Determinants and Mechanisms of National Identity Shift in Tanzania

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DETERMINANTS AND MECHANISMS
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY SHIFT IN TANZANIA

by

Alexander C. Wendt
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
Political Science

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ABSTRACT

Determinants and Mechanisms of Identity Shift in Tanzania

by

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Utah State University, 2018

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Since gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania has enjoyed high levels of national identification, far higher than other states in east Africa. Yet, between 2005 and 2015, the Afrobarometer survey recorded a decline in the national identity and an increase in ethnic identities in Tanzania. These changes are striking because of the successful nation-building policies implemented by former president Julius Nyerere. In addition, during the same period of 2005-2015, states bordering Tanzania have increased their level of national identification. This thesis reviews the literature on how changes in institutions, economic modernization, and conflict create incentives for political competition that may in turn reshape identities. The preliminary results suggest that while the introduction of the multiparty rule in 1992 in Tanzania created a more competitive and democratic political process, it may have also brought about a longer trend of identity shift in the Tanzanian population: the national identity has been declining, while ethnic identities have been rising.

(60 pages)
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Alex Wendt
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Introduction

The 2015 Tanzanian presidential elections were the most contentious that the country experienced since gaining independence in 1961. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) candidate, John Magufuli, won the election with 58% of the vote, while the CHADEMA opposition candidate, Edward Lowassa received 40% of the presidential vote. Lowassa refused to accept his defeat and initially did not concede the election; instead, Lowassa filed a petition for a recount. While Lowassa’s recount efforts were unsuccessful, the Zanzibar election commission nullified election results in Zanzibar due to “gross irregularities” (Ruling Party Wins Tanzania Presidency 2015). The 2015 Presidential election was the most competitive in the country’s history. This election stands in stark contrast to many decades of popularity enjoyed by a single party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi. While the introduction of the multiparty rule in 1992 in Tanzania created a more competitive and democratic political process, it may have also brought about a longer trend of identity shift in the Tanzanian population: the national identity has been declining, while ethnic identities have been rising.

The Afrobarometer survey records a major shift in Tanzanian identity between 2005 and 2015. In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that identified as equally ethnic and national increased from 6.1% in 2005 to 24.1% in 2015 (see Figures 1a and 1b). In 2015, the proportion of the population that identified as national dropped to 57.8% from 75.9% in 2005. The increase in Tanzanians identifying equally with their nation and ethnicity came at the cost of national identity. Why did national self-identification decline in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015? States that border Tanzania are experiencing an increase in their national identity. Why is ethnic identity in

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1 In the 2005 survey round, the sample size in Tanzania was 1,248. During the 2014–2015 survey round, the sample sizes increased to 2,350 in Tanzania. While the new sample doubled in size in the 2014–2015 survey round, the samples in the 2005–2006 survey round are large enough to be statistically sound. I do not believe the changes in sample size can account for such drastic variation in the changes of ethnic and national identification.
Tanzania becoming more important?

Figures 1–6 show the shifts in identity in states that border Tanzania. Across these cases, there is a trend towards stronger national identification—other than Uganda, which exhibits no shifts—making the decrease in national and increase in equal ethnic and national identity in Tanzania more puzzling.

For instance, in 2005, 44.4% of Kenyans surveyed had an equally national and ethnic identity. In 2015, this decreased to 40.1%. National-only identification increased from 24.3% in 2005 to 38.4% in 2015.

A similar trend but with less dramatic change can be seen in Zambia, where the proportion

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2 Note that x-axes in Figures 1a-6b differ. These graphs were obtained from the Afrobarometer survey. It is necessary to look at the percentages on each column to see the true change in identification.
of the population that identified with an equally ethnic and national identity decreased from 60.2% in 2005 to 40.1% in 2015. National-only identity increased from 24.3% in 2005 to 38.4% in 2015.

In Malawi, the proportion of the population that identified with an equally national and ethnic identity experienced no change. The proportion of the population that identified with an equally national and ethnic identity was 47.6% in 2005 and 47.7% in 2015. National-only identification increased from 22.9% in 2005 to 35.5% in 2015. “Ethnic ID” only decreased from 18.1% in 2005 to 10.5% in 2015.

In Mozambique, the proportion of the population that identified with an equally national and ethnic identity decreased from 40% in 2005 to 17.8% in 2015. National-only identification of Mozambicans increased from 36.4% in 2005 to 52.7% in 2015.
Uganda is the only state in East Africa that experienced no change in its equal identification and only a slight increase in national-only identification. In Uganda, the proportion of the population that identified with an equally national and ethnic identity slightly increased from 49.7% in 2005 to 50.4% in 2015. National identification increased from 18% in 2005 to 20% in 2015.

In summary, the states that make up East Africa, with the exception of Uganda, which saw little change, experienced increases in national identity at the expense of ethnic identity, while Tanzania experienced a decline among individuals identifying with the nation only. Furthermore, national-only identification remains highest in Tanzania compared to the other states in East Africa. The documented change in Tanzanian identity is possibly part of a longer trend; however, due to data limitations I can only speak with certainty about the change from 2005 to 2015.
This thesis asks why national self-identification declined in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015. To explain why this is an important question, I, first, provide a brief overview of the relevant history of Tanzania. Second, I summarize why Tanzanian socialism, villagization, and the emphasis of Kiswahili in education led to a high degree of national identification in Tanzania and why the onset of the multiparty era may have undermined it. Third, I include the review of the academic literature on identity, which focuses on three determinants of identity shift: institutions, modernization, and conflict. Each of these determinants may create significant incentives for political competition, which has a direct impact, as a causal mechanism, on identities. Finally, I propose, to establish, through process tracing methodology, what determinant or combination of the determinants created incentives for political competition, which in turn caused a shift in self-perceived identities.

**Tanzanian History**

Why does Tanzania exhibit the highest measure of national identity in East Africa? High measures of national identity in Tanzania as recorded by the Afrobarometer survey have their foundation in policies set by President Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) during the post-colonial period. President Nyerere and TANU created policies central to building Tanzanian national identity, including Ujamaa villagization, rural development, and the emphasis placed on Kiswahili as the official language of Tanzania. In this section, I briefly review the post-independence period in Tanzania, which saw the creation of the strongest national identity on the continent and a recent decline in the national identity, which motivates this essay.

**Tanzanian Socialism**

Shortly after Tanganyika received independence in 1961, the new state’s prime minister, Julius Nyerere, resigned his post and retired to his village where he wrote four pamphlets. The
most important of these was *Ujamaa the Basis of African Socialism*. Nyerere explained to the Tanzanian people that while independence was a great success their work in uplifting the country remained unfinished. Their goal was “full liberation, which could be achieved by self-help and hard work” (Coulson 1988:136). The Tanzanian people saw Nyerere as a “mwalimu,” a moral teacher who knows what is best for his people (Ibid). Part of Nyerere’s ideology was to fight tribalism and other factors that would “hinder the development of unity among Africans” (Abdulaziz 1980). This ideology included basing Tanzania around an “African nationalist identity” where land provided to peasants for food security was a basic human right (Bryceson 2010, 73; Scott 1976).

TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, the political party that fought for independence in Tanganyika; contested tribalism by dismantling traditional tribal authorities. After making chiefs irrelevant, TANU then encouraged former chiefs to become party members, wisely making sure TANU did not create enemies (Bryceson 2010, 74). Before independence, TANU concluded that rule through traditional authorities like chiefs was not preferable (Iliffe 1979, 569). Some TANU leaders wanted to allow tribal councils to remain in power “to catch up with other tribes which have made great progress” (Ibid). Nyerere feared that if tribal chiefs and councils remained in power, it could lead to secession, with disastrous consequences. “We can’t have another Katanga here”, Nyerere said (Ibid). During the Katanga secession, Katanga province declared their independence from the Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville, causing a two-year civil war. This is precisely the sort of event that Nyerere sought to avoid.

The 1967 Arusha Declaration explicitly stated the policy of TANU was to construct a socialist state, and defined what socialism meant to TANU and thereafter the Tanzanian people. Individual human rights such as freedom of expression were noted, but the role of the state is most
striking: “To ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production” (Coulson 1988, 176). The declaration continued, explaining that the state would intercede in the economy of the nation to secure “the wellbeing of all citizens” (Coulson 1988, 176; Nyerere 1973). Even though the state would intervene, the declaration later notes that the state cannot always provide the services that individuals would like; therefore, the Tanzanian people must also be self-reliant (Nyerere 1973). Tanzanians would become self-reliant through development projects sponsored by the state.

An important part of Tanzanian socialism focused on Pan-Africanist support for anti-colonial liberation struggles in Africa, putting Tanzania at odds with the United States and Great Britain during the Cold War. When “imperialist forces” in Africa fought against independence movements, Nyerere used Tanzania as a safe haven for liberation groups. Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South African’s independence movements all used Tanzania as a home in their armed conflicts against white minority rule (Otunnu 2015).

Nyerere corresponded with the Kennedy, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. In this correspondence, he tried to explain why southern African liberation movements aligned themselves with the Soviet Union and Cuba and not with the United States. African liberation movements received arms from the USSR because liberation movements embraced a socialist and not capitalist reform approach. Nyerere wrote to President Ford, “America’s interest in Angola, as far as I understand it, is that Angola should not become a satellite or puppet of the USSR and that there should be no military bases on Angolan soil which might be used by America’s enemies” (Otunnu, 30). Nyerere tried to persuade President Ford that if America intervened against the MPLA, then the MPLA would be forced into the Soviet sphere of influence. Thereby through American actions, Angola would become a puppet of the Soviets and there would be a Soviet
military presence in Angola, the very things the United States wished to avoid through their intervention (Ibid).

Villagization and Access to Education in Kiswahili

Tanzania had extensive plans for development in rural areas, but these well-intentioned plans were less likely to succeed due to demographic challenges. Before 1973, there were 11 million people categorized as “rural dwellers” throughout the country (Scott 1998, 229). Rural peasants lived off subsistence farming and pastoralism. Thus, scattered villages prevented development on a large scale. If Tanzanian development practices were to reach most people, rural villagers had to move (Mwapachu 1976, 4). In 1962, Nyerere emphasized the necessity for village life in Tanzania:

“If you ask me why the government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple: unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water” (Nyerere 1967).

Nyerere’s goal was for people to come and live in Ujamaa villages, cooperate, be educated, and learn modern agricultural techniques, thus alleviating poverty (Havnevik 2010, 38). The state could not administer services to the people without “concentration into standardized units” (Scott, 231).

At first, villagization was gradual and voluntary. Nyerere made a point of warning bureaucrats against the use of administrative or military coercion, insisting that no one should be forced, against his or her will into the new villages, arguing that “socialist communities cannot be established by compulsion” (Scott 1998, 231). Bureaucrats picked blank spots on the map of Tanzania, where settlers were relocated. Economic logic was unimportant. TANU activists ignored Nyerere's advice against compulsion, withholding famine relief from individuals unless they
moved to Ujamaa villages, resorting to violence and intimidation, and even burning down houses. At times, peasants moved peacefully but fled the new villages when they could. Brutal methods were common, but Nyerere criticized the brutality even though he also wanted peasants to move more quickly, “Despite our official policies and despite all our democratic institutions, some leaders do not listen to the people” (Scott 236).

By 1973 Nyerere changed his mind and grew to agree that peasants did not know what was best for them, stating “it may be possible-and sometimes necessary to insist on all farmers in a given area growing a certain acreage of a particular crop until they realize that this brings them a more secure living, and then do not have to be forced to grow it” (Scott 1998, 231). Compulsory villagization began in earnest in the 1970s, overseen by Nyerere himself, who wanted quick results.

These planned villages differed from Ujamaa villages in that the former were nominally voluntary, while the latter were compulsory. The state forced people to move, arguing that it was in the people’s best interest. The purpose of forced settlement was about disorientation and reorientation, disorientation by taking people out of their homelands, and reorienting them in new villages, getting them ready for state services, and indoctrination. Movement into planned villages was most importantly about political control (Scott 1998, 240; Geiger 2005, 285). Nyerere framed compulsory movement by the people as a matter of life and death. The state would become father to the people, thereby helping them lead a “prosperous life for themselves” (Mwapachu 1976, 3).

Agrarian and pastoral Tanzanians were averse to moving into their new villages set up by the state. Since peasants resisted agricultural advice, resettlement was necessary to take them out of their traditional environment (Coulson 1988, 162). Resettlement was harmful because farmers and pastoralists had adapted their practices to the environment they inhabited rather than the new environments found in collective villages. (Coulson 1988, 158; Scott 1998, 235). Resettlement
centered on the view that Tanzanian peasants did not know what was best for themselves since they were poorly educated. Reflecting this, the 1961 World Bank Report and the Tanganyikan First Five Year Plan both note that peasants “are primitive, backward, stupid, and generally inferior human beings” (Coulson 1988, 161).

Not all Tanzanians living in rural communities were forced to move though. Wealthy, densely settled areas such as the West Lake region and Kilimanjaro were largely spared for three reasons: (1) farmers there were already living in densely populated villages, (2) their undisturbed production in cash crops was vital for state revenue, and (3) the groups residing in these areas were overrepresented among the Tanzanian bureaucratic elite (Scott 1998, 236). Across the country, those areas, from which more government officials originated, experienced a delay in villagization and the overall process was better planned in those areas (Scott 1998).

David Laitin, in his 1992 book Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa, begins with the hypothesis that leaders “have an interest in language rationalization” (Laitin 1992:9). Language rationalization is “the territorial specification of a common language for the purposes of efficient administration and rule” (Laitin 1992, 9). “Efficient administration and rule” were hallmarks of Nyerere’s rule over Tanzania by establishing Tanzanian socialism, resettling rural peasants, and creating development programs once these peasants resettled (Ibid). These policies used Kiswahili as a tool to bind the country together by educating the populace, because the majority of Tanzanians were uneducated.

Nyerere advocated that the country needed unification during a 1962 speech to parliament, stating, “I believe that culture is the spirit and essence of any nation. A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people without spirit which makes them a nation” (as
reviewed by Polome and Hill 1980, 145). In 1990, Nyerere reiterated his belief in the unifying power of Kiswahili in Tanzania, saying:

“Making Kiswahili Tanzania’s language helped us greatly in the battle against tribalism. If every Tanzanian had stuck to using his tribal language or if we had tried to make English the official language of Tanzania, I am pretty sure we would not have created the national unity we currently enjoy” (Laitin 1992, 92).

