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The Effects of the Political Landscape on Social Movement Organization Tactical Choices

Jennifer Marie Swalboski
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THE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION TACTICAL CHOICES

by

Jennifer M. Swalboski

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Sociology

Approved:

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Douglas Jackson-Smith          E. Helen Berry
Major Professor                Committee Member

______________________________  ______________________________
Leon Anderson                   Mark R. McLellan
Committee Member               Vice President for Research and
                              Dean of the School of Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

2012
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ABSTRACT

The Effects of the Political Landscape on Social Movement Organization Tactical Choice

by

Jennifer M. Swalboski, Master of Science

Utah State University, 2012

Major Professor: Dr. Douglas Jackson-Smith
Department: Sociology

The majority of sociological research on social movement tactics and strategies has focused on how theories of resource mobilization and dynamic political opportunities affect the innovation of tactics and types of tactics used. Relatively few studies have explored the roles of institutional, cultural, and political contexts in determining why social movement leaders choose certain tactics. This research study examines lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMO) that are pursuing institutional advocacy. Specifically, it is a comparative case study of how tactics of LGBT organizations in Minnesota and Utah are affected by contested and conservative political landscapes, respectively. The concept of political landscapes was developed and includes three core components: the institutional structure of the political system, the sociocultural context, and dynamic political opportunities. Data was collected from 16 semi-structured interviews of LGBT SMO leaders. Secondary data
was also collected by examining public records, newspapers, magazines, and organizational websites.

The results from this study suggest that dynamic political opportunities are embedded in the larger institutional and sociocultural contexts. In Minnesota, the combination of a more open and competitive political system and a more diverse Christian presence and ethnically diverse urban areas have resulted in the use of tactics that are much more open and direct. Specifically, LGBT SMOs in Minnesota use tactics such as only endorsing candidates publicly, focusing on building a broad bipartisan base of sponsors for LGBT legislation, working with other SMOs to create large coalitions, using a frame that is all-encompassing of movement goals, and building a large, grassroots movement. By contrast, the closed and conservative political system and a dominant religion in Utah have resulted in more private, compromising, and behind-the-scenes tactics. LGBT SMOs in Utah tactics include using both public and private political endorsements, good-cop bad-cop organizations, delegate trainings, and frame alignment with the conservative culture.
The Effects of the Political Landscape on Social Movement Organization Tactical Choice

by Jennifer Swalboski

This thesis examines the tactics used by organizations in Minnesota and Utah pursuing rights and protections for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community. Minnesota and Utah provided good examples of LGBT movements that are pursuing moderate goals such as anti-discrimination or anti-bullying legislation. Minnesota movement organizations operate in a political context that offers a relative balance of political party power and diverse religious, racial and ethnic groups. By contrast, Utah represents a very conservative political context in which Republicans have completely dominated both the legislative and executive branches for decades. Utah also has a very monolithic culture which is dominated by one religion. Both states have very different election systems and processes. The differences in institutional (election systems), cultural, and political contexts led to the development of a concept called the “political landscape.” Utah and Minnesota provided the basis for a comparative study of how the distinctive political landscapes of each state affect the tactics used by organizations. Specifically, the research explored whether or not the conservative political landscape of Utah caused the LGBT organizations to create a different set of tactics compared to the more moderate and contested political landscape of Minnesota.

The results of this study suggest that institutional factors (such as election and party systems) and cultural factors (such as religion and ethnic diversity) do structure the tactics LGBT leaders chose in pursuit of similar goals. In Minnesota, the more open and competitive political landscape resulted in the use of tactics that are more open and direct. Specifically, LGBT organizations in Minnesota used tactics such as endorsing candidates publicly, working with other organizations to create large coalitions, working toward all LGBT movement goals (such as marriage equality), and building a large, grassroots movement across the state. On the other hand, the closed and conservative political landscape of Utah resulted in more private, compromising, and behind-the-scenes tactics. LGBT SMOs in Utah use both public and private political endorsements, targeted delegate trainings, and align their movement goals within terms that are compatible with the dominant conservative culture. The conservative political landscape of Utah also caused tension within the LGBT movement because LGBT leaders were forced to compromise and carefully interact with conservative legislators who are not completely LGBT supportive, while simultaneously trying to assure the LGBT community of their commitment to all LGBT goals.
I would like to thank my adviser Dr. Douglas Jackson-Smith for his constant guidance and tireless work on my thesis that led to many revisions and a final product that I am proud to have completed. I never thought I would say this, but I have grown used to and will miss receiving drafts back in a different color than they originally were!

Next, I would like to thank Dr. Eddy Berry for her guidance, encouragement, and support while I found myself as a graduate student and completed my thesis. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr. Leon Anderson who added a wonderfully qualitative and experienced lens to my thesis that was greatly welcomed.

Although many of them already know this, I would not have been able to complete my thesis without the support and encouragement of my family and friends. I sincerely thank my parents for their continual faith and encouragement; they have made every adventure and goal possible for me to achieve. I would also like to thank my family for their constant support and understanding as I sought my degree far from our home in Minnesota. I am grateful for all of my friends who provided much needed outlets, adventures, and laughter during stressful times. A special note of thanks to Maddy who acted as a sounding board for all and any ideas I conjured up. And lastly, I am genuinely thankful to G Allred who created a home for me in our department and in Logan.

Jennifer M. Swalboski
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INTRODUCTION

The “question of tactical choice is a persistent one for social movements. Tactics are the essence of collective action” (Ennis 1987: 520). Much of the social movement research on tactics and strategies up until today has focused on conditions that promote the innovation of new forms of tactics and strategies (Brockett 1991; Gerlach and Hine 1970; McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003; Staggenborg 1989; Tarrow 1994). Other studies focus on how social movement organization (SMO) structure and internal characteristics are associated with the emergence of certain types of tactics and strategies (Freeman 1979; Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988, 1989). Yet another avenue of research has explored how different types of tactics and strategies can contribute to SMO success or survival (Ganz 2000; Minkoff 1993; Taylor 2007). Although these avenues of research are important, relatively few have explored the roles of social, cultural, and political contexts in determining why social movement leaders choose certain tactics.

Social movements are a major driver of social change in our society (McAdam and Snow 2010). Some of the most studied social movements in the US include the Women’s Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Peace Movement, each of which is known for using disruptive tactics during the earlier stages of each movement to accomplish their goals (McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003; Minkoff 1993; Staggenborg 1988, 1989; Tarrow 1998). Social movements such as these occurred during periods of great social change, which allowed for and sometimes demanded major tactical innovation to gain the attention needed for change to occur. McAdam (1983) focuses on how the use of disruptive tactics by social movement actors can cause their opponents to
grant concessions in order to stop social disruption. As social movements become more formal and institutionalized, they often shift their use of tactics and use fewer disruptive tactics (Freeman 1979; Morris 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988). The focus on the major US social movements during periods of great social change has resulted in a concentration of research studies on disruptive tactics, yet it is also important to understand the use of the full range of tactics by social movement organizations (SMO) that have become more formalized and institutionalized.

One major focus of social movement activists over the last 20 years has been efforts to promote equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) citizens. The majority of social science research on the LGBT movement has focused on a small number of states where efforts to gain rights for same-sex marriage experienced prominent successes or failures (Knochel 2010; Lewis 2011; McCann 2011; Thomas 2011; Willetts 2011). While 11 states currently offer some form of relationship recognition to same-sex couples – whether it is marriage or civil unions – the bulk of US states have LGBT movement organizations whose efforts are directed toward different ‘intermediate’ goals (short of marriage equality) to protect the rights of LGBT citizens (Human Rights Campaign 2011).

In order to investigate why social movement leaders choose certain tactics, I conducted a comparative case study of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) SMOs in Utah and Minnesota. Minnesota and Utah provide good examples of social movements whose work focuses on intermediate types of outcomes, including formalizing domestic partnership arrangements and passing local or statewide anti-discrimination and anti-bullying statues. They also are important cases to study because,
unlike many previous studies, these states provide more contested or unfavorable political landscapes which likely require SMOs to adapt their tactics and strategies to be effective. My specific research question is: How do the political landscapes of Utah and Minnesota affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT social movement organizations pursue as they seek to protect the rights and well-being of the LGBT community?
Within social movement theory, three perspectives have been prominent: resource mobilization, political process model, and framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). These perspectives have each provided detailed explanations about the emergence and dynamics of social movements. They have also each been adapted to explain the specific factors that account for the genesis of innovative SMO tactics, the relative effectiveness of different tactics for achieving movement goals, and the factors that are associated with the choice of certain tactics and strategies. The following section provides the conceptualization of tactics and strategies, a brief overview of the contributions from each of these three social movement theoretical perspectives, and explores their potential application to an analysis of contextual influences on SMO strategies and tactics.

**Tactics & Strategies**

Previous work in social movement research often has been unsystematic in the use of the concepts of tactics and strategies. In this research study, I am treating *strategies* as the long term action plans that define the broad approaches a social movement organization decides to follow to achieve a specific goal or result. Previous research has identified four broad strategic forms that SMOs pursue: social protest, institutional advocacy, service provision, and cultural production or sponsorship (Minkoff 1993). Social protest involves increasing visibility for movement issues and placing pressure on elites through the use of non-routine political action. Social protest usually includes a public action that is demonstrative or confrontational in nature. Institutional advocacy involves seeking policy reforms through routine channels such as
conventional legal and political actions. Service provision entails providing direct services or benefits to constituents without advocating any change in policy. Finally, cultural production or sponsorship involves contributing to the distribution of ideas, knowledge, or systems of belief through action in arts, media, humanities, or social sciences.

Individual SMOs might primarily focus on one form, but can draw upon the full repertoire of strategic forms that might shift through time. Preliminary research suggested that in both Minnesota and Utah statewide LGBT organizations focus primarily on institutional advocacy and service provision, but they differ in actual tactics to achieve their institutional goals. For example, organizations in Minnesota and Utah may focus on the same strategy at different scales such as pursuing institutional change by affecting statewide legislation or by focusing on changes that can be effected at the local level in city councils, school districts, and counties.

Given that LGBT organizations in Minnesota and Utah both mainly focus on institutional advocacy and service provision, I expected there to be variability in the tactics used by LGBT organizations located in different political landscapes. *Tactics* are defined as the specific short- and medium-term methods used and employed in the greater social movement field by a SMO to achieve their strategic objectives and goals. Examples of tactics can include but are not limited to framing work, coalition or alliance building, organizational elaboration, community workshops, electoral mobilization strategies or insider tactics, and forms of protest (Ghoshal 2009; McAdams 1983; McCammon 2003; Morris 1981; Staggenborg 1989; Taylor 2007). Forms of protest can include but are not limited to a march, sit-in, rally, or street theater. These more
disruptive forms of tactics are less likely to be used by SMOs whose main strategies focus on institutional goals.

Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization (RM) theory focuses on the significance of available social and material resources, as well as the organizational structure of social movement organizations. Resources are considered to provide a foundation for the overall emergence, success, and development of social movement organizations (Zald, 1992). Successful fundraising has been found to be an important contributor to the innovation of SMO tactics (McCammon 2003), but the availability of a wide variety of resources, not just monetary, is also significant (Freeman 1983; McAdam 1983). Within the RM perspective, the structure of a larger community of contemporaneous social movements is thought to affect the emergence, resources, outcomes, tactics, and strategies of particular SMOs. Research studies have found that heterogeneous social movement fields, or organizations with diverse visions of how leaders should achieve their goals, are more likely to have substantial discussion or debate of the appropriate tactics than a field without SMO diversity. Therefore, discussion and debate among leaders of a heterogeneous social movement field are more likely to spur the development of new tactics (Ganz 2000; McCammon 2003).

The organizational structure of SMOs has been found to be an important factor in the use of different types of tactics and strategies (Freeman 1979, Morris 1981, 1984; Staggenborg 1988, 1989). SMOs that are more centralized and formalized are expected to select more institutionalized and non-disruptive tactics and strategies. By contrast, the
more decentralized and less formalized SMOs tend to be more engaged in direct-action and disruptive tactics.

*Political Process*

The availability of resources, organizational structure, and the broader SMO field all influence the innovation of new tactics and the type of tactics used, but this does not address the influence of larger societal context on tactical choices. The political process model builds on and extends the resource mobilization perspective. Political process scholars recognize the importance of resources in social movement success, but assert that even when a movement has a great number of resources, if there is an unfavorable institutional context or a lack of political opportunities, the movement will not be successful.

Political opportunities can be understood as, “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage or discourage people from using collective action” (Tarrow 1998:18). This definition allows for a broad interpretation of political opportunities so clarification is needed. The following makes a distinction between structural and dynamic political opportunities.

“Structural opportunities are [the] more stable features of political institutions and culture that change only gradually over decades” (Jenkins and Form 2005: 338). Institutional political arrangements (e.g., party systems, voting rules, balance of power between the executive, judiciary and legislative branches) that are more diverse, open, and/or responsive to civil society are easier for SMOs to influence than monolithic, closed, or repressive systems.
Scholars have found that the institutional structure of a political system shapes the differences in movement formation and strategy (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1991; Meyer 1993). Specifically, national differences in state institutions (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Meyer 1993) and political party systems (Kriesi 1991) provide stable opportunities, or a structured context, that shape differences in movement formation and strategy. Greater institutional access to political decision makers generally has been found to make social movement actors less likely to turn to disruptive tactics (Kitschelt 1986). These systematic institutional contexts are more enduring than the constantly changing dynamic political opportunities.

