The European Defense Community

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THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

by

Robert H. Alfandary

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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in
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In 1945 it was a common belief that World War II had just been fought to successful completion. The German and Japanese Empires were vanquished, with Germany destroyed more thoroughly than any of the countries she had occupied. The two large remaining powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, seemed to be working together for the common good of the whole world. They had even agreed to participate in the United Nations Organization, which, as a matter of fact, they had been prominently associated with since the earliest negotiations. Now universal peace, and maybe the Millennium, would be the order of the day.

But Europe was utterly exhausted, her population decimated, and her industries destroyed. The statesmen of Western Europe set themselves up to rebuild their countries, both physically and morally. Generously, the United States furnished money and supplies to start the reconstruction. U.N.R.R.A., loans, and Marshall aid were designed to accomplish this task.

On the political front the collaborators, Nazis and Quislings drew long prison sentences, and faced the firing squad. The hangman's noose was used extensively in the liberated Eastern Europe, which the Soviet Armies were occupying, or where Soviet troops were maintained to guard communication lines to Germany and Austria.

Europe returned to normalcy, but uneasiness prevailed. Reconstruction was slower than had been thought at first, and, more important, there were too many differences of opinion between the Western and the Soviet definitions of "democracy."
It became apparent that Western Europe, whose spiritual and physical qualities had been destroyed, lacked a major power and was just a vacuum, ready to be taken by whatever power felt strong enough, or by the powerful local Communist Parties.

Eastern Europe had been "liberated" by the Soviet Army, and "friendly" governments were established outright or by "revolution." Western Europe had been "liberated" by the British and American armies, and prewar governments took over the reins of control, and re-established democratic processes, after disfranchising all those who had collaborated with the Germans. And suddenly, with the blockading of Berlin by the Soviets in 1949, Europe realized that a wall, the Iron Curtain, separated it in two halves.

The economic task of reconstruction in Western Europe was tremendous. The United States maintained that Western Europe should effect some form of unification, as the various trade barriers between the nations were stifling reconstruction.

The idea of unification was a very old one. Many rulers and philosophers tried to achieve it or advocated it in the past. In the nineteen-twenties Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was the soul of the Pan-Europa movement which enlisted the support of such people as the Masaryks and Aristide Briand. Both in 1942 and in 1946 Mr. Churchill urged Europe to unite.

A "European movement" was founded after the historic Congress of The Hague in 1948, which called for a European Parliament. The resolutions adopted by this Congress forced the European Governments to effect some move in the direction of European integration, and the Council of Europe was born in 1949. Symbolically, Strasbourg was
chosen as its seat.

Relations between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the United States and Western Europe, on the other, worsened, and the West came to feel that the guarantees of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations were not sufficient. Therefore twelve Western nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, its main provision being that should one of the signatories be attacked, the others would consider this as being an attack against them all.

Thus, in the late forties, there were two main forces at work in Europe. The one was fear of the Soviet Union, and it led to the North Atlantic Treaty, and the other was an urge to unite, with the hope that the result would be a Third Force strong enough to become a balance between the Soviet and American colossi.

The Korean War brought a shock to unarmed Western Europe. Overnight Marshall aid changed from an economic to a military character. Moreover it was feared that the German vacuum was an invitation to stage another Korea in Western Europe. This prompted the United States to advocate German rearmament, as Germany was the only country with a large untapped source of manpower.

The European urge to unite, which had been manifested a few months earlier by the advocacy of the Schuman Plan to pool Western Europe's coal and steel resources, and American insistence on German rearmament, were combined into one policy which became known as the Pleven Plan, forerunner of the European Defense Community: Germany was to be rearmed within the framework of a Western European organization, with supranational powers in the field of defense.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the struggle for the European Defense Community. To do justice to the subject, it would be necessary to write a comprehensive post-war European history. This not being possible, the author has decided to include in his study only the smallest possible amount of outside material not directly necessary to the understanding of the E.D.C. The basic assumption in this thesis is that the reader is familiar with general developments of post-war history, with the names mentioned in the text, with the working of the Organizations which have a stake in the E.D.C. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Council of Europe, European Coal and Steel Community).

The study is divided in three main parts: a political and military history of the E.D.C., an analysis of the Treaty, and a brief historical and political account of the fight for the E.D.C. in the six participating nations, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Only those facts deemed by the author to be the most important have been included. He has tried to show the political tug of war involved in the framing and subsequent fight for ratification of the E.D.C. Many different factors, people, factions, organizations, governments, have had a hand in the drafting of the Treaty. As many have fought it tooth and nail. Even where it has been ratified, there is a constant struggle to reverse the country's position. France and Italy have so far failed to ratify the E.D.C., but there are signs pointing to probable ratification by Italy, and possible ratification by France, in the near future. When this comes about, Europe will engage in one of the boldest experiments of modern times: the fusion, under supranational control, of its armed forces, and the marshalling of its economic power to support its unified army.
It would not be possible to name all the people who have helped me in the undertaking of this study. However, I should like to thank in particular Dean Milton R. Merrill and Professors Wendell B. Anderson, L. J. Arrington and M. Judd Harmon of Utah State Agricultural College for their numerous suggestions and criticisms. Special thanks go to my father, Albert S. Alfandary, who patiently gave me some understanding of the political situation in Italy; to M. Yves Passy, who sent me material unavailable in this country; and to my wife who read the manuscript throughout, typed parts of it, and suffered from my one-track mind. I received suggestions from many friends, but all the failings are my own.
Disagreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union became more evident as memories of World War II faded out. In Eastern Europe the satellites were progressively integrated in the Soviet system, while they lost their individuality and their democratic governments.

The Soviet pattern of aggression was made clear by the "Revolution" of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia, culminating a few months later in the Berlin Blockade. This latter event showed how democracies can rise to a major challenge. For almost a year the West fed, clothed and provided fuel to Berlin through the Airlift. In a period of eleven months, the United States, Great Britain and France flew "1,402,644 metric tons of food, coal, and other essential supplies" into the besieged city.¹

Slowly it dawned on Western Europe that the probable reason the Russians had not attacked the West was their fear of the atomic bomb.

The economic reconstruction of Europe was speeded up through the Marshall Plan, proposed in 1947, whereby the United States made "funds available for economic and financial recovery."²

However, in view of the financial and economic situation prevalent in Western Europe at the close of World War II, and until the Korean invasion of 1950, no military effort was possible. Had any been attempted, it "would only have impeded and frustrated the execution of the economic plan."³

In 1947 France and Britain entered into a military alliance, the

¹ Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, 1950), p 391.
³ Ibid.
50-year Dunkirk Treaty. The following year France and Britain widened the membership of their alliance by entering into the Brussels Treaty with Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. This treaty provided that an attack against any one of the signatories would be considered as an attack against all the others. Furthermore, the treaty also provided that a joint headquarters would be established; subsequently it became operative under the command of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery of El Alamein.

While the Berlin Airlift was demonstrating the will of the free world not to give in to Soviet blackmail, discussions progressed in Washington among various Western countries with the intention of establishing a collective security pact among themselves.

The North Atlantic Treaty was eventually signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, by the foreign ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Treaty provided that an attack against any of the signatories "in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." 4

A military build-up did not follow the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty. Instead, France, Great Britain and the United States decided to relax occupation controls in Western Germany. To this effect they allowed the Germans to hold closely supervised elections in their three occupation zones, in September 1949. The Christian Democrats, led by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, won the election. The Social Democrats, under the leadership of Dr. Schumacher, emerged as the second most important party of Western Germany, whose name henceforth was the Federal Republic of Germany.

After the failure of the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet pattern of

4. Article 5.
aggression shifted to the Far East. On June 25, 1950, a shocked world learned with horror that the Republic of Korea had been invaded by its northern neighbor, the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Korea. While President Truman and Congress aped troops to the Pacific, Western Europe woke up to the fact that it was powerless to resist an attack coming from the East.

On July 26, 1950, the German Bundestag passed a resolution "expressly demanding the formation of a European federal state and empowering the German Federal Government to direct its policy toward realizing this aim."

However great the threat of aggression in Europe was, the French representative on the Atlantic Council of Deputies, M. Hervé Alphand, made it quite clear on August 7 that France did not intend even to consider the question of German rearmament.

In August, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, held its second annual session. The Korean invasion was foremost in everybody's mind. The statesmen gathered in Strasbourg were wondering whether Europe would not be the next pawn in the Soviet American "chess-game."

They realized that Europe was devoid of a first-class power. Its armies existed mostly on paper. The American troops in Germany, besides being few in numbers, were not fighting forces, as they had been softened by the occupation.

Even though its terms of reference did not allow it to discuss military matters, there was a fiery debate in the Assembly on the subject of European rearmament. This debate was the first positive step in Europe, showing that there was an understanding of the Soviet danger.

5. quoted by Walter Hallstein, "Germany's Dual Aim: Unity and Integration," Foreign Affairs, 31 (October 1952), 59.
7. The following information is primarily based on Clarence C. Walton, "Background For The European Defense Community," Political Science Quarterly, 51 (March 1953), 49-52.
Never losing an occasion to embarrass the Labor Government, Mr. Churchill, who was the most eminent of the members of the Consultative Assembly, made an impassioned plea for European rearmament.

He asked whether rearmament would force the Russians to act? He answered it by stating that the Russians had already made their own time-table and that nothing would change their calculated designs which would be neither "timed nor deflect" by rearming Germany. Mr. Churchill went on to ask what had been done in Western Europe to offset the differences in manpower since the Brussels Pact had been signed in 1948. He answered: nothing. He then pointed out that the Western superiority in oil, steel and aluminum would rather invite an attack than deter it, and that Europe was well worth the price. He then wanted to know whether Europe had the time to rearm? He stated: "No one can answer that question for certain," but the American monopoly of the A-Bomb might deter the Russian attack until the Soviets had an "adequate supply of A-Bombs of their own."

Then, he introduced a Resolution, which, upon being slightly amended, read:

The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defence of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control under the authority of a European Minister of Defence and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.

The day was August 11, 1950. The vote in favor of this Resolution was 89 to 5, with 27 abstentions.

Thus the Consultative Assembly had manifestly endorsed the idea of a European Army. This was in accordance with the ideal of European integration, of which the Assembly itself was the first landmark. The next step was taken on May 9, 1950, when the French Foreign Minister,
Robert Schuman, proposed that Western Europe should pool its coal and steel production.

Shortly after Mr. Churchill made his speech and his Resolution passed, M. Paul Reynaud, of France, proposed, amid great enthusiasm, that Mr. Churchill should be the first European Minister of Defence.

Now that the Consultative Assembly had made its views known, the question of a European Army was up to the various European Governments. Their representatives were to gather in New York on September 15 to attend the second session of the North Atlantic Council, the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) nations.

A few days before the Council was to meet, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made a unilateral announcement on September 6, in which he "said ... that it was obvious and proper that the strength of Western Germany be brought into the defense program for Western Europe now getting under way." This statement caused considerable embarrassment to the French Government.

During the North Atlantic Council meeting, Secretary Acheson proposed officially that Germany be rearmed. This proposition was supported by all the delegations, save the French.

A few days later the Council recessed without a decision on this point having been reached, to permit the ministers to consult their respective Governments on the problems involved in the creation of an integrated military force for the defense of Western Europe; this

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integrated force was to be organized under the North Atlantic Treaty; it would have a Supreme Commander with considerable power in peace and war; the Supreme Commander was to be supported by an international staff representing all the nations contributing to the force.12 Conveniently nothing was said about German participation in such an integrated force. Time was given to the French Government to see if it could swing enough party leaders to the view of having Germans in uniform again. Relaxed controls over Germany were announced, however.

These were carried out shortly after the New York meeting, when the Allied High Commissioners in Germany, interpreting the decisions of the Council, announced that the German police force would be increased by 30,000 men organized on a "Land" basis and which would be brought under the control of the Federal Government in case of emergency only.13

The fact that a German military contribution different from the police force, was wanted by the United States, was announced by the American High Commissioner, Mr. John McCloy on October 8. He made it clear that two conditions would have to be fulfilled before German rearmament would be permitted: first, no German national army would be allowed, as any German contribution was to be within the framework of an integrated European defense force; and second, no German rearmament would be attempted, should the Germans themselves oppose it.14

The Germans preferred to increase their police force. On August 18, Chancellor Adenauer had called for a West German police equal in numbers to that of the police force of the Soviet Zone.15 This call was repeated on October 17 by the Chancellor. The German proposals

15. Ibid., August 17-30, 1950, 564.
were far from mild, as the East German police forces were estimated to be 300,000 men strong.16

The French Government had been thinking over the acceptance by Mr. Ernest Bevin, the English Foreign Secretary, of Secretary Acheson's proposal about rearming Germany. It understood that what Washington wanted was German contingents in the proposed Atlantic force, in spite of Mr. McCloy's assurances that no separate German national Army would be allowed. In desperation the French Premier, M. René Pleven, proposed to the French National Assembly, on October 24, the creation of a European Army, with German participation. His plan, since known as the Pleven Plan, had seven main points:17

1. France admitted the necessity of German participation in Western defenses.

2. The German contribution could be made only in a European Army which represented a "complete fusion of the human and material elements." For this reason, integration must be at the lowest possible level.

3. The European Army must be indissolubly linked to a European political authority which would exercise the necessary democratic control.

4. Executive work would be entrusted primarily to a European Minister of Defense who would determine the contributions in men, equipment and materials from each country. He would be assisted by a Council of Defense.

5. The Army would be financed through a common budget.

6. In regard to both strategy and organization requirements, the European Army would be used in accordance with obligations assumed

under the Atlantic Pact.

7. Each country would retain control of that part of its existing army which was not incorporated in the common force (overseas and police units) although the European Minister of Defense should, for a particular task, release part of the pooled national army at the request of the participating countries. 18

Before a Conference on the European Army would be called, the Schuman Plan should be ratified. M. Pleven had invited all of the European countries, including Great Britain, to participate in the Army he proposed.

After a rather short debate, the French National Assembly approved a Resolution allowing the Government to start discussions with other Governments in order to establish the European Army. The vote was 343 deputies in favor of the Pleven Plan, while 225 were opposed. The latter were mostly Communists and de Gaullists. Furthermore the Assembly adopted another Resolution expressing its will that no German Army with German General Staff be recreated, by a vote of 402 to 163. 19

Now that the French Government had officially advocated the formation of a supra-national European Army, all the European leaders made their views known. Chancellor Adenauer immediately called for a "security pact" between Germany and the Western Powers on the basis of equality for Germany in any defense force, such equality to take the form of:

1. The provision of similar weapons.

2. The same size though not necessarily the same quantity of units.

18. For excerpts from M. Pleven's speech, see Annex A.
3. The same participation in leadership. But the Chancellor criticized the French Plan for "its attempt to link the question of Germany's contribution to European defence with the Schuman Plan, and said this gave the impression that France wanted to apply pressure." On November 19 he reemphasized his position, and rejected the Pleven Plan on the ground that Germany would not have any equality with the other participants.

The German Social Democrats, speaking through their party chief, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, rejected the Pleven Plan outright because it was counter to the spirit of Franco-German reconciliation, and was inadequate under existing circumstances. Schumacher's conditions were: a prior general election, which he hoped to win, and a guarantee of sufficient allied forces in Germany to hold Soviet forces "off the soil of the Fatherland." This nationalist appeal was not shared by all European Socialists. Paul Henri Spack, the leader of the Belgian Socialists, writing in Foreign Affairs, stated his credo:

"For my part ... I say that I prefer to prevent war and, if it comes, to win it under a foreign command rather than lose it under my own national command. The task we must accomplish is a common task. Our task is together to defend a certain civilization, a certain way of life and a certain philosophy. Each nation must contribute its share to this common task: each can do this effectively only if all our individual efforts are merged in a single effort."

The British laborites, however, were not as far-sighted as their Belgian colleagues. On November 15, the British Under-Secretary of

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23. In Italian in the original.
State for Foreign Affairs told the House of Commons "that the Government was unable to accept proposals for a European Minister of Defence and a European Army." 25

To the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe which met again in November 1950, M. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, said: "This Plan is essentially the one you recommended." 26 He explained the reason for the Pleven Plan:

We want a defense organization on a European basis, because we see no other possible solution to the German problem. The Atlantic Pact has a temporary aim. The European Army in our view is a permanent solution, and must insure peace against all threats, internal or external, now and in the future. 27

On November 22, the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly, by a vote of 18 to 1, with 2 abstentions, called for the formation, without delay, of an all-European Army including German units. 28

Two days later the Assembly adopted, by a vote of 87 to 7, with 19 abstentions, a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers renewing its appeal for the creation of a European Army. 29

Again the Assembly showed to the Western European Governments, by a substantial majority, that its members wanted a European Army, with Germans included in it. The negative votes were cast by German Socialists, while the British and Scandinavian Socialists abstained.

Speaking in Paris on November 1, the French Defence Minister, M. Jules Moch, had explained that the Pleven Plan did not contemplate the creation of German divisions, but only of battalion strength units, and furthermore, that at all stages, half of the European Army should be

27. Quoted by M. Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 471.
29. Ibid.
composed of French soldiers.\textsuperscript{50}

As the Schuman Plan had been received in a rather hostile way in Washington, where it was believed to be a French attempt at sabotaging the Acheson proposals on German rearmament, the French Government, through its representative in the North Atlantic Council of Deputies (in session when the North Atlantic Council is not meeting) amended it by no longer insisting on battalion size units, nor on the appointment of a European Defense Minister.\textsuperscript{31} On December 6, the French Government approved a compromise proposed by Mr. Spofford, the American representative on the North Atlantic Council of Deputies,\textsuperscript{32} that, pending the creation of a European army, the immediate formation of German combat teams of about 6,000 men should be permitted, on the basis of five to one from other Atlantic Treaty nations. The French maintained their opposition to the creation of a German General Staff and War Minister.\textsuperscript{33}

They also withdrew their stipulation that the Schuman Plan should be signed prior to the beginning of the recruitment of German units.

The North Atlantic Council convened again on December 16-19 in Brussels. It decided to appoint General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of the integrated military force.\textsuperscript{33} Tackling the problem of German rearmament, the Council gave the go-ahead signal to form a European Army, wherein one-fifth of the units would be German.\textsuperscript{34} The final communiqué announced that:

The Council also reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common defense.

\textsuperscript{50} Chronology of International Events, VI (October 19 - November 1, 1950), 711.
\textsuperscript{31} "German Rearmament", The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 63 (November 16, 1950), 1.
\textsuperscript{32} "German Rearmament: Policies and Opinions," The World Today, VI (February 1951), 70.
\textsuperscript{33} See pages 5-6.
\textsuperscript{34} Chronology of International Events, VIII (January 16-31, 1951), 83-84.
German participation would strengthen the defense of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Council invites the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to explore this matter with the Government of the German Federal Republic.\(^35\)

The Soviet Government was viewing these developments with considerable misgiving and on December 19, the day the North Atlantic Council concluded its meeting in Brussels, a note was delivered to the French, British and American governments:

During the course of the past few months, negotiations have been proceeding between the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States of America, with the participation of certain other governments, regarding the inclusion of Western Germany and its armed forces in both West European and North Atlantic groupings of powers, the aggressive nature of which the Government of the U.S.S.R. already has recorded on a number of occasions.\(^36\)

The Western Powers delivered their reply on December 22:

The only German military force which exists at present is that which has been for many months established in the Soviet Zone, and which is trained on military lines with artillery and tanks. If the participation of German units in the defense of Western Germany is being discussed, it is solely because Soviet policy and actions have compelled the other nations to examine all means of improving their security. ... The serious tension which exists today springs neither from the question of the demilitarization of Germany, nor from the German problem as a whole. It arises primarily from the general attitude adopted by the Government of the U.S.S.R. since the end of the war, and from the consequent international developments of recent months.\(^37\)

In January the French Government announced that it would call a Conference early in February with a view to forming a European Army.\(^38\)

On January 14 Chancellor Adenauer announced the prerequisites for German participation in the Conference: replacement of the Occupation Statute by a contractual law, elevation of the High Commissioners to

\(^{35}\) Current History, 20 (February 1951), 109.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., page 107.

\(^{37}\) Quoted by Ossolow, op. cit., p 478.

the rank of Ambassador, complete equality of the German contingent in the European Army, allied financial support for the German contingent, and no decisions by any Four-Power talks to be taken at the expense of Germany. 39

Secretary Acheson "warmly welcomed" the French plan and agreed that the American Ambassador in Paris, Mr. David K. Bruce, should be the American observer to the Conference. 40

The European foreign ministries were studying the Pleven Plan and were getting ready for the Paris Conference. In the interval, Premier Pleven made a hurried trip to Washington where he discussed the essence of his plan with President Truman. The communiqué issued at the end of their meeting showed the determination of the United States to support German participation in a European Army. 41

Finally, on February 15, the long-awaited Conference met in Paris. It was to remain in session for over a year, although not continuously. Its full participants were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg. Observers were sent by Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States.

