THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A MEASURE OF DOGMATISM AND
RETENTION OF ROGERIAN AND SKINNERIAN CONCEPTS

by

Richard A. Carpenter

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Psychology

Approved:

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

1975
Acknowledgments

I would like to give special thanks to my chairman, Dr. Elwin Nielson. His personal and professional example and standards have been an incentive to me in the pursuit of this project. Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. E. Wayne Wright and Dr. Michael Bertoch, committee members.

I would also like to thank Maura Carpenter, who typed this paper for me despite her own professional commitments.

Also, Mr. Art Smith of the Speech Department and Mr. Jerry Overson for their help on the delivery of the two speeches utilized in this study. To Ron Thorkeleson for his help in the computer analysis of the data used herein. Finally, a word of appreciation and thanks to my fellow graduate students for all their valuable criticism, thoughts and support which they gave so freely to me and to the teachers and students of Psychology 101 at U.S.U. for their cooperation.

Richard Carpenter
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Abstract

The Relationship between a Measure of Dogmatism and Retention of Rogerian and Skinnerian Concepts

by

Richard A. Carpenter, Master of Science

Utah State University, 1975

Major Professor: Dr. Elwin Nielsen
Department: Psychology

The present study attempted to investigate the relationship between a subject's degree of dogmatism and his attitudes towards the different theoretical positions held by B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers regarding the control of man. This study utilized selective retention as an indicator of subjects' attitudes. No significant difference was found between Skinner's and Rogers' on their retention of high, medium, and low dogmatism groups. There was also a non-significant correlation between subjects' scores on the retention of Skinner's and Rogers' concept and subjects' dogmatism scores.

(80 pages)
Chapter I

Introduction

The construct of dogmatism has been the focus of a great deal of research since Milton Rokeach published *The Open and Closed Mind* in 1960.

It has been a useful construct in attempting to conceptualize the components of different behaviors. For instance, DiRenzo, G. (1968) used dogmatism to help understand citizens' voting behavior in the 1964 election. It may well be a construct that would be useful in helping to clarify and understand why different people identify with and are attracted to different schools of psychology.

People who choose different types of therapy have been shown to share some common personality traits (Jacobson, 1970). Jacobson found that Ss who chose behavior therapy (the applied segment of the school of behaviorism) "were on the average more dependent, more authoritarian, and more externally oriented than Ss choosing analytically oriented therapy." Perhaps had Jacobson used dogmatism as a variable in her study she may have also found that these Ss may have had higher scores on that test.

Wallen (1968) attempted to determine the extent to which the degree of dogmatism possessed by the counselee influenced the counselee's preference for directive vs. non-directive counseling. He found that relatively close-minded subjects expressed a significantly greater preference for a counselor who was directive, while the relatively open-minded subjects expressed a
significantly greater preference for a counselor who was non-directive. Maybe naive subjects who vary on their degree of closed mindedness vs open mindedness have the same sort of preferences regarding the more controlling views of behaviorism and the less controlling, non-directive client-centered approach.

Recently, Ryand and Gizynski (1971) investigated, post hoc, clients' feelings about their behavior therapist and their behavior therapy. They found that subjects were split in terms of their different degree of attraction to the behavioral approach. Those with positive feelings about the approach saw it as scientific, direct, quick; while those with negative feelings viewed it as cold and domineering. Ryan and Gizynski reported that these results were probably due to a congruence between clients' attitudes and certain elements of the treatment as, for example, therapist direction and control of sessions.

It can be inferred from both the Ryan and Gizynski study and the Jacobson study that people have differing perceptions and attitudes towards the different branches of psychology. Perhaps, had both of these studies measured the subjects' levels of dogmatism, they might have shown that those subjects who liked or chose behavior therapy were more dogmatic than the other subjects.

Carl Rogers is the recognized leader of an applied form of phenomenology called the client-centered approach. The basic premise of non-directiveness of client makes this approach less directive than behavior therapy. It could be perceived, therefore, as a less authoritarian type of therapy than behavior therapy. Since dogmatism has been shown to correlate \( r = .71 \) quite strongly with authoritarianism (Kerlinger, 1966) it seems likely that a more
authoritarian type of ideology, such as behaviorism, may also be perceived as being a more dogmatic system.

Ideology can be defined as the body of doctrine or tenets of social movements, classes or groups. Schools of psychology have their own ideologies. These ideologies could be perceived as being dogmatic or less dogmatic and could be attractive to a person who is more or less dogmatic. Breger and McGaugh (1967) said that "... the field [of psychology] is still characterized by 'schools'--groups who adhere to a particular set of ideas and techniques to the exclusion of others. Thus, there are dogmatic psychoanalysts, Adlerians, Rogerians, and most recently, dogmatic behaviorists."

In light of Rokeach's findings with different religious and political groups one might ask "Are there different levels of dogmatism in the ideology of the different groups which attract equally dogmatic adherents?"

The intent of the present study is to determine if different levels of scores on the Dogmatism Scale Form E may have some relationship with a student's affinity for a particular theoretical orientation or school of psychology, namely Skinnerian Behaviorism vs. Rogers' client-centered approach.

This writer has been unable to find any research which deals specifically with the question of a subject's affinity for different schools of psychology as related to their degree of dogmatism. A question worth asking at this point is: Would a person who is highly dogmatic find Skinnerian concepts to be more attractive than someone who is less dogmatic? Also, would a highly dogmatic person find Skinnerian concepts more attractive than Rogerian concepts?
Rokeach (1960) attempted to show how different schools of psychology were related (conceptually) to his main distinctions of the open and closed systems. Of behaviorism Rokeach said, "Behaviorism emphasizes the importance of external reinforcements or rewards and punishments, as determinants of behavior. If man were completely closed in his belief system (dogmatic) he could be completely controlled and directed by such arbitrary reinforcements." He goes on to say "What does matter from our point of view is that they all seem to have as their model a man (also a rat or pigeon) completely closed in his belief system."

Perhaps a dogmatic person would find such qualities as enumerated in the aforementioned description of behaviorism to be attractive because they are congruent with his attitudes and could be incorporated into his belief system.

Clouser & Hjelle's findings (1970) tend to support Rokeach's hypothesis regarding behaviorism's emphasis on the external. In their study they correlated subjects' scores on Rokeach Dogmatism scale with their scores on the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control scale. The correlation yielded was .24 (significant at an alpha level of .01). In addition a test of significance of the difference between mean dogmatism scores for extreme externals and extreme internals showed a significant difference at the .05 level. This data indicates that a person who was more dogmatic was also more externally oriented in terms of his Locus of Control. This data as well as Rokeach's hypothesis would imply that a dogmatic person may find Skinnerian concepts
to be more attractive than a less dogmatic person as well as more attractive than Rogerian concepts.

Weiss (1973) found, in a comparison with doctoral level analytically-oriented students, that behavior therapy students 'behaved more in the style of a "true-believer" (Hoffer). A true believer is a person who holds his beliefs to be true to the exclusion of all others; i.e., dogmatically. Weiss raised the question of whether this behavior was shaped (a process of selectively reinforcing appropriate responses yielding a desired behavior) by the students' department; or whether the students perceived the program as having a dogmatic quality and thus its inherent characteristics were compatible with the students' personalities. Proceeding on Weiss' later assumption perhaps the more dogmatic psychology graduate student would do better in the experimental-behavioral department than in a counseling program with a more phenomenological bias. Saltzman (1967) attempted to see how student counselors varied on three Rogerian therapy main components (positive regard, empathy and congruence) relative to their scores on the dogmatism scale. He found that student counselors low in dogmatism were rated most positively on each of the three variables. This tends to indicate that a student low in dogmatism has better facility with Rogerian methods and this may indicate a possible preference for the Rogerian concepts.

By virtue of its professed lack of control and absence of any real theoretical superstructure Rogers' non-directive client-centered approach may attract less dogmatic adherents. Conversely, it appears that
behaviorism with implied dependence on total control (by the awarding and withholding of reinforcers) may attract more dogmatic adherents.

On the assumption that, conceptually, there may exist a relationship between level of dogmatism of Ss and attitudinal congruence with behaviorism or the Rogerian client-centered approach, two questions worth asking are, "Can this be demonstrated empirically?" and if so, "To what extent does this relationship exist?"

In light of the high degree of transparency of Rokeach's D scale when answered by psychologists, how can we assess the different levels of dogmatism of the adherents to behaviorism and the client-centered approach? One way to get at these attitudes unobtrusively is by use of selective retention as an indicator of attitude.

This writer has been unable to find any research comparing subjects' scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale-Form E and retention scores on the tenets of behaviorism and/or the Rogerian client-centered approach.

**Purposes**

Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to inquire whether a person who is highly dogmatic will have better retention of Skinnerian concepts than the low dogmatic as well as better retention of Skinnerian concepts than of Rogerian concepts. It will also be the purpose of this study to inquire whether a low dogmatic person will recall more Rogerian concepts than the high dogmatic person as well as better retention of Rogerian concepts than of Skinnerian
Finally, this study will attempt to ascertain if scores on the Dogmatism scale are significantly correlated with scores on the Skinner scale in a positive direction while being significantly correlated with scores on the Rogerian scale in a negative direction.
This review is divided into 2 parts. The first deals with Skinnerian Behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach. The second with the empirical measures utilized in this study.