The institutional structure of Minnesota and Utah’s political systems may have a significant effect on tactical choice. An open political structure with primary elections and two competing political parties (as in MN) may lead SMOs leaders to make different choices compared to a more closed political structure with a caucus system and one dominant political party (as in UT).

There is also a strong cultural component when understanding structural opportunities. While not ignoring the institutional component of structural opportunities, some studies focus on the influence of cultural components such as political culture, political discourse, and the prevailing cultural climate. For instance, different political cultures in Germany and France changed the way activists thought about politics (Nelkin and Pollack 1981). Brand (1990) focused on how the prevailing cultural climate affects and interacts with framing activities. Related factors such as religion, ethnic diversity, and public opinion may be important in understanding SMO leaders’ tactical and strategic choices.
A second type of political opportunity reflects ‘dynamic’ political opportunities that are “relatively volatile, shifting with events, polices and political actors” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 277). These kinds of political opportunities reflect shorter-term variation through time in the degree of SMO access to the political system, divisions within the political elite, availability of elite allies, and the degree of state repression (McAdam 1996). Historical conjunctures might provide constellations of factors that are relatively favorable (or unfavorable) to the ability of the SMO to impact political outcomes. It is important to understand that “In this more dynamic model of political opportunity, structure channels movement activities, making various choices of action appear more or less desirable…” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 278).

Within social movement research, a number of dimensions of dynamic political opportunities have been shown to affect the development of movement tactics. Perceptions of political opportunities by social movement leaders can spur tactical innovation (McAdam 1983) and more specifically periods of political conflict and instability - characterized by greater fragmentation among elites or increased competition among elites due to political realignments - can alter the use of different tactics (Brockett 1991; Tarrow 1998). Institutionalized state structures create stable patterns of access, but changing political opportunities such as an opening up of access to power, shifts in ruling alignments, cleavages among elites, and the availability of influential allies provide incentives for leaders to develop or change tactics in order to take advantage of the political opportunity. McCammon (2003) found that political defeats in the larger political environment, rather than perceived political opportunities, can cause social movement actors to change tactics.
In general, more favorable political opportunities would be expected to be found in Minnesota given their more open institutional structure and contested political landscape. A greater diversity of political actors and interests suggest that SMO leaders in Minnesota are likely to have more potential elite allies which would increase their perceived political opportunities. This could manifest tactically as increased coalition building and more overt pressure on elected officials especially at the state-level compared to Utah. On the other hand, incremental changes at the municipal level for Utah may be more prevalent as a result of their more closed institutional structure and lack of political opportunities. These conditions may also lead to the use of disruptive tactics in Utah.

**Framing**

A major critique of resource mobilization theory and the political process model is that they do not adequately account for how people experience and understand their social world, and for the central role of cultural beliefs, interpretative frames and idea systems in making sense of social phenomena (Klandermans 1992). Snow and Benford (1992) argue that effective social movements actively engage in the production and maintenance of meaning. They do this by framing, which is the “signifying work, that is the processes associated with assigning meaning to or interpreting relevant events and conditions in ways intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Benford 1997: 416). SMOs both respond to larger interpretive frames in society as they select tactics that will resonate with their followers and broader society, but also use framing as a tactic to help shift
public perceptions and support in their favor. Specifically, SMOs operate under a broader collective action frame which involves “public discourse, that is, the interface of media discourse and interpersonal interaction; persuasive communication during mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents and countermovement organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collection actions” (Klandermans 1997: 45).

These broader collective action frames shape the tactics that SMOs use (Staggenborg 1989), but SMOs also frequently try and reshape or redefine the collective action frames they operate under as a tactic itself. As SMOs try to reshape the collective action frame, they do so in response to the broader political environment (Benford and Snow 2000). Therefore, the use of framing as a tactic and collective action frames are important cultural factors in understanding why SMO leaders choose certain tactics.

Political Landscapes

The field of social movement research on tactics and strategies is broad and covers many possible explanations of tactical innovation and change. SMO institutional resources, political processes, and framing are all potentially important influences on their choices of tactics. In this study, the concepts of structural – both institutional and cultural – and dynamic political opportunities are used to develop the idea of a ‘political landscape’ that I expect to structure the selection of movement tactics by LGBT SMOs in Utah and Minnesota. There is a relative lack of research on how structural opportunities affect tactical choice and types of tactics. It is important to understand how the institutional structure of a state’s political system may affect tactical choice. I would also
like to further develop the idea of a cultural component of structural opportunities by looking at variables such as religion, ethnic diversity, and public opinion on LGBT issues as the sociocultural context.

There is an underlying assumption in this study that social movements geared at institutional change will need many types of resources. Because I want to highlight the influence of the different political landscapes in Utah and Minnesota, I focused my research on aspects of political opportunities and sociocultural factors that affect tactical choices rather than features of resource mobilization and framing theories. The greater institutional and cultural contexts have been conceptualized as the more stable characteristics of a state that may influence resource mobilization, dynamic political opportunities, and framing as well as tactics and strategies (Figure 1). Dynamic political opportunities are included in this study to further understand the specific impacts of shifting short-term political opportunities on tactical choices.

Political landscapes in my study include three core components: the institutional structure of the political system, the sociocultural context of each state, and dynamic political opportunities. The *institutional structure of the political system* refers to the specific enduring characteristics of each state’s political system, including whether it has a competitive two-party or one-party dominated system and the type of election procedures used to elect local and state political officials. The *sociocultural context* refers to how sociocultural characteristics, including religious tendencies, ethnic diversity, and public opinion, are likely to shape greater collective action frames and affect the use of certain movement tactics. This study will use McAdam’s (1996) definition of (dynamic) *political opportunities* which includes the degree of access to the
political system, existence of divisions within the elite, availability of elite allies, and
degree of state repression.

My research question is: How does the political landscape of Utah and Minnesota
affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT social movement organizations pursue as they
seek to protect the rights and well-being of the LGBT community? Within this broader
question, I want to explore two focused subquestions: (a) Are there certain parts of the
political landscape that have more influence on SMO choices of tactics and strategies?
and (b) Is there a distinctive set of tactics adopted by SMOs working in more closed or
conservative political landscapes?
METHODS

Data Collection

This is a comparative analysis of social movement organizations in Minnesota and Utah. The unit of analysis is statewide social movement organizations who are pursuing institutional changes to increase the rights and well-being of each state’s LGBT residents. Purposive, theory-based sampling was used to select social movement organizations in Utah and in Minnesota (Patton 2002). As mentioned above, examples of strategies used in social movement research include: social protest, institutional advocacy, service provision, and cultural production or sponsorship (Minkoff 1993). Purposive sampling was used to select all SMOs in each state that place some emphasis on advocating for policies and programs to benefit the LGBT community. Three organizations in Minnesota and two organizations in Utah were identified as LGBT SMOs that pursue institutional advocacy, the selection criteria. Most of these also were engaged in service provision and/or cultural production.

I started by collecting secondary data and examining public and archival records to provide descriptive data on each state’s political landscape and social movement organizations. Table 1 provides an overview of how various types of data were used in relation to the sections in this paper. SMO websites were used to do a preliminary analysis of organizations. Mainstream newspapers were systematically searched using words related to the LGBT movement and LGBT organizations. The accuracy of the organization’s websites and media sources were checked during key informant interviews. LGBT magazines were searched to provide additional information about the
LGBT communities and movements in Utah and Minnesota. Government websites were used to find information about legislation related to the LGBT movement. All of these sources of data provided a basis for detailed questions during key informant interviews. Census data, public records, and media archives were used to characterize the political landscape of each state.

TABLE 1. Sources of Data Used in Operationalizing Key Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Concept</th>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Structure</td>
<td>MN &amp; UT State Legislature Websites</td>
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<td>Utah Foundation</td>
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<td>Newspaper Articles</td>
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<td>Dynamic Political</td>
<td>MN &amp; UT State Legislature Websites</td>
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<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>Minnesota Historical Society</td>
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<td>State of Utah Websites</td>
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<td>LGBT Organization Websites</td>
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<td>Movement History</td>
<td>LGBT Organization Websites</td>
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<td>MN &amp; UT State Legislature Websites</td>
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<td>Primary Interviews with SMO leaders</td>
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<td>LGBT Organization Websites</td>
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<td>Landscape</td>
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<td>LGBT Magazine Articles</td>
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Primary data was collected from semi-structured interviews of leaders of LGBT SMOs in Utah and Minnesota. Raw data was gathered from leaders who are “the people authorized to make strategic choices within an organization” (Ganz 2000). I also recognize that individual leaders rarely act alone, but formulate tactics and strategies
through a process of interaction between the many leaders who share responsibilities in an organization. Therefore, I conducted interviews with all willing decision makers in the organizations. Leaders ranged from executive directors to community organizers in each of my study organizations.

The interview instrument included questions about the informant’s involvement in the LGBT movement; the use and change of tactics and strategies; how political, institutional, and cultural factors influenced tactics and strategies; and how financial and human resources affected tactics and strategies. The majority of interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 90 minutes; three interviews last longer than two hours. As the interviewer, I acknowledged that I had previously volunteered for an LGBT organization in most interviews. I believe that my involvement in the LGBT community influenced and increased the responses by those interviewed.

Utah has roughly half as many residents as Minnesota. Compared to Minnesota, Utah has a notably smaller number of organizations and individuals working towards institutional advocacy for LGBT rights, so snowball sampling was also used to identify more key informants. Interview respondents were asked to suggest the names of others who they thought would be good sources of information about political action on behalf of the LGBT community. This led to interviews with two LGBT SMO founders and past board members. A third interview was conducted with an SMO employee who had separate responsibilities in the larger LGBT movement outside of their organization responsibilities.

Nine interviews were conducted in Utah with seven leaders at two social movement organizations. Follow-up interviews were conducted with two informants.
There were no problems contacting and conducting interviews with LGBT leaders in Utah (other than the fact that there is a relatively small number of leaders). Informants were willing and happy to help with the study and tell their story of Utah’s LGBT movement.

Seven interviews were conducted with SMO leaders in Minnesota. The leaders came from three social movement organizations that have been working for years to affect institutional change that would expand LGBT rights in the state. All of the longest serving and most experienced LGBT leaders in Minnesota were interviewed, but some of the newer, more active political organizers declined to be interviewed. This allowed for a detailed understanding of the last decade of the LGBT movement in Minnesota, but I was unable to gather full information about some of the most recent tactical choices in policy and political decision making. Specifically, I was denied access to leaders and staff who are working on a newly created political campaign to defeat a proposed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage that will be voted on in a statewide referendum in November 2012. An initial meeting and short interview was conducted with a campaign organizer, but they declined to participate in a full interview afterwards. Other informants pointed to another campaign organizer, but this person also declined to be interviewed. Two leaders from another organization also declined to be interviewed. All of these potential respondents said they did not have enough time to be interviewed. After a short interview with someone from a different organization, the interviewee decided she was not the right person to speak with. Problems with interviewing key informants were only found in Minnesota. It took a substantially longer amount of time to start a dialogue with key informants in Minnesota than it did in Utah.
Data Analysis

I used public records and archives to operationalize the three components of political landscape. This information was used to help guide interview questions and develop a broader understanding of the relationships between political landscapes and the strategies and tactics of LGBT social movement organizations in each state.

All interviews were transcribed and combined with all other types of data to explore patterns and relationships among the key variables. First, the transcripts of the interviews were analyzed by using open coding, which involved categorizing interviews by words and phrases that identify specific dimensions (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). General themes were found on most aspects of the political landscape, tactics, and strategies. The second step of analysis included focused coding where specific themes found during transcription and the first round of open coding were elaborated on and validated. The last round of coding focused on the apparent linkages between components of the political landscape and the use of certain tactics or strategies.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Design

In this research study, it is difficult to understand the exact impact each state’s political landscape has on SMO tactical choices because the sample size is small. There may also be unmeasured variables that differentiate Utah and Minnesota which could be involved in determining tactical choices. Although the exact impact of the political landscape may be difficult to prove, this study identifies some important patterns based on secondary data and the accounts of leaders in LGBT statewide social movements and the narratives behind why leaders chose certain tactics and strategies. Although the
findings of this study should not be generalized to all other types of social movements, the findings may be generalizable to other U.S. states that have similar political landscapes and to SMOs with similar goals. Further research may be conducted comparing other conservative states, such as states in the South, with Utah to see if their political landscapes produce the similar forms of tactics and strategies.