The day before the Conference opened, the French Government submitted its proposals relative to the Pleven Plan. They called for the formation within 18 months of a European Army of 10 to 12 divisions, including 100,000 Germans, which would be developed later into an army of 30 divisions. The largest unit of any nationality would be a combat team of approximately 5,000 men or roughly a third the size of a normal division; and each division would have at least two different nationalities. There would be a gradual standardization and

41. Ibid., January 31, 1951.
and as imitation of training, equipment and armaments; this would be worked under a Council of Defence Ministers, responsible to an inter-parliamentary assembly, who would appoint a European High Commissioner as its executive agent. After the first 18 months, the European High Commissioner would become the European Defence Minister, and real integration would take place. The second stage would be of indefinite duration. The French Government thought this plan had the advantage of making German troops available for Western defense, while making it impossible for the Germans to have an independent army.

The Conference recessed after its first session until February 22, in order to allow the participants to study the French proposals. Just before the third plenary session, the German delegation announced that it accepted as basis of discussion the French memorandum, and that any German counter-proposals would be made within the framework of the French plan.43

On January 9, talks at the technical level had begun between representatives of the Allied High Commission and German military experts led by Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, at the Petersburger Hof, in Germany. The German Generals wanted an army of 250,000 men, recruited over a period of 4 years, with a German General Staff, a German war industry, and responsible to a German War Minister. Twelve armored divisions were to be included in this army. The War Minister would be the agency through which the German troops would be associated with the other European armies.44 For the European Army, the Germans proposed that the basic unit be a 15,000 men division supported by

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43. Chronique de Politique Étrangère, V (September-November 1952), 528-529.
artillery and able to fight against a comparable Russian division. 45

In early July, following consultations in Washington, the American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy dismayed the Germans by rejecting their proposals. He told them that their proposals advocated at the Petersburger Hof would have to be tied to the plan being discussed by the Paris Conference. The Germans had been so sure that the American Government would support their proposals that they had paid only scant attention to the Paris Conference, where they had only sent minor representatives. Thus it was only in early July that the United States Government had decided to give all-out support to the Eleven Plan.

The task of reconciling the German and French views proved to be an arduous one. However, with considerable prompting from General Eisenhower, who had assumed command of the N.A.T.O. forces in Europe in early January, an Interim Report was agreed to by the Paris Conference on July 24, 1951.

M. Hervé Alphand, the French delegate and President of the Conference, announced the points of agreement and those still remaining to be settled. The former include:

1. "All existing and future armed forces intended for the defense of Europe will be pooled under a joint supra-national authority."

However, the police and overseas forces, such as those in Indochina, were excluded.

2. No discrimination will be tolerated between participating states.

3. There will be a joint European defense fund to meet all the expenses of this integrated force. It will, on the one hand, collect the financial contributions of the member states, and, on the other hand, receive outside assistance from other states.

4. There will be a single system of supply and a joint program of armaments whose purpose will be standardization of armaments and specialization in production so that resources will be economically used.

5. During the transitional period the new European institutions will delegate their responsibilities to national authorities.

6. These institutions and their principal functions will include a European Defense Authority functioning as European Minister of Defense, a Council of Ministers whose consent would be necessary when the authority had to take important decisions, a parliamentary assembly to control the administration and to some extent the credits allocated to it, and a court of justice to decide juridical problems.

7. Units comprising the European force will depend on integrated command for command, equipment and supply, etc. There will be an integrated general staff, an integrated air force, integrated regulations regarding uniforms and European schools for the training of personnel.

8. Just as the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, the proposed treaty will last 50 years.47

The points of disagreement listed in the Interim Report include:

1. The size of the basic unit.

2. Technical points concerning the budget, armament and equipment plans which require further study by experts.

3. Whether the supranational authority should be a single commissioner or a college of commissioners.

4. The level of integration of units.

5. The percentage of the total expense to be borne by the members.48

The principal disagreement was as to the size and the level of integration of the basic unit. The French Government's fear of a remi-


48. Ibid.
litarized Germany made it cling to the idea of having "European" basic units composed of three combat groups, following the lines of the Spoofford compromise of December 1950. On the other hand the Germans were willing to abandon their claim to effect integration at the corps level, but they would not compromise on integration at a level lower than the divisional. 49 "... it was evident that no clear compromise had been worked out to reconcile Germany's demand for practical equality and France's fear of a revived Wehrmacht." 50

One thing remained clear, however, and that was General Eisenhower's urgent need for fifty additional divisions, 12 of which were to be German. To get these the West had to pay a political price, and make concessions. The Economist commented that: "The questions to be settled now, therefore are two: how urgent is Europe's need of these German divisions? And how high a price is it worth paying for them?" 51

The Paris Conference took a recess after the Interim Report to allow the member Governments to review their basic positions, and try to find compromises on the unsettled points. Also they had to wait to see what offers would be made by the British and American Governments at the forthcoming conferences of the Big-Three foreign ministers at Washington and of the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa. The French Government, through foreign minister Schuman, announced that it would insist on the principles of a European Army under a supra-national authority. 52

On August 24, the French Government decided that instead of assigning troops gradually to the European Army (see point of agreement 5), as was originally proposed by ... Pleven in his October 1950 speech, all

troops participating in the defense of Europe would become European as soon as the Treaty would come into effect. This decision was taken because the French Government feared that Germany might establish national armed forces prior to integrating them in the European Army.

Before the Washington Conference, due to start on September 10, the German Government, realizing its strong bargaining position, had made some demands which would have to be considered by the Allied Governments. These demands, though not necessarily supported by Chancellor Adenauer, included complete equality with other sovereign powers, political autonomy for the Saar, an assurance that lost lands beyond the Oder-Neisse line would eventually be returned, an assurance that General Eisenhower would not retreat from the Elbe but would carry any war immediately to the Vistula.

The Big-Two foreign ministers held a meeting in Washington from September 10 to September 14 to review their European policies. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman issued a communiqué and a declaration at the end of their meetings. The declaration provided that:

The three foreign ministers declare that their Governments aim at the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a continental European community, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic community. ... They ... welcome the Paris plan as a very important contribution to the effective defence of Europe, including Germany.

The participation of Germany in the common defence should naturally be attended by the replacement of the present Occupation Statute by a new relationship among the three Governments and the German Federal Republic.

A few days later the French Foreign Ministry announced that it

54. "Germany And The West," The Economist, CLXI (September 8, 1951), 544.
was agreed at Washington that no German would be called up until the E.D.C. was established, and that the training of the German recruits would be done by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (S.H.A.P.E.) until European schools were established.56

The North Atlantic Council met in Ottawa from September 15 to September 20. It approved the declaration on Germany issued at Washington, and the European Army was endorsed without reservations. The Economist remarked that from "an impromptu French aspiration" the European Army had become "part of a deliberate programme," and that from a "luxury" it had become a "necessity."57

Another result of the two conferences was that France now did not object any more to integrate the forces at the corps level. This was due mostly at the insistence of S.H.A.P.E. The remaining big obstacle to an agreement was the question of finance: would the five parliaments renounce the power to set the figure of their military budget? It had been proposed that the Authority should determine the overall budget and apportion the costs to each member country.58

Early in October the Paris Conference resumed its work, to settle outstanding questions. On October 9, the Netherlands Government announced it had decided to participate fully in the Conference.59

On November 22, prior to the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Big-Three Foreign Ministers (Mr. Morrison had been replaced by Mr. Eden following the victory of the Conservative Party at the polls on October 25) met with Chancellor Adenauer in Paris. It was announced that: "The mission of the forces stationed in Germany by the three

57. "An Army In Embryo," The Economist, CLXI (September 22, 1951), 665.
powers will be the defense of the free world, of which the Federal Republic and Berlin form part." 60

The communiqué told the Germans that they had to ratify the future European Defense Community before the future Contractual Agreements, whose draft they had approved, would come into effect. 61

The eighth meeting of the North Atlantic Council took place in Rome from November 24 to November 28. It ended on a very optimistic note. It approved the creation of a European Army. It decided that the European Defense Force should be composed of 43 divisions of approximately 559,000 combat soldiers plus service forces supported by a tactical air force and would include a German contingent of 12 divisions. The combined force was to be ready by mid-summer 1954, and the European Parliaments should have approved the Treaty by April 1, 1952. 62

The Economist's terse comment was: "Nato has fallen into the habit of assuming in its calculations a German contribution in men, materials and money; although in fact it may not get it." 63

One of the most important features of the Rome Conference was the fact that the European Army was now discussed as an imminent reality and not as a theory.

It had been hoped that with the change of Government in Great Britain, there would finally be British participation in the E.D.C.

On November 23, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the Home Secretary, dispelled any such notions in the Council of Europe by promising British assoc-

62. International Organization, VI (February 1952), 144. The author has been unable to find out who was primarily responsible for this fanciful expectation. However, he has a strong suspicion that the American representative, Secretary Acheson, was responsible for the Council's wishes to be confused with realities.
63. "Nato in Rome," The Economist, CLXI (December 1, 1951), 1312.
ation with, but not participation in the E.D.C. H. Paul Reynaud, addressing Sir David, told him: "I give you a solemn warning. The refusal of Great Britain to enter the European Army will mean its rejection in the French Parliament." 64

The British failure to participate in the European Army was due to Britain's reluctance to associate herself to a greater extent with the Continent, at the detriment of the Commonwealth.

Writing in the Belgian socialist newspaper Le Peuple, Paul Henri Spaak, the President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, warned that increasingly the European Army was being considered as an American rather than a French plan. He added:

A failure of the European Army plan would no longer be considered the failure of Pleven and the French government, but rather the failure of General Eisenhower and the Allied high command, thus providing a good opportunity for the anti-Americans in Europe and the isolationists in the United States to start criticizing each other even more violently. 65

To the British House of Commons, Chancellor Adenauer declared on December 4 that the neutralization of Germany would mean its inevitable incorporation into the Eastern bloc. 66 On December 17 and 18 the British Prime and Foreign Ministers went to Paris where they agreed to "associate" Britain "closely" to the E.D.C. 67

From December 27 to December 30 the six Foreign Ministers of the E.D.C. countries met in Paris. Benelux resistance was whittled down on the question of a supra-national authority. 68

With the coming of the new year, it became increasingly apparent that the target of April 1 for full ratification of the E.D.C. set at

65. Ibid., December 7, 1951.
67. See p 411-112.
68. See p 58-60.
Rome would not be reached. On January 9, 1952, a joint Anglo-American communique was issued in Washington and London; the two Governments declared that they

... will continue to give their full support to the efforts now being made to establish a European Defense Community, and will lend all assistance in their power in bringing it to fruition. We believe that this is the best means of bringing a democratic Germany as a full and equal partner into a purely defensive organization for European security.69

The Paris Conference, which had been in recess pending the decisions reached by the foreign ministers in late December 1951, opened another series of meetings on January 26. On January 27 the German representative, Professor Hallstein, the Secretary of State, told the Conference that Germany would not sign the E.D.C. Treaty until the Federal Republic had become a member of N.A.T.O., as otherwise she would not have full equality.70

The same day the French Government announced that M. Gilbert Grandval had been appointed as Ambassador to the Saar. On January 28 the Conference adjourned after having reached agreement on the Commissariat, the Assembly, the Court of Justice and the voting strength in the Council of Ministers. No agreement had been reached on the duration of the Treaty, the location of the seat of the E.D.C. and the relation of E.D.C. to N.A.T.O., the latter requiring "special study."71 This compromise did not bring anything new as it followed the lines laid down at Paris in December 1951. At that time relations between France and Germany were worse than ever. The French appointment of M. Grandval was explained a few days later by Paris as meaning that it was a personal appointment.

70. "The European Defence Community," The World Today, VIII (June 1952), 243-244.
71. Chronology of International Events, VIII (January 17 - February 6, 1952), 69.
and not an elevation of the High Commission in Saarbrücken. The German claim to membership in N.A.T.O. was fought by General Eisenhower, but it was reiterated on February 4 by Chancellor Adenauer. He also requested a settlement of the Saar problem along the lines of German demands, as the price the West had to pay for the Federal Republic's cooperation in the defense of Europe.72

The French Government was willing to compromise, if not on the Saar, then on the question of German membership in N.A.T.O. It proposed that N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. should enter into mutual agreements of help in case of war. There were two reasons why the French Government did not wish to see Germany admitted into N.A.T.O. The first was that it would give Germany full sovereignty, and the second was that the North Atlantic Treaty provided that no country with territorial claims could be admitted to the Organization. The French were afraid the Germans would draw France into a war over the lost territories.73

It was with these elements of misunderstanding between France and Germany that the ninth meeting of the North Atlantic Council was opened in Lisbon on February 20. Two days later French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman gave a report on the progress of the Paris Conference. The Council agreed to a mutual security treaty with the E.D.C. On February 25, the Council issued a communiqué:

The Council found that the principles underlying the treaty to establish the European Defense Community conformed to the interests of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.... The North Atlantic Council agreed to propose to its members and to the European Defense Community reciprocal security undertakings between the members of the two organizations.... The Council considered that the obligations and relationships between the communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing the other.74

73. Ibid., February 5, 1952. It should be noted that Italy, although a member of N.A.T.O. has a territorial claim over Trieste.
The military arrangement agreed to at Lisbon called for 43 divisions in the European Army: 14 French, 12 German, 12 Italian and 5 Benelux.75

On March 7 the Paris Conference resumed its work, to consider some of the outstanding questions. It was clear that signature of the E.D.C. Treaty was not too far away. Therefore, on March 10, the Soviet Government, in a last-ditch effort to stop the E.D.C., offered a curious proposal: Germany was to be reunited, and allowed limited rearmament and a national army:

Germany will be allowed the national armed forces (land, air and sea) necessary to her defense.

Germany is allowed to produce military equipment and armament, the types and quantities of which should not exceed the needs of the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty.76

This Soviet offer was rejected by France, Great Britain and the United States in similarly worded notes.77

In mid-April the American Government announced that it would never supply the Germans with any kind of heavy weapons, but would instead send the weapons to the E.D.C. This announcement was hailed in France and in Great Britain for its common sense: "The EDC, even in its present rudimentary stage, is proving its value."78

Finally, after 17 long months of work and compromise of conflicting views, on May 9, the Draft Treaty of the European Defense Community was initialled by the heads of the delegations of the participating countries. A few questions remained to be settled at the ministerial level:


77. Ernest J. Knapton, "France: Traditional Fears," Current History, 24 (February 1953), 93.

78. "German Defence Costs Divided," The Economist, CLXIII (April 26, 1952), 210 and 213.
the location of the seat of the Community, the length of the Treaty, the languages to be used.\(^79\)

From May 19 to May 21 the Foreign Ministers met to examine the completed draft of the Treaty and the pending questions. They did not reach agreement on the location of the seat of the Community; but they agreed \textit{inter alia} that the territories wherein European Forces could be stationed were those defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.\(^80\)

Finally, on May 27, the Treaty Instituting the European Defense Community was signed. It provided for a supra-national authority: a Council of Ministers, a Commissariat, a Court of Justice and an Assembly. Integration of the national units would be made at the corps level. A Common budget was provided.\(^81\) Pending ratification of the Treaty, the national delegations to the Paris Conference were to meet as an Interim Committee to take care of current affairs.

At the same time as the E.D.C. Treaty, a Tripartite Declaration was signed by the United States, Great Britain and France; a Treaty between the United Kingdom and the E.D.C. and a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty which provided that an attack against the E.D.C. would be considered as being an attack against N.A.T.O. When he signed the Protocol to N.A.T.O., Secretary Acheson declared:

But, however vital defense may be at this time, the true meaning of the E.D.C. extends far beyond the field of defense. It is a part of a many-threaded pattern of ideas and actions which is changing the entire fabric of European society. Together with the human Plan and other steps toward European integration, the E.D.C. foreshadows enormous political, social,

\(^79\) \textit{Chronique de Politique Etrangère}, op. cit., p 540.


\(^81\) See pages 59-57 for a detailed analysis of the Treaty. Besides the Treaty proper and the numerous protocols, there was also a secret military protocol, laying down the number of land, sea and air effectives to be provided by each member state.
and economic benefits which will be felt by every European citizen. The events we have witnessed are full of meaning for individual men and women.

Our concern goes deeper than the program of collective security in which we are engaged. It is founded upon the basic, immutable realities of modern international life—upon the enduring interests which the people of Europe share with the people of North America. We know that neither people can be assured of peace, security, or prosperity unless the other is peaceful, safe, and prosperous.82

Now that the difficulties of writing a treaty had been overcome, the formidable hurdle of ratification remained to be faced. The German Government was the first to introduce the E.D.C. Treaty in its Parliament, with the first reading being passed by the Bundestag on July 10 through a voice vote.

Before the Treaty could be submitted to the Belgian Parliament, some agreement had to be reached on the duration of military service for the troops of the European Army. This was necessary as there was some unrest in the Belgian Army which had a military service period of two years, as against 18 months in France and Italy. Following riots in the Belgian Army, Belgium called a meeting of the Interim Committee. It was held on August 12. As neither France nor Italy were willing to increase their period of military service to two years, the Interim Committee adjourned, without a decision having been taken. Thereupon the Belgian Government reduced the period of military service to 21 months.83 This was a blow to S.H.A.P.E., as the Supreme Allied Commander had requested all N.A.T.O. nations to increase their military service to two years. However, S.H.A.P.E. did not despair, and plans were drawn up which presupposed a German contribution. The Fourth Slice of Infrastructure included military installations such as airfields and

82. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26 (June 9, 1952), 896.
83. Chronology of International Events, VIII (August 7-20, 1952), 491.

command headquarters destined for the future German armed forces. 84
And the American Government made it known that it had stockpiled enough
equipment to supply the future German forces. It was also announced
that these would be 12 divisions strong: 6 infantry, 2 panzer grenadier and 4 armored. The German air force would be composed of 1133
jet fighter-bombers. 85

From December 15 to December 18 the tenth meeting of the North
Atlantic Council was held in Paris. It heard an eloquent plea from
Secretary Acheson for prompt ratification of the E.D.C. No important
decision could be taken by the Council, as there was to be a change of
administration in Washington.

On January 6, 1953, the new French Premier, René Mayer, called
for additional protocols to the E.D.C. Treaty. Chancellor Adenauer
agreed that the E.D.C. Treaty should be tidied-up, but such changes
as were necessary need not alter the Treaty's general principles nor
make early ratification less imperative. 86

On February 7, the French Government adopted the text of the addi-
tional protocols, and they were later submitted to the Interim Committee
on February 20 by M. Hervé Alphand. 87 But he had to agree that the
French texts were badly drawn and should only serve as a basis of
discussion, and not as definitive texts. 88

The Foreign Ministers of the E.D.C. countries met in Rome in late
February to examine some of the outstanding questions to be settled,
the additional protocols in particular. They issued a communiqué on

85. Ibid., December 15, 1952.
86. Chronology of International Events, IX (December 18, 1952 -
87. Chronique de Politique Étrangère, VI (September 1953), 594.
February 26, which stated that:

The ministers instructed the Interim Committee to continue its work, keeping in mind the responsibilities that some of the parties have in overseas territories, and to reach as soon as possible conclusion of the interpretative texts of the treaty without retarding the legislative process in the various parliaments.\[89\]

It appeared that the communiqué meant that the additional protocols would not be regarded as being part of the Treaty, but would simply interpret it, and would not require specific parliamentary ratification. This was agreed to by M. Bidault, the French Foreign Minister.\[90\]

Upon his return to Paris, however, he said exactly the contrary, and assured the deputies that the additional protocols would form an integral part of the E.D.C. Treaty.\[91\]

From March 4 to March 24 the Interim Committee examined the protocols and agreed on the text of six new protocols to be submitted to the member governments.\[92\] They were communicated to the North Atlantic Council on April 24 and made public on June 18.

Meanwhile the German Bundestag had ratified the E.D.C. Treaty on March 19.

On April 23 and 24 the eleventh session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council was held in Paris. At the prompting of Mr. Dulles, the unanimous Council adopted a Resolution which

... stresses that the Atlantic Community continues to attach paramount importance to the rapid entry into force of the European Defense Community and consequently to its ratification by all the signatories as well as to the ratification of the additional protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.\[93\]

89. Ibid., February 26, 1953.
90. Ibid.
91. "M. Bidault's Behaviour," The Economist, CLXVI (March 14, 1953), 714.
92. Chronology of International Events, IX (March 19-31, 1953), 190. For an analysis of the additional protocols, see pages 56-57.
On May 11 Mr. Churchill made his famous "Locarno" speech in the House of Commons. He called for Four-Power talks to settle outstanding problems:

Russia has a right to feel assured ... that the terrible events of the Hitler invasion will never be repeated and that Poland will remain a friendly power and a buffer — although not — I trust, a puppet.

... Strong as is our desire to see a friendly settlement with Soviet Russia, we will not in any way fail in the obligations to which we have committed ourselves with Western Germany.