**Skinnerian Behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach**

Skinnerian Behaviorism and the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach are two schools of thought in psychology, each coming out of broader schools. Skinner's school of thought is subsumed under Behaviorism and Carl Rogers' approach is subsumed under phenomenology. These two positions seem to split, most basically, regarding the old philosophical argument regarding free will vs. determinism. Currently, this argument between the two schools in psychology is expressed in the following question: Is man free to control his own behavior through his subjective experience of himself in relation to his world, as Carl Rogers believes, or is man controlled by an external program of different reinforcement contingencies found in his external environment, as B. F. Skinner believes? Perhaps someone whose Locus of Control is external and is dogmatic would prefer Skinner's view of man to Rogers'. Conversely, someone with an internal locus of control and low dogmatism would prefer Rogers' view of man to Skinner's. Let us first look more closely at the two views of man as postulated by the behaviorists and by the Rogerian phenomenologists (the behavioral view...
fits more neatly under the label behaviorist; while Rogers' view is less easily labeled. For our discussion we will use the terms behaviorism and the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach).

Behaviorism, as the scientific, experimentally based approach to man has tenets or dogmas which are empirically derived. Certainly, in the current phase of psychology's evolution these are tenets which can be believed in with real conviction. It has been shown that a behavior performed and then rewarded or "reinforced" has a greater probability of occurrence while that behavior which is not reinforced and/or is punished has a decreasing probability of reoccurring (Sulzer & Mayer, 1972). With these two general principles of behavior and their variants it is possible to control animals, and to a lesser degree, human behavior. "While much progress has been made in this approach to behavior control the techniques may be said to be still in the experimental stage. The effectiveness of the procedures in terms of the extent and duration of the changes produced is not known" (Patterson, 1966). However, rather than admit a real deficit in the technology, behaviorists tend to view this lack of knowledge as only an artifact of the state of the art rather than admitting any real limitations to the technology. This type of closed mindedness may attract dogmatic adherents.

Dogmatism, which correlates at .71 with authoritarianism (Kerlinger, 1966) may well be a personality variable which is more predominantly found in the behaviorists vis-a-vis the control the behaviorist have over people in therapy and animals in the lab. Wolpe, a leading behavior therapist, illustrates this issue
of control quite succinctly in the following, "the most distinctive feature of behavior therapy is in the command it gives to the therapist both in planning the general strategy of therapy and controlling its details as he goes along. When one type of maneuver fails to accomplish change, another is tried according to appropriate indications, each variation being an application of an experimentally established principle" (Wolpe, p. 9). Therapist control and little theoretical ambiguity make this sort of therapy a potentially attractive field for the dogmatist. Wolpe goes on to say that, "an explicit assumption of the behavior therapist is that human behavior is subject to causal determination no less than that of billiard balls or ocean currents" (Wolpe, p. 16). Perhaps its presumption of an objective reality, which denies the view that "all science begins with the sensory experience of the scientist" (Carkhuff, 1967) may make behaviorism an attractive ideology to dogmatic people.

Behaviorism's external and causal deterministic view of man makes it a system which uses externally visible symptomology very effectively in therapy. Behavior therapy has as a basic tenet, the view that symptoms are the causally determined expression of the problem. Once the appropriate contingencies are placed on the symptomatic behavior the behavior will cease and the problem has thus been eradicated. Eysenck, a leading behavior therapist, states "Get rid of the symptom and you have eliminated the neurosis" (Eysenck, p. 9). Consequently the responsibility for the improvement of the client is in the hands of the therapist as diagnostician, not the client. Again Joseph Wolpe, "... the behavior therapist schools the patient to realize that his unpleasant reactions are
due to emotional habits that he cannot help; that they have nothing to do with moral fiber or an unwillingness to get well" (Wolpe, p. 16). "One result of realizing that neurotic behavior is learned is to place the responsibility for the patient's recovery unequivocally in the hands of the therapist" (Wolpe, p. 20).

Since dogmatism has been shown to correlate significantly with an external Locus of Control, behaviorism may be more appealing to the more dogmatic person.

Rogers' Client-Centered Approach, as the name implies, leaves the responsibility to change squarely with the client. Fernbach (1973) reported that 143 students who viewed a film of Carl Rogers working with a client rated his approach as non-directive. It is safe to say that Carl Rogers' approach is considered by most people in the field of psychology as non-directive. Also in Fernbach's study (1973) a significantly (alpha = .01) larger number of non-authoritarian subjects, vs. authoritarian subjects chose Rogers' as their preferred the mode of therapy as opposed to a directive type of therapy. Wallen (1968) also found non-dogmatic clients to prefer a non-directive approach.

These studies lend conceptual support to the notion that Rogers' Client-Centered Approach could be more attractive to low dogmatics than Skinner's behaviorism. In fact, the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach has very few dogma. Carl Rogers, the commonly acknowledged head of the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach sets out the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for therapeutic personality change as follows: 1) two persons are in psychological contact, 2) the therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client,
3) the therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference, and 4) endeavors to communicate this understanding to the client (Rogers, 1957). These four simple tenets of Rogers may well appeal to the low dogmatic person. Rogers' talks nothing about controlling or diagnosing the client. His intention unlike that espoused by Wolpe, is to leave the responsibility for change with the client.

While behaviorism's view of man is a model of man simply reacting to the controlling environmental stimuli, Rogers' model sees man as a being in the process of becoming. Rogers said in a debate with B. F. Skinner, 1956, that man is "a process of achieving worth and dignity through the development of his potentialities; the individual human being as a self-actualizing process, moving on to more challenging and enriching experiences, the process by which the individual creatively adapts to an ever new and changing world . . ." (Rogers & Skinner, 1956).

It seems to be that these two views of man offer two distinctly different types of dogma for the appraisal of people. It is hypothesized that a group of naive subjects scoring high on the dogmatism scale would prefer Skinner's view of man while the low dogmatic group would prefer Rogers. Let us now turn to the construct of dogmatism.

The Construct of Dogmatism

The question of the content of belief and/or ideology and the structure of belief is an interesting one; that is, what a person believes as opposed to how
he believes it. Adorno and Frenkl-Brunswick (1950) attempted to delineate an authoritarian belief structure with the introduction of the California F Scale in 1950. They found a significant correlation between measured authoritarianism and a right wing political orientation. In this case political orientation (belief content) was confounded with authoritarianism (belief structure).

**Dogmatism vs. Authoritarianism**

In 1956 Rokeach, M., presented his concept of Dogmatism as a generalized theory of authoritarianism (Rokeach, 1956, 1960); as opposed to a specific or right wing authoritarianism as measured by the California F Scale (Adorno, Frenkl-Brunswick, Sanford, 1950). His Dogmatism Scale was designed to measure generalized authoritarianism or dogmatism and has been utilized as a better indicator of generalized authoritarianism than the California F Scale (Plant, 1960; Hanson, 1968).

For purposes of his research into dogmatism and the development of his scale, Rokeach separated the ideology or content of the belief system from the structural organization of the individual's belief system. He seems to have found a measure of how a person's belief-disbelief system is organized. He separated what a person believes (i.e., Communism or Conservatism) from how he believes it (dogmatically or less dogmatically). Rokeach (1954) defined dogmatism as "a) a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which in turn c) provides a framework for intolerance towards others" (p. 195).
Dogmatism thus focuses on how a person believes rather than what he believes and is conceptualized as an openness or closedness of a person's belief system. However, despite Rokeach's claim of a content free measure of how a person believes, one group of people who hold a common set of ideological beliefs as compared to another different group of people who, in turn, hold another common set of beliefs have slightly different levels of mean dogmatism scores.

Different groups of people who adhere to their own ideological sets, have been shown to possess different mean dogmatism scores (Rokeach, 1960). It is assumed that these different groups have their own basic common ideology and generally speaking, their own common set of values. Rokeach's studied with different political and religious groups seem to offer a parallel to the two ideologies under study here: namely, Skinnerian behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach.

Rokeach (1960) compared subjects' identified as Catholics, Protestants and non-believers in terms of their group dogmatism levels. He found that Catholics were, as a group, most dogmatic (mean = 191.1), Protestants next (mean = 180.1), and non-believers last (mean = 175.6). This data was obtained from subjects residing in the Midwestern United States. In order to determine if these scores vary between the same religious groups in different geographical areas Rokeach ran a similar study in New York City. In this study Rokeach added Jews to the comparison. The results are somewhat different with the New York City sample. In New York City the Catholics were still the most dogmatic (mean = 147.4), but the non-believers were only slightly less dogmatic (mean = p47.2), than the Catholics. While both New York groups were found to be
significantly less dogmatic than their Michigan counterparts, the spread between Catholics and non-believers has decreased from nearly 20 points to .2 points. The Protestants in New York were ranked third (mean = 139.4) with the Jewish group least dogmatic (mean = 138.3). However, the only difference that approaches statistical significance (p = .10) was that between Catholic and Jewish groups. It also seems noteworthy that for both samples the overall results indicated that the Catholics scored relatively high on right opinionation, dogmatism F (California F) and ethnocentrism. The left oriented non-believers scored relatively high on left opinionation, total opinionation and dogmatism but they scored relatively low on the California F Scale and Ethnocentrism Scale.

