THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUILT- AND SHAME-PRONENESS AND
RORSCHACH INDICES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING

by

Julie Bingham Shiffler

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Psychology

Approved:

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

1997
ABSTRACT

The Relationship Between Guilt- and Shame-Proneness and Rorschach Indices of Psychological Functioning

by

Julie Bingham Shiffler, Doctor of Philosophy

Utah State University, 1997

Major Professors: Dr. Susan L. Crowley
Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson

Department: Psychology

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the degrees of proneness to the self-conscious emotions of nonruminative guilt, ruminative guilt, and shame and several indices of psychological functioning, including depression, narcissism, anger, dysphoric affect, cooperation, need for affection, and self-inspection, in a college population. Gender differences were also examined.

A measure of psychological functioning (the Rorschach) and a measure of guilt- and shame-proneness (the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified) were
administered to 91 college students (43 males and 48 females). Females reported higher levels of all three self-conscious emotions. The only gender difference found among the psychological functioning variables was higher levels of narcissism for males. For the total sample, cooperation was related to nonruminative guilt, whereas an unhealthy level of need for affection was related to ruminative guilt and shame. When males and females were considered separately, depression was related to ruminative guilt in males, but not in females. Narcissism was related to all three emotions for males, but not for females. An absence of dysphoric affect was associated with nonruminative guilt in females. Cooperation and self-inspection both correlated with nonruminative guilt for females, but not for males. The predominant emotion related to unhealthy levels of need for affection was shame for males but ruminative guilt for females. Preliminary results from 21 subjects with positive DEPI scores differed from the results of the entire sample in the relationships between the self-conscious emotions and dysphoric affect, self-inspection, and cooperation.
Study results were discussed in light of the different levels of awareness at which the Rorschach and the TOSCA-M assess emotions and psychological functioning. Socialization of gender differences in guilt- and shame-proneness was also discussed. Implications for treatment, future research, and creation of future assessments of guilt- and shame-proneness were examined.

(205 pages)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee co-chairs for their encouragement and tireless efforts to help me create something of which I could be proud. Tamara Ferguson shared her wealth of knowledge about guilt and shame and prodded me to look ever deeper to find meaningful ways to explain my results. Susan Crowley shared her Rorschach and statistical expertise and spent many hours with me helping to resolve discrepancies between the original Rorschach scoring and my own shadow scoring.

My deepest gratitude goes to my family. To my children, who patiently and willingly carried on with household responsibilities and tolerated my absences without complaint, I express my thanks. Most of all, I am indebted to my sweetheart, Al, who encouraged and supported me, helped with data, and sacrificed time that he would rather have spent with me---all while inspiring me to laugh and keep everything in its proper perspective. Without the unselfishness and loving encouragement of my family, this product would not have been possible.

Julie Bingham Shiffler
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Psychologists have long been interested in finding ways to predict various forms of maladaptive behavior and psychopathology. In the interest of this goal, researchers have attempted to identify specific precursors to a variety of ineffective styles of intrapersonal and interpersonal functioning. Once discovered, such knowledge would facilitate the development and implementation of prevention, early intervention, and treatment strategies.

One direction that researchers have taken is to examine the role of emotions in psychopathology. According to a functionalist perspective, emotions are adaptive to the situation (Magai & McFadden, 1995; Malatesta & Wilson, 1988), playing a role in determining whether and how information in the environment is perceived, interpreted, and acted upon. An emotion state is the immediate arousal of feeling and cognition in response to a situation. But emotions may also function as traits that define the individual's personality. This
occurs when the natural temperament of the individual interacts with experience over time to develop an affinity for specific emotions—an emotional style. These emotion traits or "affective biases" (Magai & McFadden, 1995) influence the way individuals perceive and interpret information, the coping and defensive strategies they routinely employ, and the way they behave. The normal result is the idiosyncracies or traits that constitute individual personalities.

Fisher, Shaver, and Carnochan (1990) contend that when an individual repeatedly and consistently responds to a variety of situations with a particular emotion, that emotion can be considered a consistent aspect or personality trait of the individual, and the person is said to be prone to that emotion. Emotion traits serve to shape development and personality. But emotion styles become problematic when persistent reliance on a specific affective style to organize and interpret experience exposes the individual to an overabundance of an emotion. Such chronic exposure can lead to pathology.

For many years, clinicians have observed high levels
of guilt and shame in many of their clients and have posited an intuitive link between psychological symptoms and proneness to the emotions of shame and guilt. Helen Block Lewis (1971, 1979a, 1979b) focused on the proposed link in her theoretical writings. She hypothesized that guilt-prone persons are vulnerable to thought-related disorders, such as paranoia and obsessive-compulsive disorder, whereas shame-proneness creates vulnerability to depression, hysteria, and narcissism. However, no longitudinal studies investigating this hypothesis have yet been conducted. In addition, H. B. Lewis postulated gender differences in proneness to the two emotions, with males more likely to exhibit guilt-proneness and females more inclined to shame-proneness.