Ethical Considerations

A letter of information was given to each key informant describing the research study and possible breaches of confidentiality. Since each social movement has only a small number of organizations, it is difficult to disguise the identity of my informants. To avoid this, some details are blurred whenever there are specific comments that may lead to the discovery of the respondent or when the information could harm the respondent and/or organization. Extra attention is taken to avoid the release of any confidential information through the use of quotations.
DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREAS

Political Landscapes

My research explores how the political landscape of Minnesota and Utah can help explain the tactics and strategies chosen by social movement organizations in those states. As discussed above, I define political landscape as having three key features: institutional structures, sociocultural contexts, and dynamic political opportunities.

To characterize the institutional political opportunities in each state, the party configuration of the legislature and Governor’s office was analyzed over the last two decades for Minnesota and Utah. The relative balance or unbalance of power and internal workings of the major political parties are also important to understand elements of the institutional structure for each state. The institutional structure of each state’s political system is represented by the processes of local and state election systems.

Institutional Structure of State Politics

For the Minnesota State Legislature and Governor’s office, there is an open primary election system for major political parties (Table 2). Party caucuses elect delegates who vote for the party endorsement, which is the selection of their favorite candidate, but a candidate must win the primary election to win the actual party nomination. At the primary election, every citizen eligible to vote, regardless of party affiliation, may participate in the primary election to determine the party nominee. Once a candidate wins the party nomination, they will appear on the ballot for the general election.
Minnesota’s political institutional context has been remarkably balanced and hotly contested for several decades (Figure 2). There are three major political parties in Minnesota: The Republican Party, The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), and the Independence Party (Table 2). The Independence Party had some influence in the late 1990s and the early 21st century with one elected governor and one elected state senator. Other than that, the DFL and the Republican Party are the major political parties in Minnesota. The last three governors in Minnesota have been from all three major political parties. Over the last decade, there has not been a time period where one political party was in control of both the legislative and executive branches.

**TABLE 2. Institutional Structure of Minnesota and Utah’s Political Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of Political Landscape</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Utah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local &amp; State Elections</td>
<td>Open Primary Election</td>
<td>Caucus System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Political Parties</td>
<td>Democratic-Farm-Labor Party</td>
<td>Republican Party of Utah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican Party of Minnesota</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Utah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independence Party of Minnesota</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Minnesota Secretary of State 2012b, and the Utah Foundation 2011

Utah uses a caucus system to nominate candidates for elected office. Candidates for partisan races, which include local, county, and state level offices, are elected by delegates selected to represent voters in Utah (Table 2). Delegates are elected at precinct caucuses to attend county and state conventions. Delegates vote to decide which candidate will be on the ballot for the general election. If a candidate does not receive 60% of delegate votes, then two candidates are placed on a primary election in June where voters can choose who will be on the ballot for the general election. Republican caucuses and primaries are closed which means that only registered Republicans can vote.
in them. On the other hand, Democratic caucuses and primaries are open which means that registered Democrats and unaffiliated voters can vote in the Democratic primary.

Utah’s political system over the last two decades reflects a more conservative political culture than Minnesota. There are two major political parties in Utah: the Utah Republican Party and the Utah Democratic Party. These two political parties have dominated Utah politics over the last couple decades. Third parties have not won any seats in the legislature in the last decade.

The Republican Party has a very large majority in both the Senate (22-7) and the House of Representatives (58-17) (Utah State Legislature 2012). A Republican majority has been a constant over the last decade for both the Senate and House of Representatives.
in Utah (Figure 3). There have been no legislators from any other political party besides the Republican Party and the Democratic Party in this time period.

The same is true for the Governor’s office in Utah. The current Governor, Gary Herbert, is a Republican (Minnesota’s Historical Society 2012). Over the last 27 years, every governor in Utah has been a Republican. The last couple of decades of Utah Governors and the State Legislature illustrates that state politics are overwhelmingly dominated by Republicans. Republicans have had a steadily growing majority in the House of Representatives over the last couple decades (Figure 3).

![FIGURE 3. Political Party Control of Utah’s Legislature, 1988-2011](source)

The Republican Party has been criticized in recent years because Republican delegates to state party conventions do not represent political views the Republican voters. Surveys conducted in 2010 and 2012 compared the political ideologies of Utah party delegates and the larger electorate (Utah Foundation 2012). In 2010, there were distinct differences between Republican voters and delegates with the delegates taking
more extreme positions than voters. A similar survey conducted in 2012 found that both the Republican voters and delegates have become more moderate, though the gap between their views persisted (Figure 4). The study noted that increased turnout at party caucus meetings in 2012 likely explained the moderation in state delegate ideologies. Although there is not as pronounced a difference in 2012, 61% of Republican delegates identify as Conservative whereas only 51% of Republican voters do.

**FIGURE 4.** Political Ideology of Delegates and Voters, 2012
Source: The 2012 Utah Priorities Survey of Party Delegates and Voters (Utah Foundation 2012)

Utah’s LogCabin Republicans, the LGBT caucus in the national Republican Party, are not recognized as an official caucus by the Utah Republican Party. The Stonewall Democrats, the LGBT caucus in the national Democratic Party, is the largest caucus for the Utah Democratic Party.


As stated earlier, the sociocultural context involves looking at how specific sociocultural characteristics of each state, specifically religious tendencies and ethnic diversity, are likely to shape the use of certain movement tactics. Understanding the religious and ethnic composition of Minnesota and Utah highlights the possible factors that may affect the LGBT movements in each state.

There is a significant but diverse Christian presence in Minnesota that consists of roughly equal proportions of Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Evangelical Protestants (Table 3). Most religions comprising less than one percent of the population were left out of Table 3 except for Mormons to allow comparison with Utah. Minnesota is overwhelmingly Protestant and Catholic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Utah</th>
<th>U.S. Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>&lt;0.5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *All percentages are rounded to the nearest percent.
** Representative sample of over 35,000 adults in the U.S.

Minnesota has less ethnic diversity than the US as a whole, with a higher percentage of people who classify themselves as Non-Hispanic White (Table 4).
Minnesota also has a smaller percentage of Blacks and Hispanics than the national average, but is very similar with its Asian population. Minnesota does have a more diverse population in the major urban areas, but northern and rural Minnesota have very homogenous populations, which can be found in statewide totals.

**TABLE 4. Percentages of Ethnic Diversity in Minnesota & Utah, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Minneapolis/St. Paul</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Salt Lake City</th>
<th>Utah</th>
<th>U.S. Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian or Alaska Native</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic Black</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>&lt;.5</td>
<td>&lt;.5</td>
<td>&lt;.5</td>
<td>&lt;.5</td>
<td>&lt;.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Races</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010a & b
Notes: *All percentages are rounded to the nearest percent.
      **Data is a combination of race and ethnicity.

The vast majority of Utah residents belong to a single church: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) (also known as the Mormons). The next largest group would be those who identified as unaffiliated with any religious group or belief.

Only 23% of Utahns are either Catholic or Protestant.

Similar to Minnesota, a large part of the population in Utah (80%) identifies as Non-Hispanic White (Table 4). Hispanics are the next largest ethnic group in Utah.
comprising 13% of the population. Although some ethnic group percentages do increase in Salt Lake City, it is still much less diverse than the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul). All other ethnic groups are 1-2% or less of the population of Utah. Compared to Minnesota, Utah is somewhat less ethnically and much less religiously diverse.

Table 5 presents results of public opinion polls in Minnesota and Utah that show support for a range of pro-gay policies. The results suggest that the public is much more supportive of LGBT rights in Minnesota than Utah. Minnesota’s public is actually more supportive of LGBT policies than the national average, whereas Utah’s residents are notably less supportive of LGBT issues.

TABLE 5. Percentage of People Who Support Pro-Gay Policies in Minnesota, Utah, and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Hate Crimes</th>
<th>Health Benefits</th>
<th>2nd Parent Adoption</th>
<th>Civil Unions</th>
<th>Marriage</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lax and Phillips 2009
Notes: All averages are rounded.

Interestingly, The Advocate, the oldest continuing LGBT publication in the United States, has ranked the largest cities in both Minnesota and Utah at different times as the gayest city in the U.S. In 2011, Minneapolis was voted the gayest city in the U.S. and it was followed by Salt Lake City earning the title of gayest city in the U.S. for 2012 (Breen 2012). These ratings are based off of number of variables including LGBT elected city officials, LGBT bookstores, Transgender protections and some entertainment variables.
Dynamic Political Opportunities

I also was attentive to information from my informants about key shifts in political alignments that affected their tactical choices. Minnesota’s current legislature is controlled by Republicans, but this is the first entirely Republican legislature since 1974 (Minnesota State Legislature 2012). The Democratic Party controlled the previous two legislatures from 2007-2010, which provided higher levels of political access to the legislature and more political allies.

As in table 6, the current governor of Minnesota, Governor Dayton, is a Democrat. Governor Dayton’s election to office presented an important dynamic political opportunity because he has been found to be very LGBT friendly. Former Governor Pawlenty of the Republican Party held the office from 2003-2011.

TABLE 6. Party Control of Minnesota and Utah’s Current Legislative & Executive Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of Political Landscape</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Utah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>72-63 Republican</td>
<td>58-17 Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>37-30 Republican</td>
<td>22-7 Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Governor</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Minnesota Legislature 2012, Utah State Legislature 2012, Minnesota Historical Society 2012, the State of Utah 2012

Other than political opportunities involved with alignment changes, Minnesota has also experienced two political opportunities involving possible policy changes. From 2004 to 2006, legislators unsuccessfully tried to put an amendment to ban same-sex marriage on the ballot. In 2011, the legislature successfully put an amendment to ban
same-sex marriage on the 2012 ballot. These two political opportunities manifested as possible policy changes that would affect the LGBT movement. These are discussed in more detail below.

Dynamic political opportunities in Utah are related to particular events and the broader conservative political system and culture, not shifts in political power between the parties. As will be explained later, the involvement of the LDS Church in Californian politics (Proposition 8) created an opportunity for Utah SMOs to work with church leaders. Pro-LGBT political actions in the more urban and Democratic capital city (Salt Lake City) shifted the tenor of political coalitions in the Republican dominated legislature and prompted short-term shifts in LGBT tactics. In general, dynamic political opportunities, or the degree of “absence” of political opportunities, in Utah reflect the dominant conservative political system and culture.

**LGBT Activism in Minnesota**

The formalization of the LGBT movement in Minnesota began in 1987 when local Minneapolis leaders started the Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council (GLCAC). In its beginning, the GLCAC offered direct services such as a crime victim services and referrals for many kinds of professional services. The 1990’s brought a shift in focus for the organization from service-oriented to public policy work. The Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council changed its name to a more inclusive OutFront Minnesota and started to focus on advocacy for changes in state and local policies. OutFront Minnesota launched the *It’s Time Campaign* in 1992 which lead to the passage of an amendment to the Minnesota Human Rights Act in 1993. The amendment bans
discrimination against LGBT people in areas such as education, employment, public services, and public accommodation (OutFront Minnesota 2012b).

OutFront Minnesota hired their first statewide organizer in 1998 and he immediately started to receive phone calls from around the state. This led to trainings, education, and community organizing in over ten cities all around Minnesota (OutFront Minnesota 2012a).

The next decade brought new challenges and a very big focus on institutional policy reforms for OutFront Minnesota. They joined the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union in a successful challenge of the state’s sodomy laws in 2001. Although OutFront Minnesota had been focusing on public policy and organizing for almost a decade, they did not hire their first public policy director until 2001. This coincided with the development of a lobbying and political organizing arm of the organization.

The LGBT movement became more organized in Minnesota than it ever had been but it needed this strength because opponents began a legislative assault to roll back LGBT-friendly policies in the early 2000s. In 2003, OutFront Minnesota began spending much of their time preventing legislation from being passed that was harmful to the interests of the LGBT community. They successfully defeated efforts to repeal the human rights protections won in 1993. In 2004, conservative state legislators started a two year battle to amend Minnesota’s constitution to prevent same-sex marriage. OutFront Minnesota played a key role in preventing the proposed anti-marriage amendment from going to the voters. They did this by increasing attendance at their annual LGBT lobby day at the capitol from around 200 people in 2002 to over 5,000 people in 2006.
OutFront Minnesota also incorporated a political action committee (PAC) in 2004. This allowed OutFront Minnesota to help elect more pro-LGBT political leaders in the 2006 elections (OutFront Minnesota 2012a).

In 2007, OutFront Minnesota went through major organizational changes. They lost important sources of funding because some key financial backers wanted to fund other causes. The longtime executive director and LGBT movement leader left the organization. The loss of funding caused the organization to go from 15 fulltime staff to only seven or eight over the next year.

The movement also saw the rise of two new organizations in the LGBT movement in 2008. Project 515 was created as a ‘grass-tops’ organization in response to research that identified 515 state statues that discriminated against same-sex couples. The organization was created to specifically do policy and lobbying work to change these 515 statues. Project 515 does work with OutFront Minnesota on policy issues, but does not get involved with organizing and leadership development across the state.

Meanwhile, a local non-political service organization, Rainbow Families, merged with a national policy organization called the Family Equality Council. This merge created a Midwest Regional office for Family Equality Council. Minnesota Family Equality Council mainly acts as a support group and educational group for LGBT families, but works with Outfront Minnesota on policy related to families and children.