Along a similar sort of value and ideological orientation dimension, Rokeach (1950) looked at different English political groups. His subjects were English college students who identified themselves as Conservative, Liberal, Attleite Laborite, Bevanite Laborite and Communist. Rokeach found that these groups did have different dogmatism levels. The Communists were most dogmatic (mean = 261.6) followed in descending order by Conservatives (mean = 258.8), Bevanites (255.2), Attleites (252.7), and lastly, Liberal (242.9). The Communists scored the highest of all groups on left opinionation, total opinionation and dogmatism while scoring lowest of all groups on the F Scale and the Ethnocentrism Scale. On dogmatism, the only statistically significant different groups were the Communists and Liberals at an alpha level of .06.

These studies are informative regarding different religious and ideological groups. They point out clearly that while dogmatism is an individual cognitive
belief structure cutting across ideologies, it is in some ways content bound. That is, the content of the belief (Jew vs. Catholic, etc.) has some predictiveness in regards to dogmatism. Thus, while on an individual level we may find a relatively open-minded Catholic and a closed-minded Jew with equal dogmatism scores, we can infer from the data that generally a Catholic will probably be more dogmatic than a Jew and a Communist will probably be more dogmatic than a Liberal. In light of these sorts of discrepancies Hanson (1968) investigated the notion that dogmatism deals solely with extremes of attitudes. His findings indicate that since conservatives were more dogmatic than Liberals that dogmatism was to some degree content bound and not simply a measure of extremes of attitudes.

Thus, one might ask, "do different systems of belief have different levels of dogmatism, thus to some degree attracting similar minded adherents?" In his book, The Open and Closed Mind, Rokeach does indeed discuss ideologies in terms of their dogma and the level of open-closedness which is a function of the number of dogma. It is also a function of how exclusionary these dogma are.

**Nature of Dogmatic Belief Systems**

In addition to Rokeach's work in the area of dogmatism and political affiliation, has been the research dealing with voting behavior and dogmatism. The two American political parties espouse different ideological points of view within the overall context of the American political system much the same as Rogers' Client-Centered Approach and Skinnerian Behaviorism do within the field
of psychology. Di Renzo's study found that dogmatic subjects preferred the Republican Party while the non-dogmatic subjects were reported to prefer the Democratic Party (Di Renzo, 1968). Di Renzo also found non-dogmatic scorers on Rokeach's dogmatism scale overwhelmingly chose Johnson (80%) while dogmatic scorers chose Goldwater (58%). The conclusion is that "personality structure is more clearly related to concrete political ideology than to a general party preference" (Di Renzo, 1968). He explains this to be due to the somewhat amorphous quality of party positions versus the concrete ideological position of candidates. Rosen & Kemy (1972) attempted to replicate Di Renzo's study in the '70 Tennessee Senate race which pitted a clear liberal Democrat against a clearly conservative Republican. They did not obtain significant results and attributed this to political-social circumstances which were not the same as in the election studied by Di Renzo.

Dogmatism has also been shown to be a significant variable which casts light on the different attitudes and value orientations held by people of high and low dogmatism.

Kirtlay and Harkness (1969) found that dogmatism was positively related to conservatism and rejection of minorities and groups associated with unconventionality and social change. They reported the following noteworthy correlations which were derived from scores on the Rokeach D Scale and the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (a measure of manifest prejudice): art groups $r = .33$, scientists $r = .26$, left-oriented political groups $r = .44$. These results tend to indicate a preference or affinity between dogmatism and authoritarianism and
rightist political ideology. It also tends to indicate that the more dogmatic a person is the more likelihood there is that he has more conventional and more traditional attitudes.

In terms of their view of the dogmatic person's affinity for the status quo, Rosenman (1967) measured high and low dogmatics attitudes towards the movie Dr. Strangelove, a film that flaunted our traditional American social values. Rosenman reported that persons scoring high on dogmatism were significantly less tolerant of the film than low dogmatics. In a similarly oriented study Kilpatrick et al. (1968) found highly dogmatic males had more conservative attitudes toward sex than did low dogmatic males while highly dogmatic females and low dogmatic females held equally conservative sexual attitudes. In another study Mikol (1960) found that high dogmatics tended to gravitate toward the traditional and conventional in music. Finally, Lorentz (1972) observed that a socially non-acceptable drug, marijuana was viewed with more acceptance by low dogmatics than high dogmatics. These studies tend to illustrate the interplay between a person's attitudes and their cognitive belief structure, or, more specially, a person's dogmatism level. A person who is high dogmatic and another who is low dogmatic may quite clearly have different attitudes, value orientations and responses towards a person, topic or ideology. Clearly, they may respond differentially toward the two different schools of psychology under investigation herein which take different views on the control of man and his behavior.
The control or non-control of a client in therapy and/or counseling by the therapist is a variable which can be used to help discriminate between different forms of treatment. It is said in this regard that a treatment is either directive (controlling) or non-directive (non-controlling). Since authoritarianism correlated \( r = .71 \) (Kerlinger, 1966), quite strongly with dogmatism it has been the interest of much research to ascertain the relationship between a client's level of authoritarianism and/or dogmatism and his choice or preference of therapist and the therapeutic approach utilized. Secondly, in this regard, an aspect of dogmatism which appeared theoretically similar to an external orientation in terms of Locus of Control is the dogmatic person's reliance on arbitrary reinforcements derived from an external authority (Rokeach, 1960). Therefore, there existed good conceptual support for Clouser and Hjelle's (1970) investigation. They found a correlation of \( r = .24 \) between external Locus of Control and dogmatism and a significant difference between mean dogmatism scores for extreme internals and mean dogmatism scores for extreme externals. Both of these studies imply that the high dogmatic and high authoritarian with their likelihood of an external Locus of Control would, conceptually, tend to prefer a directive, externally (therapist) controlling form of treatment. Conversely, we would expect the low dogmatic, low authoritarian to prefer a non-directive, non-therapist-controlled treatment. The relevant data tended to support this hypothesis. Wallen (1968) found that relatively closed-minded subjects expressed a significantly greater preference for a counselor who was directive, while the relatively open-minded subjects expressed a greater preference for a counselor
who was non-directive. An interesting study by Fernbach (1973) attempted to
determine high and low authoritarian's preference for a directive or non-directive
therapist. He had 147 students rate a film presentation by Albert Ellis, Fritz
Perls, and Carl Rogers, in terms of their directiveness. Ellis was rated as
most directive and Carl Rogers as the most non-directive. Fernbach then showed
the Ellis and Rogers segments to two equal sized groups of high and low authori­
tarians. He found that a significant number of the high authoritarians preferred
Ellis to Rogers while the low authoritarians significantly preferred Rogers to
Ellis. Perhaps had Fernbach utilized a Skinnerian therapist instead of Ellis as
the directive therapist we would have had a similar sort of choice made regarding
the choice of therapist. Jacobsen (1970) showed that subjects preferring behavior
therapy were on the average more authoritarian.

What would be the likelihood of a counselor therapist preferring and
using the directive vs. non-directive therapy as his method of choice vis-a-vis
his own dogmatism or lack of it? Kemp (1962) found that in a hypothetical
(classroom) counseling situation both high and low dogmatic student-counselors
were equally capable of assuming the non-directive stance. However, in the
actual counseling situation the group low in dogmatism didn't change significantly
in the character of their responses from their non-directive responses given in
the hypothetical situation, whereas the high dogmatics did change the character
of their responses. The direction of the change was towards fewer non-directive,
supportive and understanding statements and towards more evaluative, directive,
interpretive, probing and diagnostic responses. This study indicates that a
more dogmatic person would not only prefer a directive approach for his type of therapy used but would probably work better with it as well. Would a student therapist learn the behavioral, directive approach more easily than an open non-directive approach depending on his level of authoritarianism and/or dogmatism? Niel (1958) found that with psychiatry interns higher F scale scores resulted in greater difficulty in learning ambiguous material, that which involved humanitarian philosophy and understanding people (presumably an internal frame of reference). No such interference was found on tests of a more factual nature.

Weiss (1973) compared doctoral students of behavior therapy with students of analytic therapy and concluded that the "student behavior therapist seemed far more self-confident and secure, sometimes to the point of being arrogant. Behavior therapists behaved more in the style of Eric Hoffer's true believer." Weiss questioned whether this was a function of the departments the students were in (i.e., shaping the student) or whether the prospective student's selection of a program hinged upon the programs' compatibility with the student's personality configuration. Harper (1959) stated, "Closed minds are equally evident in fanatics of other persuasions. The psychoanalytic-hating Salter, the Freud-biting Horney, the Freud-repressing Sullivan, the Freud-rejecting Adler & Jung (and those who orthodoxy follow these and other therapeutic messiahs) show an unwillingness to listen objectively and to consider the possible merit of opposing positions. Because of their permissive exterior such dogmatism is, though present, less evident in the Rogerians (p. 95)." Harper concluded that we need more eclecticism and synthesis and that future progress is blocked by
cling to "psychotherapeutic religions." He indicates also that dogmatic schools of psychotherapy were necessary historically to insure survival of the school and to help change the professional and public view of itself. (This is consistent with Rokeach's view of the role of dogmatism played with religions. He postulated that as a threat to a religion increased so too its dogmatic quality, and when the threat subsided so too its dogmatic quality). Perhaps this is the case historically, with Skinnerian Behaviorism and the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach. It seems that behaviorism, with its reliance on the external control of man (and client) may be an ideology that is more congruent with the dogmatic person's belief system than the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach which as the name implies leaves the responsibility and control within the self of the client and generally to man himself as a self-initiating being.