Research findings regarding sex-related differences in guilt-proneness and shame-proneness are mixed. However, a growing body of research suggests that females, more than males, may be socialized to experience guilt and shame. For example, females are socialized to place greater value on relationships than on performance and to exercise control over aggressive impulses and feelings of
anger. In contrast, the socialization of males emphasizes performance and is less likely to penalize aggression. These socialization differences are believed to result in a greater tendency on the part of females to experience feelings of guilt and shame, especially in the context of their relationships (Brody, 1996; Kaufman, 1989; H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Cole, & Barrett, 1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990). Males, on the other hand, might be expected to experience guilt in connection with performance that falls below expectations. These gender differences in proneness to guilt and shame are believed to contribute, in turn, to existing gender differences in some forms of psychopathology (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

Empirical evidence for the link between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychological symptoms has increased in recent years. For example, shame-proneness is associated with general psychological maladjustment (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992), depression (Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Hoblitzelle, 1987; Shiffler, 1993; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Wright, O'Leary, &
Balkin, 1989), narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Wright et al., 1989), and anger (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). A major role in the formation of psychological symptoms has also been attributed to guilt (e.g., Blatt & Shichman, 1983; Harder et al., 1992; Leckman et al., 1984; H. B. Lewis, 1979a; Zuroff, Moskowitz, Wielgus, Powers, & Franko, 1983). Consistent with this view, excessive guilt is related to depression and depressive symptomatology (Hoblitzelle, 1987; Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990; Jones & Kugler, 1993; Leckman et al., 1984; Niler & Beck, 1989; Shiffler, 1993; Wright et al., 1989). In the rare studies in which gender differences have been considered, correlations between the emotion variables and depression have been slightly higher for males than for females (Shiffler, 1993; Wright et al., 1989).

The conclusions reached by many of the foregoing researchers must be viewed with caution because of limitations to their research. One important limitation is in the area of measurement, where two major problems have been identified. Adequate measurement of guilt- and
shame-proneness was hampered in the past by disagreements about definitions of the two emotion constructs, particularly the definition of guilt. Many researchers, including H. B. Lewis, failed to recognize that guilt is not a unitary phenomenon (Ferguson & Crowley, 1993, 1996, in press a). Guilt can be differentiated into at least two types, with an important distinction being the separation of guilt into ruminative and nonruminative types. Nonruminative guilt is a normal, functional emotion. It is characterized by a restless feeling of discomfort that occurs as a result of transgression, motivating the individual to make reparation for wrongdoing. Once the wrong has been corrected, nonruminative guilt dissipates (Tangney, 1991). On the other hand, ruminative guilt is characterized by excessive rumination over transgressions and overcompensation for misdeeds, with the accompanying feeling that nothing the offender does will ever fully atone for the wrongful deed (Ferguson & Crowley, 1993). The individual who experiences ruminative guilt frequently accepts responsibility for events outside his or her control
(Ferguson, 1996; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1996; Friedman, 1985). This ruminative form of guilt is considered more problematic than nonruminative guilt and is expected to have a stronger link to psychopathology. Previous authors (Caprara, Manzi, & Perugini, 1992) have drawn a theoretical and operational distinction between "anxious guilt" and "empathic guilt." Anxious (i.e., ruminative) guilt is based on a fear of punishment and is related to neuroticism and a tendency to aggress. On the other hand, empathic (i.e., nonruminative) guilt, which is orthogonal to aggression and unrelated to neuroticism, reflects a concern for the victim and a perceived need for reparation.

Additional difficulties in studies of guilt and shame concern the manner in which the emotion constructs are operationalized. For example, many older measures of guilt (e.g., Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory, Buss & Durkee, 1957; Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory, Mosher, 1966, 1968) are contaminated by items that are currently considered more indicative of shame. Most newer measures of guilt focus on either the empathic,
nonruminative form of guilt or the anxious, ruminative form of guilt, but not on both. In addition, many measures of psychopathology are limited by the tendency of some test takers to selectively over- or underendorse psychological symptoms. Even measures such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory--2 (MMPI--2; Dahlstrom, Butcher, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) that include subtle, empirically keyed items can be invalidated by the test taker's response style. In these situations, an indirect measure of psychological functioning may be a more useful means of obtaining information. In responding to indirect measures, such as the Rorschach (Exner, 1993), the test taker is unaware of the significance of various characteristics of his or her response and is, therefore, unable to influence test scores through a tendency to respond in a socially appropriate manner.

The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) is a cognitive-perceptual task that indirectly measures personality structure, psychopathology, and prosocial functioning. Responses are scored systematically, according to standardized scoring
criteria, resulting in a number of specific scores that each indicate the presence or absence of a particular style of personality, affective, or cognitive functioning. Because the test taker is unaware of the manner in which responses are scored and the significance of various responses, the ability to conceal psychological symptoms or negative aspects of functioning that create a vulnerability to psychopathology is reduced.

The present research provides a more rigorous test of the proposed links between guilt-proneness (both ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt), shame-proneness, and psychopathology. This rigor derives from using a measure that indirectly assesses both psychological symptoms and prosocial functioning, together with a measure of guilt- and shame-proneness that effectively operationalizes the guilt and shame constructs and considers both ruminative and nonruminative guilt.

The purpose of the present research is to investigate the relationships between proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, and psychological functioning and to examine gender differences in the relationships. This study attempts to
improve on past research in four ways.

First, the research employs assessment measures judged to be more clearly in line with the conceptualizations of guilt- and shame-proneness adopted for the present research. The instrument employed for the assessment of guilt- and shame-proneness measures both the nonruminative style of guilt-proneness, which moves the individual to engage in prosocial behavior, and the ruminative features of guilt-proneness, characterized by continued rumination over one's behavior and overcompensation for misdeeds. Only a few prior studies have examined both the maladaptive and the prosocial functions of guilt-proneness (Crowley & Ferguson, 1994, 1995).