During Governor Pawlenty’s time in office from 2003 to 2011, several important pro-LGBT bills – including legislation to create statewide Domestic Partner Benefits, the Safe Schools for All Bill which addresses anti-bullying, and a Final Wishes/Wrongful Death bill that gave same-sex partners basic end-of-life rights – were all passed by the
Democratic majorities in the state legislature with occasional bipartisan support. However, all of these bills were vetoed by Governor Pawlenty.

The Safe Schools for All Bill is a particularly good example of a bill that has been proposed many times but has yet to receive support from both the state legislature and governor. The bill would add protections under current harassment and bullying law for students with “disabilities, immigrant students, students who identify as LGBT or have LGBT parents, or who have certain physical characteristics who are at a higher risk of being bullied at school” (Minnesota Safe Schools for All 2012). In 2009, Governor Pawlenty told Republicans that he would sign the Safe Schools for All Bill into law and the bill passed with bipartisan support from the legislature. Nevertheless, Governor Pawlenty still vetoed the bill. Many LGBT leaders associated this with his desire to run for President in 2012, so he could not be seen soft on LGBT issues.

In 2007, OutFront Minnesota helped Duluth and St. Paul to become the second and third cities in Minnesota respectively to enact a municipal Domestic Partner Registry. The Domestic Partner Registry allows same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register as a couple. This strengthens a couple’s ability to secure benefits or protections voluntarily provided by businesses, hospitals, or other entities. Although they helped the first few cities pass Domestic Partner Registries, OutFront Minnesota never took their focus from state-level advocacy work. Nevertheless, there are now 18 cities in Minnesota that allow Domestic Partner Registries, though most actively started this move on their own without the involvement of OutFront Minnesota.

In 2010, there was a major shift in the control of the legislature and governor’s office by political parties. Specifically, the Minnesota Legislature had a huge Democratic
majority in 2009-2010 with 87 Democrats and 47 Republicans (Minnesota Senate 2012; Minnesota House of Representatives 2012). The 2010 elections resulted in a complete turnaround, with a new Republican majority (72 Republicans and 62 Democrats). Meanwhile, Governor Pawlenty, a two-term Republican from 2003-2011, was not supportive of the LGBT movement. He decided to run for President in 2012, so he did not run for a third term as governor. The governor’s race in 2010 was hotly contested and resulted in Governor Dayton, a Democrat, winning. Governor Dayton has proven to be one of the most pro-LGBT governors in Minnesota’s history. He is the first sitting governor to speak at the LGBT lobby day.

The switch of party control of the Minnesota Legislature and Governor’s Office changed the political landscape and provided positive and negative political opportunities for LGBT SMOs in the state. For example, in 2011, the newly won Republican majority in the state legislature voted to put an amendment to Minnesota’s constitution on the 2012 ballot. The amendment would ban same-sex marriage. OutFront Minnesota and Project 515 have campaigned against the amendment by organizing a coalition of SMOs called Minnesota United for All Families. The campaign now has over 26 staff members and over 300 organizations have joined together to fight the amendment (Minnesotans United for All Families 2012). The amendment has also attracted attention and support from national LGBT organizations as well as conservative anti-LGBT groups. This has provided OutFront Minnesota with new resources to increase their staff and programming in preparation for the amendment vote this fall.

The reaction to the amendment against same-sex marriage has created a stronger LGBT movement. The LGBT organizations now have more resources than they have
had before and are intent on building on the foundations they have spent almost two decades creating. They have increased efforts to build local groups and leaders all around the state and have created a massive coalition of cities, businesses, non-profits, churches, and individuals in support of same-sex marriage and against the amendment.

*LGBT Activism in Utah*

The LGBT movement in Utah started as a much more community-oriented movement compared to Minnesota. The Utah Stonewall Center started as a community center in 1992 and attracted many volunteers. After financial difficulties, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) Community Center of Utah, was created upon the remnants the Utah Stonewall Center in 1997. Neighboring buildings were bought so that the center could become the permanent home for the LGBT community in Salt Lake City. The LGBTQ Community Center of Utah would later be renamed the Utah Pride Center. The Utah Pride Center took over the financial responsibilities of the Utah Pride Festival in 2001, making it unique compared to many Pride Festivals around the country because it was run by an actual LGBT organization.

Founders of the Utah Pride Center recognized the need to better organize the political power of the LGBT community in Salt Lake City. For a while, there was only a phone tree of LGBT people in Salt Lake City to call for political action and LGBT leaders realized that there was more potential for organized political action. In 2001, Equality Utah was created and incorporated as a political action committee, which allows the organization to endorse political candidates. The organization focused on electing city-level LGBT candidates and building membership and funds.
In 2004, with the full backing of the legislature and governor, Utah voters approved an amendment to Utah’s constitution that defines marriage as the legal union between a man and a woman. Voters also approved an initiative that restricts any other form of unmarried domestic union. In response, Equality Utah incorporated a non-profit 501 (c)(3) and 501 (c)(4). The 501 (c)(3) of Equality Utah was incorporated as tax-exempt organization that focused on educational activities. The 501 (c)(4) was incorporated to facilitate the political organizing wing of Equality Utah that can lobby and participate in political campaigns. The goal of the organization was to support the election of LGBT-friendly legislators from outside of Salt Lake City area (because the Salt Lake City legislators were too few to affect the overall composition of the state legislature). They also saw the need to start an education campaign to help Utahns understand LGBT issues.

From 2005 to 2008, Equality Utah’s focus was on the Utah legislature and statewide policy issues. Because the Utah legislature meets on a part-time basis (from January to March), an annual cycle emerged in which most legislation supported by Equality Utah failed to get out of committee for full floor debates. Efforts to add LGBT friendly amendments to the major bills that did get passed during this time period also consistently failed. The conservative positions of most of Utah’s elected officials meant that the legislative work of Equality Utah during this time focused more often on efforts to prevent LGBT-unfriendly legislation from passing than on constructive efforts to extend protections for Utah’s LGBT residents.

After many years of no success, an unexpected (and backhanded) opportunity arose for the LGBT movement in Utah. Proposition 8, an amendment to the California
constitution to ban same-sex marriage, passed in 2008 after receiving significant and highly visible support from the LDS Church. Their public support for the initiative drew significant negative publicity to the LDS Church in the national media. In response to the negative public attention, LDS Church leaders contacted members of the Utah LGBT movement in order to start a dialogue. They also came out publicly in support of the Salt Lake City nondiscrimination ordinance before it passed and said that same-sex couples should have rights regarding medical care, fair housing, and employment (Mikita 2009).

In 2008 LGBT leaders from the Utah Pride Center held a town hall meeting for citizens of Salt Lake City to talk about the LDS Church and Proposition 8. From the input of citizens, it was clear that marriage was not as big of a concern as it was elsewhere. Citizens at the town hall meeting talked about employment and housing discrimination as the biggest problem in their lives at the moment. LGBT leaders took the opinions of many LGBT citizens and the “support” of the LDS Church to focus on passing nondiscrimination legislation.

Equality Utah created the Common Ground Initiative where they helped draft five bills in the legislature that were in accordance with what the LDS Church would support. All of the bills died in committee hearings in the 2009 Legislature. With the support of the LDS Church and many large businesses, Equality Utah responded by turning its focus to getting nondiscrimination ordinances passed in cities, businesses, and universities. Over the last two years, Equality Utah has helped 15 cities pass nondiscrimination ordinances (Equality Utah 2012a).

Meanwhile, Equality Utah continues to work with the legislature to pass a statewide Nondiscrimination Bill, which would add sexual orientation and gender
identity as protected classes that cannot be discriminated against. This legislation has repeatedly been tabled in committee for four legislative sessions out of the last five. In the 2012 legislative session, the legislative leadership did not allow the Nondiscrimination Bill out of committee. This was despite the fact that Equality Utah had the support of major businesses and corporations, the LDS Church, and the Chamber of Commerce. This reinforced Equality Utah focus on passing nondiscrimination ordinances at the local municipal level. In March, 2012, they also worked to get more pro-LGBT delegates elected in party caucuses in targeted areas around the state so that they could influence the selection of political candidates for upcoming state legislative races.
FINDINGS

The findings below are organized according to the political landscape components outlined above starting with the institutional structure of the political system and followed by the sociocultural context and dynamic political opportunities. Aspects of resource mobilization are revisited to understand possible effects outside of the political landscape on the SMOs in Minnesota and Utah.

Institutional Structure and Tactical Choices

Aspects of the party system in each state are easily confused with events that could be construed as political opportunities. The enduring characteristics of political party balance and dominance in Minnesota and Utah respectively represent the broader party system context in each state. Similarly, formal electoral rules (such as the differences between an open primary system compared to a closed caucus system) provide structural conditions that are likely to affect political mobilization and tactics.

Minnesota. As noted above, Minnesota’s party system has long been relatively balanced and contested between the two main political parties. For over a decade in Minnesota, the Governor has been from a different political party than the party that controls the legislature. That has resulted in consistent access by the LGBT movement to the political system in Minnesota in one way or another.

One tactic used by the LGBT movement in Minnesota that seems to occur in response to the contested party system is to have as many legislators from both parties and around the state co-sponsor their legislation. One LGBT leader commented,
We have a broad base of support. For a long time we had bipartisan support on our bills. We try to keep it broad based. A mix of rural, suburban, and city legislators. We really try to make it as broad as we can.

This LGBT leader recognized that Republican support of the LGBT movement in Minnesota can create problems for some legislators, therefore it is important to have a broad mix and significant numbers of legislators (including Republicans) co-sponsor bills to take pressure off the few that might worry about political backlash. In some areas, politicians perceive a threat that Republicans who speak out in support of LGBT rights might be challenged by more conservative Republicans in a future primary, but this is not as universal or common as it appears to be in Utah.

A distinctive tactic used by Minnesota’s LGBT leaders to support their political allies from both parties is to only endorse candidates who support them openly or publicly. The LGBT movement in Minnesota has benefited from a political system which is more contested because it creates more potential allies that can support the LGBT movement publicly. By forcing candidates to come out in support for them if they would like to be endorsed by LGBT leaders, the SMOs are able to solidify political backing in legislative votes. In the past, one LGBT leader explained, efforts to quietly or privately support candidates have backfired,

We only endorse supporters. We’ve found throughout the years that there are a number of legislatures who want us to come out and support them, but they don’t want them to be public. They will support and say I’m with you, but don’t let anyone know you are doing work behind the scenes. At some point, if they are scared about being out about LGBT then they are going to back out. So we only back candidates who come out in support of LGBT.

The large number of allies they already have allows them to force candidates to come out in support publicly if they want the endorsement. To increase bipartisan support, LGBT
leaders often encourage Republicans to co-sponsor legislation. This process allows them to begin to support the LGBT movement publicly.

The development of a LGBT Lobby Day in Minnesota was a tactic that has greatly affected LGBT access to legislators over the last decade. There has been anywhere from 200 people to over 5,000 people attending LGBT Lobby Day to speak with their legislators. A longtime movement activist speaks of the effectiveness of the LGBT Lobby Day,

So then we started having lobby day and we would bring thousands of people or hundreds at least to the capitol to meet with their legislators and now like legislators have told us before point blank, we hear you and we know you and we know that we have people that, we made a difference in that way… And that is something OutFront has had a direct impact I think on the political process so it makes it a little bit harder for them to take anti-gay votes because they know that there are people in their districts that are going to hear about it and not be happy.

The LGBT leaders find this Lobby Day extremely important for the movement because it increases awareness of legislators that LGBT people live in their districts. This tactic has been important over the last decade because it continually reintroduces LGBT citizens to their legislators every year, no matter which political party is in control of the legislature.

The Lobby Day is also important because it provides a unique opportunity for LGBT leaders to work with members and supporters of the LGBT community who are interested in the political process. According to an article in the Star Tribune, “Participants spent the morning learning community organizing techniques and preparing to spend the afternoon lobbying lawmakers…” at the 2012 LGBT Lobby Day (Brooks 2012). The Lobby Day not only made legislators aware that they have LGBT constituents, but is also allows many members of the LGBT community to learn how to community organize and interact with their legislators.
Minnesota has a relatively open electoral system. Anyone is able to vote in state and local political party primaries where candidates receive their party nomination. Party caucus turnout varies depending on the year. The majority of Minnesota’s LGBT leaders involved in political organizing said that caucuses and primaries have not been a major focus of the LGBT organizations over the last decade.

Utah. Utah has a very conservative political landscape compared to Minnesota. The political landscape is considered conservative because both the legislative and the executive branches have been not only controlled but completely dominated by the Republican Party for decades. Republicans have a supermajority that allows the most important political votes to take place in closed-door party caucuses and committee meetings rather than during primary elections and floor debates or public votes in the legislature. This makes it hard for the LGBT movement because the state Republican Party is not LGBT friendly and this considerably limits their access to the political system. The Democratic Party is pro-LGBT, but the small numbers of Democrats in the legislature prevent LGBT organizations from having high amounts of access to the political system. So Utah can be characterized as a more closed political system.