There seems then, to be several reasons to assume that students who choose the behavioristic approach may be more dogmatic as a group than those who are interested in studying client-centered therapy.

**Empirical Measures Utilized**

**Dogmatism Scale**

Let us now turn first to the Dogmatism Scale. Rokeach's primary purpose is to measure individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems. Rokeach's items in the instrument were included on face validity. The Dogmatism Scale went through five revisions, and the final scale, Form E, contains the best forty items (as determined by item analysis) from the sixty-six
item Form D. Most all of the items on the scale were constructed by Rokeach. Those that were not are: item 21 from Hoffer (1951); 14 and 21 from Breger (1952), 22, 23, 27, 31, 33 and 34 from MMPI (Hathaway and McKinley, 1943). Ss agreement with the item is scored as closed, disagreement is scored as open. The final corrected and revised form, Form E, has reliability coefficients ranging from .68 to .93 for different groups (Rokeach, 1960).

Rokeach's D Scale is a scale "designed to measure individual differences in the extent to which belief systems are open or closed" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 19). The California F Scale of Adorno et al. has been demonstrated to be a measure of right-wing authoritarianism while Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale is a measure of general authoritarianism (Kerlinger and Rokeach, 1960; Kerlinger, 1966, Plant, 1960).

Vacchiano, Strauss & Hochman (1969) reviewed all the relevant research on Rokeach's scale and concluded "the findings generally support the validity of Rokeach's concepts, particularly as a generalized theory of authoritarianism."

Selective Recall

In 1902, Stern was the pioneer in selective recall who first broke from the classical tradition of Ebbinghaus by looking at the problem of memory distortion as a function of personal attitudes and beliefs. He found that one's attitudes will affect how one remembers material related to the attitude. His early work has been studied repeatedly through the years. Bartlett (1932) stated, "remembering is an imaginative reconstruction or construction built out of the relation
of our attitude toward a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experiences" (Seelman, 1940).

Memory distortion as a function of personal attitude has been confirmed repeatedly through the years (Watson & Hartman, 1939; Levine & Murphy, 1943; Taft, 1954; Feather, 1969; Wickley, 1970).

This phenomenon has been utilized with political orientation and recall. Kitano (1970) found when radicals and conservatives were asked to recall statements concerning political views of the Japanese Government that the radical group showed a higher ratio of recollection of the radical statements and conservative group of the conservative statements; that is, the statements which were consistent with the social attitudes of the Ss are recalled in a higher ratio while those which were incompatible were more apt to be forgotten. It seems that perhaps we could infer a person's political ideological adherence and/or attraction to that ideology by looking at the selective recall of political items. So too with attraction to psychological ideologies.

It has been shown that people (Ss) "under controlled conditions were able to report more arguments that supported their attitude toward a given issue than arguments that did not support their attitude" (Feather, 1969). The number of consistent and inconsistent arguments reported didn't, however, depend upon the subjects' degree of dogmatism while there was a difference between high and low dogmatics in terms of what was recalled vis-a-vis the different content of arguments. That is, the two groups recalled differently arguments pro and con on the Viet Nam War issue (Feather, 1969a, b). These results were replicated
in a similar study by Gormley & Close (1969). Kleck and Wheaton (1967) found that closed-minded Ss do recall less from the dissonant article than do the open-minded subjects supporting the use of selective recall as was found in the above studies.

Pryon and Kafer (1967) found that on a recall task involving recall of nonsense sentences, low dogmatics recalled significantly more items than high dogmatics. However, no data involving recall of meaningful material was found by this writer.

**Dogmatism and Response Set**

In 1961, Erlich found that achievement scores in an introductory sociology course were negatively correlated with dogmatism. However, in analyzing psychology courses achievement, neither Christensen (1967) nor Costen (1965) found any significant correlation between dogmatism scores and achievement scores.

A possible confounding variable with recall is I.Q. and memory differences. However, neither Erlich (1955) nor Kleck & Wheaton (1967) found any difference in recall level between high and low dogmatic subjects as a function of I.Q. levels. Kleck & Wheaton (1967) also found that the decreased recall of a dissonant article by high dogmatics was not a function of memory differences.

It may be that subjects with different levels of dogmatism might have a response set with different types of questions (i.e., true - false, etc.). However,
Christensen (1967) found no significant correlation between dogmatism scores when correlated with either an essay or multiple choice score, and White and Alter (1967) found no significant correlation between dogmatism scores and scores on a true-false test and multiple choice test. It appears from the above research that a dogmatic subject's response set to different types of questions (i.e., true-false, essay, multiple choice, etc.) and I.Q. levels are not confounding variables.

Becker (1967) found that when Ss' scores on Rokeach's D Scale were paired with another of Ss' scores on another variable (yielding a bivariate frequency distribution) that scores on D Scale were curvilinear. This necessitates using a high medium and low trichotomy in analyzing the Ss scores, for to exclude the middle group would yield distorted data.

In conclusion, it is expected that by looking at a person's selective recall of certain relevant psychological items we can infer his adherence and/or attraction to that psychological ideology. We could relate this retention of psychological items to a subjects' level of dogmatism. It may be that behaviorism, the rigorously scientific field of psychology, would be more attractive to more closed minded individuals, or it may not. Conversely, the Client-Centered Approach, with its dedication to the client's self-control of himself and lack of scientific rigor may attract more open minded people or it may not. These issues raised here have not been answered by the research to date.
Chapter III

Purposes and Objectives

For purposes of the present study it is assumed that different theoretical orientations, i.e., schools of psychology have different tenets and beliefs. It is also postulated that students who become adherents (to a greater or lesser degree) of different schools probably find certain aspects of the school attractive and other aspects less attractive. In other words, a given school of thought may be attractive for people who are relatively dogmatic in their own belief system. Conversely, another given school of thought may be attractive for people who are relatively non-dogmatic in their own belief system.

It will be the objective of this study to determine if high dogmatic subjects score higher on the Skinner retention scale than low dogmatic subjects. It will also be the objective of this study to determine if low dogmatic subjects score higher on the Rogers retention scale than the high dogmatic subjects. Another objective is to determine if Ss in the highly dogmatic group will have higher mean retention scores on the Skinner scale than on Rogers scale. It will also be the objective of this study to determine if Ss in the low dogmatic group will have higher mean retention scores on the Rogers scale than on the Skinner scale. The final objective will be to do separate Pearson product-moment correlations to determine the degree of common variance between dogmatism scores and retention scores on the Skinner and Rogers scales.
Hypotheses formulated on the basis of the preceding objectives are:

(1) On the combined Skinner retention scale, there is no significant difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups.

(2) On the combined Rogers retention scale, there is no significant difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups.

(3) In the high dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the combined Rogers scale.

(4) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the combined Rogers scale.

(5) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion for the Skinner scale and the Rogers scale.

(6) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion on the Skinner scale and the Rogers scale.

(7) Scores on the Dogmatism Scale are significantly correlated with scores on the Skinner scale in a positive direction while being significantly correlated with scores on the Rogerian scale in a negative direction.
Chapter IV

Procedures

Population and Sample

Population

The population utilized in this study was comprised of students enrolled in Psychology 101, Introduction to Psychology, during Winter & Spring Quarters, 1974. The subjects ranged in age from 18-21 years old.

In order to have subjects who had completed both the Skinner and Rogers retention scales and the dogmatism scale those subjects who had not completed all three scales were dropped from the study.

Sample

The total N for this study was originally 96. However, since 54 of these subjects were absent from the Psychology 101 class during one or another testing occasion, they were dropped from study. This was intended to yield true data for all subjects utilized. Thus the total N for all 3 groups was 42. Subjects were separated into groups by the method utilized by Rokeach. This method is one which uses relative ranks of subjects scores. For example, the group known as high dogmatism is high relative to the medium and low groups. Subjects were ranked by the score they received on the Dogmatic Scale-Form E and comparisons were made between the highest 1/3, the middle 1/3, and the lowest 1/3. Students
in the highest 1/3 of the ranked scores on the Dogmatism Scale-Form E were placed in one group and were known as the high dogmatic group with an N of 12; students who scored in the middle 1/3 of the ranked scores on the Dogmatism scale-Form E comprised that group designated as the moderate dogmatism group with an N of 20; students who scored in the lowest 1/3 of the ranked scores on the Dogmatism Scale-Form E comprised that group known as the low dogmatism group with an N of 10. These 3 groups served as the subjects for the study.