Second, the instrument used for assessing psychopathology in this research overcomes the problems of the social desirability response set of test takers who are reluctant to reveal psychological difficulties. Using an indirect measure reduces the ability of the test taker to intentionally conceal problem areas. This research improves upon past research by providing a view of the
psychological functioning of the respondent that is uncluttered by the desire to respond in a socially appropriate manner.

Third, the measure of psychological functioning for this research includes measures of adaptive, prosocial functioning. Therefore, it is possible to examine not only the potentially negative effects of proneness to shame, ruminative guilt, and nonruminative guilt, but also the relationship of the three self-conscious emotions to healthy psychological and interpersonal functioning.

Finally, this research considers gender differences in the relationships between the emotion variables and psychological functioning. Although gender differences have been proposed in theory and some research evidence suggests the existence of gender differences, gender has not been considered in previous studies of guilt-proneness, shame-proneness, and varied forms of psychopathology.

This research examines whether the self-conscious emotions of shame-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, and nonruminative guilt-proneness are related to symptoms
of psychopathology and/or to healthy functioning, and whether gender differences exist in the relationships, by addressing the following research questions:

1. Are there gender differences in this sample in the levels of proneness to shame, proneness to ruminative guilt, and proneness to nonruminative guilt, as measured by the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989; revisions by Ferguson & Crowley, 1993)?

2. Are there gender differences in this sample in the levels of psychological symptoms, including depression (as measured by the depression index [DEPI] of the Rorschach [Exner, 1993]), narcissism (as measured by the reflection score of the Rorschach), anger (as measured by the white space [S] responses to the Rorschach), and dysphoric affect (as measured by the sum of shading responses on the Rorschach)?

3. Are there gender differences in this sample in the levels of prosocial tendencies, including positive interactions with other people (as measured by the cooperative movement [COP] score of the Rorschach), normal
need for closeness (as measured by the texture score of the Rorschach), and positive self-inspection (as measured by the form dimensionality [FD] score of the Rorschach)?

4. For males and females, what is the multivariate relationship between the Rorschach symptom variables of depression (as measured by the DEPI), narcissism (as measured by the reflection score), anger (as measured by the S responses), dysphoric affect (as measured by the sum of shading responses), and the self-conscious emotion variables of shame-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, and nonruminative guilt-proneness, as measured by the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified?

5. For males and females, what is the multivariate relationship between the Rorschach positive psychological functioning variables of positive interactions with other people (as measured by the COP score), normal need for closeness (as measured by the texture responses), and positive self-inspection (as measured by the FD score) and the TOSCA--M variables of shame-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, and nonruminative guilt-proneness, for males and for females?
It is hypothesized that females will have higher levels of depressive symptoms and dysphoric affect and that males will have higher levels of narcissism and anger. Females are also expected to exhibit higher levels of each of the three prosocial tendencies and each of the three self-conscious emotions. It is predicted that shame-proneness and ruminative guilt-proneness will be positively related to depressive symptomatology, narcissism, anger, and dysphoric affect. For females, it is expected that shame-proneness and ruminative guilt-proneness will correlate positively with depressive symptomatology and dysphoric affect; whereas for males, it is expected that shame-proneness and ruminative guilt-proneness will be positively related to anger and narcissism. It is anticipated that for males, ruminative guilt-proneness will be the predominant self-conscious emotion relating to psychological symptoms. For females, the strongest relationships are expected between the psychological symptoms and shame-proneness. These proposed gender differences, if obtained, are expected to represent different coping processes in men and women. It
is also expected that nonruminative guilt-proneness will be positively related to adaptive, prosocial tendencies, with no statistically significant gender differences.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This review will summarize the current understanding of the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and symptoms of psychopathology. To begin, definitions of the constructs guilt, shame, guilt-proneness, and shame-proneness will be provided. The distinction between ruminative and nonruminative guilt will be described, and the relationship between ruminative guilt and shame will be considered. The theory of Helen Block Lewis will be incorporated into the definitions, including the proposed relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and various forms of psychopathology. The theoretical relationship between each construct and vulnerability to psychopathology will then be discussed. The current state of research regarding the relationship between guilt, shame, and psychopathology will be summarized, including examination of measures used to assess guilt- and shame-proneness and the limitations of the research. The focus will then turn to a discussion of the Rorschach as a measure of psychopathology and its possible advantages in
examining the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychological symptoms that contribute to psychopathology.

Definitions

Guilt and Shame as States

Considerable disagreement currently exists concerning which psychophysiological states should be regarded as primary, fundamental, or discrete emotions (cf. Ekman, 1984; Fisher et al., 1990; Izard, 1977; Ortony, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tomkins, 1972, 1980). In some taxonomies, guilt and shame are both considered to be primary emotions, and some systems include one but not the other. Other theories include neither guilt nor shame as primary emotions because of the cognitive aspects of the two states. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, guilt and shame will both be regarded as emotions and, more specifically, as self-conscious emotions.