Western Germany will in no way be sacrificed or cease to be master of her own fortunes within the agreements we and the other N.A.T.O. countries have made with them. 94

Sir Winston then put forth the suggestion that he had a solution for Russian demands for security and the West's need for safety and freedom. The germ of his idea lies in the Locarno Treaty of 1925, in which Britain agreed to go to the aid of Germany if she were attacked by France and vice versa. "A similar idea might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind," he added.95

Sir Winston's suggestion was received with dismay in Bonn, where it was feared his proposal meant there must be a British plan to substitute a treaty similar to the Locarno Treaty for the E.D.C.96 It did not prevent the German Bundesrat from ratifying the E.D.C. Treaty on May 15. But because of constitutional reasons, President Heuss did not sign it until a year later.97

The German Socialists who had opposed the E.D.C. were snubbed during the Socialist Movement For The United States Of Europe's sixth

94. Ibid., May 12, 1953.
95. Ibid. It should be remembered that the Locarno Treaty guaranteed against change by force, not Germany's eastern but its western frontier.
96. Ibid., May 13, 1953.
97. See pages 78-79.
European Congress. Its Political Commission adopted a resolution which stated:

The socialist movement reaffirms its agreement with the desire to implement the European Defense Community, which constitutes one stage in the construction of Europe and one of the most effective means of ensuring its security.98

On June 22 the six Ministers of the E.D.C. countries met in Paris, to seek means of speeding up ratification of the E.D.C. Apparently the French Foreign Minister still held for further guarantees from the United States and Great Britain. Also he could not commit his Government to any course of action, as France was in the midst of its longest political crisis.

The Big Three Foreign Ministers met in Washington between July 10 and 14. The communiqué issued at the end of their meetings showed their desire to further European unity, as "the establishment of the European Defense Community constitutes a necessary step" in the strengthening of Europe.

Such a community, peaceful by its very nature, is not directed against anyone. The interests and security of all countries cannot be better safeguarded than by the removal of causes of conflict in Europe. Indeed, the provisions laid down in the European Defense Community Treaty are a guarantee that its forces would never be used in the service of aggression.99

Shortly thereafter, and quietly, the second Chamber of the Dutch States General ratified the E.D.C. Treaty on July 23. But there was no sign that the French Government intended to press for ratification of the E.D.C. in the National Assembly.

The extent of Dr. Adenauer's victory at the polls on September 6 surprised even the shrewdest observers of the European and German scenes. For this reason the French Government hoped for further British guaran-

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teos to the E.D.C., and maybe even participation in the E.D.C. But
the British Government, through Sir Winston Churchill, let it be known
that it was becoming impatient with the French demands. Speaking to
the Conservative Party's Conference at Margate, Sir Winston threatened
the French Government with an alternative solution to the E.D.C.100

One more attempt at influencing Laniel's Government to press
for ratification of the E.D.C. was made at Bermuda, where the French
Premier met President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill. Again
the French leader, who had just received a majority of 15 in a confi-
dence vote in the National Assembly, could not offer much. The final
communique called for the usual prompt ratification of the E.D.C.: 101

In the continuing development of a united Europe, includ-
ing Germany, we see the best means of achieving greater pros-
perity, security and stability for its free peoples. We reaf-
firm that the European Defense Community is needed to assure
the defensive capacity of the Atlantic community, of which it
will be an integral part within this framework. It will en-
sure intimate and durable cooperation between the United King-
dom and United States forces and the force of the European De-
fense Community on the continent of Europe. 101

Just a few days before the Bermuda Conference, the Belgian Chamber
of Representatives had ratified the E.D.C. Treaty by a vote of 143 to
49 with 3 abstentions.

The threat uttered by Sir Winston Churchill at Margate that an al-
ternative solution to the E.D.C. would have to be found if the Treaty
was not ratified soon was emphasized by Secretary Dulles during the
Paris meeting of the twelfth session of the North Atlantic Council. On
December 14 the Secretary warned Europe that:

100. See pages 115-116.
(January 1954), 16.
If, however, the European Defense Community should not become effective; if France and Germany remain apart, so that they should again be potential enemies, then indeed there would be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety.

That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy.

If West Europe is to develop a political, economic and military unity which includes France and Germany, that must happen soon. 102

In its final communiqué, issued on December 16, the North Atlantic Council called once more for the ratification of the E.D.C.:

Within the continuously developing framework of the Atlantic Community the institution of the European Defense Community, including a German contribution, remains an essential objective for the reinforcement of the defensive strength of the alliance. 103

Mr. Dulles's "agonizing reappraisal" was understood to mean that the United States would withdraw her troops from Europe if the E.D.C. was not ratified soon. French failure of ratification was disturbing S.H.A.P.E.'s plans. On January 7, 1954, General Alfred M. Gruenther, the Supreme Commander, announced that long-term planning for the Atlantic alliance defenses is based on the assumption that German forces will become available to strengthen the European shield which is "particularly inadequate in the Center." Therefore, establishment of the E.D.C. is the goal of the Atlantic alliance. 104

Progress was being made with the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. The First Chamber of the Dutch States General, on January 20, 1954, the Belgian Senate on March 12 and the Luxembourg Chamber of Representatives on April 7, all ratified the E.D.C. Treaty.

From January 25 to February 13 the future of Germany was discussed in Berlin by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, Mr. Dulles and M. Bidault, the

Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Mr. Molotov proposed that a referendum should take place in Germany about the E.D.C. He warned that if the Germans chose E.D.C. there could be no peace treaty.105 Reporters noted that the Soviets seemed to fear the E.D.C., which they considered as being an aggressive anti-soviet organization. They would do anything to prevent its ratification.106 They tempted the French Government by suggesting that the seven-year unpopular Indochina war might be settled, should the French not ratify the E.D.C.:  

...take no mistake about it — the Soviet Union understands the importance of the European Defense Community, and the best evidence is her efforts to defeat it. Russia has made a show of easing East-West tensions, offered trade to our N.A.T.O. allies, dangled a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. before the European N.A.T.O. countries, all with the purpose of undermining E.D.C. And finally, we have the clear implication from the Communists that if the French want to end the war in Indochina, they had better let E.D.C. die on the vine.107

The forces under arms in the Soviet Union and in the satellite states are by no means negligible. The 1952 estimate of 175 Soviet divisions has not changed. Also, the Soviets have approximately 350 submarines, 100 modern destroyers, 25 modern cruisers, 2,000 minor vessels, about 20,000 aircraft in the Soviet Air Force (4,000 of them jets) and 3,000 naval aircraft; the Soviet Army has over 30,000 tanks and about 25,000 more in reserve. It was estimated that the satellites had between 1,335,000 and 2,140,000 men under arms, and between 1,700 and 2,300 tanks.108

Germany is the focal point of the struggle for world power. With Germany in the orbit of the U.S.R., it would only be a matter of time until the rest of Europe would be sovietized. Dr. Adenauer has said that Europe should not lose any time in uniting, for "power works as a magnet on weaker bodies." 109

Chancellor Adenauer stated before the signature of the E.D.C. Treaty that Germany could withdraw from the E.D.C. upon its unification with Eastern Germany. This was repeated at Berlin by both M. Bidault 110 and Mr. Dulles. Thus an interesting point of international law arose: would a reunited Germany be bound by obligations contracted by either Western or Eastern Germany? The answer depends on whether Eastern Germany is incorporated into Western Germany or whether a fusion occurs. In the former case the obligations of the Federal Republic would bind the reunited state, while in the latter case the new state would not be so bound. 111

Relations between Germany and France were rather strained during the first half of 1954. When on March 31, the head of the German diplomatic mission in Paris deposited at the Quai D'Orsay the Instrument of ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty, M. Schumann, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the German representative that France would not consider ratification complete until Germany had signed the additional protocols. 112 This brought irate reactions in Germany.

110. See text of his statement on page 92.
On February 26, the Bundestag had passed amendments to the German Basic Law, allowing the German Government to establish conscription and stating that the E.D.C. Treaty was not in conflict with the Basic Law.

On March 5, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly adopted a motion asking the Government to veto the German constitutional amendments. The following day the French Foreign Ministry announced that on February 7 and on February 22 the French High Commissioner in Germany, M. André François Poncet, had told the German Government about France's opposition to the amendments, even though the American and British Governments had manifested their approval. Despite French opposition the Bundesrat passed the amendments on March 19. The Allied High Commission was still paralyzed until finally, on March 25, the French Government reversed its position, and approved the amendments. This opposition, too, was deeply resented by the German Government. 113

The German Government had attempted to effect a compromise on the Saar problem, when on April 9 Chancellor Adenauer accepted the van Naters plan to Europeanize the Saar as the basis for a settlement and thereby renounced his political claim over the Saar. 114

To meet French demands of association with the E.D.C., on April 14, the British Government, and on April 16, the United States Government made known far-reaching decisions designed to help the French Government in obtaining ratification of the E.D.C. in the National Assembly. 115

On April 23, the North Atlantic Council held a one-day meeting in Paris. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting said that:


114. Ibid., ibid., p 1.

115. For detailed information, see pages 116-118 and 124.
The Council — reaffirming its long-established position that the institution of the European Defense Community is in the essential interest of the alliance — welcomed the ratification of the E.D.C. treaty by a number of the signatories since the last ministerial meeting, which brings closer the entry into force of the treaty. The Council also expressed its gratification at the far-reaching steps taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States toward cooperation with the European Defense Community, thus ensuring their lasting and close association with the defense of the Continent of Europe. 116

Increasingly in 1954 statesmen and writers are investigating the possibilities of alternatives to the E.D.C. Treaty which was not yet ratified, two years after its signature. The United States has based her whole European policy on the E.D.C. Great Britain has also based her European policy on the E.D.C., but to a lesser extent. So, one may wonder what the alternatives are.

First of all there is the solution which is often put forth of admitting the Germans into N.A.T.O. Such a move would most certainly be vetoed by France.

The United States could rearm Germany, with or without the help of Great Britain. Such a solution would be unilateral in character, and therefore would be probably resented by the other E.D.C. countries, as they would have no check on German rearmament.

The United States could withdraw her troops from Europe, and shift to a strategy of peripheral defense. This would be a solution of despair.

The Austrian solution could be adopted: laws passed by Parliament, or Government orders are valid unless they are vetoed by all the occupying powers. This would presuppose Soviet approval of such an alternative solution, a most unlikely hypothesis.

Another alternative would be that suggested by Dr. Edward R. Murrow, to have Great Britain replace France in the E.D.C. British approval of

such a solution would be very surprising.

The West German police forces could be increased to the same level as their Eastern counterparts. Such a solution would be far from practical, as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has repeatedly stated that he needed at least 12 German divisions.

Mr. Denis Healy, a British M.P., has suggested that . . . A.F.E. should be organized along the lines proposed for the E.D.C., thus replacing it completely. Such a solution might be acceptable to a great majority of French deputies, as it would mean that the United States would be closely associated to and could control German troops. A similar solution was advocated by Sir Robert Boothby, when he proposed that E.D.C. be merged into N.A.T.O. These two solutions would probably be quite unacceptable to the American Congress.117

A different alternative which could conceivably muster enough support is to go ahead with the E.D.C. but without France, and add some countries which have not shown any willingness, so far, toward joining. That Denmark might agree to such a solution became a distinct possibility when her Foreign Minister, Mr. Hansen, told the Danish Parliament that much had happened since Denmark's basic policy on Germany had been framed in 1947.118 The same position was adopted by Yugoslavia on May 4, when her Foreign Minister, Mr. Popovic said that his country's position toward the E.D.C. was "positive." And Yugoslavia would "take part in efforts

118. Chronology of International Events, X (February 4-17, 1954), 109.
leading" to cooperation on a wider basis.119

On July 5 it became known that the United States and Great Britain were examining ways to give full sovereignty to the German Government in their zones, including the permission to build up her armed forces. It is the author's feeling that such a policy is unfortunate. All it does is to break the front of Western unity, without adequate compensation.

ANALYSIS OF THE E.D.C. TREATY

The Treaty instituting the European Defense Community has 132 articles, 13 Protocols and one Convention. Furthermore, there is also a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, a Treaty between the United Kingdom and the E.D.C. and a Tripartite Declaration signed by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. To these may conceivably be added the six additional Protocols negotiated in 1953, for a total of close to 100 printed pages. Perforce, the analysis of the E.D.C. Treaty will be brief and will deal only with the most important parts of the Treaty.¹

A. Fundamental Principles (Articles 1 to 8)

The European Defense Community, of a supra-national character, has institutions common to the six member states, common armed forces, and a common budget. Its objective is strictly defensive and it ensures "the security of the member states against any aggression by participating in Western Defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty." (art. 2)

There will be no discrimination among the member States. (art. 6)

The Community "shall have juridical personality.... It may acquire and transfer real and personal property, and may sue and be sued" in its own name. (art. 7)

The four institutions of the Community shall be a Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly, a Commissariat and a Court of Justice. (art. 8).

B. The Institutions of the Community (Articles 8, and 19 to 67)

1. The Commissariat (Articles 19 to 32)

The Commissariat is a collegial institution composed of nine members, no more than two being of the same nationality, and serving for six years. They may not receive instructions from any Government. They may not engage in professional activities during their tenure of office. (art. 20)

In the Commissariat, decisions are taken by majority vote only (at least four votes are required), and unanimity is never required. (art. 24)

The President, whose term of office is to be four years, shall coordinate the respective duties of the Commissioners, and "shall ensure the execution of decisions of the Commissariat, and shall be responsible for the administration of the services." (art. 26)

The Commissariat will have at its disposal all of the necessary personnel, both civilian and military, to carry out its tasks. (art. 30)

In the exercise of its powers, the Commissariat shall take decisions, make recommendations and issue opinions. Decisions shall be binding in all their details. Recommendations shall be binding with respect to the objectives which they specify, but shall leave to those to whom they are directed the choice of appropriate means for attaining these objectives. Opinions shall not be binding.

In cases in which the Commissariat is empowered to issue a decision, it may limit itself to making a recommendation. (art. 27)

2. The Assembly (Articles 33 to 38, 46, 87)

The supra-national character of the Commissariat precludes its being responsible to the various Governments. However, a political organ was deemed to be necessary for its control. This organ is the Assembly of
the European Defense Community. It is the same Assembly as that provided for in the European Coal and Steel Community, with three further delegates each for France, Germany and Italy. (art. 33) Thus France, Germany and Italy will have 21 members each, Belgium and The Netherlands 10 and Luxembourg 4, for a total of 87 members in the Assembly.

The Assembly shall hold one annual session, lasting not over one month. (art. 34) It shall examine a general report from the Commission and it may censure its operations by a two-thirds majority. In that case, the Commission shall resign in a body. (art. 36) Such a motion of censure may also be introduced at the invitation of the Council or of any member state. (art. 46)

One of the most important functions of the Assembly is to vote upon the budget proposed by the Commission and approved by the Council.

The Assembly may also:

... propose changes by annulling, reducing, increasing or adding receipts or expenditures. These proposals may not have the effect of increasing the total amount of expenditures appearing in the budget adopted by the Council. (art. 37)

The Assembly, by a two-thirds majority, may propose the rejection of the entire budget. (art. 37)

The tasks of the Assembly, under Article 38, are examined below.2

2. The Council (Articles 39 to 50)

The Council of Ministers, composed of representatives of the member states, may issue directives for the action of the Commission by a unanimous vote. The Council shall take decisions and issue "concurrences which the Commission shall be bound to obtain before making decisions or issuing recommendations." (art. 39)

The reason for these broad powers is that, although the Commission...
The Council is of supra-national character, it cannot carry out its tasks effectively, unless there are constant and friendly contacts with the member Governments.

The Council shall meet at least every three months, "upon convocation by its President, at the initiative of the President, of one of its member or of the Commissariat." (art. 41)

In a general way the Council's task "is to harmonize the actions of the Commissariat with the policies of the Governments of the member States." (art. 39) To this effect, the Council may issue directives, decisions and concurrences. (art. 43) Directives may be issued to the Commissariat, but only with a unanimous vote. The Treaty spells out in detail the types of decisions the Council is called upon to take.

A system of weighed voting is used in the Council: Germany, France and Italy have three votes, Belgium and The Netherlands, two, while Luxembourg has one. (art. 43 bis)

The Council may call a joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council, and decisions taken unanimously in such joint meetings shall be binding on the Community. (art. 47)

4. The Court (Articles 51 to 67)

Its function is to ensure the rule of law in the interpretation and the application of the Treaty. (art. 53) The Court "is the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community." (art. 53)

As in the E.C.E.C., the Court will be both administrative and judicial in character. In this latter capacity, it will decide conflicts between member States relative to the application of the Treaty. (art. 65) In its administrative capacity, it may annul decisions of the institutions of the Community. (arts. 54, 57 and 58)
II. General Provisions (Articles 112 to 130)

The member states will take all measures necessary to ensure the execution of the Community's decisions, in furnishing information, by expecting that its agents perform certain controls on their territories, by acknowledging necessary immunities and privileges. (arts. 112 to 116)

"The member states undertake not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with the present Treaty." (art. 121)

If a member state fails to carry out obligations imposed upon it, the Court shall decide the case as a matter of urgency, such decision being notified to the Council. (art. 117)

The seat of the Community and the languages to be employed by the institutions of the Community shall be determined when the Treaty comes into effect. (arts. 113 and 119) It should be noted, however, that French is the original language of the Treaty, and that in case of discrepancies, the text of the original shall govern. (art. 130)

Other European States may request to accede to the Community; this accession may be accepted by unanimous vote of the Council. (art. 129)

One last provision should be noted, i.e., that the duration of the Treaty is fifty years. (art. 123)

C. Military Provisions

The European Defense Forces (E.D.F.) are composed of contingents furnished by the member states.

The basic units furnished by any member state (with the exception of Luxembourg) for the Land Forces is a Groupement of varying strength. Three different types of Groupements are foreseen: infantry, armored and mechanized Groupements of, respectively, 15,000, 12,700 and 12,700 men in peacetime, and in wartime 2,000 men would be added to each of the basic
units. (Military Protocol)

The Army Corps shall be composed of basic units of different national origins; three or four Groupements will form one Army Corps, and its maximum strength is 30,000 men.

In the Air Forces, 75 aircraft usually form a basic unit, which has from 1,500 to 2,000 men. An unspecified number of basic units will form a European basic unit.

The Naval Forces will be of national character, and may occasionally "be incorporated into formations subject to the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Exceptions on the level of integration may be made with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (arts. 63 to 70)

The European Defense Forces include all of the land and air forces of the member states, with the following exceptions:

a. Forces to be sent to non-European territories for which the member states assume the defense responsibility.

b. Forces necessary for Berlin, Austria, and United Nations missions.

c. Police and Gendarmerie forces as well as troops intended to serve as bodyguard for the Chief of State.

d. Naval forces for the protection of non-European territories for which the member states assume defense responsibility. (art. 10)

But "the volume and nature of such forces existing on the territories of member states shall be such as not to exceed the limits imposed by their mission." (art. 11)

Three cases are foreseen in which a member state may withdraw temporarily a fraction of the contingents which it has put at the disposal of the E.D.C.:
a. "In case of disturbances or threatened disturbances within
the territory of a member state in Europe..." (art. 12)

b. "In case of a serious emergency affecting a non-European terri-
tory for which a member state assumes responsibilities of defence..."
(art. 13)

c. "In case (of) an international mission to be accomplished
outside" the European territory of the member states. (art. 14)

The defense of the territories against a military attack is carried
out by the E.D.F., while the civil defense shall be ensured by each of
the member states. (arts. 15 and 17)

The E.D.F. are placed under the authority of the Commissariat which:
a. Establishes plans for the organization of the forces. (art. 71)
b. Directs the training and preparation of the E.D.F. "according
to a common doctrine and uniform methods" and it also directs the
schools of the Community. (art. 74)
c. Exerts "the necessary powers of inspection and supervision."
(art. 76)
d. Deploys the E.D.F. within the framework of the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe's recommendations. (art. 77)
e. Administers "personnel and matériel" within the provisions of
the Treaty. (art. 78)

The volume of the forces furnished by any member state may only be
modified with the unanimous approval of the Council.

The E.D.F. shall be organized into central institutions, territo-
rial military commands and troop commands. (Military Protocol)

Until the time integrated units shall become effective, a military
degate from the Commissariat to the member states shall supervise the
birth and training of the national basic units.
As soon as the units are integrated, no more than eighteen months after the effective date of the Treaty, the military delegates shall turn their functions over to the Commissariat. (Military Protocol)

Recruiting is a national task and it has to be carried out within the dispositions outlined in the Military Protocol, under the supervision of the Commissariat. (art. 73)

The term of service shall be uniform in the E.D.F. and is to be decided as soon as possible by unanimous decision of the Council. (art. 72) Mobilization plans shall be drawn up by the Commissariat, but the decision to proceed with mobilization is up to the member states. (art. 75)

Uniform general dispositions are defined in the Military Protocol on the status of the European soldiers, including particular rules on the discipline principles. These dispositions follow very closely the French legislation. (Military Protocol, Title III)

"The training and the conditioning of the European Defense Forces shall be carried out on the basis of a common doctrine and uniform methods," and a number of common military schools shall be created as soon as the Treaty goes into effect. (Military Protocol, Title IV)

There is no common language in the E.D.F., each unit using its own national language.

Communications made to a subordinate echelon shall be in the language of that echelon ...

Communications made to a higher echelon shall be in the language of the echelon in which the communication originated.

However, the reference language of the Commissariat shall be French. (Military Protocol, Title V)

D. Financial Provisions

The financial provisions of the E.D.C. Treaty are to be found in

1. Establishment of the Budget (Articles 87 and 87 bis)

A common budget is the motivating idea in the financial provisions. It has to be established by the Commissioner in consultation with the member States, and it has to be approved by the Council of Ministers, through a unanimous vote.

The Council of Ministers must vote unanimously on the total volume of the budget and on the contribution of each member state.