**Materials**

Three scales were employed in this study. One was the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale-Form E (Rokeach, 1960). The second and third scales were retention tests on statements made by Skinner & Rogers at the outset of their tape recorded debate at the University of Wisconsin, 1962, entitled "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior" (see Appendices C & D).

The instructions for the Dogmatism Scale-Form E (see Appendix A) were as follows:

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1: I AGREE A LITTLE       +1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE       +2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE

+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH         -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

The scale yields a total score for each subject. This is computed by adding a constant of +4 to each of the items and then totaling all 40 obtained scores.

The Skinner and Rogers scales (see Appendix B) were comprised of 15 items each. These were direct quotes from the talks of Skinner and Rogers as read to the Ss by a member of the Utah State University Speech Department. The questions were an assortment of multiple choice and True-False questions. The subjects were instructed as follows regarding the Rogers and Skinner scales:

This test does not in any way count toward your grade in this class.
This is simply a recognition or memory test for use in my study. Please answer the questions by making the correct answer as you remember it.

Method

The method was exactly the same (except for presentation order of the Rogers & Skinner talks) for both Psychology 101 classes (Winter Quarter, 1974, & Spring Quarter, 1974). Both classes were taught by the same instructor who taught the class with an eclectic approach to the subject matter.

For both groups the data was collected early in the quarter before the students were lectured to on the teachings of either Skinner or Rogers. It was
hoped that this would allow us to use Ss who were naive. Their naivete as to the teaching of Skinner and Rogers was also insured to some degree by the fact that the majority of students in Psychology 101 are in their freshman year and hadn't yet been well schooled in Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts.

Subjects were first administered Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale-Form E. One week later, a member of the Speech Department read to the class the transcribed statements of Skinner & Rogers (see Appendices C and D). The purpose of having one person read the statements was to provide a control for the differing levels of charisma and appeal found in the voices of Skinner & Rogers. In the Winter Quarter Class the order in which the statements were read was Rogers first and immediately thereafter Skinner's statement was read. Immediately after the transcribed statements were read the Skinner and Rogers scales were passed out to the class. In order to allow for selective retention the recall task was again administered, in its exact same form, one week after the first administration. The two scores derived from the administration were averaged yielding a mean score for each subject on the Rogers & Skinner scales.

The same procedure was repeated with the Spring Quarter Psychology 101 class. The only procedural change difference was that the order of presentation of the two statements was reversed. That is, in the Winter Quarter reading of the transcripts, Rogers' statement was read first followed immediately by Skinner's statement. This was reversed for the Spring Quarter class, with Skinner being read first followed by Rogers. The 2 groups of data obtained from the 2 classes were then grouped together and treated as one group thus negating the order of
presentation effect as a confounding variable. There were 42 Ss involved in the study.

**Statistical Analysis**

To test for the significance of the difference between the mean scores on the Rogers & Skinner scales of the high, medium and low dogmatic groups for the hypotheses, six separate one-way analyses of variance were used; one for each scale (Guilford, 1956, p. 258). To test the relationship between variables involved in the study, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was used (Guilford, 1956, p. 285).

**Scoring of the Instrument**

The protocols were all scored by the investigator. The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale-Form E was scored first by hand and final computations were done on a Commodore-AL 1000 Calculator.

**Results**

Hypothesis 1: (on the combined Skinner scale there is no significant different between high, medium and low dogmatism groups) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 1 summarizes the results of this analysis.

There was no significant difference found in this data.
Table 1

One-way Analysis of Variance with Dogmatism as the Independent Variable and Retention Scores on the Skinner Scale as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.429</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 2/39 F at .05 = 3.23 F at .01 = 5.18.

Hypothesis 2: (on the combined Rogers scale there is no significant difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis.

Table 2

One-way Analysis of Variance with Dogmatism as the Independent Variable and Retention Scores on the Rogers Scale as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.479</td>
<td>1.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 2/39 F at .05 = 3.23 F at .01 = 5.18.

There was no significant difference found in this data.
Hypothesis 3: (in the high dogmatism group there is no significant difference between mean retention scores on the combined Skinner scale and the combined Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis.

Table 3

One-way Analysis of Variance with High Dogmatism Scores as the Independent Variable and Mean Retention Scores on the Rogers & Skinner Scales as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>( F )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.04</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1/22 \( F \) at .05 = 4.35 at .01 = 8.10.

There was no significant difference found in this data.

Hypothesis 4: (in the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the combined Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 4 summarizes the results of this analysis.

There was no significant difference found in this data.
Table 4

One-way Analysis of Variance with Low Dogmatism Scores as the Independent Variable and Mean Retention Scores on the Rogers & Skinner Scales as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.0026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1/18 F at .05 = 4.45 F at .01 = 8.40.

Hypothesis 5: (in the high dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between retention scores on the second testing occasion on the Skinner scale and the Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 5 summarizes the results of this analysis.

Table 5

One-way Analysis with High Dogmatism Scores as the Independent Variable and Retention Scores on the Second Testing Occasion on the Skinner Scale and the Rogers Scales as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1/22 F at .05 = 4.35 F at .01 = 8.10.
There was no significant difference found in this data.

Hypothesis 6: (in the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion on the Skinner scale and the Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 6 summarizes the results of this analysis.

Table 6

One-way Analysis of Variance with Low Dogmatism Scores as the Independent Variable and the Retention Scores on the Second Testing Occasion on the Skinner Scale and Rogers Scale as the Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1/18 F at .05 = 4.45 F at .01 = 8.40.

There was no significant difference found in this data.

Hypothesis 7: (scores on the Dogmatism Scale are significantly correlated with scores on the Skinner scale in a positive direction while being significantly correlated with scores on the Rogerian scale in a negative direction) a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed between dogmatism scores and the Rogers & Skinner scales. (For purposes of a more in-depth analysis the results of the two scales were broken down into six variables.
They are as follows: variable 1) subjects’ scores on first testing on Skinner scale; variable 2) scores on first testing on Rogers scale; variable 3) scores on second testing on Skinner scale; variable 4) second testing on Rogers scale; variable 5) total scores from variables 1 and 3; variable 6) total scores on variables 2 and 4).

These results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7

Inter-correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores on Skinner and Rogers Scales</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom - 40, r at .05 = .304, r at .01 = .393, r at .10 = 2.57.

The results of the above table indicate no significant relationships existing between the scores on the dogmatism scale and the scores derived from the two recall tests of the Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts.
Chapter V
Discussion

The findings of this study indicate that there exists no significant difference between those subjects who are highly dogmatic, moderately dogmatic and non-dogmatic in their retention of Skinnerian or Rogerian concepts. Utilizing the concept of selective retention as a predictor of attitude, neither of the three dogmatic groups had any significantly different level of positive attitude toward Skinner's or Rogers' concepts. Thus, it appears that the data obtained herein would tend to dispute any a priori attitude affinity towards Rogerian or Skinnerian concepts vis-a-vis different levels of dogmatism or closed mindedness.

The question raised by Weiss (1973) in his study was essentially, why did behavior therapy students appear to behave more like "true believers" than analytic students. Weiss speculated that the behavior therapy students were either selectively reinforced by their professors for their dogmatic verbal statements (in which case the students initial levels of dogmatism varied prior to their being shaped up) or the students entered into the behavior therapy program precisely because they perceived it as being a dogmatic school and this was congruent with their high levels of dogmatism.

Conceptually, it would follow that the opposite would be true of the Rogerian therapy students. That is, they would behave as a "non-true believer."
This appears to be so by virtue of the quality of the Rogerian School’s non-directive approach as opposed to the directive approach used in behavior therapy.

Weiss' question was partially addressed by this investigation. The question was reformulated as follows: Would the highly dogmatic group remember Skinner significantly more than the medium group and low group? The answer was clearly no. The converse, in regard to Rogers, was also answered no. A highly dogmatic person, thus, has no more a priori affinity for Skinner than a moderate dogmatist and the non-dogmatist.

It would appear by extending the point that the so-called "dogmatic behaviorist" is perhaps an historical artifact due to the fact that behaviorism is a relatively new school and is in its dogmatic phase and therefore people are more frequently exposed to a dogmatic behaviorist in their schooling. Rokeach (1960, p. 68) reported that this phenomenon has been observed in new religious sects. Dogmatism is essentially a self-preservation tactic which the new sect uses to protect its dogmas from outside attacks and threats in the form of challenges to its dogmas as well as a motivating force in spreading the new "gospel." We have seen this happen repeatedly and as the sect or faith ages it becomes less dogmatic. (This can be observed in Catholicism most explicitly.) So too, in psychology's history. Observe Freudian Psychoanalysis' evolution. Initially, it was quite dogmatic. Eventually the dogmatic quality gave way before the dialectic processes of history and soon we observed the emergence of the so-called New Freudsians. Today the "school" of Freudianism is not
especially dogmatic although it is not unusual to meet a dogmatic Freudian.

It would be my bias that Weiss' study showed the behavior students to behave as "true believers" because he used advanced doctoral students that were shaped up to be "behaviorists" by their undergraduate programs and to a greater degree by their graduate programs. Consequently, they chose the behavioral graduate program because of some prior disposition as well as being shaped up by their departments.