Tanzania did and does still experience and high degree of national unity, far greater than that of other East African states. How did Nyerere and TANU change education and use Kiswahili to create unity? TANU declared Kiswahili the national language shortly after independence. Further steps taken after independence display commitment to the decision. First, all adult education and literacy programs were taught in Kiswahili; teaching in other tribal languages was canceled. Second, the National Kiswahili Council increased Kiswahili usage in all levels of Tanzanian life. The National Kiswahili Council also encouraged writers to use Kiswahili in their work, establishing standard Kiswahili. Third, Kiswahili was made the official language at all levels of government. Fourth, all government workers were transferred out of their home region and were assigned to other parts of the country, forcing them to use Kiswahili to communicate. This also had the effect of making their children learn Kiswahili since they also were not in contact with their parents’ tribal groups (Polome 1982, 173).

Part of the logic behind resettlement and Ujamaa villages was to reduce inequality in Tanzania. Ujamaa villages brought people together and then bring government services to them (Court 1976, 668). By resettling individuals, the state could educate children in primary school and then use the same schools in the afternoon for adult literacy courses (Court 1976, 669). The education system in Tanzania was revamped to reduce inequality, and education was made for “mass needs” rather than “a small highly educated elite” (Court and Kinyanjui 1980, 57). The government changed school curriculums to provide knowledge that they considered useful at the
village level. This way, the relationship between schools and villages was symbiotic, with the village sending students to school who would eventually help the village. Fostering a symbiotic relationship between schools and villages also reduced regional competition. Schools could satisfy village needs, reducing the number of people who needed to travel out of their home region to search for national jobs.

Kiswahili-focused education efforts featured a high degree of political content. Creating a national identity, ending tribalism, and educating the masses were all part of education that created individuals who were deeply committed to Tanzanian socialism (Prewitt, Von der Muhll, and Court 1970, 222). Political subject matter found in Tanzanian curriculum was designed to help students develop some level of “political consciousness” (Court 1976, 670). First, individuals needed to understand the level to which the state was underdeveloped and their place in encouraging development. Second, citizens also needed to understand Tanzanian socialism and how they fit into the system, which helped foster feelings of national pride. Third, political subject matter sought to “foster a spirit of co-operative behaviour rather than individualistic” (Court 1976, 670). Using Kiswahili as the only language of instruction was a way to politicize students; it helped individuals bond to the state since the use of Kiswahili was linked to resistance against colonial rule (Geiger 2005, 281). Language choice, for individuals and for the state, was inherently political.

Using Kiswahili in school and life was an expression of national identification and ensured that individuals had a greater sense of national identification than under other circumstances (Court 1976, 671). Tanzania’s Minister of National Education explained:

“Our pupils are being oriented to our own mode of life and our own set of values, with the emphasis on service to the community...The youth we take into our schools today will after some years return worthy to take their places in their society-- and not only that-- they must enrich that society and breathe new life into it, instill in it the desire for purposeful
development and provide the necessary unified sense of direction for the whole country” (Prewitt, Von der Muhll, and Court 1970, 222).

TANU fully expected their system of Kiswahili political education to foment strong national identities that would benefit the entirety of Tanzania. Based on Afrobarometer survey results, this seems to be the case. President Nyerere’s intention to build national identities in Tanzanian citizens by urging rural development, Ujamaa villagization, and fostering Kiswahili as the national language are key reasons why Tanzania is more stable politically in East Africa and in Africa (Barkan 2000; Chaligha 2002).

Through institutionalizing the use of Kiswahili, the use of Ujamaa, and villagization, Nyerere intended to modernize Tanzania. Nyerere wanted to create a dialogue through Ujamaa to discuss economic and social behavior. The intention was to build the state that could rely on itself and not on foreign powers and money delivered through loans and handouts. In addition to this, Nyerere wanted Tanzania’s wealth dispersed equitably (Hunter 2008, 475-476).

During the single party era in Tanzania, TANU and later CCM’s goal was unity. Consequently, civil organizations, political parties, and politicization of the civil service were restricted until they did not exist. In turn, this created a society where people could not be critical of the political system. Individuals were supposed to be passive bystanders (Makulilo 2012; Babeiya 2012). This was all part of the effort to build national unity, bring peace, and encourage development (Ibid). Nyerere argued that to fulfill his goals of nation building and economic self-sufficiency there was no room in Tanzania for ethnic distractions in their politics. Democracy left too much room for different ethnic groups to use separation of power (as well as checks and balances) to open space for new and different views from the state, which would then mobilize political support for ethnic groups. Nyerere was concerned this would stop his unification and development efforts before they could come to fruition. (Malipula 2014, 131-132).
Economic Issues

Although Nyerere’s projects in the 1960’s and 1970’s did create nationalist unity the Ujamaa centralized, economic system did not work. Nyerere’s efforts to modernize the state were still limited due to his own mistakes and situations beyond his control. First, Nyerere had to deal with droughts and famine within Tanzania during the time of villagization (Otunnu 2015). Food shipments to the villages, which had been used to entice people to join the villagization schemes, were cancelled, but the cost was too high. (Ibid). Second, CCM, (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the party that replaced TANU), suffered from poor leadership at the local level (Ibid). Third, villagers left their new villages or simply would not grow the crops provided to them by the government because they would not earn much money in the world market (Ibid). Fourth, trucks were not available for delivery of produce and there were not enough warehouses to store food for the villages (Otunnu 2015; Saul 2002, 194-199). Drought, productivity issues, the national debt, and war with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin added to Tanzania’s economic woes (Heilman and John 2012).

Reforms and Multiparty Elections

Tanzania’s economic problems were large enough that President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who replaced Nyerere in 1985, decided that Tanzania needed economic help. President Mwinyi could get the economic help he wanted in exchange for liberal reform (Malipula 2014). The International Monetary Fund and World Bank strongly encouraged Tanzania to undergo economic and political liberalization (Bagenda 1994; Gibbon 1995; Havnevick 1993; Babeiya 2012). Reforms included “the dismantling of parastatals, price deregulation, an end to pan-territorial pricing, currency devaluation, the removal of input and food price subsidies, and the liberalization of trade” (O’Gorman 2012, 316). The foremost reform impressed upon Tanzania was the change from a single-party political system to a multi-party political system. At the time, eastern European countries were experiencing changes to their political systems, embracing multi-party politics due
to the end of the Cold War. Consequently, aid agencies used their influence to encourage developing states in Africa to become multi-party states as well (Livig 2009; Villalon and Von Doepp 2005; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Malipula 2014, 114). Multi-party states were thought to be more competitive economically.

Support for liberalization and related reforms came from within CCM’s party as well as from outside sources (Chaligha et al. 2002). Members of CCM formed a committee to end the single-party system and some even say that Nyerere was instrumental in changing to a multi-party system to avoid conflict in the country (Malipula 2014; Bangura 2006). President Mwinyi’s Nyalali commission was formed to investigate the opinions and thoughts of Tanzanian citizens about moving away from their single-party system to a multi-party system. The commission found that only 20% of Tanzanians wanted to change to a multi-party system. Ujamaa had worked well; Tanzanians thought that unity was equated with peace and a lack of unity would bring turmoil (Chaligha et al 2002; Malipula 2014, 115).

Since few ordinary Tanzanians supported the transition to multi-party elections, the change is a top-down transition imposed on the country either by foreign non-governmental organizations and then facilitated by CCM. The concern once again was that liberalization would “sow seeds of class division where the rich due to their ability to pay received better services compared to the poor” (Malipula 2014, 146). Nyerere preferred smaller “structural adjustments” that did not tamper with his socialist vision for Tanzania. He felt the reform ideas that donors wanted instituted were too capitalist (Malipula 2014, 101; Wangwe 2005). Socialism had failed in Tanzania, but Nyerere was personally undeterred, saying, “although socialism has failed in Tanzania I will remain a socialist because I believe socialism is the best policy for poor countries like Tanzania” (Mesaki and Malipula 2011).
**Incumbent Advantage**

In 1992, Tanzanian government amended the constitution through the Political Parties Act to allow multi-party democracy in the country (O’Gorman 2012). Even though the constitution was amended to allow for multiple parties, this did not mean that CCM would allow their hold on power to be diminished. CCM elites managed the transformation of political institutions in Tanzania to prevent their loss of power (Makulilo 2009).