It decides, through a two-thirds majority on the distribution of expenditure. The whole common budget, once approved by the Council, is sent to the Assembly which can propose modifications without, however, being allowed to increase the total amount of the expenditures.

2. Contributions of the member states (Articles 94 and 95)

The contributions of the member states are fixed by the Council, in accordance with the procedure adopted by N.A.T.O., and they shall be payable monthly.

3. Budgetary and account technique (Articles 84, 85, 90 to 92, 97 and 98)

The preparation and the establishment of a common budget are effected according to the usual rules. The Financial Comptroller will control the execution of the budget and he shall check the regularity of expenditures.

An Accounts Commission, whose members are appointed for five years, shall also control the financial operations of the Community.
4. Financial relations between E.D.C. and N.A.T.O. (Articles 87 bis and 91)

The budget shall be prepared according to the lines established for N.A.T.O. This is obligatory during the first two years of E.D.C.

Should any member state feel that the common budget is not established in accordance with the intentions expressed by its Government or Parliament, "the Community shall submit this budget to the competent authorities" of N.A.T.O. for their opinion. (art. 87 bis)

In the establishment of the budget, the commitments of the member states with N.A.T.O. are to be respected. (art. 91)

These two articles were written in the Treaty to be sure that the member states' commitments to N.A.T.O. are not jeopardized.

5. Financial relations between E.D.C. and other states (Article 99)

The E.D.C. may receive outside help and may also give such a help to other states. It is the Commissariat which deals with foreign aid questions; such agreements as are entered into by the Commissariat with other states must be approved by the Council.

6. Financial policy of the Community (Article 95, Financial Protocol)

In the establishment and the execution of the budget, monetary transfers among member states or between them and other countries shall be limited. This principle is reemphasized in the Financial Protocol, whereby no less than 85%, nor more than 115%, of a member state's contribution may be spent in that state.

Through this provision, the economy of the member states should not be disturbed to any large extent.

7. Convention Relative to the Tax and Commercial Regime of the Community
The Community does not have a tax exemption for goods acquired in or a duty exemption for goods imported into a member state (arts. 29 and 31), but it may transport these goods within the territories of the member states without paying other taxes. (art. 30)

The end items "furnished free of charge to the Community by means of foreign aid" are not taxable. (art. 33)

8. Protocol on the Conditions of Remuneration and Pension Rights of the Civil and Military Personnel Employed by the Community

This Protocol states general principles on the pay of the Community's employees.

There are three elements in the pay:

a. A basic pay varying with rank.

b. A suitable allowance designed to adapt the basic pay to the economic conditions of each state.

c. "A separation indemnity for military personnel exercising their functions in a state other than their state of origin."

Military personnel will moreover have the benefit of certain indemnities in kind.

Wherever possible, housing will be furnished to military personnel, and special indemnities for military personnel stationed in a state other than their state of origin or in towns where rents are exceptionally high, are also provided.

E. Economic Provisions

1. Principles of the Powers of the Commissariat

In order to ensure a maximum of efficiency, the Commissariat has been given important powers in the field of the economics of defense as well as in the military field. The Treaty gives the Commissariat
practical means to carry out these powers. This delegation of powers by the Governments of the member states to the supra-national authority is balanced by dispositions giving the right of intervention, according to the case, to the national Governments, the Council, the Assembly, or the Consultative Committee for Economic and Social Affairs.

The powers of the Commissioner deal with the following fields:

a. The preparation of the programs of armament, equipment, supply, infrastructure and scientific and technical research for the Forces of the Community.

b. The execution of these programs.

c. The granting of authorizations and their control concerning the production and the exportation of war material, the plans for its productions, the technical research and the building of prototypes.

d. The preparing of plans dealing with the economic mobilization of the member states.

e. The questions relative to foreign aid furnished by the Community and the foreign aid destined to the E.D.F.

2. Preparación de los programas (Articles 101 to 103)

In the preparation, as well as in the execution of the programs, the Commissariat, in consultation with the member states, makes the best possible use of the technical and economic capacities of each member state.

The programs are also established by taking into account the contributions to be furnished by the member states.

One of the essential aims of the Commissariat's policy in the field of armament, is a full standardization of materials, simplification of production and the best possible use of the raw materials of the member states.
3. Execution of the program (Articles 104 and 105)

The Commissariat, in consultation with the Council and the member states, ensures the execution of the common programs to the best interest of the Community.

There is a fundamental rule for placing contracts: they must be placed with the lowest bidders. "Contracts above a certain amount shall be submitted by the Commissariat to a Contracts Committee, including nationals of each of the member states.

If the Commissariat deems that "national public policy or private practices or agreements" tend to restrain normal competitive conditions, it shall appeal to the Council "which shall decide unanimously on measures to remedy the situation."

4. Scientific and technical research in military fields (Article 106)

"The common program for scientific and technical research in military fields, as well as the means of execution of this program" shall be prepared by the Commissariat which shall ensure its execution after approval by the Council.

5. Authorization of production, importation, exportation and technical studies (Article 107)

To ensure the fulfillment of the armament program and to protect the security of the Community, all production, importation and exportation of war material has to be licensed by the Commissariat.

The Commissariat will also regulate the manufacture of prototypes and technical research concerning war material. (This regulation applies to the materials listed in Annex I of Article 107.)

Annex II to Article 107 lists the equipment for which the Commissariat may not deliver an authorization of production in strategically
exposed areas, unless there is a unanimous approval by the Council. These include atomic, chemical and biologic weapons, long-range and guided missiles, magnetic mines, warships other than small defensive craft, and military aircraft.

In an annexed letter to the Treaty, Chancellor Adenauer explicitly states that prohibition of the manufacture of the above listed weapons in Germany will not be considered as discriminatory, as the Federal Republic is situated in a strategic area.

The Commissariat will deliver a general authorization to manufacture war materials to those member states responsible for the defense of dependent territories.

6. Sanctions (Article 103)

Heavy fines may be imposed by the Court upon request of the Commissariat on the firms contravening the provisions of Article 107.

7. The Consultative Committee (Articles 109 and 110)

To help the Commissariat better to understand the economic and social consequences of its policies, the Treaty provides that a Consultative Committee, composed of 20 to 34 members, nominated by the Council and including an equal number of representatives of producers and labor,

... shall be consulted by the Commissariat concerning problems of an economic and social nature raised by the preparation or execution of the common armament, equipment, supply and infrastructure programs.

8. Preparation of economic mobilization plan (Article 111)

"In consultation with the governments of the member states, the Commissariat shall prepare plans for the mobilization of the economic resources of the member states."
F. Provisions concerning the status of the E.D.F.

Provisions concerning the status of the E.D.F. are found in Chapter II, Title III, of the Treaty, in the Convention Concerning the Status of the E.D.F., in the Jurisdictional Protocol and in the Protocol concerning Military Law.

1. Public security (Convention Relative to the Status of the E.D.F., Articles 1 to 11)

   The Convention defines the conditions of assignment of the members of the E.D.F. and their families on the territory of the Receiving States, the police rights for military units in the bases of the Community, the regulations affecting road, air and water transportation, the right to wear uniform and bear arms.

2. Public services and military installations (Convention Relative to the Status of the E.D.F., Articles 12 to 28)

   a. Public services (Articles 12 to 20)

      The E.D.F. will benefit on the territory of the member States of all necessary public services (postal services, transportation, utilities, sanitary services).

   b. Military installations (Articles 21 to 26)

      The Community alone is qualified to list its needs in military installations. However, the receiving State, though it may not dispute these needs, may pronounce itself on the choice of means. In case of conflict, the receiving State can have recourse against unjustifiable demands of the Community.

   c. Civil labor (Article 27)

      This article determines the conditions under which civil labor will be placed at the disposal of the Community.
d. General clause of Article 23

"The rights applicable to and the obligations incumbent upon other Forces stationed on the territory" of a receiving State will be taken into consideration when agreements shall be concluded regarding the status of the E.D.F. in the territory of that receiving State.

3. Civil jurisdiction — Reparation of damages caused by the Community or its agents (Jurisdictional Protocol, Articles 1 to 17)

Following the French administrative and civil laws, the Jurisdictional Protocol lays the principle of responsibility on the classical notion of tort. To maintain the rights of the victim, certain types of damages for which the Community is deemed to be responsible are listed. The jurisdictional organs of the Community, and in particular the Court, will establish a judicial system which may serve as the base of a future European judicial system.

Claims against the Community will be brought before local Indemnity Commissions, regional sections of the Court of Justice and the Court itself. These are "European" organs, but two out of the three members, including the President, of the Indemnity Commissions, are nationals of the States in which these Commissions are located.

The regional sections of the Court are presided over by one of the Judges and four nationals of the State where the litigation occurs.

4. Penal Provisions (Jurisdictional Protocol, Articles 18 to 34)

Punishment for the penal offenses committed by members of the E.D.F. will be the prerogative of the Community. Punishment will be meted out according to a convention instituting a common legislation which is in the process of being framed.3

5. Protocol relative to Military Law

This Protocol mentions that a common military law will be adopted, as soon as the E.D.C. Treaty comes into force.

6. Mutual security provisions

1. Guarantees between the member states

One of the essential reasons for the Treaty is to increase the collective security of Western Europe. To this end, as provided in Article 2 of the Treaty, any armed aggression against a member of the Community shall be deemed to be an aggression against all the other members.

2. Guarantees between the member states and the United Kingdom

A Treaty between the United Kingdom and the member states was also signed on May 27, 1952. It extends the guarantees of the Brussels Treaty to Italy and Germany. Article 1 provides that the United Kingdom will come to the help of the Community, should it be attacked, and Article 2 is a guaranty of help from the Community to the United Kingdom.


In a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty it is provided that N.A.T.O. members will consider an attack against the E.D.C. as an attack against themselves, and on their side, in a Protocol to the E.D.C. Treaty, the members of the E.D.C. will consider an attack against N.A.T.O. as an attack against themselves.

4. Organic relations between E.D.C. and N.A.T.O.

On the technical plan, a close relation between E.D.C. and N.A.T.O. is foreseen.

On the political plan, mutual consultations will take place to inquire into common objectives.
In a Tripartite Declaration, also signed on May 27, 1952, the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and the United States made it known that should any action whatsoever threaten the integrity of the E.D.C., the British and American Governments would consider such an action as a threat against their own security. This Declaration is intended to stop E.D.C. members from seceding.

II. Interim Committee

The six delegations of the signatories to the E.D.C. Treaty shall meet as an Interim Committee until such time as the Treaty comes into force. It shall consider problems concerning the Community and measures which may have to be taken before the Community begins to function.

"In addition, it shall collect all of the information needed to facilitate performance by the Commissariat of the most urgent tasks for which it is responsible."

I. Additional Protocols of 1952

1. Protocol on Article 10

Each member State decides the initial assignment of the new recruits, either in the E.D.F. or in the national armed forces.

Each member State decides upon individual exchanges of personnel between the E.D.F. and the national armed forces.

2. Protocol on Article 13

The signatories to the Treaty agree that upon "urgent" application of a member State to withdraw units from the E.D.F., they shall be put at its disposal by the Commissariat.

The Supreme Allied Commander may not refuse to give his agreement unless the withdrawal is of a nature such as to jeopardize the security

4. For the text of the Additional Protocols, see: Chronique de Politique Etrangère, VI (September 1955).
of the Community.

3. **Protocol on Article 43 bis**

As soon as the Treaty comes into force, the date of the activation of the first echelon shall be determined.

4. **Protocol on the European military schools**

Personnel of national armed forces may attend European Military Schools.

5. **Protocol on Article 72**

Mobilization plans of the E.D.F. shall only concern the determination of the needs of those forces to put them on a war footing and assure their maintenance, as well as the agreements necessary to meet these needs.

6. **Protocol on Article 107**

The general authorizations mentioned in Article 107 will be delivered as soon as the Treaty comes into force. They may not have any limitation of duration, quality or quantity.
Sovereignty over military affairs has always been one of the most jealously guarded prerogatives of states. That the E.D.C. Treaty has been proposed before a Political Community was set up is a clear sign of the fear in Europe, after the beginning of the Korean invasion.

This lack of a political authority has been deplored by both M. Schuman and Chancellor Adenauer, who have said that, if there had been enough time, it would have been better to complete Europe's political unification before tackling the job of creating a unified and integrated European Army.¹

Had the Soviet threat not been so great, such a course would undoubtedly have been adopted. That the European statesmen were aware of the problem involved in the lack of a unified political authority over the military forces is shown in Article 33 of the European Defense Community Treaty.

In October 1951, at the London meeting of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies, M. Hervé Alphand presented a report on the progress of the Paris Conference. He said the Conference was studying a proposal submitted by Italy, to create a European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage.²

On December 30, 1951, the six Foreign Ministers gathered in Paris since December 27 agreed to propose to their countries the establishment of a

... single, directly elected bicameral parliament with power to levy taxes, administer a combined defense budget and oversee management of coal and steel industries united under the Schuman pool.3

This was the proposal which led to Article 38, which provides that within six months of the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty, the Assembly should examine:

(a) The creation of an Assembly of the European Defense Community elected on a democratic basis.
(b) The powers which might be granted to such an Assembly; and
(c) The modifications which should be made in the provisions of the present Treaty relating to the other institutions of the Community, particularly with a view to safeguarding an appropriate representation of the States.

Article 38 also lays down, in broad lines, the structure of the definitive organization:

The definitive organization which will take the place of the present transitional organization should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate federal or confederal structure, based upon the principle of the separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system.

Three days after the signature of the E.D.C. Treaty, on May 30, 1952, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted its Resolution 14, which requested the Governments participating in the E.D.C. to "give immediate effect" to the proposals embodied in Article 38.

The Assembly requested that the task of drafting a Treaty for a European Political Community be entrusted to:

— Either the Assembly for which provision is made in the Treaty setting up the European Coal and Steel Community, as soon as this Assembly has been set up.
— Or the Assembly of the Council of Europe, sitting with a restricted membership corresponding to the number and allocation of the seats in the Assembly of the European Defense Community.4

Foreign Minister Schuman of France proposed early in July 1952

that the task of planning the European Political Authority be entrusted
to the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C. ... C.) as
soon as it was set up.5

This suggestion was acted upon when the E.C.C.C. Assembly met
for its inaugural session on September 10 the Council of Ministers
of the E.C.C.C. formally invited the members of the Coal and Steel
Assembly to work out the Constitution of a European Political Commu-
nity.6

Following the spirit of Article 38 of the E.D.C. Treaty, the Mi-
nisters requested the Assembly to have the draft of the European Poli-
tical Community Treaty ready within six months, i.e., by March 10, 1953.7

The E.C.C.C. Assembly decided to become an Ad Hoc Assembly through
the addition of three members each from France, Germany and Italy, and
with enthusiasm began to tackle the task of drafting a Treaty for a
European Political Community.8 Thus the task of drafting the Treaty
was entrusted to practical politicians, and not to technical experts,
as was the case for the E.D.C. Treaty.

On September 15 the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Assembly was
held,9 and, at the requested date, on March 10, 1953, the completed
Draft for the Treaty setting up "a European Community of supranational
character" was presented to the Ministers at a ceremony in Strasbourg.10

5. "A Political Authority For Europe," The Economist, CLXIV (July 5,
1952), 10.
6. Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich, "Statute of the European Com-
8. Ibid., p 12. It should be noted that the members of the E.C.C.C.
   Assembly become members of the Ad Hoc Assembly, not as members of
   the E.C.C.C. Assembly, but in their individual capacity.
10. Bowie, op. cit., p 22. For analyses of the E.P.C. Treaty, see:
    Ibid., 22-23. Herbert W. Briggs, "The Proposed European Political
    Community," American Journal of International Law, 48 (January 1954),
    110-122. Basil Karp, "The Draft Constitution For A European Political
It was decided at Brussels, in December 1950, to establish in France the combined military headquarters of the N.A.T.O. forces in Europe, with General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (S.A.C.E.U.R.), according to the agreement reached at the New York meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

General Eisenhower arrived in Paris on January 7, 1951, and made a whirlwind tour of all the N.A.T.O. capitals.1

He had been "horrified" by the Pleven Plan when it was first announced, and when he arrived in Frankfurt, he said that if the West wanted Germany to be aligned on the side of the free world, she must be given equal status with other countries.2

General Eisenhower looked at his task as being a military one, with difficult political implications. The North Atlantic Council gave him the order to build up the forces of Western Europe, to integrate them, to make plans, to coordinate the defense of the N.A.T.O. nations. He knew that Germans would be needed to defend Europe, and he wanted them badly. He did not want a token force, but a serious contingent.3

When he returned to the United States, after his tour, General Eisenhower reported to a joint session of Congress. He emphasized

1. Jan 7, France; Jan 9, Belgium; Jan 10, The Netherlands; Jan 11, Denmark; Jan 12, Norway; Jan 13, Great Britain; Jan 16, Portugal; Jan 17, Italy; Jan 19, Luxembourg; Jan 20, Western Germany; Jan 23, France; Jan 25, Iceland; Jan 26, Canada; Jan 27, United States.
that he thought there should be a political agreement with Germany, prior to recruiting German troops. He added that he did not want unwilling contingents in his army.4

General Eisenhower appointed Brigadier General Michaelis as his observer in the European Army Conference. When he realized that the French Government would never allow the Germans to have a national army, he swung behind the Ploven Plan, and it is at his insistence that the United States abandoned the Petersburger Hof Plan. The Supreme Commander was a firm believer in European unity, and he came to believe that the E.D.C. was an important step in that direction.

When the North Atlantic Council met in Rome, General Eisenhower told the Ministers that European unity was "absolutely necessary" and he expressed the hope that the European Army would be a great stride toward that goal.5

Again when he talked to the N.A.T.O. Finance Ministers, on December 15, 1951, he expressed his belief that the European Army was the only satisfactory solution, both politically and militarily, for bringing German armed forces under his command.6

When there appeared to be a breakdown in the negotiations in late January 1952, General Eisenhower told Professor Hallstein, the German representative, that he hoped Bonn would not link the nuer problem to the E.D.C.7

In his first Annual Report, General Eisenhower declared:

The concept of a European Defense Force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of N.A.T.O. aims.8

4. Chronology of International Events, VI (February 1-14, 1951), 110.
6. Chronology of International Events, VII (December 5-13, 1951), 745.
8. Ibid., April 2, 1952.
One year later, General Ridgway, who had replaced General Eisen-
hower as S.A.C.E.U.R., said that:

During my year of command I have followed closely the
plans for the European Defense Community. The benefits which
the early ratification of the Treaty would have brought to
our efforts and to European unity included the contribution
of West Germany, which I consider indispensable to our defense
system. The E.D.C. has maintained constant liaison with the
Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and has
observed and assisted in its planning. Its plans are workable
and sufficiently advanced to avoid delay in developing a Ger-
man contribution.9

A few months later, the new Supreme Commander, General Alfred M.
Grueber, told a large audience in New York City:

I should like to make it crystal clear that we still do
not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out Russian attack.
That is why we have recommended to the North Atlantic Council
that our forces should continue to be strengthened.

One of the sources of additional defensive strength is
Western Germany.10

Talking about the E.D.C., he declared that: "We have analyzed the mili-
tary aspects of this plan. We consider it not only feasible but also
highly desirable from a military point of view."11

In January 1954, General Grueber told the American Club of Paris
that the forces under his command were still not capable of resisting
a determined attack from the Soviet Union, and that the defensive system
of Western Europe, particularly in the Center, was quite inadequate.
German troops were needed to fill the gaps, and therefore a solution
of the E.D.C. had to be arrived at.12

In March 1954, at the time of the "Juin" controversy in Paris,
General Grueber told the press that "N.A.T.O. had not contemplated
any alternative solution to the E.D.C. He added that "N.A.T.O. had

10. Alfred M. Grueber, "NATO, A Thriving Success," Vital speeches,
XX (November 15, 1953), 75.
11. Ibid.
proclaimed that a German military contribution was necessary for the defense of Europe, and that such a contribution was possible under the E.D.C.\textsuperscript{13}

Upon assuming his command, General Eisenhower had declared that henceforward he was only one-twelfth America. His successors behaved in the same way, and therefore their statements in favor of the E.D.C. carried more weight than those of ordinary politicians. General Eisenhower can be credited with many improvements in the text of the E.D.C. Treaty, though it is very difficult to pinpoint them. He can be credited with influencing Mr. Churchill in giving in at Paris, at the time of the December 1951 meeting; he can be credited with helping to ease the Franco-German tension of January and February 1952. His successors, General Gruenther in particular, were highly regarded by European statesmen, and commanded a striking personal loyalty among all the personnel of S.H.A.F.E., with many of the European officers destined to enjoy high positions in the future European Defense Community.

Article 18 of the E.D.C. Treaty is the basic Article regulating the powers entrusted to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, with regard to the European Army:

1. The competent Supreme Commander responsible to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall ... be empowered to satisfy himself that the European Defense Forces are organized, equipped, trained and prepared for use in a satisfactory manner.

As soon as they are ready for use, the European Defense Forces shall ... be at the disposal of the competent Supreme Commander responsible to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who shall exercise with respect to them the powers and responsibilities accruing to him under his terms of reference and shall, in particular, submit to the Community his needs as regards the articulation and deployment of these Forces.