Another question raised in this paper was in regard to Jacobson's (1970) study and the Clouser and Jhelle study. Jacobsen found, it will be remembered, that Ss who chose behavior therapy "were on the average more dependent, more authoritarian, and more externally oriented than Ss choosing analytically oriented therapy." Clouser & Hjelle (1970) found that an external control orientation, as measured by the Rotter Internal-External Scale (1966), varies positively \( (r = .24 \text{ sig. at } = .05) \) with scores on Rokeach's D Scale. Thus, the present study postulated that perhaps had dogmatism been a variable used by Jacobsen it too would have been associated with those choosing behavior therapy. The present study essentially shed no light on this postulation. It can only be said regarding the obtained data herein that Ss who were high in dogmatism had essentially the same degree of recall of both Skinner and Rogers statements. The data indicates that a high dogmatic person has no greater attitude congruence with Skinner's position than he may have with Rogers' position.

Looking at the stereotypes from the other side of the issue, this present study showed no significant difference within the low dogmatism groups
in terms of their mean retention scores on the Skinner and Rogers scale.

Therefore, on the assumption that selective recall is an indicator of attitude, Rogers' view of man as self-determined and free and Rogers' attitude of non-control and non-direction of clients were not necessarily more appealing to the low dogmatic group than were Skinners', "man's behavior is determined," views. Perhaps with different groups such as advanced psychology students the attitudes may have had more time to form and this may be the time at which a more or less dogmatic flavor would be found in the Ss. However, naive Ss attitudes towards Skinner & Rogers were essentially the same at the different levels of dogmatism.

The final query of this study was the amount of common variance between levels of dogmatism and the different levels of retention scores on the Skinner & Rogers scales. As was found there existed a negative relationship between levels of dogmatism and all six sub-variables within the two retention scales. However, while these correlations were negative, there wasn't any strong relationships found. It would seem to be indicated in the correlational matrix, to a small degree, that as the Ss score on the D scale increased the retention scores tended to decrease and vice-versa. However, with no correlation higher than -.23 this can only be said with the greatest caution since a graphic depiction of the bivariate distribution indicates a great deal of spread around the line of best fit.

It would appear that to categorize all psychologists who more or less identify with the principles of one "school" in psychology as dogmatic is a
generalization which simply doesn't hold up. It seems reasonable to suspect that dogmatism is a personality variable which is probably normally distributed, cutting across schools of psychology. This would explain the dogmatic behaviorist and the dogmatic Rogerian and the non-dogmatic behaviorist and the non-dogmatic Rogerian. It also would be a reason for a lack of significant difference found here between groups. While the small N of each group may have also been a contributory factor in the lack of a significant difference it seems more likely to be a function of the fact that dogmatic and non-dogmatic people can be found in any group. This may well be highlighted in this study by the fact that naive subjects may not be grouped by attitude, as yet, regarding pro-Skinner or anti-Skinner sentiments.

What our field needs is more eclecticism and synthesis of our schools. Perhaps one day we will be able to view the work of the behaviorist as explaining one piece of the puzzle, Rogerians another piece and, say physiological psychology, another piece. When we begin looking more at the similarities within the different schools and not until then can we end the senseless in-fighting which separates our field into different camps. After all, we psychologists are all in the field which, directly or indirectly, hopes to lead man and society to a higher level of consciousness and self-awareness and a better life for all.
Delimitations

The Instrument

It may seem that there exists a confounding variable in the two scales of retention of Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts in that there is a differential degree of difficulty in recalling the item. This differential difficulty would, to be confounding, be greater for one scale (for example, Skinners) than for the other (for example, Rogers). However, the correlation between the Skinner & Rogers scales was .46. It seems that this correlation indicates that their common variance is close enough to persuade us that the two scales are of relatively equal difficulty while retaining a good amount of variance explained by other variables. It was hoped that dogmatism could be one of those other variables and that these scales could in some way help discriminate at different dogmatism levels.

Sample

The size of the subject sample does seem to be of a small enough size for the low dogmatism group (N = 10) that an adequate degree of generalizability may be questionable. The comparisons yielded between the high dogmatism group (N = 12) and the low dogmatism group may not have yielded statistically significant data due to a constricted sample size. A larger sample size of, for example, N = 100, may well have yielded the statistical difference between groups that the study hoped to find.
Implications for Further Research

1. Using naive subjects a study should be run to determine change of attitude (both in terms of degree and direction of change) toward Skinner & Rogers using a pretest-post test design.

2. The study could be replicated using graduate students in the behavioral and counseling programs. This would be useful in assessing the differing levels of dogmatism in subjects whose attitudes and biases had already had sufficient time to form.

3. There is much talk of Rogerians and Skinnerians. A scale should be devised to assess the degree of affinity for the two positions so as to assist the researchers in this area when he is using "Rogerians" and "Skinnerians" as his subjects.

4. Replicate this study except this time have longer time intervals between the administration of the recall task such as one month, three months, and six months.

5. Use other relevant variables of the subjects personality, such as I.Q. scores or G.P.A., as covariates with dogmatism and see if there is any significant relationship between these variables by means of an analysis of covariance.
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Appendix A: Opinion Questionnaire

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case:

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE      -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE   -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH      -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. The United States and Russian have just about nothing in common.
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
25. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

26. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

27. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

28. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

29. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

30. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

31. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

32. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

33. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

34. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

35. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

36. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

37. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
Appendix B: Questions taken from Rogers & Skinner

The following questions are taken from the speech by Carl Rogers. Questions 1-15—Rogers Scale.

T F 1. Rogers said "it's clear that some of the most basic concepts of this new third force in psychology have no meaning at all for the behaviorist group."

T F 2. Rogers said "there is a fresh breeze blowing in our land that is expressed by an interest in such things as:
   a) ontological thought d) Zen Buddhism
   b) existentialism e) b and d
   c) behaviorism

T F 3. This fresh breeze is also, according to Rogers, exhibited by what Maslow calls:
   a) a new force in psychology c) the new third force in psychology
   b) the primary force d) the two older forces in psychology

T F 4. Rogers said "man has felt himself to be but a puppet in life, whirled by economic and world forces."

T F 5. Rogers feels in sympathy with this new "fresh breeze" because:
   a) He himself feels this way
   b) The new books he's read tell him it is so
   c) It is deeply in line with his experience in working with clients in therapy
   d) Other therapists have told him it is so

T F 6. Rogers has described therapeutic development as a self-initiated process of learning to be free.

T F 7. The sense of freedom which Rogers' clients feel is:
   a) an outward choice of alternatives
   b) an inner experience within the person
   c) both a and b
   d) neither a or b

T F 8. According to Rogers, human freedom and the complete determinism of modern science are:
   a) incompatible
   b) coexist in a non-paradoxical way
   c) existing along side each other as a paradox
   d) in no way related
9. According to Rogers, man can only live as an object.

10. According to Rogers, we can deny the subjective element in ourselves at:
    a) no peril
    b) a little peril
    c) moderate peril
    d) great peril

11. The subjective side of ourselves a) precedes  b) follows
c) is unrelated to: our scientific activities.

12. Rogers states that one day the future development of the behavioral sciences will contradict the basic fact that the subjective side of our personality is an essential part of being human.

13. Rogers says that to the experimental positivist behaviorist stream of psychology the term "freedom" has:
    a) some meaning
    b) no meaning
    c) a great deal of meaning
    d) he didn't say it at all

14. To the extent that a behaviorist point of view in psychology is leading toward a disregard of the person or toward treating people as manipulable objects it is:
    a) a fundamental error by the behaviorist
    b) something Rogers must question very deeply
    c) compatible with Rogers' philosophy
    d) something Rogers likes and encourages

15. Behaviorism's disregard of persons or its treating persons as manipulable objects, is, according to Rogers, compatible with some of life's strongest undercurrents.

The following questions are taken from the speech by B. F. Skinner;
Questions 1-15--Skinner Scale.

1. As a plausible working assumption for science, Skinner states that:
   a) none of human behavior is controlled
   b) some behavior is controlled
   c) most behavior is controlled
   d) all behavior is controlled

2. By control of behavior Skinner is talking about, for example, that type of control as is achieved in economics by wage systems which mobilizes and energizes people.
3. By control, Skinner is not talking about the various police and military forces which governments use to keep people working within certain legal frameworks.

4. In cases where the control of people breaks down as in the case of the hobo who stops working, student who skips school; this is due to:
   a) free choice of those persons
   b) disillusionment
   c) all variables affecting control of behavior are not being manipulated, thus, control of those persons was not 100%

5. The fact that man is completely controlled by his genetic and environmental history means that in no way can man control his own destiny, according to Skinner.

6. Skinner said that in light of the environment-controlling man, man controls himself as a species by working upon:
   a) the environmental forces
   b) the genetic forces
   c) neither a or b
   d) both a and b

7. Skinner defines control as:
   a) never really defined it
   b) something science hasn't yet been able to define
   c) any contribution which is made toward determining a man's actions
   d) getting someone to do something without their realizing "why"

8. Our world is a world, according to Skinner, which man has worked out largely because:
   a) he wanted to have a nicer world
   b) it is a hostile world
   c) of its bearing on man's behavior
   d) man's nature has been to have progressed in his world

9. If it is true, according to Skinner, that human behavior is 100% the product of a genetic and environmental history, it is nevertheless true that man has created and can modify that history and in that sense he can control himself.

