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COMPROMISE IN A CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT:
THE CASE OF HAMAS

by

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Introduction

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has been a point of contention for most students of Middle Eastern politics. There appears to be a dichotomy of views on the question of whether Hamas is a legitimate mainstream political organization within Palestine, or whether it is just another manifestation of the fundamentalist ideology that (according to some people) Islam seems to encourage. The United States has classified Hamas as a terrorist organization and has directed some of its efforts of the war on terror against the organization with the aim of destroying Hamas.

Yet it appears that within the Occupied Territories, Hamas enjoys a substantial amount of support among the populace. The organization is seen mostly as an alternative to the secular Palestinian Authority, which is headed by Yasser Arafat. The support seems to peak especially during times of crisis and Israeli incursions into the territories. Hamas is also very apt at exploiting the current lack of confidence in the Oslo Accords of 1993. Despite such differing viewpoints, Hamas has an identity of its own, which like that of most other organizations is likely to change with time and as the political context changes.

This essay will deal with two main issues. First, it will document the political evolution that has occurred within Hamas since the beginning of the First Intifada (uprising) in 1988 up to and including the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada. Have the short and long-term political objectives of Hamas changed? If yes, then in what direction are those changes taking Hamas? Answers to these questions will be provided by relying heavily on the provisions of the charter of 1988 and personal statements of the political and spiritual leaders of Hamas.

The second issue of interest is that of determining the factors behind such changes. Are such changes dictated by external and/or internal actors? It is argued here that the
Oslo Accords of 1993, integration in the Palestinian political arena, the adversarial role of the Israeli government, as well as a realization of the current political context in the region, has caused the stated political objectives of Hamas to become more limited and pragmatic. Such changes became particularly evident beginning with the signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993. Is that the case?

If indeed that is the case, then the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinian Authority need to reconsider their stance toward Hamas. Perhaps a shift in policy may be due. This is especially important because of the significant political capital that Hamas has accumulated since the beginning of the First Intifada. It is also important, in the current context of the “war on terror,” to clarify the objectives of Hamas and the extent to which such objectives fit the description of a terrorist organization. Such an inquiry may then lay the basis for future investigations on the viability of a solution of the Palestine question, including Hamas as part of the equation.

I. Origin and Organizational structure of Hamas

Harakat al-Muqawama al-‘Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement) or Hamas, as the organization is widely known, was “established as a response to the eruption and continuation of the [first] intifada.”¹ Although it claimed that it provided the inspiration and the push for the uprising, it was evident that the uprising was instigated by the mood on the street, rather than by an well-orchestrated organization.

To understand such beginnings, it is well to keep in mind that before Hamas came to the scene as the embodiment of Islamic values and principles, the Muslim Brotherhood had developed an extensive network of hospitals, schools, and social services and was respected by most Palestinians. Given the changing political atmosphere and the increasing frustration of
Palestinians with the situation in the Occupied Territories (West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem), the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Gaza decided to take action.

Up to that time the Brotherhood believed that time for *jihad* (religious war) had not come yet, since "the Brotherhood was still going through the phase of Islamic upbringing and preparation." Nevertheless, it became obvious to the Brotherhood leaders that the killing of a number of Palestinian workers by an Israeli driver had provided the needed context for its involvement in the armed struggle against Israel and its attempt to steer the uprising in their preferred direction.

The first meeting of the Hamas' leadership took place on December 9, 1987 and the first statement was issued on December 15, 1987 calling on the people to reject the occupation and avenge the blood of the fallen comrades. The organization inherited the Gaza leadership of the Brotherhood although initially it proclaimed itself independent of the Brotherhood. Ahmad Yasin, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Sheikh Salah Shihada, Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi and Abd-al-Fattah Dukhan provided the spiritual and political guidance of the organization and began administering the Intifada from their headquarters in Gaza.

With the publication of "the communiqué dated February 11, 1988, the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood became apparent," but it wasn't until August of 1988 that Hamas claimed itself to be a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood when it published its charter of that same year. The declaration signaled a new stage in the development of the organization. Hamas recognized that its support base among the Palestinian people was increasing daily and the Brotherhood felt comfortable in claiming Hamas as a byproduct of its movement.
Given the perilous circumstances under which Hamas members operate, the basic organizational unit is composed of cells. “The Hamas command structure [is] headed by three Islamic Congress activists: one responsible for military matters, another for political affairs, and a third for propaganda and the printing and distribution of handbills (solely authorized by Sheikh Yasin).”