According to current psychological theories, the
experiences of guilt and shame are separate but related emotions. Two factors differentiate guilt and shame, namely, the role of the self (H. B. Lewis, 1971) and the focus of the negative affect (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al., 1992). As a result, the two emotions produce distinct phenomenological experiences in adults (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al., 1992), and even in children as young as 7 and 8 years old (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991). According to Barrett's (1995) functionalist approach, guilt and shame are social emotions that serve important functions. Each is associated with specific action tendencies and particular understandings about the self and others, although cognitive understanding is not required for the emergence of the emotions. Socialization obviously contributes to the development of shame and guilt, and this process contributes to the development of a sense of self. The state of guilt or shame is the immediate but temporary arousal of the emotion in situations that would, for most persons, evoke the emotion.
State of Shame

Shame is adaptive at the state level and functions to suppress arrogance, foster humility, and promote adherence or deference to group norms and standards of behavior. As we consider actions that would violate society's norms and standards, this internal evaluation (either conscious or unconscious) of "what others would think" serves to keep our behavior within socially acceptable limits (Scheff, 1988). Shame occurs when there is a discrepancy between the ego and the ego ideal (Ward, 1972). It involves the painful realization that the individual is something that he or she did not want to be. It functions to sustain ideals about who one wants to be and to preserve one's commitment to personal goals (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). The desire of the self to remain worthy of respect motivates conformity to society's expectations.

According to Helen Block Lewis (1979b), shame functions to restore the bond between the self and another person. It is "the self's vicarious experience of the other's negative evaluation" (p. 381). Although norm violations often trigger feelings of shame, the individual
experiencing shame does not focus on his or her behavior, but rather on the defective, worthless self, accompanied by a desire to hide rather than to make active reparation. This negative evaluation of the self rather than the behavior poses a threat to self-concept and identity. H. B. Lewis (1979b) stated that shame is the result of seeing the self from the viewpoint of the rejecting other for whom the self cares, and a normal reaction is hostility and an attempt to humiliate the other. However, the shamed individual values the other, and the thought of retaliation produces feelings of guilt. The only acceptable recourse is to direct the humiliated fury toward the self. The result may be tension, diffuse anxiety, or a drop in self-esteem.

Because the entire self is the "target of attack" (H. B. Lewis, 1979b, p. 381), shame is a more devastatingly painful experience than guilt. The focus on the self rather than on behavior results in shame being more self-conscious and private than guilt. It involves more autonomic reactions (e.g., blushing, sweating, increased heart rate) than guilt. The typical response to shame
involves lowering the head, averting the eyes, and wanting to disappear. Shame also tends to bind the tongue. As a result of its relative wordlessness, its imagery of being looked at, and its concrete autonomic activity, shame feels irrational and confusing and is frequently compounded by shame over feeling shame.

Other writers have described shame as a much more global and acutely painful experience than guilt (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989b). In shame, the entire self, not just the behavior, is negatively scrutinized by the self and found to be defective (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1990). There is a sense of being worthless and powerless (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989a, 1989b). The desire to deflect attention away from the exposed self produces a sense of shrinking and being small, and a longing to hide and withdraw from interpersonal contact or distance the self from the evaluating agent (Barrett, 1995; Ward, 1972), although it is also possible to be ashamed as the self confronts the self. When it is not possible to elude the scrutiny of others, shame can motivate rage and aggression, which serve as a means of
escaping the interpersonal realm by distancing the individual from others (H. B. Lewis, 1979b; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995).

State of Guilt

Guilt, as a state, is the feeling of discomfort that accompanies the realization that one has violated one's own moral standard. The center of attention is the specific behavior, often some kind of harm done to someone or something (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The individual is convinced that he or she had some control over the event and could have prevented something bad from occurring. He or she feels responsible and motivated toward setting things right (Barrett, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995). Guilt functions to restore the bond between one's behavior and the expectations of society (H. B. Lewis, 1971). It guards against the destruction of group ties (Modell, 1971). Friedman (1985) proposed that guilt is a biologically based sensitivity and concern that derives from the need to maintain relationships, arising when one has somehow harmed or failed to help significant others.
Jones, Kugler, and Adams (1995) have suggested that guilt is particularly salient in the case of transgressions that threaten the status of relationships, as opposed to transgressions that do not involve relationships. At a state level, guilt serves the adaptive function of motivating altruistic and prosocial behavior and inhibiting aggression (Merisca & Bybee, 1996; Tangney, 1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, & Krupnick, 1990) by serving as a self-inflicted punishment following transgressions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). It motivates confession and reparation (Tangney, 1992). Baumeister et al. (1994) maintained that guilt is most effective in promoting prosocial behavior within close relationships. Guilt functions to strengthen these social relationships by (a) prompting behaviors such as concern, respect, and positive treatment of the other; (b) influencing more powerful persons to make concessions to less powerful persons; and (c) restoring emotional equity within a dyad after a transgression by decreasing the happiness of the transgressor, which may, in turn, soothe the feelings of
the victim.

According to Helen Block Lewis, guilt is "the relation of the self to transgression for which it is responsible" (1979b, p. 375). It is the feeling of discomfort that arises from attention given to how one's behavior violates normative standards. Guilt is a more objective experience than shame because it is about actions or thoughts for which one is responsible, rather than being about the self. In contrast to the passive position of the self in shame, the self in guilt is actively engaged in the pursuit of making amends or thinking about the feeling of guilt. The person who feels guilty faces the difficulty of assessing the extent of his or her responsibility, determining what restitution is owed, and knowing when sufficient reparation has been made. Although guilt may be experienced as an uncomfortable state, the focus on specific, and presumably controllable, behaviors apart from the self leaves the self-concept and identity virtually intact (H. B. Lewis, 1971).
Guilt and Shame as Traits