LGBT leaders in Utah are keen to point out that the problem is not the LDS Church; it is the overwhelming conservativeness of elected representatives in the state legislature. A longtime activist in the LGBT movement characterized the legislature by saying,

Well I don’t think it’s the church, as a matter of fact I know it’s not the church. It is the institutional mentality of, of these, they are not very representative the representatives. They are representative of a very select part of the extreme Republican Party and they just are, they just have no stomach for it [LGBT issues].
Many LGBT leaders were very pointed in stating that the legislature is the biggest obstacle for any success of statewide legislation.

The dominance of the Republican Party in the Utah legislature, and the domination of Utah’s Republican Party by conservative representatives, has prevented the LGBT movement from successfully passing major legislation. This has caused the movement to redefine their goals or ideas of what progress is in a conservative political landscape. An LGBT leader said,

> Progress here is not measured so much for us in terms of… we don’t measure progress by the amount of legislation passed. That’s one variable in the measuring of success. But part of our success is… what relationships we can foster, where we can be successful in stopping bad legislation, making it less impactful in a negative way.

As a result, the LGBT movement has adopted tactics that concentrate on fostering working relationships with Republican leaders and focus on preventing bad legislation from being passed.

The LogCabin Republicans (LGBT Republicans or LCR) are helpful to the Utah LGBT movement because they can help foster relationships with other Republicans that the LGBT leaders would not normally have access to. Although the LogCabin Republicans are not an official caucus in the Utah Republican Party, they have many members around Salt Lake City. Because of the strong association between the Utah Republican leadership and a strong anti-LGBT agenda, some LGBT movement activists have been critical of working with the LogCabin Republicans. However, one leader explained how helpful the LogCabin Republicans can be,

> So I would say that LCR is much more effective in their long term personal relationships that they have developed and in opening a door for an organization
like ours. Because they don’t have a lot of funding, they’re not taken very seriously but they do have some key relationships that they have developed over time that have proven to be incredibly important to the work that we do.

They open the doors for some of the LGBT organizations and also help protect the Republican Party platform from anti-LGBT issues at the Salt Lake County Convention.

On the other side, the Stonewall Democrats (LGBT Democrats) are the largest caucus within the Utah Democratic Party. This provides increased support within the Democratic Party leadership to pressure members for support of pro-LGBT policies. One respondent noted, “So if we have, let’s say we have a seat where we have a Democrat who is not pro-LGBT, that’s when Stonewall can be incredibly effective. They are the largest caucus in the Democratic Party in the state of Utah.” Equality Utah is careful to appear non-partisan, so the two examples of LGBT caucuses within the larger political parties allow the LGBT movement to build relationships with the dominant political parties while also sustaining the support of elected Democrats.

Utah’s relatively closed political system forces LGBT SMOs to work more quietly behind the scenes with many legislators. Although the Democratic Party is very supportive of the LGBT movement, working behind the scenes with Republicans has become a very important and common tactic. In general, the LGBT movement spends a lot of time proposing changes in or preventing bad legislation before it is even heard in a committee. An LGBT leader explains,

We have some legislators who will ask to have legislation drafted and then bring it to us and have us vet it and make sure that we’re good with it before it moves on. Sometimes that just looks like will you just take a look at it and make sure it doesn’t have any unintended consequences, how do you feel about it? They’re not asking for us to champion it, they just wanna make sure that it doesn’t do anything bad.
This type of agenda-setting tactic, preventing anti-LGBT legislation or decreasing its negative effects before it gets out of committee, was adopted because SMO leaders realized that most decisions are made in committee hearings before a bill is ever voted on.

LGBT leaders in Utah have adopted a defensive mindset in which they expect to compromise and they realize that pushing a more aggressive agenda might provoke the Republican majority to respond by pushing through more aggressive anti-LGBT legislation. For example, a legislator recently approached LGBT leaders for input on a proposed Health Education Bill in the 2012 legislature that would have expanded prohibitions on the mention of homosexuality or contraception by teachers in public schools. LGBT leaders accepted the language in the bill, but warned the legislator that if the language became any more conservative, they would speak out about it. When discussing the tactics used for the Health Education Bill with an LGBT activist from another state, it was clear to an LGBT leader in Utah that Utah has a unique approach to dealing with the conservative legislature.

Because of the climate of our state doesn’t allow us to do much else. Sometimes you have to. It’s compromise right? And if we were to be publicly supportive or publicly against this and in an aggressive fashion it would probably backfire…By being too vocal sometimes you have to take the backseat. I have found that approach to be quite unique.

LGBT leaders worked behind the scenes with legislators to lessen the impact of the bill rather than speaking out in opposition. They also make compromises so that the Republican majority does not completely alter the bill which would have even worse implications for the LGBT community. Not pushing for further progress or maybe pro-LGBT language in a bill such as this one is a common tactic in Utah and the LGBT
leaders recognize that most LGBT movements in other states would not have to be so cautious and work so privately. Interestingly, the legislature passed the bill, but public pressure from a wide range of citizens and interest group organizations (most prominently the PTA, Utah Teachers Educational Association, and parents groups) caused the Governor to veto the bill on the grounds that “it goes too far by constricting parental options” (Herbert 2012).

To gain more legitimacy with the legislature, the LGBT movement leaders always seek to find more straight, Republican LDS legislators to sponsor their legislation. They currently have straight, LDS sponsors but they are all in the Democratic Party. They would like to increase their credibility according to one LGBT leader, “I think as we move forward I would like to see us continue to find straight Mormon people to sponsor our legislation and hopefully some will be Republicans. It just gives it a whole different level of credibility.” This is different than LGBT activists in Minnesota who already have occasional Republican sponsors for pro-LGBT legislation, and are more interested in ensuring a broad spectrum of sponsors. In Utah, a Republican sponsor adds credibility to a bill that a Democratic sponsor would not give to it.

Utah LGBT leaders also realize that the political landscape in Utah means that they have to frame their legislation differently than elsewhere. When discussing ideas for future legislation to formally recognize unmarried but committed domestic partnerships, an LGBT activist explained how the LGBT movement would probably advocate and organize support for legislation in a way that appeals beyond the LGBT community. The LGBT activist said, “I think that if we are gonna open this up, we have the opportunity to open the door for a lot more people if we do it that way. And I think they should have
access to that.” They recognize the importance of helping other people who depend on each other in a relationship, but are not involved in a conjugal relationship. By framing this topic differently compared to other U.S. states, they hope to appeal to a broader coalition of supporters and gain more credibility in the legislature.

Although many of the tactics mentioned above are all used to garner credibility or lessen the impact of anti-LGBT legislation, Utah’s LGBT organizations have adopted another important tactic to increase their access or credibility. Specifically, the two biggest LGBT organizations in Utah, Equality Utah and the Utah Pride Center, often adopt a good-cop bad-cop approach in order to gain more access for the more moderate organization. Specifically, Equality Utah has branded themselves as a more respectful and responsible organization that can work with legislators in a nonconfrontational way without attracting public attention. Activists at the Utah Pride Center and other leaders in the LGBT community are then free to have rallies and public protests to capture public attention and increase support from the LGBT community. A member of Equality Utah said,

And we are more than happy to empower them with contacts and resources to do that effectively but we will never be the head of it. Because … our goal is to really be building relationships with those elected and policy makers who feel like we are not trying to threaten them. We are actually trying to help you keep those mad people from storming the capitol. That’s what we, we want to help you in that. So you need to keep having us at the table so we can help prevent that. It’s the good-cop bad-cop strategy.

Leaders from all LGBT organizations in Utah are aware of this good-cop bad-cop tactic and recognize the benefits of a complementary approach. It allows Equality Utah to foster a good relationship with the legislature while providing an outlet for the LGBT movement to still express its anger and frustration publicly.
In Utah, the Utah Pride Center is a 501 (c)(3) which means it can only educate citizens on the political process, but cannot lobby, work on campaigns, or endorse candidates. An LGBT leader from the Utah Pride Center explains this diverse field of organizations,

…[S]o it will be other activists here and outside the organizations who will be the loud mouth voices that will be the irritants…. And then Equality will be perceived as the logical, safe middle ground that the legislature will come to and say you’re level headed, tell us how to stop these crazy people.

Therefore, this tactic allows the Utah Pride Center more freedom with tactics and strategies while it allows Equality Utah to paint itself as the organization as the more moderate organization that can work with the legislature.

This type of tactic is notably absent in Minnesota. The two major statewide LGBT organizations focus on policy gains and work together as much as possible on common legislative priorities. They also have much more access to the political system and do not worry as much about maintaining or increasing their credibility as LGBT organizations have to in Utah.

As noted above, Utah has a caucus system in which voters elect delegates to represent them at county- and state-level party conventions. In Utah, each political party has an option to have open or closed caucuses. The Republicans have closed caucuses that only allow registered Republicans to attend and vote at the local neighborhood-level caucuses. The dominance of the Republican Party in most local and statewide elections and the fact that they have closed caucuses has been cited by many observers as the reason voter turnout and caucus participation in Utah is relatively low (Utah Foundation 2011). One LGBT activist in my interviews felt that this is why there is also low turnout
from the LGBT community, “We encourage people to get involved in the political
caucus. One thing that I have found my involvement with the LGBT movement here and
with the Democratic Party is that the LGBT population is very apathetic.” The Stonewall
Democrats are said to be the largest caucus, but the LGBT population in general is turned
off from participating in state politics by the overwhelmingly dominant conservative
political landscape.

In response to a relatively apathetic voting population, a major tactic used by
Equality Utah and the Utah Pride Center has been training delegates to attend
neighborhood party caucus meetings. The Utah Pride Center focuses on educating their
support groups and volunteers about the party convention delegate process. They also
conduct outreach to the greater LGBT community on these issues as well. Equality Utah
holds focused delegate trainings designed to help the candidates they endorse become the
party nominees for particular positions. One LGBT leader explains:

It’s very, very targeted. It has to do with calling people in certain districts and
saying do you have cousins, do you have friends who are already Republicans?
Can you help us get them to a delegate training? We’ll come to your house. Like
we’ll come train you. We’ll do whatever it takes.

These trainings are targeted to certain districts and candidates in order to help the
Republicans that they privately endorse and to encourage people to become delegates so
that they can vote for more moderate, LGBT-friendly Republicans.

They are also very thorough in helping people understand the caucus and delegate
selection process. Another LGBT leader explains,

We plan on identifying where districts are, where their precincts are, when their
caucus meetings are, showing up to those caucus meetings, what the process looks
like for getting elected, what the commitment is when they are elected, and what
kind of candidates they should be supporting.
Many people in Utah do not understand or participate in this process, so LGBT leaders find it important to follow through with the delegates and make sure the delegates understand what responsibilities they are taking on. Encouraging voters to become delegates, Equality Utah said on its website, “In order to change the faces on Capitol Hill, we must change the names on the ballots. As a delegate, you have the power to make that change” (Equality Utah 2012b). Equality Utah has hosted seminars online and over the phone that are comprehensive delegate trainings. They have also hosted delegate trainings with other organizations in order to help train anyone who wants to become a delegate. Delegate trainings are important to overturn voter apathy and make a complicated delegate system easily accessible. As mentioned above, some Republican legislators in Utah are supportive of LGBT movement goals (or at least want to avoid doing harm to the LGBT community). These representatives are willing to work quietly behind the scenes to help where they can. They cannot publicly support the LGBT movement because they believe that they would lose their next primary election. The LGBT leaders consider those Republicans who help them behind the scenes as allies. An LGBT leader said,

A lot of these folks are people that you go to and you say that this bill is really, really bad. This is what would happen, who do I need to talk to and what do I need to do? And for me I see them as an ally and say okay you need to talk to so and so and you need to say such and such and I will follow back around. Like that for me, even if you’re not willing to stand next to me on the podium and be like I accept this work for equality. Totally will take it.”

This tactic is very unique to Utah because most Republican legislators cannot afford politically to come out in support of the LGBT movement. It allows the LGBT
movement to take advantage of the private divisions or sympathies among Republicans and helps them increase their access to the political process.

Divisions among Republicans also helped LGBT leaders recognize the importance of protecting their Republican allies in local caucus meetings to defend against challenges from more conservative Republican candidates. An LGBT leader talks about their tactical decisions to protect Republican allies,

…I would say there is even a majority of Republicans that say look I support you privately, I totally get what you are trying to do, I think it makes sense, I cannot support you publicly. I will lose my seat. And so that says to me we have got to do our due diligence to figure out how we can either get enough of you on that the blame is spread out. So that is actually part of our strategy for next year statewide. Is to build a large enough group that one cannot be pulled and targeted on their own.

To protect these Republican allies, they endorse them privately, offer campaign help, and target their districts to help elect and educate delegates about them. LGBT leaders are able to encourage members of their organizations in specific districts to participate in their local caucuses.