After years of single-party elections, CCM had an incumbent advantage since they were the only option for those many years. When political institutions were changed to allow new parties, there were no foundational groups that new parties could draw supporters from. Trade unions, human rights organizations, and cooperatives were nonexistent. Furthermore, Tanzania has many different ethnic groups that represent small proportions of the population; consequently, it is difficult for political parties to attract voters if they were to campaign based only on ethnic considerations (O’Gorman 2012). New political parties must also try to unlink the ideas of peace, unity, and Ujamaa with CCM. CCM the party was inexorably linked to the state (Makulilo 2012). It is difficult to “untangle, both practically and in people’s minds, the links which were so carefully forged between the party and the state property, functions and personnel (Huntington 1991, 209). Perhaps Tanzania is now experiencing the beginning of the unlinking of state and CCM ideology in the minds of Tanzanian citizens.

The lack of higher education also plays a role in keeping CCM in power. Most Tanzanians, especially rural Tanzanians, have never read the constitution, and “it is no secret that the average Tanzanian suffers from a total ignorance of basic legal rights” (Ngware 1997, 246). The only party that many people know is CCM, and when CCM is equated with equity, peace, and Ujamaa, then what chance to other parties have? (Makulilo 2012). Even the constitution essentially codified CCM ideology in Article 9, stating that:
“The object of this constitution is to facilitate the building of the United Republic as a nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom, justice, fraternity and concord, through the pursuit of the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance which emphasizes the application of socialist principles while taking into account the conditions prevailing in the United Republic and for that reason, the state authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct their policies and programmes towards ensuring... [That] “The country is governed according to the principles of democracy and socialism” (Sulley 2012).

In summary, the unity and nationalistic sentiment that Tanzania enjoys is due to the efforts of Julius Nyerere, TANU, and later CCM. Tanzanian socialism, villagization, and the emphasis of Kiswahili in education engendered feelings of national unity among Tanzanians. In this Nyerere succeeded, yet, the lack of economic development ushered in the multiparty era through economic and political liberalization efforts of outside actors and Tanzanian political officials. Political reform efforts and past programs have enabled CCM to maintain their control over the Tanzanian political system. The changes seen in Tanzanian political institutions may be the early forces behind Tanzanian identity shift as seen in the Afrobarometer survey.

The subsequent section discusses types and approaches to nationalism as well as the four dominant theoretical schools that outline ethnicity related to this thesis.

**Nationalism: Types and Approaches**

In the previous section, I summarized the methods through which Tanzanian political elites established a strong national identity after independence, which makes Tanzania’s recent decline in national self-identification and a rise in ethnic self-identification even more puzzling. Before proceeding to the discussion of how ethnic identities are constructed, this section briefly reviews different conceptualizations of nationalism.

According to Anderson (1983), a nation is “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 6). Imagined communities are a group of people, like in a nation, connected by traits they have in common. These traits include language, culture and
literature (Ibid). Similarly, Gellner (1983) described nationalism as “not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist.” (p. 169). This definition of nationalism emphasizes that any group of people larger than hunter-gatherers would be too large to know all members of the society. Illeffe (1979) emphasized the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up approaches to nation-building, arguing that “no state, especially no colonial state creates a nation. A state creates subjects. The subjects create the nation, and they bring into the “process the whole of their historical experience” (p. 486).

Approaches to Nationalism

There are three dominant schools of nationalist thought: primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005). First, in primordialism, nationalism is assumed. This is because nations occur naturally simply because people live in groups. Nations are noted by shared language, culture, and religion. Nations and nationalism are important parts of human nature, because nations are primordial, feelings of devotion to a nation are expected (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005).

Second, ethno-symbolism is distinct but similar to primordialism since it focuses on ethnic groups, where each group have their significant shared history. Nations in ethno-symbolist theory are not fabricated. Nations develop; they materialize because of their people’s historical connection. Their connection influences their future but does not necessarily predetermine it (Hoggard 2016).

Lastly, modernism is the currently accepted approach to nationalism. Modernism contends that, “nations and nationalism have appeared as consequences of the processes that mark the modern period of social development” (Ichijo and Uzelac 10, 2005). During the eighteenth century the modern state, industrialization, and increased literacy created nationalism. Traditions and
values are often lost when nationalism takes hold. Nationalism is the substitute for the values of the previous society. Nationalists like Nyerere, will invent new traditions, creating new “political religion” (Ichijo and Uzelac 11-12, 2005). Nationalists may also remind their fellow citizens of their extended past, closeness, values, and culture. Modernists would say this interpretation of the past is not accurate. Anderson attributes standardized language to national cognizance (Anderson 1983).

All three aforementioned definitions are examples of modernism. Gellner and Illeffe’s modernist definitions of nationalism are fitting for Tanzania, since the idea of the state was created through the work of Julius Nyerere and TANU. Anderson theorized that the foundation for national consciousness began when literature and capitalism took hold in Europe; languages were standardized, and states unified. Language was the medium of transmission for national identification (Anderson 44-45, 1983). Nyerere used Kiswahili in education in the same manner in Tanzania. Since Kiswahili had no strong connection to any specific ethnic group in Tanzania, the steady institutionalization of Kiswahili as a national language enforced nationhood relatively equally among all ethnic groups in the country (Malipula 2014).

In summary, this section has summarized the current state of the literature on nationalism, which prioritizes modernism as its primary approach. Modernism emphasizes national identity as a social construct. The next section of this thesis reviews the theoretical schools that define ethnicity as an identity category separate from national identity.

**The View of Ethnic Identity as Sticky vs. Malleable**

There are four major theoretical schools that define ethnicity: essentialism, instrumentalism, social constructivism, and institutionalism (Varshney 2007). In this section, I briefly review each of these theoretical traditions.
Essentialism

The essentialist idea of ethnicity defines ethnic groups as “natural, inevitable, and therefore unchangeable categories bound by a particular shared belief” (Malipula 2014, 58). In the essentialist school an individual is the way they are because of established qualities that are “inherent, eternal and unalterable (Ibid). Ethnic groups are classified with qualities like gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, and sexual orientation (Hirschfield 1996; Mason 1994; Solomons and Back 1994). In turn, the qualities listed above hold social meaning, giving cues to individuals inside and outside of a specific ethnic group. Racism, and other forms of oppression which create divisions in groups of people, are preserved by essentialism (Van Dijk 1987). Campbell, in 1958, theorized that prejudice-based belief systems are the foundation for differences between ethnic groups. These ethnic groups are identified by perceptions of a coherent and unified entity, which is linked to a belief that there is some sort of underlying essence gluing these groups together (Yzerbyt, Corneille, and Estrada 2001; McGartey et al. 1996).

To most essentialists, ethnicity is stationary and cannot be changed. Furthermore, the essentialist view of ethnicity may give a basis for keeping ethnic groups locked into their normally seen categories (Yzerbyt, Rocher, Schadron 1997). Ethnic groups represent types of people, they specify that the individuals in an ethnic group are, “fundamentally a particular sort of person” (Malipula 2014, 58). Essentialists paint ethnicity into the same box as classism, racism, and other oppressive characteristics; meaning ethnicity leads to conflict and division (Ibid). This could have troubling implications for the future of Tanzanian politics.