2. During wartime, the competent Supreme Commander of

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Combat}, March 30, 1954. See also page 93.
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall exercise with regard to the Forces provided for above the full powers and responsibilities of Supreme Commanders, such as these are conferred upon him by his terms of reference.

Thus S.A.C.E.U.R. is also the Supreme Commander of the European Defense Forces. Various articles give him a vast range of powers. His consent must be secured to exchange the Forces used in Austria and Berlin, or by "virtue of a decision of the United Nations" with troops which belong to the European Defense Forces. 14

When a serious emergency affecting a nation's non-European territories arises, S.A.C.E.U.R.'s agreement must be secured before that nation may divert troops assigned to the European Defense Forces to such territories. 15 He must also give his consent when a nation wishes to withdraw some troops from the European Defense Forces for an international mission. 15

S.A.C.E.U.R. has also important functions with respect of the composition of the integrated units. An Army Corps 17 or an Air Force 18 basic unit may be composed of units of the same national origin, upon his recommendation.

The European Defense Forces will be deployed by the Commandariat according to S.A.C.E.U.R.'s recommendations. These recommendations can be set aside with the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers only. 19 This Article was devised to prohibit any nation (i.e. Germany) from deploying her national troops in any way contrary to the wishes of the other nations (i.e. France). With his agreement, elements of

15. Article 17. However his agreement may not be withheld, unless there may be a threat to the security of the Community (see additional Protocol.)
17. Article 59, section 2.
18. Article 59, section 25.
19. Article 77, section 1.
the European Defense Forces may be stationed in the areas defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty and which are not comprised in the territory of any of the member states. Schools, training centers, and other establishments of the Community may also be installed in the same areas with C.A.E.U.R.'s approval.

His agreement will be necessary regarding the volume of Luxembourg's military forces, "their organization and the arrangements for their eventual integration and for their use."21

And finally personnel belonging to the European Defense Forces will be assigned to the Headquarters of the "Commander responsible to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ... and of appropriate subordinate Headquarters."22 This means that the European uniform will be seen at C.N.A.T.O. and at Allied Forces Central Europe.

20. Article 126, Section 2.
The Benelux nations suffered greatly during World War II, but when Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed the rearming of Germany during the second session of the North Atlantic Council, they approved this suggestion. As Germany was her principal market, The Netherlands's approval was given without reservation. However, when the Paris Conference for a European Army opened on February 15, 1951, The Netherlands was only represented by an observer, and was not a real participant. It was only after the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council, on October 9, 1951, that the Dutch Government announced it would become a full participant in the Paris Conference.

But the Dutch were not resigned to lose their sovereignty and they supported the Belgian position at the Rome meeting of the six Foreign Ministers of the E.D.C. nations, in November 1951.

Once it was won over to the idea of having a supra-national political authority, the Dutch Government decided to modify its country's Constitution; this was announced by the Dutch Defense Minister, Mr. Staf, on December 7, 1951.

Regular general elections were held on June 20, 1952, shortly after the signature of the E.D.C. Treaty in Paris, with the Government forces obtaining a substantial majority in the States General.

Results in the First Chamber follow:

2. See pages 69 and 70.
3. Chronology of International Events, VI (December 5-18, 1951), 745.
Government Coalition
Catholic 17
Labor 14
Anti-Revolutionary 7
Christian Historical 6
Freedom 4

Opposition
Communist 4 2

Results in the Second Chamber follow:

Government Coalition
Catholic 30
Labor 30
Anti-Revolutionary 12
Christian Historical 9
Freedom 2

Opposition
Communist 6
Political Reformed 2
Catholic National 2

Modification of the Constitution proceeded swiftly, and the Second Chamber adopted the constitutional amendments on December 2, 1952. They permitted transfer of national authority to supra-national organizations, by providing "that international measures at variance with the Netherlands Constitution may be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Netherlands Parliament."7

The idea of a European federation gained still more, when, two weeks later, on December 17, the European Movement conducted a poll in the Dutch towns of Delft and Bollenward to test their citizens' opinion on European unity. 75 percent of the 39,000 eligible voters of Delft went to the polls, 93 per cent of them voting "yes" to the "proposition favoring a European Government with democratic representation and a European Constitution." The turnout was 88 per cent of the 4,000

5. Ibid.
voters in Boleward, 97 per cent of them voting "yes."

The First Chamber of the States General passed the constitutional amendments on May 30, 1953, and one month later, on June 22, they were officially proclaimed throughout the country.

Shortly thereafter, on July 23, the European Defense Community Treaty was approved by the Second Chamber, the vote being 75 in favor to 11 opposed. The latter included the Communists, the Political Reformed, the Catholic Nationals and one member of the coalition.

Finally, on January 20, 1954, the Treaty was approved by the First Chamber, by a vote of 36 to 4.

Like France, Belgium suffered at the hands of Germany during World War II. Therefore, the Belgians were and are in sympathy with the French objections to the E.D.C.

The Belgians had favored the European Army as early as November 29, 1950, when, in the Chamber of Representatives, Foreign Minister Van Zeeland said the Belgian Government approved the creation of the European Army proposed by M. Pleven.

The Belgian Government participated in the Paris Conference from its inception. However, as was made clear in Rome, in November 1951, the Belgians did not wish to surrender completely their sovereignty to a supra-national organization, even for their defense. They also urged that the E.D.C.'s budget should be fixed by unanimous vote of its Council of Ministers. They insisted that the nomination of the

9. Ibid.
commanding officers of national units should be reserved to the national authorities, and that the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers should be necessary for nominations to higher posts. 14

However, the Belgians gave in during the December meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the E.D.C. and they agreed that a supranational authority should run the European Army. 15

The Economist contended that the Belgian opposition to a supranational authority was due to M. Van Zeeland's fear of losing the elections, which would have to be held in such a case, 15 as the Constitution would have to be amended.

Following its signature of the E.D.C. Treaty, Belgium underwent a grave debate among the population on the subject of military service. Troops rioted in Brussels and in Wallonia when the Government failed to release them after 21 months: it had decided to keep them for the full two-year period of military service. Belgium was the only country among the E.D.C. nations to have a two-year period of military service, as had been requested by E.A.C.E.U.R. According to the E.D.C. Treaty, a uniform period of military service was to be agreed upon by the signatories.

Following the failure of the special meeting of the Interim Committee called by Belgium, the Government announced on August 13, 1951, that it would release its draftees after 21 months. 17

In 1953 a parliamentary commission and leading juridical experts announced that the E.D.C. Treaty and the additional Protocols conflicted with the Belgian Constitution. The technicalities of the military command and the movement of troops would infringe on the prerogatives of

the King. Therefore, it was decided to amend the Constitution. Another Committee of the Chamber of Representatives examined the Bill to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty. The majority of the Social Christians, the Government Party, were in favor of the E.D.C. However, Frans van Caenepeel, the Social Christian President of the Chamber, objected to the surrender of sovereign rights to a supra-national organization. The liberal opposition was willing to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty provided that the Constitution would be revised. The Socialists insisted on preliminary revision of the Constitution and the establishment of a European Political Community to ensure control of the Defense Community.

The Chamber of Representatives was called for an extraordinary session in October 1953, to debate the E.D.C. Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, on November 12, defended the Treaty in forceful language:

Yes, we enter in the European forces. Yes, we entrust our defense to these forces, which themselves are integrated in the Atlantic forces.

Doing this, it is true that we accept some limitations, some interventions by supra-national organs. But what we temporarily abandon on the national level, we regain with interest on the European and Atlantic levels — and that, to the benefit of the national interests we are entrusted with.

A week later, A. Paul Henri Spaak, the Socialist leader, urged ratification of the Treaty on the ground that the question was no longer whether Germany was to rearm, but how. He expressed the belief that should the E.D.C. not be ratified, the United States would rearm

20. La Nation Belge, November 13, 1953. "Oui, nous entrons dans les forces européennes. Oui, nous confions notre défense à ces forces, incorporées elles-mêmes dans les forces atlantiques.

En ce faisant, nous acceptons certaines limitations de fait, certaines interventions d'organes supranationaux. Mais ce que nous abandonnons temporairement sur le plan national, nous le retrouvons et au delà, sur le plan européen et sur le plan atlantique — et cela au bénéfice des intérêts nationaux dont nous avons la charge."
Germany on its own.21

On November 26, 1953, the Chamber of Representatives voted 148 to 49, with 3 abstentions, in favor of the Bill to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty. The opponents were 9 Social-Christians, 29 Socialists, 4 Liberals, the 6 Communists, and the Independent pro-Communist.22

The Belgian Senate debated the E.D.C. in March 1954. M. Van Zeeland told the Senators that for Germany to participate in the E.D.C. is "a right and a duty." On March 12, the Treaty was approved by 125 votes to 40, with 2 abstentions. The opponents were 11 Social-Christians, 25 Socialists, the 3 Communists, and 1 Independent Catholic.24

The same day the Chamber of Representatives, as well as the Senate, approved a Resolution declaring a revision of the Constitution to be necessary. This had the automatic effect of dissolving Parliament, and general elections were called for April 11.25 Their result was a loss of absolute power of the Social Christians who still remained the strongest party;

Results in the Chamber of Representatives follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Christians</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Previously 108)

(77)

(20)

(7)

Results in the Senate follow:

22. Ibid.
24. Chronology of International Events, X (March 4-17, 1954), 162.
A coalition Government was formed between the Socialists and the Liberals by the veteran Socialist leader, Achille Van Acker, with M. Paul Henri Spaak as Foreign Minister. In his Governmental Declaration, M. Van Acker said that "there would be no change in foreign policy."

The Luxembourg Government, because of the size of the country, had to follow the lead given by more powerful nations. As it was afraid of German influence in the E.D.C. it supported the Belgian position in Rome. And when the Belgians capitulated, the Luxembourg Government followed suit and presented the E.D.C. Treaty to Parliament.

The Conseil d'Etat (the Upper Chamber), on September 10, 1953, said that the European Defense Community Treaty was unconstitutional, but it approved it anyway, "as there is no other choice in present circumstances." It then recommended that the Government revise the Constitution immediately.

The Lower House, on April 7, 1954, voted by 46 to 4 to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty. The four negative votes were cast by the 4 Communist deputies.

27. Ibid., April 22 - May 5, 1954, p 274.
28. Ibid.
In late May 1942 Dr. Schönfeld, a representative of the German Resistance Movement, met the English Bishop of Chichester in Stockholm and, among other things, proposed, in the eventuality of a successful Putsch against Hitler, "the organization of a European Army for the control of Europe, of which the German Army would form a part, under a central authority." As the Allied policy was unconditional surrender, this proposal was not acted upon, nor even discussed.

Eight years later, on July 26, 1950, an almost unanimous Bundes-tag demanded the formation of a European Federal State. This was possible, as a feature of the German Constitution, or Basic Law as it is better known, was the discretion to transfer sovereign rights to international organizations.

The proposal Mr. Churchill made in the Council of Europe, in August 1950, to form a European Army did not win unanimous approval in Germany. While the Government Party, the Christian Democrats, generally favored such a scheme, the Social Democrats were vigorously opposed. Their policy was emphasized by Dr. Carlo Schmid in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on August 10, and by the Party Leader, Dr. Kurt Schumacher on August 23: if Germany was to rear at all, it should be in the capacity of an equal partner, and only after the United States

had promised to defend Germany "East of the Vistula", and not within her borders.5

The German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer was afraid of a German national army, and therefore supported the idea of a European Army. One of his most loyal supporters, Herr von Brentano, told reporters in Strasbourg on August 25 that his country was opposed to the creation of a German national army, but she would like to take her place in the family of nations, and help to defend the West. Therefore, she was prepared to contribute through her industrial production and her manpower to a European Army under European command, and controlled by a European political authority.6

Germany, however, was not ready to consider rearmament. Dr. Adenauer had to deny on October 20 that his Government was committed to remilitarization, although it supported a European Army under European command.7

German reactions to the Pleven Plan have already been reported.8

Nationalistic pressures being too strong, Dr. Adenauer only sent minor representatives to the Paris Conference for a European Army, while his big guns were reserved for the Petersburger Hof talks.9 Following their failure, the German Government did not modify its intention not to allow integration in the European Army to take place at a level lower than the divisional.

Thus, speaking to the British House of Commons on December 4, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer could declare that his country had rejected "Neutralization."

6. Ibid., p 561.
8. See pages 8 and 9.
He added:

A neutralized Germany, constantly alarmed as to the developments which the future might bring, would sooner or later inevitably be drawn into the whirlpool of the Eastern bloc. This would mean the end of Germany's membership in the European Community, and would be followed by the downfall of the other free nations of Europe as well.10

Two days later, on December 6, 1951, Dr. Adenauer told a Chatham House audience that Germany could never resign herself to losing the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse frontier, but that good relations should be maintained with the Polish Government.11 This was and still is the core of the German problems: how to reunify Germany and regain the lost territories?

As the E.D.C. Treaty took shape, the German Government began the study of the steps which would be necessary to implement it in Germany. Early in 1952 the Director of the Federal Government's Security and Defense Department, Herr Theodore Blank, announced that conscription would be necessary to fill the ranks of the German divisions, as soon as Germany's contribution had been fixed for the E.D.C.12

In February 1952, by 204 votes to 156, with 6 abstentions, the Bundestag, following a debate on the European Defense Community, adopted the following resolution:

We reaffirm the necessity of uniting all free European nations in a federation with equal rights and obligations. In the present world situation it is the duty of the future European Defense Community to defend, in conjunction with the other nations of the free world, the principles of liberty and democracy. Its sole aim must be to safeguard peace and to ward off all threats to peace. Recognizing that in a struggle against the enemies of freedom there can be no neutrality, Germany wishes to cooperate as an equal partner in

This task, we wish to see Germany reunited in peace and in freedom.\footnote{13}

The Bundestag passed also other resolutions establishing conditions for giving its approval to the future E.D.C.:

1. The eventual settlement of the Saar problem should not be prejudiced by prior unilaterally action.

2. Germany's share in the financial burden of the E.D.C. should not be proportionally larger than that of other countries.

3. War criminals, who had not committed war crimes individually, should be released by the allied powers.

4. All restrictions on German industry should be lifted.\footnote{14}

Following the signature of the E.D.C. Treaty in Paris on May 27, 1952, the Government transmitted a Bill to Parliament to seek ratification of the Treaty. The Bundestag voted in favor of the Treaty during the first reading, on July 10, by a voice vote.

Meanwhile plans were already being made to implement the Treaty. In November Herr Blank revealed that the German divisions would need about 22,000 officers, including 40 generals, and 30,000 N.C.O.'s and longtime servicemen.\footnote{15}

The debate on the European Defense Community sharpened both in and out of Parliament. On December 6 the Treaty passed its second reading in the Bundestag, and as Chancellor Adenauer had requested that it be not passed on third and final reading immediately, it was not until March 19, 1953, that, by a vote of 224 to 165, with 2 abstentions, the

\footnote{13} "Policy of European Unification Between 1945 and the Death of Marshal Stalin," Europe Today And Tomorrow, No. 35 (December 1955), p 24.


\footnote{15} "German Citizen Soldiers," The Economist, CLXV (November 13, 1952), 437. For an exposé of how the Germans will be recruited in the European Army, see: Don Cook and Axel von dem Bussche, "What Is This New German Army?" The Saturday Evening Post, 227 (July 3, 1954), 25.
Bundestag ratified the European Defense Community Treaty.16 Immediately thereafter, President Heuss announced his decision not to sign the Treaty until a verdict was handed down by the Constitutional Court sitting in Karlsruhe about the constitutionality of the Treaty.

The constitutional issue involved was very baffling. As early as January 1952 the Social Democratic Party had applied to the First Senate of the Constitutional Court for a ruling as to whether the E.D.C. was constitutional, as the Basic Law expressly forbade Germany to have an army. The First Senate ruled that it could not hear the petition until the E.D.C. Treaty was signed into law. In June 1952 President Heuss requested the First Senate to give him an advisory opinion on the question of whether he would be acting constitutionally by signing the E.D.C. Treaty if it had not obtained a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament. Although the ruling would not be binding, it might influence enough deputies to vote against the E.D.C. if, as expected, it was adverse to the Government's position. Therefore, Chancellor Adenauer phrased a request to the Court for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Treaty in such a way that it would have to come before the Second Senate of the Court, which was known to be favorable to the Chancellor. The President of the Court, Dr. Hermann Hœpker-Aschoff foiled the Chancellor's plan. He announced on December 9 that it would not be necessary for the Second Senate to consider the constitutionality of the E.D.C. as President Heuss's petition would be heard by a joint session (Plenum) of the two senates. The Plenum's decision would overrule any of the two senates' decision and would be the "Court's final and irrevocable verdict on the constitutionality of the treaties."17

The following day President Heuss withdrew his request, after conversations were held with Chancellor Adenauer. He gave as his reason the fact that he had not requested a binding decision but only an advisory opinion.

Hearings on Chancellor Adenauer's request for a ruling on the constitutionality of the E.D.C. were opened by the Second Senate on February 20, 1953. The coalition contended that the E.D.C. did not violate the Basic Law, and therefore only a majority was needed for its passage. The opposition maintained that it violated the Basic Law, and therefore it needed a two-thirds majority. On March 7 the Second Senate decided that it could not rule on the validity of the E.D.C. until both Bundestag and Bundesrat had ratified it. And on April 1, the Social Democrats withdrew the suit they had filed, as President Heuss had assured them that he would not sign the E.D.C. Treaty without a prior favorable ruling from the Constitutional Court; he reemphasized this when he received Herr Ollenauer, the leader of the Socialists on April 27. Following these reassurances, the constitutional issue faded, and this particular point was never raised again.

Following the March 7 ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Bundesrat decided on April 24, 1953, by a vote of 20 to 18 to postpone consideration of the E.D.C. Treaty. Four days later Chancellor Adenauer decided to resubmit the E.D.C. Treaty to the Bundesrat. In the meantime

19. Ibid., March 5-13, 1953, p 164.
the Chancellor hoped to succeed in changing the mind of Dr. Haier, the
head of the Wurttemberg-Baden Government, who headed a coalition includ-
ing Social Democrats, by appealing to his patriotism. This was success-
ful as on May 15 the Bundesrat, by a vote of 23 to 15, voted in favor
of a compromise which had the effect of approving the E.D.C. Treaty.24

On July 26, Dr. Adenauer opened the electoral campaign of his
party for the forthcoming national elections when he insisted that
Germany had to stand by the Bonn and Paris Agreements, lest the West
decided to negotiate over Germany's head with the East.25 The campaign
was fought over many issues, that of the E.D.C. and of the European
policy of the Government overshadowing all the others. The Social Dem-
ocratic Party (S.P.D.) maintained that if the E.D.C. came into effect,
all the chances of reunifying Germany would be lost. Very courageously,
Chancellor Adenauer staked the whole campaign on the E.D.C. In a whirl-
wind tour of Northern Germany, on August 30 and 31, a region where his
party was weakest, he told his audiences that his policy would assure
the defense of Europe through the E.D.C.26

The results of the elections, which were held on September 5, more
than justified Chancellor Adenauer's claim that the German people were
behind him. His victory even astonished him, as he secured an absolute
majority in the Bundestag. The Socialists' failure to achieve any sub-
stantial success (they even lost their strong-hold of Hamburg) and the
failure of the Refugee Party were notable. Still more important was the
total defeat of the Communists, who failed to secure a single seat in
the Bundestag, and the lack of faith the Germans put in the extremist

25. "West German Elections," The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 69
(July 30, 1953), 2.
Weekly, 69 (September 5, 1953), 2.
parties of the right:

- Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU)
- Social Democrats (SPD)
- Free Democrats (FDP)
- All-German Bloc (GB) and Victims of Injustice (BHE)
- German Party (DP)
- Center Party (Z)

Total 27

The immediate effects of Chancellor Adenauer's victory were threefold: a strengthening of his position, both internally and externally, a weakening of the Social Democrats and a rout of all extremist parties (six parties failed to secure a single seat in the Bundestag).28

Dr. Adenauer commented on his victory in a speech delivered to the Bundestag on October 20:

The German people have, in the September 5 elections, unanimously and unrestrictedly approved the foreign policy of the Federal Government, including especially the agreements furthering European integration.

In the field of foreign policy, the Federal Republic will continue to concern itself mainly with... the achievement of a free Europe, and the integration of Germany into the European community.

I have repeatedly pointed out that European integration, as expressed in the E.D.C. and the European Community for Coal and Steel, is in no way opposed to the endeavors of German reunification.29

Dr. Adenauer was emboldened by his electoral success. Now he could urge the other E.D.C. signatories to ratify the Treaty promptly. He proceeded to enlarge his coalition Government by including the B.H.E. In this way he had at its disposal a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. On November 12 he deployed the coupling

29. Konrad Adenauer, "German Foreign Policy," Vital speeches, XX (November 15, 1953), 78-79.
by France of the Saar question with ratification of the E.D.C.