There are individual differences in the extent to which persons experience the states of guilt and shame. When guilt and shame are used consistently and extensively to interpret experience, they become the emotion traits of proneness to guilt, which can take the form of either ruminative or nonruminative guilt, and proneness to shame. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the choice of whether ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, or shame is evoked by a specific situation depends less on the characteristics of the situation than on the meaning assigned to the experience by the individual (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992). According to one view, whether an emotion is adaptive or maladaptive depends upon how rationally the individual perceives the situation and the degree to which the emotion fosters personal development (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995). Limited empirical evidence suggests that women are more prone than men to report shame, ruminative guilt, and nonruminative guilt (Shiffler, 1993).
Trait of Shame

Shame as a trait exists when the individual repeatedly experiences shame in response to a wide variety of situations. The person for whom shame is a personality trait almost continuously experiences the painful self-denigration and the desire to withdraw or hide that occurs as a result of the belief that the entire self is defective. Shame becomes maladaptive when it involves adherence to unrealistic ideals or promotes the view that inherent and unchangeable characteristics of the individual are unacceptable (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995).

H. B. Lewis (1971, 1987) observed that a kind of humiliated fury, frequently directed against the self, may accompany the experience of shame as a trait, otherwise known as shame-proneness. She proposed that the greater value women place on interpersonal relationships makes them more vulnerable than men to the evaluation of others, and hence more prone to the emotion of shame. Because women in general are more sociable than men, they experience greater sadness and shame over social loss. Inasmuch as our culture tends to value sociability less
than productivity, women may respond by devaluing their social selves, thus making themselves more vulnerable to shame. In addition, H. B. Lewis saw women as more likely to direct their hostility inward because they are less aggressive than men.

**Trait of Guilt**

One of the clear weaknesses in prior research on guilt- and shame-proneness is the focus on either ruminative guilt or nonruminative guilt, to the exclusion of the other. Researchers such as Tangney and her associates (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1991; Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme, & Domingos, 1988; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989, 1992) and M. Lewis (1992) have viewed guilt as serving primarily adaptive functions, ignoring the possibility that a guilt-prone orientation can serve the person maladaptively. Guilt--in either the state or the trait form--has been seen as motivating the individual toward action that redresses the wrong, and once the transgression has been repaired, the discomfort and guilty
affect dissipate. This is what actually occurs in the case of proneness to "nonruminative guilt" or "empathic guilt," which might also be described as a well-developed conscience. Tangney (1993) contended that any maladaptive tendencies related to guilt are due to an overlay of shame.

In contrast, other researchers such as Harder and his associates (Harder, 1990, 1995; Harder et al., 1992; Harder & Lewis, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990) and Kugler and Jones (1992) have focused almost exclusively on "ruminative guilt" or "anxious guilt," in which the individual repeatedly accepts personal responsibility for negative events outside his or her control. In situations of actual wrongdoing, the offending individual believes that he or she can never do enough to properly atone for the wrongdoing. This leads to excessive rumination as the infraction, real or otherwise, is played out over and over again in the mind of the individual. Repeated efforts to make amends are never quite sufficient to rid the self of the nagging memories and the painful affect associated with the transgression. When the guilty individual is
unable to let go of self-reproach for the violation of a norm, feelings of guilt may be tied to inability to forgive the self. Guilt becomes ruminative, then, when it goes beyond appropriate redress, creating within the individual the sense that he or she should do more to make amends—even though nothing the individual does can ever bring relief from the feelings of guilt (Ferguson & Crowley, 1993). It is this "misplaced" responsibility—the inaccurate belief that one is responsible for events or circumstances over which the individual has no control—that appears to be the hallmark of ruminative guilt (Ferguson, 1996; Ferguson et al., 1996; Friedman, 1985). Examples of ruminative guilt in the face of lack of control over the outcome of a situation include survivor guilt, separation guilt (i.e., guilt over individuation), or guilt felt by persons who recognize that they have more of something than someone else (Modell, 1971).

Lindsay-Hartz et al. (1995) observed that persons who experience unresolved guilt often attempt to restore the moral balance through self-punishment, extreme measures to avoid future transgression, engaging in symbolic
behaviors, trying to right the wrong, or an obsession with order. They may feel guilty in connection with future situations that do not merit guilt, or they may create situations that correspond with their feelings of guilt. According to this view, the likelihood of guilt-proneness is increased when an individual (a) habitually takes responsibility for preventing bad things from happening, (b) believes in his or her ability to control such bad things, (c) exhibits high levels of empathy, and (d) desires to honor personal and moral commitments. Friedman (1985) referred to psychopathology that contains ruminative guilt as "pathologies of loyalty" (p. 530). de Rivera (1989) proposed that nonruminative guilt is characterized by a focus on caring for the other (with one's own ego having less importance). In contrast, ruminative guilt focuses on the self and is motivated by the fear of rejection or a defense against the recognition that unwanted events are outside one's control (with concern for the other having less importance).

Although Helen Block Lewis did not directly address the issue of "ruminative guilt" per se, she referred to it
indirectly. She lumped simultaneously evoked guilt and shame under the category of guilt and said that in such cases, guilty ideation combines with the painful self-reproach of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). According to this perspective, even after restitution has been made, shame functions to keep the guilty ideation alive.