Instrumentalism

According to instrumentalism, ethnicity is produced by “political, social, and historical situations and interests which are not necessarily genealogical or cultural (Trurton 1994). Erickson agreed in 1993 when he stated that ethnicity is a relationship between different groups. These
groups have members who declare that they are a group of people and are recognized by others. An ethnic group then shares political, historical, organizational, and symbolic criteria (Eriksen 2002). Instrumentalist scholars fundamentally disagree with essentialism due to the simple question of whether ethnic identities and groups do change over-time (Fukui and Markakis 1994). Instrumentalists argue that the essence of ethnicity can be warped and molded by leaders to serve their interests (Brass 1991). Thus, the very ethnicity and ethnic groups of those involved is accounted for in the handiwork of elites. Because ethnicity can be manipulated, instrumentalists view ethnicity as flexible and most certainly constructed. Instrumentalists also believe that ethnic identity is not intrinsically valuable; rather, it is a façade for political and economic interests (Varshney 2007).

In Africa specifically, Gentili sees ethnicity as a more modern structure due to colonialism; essentially, groups of people were manipulated to help European economic and political interests (Gentili 2005). Ethnic exploitation includes but is not limited to creating new ethnic groups, the combination of groups, or the reduction of them, such as in Rwanda during Belgian colonization (Illife 1979; Mpangala 1994; Weber 2010). British colonial rule came to Tanzania only after World War One, before then, Tanzania was ruled by Germany. German colonial rule classified Tanzanian citizens into different ethnic groups; educated Muslims from the coast who spoke Swahili, called maakida, governed these ethnic groups. The maakida were not local leaders from local ethnic groups. British colonial rule differed; they replaced the maakida with local ethnic leaders because the maakida had adversely affected local tribal customs, reducing them. German rule had increased national feelings instead of ethnic feelings, a trend which British administration sought to change (Weber 2010).
Social Constructivism

The social constructivist school of ethnicity is a combination of essentialism and the instrumentalist approach to ethnic identity. The principle difference between the groups is that social constructivists judge that essentialism and instrumentalism do not consider historical events that may reshape the identity of groups and individuals (Malipula 2014, 56). Ethnicity in social constructivism is not unaltered. Instead, the shared history of a group and individuals work in conjunction with political, economic, and cultural components to form part of a niche that affects ethnic identity. Hence, ethnic identity in Africa is based on the foundation of “socioeconomic processes informing and identifying people’s ethnic belonging (Malipula 2014, 56). Ethnicity in Africa as we see it today was shaped through colonial and postcolonial processes; these ethnic groups are at the same time amalgamations of old and new identities. Current ethnic identities are, “both [a] modern construction and age-old cultural expressions” (Chabal 2009; Chaba and Daloz 1999; Berman 1998; Malipula 2014, 56).

Another aspect of the social constructivist approach to ethnic identity is that ethnic identity is “being negotiated and constructed daily” through interaction among individuals in and outside of ethnic groups (Isajiw 1993; Malipula 2014, 56). The process of changing ethnicity is continually being manipulated and molded. Thus, it is difficult to determine when a group of individuals can become an ethnic group. Perhaps, this vision of ethnic groups is so alterable that the identities become less meaningful.

Institutionalism

The main idea behind institutionalism in comparative politics is that political institutions explain cleavages in multi-ethnic societies (Varshney 2007). The design of political institutions is important, whether the institutions are designed as proportionally representative, first-past-the-post systems, federal, or unitary systems. The differences between institutions help explain the
fluidity of identities depending on institutional background (Ibid). Institutions appropriate for homogenous societies are distinct from appropriate institutions; consequently, ethnically diverse societies need political institutions noticeably distinct from undivided societies (Ibid). John Stuart Mill argued that for democracies to be functional common loyalties must exist in the citizenry; however, in an ethnically diverse society there are most likely going to be conflicting loyalties. Mill predicts diverse ethnic groups would need to be brought to heel under one ethnic group, an ethnic group that is more advanced politically. This would then force the smaller, less advanced groups under the guidance of the more advanced group, creating civic consciousness and driving the society toward a common point instead of driving ethnic groups inward (Mill 1990).

Lijphart argued for consociationalism, where elites decide political and cultural decisions (Lijphart 1977). Horowitz disagreed, instead suggesting that electoral systems would force political parties to appeal across ethnic lines, not create enduring inter-group violence (Horowitz 1985). These ideas apply to only national-level institutions, and if institutional theory is relevant at the regional and local level then the institutions must vary at the local and regional level (Varshney 2007).

New developments in the institutionalist literature contend that local variation in conflict can be determined by the presence of local civic organizations, such as political parties, and whether or not political parties integrate differing ethnic groups into their party structure (Varshney 2002). There is a new focus on how institutions influence identity choice. In the 1960s and 1970s when consociationalism was developed essentialist views of identity were popular Lijphart assumed that ethnic identities were fixed and political institutions were built based on fixed identities (Lijphart 2001). Work from Posner (2005) discussed later in this paper shows how ethnic
identities are malleable due to institutional changes. Identity choice in institutionalism is a dependent variable for explanation (Chandra 2004; Laitin 1998).

In the current institutionalist literature constructivism and institutionalism are interconnected. One aspect of constructivism is that identity formation takes time and is consequently sticky, while institutionalism is more fluid, and identities will vary based on “institutional context” (Varshney 2007). Daniel Posner shows how during Zambian colonial history British rule institutionalized two identities: linguistic identity and tribal identity, however, the modern choice between language and tribal identity is determined based on whether or not Zambia has a one-party or multiparty electoral system (Posner 2005). The connection between social constructivism and institutionalism and their effect on identity formation and identity choices are ripe for further research.

In summary, currently, no scholars argue that ethnic identity is unchangeable like essentialism argues, or that ethnicity is only used as a tool, as seen in instrumentalism. Institutionalism is the method of inquiry currently used. The next section outlines the relevant literature on ethnic identities, specifically, how identity may change through, political institutions, economic development, and conflict. The subsequent section overviews the literature on political competition and introduces political competition as a causal mechanism that links political institutions, economic development, and conflict on the one hand and changes in identities on the other hand.

**How Do Ethnic Identities Change?**

Identity matters because it is “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspect of politics” (Smith 2002, 302). Identity is significant in politics because identity influences what individuals want and gives individuals a shared purpose (Abdelal 2009;
Gutmann 2003). In politics, identity as a political actor, elite, or constituent influences what individuals want out of politics as well as what they will do to obtain what matters. Identity represents how an actor understands themselves through their interactions with distinct individuals who may be dissimilar (Fearon 1999). Consequently, the understanding of oneself comes from interaction among actors in political and social spheres (Abdelal 2009).

Social identity in each community revolves around two important processes: the process, which generates the menu of people’s identity options, and the process by which the choices from this menu are made. Furthermore, the context that a person finds themselves in affects their conscious decision-making process about what identity will work best in each situation; in short, social identities are “multidimensional” (Chandra 2006; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Horowitz 1985; McLaughlin 2007; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). Identities are context-dependent.