While the tactic of privately endorsing supportive Republicans is often done in Utah, this generates internal tension and controversy among movement leaders and activists surrounding some of the endorsement decisions made by Equality Utah. An LGBT leader discussed how the process allows some candidates, who do not agree on the issue of LGBT relationship recognition, to be endorsed because it is very unlikely that it will happen for a long period of time,

And there had been an internal conversations to say okay we’re gonna have to actually run a ballot campaign before they have to so does it make sense to not endorse someone who is really viable, has a great strategic position but not to give it to them because in 15 years if they’re still in office, they’re not gonna vote for it… And hopefully by then we will have grown them to be with us.
This provokes internal debate because many LGBT leaders or LGBT constituents want to endorse only people who fully support the wider political goals of the LGBT movement (including legal recognition of same sex partnerships or marriages). Because of the lack of sufficient “full” allies, the LGBT leaders in Utah seem willing to support legislators who are friendly to at least some of their goals as a way to have some influence on the political process. Interestingly, they report that almost everybody they have endorsed quietly eventually come out publicly and was willing to openly support them. This tactic is very different compared to LGBT organizations in Minnesota, where LGBT leaders only endorse fully supportive candidates publicly because there are more LGBT supportive legislators overall compared to Utah.

As mentioned above, LGBT leaders have found voters in Utah and the LGBT community to be very apathetic in response to the closed political system. In response to this, LGBT leaders from Equality Utah have created a new campaign called the *I Want Action Campaign* to help encourage allies or members of the LGBT community to participate more in state and local politics. An LGBT leader explains what the *I Want Action Campaign* is,

...We’re really past that point where people need to be like ‘hey it sucks here,’ you know instead of just accepting that, really feel empowered to [say] it’s time for you to take action right. It’s time for us to really demand action, not just from ourselves but from our legislators. Um and so this thing is a digital advocacy platform, it takes people through five easy action steps. One after another in real-time. That’s signing a petition, that’s sending a letter to your senator, that’s broadcasting it to your network of friends, like hey I just took action at EqualityUtah.org you should too.

This tactic is specifically designed to help motivate younger LGBT members and allies to participate in a process that they don’t often see as relevant or worthwhile. They will be
initiating this campaign at the 2012 Pride Festival, and hope it will allow them to interact with a larger number of people and help build support for the Nondiscrimination Bill before the next legislative session.

Characteristics of the institutional structure of the political system in Utah, such as the dominance of the Republican Party and the caucus system have created a very conservative political system that does not allow the LGBT movement much access. This is a constant problem for the LGBT movement and it will not likely change in the near future. Unlike Minnesota, this has caused the LGBT movement to work mainly behind the scenes with Republicans and focus on committee hearings where the majority of decisions are made in the legislature. However, this approach has also created tension between the internal LGBT community and the external community the LGBT movement is trying to reach.

The competitive two-party system and relatively open election system allows more constant access to the political system for the LGBT movement in Minnesota. LGBT organizations do not need their main focus to be working with political leaders behind the scenes because they can work with legislators or Governors from both parties. The contested and more open political system allows LGBT leaders to use tactics that are more public and upfront.

Sociocultural Context

The second component of the political landscape reflects the sociocultural context or how sociocultural characteristics of each state shape the greater collective action
frames and the effectiveness of certain movement tactics. Specifically, I expected religious and ethnic diversity to shape the tactics of LGBT SMOs in the two states.

Religious diversity in Minnesota provides a unique setting for the LGBT movement. The obvious source of most opposition to the LGBT movement is from conservative religious groups, congregations, or organizations. Yet the religious diversity of the state also creates space for many types of religious congregations to support LGBT rights. SMO leaders have created a very large religious coalition in support of marriage equality. Even before the amendment was put on the ballot, OutFront Minnesota has been working with religious individuals and congregations to sign on in support of marriage equality. A movement organizer who came on after the faith coalition had been developed for years said,

I’ve been working on building an even broader faith coalition. So when I started at here, we had a pretty diverse group of people of faith already. We had most of the protestant-Christian denominations were represented there. Um we had some Catholics there. We had a Jewish representative. And since I’ve gotten in there I’ve been doing lots of one-on-one meetings with anyone and everyone I can find who is interested. And I’m trying to reach out to even more communities.

They focus on engaging any and all willing religious individuals and congregations to talk about marriage equality. They are creating this broad coalition to show that there is strong religious support from some groups in favor of marriage equality and LGBT rights. They also use their resources to help congregations go through an open and affirming process to become official supporters of the LGBT movement.

A specific example of how movement leaders have to craft their message carefully in response to the greater collective action frame relates to the role of the Catholic Church. In Minnesota, the religious opposition to marriage equality is led by the
Catholic Archbishop. LGBT organizers are very intentional about framing this opposition as something coming from the Catholic hierarchy, not the members of the Catholic Church in order to avoid alienating the rank and file Catholic public. A movement organizer describes their approach to framing this situation intentionally,

We want to take a more nuanced approach and say the Catholic hierarchy is terrible, but catholic lay people are very supportive, they are allies, and we need them to be part of our movement.

They recognize the value of incorporating allies from all faiths into the LGBT movement, so intentionally use framing as a tactic so they can help redefine the greater collective action frame by allowing individuals of many faiths to be part of the LGBT movement.

The LGBT movement in Minnesota is also very confident in their general message or frame. They see no need to change how they frame their argument for LGBT rights in response to short-term changes in political opportunities. One LGBT movement leader expressed their confidence in their message, “We use pretty bland rhetoric, pretty neutral rhetoric that doesn’t really, it usually can be backed up with facts or logic or whatever… We are confident in the message we have.” And another LGBT activist had a similar response, “It’s like no matter who I am talking to, this is what we are about and you’re either with us or you’re not but we’re not going to change our message.” They believe that their message will be understood by many people, so they don’t find a need to change it in relation to the greater culture in Minnesota.

As noted above, Utah is much less religiously diverse, and opposition to LGBT protections does not primarily come from religious organizations. While many smaller religious congregations already work with Utah’s LGBT movement, the SMO leaders recognize that support from (or at least the absence of opposition from) the LDS Church
is extremely important for success within the state. Utah SMOs have been able to work with a diverse set of religious congregations and leaders because they specifically decided not to talk about marriage equality. An LGBT leader describes this as a tactic that is necessary but that creates problems within the internal LGBT community,

And we get some backlash from our internal community about that um I almost never talk with religious people about marriage. Almost never… And when we talk to our internal community, yes you know what our goal is, full fricken equality right! All the way. So it does change, I would say not just when I’m talking to religious people but when I’m talking to the moveable middle at large cause they’re kinda the same there.

By taking marriage out of the conversation, LGBT leaders have found that they can make progress with religious leadership in Utah and a large part of the conservative culture. Many people in the LGBT community do not agree with leaving marriage out of the discussion with religious groups, but LGBT leaders use it as a tactic because they feel they would not be able to work with religious leaders otherwise.

The LGBT movement not only recognizes the importance of support from the LDS Church, but also understands the need to adapt their language or framing to resonate within the generally conservative social and political culture in Utah. They have been working on material that includes Mormon stories and has a conservative voice in order to reach out to those who are on the fence about LGBT issues. They do not expect most of the public to organize in support of LGBT rights, but just hope to start a dialogue with the conservative population that increases understanding and acceptance of the LGBT community.

The LGBT organizations in Utah currently reach religious individuals through specific local organizations, including Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and
...Well not most but a good portion of people who have LGBT family members and come from a very doctrinal, LDS background and needs some support to rectify those two things and to hold them. And I think that once that portion is, once people can find some community and some safety, then you can, then they’re ready to start doing the work that we do.

The LGBT movement recognizes the need to use support groups and moderate discourse to reach these the broader public. Their support of these groups provides safe spaces to discuss and reconcile individual’s religious and LGBT beliefs. They see this as the first step before these people can become major supporters of the LGBT movement.

LGBT organizations in Utah do work with an Interfaith Roundtable, but they mainly help out as needed. The Interfaith Roundtable is comprised of religious leadership who want to broaden understanding in faith communities. LGBT leaders provide support in the form of panel speakers or occasionally bring specific LGBT issues to the Interfaith Roundtable meetings, but this coalition is specifically for members of faith communities.

The diversity of religious congregations and religious character of the anti-LGBT opposition in Minnesota has created a situation where LGBT leaders have tactically sought to create a large faith coalition that is specifically in support of LGBT rights and same-sex marriage. Minnesota works around unsupportive church leadership by using inoffensive frames that appeal directly to individuals of faith. LGBT activists are very confident in their message and they find no need to change it. Utah recognizes the dominance of the conservative culture and has changed their framing to meet the greater collective action frame. LGBT leaders in Utah recognize the importance of support from
the LDS Church hierarchy and have not yet started building a faith coalition for LGBT rights.

While the state is overwhelmingly comprised of non-Hispanic whites, in the major cities in Minnesota there is a wide diversity of ethnic populations (Table 4). OutFront Minnesota has taken the lead on organizing ethnic groups around LGBT issues in Minneapolis and St. Paul. They focus on outreach to LGBT ethnic organizations through which they can gain deeper connections in specific ethnic communities. For example, Shades of Yellow (SOY) is the only known LGBT Hmong organization in the world. It has been growing fast over the last four years. Color Coordination is also another LGBT ethnic group focused on organizing queer groups of color. One LGBT leader describes their intentional collaborations with urban ethnic groups,

I think that we are focusing more on sort of outreach to the communities, some more intentional collaborations with for example Latino/Latina organizations, Hmong organizations, Somali organizations….We’re working specifically to address multiple barriers when it comes to being both LGBT and Latina.

They intentionally reach out to ethnic communities and organizations and help deconstruct barriers related to the combination of identities associated with specific ethnic communities and being LGBT.

Compared to Minnesota, there are relatively few large or organized ethnic or racial groups in Utah besides Hispanics, and the Hispanics have only recently emerged as a significant part of Utah’s population. The LGBT organizations I interviewed reported having informal relationships with organizations such as the NAACP, and they also work on immigration issues with local groups. They also have ongoing dialogue with elders in the Polynesian community. Although relationships with ethnic groups and leadership are
developing, they are still a relatively small part of their overall tactical repertoire. Both the Utah Pride Center and Equality Utah recognize that they can do much more to work with Utah’s ethnic communities and groups. Over the next two years, Equality Utah hopes to build a relationship with all members on the Ethnic Chamber of Commerce.

**Dynamic Political Opportunities**

As defined above, dynamic political opportunities in each state include the degree of access to the political system, existence of divisions within the elite, availability of elite allies, and the degree of state repression. Sudden changes in the openness of the system, shifts in ruling alignments, and emerging cleavages among elites may provide dynamic political opportunities for leaders to develop or change tactics to take advantage of the situation. These political opportunities may be short-term changes in the balance of political power or major legislation that increases or decreases the ability of the SMO to impact political outcomes.

Minnesota has had three major political opportunities in the last decade that impacted the tactics of LGBT SMO leaders. These include the 2006 successful defeat of a proposed amendment against same-sex marriage, the 2010 political party configuration change in the legislature, and the placement of a constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage on the 2012 fall ballot.

From 2004 to 2006, some legislators attempted to put a vote on the ballot that would amend Minnesota’s constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage. As mentioned earlier, OutFront Minnesota had created a LGBT Lobby Day that increased awareness and contact of LGBT citizens with their legislators over the last decade. This particular
threat of the constitutional amendment angered and mobilized the state’s LGBT community and greatly increased attendance at their LGBT Lobby Day.

That’s where we were able to have lobby days where there were over 5,000 people there. We were able to shock the legislators. They had over 50-100 people coming into their office from a rural areas. Having the mayor take the bus with them. Show the depth and breadth of support for equality. There was no way they could say there is no one in my district who aren’t supporters.

When the lobby day started, there were only a couple hundred people from around Minnesota, but the threat of a proposed constitutional amendment increased the scale and effectiveness of this tactic.

The realignment of Minnesota’s state legislature in 2010 also shifted political opportunities in a way that forced LGBT leaders to adapt their tactics in order to be effective. The Democratic Party lost 25 seats in the House of Representatives and 16 seats in the Senate, which drastically changed the party alignment and control in the state legislature.

The change to a Republican dominated legislature provoked LGBT leaders to focus new attention on the importance of party caucuses as a venue for political activism. In Minnesota, anyone is able to vote in the political party primaries where a candidate receives the party nomination, but the party nomination is greatly affected by the party endorsement. That means those who participate in the party caucuses are important because they decide who will get the party endorsement. OutFront Minnesota created a non-partisan caucus kit that could be used by voters from all parties. One leader noted, “I think the vast majority is DFL caucuses but the caucus kit isn’t just one-party, it’s a multi-partisan document. But it’s probably going to be harder in Republican caucuses to pass any of our resolutions and things like that.” The kits explain the process of party
caucuses and how voters can become a delegate at the state convention. They also recommend specific resolutions to be introduced to the party platform, but they recognize these will probably be less influential in the Republican Party. The focus on the party caucuses has manifested differently in Minnesota compared to Utah. Minnesota created this caucus kit whereas Utah is much more focused in finding targeted delegates and helping them through the process. Although the party caucuses are part of the election system, the political changes in legislative party balance of power caused the LGBT organization to develop a new tactic.