Following the elections, Chancellor Adenauer proceeded on the assumption that the E.D.C. would be ratified by all the signatories. To implement the Treaty in Germany he introduced amendments to the Basic Law in the German Parliament. On January 14, 1954, the Bundestag adopted by a vote of hands the first reading of a Bill which authorized compulsory military service and another one which declared that the E.D.C. Treaty and the Bonn Contractual Agreements were not in violation of the Basic Law. The Bills passed their second and third readings in the Bundestag on February 26 by a vote of 334 to 144, thus achieving the two-thirds majority required for the amendment of the Basic Law. The Bundesrat approved them by 26 votes out of 38 on March 19, thus also achieving a two-thirds majority.

While the German Parliament was debating the constitutional amendments, the eyes of Germany were focused on the Berlin Conference between the Big-Four. Chancellor Adenauer drew five conclusions from the Berlin Conference in a Bundestag debate which was held a few days after the Conference ended:

1. The establishment of E.D.C. and the unification of Europe were more important than ever.
2. The Federal Republic must consolidate its internal structure founded on freedom and law and develop the spiritual and material strength necessary to prevent Sovietization of the whole of Germany.
3. Germans must show by word and deed their determination not to resign themselves to partition.
4. As the German question would never be solved in isolation, Germans should support any attempt to eliminate international tension, and also the development of a collective security system based on the free consent of members which might cause Russia to release the Soviet Zone from its sphere.
5. The Federal Government would do everything possible to ease the burden of Germans in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

32. Ibid., p 137.
On June 15, 1954, a deputy of the C.D.U. resigned from the Party in protest against the lack of results from Chancellor Adenauer's policy of Europeanization. Adenauer's foreign policy cornerstone is the E.D.C. His whole political career has been staked on it. The rebuffs from France that he has received during 1954 reduced his prestige among politicians. The people, apparently, were still with him as witnessed by the election results in Rhine-Westphalia on June 27.

But Dr. Adenauer's patience seems to be wearing thin. He has nothing to show for his policies. Germany is still an occupied country, even though her Parliament has voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Contractual Agreements and of the European Defense Community. On June 15 he told his cabinet that further waiting to regain Germany's sovereignty was intolerable. Apparently Dr. Adenauer was thinking about disassociating the E.D.C. Treaty from the Contractual Agreements, as was already advocated one year earlier by Dr. von Berkat, the Chairman of the German Party parliamentary group.

The Economist's terse comment summarizes Dr. Adenauer's position very accurately: "Dr Adenauer cannot be expected to sit much longer like patience on a monument."

There was and still is resistance against the E.D.C. in Germany. "It is of a moral and frequently legalistic nature," says Dr. Adenauer. But the main reason for opposition, which comes mostly from Social Democratic circles, is tied to the question of German reunification. As a result of World War II, Germany has lost more than a third of the territory

33. See page 35.
36. Chronology of International Events, IX (June 4-17, 1953), 354.
which belonged to her before the advent of Hitler. 39 "True these losses of territory are not valid in international law, but the fact remains that for the time being they are lost." Dr. Adenauer wrote this for foreign consumption. At home, he cannot afford to be less nationalistic than his S.P.D. opponents. Thus he declared on October 20, 1953, to the Bundestag: "The reunification of Germany in peace and freedom remains the uppermost objective of the Federal Government." There is no doubt that Dr. Adenauer does not intend to start a shooting war to regain the territory lost to the Poles. He will try to regain it peacefully, if that is possible. But for the time being it is "lost." The Socialists claim that this territory will be lost forever with the coming into force of the E.D.C. as well as the territory of Eastern Germany.

Should Germany ever be reunited, it is doubtful that she would leave the E.D.C. As early as April 1952, Dr. Adenauer has claimed that a reunited Germany would not be bound by any obligation contracted by either the West or the East German Governments, 40 but he told a San Francisco audience on April 11, 1953, that a reunited Germany would not leave the E.D.C. because she would not be strong enough to stand alone. 41 He repeated this on February 19, 1954: "The Federal Republic will use all of her influence to keep her engagements honored by a united Germany." 42

42. Combat, February 20, 1954.
"As yet Germany has no Peace Treaty. She has no army, and should be permitted no army. She has no armaments, neither will she acquire any."¹ This statement was made by M. Robert Schuman on July 25, 1949, in defense of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since that day the changing world situation has forced M. Schuman to undertake a complete reversal of his policies toward Germany.

As late as August 7, 1950, M. Hervé Alphand, the French Representative on the North Atlantic Council of Deputies, announced that France did not intend to consider German rearmament. Therefore, it came as a grave shock when Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed in New York that Germany should be rearmed.

That same day, on September 6, 1950, when Secretary Acheson was giving his famous interview, M. Schuman had expressed his belief that the external security of Germany was the responsibility of the Allies.² He added that the police force of Western Germany was 85,000 men strong, with a whole population of 48 million, while the East German police force, with a population of 13 million, was 220,000 men strong and he asked his listeners to "meditate" on this fact.³

Upon his return from the New York meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September 1950, M. Schuman told a Metz audience that Germany

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¹ Quoted in J. B. Durosselle, "German-Franco Relations Since 1945," The Review of Politics, 14 (October 1952), 514.
² C. G. D. Onslow, "West German Rearmament," World Politics, 3 (July 1951), 464.
³ Chronology of International Events, VI (August 31 - September 20, 1951), 591.
must join in the defense of freedom, but should not be allowed any armed forces until the French Army was fully equipped. To this end, on October 23, the unanimous French Government approved a declaration on German rearmament. And the following day Prime Minister René Pleven made his famous speech in the French National Assembly.

The National Assembly's motion "approving the Government's statement" was passed by a vote of 349 to 235, while the motion approving the Government's determination "not to allow the revival of the German army and general staff" was passed by 402 votes to 163.

The Pleven Plan was proposed by the French Government not because it was in favor of a European Army, but because it was opposed to, and fearful of, German rearmament, as urged by the United States Government; an integrated European Army appeared as the best way to prevent the resurrection of a German national army.

The Pleven Plan was accepted with mixed feelings in France, but generally the leaders of the majority seemed to approve of it. On June 17, 1951, elections for the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic were held. Six main groups emerged with an approximately equal strength: the de Gaullists who were the strongest party, the Socialists, the Communists, the Popular Republicans and the Rally of the Left (R.G.R.).

Throughout 1951 opposition to the European Army stiffened in France, and it became increasingly clear that the only chance for a European Defense Community to be approved was contingent on a British guaranty. The British refusal to participate in the Paris Conference as a full

5. Chronique de Politique Étrangère, V (September-November 1952), 522.
6. See Appendix A for excerpts from M. Pleven's speech.
member was a telling blow to the French Government and its defeat at the polls might be ascribed in part to that English position. However, on December 17-18, 1951, the new British Prime Minister and the new Foreign Secretary, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, went to Paris to talk things over with Mr. Pleven and Mr. Schuman. With some prodding from General Eisenhower, the British leaders agreed to associate their country as closely as possible to all the stages of the E.D.C.'s political and military developments.

Two weeks later, on January 7, 1952, A. Pleven's Cabinet was overthrown by the National Assembly. His successor, M. Edgar Faure, was an advocate of the E.D.C.

Following a bitter anti-German debate, on February 19, the National Assembly, by a vote of 327 to 287, adopted an Order of the Day wherein it laid down strict conditions for its approval of the E.D.C. It recommended:

c. That the Government should request the United Kingdom and United States Governments to guarantee, in the event of any default on the Treaty or violation of the terms thereof, the commitments undertaken towards the European Defense Community by maintaining their forces in Europe in sufficient strength and for as long a period as may appear necessary.
d. That French contingents... should at all times be at least equal to those of any other member of the Community....
e. That the integration of national contingents should be effected at the lowest possible levels and in such a way as to avert all risk of the revival of independent national forces by adding to the latter basic service units of the same nationality.
f. That arrangements be made in the Protocols to the Treaty for units to be set afoot only as and when the machinery of joint control is established.

And, furthermore, the National Assembly asked that a supra-national

political authority with "limited but effective powers" be established. It steadfastly refused to approve the reconstitution of a German National Army and General Staff. And finally, it requested the Government to make determined efforts to secure the participation of the United Kingdom in the European Defense Community.

The association of the latter country, constituting a guarantee which would meet all the preoccupations of the National Assembly, would of course entail the study and preparation of institutions and practical measures likely to ensure its success.12

At that particular time, relations between Germany and France were exceptionally strained, for in late January 1952 M. Gilbert Grandval, France's High Commissioner to the Saar, was elevated to the rank of Ambassador, and the Germans, through Professor Hallstein had requested membership in N.A.T.O. Thanks to General Eisenhower, bad feelings were somewhat soothed so that the E.D.C. Treaty could be signed on May 27.

Throughout the rest of 1952 no effort was made to present the E.D.C. Treaty to the National Assembly. On the contrary, it became apparent that the opponents of the Treaty had rallied their forces.

On January 6, 1953, following another crisis in the French Government, M. René Mayer, the Prime Minister designated, outlined his program to the National Assembly. He called for negotiations to secure additional protocols to the E.D.C. Treaty designed to preserve the integrity of the French Union and of the French Army.13

The French National Assembly gave him the nod to form a Government. On January 28 the Bill to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty was introduced in the National Assembly. On February 4 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly elected as its rapporteur for the E.D.C. Treaty the Socialist ex-Minister, M. Jules Moch, a vociferous opponent of E.D.C. in its

present form. Likewise the Assembly's Defense Committee chose General Pierre Koenig, a de Gaulist leader opposed to the E.D.C., as its rapporteur.14

Three days later, the Council of Ministers approved the French version of the additional protocols to the E.D.C.15 France's Foreign Minister, M. George Bidault, told the Council of the Republic's Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 4, that ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty was inseparable from the question of the additional protocols.16 The aim of French policy, he said two days later, was to "make Europe without unmaking France" and he added that before ratification of the E.D.C. the Saar problem would have to be settled.17

On June 10, during the longest French political crisis, M. Bidault, trying to secure the investiture of the National Assembly, added another condition for French ratification of the E.D.C., namely that negotiations tending to win British association should be completed.18 However, M. Bidault failed to be elected Premier, and on June 26 M. Joseph Laniel, the newly-elected French Premier, told the National Assembly that Parliament would have to decide the issue of the E.D.C. only after "the certainty has been obtained of a settlement of the Saar question, the signature of the interpretative protocols, and the conclusion of agreements under negotiation with Britain."19

The same day, during the debate, one of the architects and main exponents of European integration, M. Robert Schuman, expressed the philosophy of his party, the M.R.P.: The European Defense Community should be realized only

17. Ibid., March 5-18, 1953, p 133.
18. Ibid., June 4-17, 1953, p 353.
as a very last step. It was got under way sooner than we might have wished. It is a mistake to believe that the Defence Community is the essential core of European integration. It is merely one of its aspects and one of its modes of application.20

In late October, the Council of the Republic held a debate on the European policy of France. The main topic of discussion was the European Defence Community. M. Bidault, the Foreign Minister, advocated the E.D.C. ardently, but again he put qualifications on the ratification of the Treaty. Three questions had to be settled first, he said: the year, the additional protocols and an agreement with Great Britain.21 An overwhelming vote on October 30 approved the motion which called upon the Government "to seek guarantees for all French interests and the integrity of the French Union, and the establishment, notably with Britain, of a true equilibrium in Europe."22 The vote was 240 to 74. The Economist editorialized that:

It is not M. Bidault's habit to move so far ahead of public opinion in France that he risks being cut off. So the spectacle of his full-blooded defence of the European Defence Community before the Council of the Republic last week is doubly reassuring. It shows, first that the Foreign Minister will act on the assumption that there is life in the treaty yet, and secondly that public feeling is less hostile to it than had been generally asserted.23

On November 17, the National Assembly also held a debate on the European policy of France. Divisions of opinion were sharp. The only concrete result of this debate was the declaration made by M. Bidault, on November 21, during his speech:

The Government has explicitly subordinated the treaty's ratification to the certitude of a settlement with Germany

of the Saar question. It is a political prerequisite, which, in no case, we could ever renounce.  

The Communists in the Assembly told their colleagues that they would do "everything" within their power to prevent ratification of the E.D.C.  

On November 27 the Assembly voted. 275 deputies were in favor of the confidence motion while 234 were opposed. There were 38 abstentions and 65 deputies were absent. This vote, however, is quite misleading as the table below shows. The 105 Socialists opposed the Government's motion while a majority were known to favor the E.D.C. at that time. A great number of Peasant deputies voted for the motion, while many were known to be opposed to the E.D.C. The Economist said that "if foreign policy could be separated from domestic entanglements, a narrow majority for EDC could probably be mustered in the French Chamber."  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>AGAINST</th>
<th>ABSTAINED (or absent)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
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<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>ARP</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>URA.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant and Independent</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (incl. all others)</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>103</td>
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The election of the President of the Republic in December was a comedy: 13 ballots were needed to elect A. René Coty, an Independent


25. Journal Officiel, November 19, 1953, p 5258. On October 23 the Central Committee of the French Communist Party adopted a resolution which called for joint action with "all the opponents" of the Bonn and Paris Treaties, thus making offers to other parties for a popular front.


27. "Taniel's Pyrrhic Victory," The Economist, CLXIX (December 5, 1953), 729.

28. Ibid., p 730.
Conservative member of the Council of the Republic. The Communists were implementing their October Resolution, as they voted en bloc for the Socialist candidate. The final ballot showed that M. Coty received 477 votes, M. Naegelen (Socialist) 329, M. Jacquinot (Independent Conservative) 21, and various candidates 44 votes.\textsuperscript{29}

M. Coty's views on the E.D.C. had not been expressed in the Council of the Republic, as he had been absent when that body held its debate on European policy, but he was supposed to favor the E.D.C., if no other solution could be found.

A new President of the National Assembly had to be elected in January 1954. M. Le Troquer, a Socialist Deputy, was elected on the third ballot, thanks to Communist support, on January 12. The Communists voted for him in order to prevent M. Pflimlin, a Popular Republican, from being elected President, because he was "a ferocious partisan" of the E.D.C.\textsuperscript{30}

Oil was added to the fire of debate when, during the Berlin Conference, M. Bidault declared on February 4: "I have said, and I repeat, that unified Germany will not, and cannot, be bound ... by the political ties entered into either by the Federal Republic, or by the Popular Republic."\textsuperscript{31}

A few days later the terms of the report the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly was to make became known. The rapporteur, M. Koch listed some of his objections to the E.D.C.:\textsuperscript{32}

1. French representation in the Council of Ministers was only 3 votes, while the Benelux nations, with half the French population, and who were to furnish only one fourth to one third the French military

\textsuperscript{29} Chronology of International Events, X (December 17, 1953 - January 6, 1954), 7.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., January 7-20, 1954, p 45.
\textsuperscript{31} Combat, February 6, 1954.
\textsuperscript{32} Corriere Della sera, February 11, 1954.
effort, had 5 votes.

2. The American and British guarantees were moral and not final: France had no veto on the movement of U.S. troops and the United States could withdraw her troops from Europe without French approval.

3. Germany's membership in N.A.T.O. would not be de jure, but certainly would be de facto.

4. Should the international tension worsen, Germany might be called on to furnish a greater effort, thus giving her preponderance in E.D.C.

5. The establishment of E.D.C. would lead to the reconstitution of the German Army and German General Staff.33

The Government replied to these criticisms on March 18, without, however, changing anybody's convictions.

On March 27, France's highest ranking soldier, Marshal Alphonse Juin, N.A.T.O. Commander of the Central European Sector, Inspector General of the French Army and most important military adviser to the Government, without clearing his speech with the Government, as was provided by law, attacked the E.D.C. at Auxerre:

I immediately pointed out that ... the treaty lacked progressivism, that many articles were inapplicable, and that it could only be put to use if a whole series of new clauses were added, saying nearly the contrary, for its application, of what it explicitly stipulates.34

A telling blow to the E.D.C. came on April 20, when, writing in the Paris newspaper France-Soir, M. Vincent Auriol, the highly respected former President of the Republic, said: "It is difficult to accept the prospect of a truncated nation in a truncated Europe face to face with

33. Ibid.
34. Comité, March 29, 1954. "J'ai tout de suite fait observer que ... le traité manquait de progressivité, qu'il était inapplicable sur bien des articles et qu'on n'en pourrait tirer quelque chose qu'en l'asortissant de toute une série de correctifs disant à peu près le contraire, pour son application, de ce qu'il stipule expressément."
other nations maintained whole and entire." And Germany and Italy "united by their territorial demands would combine to dominate the proposed European political authority and to involve a European army in the realization of their demands." 35

On June 9, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly finally rejected the E.D.C. Treaty by a vote of 24 against 18 with 2 abstentions. 36 The Defense Committee followed suit the following week by also rejecting the Treaty by a vote of 29 to 13. 37

In June, despite the accession of M. Pierre Mendès-France, whose views on the E.D.C. were regarded as rather cool, to the French premiership, General Grunther told the American Congress on June 14 that he was "basically optimistic" about the success of the E.D.C. in France.38

Apparently there are two groups of deputies of equal strength in the National Assembly, those for and those against the E.D.C. Therefore, if and when the E.D.C. comes up for a vote, the decision will depend on a handful of deputies. 39

To the outsider the E.D.C. situation in France seems to be more complicated than it really is.

Government after government has refused to face the country squarely on the issue of German rearmament and has preferred to give a formal adherence to EDC whilst at the same time postponing a decision about it. 40

The reason lies in each Government's precarious situation. The Third Force has no firm majority.

Throughout 1953 even the proponents of E.D.C. stated that before France could ratify the Treaty, the Saar problem had to be solved, further Anglo-American guarantees given to the E.D.C. and the additional protocols should be rated on an equal level with the E.D.C. Treaty itself.

The proponents of the E.D.C. pointed out that in any case Germany would be rearmed and that such rearment should be channelled in the strictly regulated frame of the E.D.C. France had taken the lead toward European integration and should keep it. It is better to have a strong France in an integrated Europe, even if her sovereignty is limited, rather than a weak and isolated France keeping her full sovereignty. The result of weakness is always a more or less important loss of sovereignty. The French Army depends and has depended for several years on that supra-national organization which is called N.A.T.O.

If France can keep her European leadership, her importance in the world will be increased, and not diminished. The additional protocols which have been accepted by the other E.D.C. nations allow France to fulfill her mission in the overseas territories and to safeguard the integrity of the French Army. By abandoning E.D.C. to some illusory East-West settlement, the West would be weakened, thus fulfilling Soviet policy. Lastly, the German divisions in the E.D.C. would give the West a substantial military help, thus allowing mobilization to take place and reinforcements to arrive from Great Britain and the United States.41

The opponents of the E.D.C. in France use the following arguments:

Germany gains a sovereignty she had lost while France loses part of her own sovereignty. France's importance in the world will be lessened because of her ties to the E.D.C. France's overseas military commit-

ments will prevent her from being equal to both her world commitments and to Germany within the E.D.C. The European Army will only furnish 12 supplementary divisions to the Western forces; this gain is very small when comparing it to the might of the Soviet and satellite armies. Therefore, the E.D.C. will aggravate the international tension. The reconstitution of the Wehrmacht, whether openly or not, will be a direct result of the E.D.C. Germany gains an army, while France has to put hers into the hands of a supra-national organization. France's old military tradition will be shattered by the scinding of her army into one branch under European command, and one which will be colonial.\textsuperscript{42}

Two of these points merit a more extended analysis. All of the objections to the creation of the E.D.C. can be explained in three words: fear of Germany. Germany's foreign policy has always been friendly with Russia. With the Russians and the Austrians, the Prussians effected a partition of Poland at three different times. The Prussians left the Napoleon forces through the Convention of Tauroge\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{43}} in 1812, entered into with Russia. The Treaty of Rapallo linked Germany to the Soviet Union in 1922. Von Seeckt, the head of the German Army in the early period of the Weimar Republic, was openly pro-Russian. Hitler concluded the never-forgotten Treaty of August 1939 with Stalin. Thus the French fear that Germany, in the future, would defect with her armed forces to the Soviet Union, as she has done in the past, while France will remain her traditional enemy.

Germany's attempts at democracy have been few and unsuccessful since the state was first established by Bismarck in 1870.

Between Germany and France "there is the trench of the Rhine, five

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
centuries of Roman culture, and millions of dead. And the bridge
between them is made only of speeches. 44

Some of the strongest obstacles to the E.D.C. are the ties binding
France to the French Union. France's Constitution gives overseas people
the same rights of citizenship as Frenchmen have in the Metropolitan
area.

To redefine the status of these varied territories in relation
to the European Community treaties and at the same time to try
to preserve the ties with France would precipitate a crisis
that might dissolve the French Union. And the United Nations
would be entitled to interfere, according to Article 73 of the
Charter. France is disinclined to risk it. 45

This position is held both by the right and by the left. The
French newspaper Combat claims that with the adoption of the E.D.C.,
France would lose her colonies; it adds that she will have to spend too
much for military goods, not letting her industries manufacture enough
consumer goods, thus ensuring Germany and the Netherlands a free hand
in the trade with the members of the French Union at the detriment of
France. 46 The same concern was voiced by a considerable number of
French deputies during the debate of November 1953.