Ethnicity is an important branch of identity, where one’s membership in that identity group is based off attributes related to descent. Furthermore, ethnic identities are characterized by constrained change and visibility (Chandra 2006). Descent-based attributes “are acquired genetically, through cultural and historical inheritance” (Chandra 2006, 400). Alternatively, certain descent-based attributes are acquired during life as a sign of inheritance, like a name or tribal markings (Ibid). Horowitz argues that the traits found in ethnicity are believed to be innate (Horowitz 1985). This would suggest that the traits found in ethnicity are stable and do not change much. Yet ethnic identities will change due to circumstance, although the changes that do occur to ethnicity are still constrained by foundational attributes (Chandra 2006).

The academic literature debates the extent to which ethnic division affects the relationship between individuals in the state. Ethnic differences have been shown to have an adverse effect on political stability and economic performance of states (Easterly and Levine 1997; Cederman and
Girardin. 2007). However, recent experimental work in Kenya, found little evidence that preferential treatment, known as coethnic bias, is the mechanism behind the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and poor state performance (Berge et al. 2015). Based on recent advances in the institutionalist tradition of inquiry; I conclude that the question of whether ethnic diversity leads to certain state outcomes misses the process by which ethnic identities are formed. Instead, one should ask, which policies and/or institutions are more likely to create polarized ethnic or other identities in a given society (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). The remainder of this section discusses the academic literature outlining political institutions, economic development, violent conflict as independent variables and their effect on political competition as a causal mechanism that influences identity.

**Political Institutions**

Daniel Posner defines institutions as a political system that constrains elites and non-elites in society (Posner 2005). Institutions constrain actors because “institutions are the formal rules, regulations, and policies that build social and political interactions” (Posner 2005, 2). Ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences (Moravcsik 1997). Posner adds, “The ethnic identities that people use to define who they are can often be traced to specific state policies, regulations, and administrative structures: that is, to institutions” (Posner 2005, 11).

Individuals have different identities that draw from institutions. Posner uses examples from Zambia to show that incentives for Africans to invest in their identities as tribe members were derived from colonial institutions. In Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, the British South African Company made deals with traditional chiefs to tax the areas under their control. Colonial policies gave individuals incentives to identify with a tribal identity because without access to a tribe and
chief that were recognized by the state, an individual would not receive resources available through the colonial power. Posner theorizes that tribal identification should be stronger when members of the tribe have an official native authority figure. He found that 58% of tribes that had native authorities increased in population size (Posner 2005, 38). Conversely, 77% of tribes that did not have native authorities decreased in size (Posner 2005, 27-38). Tribes that did not have official native authorities did not have access to state resources, so individuals would switch tribes for access to limited resources. In this case, the institutional change had an unintended effect on individual identity. Though individuals did switch tribes to gain access to resources, thereby changing their identity, the change in identity was an unintended consequence of the change in tribal institutions.

Only certain ethnic groups can engage in the political competition due to size. Ethnic groups must be large enough to command sufficient political power. Ethnic identification should be stronger in and among ethnic groups that are larger. Additionally, members of ethnic groups that are politically relevant will be politically mobilized to obtain access to scarce resources and have greater internal expectations to identify ethnically (Posner 2004b).

While all African states have constitutions, laws, and rules that limit presidential power, scholars generally agree that state institutions previously had little actual effect on constraining leaders’ actions in African states. However, this has changed in the last four decades. Institutions seem to constrain African leaders more now than 50 years ago. Posner and Young found “three quarters of the African leaders who left power in the 1960s and 1970s did so through a coup, violent overthrow, or assassination” (Posner and Young 2007,129). Contrast this with the period between 2000 and 2005 where leaders leaving power through violent means fell to 19% (Ibid).

African institutions have become increasingly powerful in constraining leader choices. In
the past, violence meant forced changes in political power; now political power changes in concert with institutional rules. A leader’s desire to remain in power has most likely not changed. Instead, formal rules of the state check leader ambitions (Posner and Young 2007). This suggests that formal rules and policies altered the identities of African leaders such that remaining in power through disobeying the formal rules and regulations of the state is no longer an acceptable.

The governing style of elites when formalized in the policies and laws of the state is an additional insight into how institutions affect identity. During the post-colonial period, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere intended to change Tanzanian identity. Nyerere “forcefully downplayed the role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasized a single Tanzanian national identity” (Miguel 2004).

Rather than playing the ethnic card to gain supporters, Nyerere emphasized national identities. TANU, founded by Nyerere, felt its job was to “fight tribalism and any other factors which would hinder the development of unity among Africans” (Miguel 2004, 337). In addition to playing the nationalist card, President Nyerere emphasized the ethnically nonaligned Kiswahili as the national language, encouraged civic education in school, and disassembled traditional tribal authorities (Miguel 2004, 338). Nyerere felt these reforms would build a national identity in place of the former ethnic identities. We see the effects of these reforms in the high national identity, as recorded in the Afrobarometer dataset. By emphasizing a state identity, Nyerere and TANU modified the rules of the state, ultimately securing greater political power. Single party rule changed institutions, emphasizing national identity in Tanzania, consequently, it is expected that multi-party elections will lead to another shift.

\textit{Economic Development}

\textit{Modernization Theory}

There are two competing schools of thought concerning modernization and its effects on
national and ethnic identity in Africa: classic modernization theory and second-generation modernization theory. Classic modernization theory argues that urbanization, universal education, mass media, and industrialization help raise levels of national identification over ethnic identification (Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1964; Weber 1979; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). Urbanization breaks ties to tribal homelands and brings individuals together where they interact with citizens from different ethnic backgrounds. Education and increased media access increase national identification by cultivating a common language and a common shared history over ethnic histories. Industrialization leads to a decline in subsistence agricultural practices and encourages a monetary economy wherein individuals rely less on ethnic networks and more on a national backdrop. A cross-national study of African states supports classic modernization theory (Robinson 2014).

Modernization Theory emphasizes processes like urbanization, education, and industrialization, which are distinct from each other. The processes emphasized by modernization theory may be a function of change in political institutions, since a new regime could try new development programs, for instance. Yet, it is also possible that the same political regime to create higher levels of urbanization and education.

Second Generation Modernization Theory

In contrast to these arguments, other scholars propose second-generation modernization theory, arguing that increased ethnic identification is a result of political and economic modernization (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Certain scholars advocating for second-generation modernization theory propose that ethnic categories, in the contemporary sense, exist in response to modernization (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Connor 1972; Calhoun 1993). Competition over new resources that stem from modernization, like jobs, schools, and clinics, encourage ethnic identification over national identification. Gaining access to resources like these
is difficult since the national government controls those resources. Ensuring constant access to these resources requires building a coalition that wins the presidency or building a coalition that can apply pressure on the president (Posner 2004b). This creates more fragmented societies and less national unanimity (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).

**Violent Conflict**

At the end of the Cold War, many explanations for conflict centered on ethnic nationalism. After controlling for variables like per capita income and economic growth, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that countries with high ethnic and/or religious diversity do not experience more civil war, “rather the conditions that favor insurgency” give better explanations for why ethnically diverse states experience civil war. Today, conflict is no longer viewed as a function of ethnic diversity, but instead as a driver of change in identities.

Political competition serves as a causal link between violent conflict and identity shift. Elites use political rhetoric in response to conflict to encourage individuals to change their identity for protection or access to resources that will help their survival during the conflict. Past conflict may affect identities in the present. Historic pre-colonial conflict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and a weaker sense of national identity (Besley and Rynal Querol 2014). Historical conflict negatively correlates with patterns of development (Ibid). It is also possible that political rhetoric invokes past conflict to preserve political power (Fearon and Laitin 2000). In Tanzania, Kiswahili culture became associated with resisting German colonialism through “armed and moral resistance” (Geiger 2005, 281). Later when Nyerere emphasized Kiswahili in schools and as the official state language, he was building upon old connections and togetherness that are built through common identities.