10. One of Skinner's critics said that Skinner represents the dead-end of:
    a) Marx
    b) Einstein
    c) McClellan
    d) Darwin
    e) Lenin
    f) a and b
    g) a and d
    h) none of these
11. Skinner said that historically early peoples hunted and fished because:
   a) they liked to
   b) they were reinforced for hunting and fishing with something edible
   c) it was an accidental discovery, passed on through the ages
   d) they had a goal (to eat) and invented hunting and fishing techniques as a means to achieve that goal

T F 12. The inner control (an individual's self-control) as an alternative to external control is not a real alternative according to Skinner; it is nothing but the product of another kind of external control.

13. Skinner says man, to be controlled, must be:
   a) unaware of control
   b) somewhat aware of
   c) totally aware of control
   d) may be aware or unaware of control

T F 14. Skinner states that you can prove that all of the behavior of human organisms is controlled 100%.

T F 15. Skinner said that there is more than one scientific method and more than one way of knowing.
SKINNER: I don't believe you could ever prove that all of the behavior of a human organism is controlled. But the assumption, is, I think, more and more plausible, at least as a working assumption for a science. And I believe, also, as a working assumption for a more general consideration regarding human affairs in general. Now, Dr. Rogers in conceding this much has tended to narrow the notion of control. In the paper that I refer to, he cites as examples of recent advances in controlling behavior; the evidence that under certain social conditions a man may be led to make judgments which are contrary to the evidence of his senses. In other experiments it has been shown that a person may change his opinion without his being aware of what has influenced him to do so. He has cited satisfying electrical stimulation as an all-compelling kind of gratification that might very well be used to control behavior, and, of course, the effect of drugs in producing vivid hallucinations. Changes in disposition, personality would also be cited by Dr. Rogers. Now, but control means, to me much more than this. These particular examples are examples of surreptitious control. Control, where the controlee is not aware that he is being controlled. Or they are special examples of powerful control. Now what I am talking about when I say the control of human behavior is any contribution which is made toward determining a man's action. It does not need to be surreptitious, it does mean that the man may not be fully aware of what is being done to him and it does not mean that it will be 100% successful. I'm talking about such controls as is achieved in economics with various wage systems, the ordinary, rather
ineffective ones or special incentive wages and so on. One has only to examine other nations, other cultures, to appreciate the extent to which in America our economic system does energize people. It makes them productive, it makes them enterprising; undertaking new kinds of things. I mean by control the various police and military forces which governments use to keep people working within a certain legal framework. I mean by control the various techniques which are used in education to bring about what we call the acquisition of knowledge or traits of character, and so on. Now the fact that occasionally an employee doesn't go to work for the day or occasionally a man becomes a hobo and stops working altogether or the fact that a student plays hooky or that someone breaks the law or escapes from jail; this does not mean to me that these are not very powerful controlling influences. The exceptions are to be expected, because in no one of these cases are the variables which are manipulated the only variables and, hence, the control is not 100%. So, I hope that when we are talking here about control we will speak more generally and not limit this to concealed control; although there are special problems involved there, I'll admit and would not, also hope to deal only with 100% effective control. Now, that is one thing that I wanted to state in these early remarks and I think that it will come up again in the discussion. Another one has to do with the implications of the notion that human behavior is controlled; and thus for the moment let's talk about complete control. Another one of my valued opponents in this line of thinking is Joseph Woodcroach, whose book The Measure of Man published in 1954 is largely an attack on Walden Two, my utopian novel and also on other
works of mine. He's recently returned to the attack in an article in the
Saturday Review of Literature in which suddenly I find myself classed with the
existentialists but being cited by Croach symbolizing what he calls the dead end
of the tendency represented by Darwin and Marx and he cites me as denying
categorically and absolutely that man has any control over his destiny, that he
has any power to choose or determine. And he goes on to document this by
saying that I write in my book, Science and Human Behavior, "the inner man
who is held responsible for the behavior of the external, biological organism
is only a pre-scientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered
in the course of a scientific analysis. And all these causes lie outside the
individual and he goes on from this dead-end. The fact that man is (let us assume
for the moment) completely controlled by his genetic and environmental history
does not in any sense mean that he cannot control his own destiny. He's already
been doing this both in the field of genetics and in the field of the environment;
because from the very beginning of civilization or culture, man, as we know
him, man has been working upon the very genetic and environmental forces
which are responsible for him. And the geneticists, today, are beginning to
talk quite openly about the possibility of improvements in man through genetic
measures; just yesterday I read the report in the morning paper that Professor
Huxley has come out again in favor of sperm banks or special donor fathership
so that in the world of the future the father will be proud not that the child is of
his own blood; but that he has the best blood that money can buy. The environ-
mental control is already here and has been here for thousands of years. Man
is largely responsible for the environment in which man lives; he's certainly responsible for this very pleasant environment here this afternoon in every detail. We live more and more in a man-made world and it has been a world which man has worked out largely because of its bearing upon his behavior. He's reduced the need to escape from extremes of temperature and so on. He has come to be reasonably comfortable, well-fed and can then devote ourselves to things which are more important. This is a contribution of a purely technical, physical technology; but the social technology and the cultural technology which has gone along with this is even more important. What man has done is to create for himself a world in which he is governed, in which he is employed, in which he can hire, in which he can gain the necessary wealth through borrowing or stealing or something of that kind. He has built a world in which he is able to behave in ways which would otherwise be impossible. And, in a sense, he has controlled himself. If it is true that human behavior is 100% the product of a genetic and environmental history, it is nonetheless true that man has created and can modify that genetic and environmental history and, in that sense, he can control himself. Now, that is not a pun, I'm not playing on words here. Very often it is true that the man who builds the environment, is not the man who is controlled by it: but that is often the case. And as I write elsewhere, the techniques of self-control which we can expect from religious, ethical and moral works of the past can be analyzed in terms of a manipulation of an environment with the result that the man who has, thus manipulated the environment will behave in a way that will cause him less trouble or gain him greatest achievements.
So that we do control ourselves, even in a world in which human behavior is totally controlled because we modify that behavior. Now, this may seem, again, even if you don't regard it as a play on words; it may seem logically impossible; but the point is that we do this, not because even then we step outside any causal stream or outside the stream of history but because it happens to be in man's nature to take steps of this sort. This brings me to third theme which we will certainly be dealing with again and again, I'm sure, in this debate. This is the so-called choice of values. Why do we in controlling man control him in one direction and not in another? How do we decide in advance how we want to control? This comes up in the case of education. Suppose we have a very powerful educational technique; what will you teach? If psychology can tell you the techniques can it tell you what ought to be taught? Now, this is a whole field of value judgment, but I don't think it need necessarily be put outside the realm of science. As far as I'm concerned there's only one science, there's only one way of knowing and that may be in the hands of scientists or in others' but it comes to the same thing. I don't know of any special wisdom which is available when science must stop and turn the choice of values over to others. As I see the question of values, they concern some characteristics of human behavior which have led to various kinds of explorations in the design of culture. We could explain some activities of man in the face of physical technology by appealing to the immediate results. Early people hunt and fish for food because in hunting and fishing you are reinforced immediately with something edible. Later, a culture develops methods of
storing food, drying, preserving, freezing; they develop methods of agriculture—where something must be done in the early spring and you eat only in late August or September, perhaps and so on. Slowly a culture builds the capacity to do things because of more and more remote consequences. Now this is also true in the case of the cultural technology which man has worked out. A strong man, able to whip anyone else in a battle will steal and take from others, will force him to labor for him, and so on. This becomes an early, primitive kind of governmental structure. And we explain it in terms of the immediate reinforcement of the strong man who is capable of exerting that kind of power. Later, a government which becomes more sensible in its long-term consequences, will work out ways of controlling which will not resort to brute force and will have a greater survival value in the long run; because such governments will make better use of the people governed. And I think as you can trace a physical technology, the becoming important of more and more remote consequences so you can trace this in cultural technology. And, I think this brings us to my way of thinking, the crucial issue. Dr. Rogers has referred to the suggestion that there are three ways of looking at human behavior, the Freudian, or the positivistic-behaviorists or that way (I haven't a name for it) which emphasizes the self or that the individual becomes interested in the self as a source of wisdom, source of strength in altering conduct. My colleague, David McClellan, has written a book on psychoanalysis and religion which has taken the same theme but has left out, I suppose, the positivistic view. McClellan, taking his cue from David Bahan's very interesting book on Freud's sources has noted that the
Protestant Reformation and the Jewish Hasidic mystical movement and Freud from the latter in his psychoanalysis all exemplify the kind of revolt against external control. This is the conflict in between psychoanalysis and governmental operations. It is the general turning to the individual to find salvation. This is the theme, of course, of the Protestant Reformation; that one can seek one's God within himself. And Freud carries this out, hoping to find within the individual the source of a pattern of life which is not imposed from the outside.