Yasin together with Rantisi are known as the spiritual and political leaders of the organization. The military wing of the Hamas “is known as the Izz al Din Qassam Brigades, [and] is the force behind most of the violence and killings attributed to Hamas.” The Brigades were not formally established until 1991 and are usually staffed by fewer than 100 operatives. In addition, Hamas continues to fund its social projects such as hospitals, schools, and feeding centers.

Despite continual attempts on the part of Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to eradicate the leadership and operatives of Hamas, the organization continues to operate effectively, although not always at full capacity. Indeed, ever since the First Intifada, Hamas has continued to gather political capital and has proven a formidable challenge to both the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as well as Palestinian security forces. In the future, one can expect Hamas to flex its political muscle to achieve its vision for an independent Islamic Palestinian state.

II. Hamas during the First and Second Intifada: A comparative study

According to the Hamas Covenant (Charter) of 1988, the organization took it upon itself to engage other forces within Palestine to achieve the goal of regaining possession of the land of Palestine so that the “banner of Allah [might be risen] over every inch of Palestine” (Article 6). In this context, the covenant of 1988 is a very important document because it lays out plainly, the objectives and underlying ideology of the organization.
According to the charter, the most important objective, indeed the raison d'être for the organization, is the liberation of the historical Palestine from the Zionist occupiers. Such an objective emanates from the belief that “the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered; it, or any part of it, should not be given up” (Article 11). Thus it follows that all of Palestine must be retrieved for the benefit of the future Moslem generations, until the end of the days.

Hamas contends that Israel is an occupying force who has taken over holy Muslim land forcibly. As a neocolonial state, Israel must be expelled from the territories by way of persuasion or by force. Given that the balance of power between the Palestinians and the Israelis is tilted in favor of Israel, there is not much chance that the Hebraic state will disappear by way of persuasion, or any diplomatic maneuvering. As such, an armed struggle (jihad) must ensue to ensure the defeat and the expulsion of the occupier from every inch of historic Palestine (Article 15). Time is on the side of justice and truth.

Hamas also does not see much utility in international agreements or conferences on the Palestine question. This lack of faith in diplomatic initiatives and solutions is reflected in Article thirteen, where such options are found to be “in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement...[Such] conferences are only ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitrators.” Given the religious importance of Palestine to Islam, such interference by outsiders is considered unsolicited and ill-gotten. This stance is hardened by the observable facts that almost always such international undertakings favor the Jewish state vis-à-vis the Palestinian people.

Hamas maintained this adversarial stance towards the Oslo Peace Accord and staked its reputation on the failure of such talks. As will be demonstrated later, the temporary success of
the peace talks brought changes in the short-term objectives of the organization. Hamas objected to the Oslo Accord and the Wye Memorandum, as well as other initiatives, partly because of its stated objectives as enumerated in its covenant. Yet, there were other important factors that came to play, especially after the “Gaza-Jericho first” and Oslo talks.

The main reason was that acceptance of the peace talks was tied to the recognition of the state of Israel in what was most of historical Palestine. Coupled with that was the acceptance of the settlements, which was rendered de facto after the Palestinian Authority (PA), agreed to open the byways between the settlements and Israel proper. Hamas also objected to the talks, because the PA was charged with administering the security in the Occupied Territories, which meant that it would be doing the dirty work of the Israeli Defense Forces. Hamas’ fears were soon materialized when the PA arrested hundreds of Hamas activists after a spate of suicide bombings and kidnappings of Israeli soldiers in the early 90s. Lastly, Hamas objected to such talks because they sidestepped the sensitive issue of the “right of return” of the Palestinian refugees to their ancestral land.

Besides the objective of the elimination of the state of Israel, Hamas declares that any Palestinian state would have to be one based on the principles of Koran. Article eight of the Covenant reads, “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution....” Hamas envisions an Islamic state where others would be allowed to exercise their religion. It contends that only “under the wing of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three religions...to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam” (Article 31).

In addition, although it proclaims brotherhood with all other Palestinian liberation forces, Hamas maintains that only when those organizations abandon the secularist path will Hamas
become “its soldiers, and fuel its fire that will burn the enemies” (Article 27). Considering its deep religious background, Hamas is unwilling to compromise its religious ideology and objectives in exchange for closer cooperation with other secular forces, such as the PLO, which is headed by Yasser Arafat.