Meanwhile, Governor Pawlenty was in office from 2003-2011 and was infamous for vetoing all LGBT-friendly legislation. During that time, SMO leaders struggled to get their positive legislation adopted. One leader noted:

He vetoed anything good and signed everything bad. At that point of course we had more pull with the legislature so we could usually get some bad stuff killed or watered down or something in the legislature so that it wasn’t, there wasn’t too much for us to worry about Pawlenty signing. But it was about Pawlenty vetoing particularly the safe schools bill. So yeah that administration pretty much locked us out.

Unlike Utah, the LGBT movement in Minnesota had relied on public support for key legislators and the Democratic Party’s control of the legislature to block or weaken anti-LGBT legislation, whereas LGBT leaders in Utah were forced to work privately with supportive Republicans to achieve the same effect. In addition, the LGBT movement in Minnesota has also been able to help support multiple pieces of pro-LGBT legislation each session (though much of this was vetoed by the governor).

The Safe Schools for All Bill provides a great example of how the LGBT movement changed tactics in response to the election in 2010. Before the election, to try
and get legislation passed without a veto from the Governor, the LGBT movement had built a very large coalition of over 40 organizations from across the political spectrum who supported the Safe Schools for All Bill. This coalition deliberately broadened the groups protected under anti-bullying law to prohibit harassment based on race, sex, and religion, in addition to gender identity or sexual orientation. LGBT leaders worked with many groups in this coalition to pass legislation that is not just LGBT related but would greatly benefit the LGBT community, hoping that this would pressure Governor Pawlenty to sign the bill. Yet while the governor actively worked to find a compromise on the bill, and though it passed with large bipartisan support in the legislature, he still vetoed it in 2009.

By contrast, the switch in party control of the legislature in 2010 meant the loss of ready access to the most LGBT-friendly political party. In response, while LGBT leaders continued to build an even bigger coalition in support of the Safe Schools for All Bill, they also started to work directly with youth to create an anti-bullying movement and a network of Gay-Straight Alliances (GSA) in high schools. An LGBT organizer explained,

So building on the comprehensiveness of the coalition which directly grows the comprehensiveness of the issue. So building a coalition but also getting youth involved in the movement to lead the movement. So tactics around there have been building a youth led anti-bullying movement, identifying youth leaders, and identifying community members to help lead the way.

This tactic of building youth leaders and a GSA network was specifically geared at broadening the LGBT movement behind this legislation, but also making direct impacts in the schools in ways that did not rely on a legislative victory. The youth leaders will be
able to testify at committee hearings in the legislature and build a bigger support network that might impact the climate in schools.

As noted above, the massive switch in political party power in the legislature was matched by a switch in the executive branch. Governor Dayton, a very LGBT supportive Democrat, was elected to office in 2010. After the Safe Schools for All Bill was not allowed out of committee in the 2011 and 2012 legislative sessions, LGBT leaders found a way to work with pro-LGBT Governor Dayton. All three LGBT organizations worked together with friendly legislators and the Governor to create a Anti-bullying Taskforce. One LGBT leader explained, “The governor put together, just created a taskforce on Safe Schools and we have had a pretty active behind the scenes role in helping the governor select some candidates for that committee and um things like that.” These organizations worked with the pro-LGBT Governor to prepare an Anti-bullying Taskforce that will evaluate school districts around Minnesota. “The task force is expected to take testimony from parents, teachers, bullying experts and students who have been targeted by bullies. Dayton even wants the task force to better define what bullying, harassment and intimidation mean” (Post 2012). The LGBT organizations were also successful at helping get members of their organizations or pro-LGBT supporters and legislators to be on the commission.

Tactics such as creating an Anti-bullying Taskforce and working directly with youth and high schools to create leaders and develop local anti-bullying programs were a direct response to the 2010 switch in political power in the legislative and executive branches. These tactics also help the Minnesota LGBT movement continue to make
progress building a bigger movement at a time when they were unlikely to make progress in the state legislature.

Another political opportunity arose in 2011, when the Republican majority in the legislature voted to place a constitutional amendment on the 2012 ballot to restrict the definition of marriage to a union between a man and a woman. Public and private divisions among moderate and conservative Republicans have since emerged over whether or not to support the amendment. Noted one respondent:

I think what Dibble (DFL Senator) did for us was that there were a number of Republican Senators who came up to him and said after the vote on the constitutional amendment, came up to him and said I wanted to support you but I couldn’t take that vote. Basically meaning that they knew if they voted the way their conscious was telling them to vote that they would lose the election in 2012.

Even though many Republicans wanted to vote against putting the amendment on the ballot, they felt pressured by the Republican Party not to support it. There was a threat that if they voted against it, the Republican Party would run another Republican against them in the next primary. Although the Republican Party pressured legislators to vote for the amendment, there were four Republicans who did not agree with the Republican Party’s decision to put this amendment on the ballot. These four Republicans voiced their dissent very publicly during the hearings in the legislature about the amendment. One activist recounts these representatives begging other Republicans to stand up against this amendment,

I remember when John Kriesel (Republican) …And he stood up and he said I know that there are Republicans here who are on the fence about this. And I’m begging you, I’m pleading with you to vote no with me. I’ve got your back. Tim Kelly, who is another Republican legislator, Tim Kelly has your back. All those people out there cheering have your back.
This amendment created a division among Republicans and resulted in a very public plea by Republicans to go against the platform of the Republican Party.

The divisions in the Republican Party created a political opportunity that LGBT leaders took advantage of. The organizations worked to support the vocal Republicans and in return, these Republicans have become very active in the campaign against the amendment. All four Republicans who voted against the amendment are on the board of directors for the Minnesotans United for All campaign, the coalition created to defeat the amendment. In fact, the constitutional amendment has united diverse groups and LGBT leaders have garnered support for defeating the proposal from almost every political party,

The DFL is on our Minnesotans United for All Board. Actually we have somebody from every political party except the Tea Party. The Independents, I think the Libertarians are there, we have Republicans and Democrats. And the Republicans, a bunch of them said they don’t support the Republican Party itself that they don’t support the amendment.

LGBT leaders from all three statewide LGBT organizations have worked to make sure the campaign represents all political parties and the political divisions in the Republican Party have made this possible. This tactic is used to show that it is not a partisan campaign; it stretches beyond political parties.

OutFront Minnesota is also concentrating on using the upswelling of opposition to build a coalition of cities, businesses, organizations, religious congregations, and individuals who are against the amendment. An LGBT leader explains the position of OutFront Minnesota, “For us, in this giant campaign that we are building, we are one coalition partner in this giant coalition.” They are also focused on developing all the
networks and local organizations and leaders they have been building over the last couple decades.

Making everything into an opportunity is important. The biggest test ever – the constitutional amendment. Taking the scale of work OutFront Minnesota is doing and okay this has gotta be really efficient and bigger than anything we ever built in Minnesota… Not changing our work; deepening and developing more and improving.

The amendment on the ballot will provide the biggest challenge the LGBT movement has ever faced in Minnesota and it will greatly test the leaders and networks OutFront Minnesota has built. On the other hand, they consider this amendment an opportunity to strengthen everything they have already been doing and recognize that it has mobilized many people to participate in the political process and generated new streams of financial and organizational resources for the Minnesota LGBT movement.

A major tactic in Minnesota has always been to build a strong statewide movement to achieve marriage equality, passage of Anti-Bullying Laws, and reform of 515 state statutes that do not recognize same-sex partners. Coalition building is one of the most important tactics to building a large LGBT movement in Minnesota. Outfront Minnesota comments on their website, “OutFront Minnesota works closely with the staff at Minnesotans United and Project 515 to develop the strategies to defeat the anti-marriage amendment, and to organize leaders from various political parties, communities of color, faith, labor and other progressive groups” (2012b). Coalition building helps organize the religious and ethnic diversity in Minnesota as well as takes advantage of the progressive network of organizations that has been established.

The competitive balance of political parties combined with an open political system has given them many opportunities to build a large LGBT movement. It also
allows them to turn anti-LGBT events into positive political opportunities such as the amendment. So even though this could hurt a major goal – same-sex marriage – of the LGBT movement in Minnesota, the LGBT leaders are taking advantage of the opportunity to continue to build the statewide movement. The LGBT leaders recognize that the campaign and extra staff will go away no matter what the outcome of the amendment is in the fall. Therefore, building a greater movement while they have more resources is very important. They are prepared with four different plans depending on the different outcomes in the 2012 election.

We are looking at four different options for the amendment: supportive legislature and defeat amendment, supportive legislature and amendment passes, non-supportive legislature and defeat amendment, and non-supportive legislature and amendment passes. Four scenarios and four different strategies for development, organizing, policy.

Once again, it shows how important the party configuration of the legislature is and the actual amendment outcome to any tactics in the future.

In Utah, three recent political opportunities or defeats have affected tactical choices. These include the passage of Nondiscrimination ordinances in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, the LDS support of Proposition 8 in California, and the continual defeat of a statewide Nondiscrimination Bill with higher levels of support.

Just before the legislative session in 2010, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County passed Nondiscrimination ordinances that made sexual orientation and gender identity protected characteristics in employment and housing decisions. This was the first time those phrases had been codified into law in Utah and it provoked a very hostile response from conservative representatives in the state legislature. According to an article in The Associated Press, “Johnson [Democratic Legislator] agreed to a moratorium on seeking
any gay rights legislation last session to protect a Salt Lake City anti-discrimination ordinance from coming under assault by conservative state lawmakers” (2010). As one LGBT leader described it,

Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County had both passed theirs before the leg session and there were no fewer than five bills that were aimed at directly eviscerating those protections and so we negotiated a stand down. No pro-bills, no anti-bills, no LGBT bills this session. We called a truce basically and it was a hands off session which had a very mixed reaction from all sides. It was very mixed.

Even though the LGBT movement had a major success at the local level, the legislature reacted in a repressive manner. Using their contacts with sympathetic Republican legislators, LGBT leaders quickly and quietly negotiated a truce with the legislature that prevented all sides from proposing or passing any legislation for or against the LGBT movement in 2010. This included withdrawing tentative proposals to extend statewide the local nondiscrimination protections.

On the other hand, negative media attention in 2008 of the LDS Church’s support of Proposition 8 in California provided a positive political opportunity for Utah’s LGBT movement. The negative publicity led Church leaders to come out publicly in support of some forms of LGBT protections short of marriage equality. Specifically, they endorsed the local nondiscrimination ordinances and opposed efforts to roll back these newly won protections. While they did not openly work with LGBT groups, the pronouncements of the LDS Church leaders helped prevent the five anti-LGBT bills from passing out of committee in 2010.

After the 2008 legislative session where all five LGBT bills were tabled in committee, LGBT leaders decided to scale back their statewide legislative efforts (Falk 2010). The only major legislation LGBT leaders tried to pass was the Nondiscrimination
bill in 2009 and 2011 and they tried to do this by taking advantage of the public support from the LDS church. The Nondiscrimination Bill was defeated in committees both years. In 2012, public support from major corporations and the Chamber of Commerce, with continued support from the LDS Church, added to the growing hope and expectations of success for the LGBT movement. Despite that growing support, in 2012 legislative session, the bill was not allowed out of committee. One LGBT activist commented,

That was a huge step and that took from then in 2008 to now to even get to the point where we had Chamber of Commerce members, who are very conservative, coming up to the Capitol saying we want this. We had Ebay saying we’re not going to bring 5,000 jobs to Utah because you are not going to do this.

LGBT leaders did not understand what else would help convince the legislature to pass a statewide Nondiscrimination Act. Even local media and community members didn’t understand why this bill hadn’t been let out of committee, “This year marks the fourth time that the Legislature has rejected this bill – even though it is supported by more than two-thirds of Utahns, including our state’s leading employers” (Rosky 2012). Using a broad base of support and public support as a tactic did not even phase the legislature because the bill did not even get out of committee.

While discouraged about prospects for working at the state level, Utah’s LGBT leaders used the LDS Church support as an impetus for expanding efforts to pass Nondiscrimination ordinances in other local cities and counties across the state. This new tactic was to build local support that would eventually achieve conditions for passing a statewide Nondiscrimination Bill. Over the last two years, the LGBT movement in Utah
has focused much of their work on the municipal level. An LGBT leader describes how they came to this,

What does that look like? This community in my perspective was at a place of like were never gonna win up there. We keep coming up, coming up, and getting the shit kicked out of us. And there was, I think, in my perspective I think there was a great sense of disempowerment and disengagement. Like why the hell are we doing this? It looks the same. Or what you do manage to get passed is really so stripped that it doesn’t have a lot of implication. So it was at that point that we developed the strategy of okay, it’s gonna, yeah we are gonna actually start focusing on if I can get this school to pass this policy, that’s a win for us.

School boards, city councils, businesses, and corporations are all important to their definition of progress. Nondiscrimination ordinances have been their primary goal and they have been passed in 15 cities around Utah. The conservative political landscape and constant political defeats at the state legislature have caused the LGBT organizations to focus more at the municipal level where they feel they have more political access. One respondent noted:

So I think two things made us change that: One was the realization that like wow we really can build strong coalitions, strong community coalitions, and district coalitions or city coalitions. Like more than we thought we could. And that has a long term that can give us a second piece was we are not going to be successful at passing an enumerated statewide policy until different people are sitting up there. So how do we get that done? And it literally frames a lot of our work.