The other basic fear of the French opponents to the E.D.C. lies in
the fact that France would lose part of her national army. The French
military tradition is the oldest one on the Continent. Although the
French won no major victories during World War II, they still hold their
army in high respect, and many former generals wield a large influence
in the National Assembly to which they have been elected. If the E.D.C.
is adopted, say these generals, France will be dominated very soon by

44. René Jèdillot, "Letter To Americans," The Yale Review, XLIII
   (Autumn 1953), 11.
45. André Geroud, "Rise And Fall Of The Anglo-French Entente," Foreign
   Affairs, 32 (April 1954), 387.
the Germans. There are very few highly trained staff officers in France who are skilled in modern warfare; the same is not true of the Germans. Marshal Juin's highest wartime command was a corps while there are a number of German generals who have experience as Army Group commanders.47

With a large proportion of their regular army away in Indochina, the French do not feel that they can successfully establish their leadership in the E.D.C.48 About one fourth of France's officers and forty per cent of her non-commissioned officers are stationed in Indochina.49 Even proponents of the E.D.C. look with nostalgia at the British who have refused to take part in the E.D.C.: There will still be British soldiers both in Britain and in Germany, but the only French soldiers to wear the national uniform will be stationed abroad. Will the average Frenchman wear a European uniform and follow a European flag with the same pride and enthusiasm that he has always displayed in the service of his own country? Can men of several nationalities, with different temperaments, habits and discipline, fuse their activities to such an extent?50

M. Pleven has tried to dispel the fears of losing the integrity of the French Army. According to an interview given to the French newspaper Le Figaro on November 25, 1952, he said that France had 905,000 men under the colors. The European Army would only require France to furnish 14 "Basic Units" of 12,600 to 13,000 men, or 182,000 integrated soldiers. This would leave her 723,000 men for her own army of 623,000 men, if the support troops are counted out.51

Will France ratify the E.D.C. Treaty? That question lies in the mind of every thinking observer of world affairs. As already pointed

47. Woodrow Wyatt, "Britain Is In Europe," The Twentieth Century, CLW (April 1954), 313.
48. Ibid.
out above, there appears to be an equality in the French National Assembly between proponents and opponents of the E.D.C. In late 1953 it was found that the U.R.A. was unanimously opposed to the E.D.C.; the A.R.S. had a majority opposed; the moderates (Independents and Peasants) had a small majority for; the A.R.P. was almost unanimously for; the Radicals had a majority for; the Overseas Independents had a strong majority against; the U.D.R. was evenly divided for and against; the Socialists were almost equally divided for and against; while the Progressists and the Communists were unanimously opposed.

General de Gaulle's Party was the R.P.F., until it was dissolved in 1953, with its deputies dividing into two groups: the U.R.A., which still follows the General, and the A.R.S., which has become a member of the coalition Governments. General de Gaulle's views on the E.D.C. have been outspoken ever since the Pleven Plan was first proposed to the National Assembly. They are important in view of the personality of their author. He offered an alternate plan which called for a limited German national army within a European confederation of states including Great Britain and possibly the Scandinavian nations.

This Plan was reiterated many times by General de Gaulle and his followers and explained more fully on February 25, 1953; the confederation would be presided over by a Council of Heads of Governments with a Commissariat with sovereign powers; two Assemblies — one based on uni-

52. On May 30, 1954, an extraordinary Congress of the French Socialist Party approved the E.D.C. by 1969 votes to 1215. Later, by a vote of 2414 to 972 the Congress ordered the Socialist Deputies to vote in favor of the EDC even if they were personally opposed. However, the Congress has not promised to rebel deputies that they would be thrown out of the Party, but only that disciplinary measures would be taken against them; see Corriere Della sera, June 1, 1954.

53. Les Archives Internationales, op. cit.
versal suffrage — and some form of Court. This plan was never considered seriously by any of the successive French Governments, but it keeps a sizable number of French deputies from favoring the E.D.C.

ITALY

The third important nation which is proposed as a member of the European Defense Community is Italy. Signor De Gasperi, who held the position of Premier from 1945 to 1953, was in favor of European integration. At Washington, in September 1950, he had already accepted Mr. Acheson's proposal to rearm the Germans. He also accepted the French invitation to join in a European Army. His party, the Christian Democratic Party, controlled an absolute majority in the Italian Chamber of Representatives, and it was felt that if Signor De Gasperi wanted something, the Italian Parliament would follow suit.

Upon his return from Washington and Ottawa, in September 1951, Signor De Gasperi delivered a report on his visit and on the achievements of the North Atlantic Council. To the Chamber of Representatives, he affirmed that German remilitarization might become a casus belli if the European Army was not established.1

The Italians are reported as being responsible for bringing up the question of political authority over the E.D.C.2

In February 1953, at the Rome Conference of the six foreign ministers of the E.D.C., Prime Minister De Gasperi categorically stated that the E.D.C. Treaty would be ratified by the Italian Chamber by the middle of April, before its adjournment to be followed by new elections.3 A few days later, on March 6, a special Committee of the Italian Chamber approved the text of the E.D.C. Treaty by a vote of 13 to 5 abstentions, cast by

1. Chronology of International Events, VII (October 4-17, 1951), 616.
2. See page 53.
the Nenni Socialists and the Communists. 4

Signor De Gasperi's prediction did not come true. The Italian Chamber did not ratify the E.D.C. It did not even debate the Treaty. It is often wondered why the Italian Chamber did not ratify the E.D.C. when the Christian Democrats had an absolute majority, with the leadership in favor of the E.D.C. and when, furthermore, the Christian Democrats could count upon the support of the other parties of the center as well? The answer lies in the fact that Signor De Gasperi was in the midst of the embittered battle on his electoral law. Thus, for purely technical reasons (the lack of time to debate the E.D.C.), the Treaty was not ratified by the Italian Chamber. 5

The Christian Democrats and their allies received a low blow when Mr. Churchill made his "Molotov" speech on May 11. It gave a tremendous boost to the propaganda which had been carried out constantly by the left-wing opposition. The Government did not dare to base its campaign strictly on the subject of European unification as Chancellor Adenauer did a few months later. 6 The result was that the Government did not obtain the 50.1% vote it needed to receive 65% of the seats in the Chamber of Representatives, while it obtained over 50.1% in the Senate, where elections were conducted under the old law. Both the left-wing opposition and the right-wing opposition gained at the expense of the coalition parties. Following are the results of the elections held on June 7, 1953:

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<th>Chamber of Representatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Center Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Socialists</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Left-Wing Opposition
- Communists: 143
- Left-Wing Socialists: 218

### Right-Wing Opposition
- Monarchists: 40
- Italian Socialists: 69

### Senate
- Center Coalition
  - Christian Democrats: 116
  - Right-Wing Socialists: 5
  - Liberals: 3
  - Republicans: 125

- Left-Wing Opposition
  - Communists: 54
  - Left-Wing Socialists: 28
  - Socialists and Communists (running jointly): 86

- Right-Wing Opposition
  - Monarchists: 16
  - Italian Socialists: 25

- Senators for life: 5
- Independent: 1

Following the elections, Signor De Gasperi formed a government which was defeated a few weeks later. The next Premier was Signor Pella, a close friend of President Luigi Einaudi, while Signor De Gasperi became the Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Party.

Signor Pella's foreign policy was defined in a debate in the Chamber of Representatives on October 6, 1953. He told the deputies that "Italy's position within the Atlantic alliance remains the basis of our foreign policy." He added that in regard to the European

8. Ibid.
Defense Community it would be very difficult for the country to accept it and for Parliament to ratify it as long as Italy did not receive satisfaction over the question of Trieste. This satisfaction was not long in coming. Exactly two days later Washington and London communicated a note to the Italian and Yugoslav Governments in which the occupying powers made known their intention to hand over the administration of Zone A, which includes the City of Trieste, to the Italian Government. They would withdraw their troops at the earliest practical date. The Pella Government accepted the Allied offer with enthusiasm, announcing that it was ready to take over Zone A. The Left and Extreme Right fumed against the Anglo-American statement, because it would mean surrendering Zone B forever. On their part the Yugoslavs were shocked. Both Italy and Yugoslavia, following riots in Trieste, moved their troops to the border areas, while the Allied troops maintained an uneasy order in the city. The Italians' move of five divisions was made without prior authorization by S.H.A.P.E. On December 7, Italy and Yugoslavia started to withdraw their troops simultaneously, while it became clear that the American and British troops would remain indefinitely in Trieste.

On December 14, speaking to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris about prospects for ratifying the E.D.C., Signor Pella said it would be difficult for the Italian Parliament to do so "while certain frontier questions remain unsettled."  

9. Chronology of International Events, IX (September 17 - October 7, 10. Ibid., October 8-21, 1955, p 342. The author has been unable to find out whether the Anglo-American statement was issued as an answer to Signor Pella's demand, or whether it had been agreed upon at some prior date. However, he does not doubt that the release of the announcement was timed to help the Italian Government in securing ratification of the E.D.C. 11. quoted in Ibid., December 3-16, 1953, p 805.
The Christian Democratic deputies refused to allow Signor Pella to reshuffle his Cabinet by admitting the monarchists. Thus he was forced to resign on January 5, 1954. Signor Fanfani, a member of the left-wing of the Christian Democratic Party failed to secure a majority in the Chamber on January 30. Signor Mario Scelba, Minister of the Interior from 1948 to 1953 was entrusted with the task of forming a Government on February 8. The Senate gave him a vote of confidence on February 26 (123 to 110) and the Chamber followed suit on March 10 by giving him 300 votes against 283.

Signor Fanfani's program was committed fully to the Atlantic policy followed by his predecessors and to the E.D.C. Signor Scelba declared to the Chamber that one of the most important planks of the new Government would be the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. However, Signor Scelba followed Signor Pella's policy. On March 23 he said that ratification of the E.D.C. would be impossible before the status of Trieste had been settled.

Following his visit to Turkey and Greece, Chancellor Adenauer stopped in Rome on his way back to Germany. The Italian Government was persuaded to leave the Trieste issue out and to ask immediate ratification of the E.D.C. On March 26, at the end of the meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Scelba a communiqué was issued which declared that:

Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister Scelba agreed on the necessity, in the interest of peace, security and liberty of the people of the free world, to pursue firmly the policy of European integration.

15. Corriere della Sera, March 27, 1954. "Il Cancelliere Adenauer e il Presidente del Consiglio, on. Scelba, so sono trovati d'accordo sulla necessità, nell'interesse della pace, della sicurezza e
When he talked to Dr. Adenauer, the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Paccaardi, had asked whether it would not be possible for the E.D.C. to give Italy guarantees about the Free Territory of Trieste.16

Apparantly Chancellor Adenauer's visit was beneficial, as the Scelba Government presented to Parliament on April 7 the Bill allowing the Government to ratify the E.D.C. It consisted of a single article:

... authorizing the President to ratify the Treaty and empowering the Government, for a period of eighteen months, to issue such decrees as might be necessary to implement the Treaty.17

At first it was expected that Parliament would debate the Bill at the end of May, but in late June it appeared that the debate would take place just before, or after, the Parliamentary vacations of August.

It seems that the Government can control enough votes in the Chamber of Representatives. Indeed, on May 5, a resolution proposing that the members of the Left-Wing Opposition should be entitled to election to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and to the Coal and Steel Community, was defeated by both houses of Parliament. Coalition speakers "maintained that European communities should be composed of supporters of a united Europe and not of sworn enemies of western cooperation."18

Even though he is out of office, Signor De Gasperi wields considerable influence in his capacity of Secretary-General of the Christian Democratic Party. Such influence had been evident when a radio conference which he was holding with a secretary of Signor Pella, without the latter's knowledge, was heard by a television audience. Signor De Gasperi is still one of the most ardent advocates of the E.D.C. Talking

della libertà dei popoli del mondo libero, di proseguire fermamente la politica di integrazione europea.
about it to a convention of the Christian Democratic Party, he warned that:

... it is certain that this is a battle more grave, and more important than that we fought for the Atlantic Pact; to win it, it is indispensable to have not only the majority in Parliament, but also the courageous and resolute support of our organization. 19

Premier Scelba emphasized to the Party on April 24 his desire to see prompt ratification of the E.D.C. 20

One of Italy's most reputable newspapers warned that the fundamental problem confronting Italy is the E.D.C.: "to resist or to capitulate, to remain with the free world, or to join the communist world." 21

One month later it editorialized that whatever the decision of the Italian and French Parliaments, Germany would be rearmed, and that the problem no longer was whether Germany would contribute to the defense of Western Europe but how. 22

The Republican Party is also in favor of the E.D.C. Its leader, Randolfo Pacciardi, wrote that:

I personally believe that it would be easier to obtain parliamentary ratification of E.D.C. in Italy if the six countries of the European community endorsed the pledge contained in the Anglo-American Declaration of October 8. 23

In Italy, unlike France, the members of the coalition are all in favor of the E.D.C., while the opposition, with the exception of the Monarchists, are all opposed to the E.D.C. 24 The National Council of the National Monarchist Party (PNM) meeting in Rome from May 16 to May

19. Il Popolo Di Roma, March 9, 1954. "Certo è che questa è una battaglia più grave, più importante di quella che abbiamo combattuto per il patto atlantico, per vincere la quale ci è indispensabile non solo la maggioranza in Parlamento, ma anche l'appoggio coraggioso e risoluto dei nostri organizzati."


22. Ibid., March 19, 1954.


18 issued an Order of the Day in which it declared that it favored the E.D.C., but that prior to ratification, the Anglo-American Declaration of October 8, 1953, should be implemented. Thus it appears that in Italy the E.D.C. could be ratified immediately if Trieste is returned to that country.

The left-wing opposition, just as in all other E.D.C. nations, is completely opposed to the E.D.C. Signor Nenni made his position very clear in Paris, during a two-day conference which opposed the E.D.C.25 The Central Committee of the Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.) adopted a resolution which announced that in the fight against the E.D.C., the opposition of the P.S.I. is "total and absolute."26

As early as March 1950, during a debate on defence in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill stated that Europe could not be defended without the aid of Germany. To this, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin replied: "We are all against it."¹

On July 26, Mr. Churchill again wanted to know what steps had been taken towards rearming Germany. He told the House of Commons:

It is five months now since I raised the question. The Prime Minister called me irresponsible when I did so.... Perhaps it is better to be irresponsible and right, than to be responsible and wrong."²

A few months later, in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Mr. Churchill made his historic speech calling for a European Army.³

Foreign Secretary Bevin, because of the Korean War, changed his position completely by the time of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington. There he favored Mr. Acheson's proposal for German rearmament. However, the British Government seemed to hold that the Pleven Plan was too complicated, and it was opposed to it as early as October 24.⁴

The British position was explained during a debate on foreign affairs, when Secretary Bevin declared on November 29, that if, in the Government's view,

1. C. G. D. Onslow, "West German Rearmament," World Politics, 3 (July 1951), 455.
2. Ibid., p 455.
... aggression were to take place in Europe, we are satisfied that its defence would have to take place as far East as possible, and that means that Western Germany must be involved; and if Western Germany is to be defended, it seems to us only fair and reasonable that the people of Western Germany should help in their own defence. 5

But he expressed misgivings about the Pleven Plan. 6

The same day, Mr. Gordon Walker, Minister of Commonwealth Relations, expressed his Government's belief that for Great Britain to take part in a European Army as requested by M. Pleven, would mean "surrendering powers necessary to preserve full employment." 7 This statement caused considerable anger in France where it was pointed out that the British themselves had insisted on German rearmament at Washington.

The official British position on German rearmament was expressed by Prime Minister Clement Attlee in the House of Commons three days before the opening of the Paris Conference:

We have accepted the need for a contribution from Germany, but the time, method and conditions will require a great deal of working out. There is, first of all, the provision of arms. Obviously, the rearmament of the countries of the Atlantic Treaty must precede that of Germany. Second, I think the building up of forces in the democratic states should precede the creation of German forces. Third, the arrangements must be such that German units are integrated in the defence forces in a way which would preclude the emergence again of a German military menace. Fourth, there must be agreement with the Germans themselves.8

The British Government was very sceptical of the work of the Paris Conference, and watched it with "cold aloofness." It preferred the "idea of German national contingents to be brought under General Eisenhower's direct command." 9

When, on October 25, 1951, the Labor Government gave way to a Conservative Government headed by Mr. Churchill, the hope for British participation in the E.D.C. soared high in France. Indeed, Mr. Churchill was the first world statesman to advocate a European Army. A few months before the Conservative victory he had declared to the European Movement, of which he is a President of Honor:

Without a European Army it will be almost impossible to get agreement upon German rearmament, and without a substantial German contribution there can be no effective system of German defense.\(^{10}\)

All of his statements had given hope that Britain would join the European Defense Community. Unfortunately, Sir Winston, as Prime Minister, proved to hold ideas quite different from those advocated by Sir Winston as Leader of the Opposition. Great Britain's foreign policy did not change materially. On December 5 the Prime Minister told the House of Commons what the foreign policy of his Government would be. Britons

... must be agreed that there should be a European army and that Germany must take an honorable place in it. So far as Britain is concerned we do not propose to merge into the European army. But we are already joined to it and we shall do our best to make a worthy contribution to the deterrents against aggression.\(^{11}\)

A few days later, on December 17, Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden journeyed to Paris for talks with their French counterparts. The communiqué issued at the end of the conference stated that:

The British Ministers have declared that their Government is resolved to maintain armed forces on the European Continent as long as will be necessary to fulfill their obligations toward the common powers. The British Government will associate itself as closely

\(^{10}\) The New York Times, July 25, 1951.

as possible with the European Defence Community at all stages of its political and military development.

The British forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe will be linked to the forces of the European Defence Community for training, supply and operations on land, sea and air.12

General Eisenhower and Ambassador Harriman are reported to have influenced Sir Winston to commit himself to such an extent. Without the pressure they put on him it is doubtful that he would have agreed to a communiqué which indicated a considerable departure from the policy followed by the previous Labor Government and also by his own Government up to a few days before.13

Now that the first step was taken, Britain decided to cooperate more closely with the E.D.C. countries. In a debate in the House of Commons on February 5, 1952, Foreign Secretary Eden offered British technical cooperation to the E.D.C. nations:

Subject to the overriding requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, British forces on the Continent will operate as closely as possible with the European Defence Forces and be linked with them in matters of training, administration and supplies. Arrangements could, for instance, be made for individuals and formations of the European Defence Community to train with British formations in Germany and elsewhere, and for us to lend officers and units where this is convenient to the European Army. We think that a considerable measure of blending between the air forces of the United Kingdom and of Europe may well prove to be a particularly profitable field of action.14

Yet closer cooperation was offered by Great Britain on April 15, when it was announced that, in response to a request of the European Army Conference made on March 14, the British Government

... had proposed a treaty providing that so long as the United Kingdom remained a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, she would come to the aid of any member of the Defence Community who might be attacked and that the parties to the Defence Community should give a reciprocal undertaking to the United Kingdom.15

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13. Ibid.
When the E.D.C. Treaty was signed on May 27, 1952, there were three documents bearing on British relations with the E.D.C. The first was the Treaty between Great Britain and the E.D.C. which in effect extended the Brussels Treaty guarantees to Italy and Western Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees to Germany.

The second guaranty extended by Britain to the E.D.C. nations, i.e., Germany, was in the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. The third was included in the Tripartite Declaration.

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the House of Lords on July 31, 1952. During the debate on ratification in the House of Commons, Mr. Eden declared that "we have no choice, if we are to lay a foundation to Europe, but to try and bring Germany into the family of nations or permanently to ostracise her. There is no middle course." 

The Labor Opposition decided to abandon bipartisan foreign policy and voted against ratification. The final vote, in the House of Commons, was 293 votes for and 255 against.

French fears of Germany were not allayed by the British guarantees. France wanted more British participation in, and closer association with, the E.D.C. As a matter of fact, the French wanted Great Britain to join the E.D.C. That she would not do so was reemphasized by Foreign Secretary Eden, once more, on January 28, 1953, when he spoke to the House of Commons. He said that it would be wrong to give false hopes of Britain joining the E.D.C.

17. Ibid., August 2, 1952.
18. Ibid.
One week later, the Foreign Office published details of a British memorandum, proposing various ways in which British forces might be associated with E.D.C. forces. The suggestions included:

The provision of training facilities and advice on training questions by the United Kingdom; the secondment of British officers to E.D.C. staff; joint unit training exercises; joint formation training under O.A.C.E.U.R.; interchange of officers and of air force squadrons; and coordination of air defence systems.

This announcement drew protests from Mr. Shinwell, the Minister of Defence in the preceding Labor Government, and from other Labor M.P.'s.

During their visit to London in February 1953, Mme. Mayer, the French Premier, and Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, had requested Britain to associate herself, even if in a limited way, with the E.D.C. through another Treaty. The February reply of the Foreign Office not having been deemed adequate, the French Government sent another memorandum to London reiterating its suggestion that Britain should associate herself still more closely to the E.D.C. On September 29, the Foreign Office sent a memorandum to Paris, offering cooperation between the United Kingdom and the E.D.C. The British proposed that a British Minister should be sent to participate in the meetings of the E.D.C.'s Council of Ministers, and one representative would participate in the work of the Commissariat with British member working with all the common organs of the E.D.C. In an annexed note, the British Government suggested that this cooperation could be established for the observance of common military doctrines. The note proposed as well possibilities of Air Force integration by opening common training facilities. For

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22. The following information is largely based on "Le Probleme De La Communaut\'e Europ\'eenne De D\'efense En 1953," Les Archives Internationales (December 1953), Document No. 1121.
the Ground Forces, it was proposed that British officers should be
assigned to all the levels of the E.D.C. commands. Finally, there
should be common naval and amphibious exercises. The French pointed
out that the British note's emphasis was on technical cooperation,
which was a step forward, but fell far short of French expectations.
The British memorandum, it was admitted, gave a maximum of concessions,
but it did not close the door to still further concessions.