Thus, when Hamas was first established and during the first years of its existence, its position on essential issues such as the recognition of the state of Israel, acceptance of international mediation, nature of a future Palestinian state and the relationship with the PLO was inflexible and highly ideological. It maintained a strictly Islamic perspective and did not recognize realities such as the Israeli military supremacy, sympathy of the United States for the state of Israel, and need to work within a political framework with other secular Palestinian political organizations.

Beginning with 1993, Hamas adopted a new strategy. Whereas prior to that time it had rejected any international diplomatic solutions, Hamas now showed that it was willing to compromise and accept the agreements, although it still maintained an adversarial position towards the Oslo accords. Such changes were signaled by communiqués sent out by Shaykh Yasin, the spiritual leader of the movement. The communiqués indicated that Hamas would be willing to agree to a cease-fire “of ten or even twenty years with Israel if Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories.”\textsuperscript{12} Note that occupied territories here include West Bank, Gaza Strip and Arab (East) Jerusalem.

In addition, other declarations from leaders in Amman, Jordan, confirmed this new strategy by declaring that Hamas would be willing to work with the PA, Egyptian and Jordanian governments if Israel were to withdraw. Such statements implied that Hamas accepted the outcome of the Oslo accords, from which the PA drew its authority.\textsuperscript{13} In the recent years, the
position towards Oslo has hardened again given the failure of the agreement to bring peace and stability in the region, and because it feels that the accords have been abandoned completely by the U.S. and Israel.

Although rhetorically Hamas rejects categorically the two-state solution, in practice its leaders have indicated a willingness to accept that alternative. In a recent interview, Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, a senior official of Hamas political wing, implied that if Israel were to accept the notion of a Palestinian state, then Hamas would be willing to reciprocate by recognizing the state of Israel.\textsuperscript{14} During the same interview, Ismail Abu Shanab commented,

Hamas is focusing on an agenda for Israel’s withdrawal from the lands taken in 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state and a solution for the refugees...If these things are implemented, the Palestinians will be satisfied, and they will be busy for more than 20 years building their state. The new Palestine can have good relations with Israel, as well as with the rest of our neighbors.\textsuperscript{15}

Clearly, Hamas has seen a need to compromise its long-standing adversarial position towards the two-state solution. By accepting the possibility of a Palestinian state composed of West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, Hamas has also given the green light to international mediation, which it rejected in the covenant of 1988.

Also starting with 1993, Hamas began its rapprochement towards the PA. After a series of confrontation with the PA, between 1993 and 1995, “Hamas’ Gaza leadership, intent on averting more crises that risked leading to civil war, agreed to take part in an interfactional dialogue with the PA [and that] it would have to act alongside the PA.”\textsuperscript{16} As part of this new strategy, Hamas’ leadership considered the possibility of running in the Palestinian legislative elections envisioned under Oslo. Although continued clampdown on the part of the IDF and the PA caused Hamas to decide against running, seven Hamas sympathizers won seats in the Palestinian Legislative Assembly.
Prior to and following the signing of the Taba Agreement in September 1996, Hamas negotiated “a sixteen-point agreement with the Authority… The understanding behind the text was that the PA would treat Hamas as a bona fide political opposition”.

Two years later, after his release from prison, Shaykh Yasin reiterated the need for closer cooperation with the PA by noting that “we are one nation. We’re fighting the same goal, and we have one enemy, so we’ve no choice but to unite.”

Despite the ups and downs in its relationship with the PA, Hamas has continued to seek common ground with the Authority. During summer and fall of 2002, there was extensive cooperation between Hamas and the Fatah, culminating with their meeting in Cairo. The talks were also encouraged by the EU foreign ministers who held various meetings with both parties as well.

Al-Zahhar, one of Hamas political leaders in Gaza, indicated that “a secretariat had been established. We named someone and Fatah named another. The two got together to lay down the action programme, the schedule of the meetings, and the subject to be discussed.”

The cooperation went so far as to include an understanding that Hamas would join a “collective leadership outside the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) framework, in fact above it.” This compromise would bring Hamas into the governing body in return for a promise to give up independence in choosing operating methods and targets for attacks.