Now, I don't think that is the correct way of stating the case and I think it can be modified in a way which fits my purposes very well. The change is not from an external control of the individual to internal control, it is a change from coercive, punitive control to other techniques of control which are related in the long run as you won't be surprised to hear me say, to positive reinforcement. There are ways in which you can control people, so that you influence what they want to do and there are ways in which you control them so that they are forced to do what they do not want to do. If you shift from a legalistic, coercive system, to individual freedom (this is the whole theory of democracy too) it appears to take the good behavior of the individual out of the hands of the police and turn it over to the individual himself. I suggest, as a subject for future discussion here, that it would turn out that the inner control which is then discovered as an alternative to the external is nothing but the product of another kind of external control which has been concerned with getting individuals to want to behave in certain ways rather then coercing them to behave in those ways because of an external threat. As I see the trend of the evolution of culture,
it is away from the rather immediate, punitive successful ways of controlling people to those more remote techniques which are based upon a knowledge of human behavior require a very sensitive understanding of these techniques which in the long run exert a much more powerful control, and a control which I believe is more likely to build a stronger group because it releases resources, and here I would agree with Dr. Rogers, of the individual which are quite lost under aversive control. Those are the three themes I wanted to mention. We do agree that behavior is controlled; but I wanted to interpret that broadly. We, I hope, agree that even on an assumption of complete determinism man is and has been free to determine his destiny by the design of the world which determines him. And that the slow evolution of culture practices could very well be working towards the releasing of potentialities of the individual without necessarily, thereby, leaving it in the last analysis to the individual to determine his own behavior.
Appendix D: Rogers

ROGERS: I'd like to try to summarize, very briefly, some of the important elements which underly our dialog as they seem to me. I think there's a fresh breeze that's blowing through the world. It's exhibiting itself in many ways and speaking through many voices. It's expressed in the growing interest in existentialism and in the existentialist point of view. It's evident in ways that may seem odd to some of you, such as the interest in Zen Buddhism. It shows itself in the concern with the Self in psychology and in the interest in a phenomenological approach to psychological problems. Even on the political scene it is evident, I believe, in the upsurge of one new country after another arising out of a colonial past. It is exhibited in what Maslow has termed, "the new third force in American psychology," the development of Self theories, the concern with the existential person, the discussions of Being and Becoming, as over against the two older forces; the Positivistic Behaviorism point of view and the Freudian point of view. As I endeavor to understand this vigorous new cultural trend, it seems to me to be the voice of subjective man speaking up loudly for himself. Man has long felt himself to be but a puppet in life, molded by world forces and by economic forces. He has been enslaved by persons, by institutions, and more recently, by aspects of modern science. But he is firmly setting forth a new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibis of unfreedom. He is choosing himself, endeavoring to become himself; not a puppet, not a slave, not a copy of some model; but his own unique, individual self. He is saying in
no uncertain terms: "I am, I exist, I choose myself in life. I choose the meaning of death." I find myself very sympathetic to this trend because it is so deeply in line with the experience I have had in working with clients in therapy. As one therapist has said, "the essence of therapy is the client's movement from feeling unfree and controlled by others towards the frightening, but rewarding, sense of freedom to map out and choose his new personality. I, myself, in one of the papers that some of you have read, have described the therapeutic development as a "self-initiated process of learning to be free." This learning is composed of movement from, as well as movement toward. From being persons driven by inner forces they do not understand, fearful and distrustful of these deeper feelings and of themselves, living by values they have taken from others they move significantly. They move toward being persons who accept and even enjoy their own feelings, who value and trust the deeper layers of their nature; who find strength in being their own uniqueness, who live by values that they experience. This learning, this movement, enables them to live as more individuated, more creative, more responsive and more responsible persons. Clients are, as I have tried to indicate, often sharply aware of such directions in themselves as they move with fearfulness toward being freely themselves. But how can I talk about freedom, when as a behavioral scientist I conduct research on the assumption that the sequences of cause and effect operate quite as much in the psychological as in the physical world? What possible definition of freedom can there be in a modern world? Let me try to tell you what it means to me, again quoting from one of these papers. In
the first place, the freedom which my clients experience is essentially an inner thing; something which exists in the living person, quite aside from any outward choice of alternatives which we so often think of as constituting freedom. I am speaking of the kind of freedom which Frankl vividly describes in his experience of the concentration camp, when everything: possessions, identity, choice of alternatives was taken from the prisoners. But even months and years in such an environment showed only, and I quote, "that everything can be taken from a man, but one thing, the last of the human freedoms to choose one's own attitude in any given set of circumstances; to choose one's own way." It is this inner, subjective, existential freedom which I have observed. It is the realization in my clients that, "I can live myself, here and now, by my own choice." It is the quality of courage which enables a person to step into the uncertainty of the unknown, as he chooses himself. It is the discovery of meaning from within oneself; meaning which comes from listening sensitively and openly to the complexities of what one is experiencing. It is the burden of being responsible for the self one chooses to be. It is the recognition, by the person, that he is an emerging process, not a static end-product. The individual who is thus deeply and courageously thinking his own thoughts, becoming his own uniqueness, responsibly chosing himself may be fortunate in having hundreds of objective outer alternatives from which to chose, or he may be unfortunate in having none; but his freedom exists, regardless. So, we are first of all, speaking of something which exists within the individual; of something phenomenological rather than objective--but, nonetheless, to be prized. The second point in
defining this experience of freedom is that it exists, not as a contradiction to
the picture of the psychological universe as a sequence of cause and effect, but
as a compliment to such a universe. Freedom, rightly understood, is a fulfill­
ment by the person, of the ordered sequence of his life. As Martin Buber puts
it, "the free man believes in destiny and believes that it stands in need of him."
He moves out voluntarily, freely, responsibly; to play his significant part in a
world whose determined events move through him and through his spontaneous
choice and will. This is the experience of one client after another as he moves
in therapy toward an acceptance of the realities of the world outside and inside
himself and also moves toward becoming a responsible agent in this real world.
As I've indicated before, this significant human freedom exists alongside the
complete determinism of modern science as a paradox. It exists in our human
experience with as much reality as do the facts of science, and we cannot wisely
disregard it. It's one of the great contributions of our century that we are
beginning to realize that man's moods, attitudes, actions, his adaptations, as
well as his maladaptations, can be understood in the same lawful terms as the
events as the physical world. Viewed from this objective perspective, it seems
probable that we will increasingly be able to understand man's actions in terms
of laws which will be similar to the scientific laws discovered in the natural
sciences. It is this that leads to the possibility of being able to control human
behavior. It is this that leads to the issue of this discussion. There seems no
doubt but that the behavioral sciences will move steadily in the direction of
making man an object to himself; a complex sequence of events no different in
kind from the complex chain of equations by which various chemical substances interact to form new substances or to release energy. But no matter how completely man comes to understand himself as a determined phenomenon; the product of past elements and forces and the determined cause of future events and behaviors, he can never live as an object. He can only live subjectively.

Some of the most pathetic individuals I know are those who are continually attempting to understand and predict their behavior objectively. Each action is meaningful to them only as the predetermined effect of preceding causes and their whole life becomes an unhappy caricature of the centipede self-consciously watching his feel. In my experience some of the failures in psychoanalytic therapies sometimes exhibit this over-intellectualized objectivity towards themselves. But the person who is developing his full potential is able to accept this subjective aspect of himself and to live subjectively. When he's angry, he is angry. Not merely "an exhibition of the effects of adrenalin." When he loves, he's loving; and not merely "cathected toward a love-object." He moves in self-selected directions. He chooses responsibly. He's a person who thinks and feels and experiences. He is not merely an object in whom these events occur.

We cannot, without great peril, deny this subjective element in ourselves. It precedes our scientific activities; it's more all-encompassing than scientific knowledge. It is an essential part of being human, of being a person. And no present or future development of the behavioral sciences can ever contradict this basic fact. Yet, I am very well aware that the experimentalist, positivist, behaviorist, stream of thought in psychology (and Dr. Skinner is a most able
exponent of that trend) hold very different views. For example, here are some of the words and concepts that I have used which are totally or almost totally without meaning in the behaviorist's frame of reference. Freedom, for example, is a term with no meaning. Choice, in the sense that I have used it, has no meaning. Subjectivity is, I believe, regarded as of very little importance. Purpose, self-direction, value or value-choice; none of these have any meaning. Personal responsibility, as a concept, has no meaning. The democratic philosophy of human nature, Dr. Skinner has pointed out, has been a useful resource of the revolutionists in the past, but is now, very probably, out of date. So it's clear that some of the most basic concepts of this new third force in psychology have no meaning at all for the behaviorist group. I trust that this dialog today may help us to clear up any misunderstandings of such differences and also to clarify our differences where real differences do exist. In summary, I would say that to the extent that a behaviorist point of view in psychology is leading us toward a disregard of the person or toward treating persons, primarily, as manipulable objects, or toward control of the person, shaping up his behavior without his participant choice, or toward minimizing the significance of the subjective; then I question it very deeply. My experience would lead me to say that to that extent it's going against one of the strongest undercurrents of modern life and is taking us down a pathway with destructive consequences.
Vita

Richard A. Carpenter

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science

Thesis: The Relationship between a Measure of Dogmatism and Retention of Rogerian and Skinnerian Concepts

Major Field: Psychology

Biographical Information:


3. Completed requirements for Master of Science degree in psychology, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 1975.
