Thus the post-Soviet cases make a good control to demonstrate the usefulness of this tool in the periphery of the world economy, as the low levels of infant mortality make the increases extremely noticeable.
Figure 4 Post-Soviet states mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)

Figure 5 Post-Soviet states minus Romania mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
As Figure 6 shows, each of these countries began to experience an increase in their infant mortality rates as early as 1988, but had seen a reduction again by 1996. The obvious exception was Romania, which increased instead from 1984 to 1988 as a result of an austerity program designed to liquidate national debt. Though this program had an adverse effect on the population, it succeeded in removing all debt by 1987, allowing Romania an easier transition after the 1989 breakup (Roper, 2000). Notably, these countries already had very low levels of infant mortality in 1960, as compared to the world average, and despite the large relative spikes, conditions were still not terribly
severe during this time, as is visible in Figure 5. These comparisons show that infant mortality rates, in at least some cases, exhibit sensitivity to short and medium-term political change, when the countries are located in the periphery.

While the former Soviet Republics show increases due to the sociopolitical changes of the Soviet collapse, Sub-Saharan Africa shows similar spikes and plateaus due to conflict and regime changes, but as a group it is much harder to distinguish underlying processes, as they did not all occur at roughly the same time, as happened in the Soviet Republics.

![Graph](image)

Figure 7 Conflict affected Sub-Saharan mortality rate, infant (World Bank, 20155)

As is visible in Figure 7, there is a plateau in the infant mortality rates of conflict-Affected Sub-Saharan Africa, but due to the time differences of each conflict the aggregated graph is not very representative of the local situation, unlike in Figures 5 and 6, which show multiple spikes at the same approximate time. Figure 8 shows a selection
of such countries with varying degrees of relative increase in infant mortality. None of these is as prominent as Rwanda however, set aside in Figure 9.

![Graph showing infant mortality rates in Sub-Saharan Africa](image)

Figure 8 Conflict affected Sub-Saharan mortality rates, infant, select disaggregated (World Bank, 2015)

Rwanda shows not one but two very dramatic relative increases in infant mortality. This represents the two separate conflicts involving the same two groups. Immediately to the South the similarly peopled Burundi experienced these same conflicts, as can be seen in Figure 10, but the increases were not as severe, and neither was the subsequent decrease as fast, remaining significantly higher to this day. Burundi experienced the stresses, but not either the armed conflict, or the positive trend once tensions were alleviated.
Figure 9 Rwanda mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)

Figure 10 Burundi mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
Figure 11 Hutu-Tutsi conflict mortality rate, infant

(World Bank, 2015)

Figure 12 Liberia mortality rate, infant

(World Bank, 2015)
Even combining the two states into a single conflict graph does not greatly attenuate the twin-peaked slope. Compared to other conflicts around the world, this one seems to stand out. Other conflicts show a plateau or shallow slope, rather than this more extreme change. Figures 12 and 13 show the most common conflict profile.

Numerous other conflicts show this same general profile, with a general downward slope followed by a modest rise or plateau, but somehow the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, particularly in Rwanda, is much different, including its rapid improvement following the more recent outbreak.

This begs the question of why Rwanda differs. For instance, the United Nations undertook disarmament initiatives during the post-conflict phase in Liberia, but not in Rwanda, correlating with a much more rapid and effective change. This and other differences may have had an either positive or negative effect on the peace process, and warrants further and more in depth comparison.
In Burundi, the same conflict did not have so dramatic a decline in infant mortality following the end of the more recent outbreak. Due to the much higher rate of infant mortality in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide, the rate may have activated another mechanism which caused the rate to fall. High infant mortality at the time of a peace agreement has been shown to be statistically significant, increasing the likelihood of continued and more expansive negotiation, rather than minimal negotiations preserving the status quo (Joshi & Quinn, 2015), and could therefore have improved conditions, and reduced structural violence and IMRs. This concept is reminiscent of Mouffe’s (2005) work on political conflict mentioned earlier, as it keeps the group from accepting a less inclusive agreement, and reinforces pluralism.

In Cambodia, unlike Rwanda, the infant mortality rate does not follow the conflict as readily. For instance, the rate of deaths within the first year of life continued to drop drastically from year to year even as the adult mortality rate spiked during the “Year Zero” and beyond9. Indeed it did not even plateau until nearly five years after the 1978 Vietnamese invasion. Then, as the peace agreement was implemented, infant mortality rates rose for several years before reducing slightly year to year until 2000, when it began to fall at a higher rate. This odd behavior still seems to indicate structural violence, but perhaps more along the order of post-Soviet states than that of Rwanda.

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9 It is estimated that Cambodia had a population of 7.89 million in 1975, and would have grown to 8.2 million by the end of 1978, under normal conditions. At the end of 1978, the population is estimated at 6.36 million (Kiernan, 2003).
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

According to the Uppsala Conflict Database Program’s (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, 1975-2011, there were DDR programs and military integration programs as a part of both the Arusha and Paris Accords (Högbladh, 2011). While this initially appeared problematic, upon further investigation the programs and implementation in place were substantively different, despite their apparent similarities. Due to the number of unique cases the UCDP conflict dataset was attempting to catalogue, the necessary criteria for dichotomous variables were quite broad, and nonspecific. Both the Paris and Arusha Accords were sparse at best, with the exception of military integration in Rwanda (UN, 1996; USIP, 2002).