Guilt, Shame, and Psychopathology

Theoretical Perspective: Guilt, Shame, and Pathology

H. B. Lewis (1985) posited that mental illness is the result of failure to maintain "our species' inherent sociability" (p. 151). When either shame or guilt goes unresolved, the result is symptom formation. The occasional experience of guilt or shame does not predispose the individual to psychopathology; rather, proneness to the emotions creates vulnerability to psychological symptoms (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

H. B. Lewis (1979b) proposed that when shame is the predominant emotion, with the self as the helpless target of hostility, the result is depression. Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al. (1992) expanded on the role of the
humiliated fury of shame in depression, stating that when the bitter, resentful anger of the shamed individual is suppressed, feelings of depression are the result. H. B. Lewis (1971, 1979b) also proposed that shame-proneness results in vulnerability to narcissism and conversion hysteria. On the other hand, guilt-proneness purportedly creates a vulnerability to thought-related disorders, such as paranoia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (H. B. Lewis, 1971, 1979b).

Research Findings: Guilt, Shame, and Pathology

A growing body of empirical evidence supports the notion that guilt- and shame-proneness are related to psychopathology and psychological symptoms. For example, Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) found that general psychological maladjustment is strongly related to shame-proneness. Contrary to the position of H. B. Lewis, shame-proneness relates more strongly than guilt-proneness to all indices of psychopathology employed in their study. It is important to note, however, that their measure of guilt- and shame-proneness utilizes a nonruminative
conceptualization of guilt. A summary of studies that examine specific types of psychopathology and psychological symptoms and their relationship to guilt and shame follows.

Depression

In what is probably the most robust and most frequently found relationship, shame-proneness has been positively correlated with depression and depressive symptomatology (e.g., \( r = .24 \) [with the variance associated with guilt statistically removed], Harder et al., 1992; \( r = .29 \) to \( .57 \), Hoblitzelle, 1987; \( r = .29 \), Shiffler, 1993; \( r = .32 \) to \( .51 \) [with the variance associated with guilt statistically removed]; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; \( r = .49 \), Wright et al., 1989). Depression is also related to blaming one's character for negative events (\( r = .72 \), Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 1981), which might be construed as a manifestation of shame.

In studies employing measures that tap a more ruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, guilt is related to clinical levels of depression (e.g., \( r = .40 \) to
.42, Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990) and depressive symptomatology (e.g., \( r = .21 \) to \( .51 \) [with the variance associated with shame statistically removed], Hoblitzelle, 1987; \( r = .37 \), Jones & Kugler, 1993; \( r = .26 \), Niler & Beck, 1989; \( r = .24 \), Shiffler, 1993; \( r = .18 \), Wright et al., 1989). It is important to note, however, that the authors who consider depression in relation to both guilt and shame find weaker correlations for guilt than for shame. Moreover, some of the measures of guilt do not adequately differentiate between guilt and shame (e.g., Niler & Beck, 1989).

**Narcissism**

Wright et al. (1989) found an inverse relationship between shame and narcissism (\( r = -.21 \)). However, when Gramzow and Tangney (1992) considered healthy versus pathological aspects of narcissism, they found a positive relationship between shame-proneness (with the variance associated with guilt-proneness statistically removed) and pathological aspects of narcissism such as exploitation or a sense of entitlement (\( r = .13 \) to \( .18 \)) and the defense of splitting (i.e., separation of good and bad images of the
self and others, $r = .34$ to $.36$). In contrast, shame-proneness was inversely related to features of narcissism that the authors considered healthier, including leadership ($r = -.36$ to $-.37$), superiority ($r = -.07$ to $-.09$), and self-absorption ($r = -.31$ to $-.32$). They found no statistically significant relationships between narcissism and their nonruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness. Wright et al. (1989) also found a positive relationship between their ruminative conceptualization of guilt and narcissism for men but not women ($r = .29$). In addition, men were more prone than women to narcissism ($p < .05$).

**Anger**

In two studies reported by Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al. (1992), shame-proneness (with the variance associated with guilt-proneness statistically removed) was positively correlated with trait anger ($r = .18$ to $:.30$), anger arousal ($r = .12$ to $:.24$), suspiciousness ($r = .38$ to $:.39$), resentment ($r = .42$ to $:.45$), irritability ($r = .30$ to $:.36$), blaming others for negative events ($r = .27$ to $:.41$), and indirect expressions of hostility ($r = .17$).
Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) also found hostility/anger to be related to shame ($r = .13$ to .24).

In neither study was their nonruminative conceptualization of guilt related to indices of anger ($r = -.05$ to .03).

Harder et al. (1992), using a ruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, found guilt-proneness to be associated with anger ($r = .28$ [with the variance associated with shame-proneness statistically removed]), whereas the association between shame-proneness and anger ($r = -.12$) was lower and in the opposite direction.

Other Pathologies

In their aforementioned study of the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychopathology, Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) found that shame-proneness (with the variance associated with guilt statistically removed) was positively related to every measure of psychological symptoms that they employed. In each of the three studies they reported, nine psychological symptoms were considered. Only one of their 27 correlations failed to achieve statistical significance
at the $p < .05$ level, and 25 of the remaining 26 correlations were significant at the $p < .01$ or $p < .001$ level. In addition to depression and anger, the psychological symptoms included somatization ($r = .07$ to .26), obsessive-compulsive behavior ($r = .25$ to .32), psychoticism ($r = .22$ to .32), paranoia ($r = .19$ to .38), interpersonal sensitivity ($r = .36$ to .49), anxiety (state and trait) ($r = .18$ to .29), and phobic anxiety ($r = .23$ to .41). None of the relationships with their nonruminative conceptualization of guilt reached statistical significance. In addition, it was on the basis of very large sample sizes that many of their rather low correlations achieved statistical significance.