This focus on the municipal level ordinances and on building community coalitions, which will hopefully affect the state legislature in the future. Although new political opportunities came about for the LGBT movement (LDS and Business support), LGBT leaders recognize that it is the Republican dominated legislature that is preventing statewide legislation from being passed.
LGBT leaders understand how important the support of the LDS Church has been for certain cities and counties in order to pass Nondiscrimination ordinances,

Well, for the LDS Church, their role is huge… I have to say honestly if we hadn’t had the statement of support from the Church for Salt Lake City ordinances, the ordinances would have passed in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, but I don’t know if they would have passed in a lot of other areas. Candidly, I can almost guarantee they wouldn’t have passed in Logan, not a shot.

In Minnesota, the three political opportunities were used to develop new tactics and increase the effectiveness of old tactics. These short-term political opportunities have only encouraged the LGBT movement in Minnesota to continue to build a bigger movement and develop leaders and organizations around the state. Meanwhile, political defeats and repression from the legislature in Utah has caused the movement to switch to a new tactic as a means to achieve a statewide Nondiscrimination Act even after major support from corporations and the LDS Church.

Resource Mobilization

Resources, whether in terms of financial or human, have been found to be important contributors to the innovation of SMO tactics (Freeman 1983; McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003). Although this study focused mainly on how components of the political landscape affected tactics and strategies, questions were asked to find out if resources and social networks had an impact on tactics and strategies.

Financial Resources. Support for Minnesota’s LGBT movement is at a level it has never been at. All three organizations have been securely funded and have greatly increased their funding since 2008. The amendment has only brought more funding in for these organizations and the campaign against the amendment. Even during difficult
financial times in 2007 when the staff of OutFront Minnesota was cut in half, an LGBT leader said, “So it really cut in but again I can't really think of anything that really suffered. Which maybe says something right there. I just can't think of something we didn't do because we didn't resources and staff.” The movement was able to pursue all their major goals during hard financial times.

The majority of funding in Utah goes towards the Utah Pride Center. They have hired four more staff which brings their total to 17 fulltime staff. Equality Utah, with four staff and one part-time staff, finds it harder to sustain one part of their organization, the c(4).

Our c4 is always our hardest org[anization] to raise money for and I don't know why right because policy gain is so important but it seems so people don't wanna pay you to lobby I guess cause it sounds so greasy… Last year was actually the first year we didn't lose money in our c4.

Even though it is harder to fund the political side of the LGBT movement, they seem to be increasing their financial resources.

Financial resources have not presented a problem to the major movement goals in Minnesota, but Equality Utah does seem to be affected by a lack of funding for political organizing, lobbying, and endorsing. One thing Equality Utah has done to circumvent having a lawyer on staff is that they have a panel of 15 volunteer attorneys who consult on legislation.

**Human Resources.** As stated above, Minnesota has been actively organizing leadership around the state. The leadership capacity is huge and it is growing in response to having the amendment on the ballot. An LGBT leader noted, “We’re going to use the amendment as an opportunity to build our movement, to develop leaders across the state
and because of this campaign we will have a stronger LGBT movement in Minnesota.”

Leadership development is and has been one of the main focuses of the LGBT movement in Minnesota over the last seven years. They are actively organizing leaders in various areas: faith, anti-violence, ethnic groups, high schools, colleges, and progressive policy.

Both organizations in Utah have switched their focus to organizing and training new local leadership and have engaged in outreach to programs around the state. It does not seem anywhere near as extensive in the multiple areas that Minnesota LGBT leaders are developing, but they have broadened their focus to developing local programs around the state and developing allies in cities around the state. Equality Utah recently hired their first staff member who is not on the Wasatch Front.

The LGBT movements in both Minnesota and Utah each have hundreds of volunteers, sometimes reaching over a thousand around each state’s major Pride Festival. Equality Utah has one to two interns at a time whereas Minnesota has over ten interns in different programs almost year around. Both LGBT movements seem to have an abundance of volunteers and there doesn’t seem to be a difference in affect of those volunteers between movements.

It is hard to tell the exact impact of financial and human resources for the LGBT movements in Utah and Minnesota because there are not many examples of SMOs going without any major resource. Financial resources are in abundance in Minnesota and they are directed toward the older, community organization in Utah, The UT Pride Center. Equality Utah still has major funding sources and LGBT leaders find ways to circumvent financial resources with human resources.
Social Networks. The LGBT leaders in Minnesota also work with a large number of ethnic and progressive organizations on broader issues related to people of color, even when unrelated to the goals of the LGBT movement. Minnesota has a large progressive coalition working on grassroots organizing on policy around the state. This coalition is called TakeAction Minnesota and OutFront Minnesota is one of 26 organization members of the coalition. TakeAction MN has been focused on building a grassroots pan-progressive movement of labor, environmental, LGBT, immigration, and ethnic rights since 2005.

TakeAction MN with the Somali Action Alliance. We work on non-LGBT issues with them but I think we try to work with a lot of different kinds of groups – both LGBT and non-LGBT – that work with communities of color. That worked has increased around the amendment.

Overall, ethnic diversity in urban areas in Minnesota has increased LGBT leaders’ attention to ethnic groups and the importance of organizing them around the marriage amendment. OutFront Minnesota focuses on building coalitions of faith, ethnic groups, and progressive organizations. The majority of these organizations support the LGBT movement and have taken action against the amendment.

LGBT organizations in Utah are also working with issue based organizations on labor and immigration, but they are working with them differently than Minnesota. They are trying to build coalitions with these groups and support them on their issues because they believe that all issues affect members of the LGBT community. One LGBT leader noted,

I think it's also making sure that when labor has an issue that's impacting their employees, then we make sure that that information goes up on our Facebook and that we drive people to those events. And the same is true if it has to do with, if it's an immigration issue, then we put it up on our Facebook, and we drive our
staff go. We go and talk to people and are present for those things to say look we, this is our issue, how can we help?

So it is important to these LGBT organizations that they work with other issue based groups and show that they are dedicated to other causes that aren’t solely LGBT. This is different than Minnesota because the LGBT organizations are still building these coalitions or relationships with other organizations whereas OutFront Minnesota is one of the main organizations involved in the massive progressive coalition.

The availability of leaders in Minnesota is a major human resource for the LGBT movement, but it has also been part of their organizing philosophy over the last two decades. Although LGBT organizations in Utah have recently started building leadership and organizations around the state in the last few years, they have an abundance of volunteers. Overall, financial and human resources are important for the organizations in this study, but they did not contribute to any major tactical or strategic decisions. Social networks of other progressive organizations can be found in both Minnesota and Utah, but they look different in each state. The openness of Minnesota’s political landscape has allowed a large progressive coalition to develop whereas LGBT organizations are still fostering relationships and coalitions with other progressive coalitions in Utah.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

It is now important to revisit the guiding research questions: How does the political landscape of Utah and Minnesota affect the tactics and strategies that LGBT social movement organizations pursue as they seek to protect the rights and well-being of the LGBT community? Within this broader question, I focused on two subquestions: (a) Are there certain parts of the political landscape that have more influence on SMO choices of tactics and strategies? and (b) Is there a distinctive set of tactics adopted by SMOs working in more closed or conservative political landscapes?

Minnesota’s more open and competitive political landscape has allowed LGBT organizations to use tactics that are much more open and direct. Specifically, the competitive two-party system allows for the use of tactics such as only endorsing candidates publicly, focusing on building a broad bipartisan base of sponsors for LGBT legislation, working with other SMOs to create large coalitions, and sponsoring an LGBT Lobby Day.

By contrast, the closed and conservative political landscape of Utah means that most important political decision-making takes place behind closed doors in committee hearings and party caucuses. The more prominent tactics used by LGBT organizations in Utah include using both public and private political endorsements, and working to find more LDS, Republican sponsors of pro-LGBT legislation. They also work to maintain credibility with moderate Republicans to ensure they are consulted on legislation that might adversely affect LGBT interests. Unlike Minnesota, LGBT organizations are able to use a good-cop bad-cop tactic in order to increase the credibility of the one SMO that
is most active in working for institutional policy change. The closed political system has also resulted in a focus on targeted party caucus delegate trainings, which is something that has never really been a concern in Minnesota because of the relatively open election system.

According to Kitschelt (1986), greater institutional access to political decision makers generally has been found to make social movement actors less likely to turn to disruptive tactics. This is found in Minnesota where LGBT organizations have greater institutional access to political decision makers and they rarely turn to disruptive tactics. In Utah, although LGBT organizations have limited access to political decision makers, they also have rarely turned to disruptive tactics. After five years of continual defeat on the Nondiscrimination Bill, a brand-new, smaller organization in Utah organized a public rally in 2012. Other than this example, the major LGBT organizations have used other forms or levels of institutional tactics and strategies rather than disruptive tactics. Similar to Minnesota, Utah rarely uses disruptive tactics.

The second component of the political landscape, the sociocultural context, greatly affects how each movement uses certain tactics and how it adapts to or works to change the greater collective action frame. The broader religious and ethnic diversity (in urban areas) in Minnesota has increased the LGBT movement’s ability to build coalitions. The open culture of Minnesota has also given the LGBT movement confidence in how they frame their message. They are bold and up front about their direct support for LBGT rights, but try to use inoffensive frames to defuse the impact of unsupportive religious leaders (particularly in the Catholic Church).
The relative lack of religious and ethnic diversity in Utah has caused the LGBT movement to alter their own frame to accommodate or meet themes from the dominant conservative culture’s interpretative frame. Examples of such themes might be tolerance, non-discrimination, and fairness (but perhaps falling short of overt sanctioning of non-heterosexual relationships). They do not speak publicly about marriage equality and attempt to frame issues in ways that would appeal to more conservative people. The lack of religious diversity also has resulted in the LGBT movement placing greater importance on cultivating the support of religious leaders from a single denomination – the LDS Church. Utah’s conservative culture (and the responses of LBGT leaders) creates tensions within LGBT organizations in Utah because their public messages and tactics are often unsatisfying to their progress-oriented members and LGBT constituents. This tension is not found in Minnesota where the LGBT movement can operate much more openly and freely.

Because dynamic political opportunities are situated within the greater institutional structure (including a long term relative balance of political party power), LGBT organizations in Minnesota have been able to capitalize on political opportunities that could have been potentially large political defeats. Despite recent political setbacks in the 2010 election, they never completely changed their tactics and strategies. Since the early 1990s, they have been focused on building a large statewide movement, and this has remained their ultimate goal throughout all the dynamic political opportunities that opened or closed their access to politicians over the last decade.

Similarly, long-term patterns of political defeats and hostility from the state legislature in Utah are embedded features of the dominant institutional structure of Utah’s
political system. The dominance of the Republican Party and a closed political system has created a situation where the majority of decisions are made away from the public discussion. Short-term political opportunities (such as the negative 2008 Proposition 8 media coverage for the LDS church) have opened up avenues for progress, but not deeply altered the fundamental tactical approaches of Utah’s LGBT organizations.

According to my results, Utah has definitely created a distinctive set of tactics and strategies compared to the more contested and open political landscape of Minnesota. The more closed and conservative political landscape has not only caused the movement to define progress or success differently, it has resulted in a tactical change to achieve their long-term goals.

Taken as a whole, the institutional structure of the political system and the sociocultural context of each state appear to have the greatest effects on the tactical and strategic choices of LGBT SMOs in Utah and Minnesota. Dynamic political opportunities and defeats are important, but can only be understood as being embedded in larger structural political opportunities and a sociocultural context that gradually change over decades. Dynamic political opportunities present opportunities on which LGBT organizations can act, but the structured political opportunities, both institutional and cultural, ultimately constrain how they respond.

Political opportunity structure and the political process model have been widely used in a variety of ways and the key concepts have been inconsistently used in social movement research (Gamson and Meyer 1996). There has also been more of a focus on dynamic political opportunities and how they cause a change in tactics or the innovation of new tactics. This study highlights the importance of structural political opportunities –
both institutional and cultural – and how they affect dynamic political opportunities, tactics, and strategies.

While my study cannot measure the exact impact of the political landscape components on SMO tactics and strategies, it does identify important structural patterns behind why LGBT leaders choose certain tactics and strategies in each state. Further research needs to be conducted to analyze and understand the exact impact of the institutional and cultural components of structural political opportunities. It would be beneficial to look at other social movements in these states that do not have specific moral and religious opposition to see whether the institutional structures have the same effects on tactics and strategies. Similarly, it would be valuable to test my initial conclusions by examining patterns in other states where the political landscapes are either closed and conservative (as in Utah) or more open and contested (as in Minnesota).

Because the two factors are found in the same state, this study is unable to tease out the exact relationships between one-party political domination and dominant religious or social conservatism on SMO tactics in Utah. It is unclear how these factors affect each other and which factor plays a more crucial role when it comes to tactical choice. Future research in states with more competitive party systems but a single dominant religious culture (or one-party states with diverse religious and cultural context) would provide an interesting test case to explore the distinctive roles of each factor.