In the process of cooperating with the PA, Hamas has made sure that its stance towards the nature of the future Palestinian state remained unchanged. Still, recent comments by some Hamas leaders hint to an attempt to tie an Islamic Palestinian state to a democratic one. These leaders argue that democracy and Islam are compatible and capable of coexisting in the same system.
In a recent interview, Abu Shanab remarked that “...an Islamic state is compatible with democracy. In this way, we see the Israelis as part of this community, if they want to live as equals.”22 During the same interview, Yasin echoed the same view, saying that “my own best vision for Palestine is of a land for Christians, Jews, Muslims – a state where everyone has equal rights.”23 Then he added that the question of whether a Palestinian state would have to be an Islamic state should be left to the democratic process. “Let the people select the kind of state they want, in the same way that United States is a state for all its people and they solve their differences democratically as equals.”24

Although such declarations are far from repudiations of Hamas’ objective of setting up an Islamic state, they do indicate a change in approach and mentality. When scrutinized in the context of the current analysis, such small concessions on such poignant issues paint a bigger picture of an evolution within Hamas. To be sure, hard-line elements remain within the organization, but over the past 15 years Hamas has evolved into a powerful as well as a rather moderate force in the Palestinian political arena. The remainder of this text will analyze the factors that caused such changes.

III. Attributable causes for changes in political objectives

The road toward political legitimacy has been bumpy and rough for Hamas. Frequent clampdowns by both IDF and Palestinians security forces, avoiding antagonizing the Palestinian people while Oslo Accords seemed to work, and offering a viable alternative to the suffering of the people, proved at times insurmountable obstacles for the organization. Three particular factors affected Hamas to a greater degree than others. These factors dictated a change in short-term (and possibly long-term) political objectives.

a. Effects of Oslo Accord
According to Kristiansen (1999) “Oslo came about largely as a result of Hamas’ challenge to the PLO and Israel. In turn, Oslo has been the great challenge faced by Hamas.”

Hamas has staked its credibility upon the failure of the Oslo accords and Arafat’s accommodation with Israel. Because of recent developments, culminating with the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas has been able to garner popular support, but it has been unable to supplant the PA as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Following the signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993, Hamas was constantly outmaneuvered by the emerging PA and the Israeli government, despite its best efforts to offer alternative viable choices to the Palestinian people. With the establishment of the PA in 1994 and the introduction of autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, Hamas was pushed out into the fringe of the political arena and had to cooperate for its survival. Palestinians within the territories favored the peace process as the only viable alternative. As such, Hamas could not criticize the PA and in turn directed its activities inside the borders of Israel.

Also, the signing of the Oslo agreement gave Arafat political leverage to go after Hamas by force, if needed. This new reality forced upon the organization the need to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Even long-time leaders of the organization, such as Yasin, Rantisi and Musa Abu Marzuq, favored such an approach and steered Hamas towards a more moderate position. Evidence of such change has already been presented, quoting Yasin and Rantisi with regards to their recognition of the PA and their stance towards a two-state solution. Their recognition of the guidelines set up by the Oslo accord also falls within the framework of such changes.

b. Cooperation and Struggle with Fatah and the role of the Israeli government

During the first Intifada and up to the signing of the Oslo accords, Hamas mounted a
significant challenge to the authority of Fatah and the PLO (its umbrella organization). For a while there was even a fear of a civil war between the secular and the religious groups. After the signing of the accords, Hamas recognized the strength of the new PA and chose cooperation over confrontation. Yet, not all matters were resolved peacefully.

Arafat was keen on flexing his muscles against Hamas sympathizers and repeatedly imprisoned and harassed them. Under the Oslo agreement, it was the PA’s responsibility to eradicate radical elements within the occupied territories. Tensions ran especially high after Hamas’ military wing undertook retaliatory actions against Israel following the Hebron massacre on 25 February 1994. Pressured by the Israelis and the U.S., Arafat ordered the rounding up of more than 400 Islamist activists in the Gaza Strip. This was followed by clashes between Palestinian police forces and Hamas activists at Gaza’s Palestine Mosque on 18 November 1994 where 14 people were killed.

The effects of such confrontations, imprisonment, and political assassination of Hamas leaders were soon evident and became more burdensome as the IDF was involved in cleansing operations. The void was filled by a “new generation of Hamas politicians. The ‘Intifada graduates’ in the thirties and early forties, had been educated in Palestinian universities and had shared schoolrooms, as well as prison cells, with their Fatah counterparts. More attuned to the secular nationalist discourse and frequently with direct lines to PA officials, this younger, highly pragmatic generation was used by Hamas in its dialogue with the PA.”