Harder et al. (1992) found shame-proneness (with the variance associated with guilt statistically removed) to be positively related to obsessive-compulsive behavior ($r = .38$), interpersonal sensitivity ($r = .29$), psychoticism ($r = .20$), and phobic anxiety ($r = .24$). Their ruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness is positively related to somaticization ($r = .30$), interpersonal sensitivity ($r = .31$), anxiety ($r = .21$), and psychoticism ($r = .26$).
Niler and Beck (1989) found guilt to be the best predictor of obsessional thoughts. Shame is positively related to neuroticism ($r = .17$ to $.31$, Johnson et al. [1987]; $r = .17$ to $.35$, Johnson, Kim, & Danko [1989]).

Although not directly examining psychopathology, Jones and Kugler (1993) obtained correlations between a measure of guilty affect as a trait and various descriptors of psychological and interpersonal functioning. They concluded that trait guilt is associated with difficulty initiating and maintaining satisfying relationships.

**Psychologically Healthy Behavior**

It is also useful to consider the relationship between the emotion constructs and the absence of psychopathology or psychological symptoms and the presence of prosocial behaviors. Such a relationship might be expected in the case of proneness to nonruminative guilt. In a study examining shame-proneness, a ruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, and empathic responsiveness, Tangney (1991) obtained a positive correlation between empathy and proneness to guilt.
(r = .10 to .44, with the variance associated with shame-proneness statistically removed). In contrast, self-focused personal distress—a maladaptive, more self-oriented index of empathic overarousal—is positively related to shame-proneness (r = .34). According to Merisca and Bybee (1996), guilt is associated with higher levels of volunteerism and interpersonal prosocial behavior and lower levels of aggressiveness and negative racial attitudes. Individuals higher in guilt are viewed as more caring, trustworthy, and thoughtful by associates. However, the guilt measure employed in their study (the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale, Mosher, 1966, 1968) may reflect moral standards more than guilt (Kugler & Jones, 1992).

Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al. (1992) found that their nonruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, with the variance associated with shame statistically removed, has a negative relationship with blame of others (r = -.12 to -0.24), trait anger (r = -.01 to -.13), resentment (r = -.16 to -.21), hostility (r = -.15 to -.16), and suspiciousness (r = -.06 to -.12). In
addition, in their study of psychopathology, Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) obtained negligible, and in many cases negative, correlations between guilt-proneness and all indices of psychopathology ($r = -.17$ to $+.11$).

It is important to note that because partial correlations have been employed in much of this research, it is unclear exactly what is being measured when the variance shared by the two constructs is removed. It is possible that guilt and shame, even in their purest forms, share certain important characteristics and that in the effort to take a univariate approach in distinguishing between the two emotions, meaningful information is being lost.

Implicit in the foregoing studies is the premise that guilt- and shame-proneness act as precursors to psychopathology, that they increase vulnerability to psychopathology, and that a causal relationship might exist. However, correlational results only indicate the existence of a relationship between the variables, and no longitudinal studies have been conducted to investigate the hypothesis that proneness to guilt and/or shame are
risk factors involved in the etiology of psychopathology.

Measurement in Previous Research

This section will begin with a discussion of measures used in assessing proneness to guilt and shame. A historical overview of the measures used in earlier research will be provided, followed by a discussion of measures being employed in current research. Strengths and limitations of the measures will be described. Finally, a brief discussion of problems in the measurement of psychopathology in previous research on guilt and shame will be presented.

Measurement of Guilt and Shame

Measurement difficulties have plagued prior research on the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychopathology. The elusive nature of the guilt and shame constructs hampers their measurement, which is still in its infancy. Most measures to date have not reliably differentiated between the two emotions. This difficulty has, in part, reflected disagreement among researchers
concerning definitions of the constructs.

**Historical Overview**

Assessment of guilt-proneness historically preceded attempts to assess shame-proneness. However, given the current definitions of guilt- and shame-proneness, older measures of guilt-proneness are incorrectly labeled inasmuch as they tap into features of both shame and guilt. For example, Tangney and her colleagues (Tangney, 1996; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) have suggested that the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 1957), the G-Trait scale of the Perceived Guilt Index (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973), and Mosher's (1966, 1968) Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory were developed without considering conceptual differences between shame and guilt. The Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (1966, 1968) also appears to contain items that tap moral standards rather than proneness to guilt (Kugler & Jones, 1992; Tangney, 1996). Harder and Lewis (1987) found that the Mosher Total Guilt Scale lacks construct validity, especially for women. Finally, the Reaction Inventory-Guilt (Evans, Jessup, & Hearn, 1975) is based on the
assumption that specific situations are likely to result in feelings of guilt. However, this measure is likely to confound guilt and shame because the choice of guilt or shame in reaction to an event is due more to the personal style of the individual than to the characteristics of the situation (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992).

Older measures assessing both guilt- and shame-proneness in a single instrument have not fared much better. Harder and Lewis (1987) examined the guilt and shame scales from the Beall Situational Upset Scale (Smith, 1972) and from the Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) coding system and found serious problems with psychometric soundness. Additionally, Tangney (1996) criticized Beall's measure for its assumption that different types of situations are either guilt-inducing or shame-inducing.

**Current Measures**

Authors of older instruments are not alone in their difficulties with operationalizing the concepts of guilt- and shame-proneness. Problems with reliability and validity also plague data derived from some of the newer
guilt- and shame-proneness instruments. Still under question is whether the instruments clearly differentiate between the constructs and whether the methods of assessment actually tap into the emotions. Differences also exist in conceptual definitions of the two emotions upon which measures are based, especially in the case of guilt. In addition, a current debate in the literature addresses the merits of adjective-based measures versus situationally based measures.