Identity shift in civil wars occurs due to territorial control through the reinforcement of
prewar cleavages between groups or the creation of new ethnic differences that are based on the conflict itself (Kalyvas 2006). Violence leads to identity shift and ethnic defection through the creation of additional dimensions to one’s identity. Identity shift is when individuals acquire “a new ethnic (or national) identity that replaces the old one, and the result of identity shift is assimilation” (Alba and Nee 2003; Wimmer 2007).

Additional dimensions to one’s identity are calculated and instrumental decisions, not whims. Individual motivations for engaging in defection also vary: coercion, opportunism and revenge are all possibilities (Branch 2007; Anderson 2005). As identities change, or not, the individuals who hold that identity have a built in-group that allows access to benefits through collective action (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Kalyvas 2008). In summary, political elites may intentionally or unintentionally manipulate identities to increase their chances of winning an armed conflict.

Political Competition as a Causal Mechanism

Political institutions, economic modernization, and violent conflict influence political competition among elites. Language and culture are also important, but these are part of an individual's identity. Since language and culture are part of existing identities, they are also subject to change through institutions, modernization, and violent conflict, as well as capture by elites through political competition. If, for example, someone running for office can build a larger coalition by using language as a polarizing issue, then that part of identity is subject to capture by politicians. These independent variables—political institutions, economic modernization, and violent conflict—working through political competition as the causal mechanism directly shape and reshape identities.

The political competition literature is broken up into two sections. First, elites will appeal
to ethnic identities to mobilize their supporters to win elections (Bates 1983; Horowitz 1985; Chandra 2004; McCauley and Wilkinson 2006). Second, constituents will vote for political parties and candidates that are from the same ethnic group because they know that a coethnic politician will channel goods to their ethnic supporters, known as “ethnic favoritism” (Ferree and Horowitz 2010; Van de Walle 2007). Consistent with both traditions, a recent cross-national study found that “ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition” (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010).

Ethnic group size is instrumental in predicting salient political cleavages. Elites expect that constituents are likely to identify with ethnic groups that are large enough to be politically useful in political competition (Posner 2004b). If constituents belong to smaller groups that are not politically useful in obtaining goods and services, the incentive would be to reevaluate their identity and join a group that is based on other identity dimensions, such as class, religion, or occupation (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Candidates may emphasize ethnicity if it will serve them the best in obtaining the necessary votes for office (Ibid). However, African voters do not make their choices solely based on ethnic considerations (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012). Unemployment, inflation, and income distribution all effect voter perception of government effectiveness (Ibid).

Posner again found that the transition from one-party to multiparty rule changed political competition in Zambia and Kenya. The political system itself creates context that affects the identities that people define themselves along concerning voting and politics (Posner 2007). Political competition in a one-party system creates different incentives for individuals to identify than a multi-party system does. In a single-party system, individuals define themselves in “small localized groups.” Religion, language, and region are common axes of individual identity in
multiparty African politics (Ibid). The change away from single party systems alters institutions, changing the confines of political competition. This allows new cleavages to modify identities and act as a means for new political competition (Ibid).

Other literature finds that political competition increases the salience of ethnic identification in Africa, as ethnic identities were more salient over national identities when competitive elections are close (Gadjanova 2017). Gadjanova thus shows identification shifting in relation to short-term electoral cycles. Furthermore, the increased salience of ethnic identities and decrease in identification with national identities works in conjunction with “heightened perceptions of ethnically-motivated discrimination, status anxieties and lower levels of inter-ethnic trust closer to nationally-competitive elections in particular” (Gadjanova 2017, 1).

Is it possible that multiparty elections introduced in 1992 increased political competition along ethnic lines in Tanzania, thus leading to a decline in national identification? While answering this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, I suggest a few aspects of Tanzanian political system on which future research may want to focus: the law that prohibits political parties from campaigning along ethnic lines in Tanzania (Fisher 2012). The rhetoric that political parties use in Tanzania during the electoral campaigns, and the regional concentration of votes in recent elections.

Tanzanian law prohibits campaigning along ethnic lines, and new political parties must have members from a minimum of ten regions. Two of those regions must be from Zanzibar. It is possible that we might see regional support for political parties rather than ethnic support. Certain parties remain stronger in specific regions, like CUF in Zanzibar and Pemba and CHADEMA in Arusha and Kilimanjaro. Especially if a specific ethnic group or groups make up the majority of the population in a given region, regional support may be a stand in for ethnicity (Fisher 2012).
Tanzania did experience a large institutional change in the early 1990s from a single-party to a multi-party electoral system. There have not been instances of civil war in Tanzania, but an examination of the ACLED dataset reveals that there is an increase in riots, protests, and violence against civilians in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015 (Clionadh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen 2010). Conflict could act as an intervening variable rather than an independent variable on its own. In this case, the change in institutions allowing multiple parties may lead to violent conflict between the parties, or between parties and the government as the newer parties and individuals may express their discontent with one another or the political system in which they operate through violent acts.

Finally, if in the past decade urbanization, formal education, and industrialization declined, then classic modernization theory would be consistent with the Tanzanian case. Second generation modernization theory may be consistent with events in Tanzania if modernization measures increased in the past decade, along with ethnic identification.

Table 1 summarizes the possible independent variables and causal mechanism that may lead to changes in identity.

Table 1

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<td>Change in political institutions</td>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Identity Shift</td>
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<td>Economic modernization³</td>
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<td>Violent conflict</td>
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To sum up, political competition is a causal mechanism that links political institutions, economic development, and conflict on the one hand and shifts in identities on the other hand.

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³ Economic modernization may produce changes towards greater national, classical modernization theory, and towards greater ethnic identification with second-generation modernization theory.
Political competition manifests as elite mobilization of supporters to win elections, as well as the expectation that co-ethnics will channel resources to their supporters, known as ethnic favoritism. Individuals tend to join the group that gives them the most access to resources. Competitive elections, crackdowns on free speech, increased protests, and change in rhetoric due to perceived discrimination are potential indicators that changes to Tanzania’s institutions have increased political competition, which in turn may have led to a decline in national identity. Process tracing methodology—described in the following section—can help track and record the changes in Tanzanian political competition.

**Proposed Methodology**

To uncover the causes behind the change in identity in Tanzania, I will process trace the events of the last ten years. I will identify which of the independent variables described by the literature drive the changes of identity in Tanzania. The following sources will be helpful while conducting my case study, but are not limited to *The Citizen*, a leading Tanzanian newspaper, the Tanzanian Office of Statistics, *Journal of Modern African Studies, Africa Review, The Economist*, and *African Bulletin*.

Process tracing is a qualitative method of case study that helps identify variables that may have been otherwise overlooked (because they are new, for instance). Importantly for this study, process tracing can be used to “make inferences [about] which causal mechanisms may have been at work” (Bennett 2004; Mahoney 2012; George and Bennett 2005).