Neither case exhibited a full-fledged DDR program. In Rwanda, there was a UN mission sent to restrict the flow of arms across the Ugandan border to the RPF, but this embargo did not disarm, and preceded the agreement. In addition, a force of 16000 troops was allowed to remain in service, while the remaining soldiers were promised a small severance at some future date, by the Arusha Accords (UN, 1996). In Cambodia the program was even weaker. There was a stipulation that 70% of the forces of each side demobilize, but weapons used by the demobilized troops would be turned over to the remaining troops, rather than confiscated (USIP, 2002). This exchange was sufficient for the UCDP, but as no weapons would be taken from the militaries of either side, there would be no change in the specific capabilities of the factions (Dresden, 2015).

The plans for military integration demonstrate the most marked difference between the two agreements. While each agreement stipulated a restructuring of the military, which is the UCDP requirement, the stipulations were much different. In the
Arusha Accords for Rwanda, there was a very specific plan to almost immediately integrate the militaries. Half of the enlisted personnel were sourced from the RPF, and half from the Rwandan National Army. The enlisted personnel were not to be individually integrated, but were adjacent to those from the other side. Both groups had a mixture of officers, with a 60% to 40% mix, favoring the Rwandan National Army. These changes were implemented in 1994, less than a year after the peace agreement (UN, 1996).

In the Paris Accords for Cambodia however, the plan was not so detailed. As mentioned previously, the forces of each side were reduced by 70%. This was considered sufficient to qualify within the Peace Agreement Dataset, but actually made no mention of integration. There was no specified timeline for demobilization, nor for the only implied integration. The parallel demobilization, no matter when it was finished, was to last at least three years after the agreement, until the 1993 elections yielded a new political body to take over the military (USIP, 2002).

The stark difference in timeline of each expected implementation may be the most telling. The Arusha Accords were never fully implemented, as the Presidential Guard and Hutu militias began killing and maiming Tutsis in 1994, at which point the RPF resumed their invasion, and eventually succeeded in supplanting the reigning government. According to Paris (2004), the Arusha Accords failed specifically because of discontent with the terms.

Too rapid of change has been shown to be problematic in other areas as well. Paris (2004) demonstrates that rapid liberalization after the end of a conflict leads to
ethnic dominance\textsuperscript{10}. In Rwanda the looming military integration would have exacerbated fears of such dominance, through mechanisms analogous to those at work in overly rapid liberalization. Additionally, the discontent would have deepened the othering, moving the metaphorical water toward the fearcoast, despite the intention of the terms to be integrative.

While many parties may have been skeptical or afraid in Cambodia, the longer timeline and lack of specificity allowed for a slow easing of tensions. In Rwanda though, the rapid change was more like panic while approaching a cliff. Both countries were expected to experience a large number of military aged males to be demobilized, but in Cambodia it would not happen so abruptly. The Arusha Accords did promise a small lump sum to each demobilized soldier, it did not correct for the rapidity (UN, 1996).

Though the pro-government militias were the ones who restarted the conflict in Rwanda, due to their discontent, the RPF were also given reason to be unhappy with their terms. First, the UN did not recognize the RPF as a legitimate entity, with rights to a military and armaments for defense like they do for states. This is particularly evidenced by the pre-accord UN mission to create an arms embargo on the RPF, by blocking shipments across the Cambodian Border (UN, 1996). No embargo was placed on the Rwandan state, as it was considered to have an inherent right to defense because of its membership in the states-system. In Cambodia, despite the asymmetry of the conflict, each side was supported by a faction of the international community, and thus avoided was treated as a completely legitimate actor within the Westphalian states-system.

\textsuperscript{10} Ethnic dominance is linked to agreement failure (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
Additionally, the Paris Accords for Cambodia proclaim the emerging state to be completely neutral in world affairs, with the inherent right to self-defense, and all the organization and equipment to achieve self-defense. The lack of an embargo in Cambodia raises the possibility that the embargo in Rwanda was not put in order to prevent further violence, but to protect the member of the system from an extrasystemic entity. This is an example of Dietrich’s (2006) Phobos, where the system acts in a phobic manner to preserve itself. Here the world system punished the non-state actor, resulting in structural violence, not because it had a less legitimate claim, but because it was not a member of the club.
CONCLUSION

This comparative study of the conflicts in Rwanda and Cambodia yielded three important results. First, is that infant mortality rates do indeed seem to be linked to short and medium term political change in the periphery of the world economy, and are sensitive to economic conditions. Specific research is still warranted to ensure that a particular change in IMR is not caused by some other condition, but the link is nonetheless substantial. Were an intervening variable responsible for this, it is unlikely to have shown up so widely across the former Soviet Republics, and not confined to a single region. Instead it shows up in multiple countries in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and in the Balkans at the same time. Additionally, while Romania experienced an early elevation of infant mortality rates, neighboring and culturally similar Moldova experienced it at the same time as the other soviet republics, rather than with Romania. Were the increase caused by a local factor, it is unlikely that Moldova, or even Ukraine, would have been isolated from it. Instead it appears that Romania’s early economic reform led to the difference in timelines, beginning the same process a few years earlier.