A hint as to what these further concessions might be, was given by
Sir Winston to the House of Commons, in October, when he said that the
European Defense Community was the best means of building up Western
Europe's defense and that Britain was going to keep her troops in
Europe in order to hold the balance of equality which France demanded.23

But Sir Winston warned the French Government, during a speech
given to the Conservative Party Conference at Margate on October 10,
to ratify the E.D.C., or an alternative solution would have to be found:

If E.D.C. should not be adopted ... we shall have no
choice in prudence but to fall in with some new arrangement
which will join the strength of Germany to the western allies
through some rearrangement of the forces of N.A.T.O.24

The British position on the E.D.C. was very clearly stated by
Foreign Secretary Eden, during his report to the House of Commons on
the Berlin Conference, on February 24, 1954:

To those who say there is danger in German re-armament --
I agree entirely. Of course there is danger in German re-
armament; nobody will deny it. Least of all will the Ger-
mans themselves deny it. However, I do not believe that
that is the real question. I believe the real question is
not whether Germany will re-arm, but how she will re-arm, and
we are perfectly convinced that E.D.C. within N.A.T.O. offers
the surest method yet devised for the security of Germany,
the security of Europe and even for the security of Soviet
Russia. We, therefore, look forward to the early establish-
ment of the European Defence Community. We regard this as
of the utmost importance and urgency.

23. "Policy Plain Or Purl?" The Economist, CLXIX (October 17, 1953),
157.
I would like to say a word about our own association with it. We have assured the member governments of E.D.C. that the United Kingdom will have the closest possible political and military association with it. Discussions have been going on for some months about the form of this association and much ground has been found to be common. As a result of the talks I had with M. Bidault in Berlin, those discussions will shortly be renewed in Paris with France and the other E.D.C. countries and also the United States. We shall do our best to ensure that their outcome will result in a still closer partnership and thus create the necessary confidence among the Western Powers.25

This partnership, foreshadowed by Mr. Eden, was embodied in a declaration he made to the House of Commons on April 14, 1954. Herein, he announced that an agreement had been reached the preceding day between the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the nations of the E.D.C. on the other.

First, a United Kingdom minister will attend meetings of the Council of Ministers of the E.D.C. A Permanent British Representative will conduct day-to-day relations with the Board of Commissioners.

Second, Her Majesty’s Government have undertaken to continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, such armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute a fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area. We have also stated that Her Majesty’s Government have no intention of withdrawing from the continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the security of Western Europe and of the E.D.C.

Third, we have agreed upon certain military arrangements... Our aim has been to confirm that British forces will be present in strength on the continent before, and not after, any aggression begins. These arrangements will ensure the integration of British with E.D.C. forces within N.A.T.O. In particular I would draw attention to the Clause which provides for the inclusion of British Army and Air Force units in European formations under the command of N.A.C.E.U.R., and vice versa.26

Such integration will take place whenever military considerations render it desirable, and when logistical considerations allow it. The declaration concluded by stating that Great Britain regards "N.A.T.O."


as of indefinite duration." In his statement Mr. Eden also announced that Great Britain was "ready to place one of the British armoured divisions now in Germany with an E.D.C. Corps ... as soon as the Corps is ready to receive it." 27

The first document signed on April 13, was an "Agreement Regarding Co-operation Between The United Kingdom And The European Defence Community." This Agreement stated that:

Article II

e) The United Kingdom and the European Defence Community shall take appropriate measures to ensure effective and continuous cooperation between their respective armed forces placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in particular to promote a common military outlook in technical fields such as training, tactical doctrine, staff methods, logistics and standardization of equipment.

Article III

The United Kingdom and the European Defence Community shall establish a procedure for consultation on questions of mutual concern, including the level of the armed forces of the United Kingdom and of the European Defence Community placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on the mainland of Europe, and any substantial modification in the level or composition of those forces. 28

To this end the British Government will appoint a representative of ministerial rank to the Council of Ministers, and a representative to the Commissariat.

The second document signed by Mr. Eden was a statement of common policy: "Military Association Between The Forces Of The United Kingdom And The European Defence Community." This Treaty spells out in some detail the common military policies to be striven for by the United Kingdom and the European Defence Community nations.

In its "Declaration" the British Government warned the Soviet Union

27. Ibid.
Her Majesty's Government have no intention of withdrawing from the Continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the security of Western Europe and of the European Defence Community.

Thus the British Government has taken all the steps requested by the succeeding French Governments, with the exception of membership in the E.D.C. That the British Government will sign the E.D.C. Treaty is more than doubtful, but not impossible in view of the ground covered since the first flat rejection of the Pleven Plan in October 1950.
Prior to the beginning of the Korean War, on April 6, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that "the United States has firm international commitments, both for German disarmament and against German rearmament." Two weeks later, Mr. McCloy, the High Commissioner in Germany reiterated that "we do not favor and do not contemplate the creation of a West German army." The Korean War changed this policy. By late July, Henry A. Byroade, of the State Department, drew up a paper outlining a project for a European Army. It was not acted upon, but the State Department tried to find a formula to use German manpower for the defense build-up in Western Europe. This must be a "joint effort" and strength would be achieved, announced Mr. McCloy on August 23. He added that: "This will include Germany and will require of the German people and their representatives straightforward and cooperative action." After a talk with President Truman, the High Commissioner, on September 5, recommended the immediate rearmament of Western Germany and wider German participation in foreign affairs. He also said that "in some manner the Germans should be enabled, if they want to, to defend their own country." The following day Secretary Acheson told reporters that Mr. McCloy

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1. quoted in C. G. D. Onslow, "West German Rearmament," World Politics, 3 (July 1951), 455.
2. quoted in ibid.
had outlined the proper objectives of American foreign policy.7

He reiterated the American desire to see Germany rearmed during the September 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York.8

The American Government's attitude toward the Pleven Plan was rather cool, but it never lost sight of the necessity of a German military contribution for Western defense, as was reemphasized by General Omar N. Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 17.9

The American position toward the Pleven Plan became friendlier when Secretary Acheson "warmly welcomed" it in a letter sent to French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in January 1951.10

President Truman and Secretary Acheson did everything within their power to ensure the success of the Paris Conference, where Ambassador David Bruce served as observer. They threw cold water on the German plan submitted at the Petersburger Hof talks, after seemingly approving it at first.

Both at Washington and at Ottawa, in September 1951, they encouraged Western Europe to unite, and reach some form of agreement on the European Army. They agreed to a Treaty of association between N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. at Lisbon, in February 1952. The United States signed the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952, as well as the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, extending N.A.T.O. guarantees to the E.D.C.

This Protocol was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 24, 1952.11 On July 1 the full Senate approved it by a vote of 71 to 5. The negative votes were cast by Senators Dirksen,

7. Ibid.
8. See page 5.
Dworshak, Jenner, Langer and Walker. 12

On August 2 the Protocol was ratified by President Truman. In the statement he issued, he said that:

Ratification of these instruments represents the latest in a long series of efforts on the part of this Government to establish normal and friendly relations between the United States and Germany. 13

Thus the United States became the first country to ratify the N.A.T.O. Protocol and also the German Contractual Agreements.

Congress had shown its willingness to help Europe along the path of integration earlier in the year. The Mutual Security Act of 1952 stated that:

The Congress welcomes the recent progress in political federation, military integration and economic unification in Europe and reaffirms its belief in the necessity of further vigorous efforts toward these ends as a means of building strength, establishing security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area. In order to provide further encouragement to such efforts, the Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so administered as to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration and economic unification of Europe. Appropriations made ... relating to defense and economic assistance, of this Act may be used ... to furnish assistance ... to any of the following organizations: (A) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (B) the European Coal and Steel Community, (C) the organization which may evolve from current international discussions concerning a European Defense Community. 14

Hopes for a quick ratification of the E.D.C. faded and Secretary Acheson, making his last official speech to the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris, said that failure to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty would lead to "disintegration" of the European unity movement. 15

The new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator

13. Ibid., August 3, 1952. Besides the Protocol to N.A.T.O., President Truman ratified the Contractual Agreements with Germany.
Alexander Wiley, issued a statement on January 10, 1953, shortly after he took his new office, declaring that Congress might cut foreign aid, should France and Germany delay further the ratification of the E.D.C.; such a delay, he added, might "explode the whole pattern" of Western European cooperation.16

The new Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, shortly after assuming his office, announced on January 27 that "if ... France, Germany, and England should go their separate ways, then it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America's own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe."17

To see for himself what the situation was, he made a hurried tour of European capitals; he impressed Dr. Adenauer with his "very great concern" for the general European situation, should no progress be made by April toward the ratification of the E.D.C.18

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Eden "on the urgent need for ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty" on March 7, when they met in London.19

No practical alternative to the E.D.C. could be found by the new High Commissioner in Germany, Dr. James B. Conant, four days later.20

The French Government apparently was afraid of the April deadline set by Secretary Dulles. On March 25, the French Premier, M. Mayer, the Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, the Finance Minister, M. Bourgeois-Maunoury and the Minister of the Associated States, M. Letourneau, went to Washington. The communiqué issued after the meetings said that it was necessary to establish the E.D.C. "with minimum delay."21

17. Ibid., January 22 - February 4, 1953, p 90.
19. Ibid., March 5-18, 1953, p 180.
20. Ibid., p 164.
A new deadline was announced by Secretary Dulles on April 23. He warned that Congress might have to refuse its aid because the United States did not intend to send troops to fight and die in Germany, in case of war, while the Germans sat by and he renewed his appeal for prompt ratification of the E.D.C.\(^22\) This warning was delivered to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris. His Resolution calling for the prompt creation of the E.D.C. was adopted unanimously.

The threat implied in Secretary Dulles's speech became clearer when, on June 11, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that half of the money to be appropriated for Western Europe be conditional on the ratification of the E.D.C. by January 1, 1954.\(^23\) This provision, known as the Richards Amendment, became part of the Mutual Security Act of 1953.\(^24\)

At the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council, on December 14, Mr. Dulles told his colleagues that if the E.D.C. were not ratified "soon", the United States would be compelled to proceed to an "agonizing reappraisal" of her own basic policies.\(^25\)

Throughout the first half of 1954, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles threatened, cajoled and urged Western Europe to ratify the E.D.C., which had become the cornerstone of American foreign policy toward Europe.

In the State of the Union Message, President Eisenhower said that:

> In Western Europe our policy rests firmly on the North Atlantic Treaty. It will remain so based as far ahead as we can see. Within its organization, the building of a united European community, including France and Germany, is vital.

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\(^{22}\) The New York Times, April 24, 1953.

\(^{23}\) Chronology of International Events, IX (June 4-17, 1953), 378-379.

\(^{24}\) Omar N. Bradley, "Is Russia Winning The Battle For Europe?" The Saturday Evening Post, 226 (April 10, 1954), 109.

\(^{25}\) See page 32 for Secretary Dulles's speech.

\(^{26}\) Chronology of International Events, X (December 17, 1953 - January 6, 1954), 33.
to a free and self-reliant Europe.
This will be promoted by the European Defense Community which offers assurance of European security. With the coming of unity to Western Europe, the assistance this nation can render for the security of Europe and for the entire free world will be multiplied in effectiveness.27

General Bradley urged that we extend to fifty years the life of the North Atlantic Treaty "to insure that it would run as long as E.D.C."28

On April 16, in a letter sent to the heads of state of the six E.D.C. nations, President Eisenhower announced American guarantees to E.D.C., which followed very closely the lines advocated by many French Deputies, at the time of the debate on European policy, in November 1953.29 This statement of American policy was designed to allay the fears expressed by French political leaders. Seeing that it did not have any noticeable effect, the "agonizing reappraisal" was recalled by Mr. Douglas Dillon, the American Ambassador in Paris, on June 29, when he told the French that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe, should the E.D.C. not be ratified.30

A slightly less hysterical "reappraisal" was made known on July 5, when it was announced that American and British diplomats were drawing up plans by which full sovereignty would be returned to Germany in the American and British Zones.

29. For the text of President Eisenhower's statement, see Appendix D.
CONCLUSION

There are many differences between the Pleven Plan as originally expounded by Premier Pleven in October 1950 and the final version of the European Defense Community Treaty as signed in May 1952. For example, the Pleven Plan provided that the integration of the armed forces should be made at the lowest possible level, i.e., at the battalion level. The E.D.C. Treaty provides that the integration will take place at the divisional level. Premier Pleven proposed that the executive of the authority to be should be a European Minister of Defense. The final version of the Treaty states that the Executive shall be a Commissariat, or Board of Commissioners. The Pleven Plan was understood to allow the existence of national units on the European Continent. The E.D.C. Treaty only allows national units in overseas territories and dependencies.

Although there are important differences between the Pleven Plan and the E.D.C. Treaty, the general spirit of the latter is in keeping with the theory first expounded to the French National Assembly. The E.D.C. is also foremost a series of compromises among conflicting views. The French and the Germans had to compromise on the level of integration of the units. The Benelux countries had to compromise on their deep dislike of a political supra-national authority. The six E.D.C. nations had to reach an agreement on the question of a common budget. Great Britain and the United States had to agree to bind themselves to a certain extent to the E.D.C.; they also had to
agree to bind themselves to a certain extent to the E.D.C.; they had to state that they considered the North Atlantic Treaty to be of indefinite duration. The other N.A.T.O. nations had to agree to underwrite the E.D.C. by signing a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty providing that an attack against any E.D.C. nation would be considered an attack against all the N.A.T.O. members.

Yet, even after all the compromises had been reached, there is a fact which had to be taken into account in any analysis of the E.D.C.: The Treaty is very complicated, it tries to settle too many details, throughout its text there is clear proof of the distrust of Germany by France. There are many safeguards spelled out in considerable detail. This does not mean that the Treaty, once it goes into effect, will not work. General Gruenther has stated that the Treaty was workable. This view has been repeated by numerous European statesmen and by the American Department of State.

Not only will the E.D.C. Treaty be workable, but it will certainly prove to be one of the boldest steps taken by European statesmen to do away with the feeling of insecurity which has existed in Europe since the end of World War II. It is a definite step along the road to European Unity. So far four nations, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have ratified the Treaty. Italy will probably ratify it in the near future, and should Premier Mendès-France give it his whole-hearted support, the French National Assembly will undoubtedly also ratify it.

The E.D.C. Treaty was devised to settle the question of German rearmament. France and the Benelux nations would take a dim view of seeing their Eastern neighbor rearmed with her own national armed forces, her own General Staff, her own war industry. Bitter expe-
ience has taught them in recent years that Germany has to be led firmly, with a short leash.

Through the E.D.C. the German military might will be harnessed for the defense of the West, but cannot be used for aggressive purposes by the Germans acting alone. Furthermore, the E.D.C. will usher in an era of understanding between France and Germany, probably not at first, but certainly in the long run when mistrust will have been whittled down.

With a desire to make the E.D.C. Treaty work by the officials entrusted with its functioning, with a will to understand the other country's viewpoint by each country, with patience and understanding by the politicians and statesmen who will be finally responsible for its smooth operation, both in the Common Assembly and in their respective national Parliaments, the European Defense Community will be a success, full and complete, and will belie the cynic's belief that different countries cannot work together for their common good.
APPENDICES
Extract of Prime Minister René Pleven's speech to the French National Assembly on October 24, 1950, proposing the creation of a European Army.

... The French Government proposes the creation, for the common defense, of a European Army tied to political institutions of united Europe.

This suggestion is directly inspired by the resolution adopted on August 11, 1950, by the Assembly of the Council of Europe, requesting the immediate creation of an integrated European Army, intended to cooperate with the American and Canadian forces, for the defense of peace.

The setting up of a European Army could not be the result of a simple joining of national military units, which, in reality, would only disguise a coalition of the old type. To unavoidably common tasks can only correspond common organs. The army of a united Europe, composed of men coming from various European nations, must realize, as far as possible, a complete fusion of the human and material elements gathered under a single European authority, political and military.

A Minister of Defense would be appointed by the participating governments and would be responsible, in ways to be determined, to them and to a European Assembly. This Assembly could be, either the Strasbourg Assembly, or one issued from it, or still an Assembly composed of
specially elected delegates. The powers of this minister on the European Army would be those of a Minister of National Defense on the national forces of his country. In particular, he would be entrusted with the execution of general directives he would receive from a Council composed of the ministers of the participating countries. He would be the normal medium between the European community and the participating countries or international organizations for everything concerning the execution of his mission.

The contingents provided by the participating States would be incorporated in the European Army, at the level of the smallest possible unit.

Financing of the European Army would be provided for by a common budget. The European Minister of Defense would be entrusted with the execution of the existing international agreements and with the negotiation of new international agreements on the basis of directives received from the Council of Ministers. The European armament and equipment programs would be agreed upon and carried out under his authority.

The participating States, which actually have national forces, would retain their own authority on the part of their existing forces which would not be integrated by them in the European Army.

Inversely, the European Minister of Defense, subject to the authorization of the Council of Ministers, could put at the disposal of a member government a part of the national forces included in the European Army, in order to meet needs different from those pertaining to the common defense.

The European forces put at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force would operate according to the obligations contracted in the
Atlantic Pact, both for general strategy and for organization and equipment.

The European Minister of Defense would be entrusted with the obtention from nations of the European community the contingents, the equipment, the materials and the supplies due by each State to the common army.

In the setting up of this European Army, a transitory phase will be necessary. During this period, part of the existing national armies, even though placed under the unified Atlantic command, will probably not be immediately incorporated in the European Army. The latter should be developed progressively, each country supplying its contribution in troops, according to proportions decided upon by the Council of Ministers, and according to the overall defense plan elaborated by the Atlantic Council.

Finally, the creation of a European Army, either during the initial phase, or in its ultimate fulfillment, should in no way constitute a reason to delay the execution of the planned programs and those being carried out, within the Atlantic Organization, for the setting up of national forces under unified command. On the contrary, the projected creation of the European Army must facilitate the carrying out of the Atlantic plans.

It is on these bases, just outlined, that the French Government intends to invite the United Kingdom and the free nations of Continental Europe, who would accept to join with it in the creation of the European Army and to cooperate in the detailed realization of the above principles. These studies should start in Paris upon the signature of the Coal and Steel Treaty.
APPENDIX B

Composition of the French National Assembly:

Communists
Progressives
Socialists
affiliated
Popular Republicans (ARP)
affiliated
Overseas Independents
affiliated
Radical Socialists
affiliated
UDR (Democratic and Socialist
Union of the Resistance)
affiliated
Republican Independents
affiliated
Peasants
affiliated
ARL (Independent Groups for Republican
and Social Action)
affiliated
URAS (Gaullists)

Total

**Composition of the Council of the Republics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Affiliated</th>
<th>Unaffiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Republicans (MRP)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Republicans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Independents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGR, including Radicals</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Republicans</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated URA (Gaulist)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement d'Outre mer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>320</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ibid., p 70.
APPENDIX C

The British Government is committed many times over to the defense of France, and is repeatedly committed to the defense of the rest of Western Europe. The principal commitments are:

Treaty of 1373 — Commitment to Portugal.
Treaty of 1939 — Commitment to Turkey.
N.A.T.O. Protocol, October 17, 1951 — Commitment to Greece and Turkey.
United Kingdom — E.D.C. Treaty, May 27, 1952 — Commitment to the six members of the European Defense Community.
Tripartite Declaration, May 27, 1952 — Commitment to the six members of the European Defense Community.
Following is the text of identical messages sent by President Eisenhower to the heads of state of the six E.D.C. nations, in which American guarantees of assistance are given.

As the time approaches for historic decision on the remaining measures required to put into effect the European Defense Community Treaty, it is appropriate for me to state clearly the United States position on the relation between the European Army and the European Community on one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the broader Atlantic Community on the other hand. The essential elements of this position, which have been discussed with leaders of both political parties in the Congress, may be simply stated. The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. This treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the United States and will steadfastly serve these interests regardless of the fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the treaty will be honored.

The North Atlantic Treaty has a significance which transcends the mutual obligations assumed. It has engendered an active practical working relationship among the Atlantic nations. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without devastation or occupation of
any N.A.T.O. country. These nations are also seeking to make the Atlantic alliance an enduring association of free peoples, within which all members can concert their efforts toward peace, prosperity, and freedom.

The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating western defense and will lead to an ever-developing community of nations in Europe.

The United States is confident that, with these principles in mind, the western European nations concerned will proceed promptly further to develop the European Community through ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. When that treaty comes into force the United States, acting in accordance with its rights and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings:

1. The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.

2. The United States will consult with its fellow signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern, including the level of the respective
armed forces of the European Defense Community, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe.

3. The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces on the one hand, and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty forces on the other, in accordance with approved plans with respect to their command, training, tactical support, and logistical organization developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. The United States will continue, in conformity with my recommendations to the Congress, to seek means of extending to the Atlantic community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense.

5. In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States. In such event, the United States will consult in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

6. In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party of the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when
there is established on the continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide.¹

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