By temporarily eliminating the core leadership of Hamas by way of imprisonment and exile, the PA and Israeli government were able to mold a new moderate leadership. This change in leadership, with these new highly pragmatic individuals, brought about moderation in the
rhetoric. Although most of the leaders have been released from jail, this pragmatic outlook remains to this day.

c. The trap of political legitimacy

As an organization that depends heavily upon the support of the populace, Hamas is very sensitive to the mood on the street. While it continued to oppose the peace talks and criticized the role the PLO played in those talks, Hamas was careful not to portray itself as antagonistic towards the sentiment of the ordinary Palestinian. Under such conditions even the military operations against Israeli targets, especially right after Oslo, became more problematic. Hamas now “had to take into account the often volatile public mood. Thus, even though it adopted a policy of tying military operations to Israeli outrages, mass anger at Israel could quickly be overshadowed by the effects of collective punishment.” 33

Knowing that Hamas was better handled by dealing with it as a political force, the PA attempted several times to incorporate Hamas within the political framework. Hamas rejected such offers because in principle it was against the Oslo accords. This attitude has changed over time. As mentioned earlier, as recently as December 2002, Hamas and Fatah officials met and discussed the possibility of cooperation. One of the issues of interest discussed was the question of legislative elections.

Hamas had expressed interest as early as 1994 in participating in legislative elections. Shaykh Yasin dictated a letter from his prison cell that indicated Hamas should be “challenging the legislative institution from within by participating in the electoral process planned for establishing an autonomous Palestinian Council.” 34

Such developments imply willingness on the part of Hamas to play by political rules. When it finally participates in a national-unity government, Hamas’ retaliatory policy will be
subject to approval by a governing body that may be a cross-section of secular and Islamic organizations, not all of which share the same attitude about what is the most desirable means of securing Palestinian independence. In this case, Hamas would find itself bound by the political legitimacy, which it is seeking to gain in order to achieve its objectives. Indeed, the current developments point towards a greater cooperation with Fatah.

**Conclusion**

Much has changed since Hamas was first organized over 15 years ago. The Palestinians are currently waging their second Intifada and living conditions in the Occupied Territories have deteriorated considerably. Thousands have been killed on both sides of the conflict and many more are wounded. Suicide bombings occur almost daily and there doesn’t seem to be any light at the end of the tunnel. Hamas now claims a considerable following and has become a permanent fixture of the Palestinian political debate.

Meanwhile, some things have remained the same. Arafat is still the representative of Palestinian aspirations, the settlements are still intact, and Palestinians live in refugee camps. Also, the United States has yet to become a true and honest broker for a peace agreement between the two parties in the conflict. Even more interestingly, a Bush is in the White House and the U.S. just completed a successful military operation against Iraq.

What effect, then, have these last 15 years had on Hamas? Are Hamas’ political objectives as militant and highly ideological as they once were? Are its leaders, still unwilling to compromise their stance on international mediation and the possibility of a two state solution? What about the secular Palestinian organizations, has there been a rapprochement between them and Hamas? It is evident form the discussion above that changes have occurred and the changing political context has dictated Hamas the necessity of compromise. It is this ability
and/or willingness to change that has assured Hamas’ survival. Much like a phoenix rising out
of the ashes, Hamas has demonstrated resilience and a certain degree of pragmatism.

Some may argue that Hamas’ change of heart on such poignant issues, as the two-state
solution for example, is only cosmetic. They comment on the fact that Yasin only asks for 10-20
years of cease-fire, not more. The motive for such a concession, it is believed, derives from the
realization that, at the present, Palestinians are not strong enough militarily to face-off Israel.
Perhaps, 10-20 years later, a stronger Palestinian state could muster the strength to defeat the
state of Israel and reclaim the land that has been unjustly taken from them.

There is certainly some validity in the argument, and Israeli policy makers must consider
it a very good reason for not providing the Palestinians with that privilege. Nevertheless, when
one surveys the Palestinian political arena, it becomes evident that the path proposed by Hamas
is not the only alternative, indeed it is not even the most sought after one. More importantly, it is
the picture that emerges during and in the aftermath of changes in the political context.
Evidently, Hamas has not been immune from such evolutionary periods, especially as new
leaders with ties to the wider Palestinian political community emerge.

Endnotes

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2 Ibid., p. 67.
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www.palestine-info.co.uk/hamas/about/index.htm.
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www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas/htm. All references to Articles of Covenant (Charter) derive from this source.


12 Ibid., p. 23.

13 Ibid.


15 Ibid., p. 109.


17 Ibid., p. 27.

18 Ibid., p. 31.


23 Ibid., p. 106.

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