Second, is that rapid military integration appears to cause fear and discontent, due to the possibility of faction dominance within the ranks. This result appears to parallel the problems associated with liberalization as outlined by Paris, (2004). Third is the apparent differential in treatment of those actors considered to be legitimate by portions of the international community. The clearest delineation is that states will generally retain the right to self-defense, and the personnel and equipment necessary for self-defense. Non-state entities will not retain this right, and at best will be allowed to integrate their personnel with that of the state. Non-disarmament, and the retention of
explicitly recognized rights to self-defense are representative of a move toward a more peaceful and just society, where direct and indirect violence will be reduced, including structural violence. This hinges on the concept of trust and respect between the parties, rather than fear-motivated disarmament. Or as integrative exchanges instead of threat based ones.

The weakness of these results comes from the small number of cases being compared. While the comparative method was useful to demonstrate the complex combination of variables within these specific conflicts, the use of this method damages the applicability of the results to other conflicts. Additionally, the research relies on the work of Boulding (1990), Dietrich (2006), and Lederach (2005) to make assumptions about how specific parts of the conflict and the peace agreements made the combatants feel. The work of these scholars may be generalizable, but it would strengthen the assumptions made here if interview and survey research were done with former combatants. That however, is not in the scope of the current research project. One final consideration, is that the conflict in Cambodia was not as fresh in the minds of the people as the one in Rwanda. Zartman (2005) has shown that conflicts may need to reach a level of “ripeness” before they can be successfully resolved; however, ripeness is only determinable after the fact, and Zartman gives no generalizable method with which to judge the ripeness of a conflict11.

11 Lederach (2003) feels that this approach has a few weaknesses. Firstly, it expects predictability; yet too often the signs of said ripeness are not apparent until the conflict ends successfully. Second, this ripeness is relative. While the conflict may be the at the right stage for one group, or the other, or the mediator, the likelihood that it will be ripe for all parties at the same time is low. He also sarcastically calls it “cherry picking” (p. 31) The ripeness metaphor makes it seem so easy; if done at the right time mediation and intervention are guaranteed to succeed, falling prey to over-simplification and failing to aid in the amelioration of conflict (Lederach, 2003; Zartman, 1985). Additionally, the ripeness metaphor sounds too much like the communist claim that capitalism must continue to its end, just as the conflict must continue
The result that may have the deepest implications, is the differential treatment of actors based upon the Westphalian states-system. If this differential treatment leads to a recurrence of civil wars, the system may come into question. By this system the international community judges who has the right to rule, but there is a long history of Western imposition of statehood. For instance, the Middle East was divided not according to national lines, but according to the interests of European powers during the forced dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Upon independence in the mid-20th century however, the states were not allowed to determine their own identities and borders, but were expected to uphold those imposed by Europe after World War I. One of the most salient examples of this is Kurdish nationalism, and the relative stability of this region, despite nonrecognition of Kurdistan and the instability of nearby recognized states.

Despite the wide spread and long history of the Westphalian states-system, some scholars have begun to challenge the validity of its origin, let alone the application and interpretation of it (Kayaoglu, 2010). Instead of officially creating the states-system, as we are normally led to believe, the story of the Peace of Westphalia seems to serve the same purpose as the story of Eirene-Peace as the product-daughter of Zeus-Power and Themis-Order. While the international community may have forsaken myths of titans and deities as a source of their institutional heritage, the new order comes with its own mythology to justify its own phobic security of the institution (Dietrich, 2006). This mythology however, prevents the system from recognizing relatively stable regions like

until it is properly ripe: Either deepening the disparities until they are so great they have to be overthrown, or allowing conflict to continue until both sides are so sick of it they have no qualms with change. While these claims may have some truth to them, they are not prescriptive (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 21).
Iraqi Kurdistan, or Somaliland, as legitimate. This non-recognition by the system, leads to structural and direct violence through ideological encapsulation (Della Porta, 2013).

In the future, further work into the question of actor legitimacy, other indicators of structural violence, and the study of integration timing will be useful. Regarding legitimacy, it would be helpful to analyze which provisions of peace agreements are levied against non-state actors, compared with state actors. For structural violence, study of particularly sensitive indicators, such as preterm birth rates, low birth weight rates, and rates of cesarean births during times of conflict, peace, and political upheaval, will be helpful where there is available data (Bodalal et al, 2014). These affects seem most noticeable in the periphery of the world economy. For rapidity an analysis of integration timelines could be compared to the rate of peace agreement failure or success.
REFERENCES


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