Process tracing “focuses on whether the intervening variables between a hypothesized cause and observed effect move as predicted by the theories under investigation” (Bennett 2004, 22). My goal is to determine which possible explanation is more likely responsible for the proposed hypothesis and the effect seen in the real world (Ibid).
Confirmation bias is a common mistake when conducting process tracing, because it can lead to selection of cases and variables that may be incorrect. Additionally, interpretation of the evidence found in the case can be influenced by confirmation bias, because a researcher needs to avoid at all costs viewing the evidence only through the lens that confirms their view of events. Other researchers studying the same case may come to very different conclusions that may contradict one case study. To ward off potential confirmation bias, a researcher should question a wide array of other variables and explanations in a case and conduct methodical process tracing while considering the alternatives (Bennett 2004, 41).

Case studies do lack the representativeness that comes from large N statistical studies, reducing the ability to make inferences about more cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124-127). Researchers who use case study methods are not selecting cases that are representative of large populations, nor do they intend to make claims that apply to larger populations (McKeowen 1999). Instead, the interest behind case studies is viewing specific outcomes and the conditions under which the causal mechanism generated those outcomes (Bennett 2004, 43). Case studies exchange generalizability for specificity. The goal of case studies is theory development, not inference about patterns across cases.

Political competition may be a causal mechanism that encourages the shift towards ethnic identity shift in Tanzania. Causal mechanisms are “structures that operate in specific contexts to generate the phenomena that we observe in the physical or social world” (Bennett 2004, 35). Process tracing helps the researcher examine the assumed sequence of events that a theory and the producing factors hypothesized should have taken place in the case study. After this process, it should be clear whether the variables in the case were relevant as described. Thereby determining
whether the hypothesized interpretation should or should not be ruled out as an explanation for the case (Bennett 2004, 36).

Four tests help researchers apply process tracing, and the researcher must ask if the evidence found can pass the four tests. Is the evidence “necessary and/or sufficient for accepting the inference?” (Collier 2011, 825). The four tests are straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive (Ibid). Straw-in-the-wind tests boost the validity of a hypothesis or may raise doubts about the same hypotheses, but straw-in-the-wind tests are not conclusive on their own: they are still important tools. For example, if a hypothesis passes various straw-in-the-wind tests, positive supporting evidence to a study and hypothesized causal inference is gained (Collier 2011).

Hoop tests are harder to pass and are consequently more demanding when examining the evidence. To pass the hoop test, the proposed hypotheses “must jump through the hoop” (Collier 2011, 826). Although passing the hoop test does not confirm the hypothesis on its own, it “establishes a necessary criterion.” Nevertheless, a hoop test is not sufficient for complete approval (Collier 2011, 827). While using a hoop test, the researcher must ask if the piece of evidence under consideration meets the conditions that must exist for the outcome in the historical event (Mahoney 2012, 575). If evidence passes the hoop test, it lends greater support and increases the chances that the hypothesis is correct (Mahoney 2012).

Smoking-gun tests evoke the idea of being caught red handed with a still smoking gun after having used it to commit a crime. If one is holding a smoking gun at the scene of a crime, then the individual is probably guilty. On the other hand, if there is no smoking gun, it does not necessarily mean that an individual is not guilty (Collier 2011). In this way, a smoking-gun test can confirm a hypothesis, but it does not necessarily fail a hypothesis if the smoking gun test is not met. Some causes and the outcomes that follow that cause must exist for the evidence to show in favor of the
proposed hypotheses. Therefore, if the researcher can describe this clearly to their audience that the necessary cause and effect exist, the smoking-gun test lends “a sufficient but not necessary criterion for accepting the causal inference” (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012; Van Evra 1997).

The doubly-decisive test contributes strong support for the proposed hypotheses, which also eliminates other competing hypotheses. A doubly-decisive test meets the necessary and sufficient criteria for determining causation (Collier 2011). True doubly decisive tests are uncommon, but the researcher can combine multiple tests that can then support one hypothesis and exclude others (Collier 2011; Bennett 2010, 211).

In this section, I have reviewed process tracing as a qualitative method of case study, which allows researchers to make inferences about which variables are responsible for the observed changes in the phenomena of interest. I also discussed why process tracing can assist in the identification of causal mechanisms through four tests: straw-in-the wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly-decisive tests. Future research should examine all aspects of political competition in Tanzania applying these four tests to determine whether the increased political competition is responsible for the observed decline in national identity there.

**Preliminary Findings**

Robinson notes that Tanzania is an outlier due to its “high degree of national identification relative to ethnic identification” and in its terms of the “relationship between income and national identification” (Robinson 2014). This means Tanzania has very high levels of national identification and a low level of economic development. This is due to the nationalization efforts of President Nyerere; while he also intended economic modernizing in the country, it failed. The failure of economic modernization led to the change in multiparty politics, which in turn led to political competition. Political competition coupled with still-low economic development has then
led toward Tanzanians beginning to identify more with their ethnic identities than the national identity. It could potentially be the case that Tanzania, due to its unique history of nation building, is a case consistent with the predictions of the Second Generation Modernization theory.

Bennett notes that the study of a deviant or outlier case can “help inductively identify variables and hypotheses that have been left out of existing theories” (Bennett 2004, 30). Tanzanian national identification is an outlier in East Africa, as is clear from the Afrobarometer survey. Even now, Tanzanian national identification remains higher than other states in the region. Only Mozambique approaches its level in 2015 with 52.7% of individuals surveyed replying that they identify only nationally. Mozambique aside, Tanzania is an outlier due to its high national identification and low economic development, which makes the research question articulated in this essay even more important.

In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that trusted the president “a lot” decreased from 80% in 2005 to 47.3% in 2015. This may be indicative of a change in institutions and political competition.
However, Figure 8a shows that in 2005, 40% of Tanzanians surveyed felt that party competition often leads to conflict, while in 2015 this number fell to 29.4%. In 2005, 33.5% of Tanzanians surveyed felt that party competition rarely leads to conflict. In 2015, this increased to 47.7%. This change in public opinion suggests that Tanzanians do not view competition among multiple parties as a potential cause of conflict, which is distinct from the dependent variable I propose here, which is shift in identity.

Figure 9a. 2005 Approval of One Party Rule  Figure 9b. 2015 Approval of One Party Rule

In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that strongly approved of one-party rule decreased from 25.1% in 2005 to 8.9% in 2015. Strong disapproval of one-party rule increased from 24% in 2005 to 43.2% in 2015. This change suggests that Tanzanians are embracing the multiparty electoral system.
In short, these numbers are consistent with change in political institutions, which created incentives for political competition that may have altered the salience of national identity in Tanzania. Future research should examine the rhetoric of elites during political campaigns, the descriptions of political competition in Tanzanian media, as well as recruitment, and voting patterns in the country to draw a conclusion about whether political competition is responsible for the identity shift in Tanzania.

**Conclusion**

Posner (2004) finds that changes in political systems, the institutions of the state, influence the identities in a society through political competition. Gadjanova (2017) finds that when political competition is high, ethnic anxiety increases and inter-ethnic trust decreases, and these changes occur as a function of electoral cycles. Political competition influences identity and politics in African states, however, we do not know at this point whether this is the mechanism responsible for the identity shift in Tanzania.

This thesis argues that political competition may serve as a causal mechanism that operates as part of political institutions, economic modernization, or conflict. By conducting process tracing of Tanzanian electoral campaigns, I will establish what determinant or combination of determinants—-institutions, economic modernization, or conflict—created incentives for political competition to alter identity in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015.

Understanding why a shift in identity has occurred, or is under way, in Tanzania is important for future researchers and policymakers, as Tanzania is a unique state on the African continent. Although Tanzanian national identity remains the highest in East Africa, the decrease in national identity deserves attention, as years of nation building that led to high levels of national identity and relative peace may be threatened.
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