Situational Guilt Scale. Klass's (1987) Situational Guilt Scale is based on a number of so-called guilt-inducing situations. However, in her recent review of measures of guilt- and/or shame-proneness, Tangney (1996) criticizes the measure for its failure to differentiate between guilt and shame.

Guilt Inventory. The Trait Guilt Scale of the Kugler and Jones (1992) Guilt Inventory consists of 20 statements with which respondents indicate the magnitude of their agreement. Although Tangney (1996) praised the Guilt Inventory for the effort made to avoid confounding guilt with shame, she noted that it does contain a few items
reflective of shame.


Dimensions of Conscious Questionnaire. The Dimensions of Conscious Questionnaire (Johnson et al., 1987) is based on situations that are specifically coded as inducing either guilt or shame. However, because individuals might react to the same situation with either guilt or shame (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992), depending on their own emotional style, this measure appears to confound the two emotions.

Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS). In a recent study, Harder et al. (1992) examined the construct validity of several measures of guilt- and shame-proneness. They correlated each guilt and shame measure with nine personality dimensions, whose predicted relationships with the emotions were theoretically determined. They concluded that a slightly modified
version of the shame scale from the Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (Hoblitzelle, 1982, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990) is the best instrument for the measurement of shame-proneness. However, Tangney (1990, 1996) criticized checklist measures such as the ASGS on the grounds that they require the respondent to distinguish between the terms "guilt" and "shame" in an abstract context, which is a difficult task even for well-educated adults (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). Adjective checklists also require the individual to make global evaluations of the self's emotional experience, which Tangney and her associates (Tangney, 1990; Tangney et al., 1995) contend is essentially a shame-related task. An additional limitation to the ASGS is its requirement that respondents be familiar with rather advanced vocabulary (Harder, 1995; Tangney, 1990, 1996). Tangney (1990) also noted that there is overlapping of the ASGS shame and guilt factors, indicating problems with divergent validity.

**Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2).** According to Harder et al. (1992), the shame scale of the Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2; Harder, 1990; Harder &
Lewis, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990; Harder et al., 1992) has only slightly less construct validity than the ASGS shame scale. They conclude that the PFQ2 may be a more appropriate measure of shame for subjects who may have trouble with the more complex vocabulary of the ASGS. The guilt scale of the PFQ2 appears to capture Caprara et al.'s (1992) "anxious guilt." Harder et al. (1992) found the PFQ2 guilt scale to be the one measure of guilt in their study that consistently demonstrates concurrent validity, although it has considerable overlap with the shame scale. However, social desirability may severely limit the utility of data derived from such direct self-report measures, because respondents may defensively deny the experience of emotions that they deem to be undesirable (Harder & Lewis, 1987). In addition, Tangney (1990) criticized the PFQ2 on the grounds that direct questions such as "Do you feel guilty?" depend on the ability of respondents to differentiate the meaning of the terms guilt and shame without any descriptors of related phenomenology. Research findings from both Tangney (1989b) and Lindsay-Hartz (1984) suggest that it is very
difficult for adults to differentiate and define guilt and shame in the abstract. Yet in other research by Tangney and her associates (Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), adult subjects who were asked to describe guilt and shame experiences were easily able to do so. Moreover, the guilt narratives and shame narratives clearly differed in terms of phenomenological and behavioral experience. Therefore, Tangney's criticism of adjective measures appears to be weakened by her own research.

**Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI)**. In an attempt to overcome the limitations of more direct measures and, thereby, obtain more valid assessment of proneness to shame and proneness to guilt, Tangney et al. (1988) developed the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) for use with a college-student population. The SCAAI measures characteristic affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses associated with shame and nonruminative guilt. Respondents are asked to imagine themselves in each of 13 situations experienced by college students. Following each scenario, respondents
are presented with a list of responses, among which are a guilt response and a shame response for every scenario. Respondents rate each response according to their likelihood of responding in that manner. Tangney (1996) has contended that situation-based measures are especially appropriate for measuring guilt- and shame-proneness because they do not elicit feelings of shame about feeling guilty, because asking about respondents' feelings in specific situations rather than global tendencies is less likely to arouse defensive denial, and because they do not rely on the ability of respondents to differentiate between the terms "guilt" and "shame" in the abstract. The SCAAI yields data with acceptable reliability and validity. For example, Tangney (1991) obtained internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's alpha) that ranged from .74 to .82 for the shame scale and from .62 to .70 for the guilt scale. Test-retest reliability for the shame scale was .79. The shame subscale of the SCAAI correlated moderately with the shame subscale of Hoblitzelle's (1987) Revised Shame-Guilt Scale, whereas the guilt subscale of the SCAAI correlated moderately with the guilt subscale of
the Mosher (1966, 1968) Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (Tangney, 1990). The SCAAI was not considered in the Harder et al. (1992) construct validation study. However, estimates of internal consistency reliability tend to be somewhat lower for scenario-based measures than for adjective checklist measures (Tangney, 1996). Additionally, Tangney's scenario-based measures of guilt may be assessing adherence to moral standards rather than a tendency to regularly experience the emotion of guilt (Ferguson & Crowley, 1996; Kugler & Jones, 1992).

Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA). Tangney et al.'s Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney et al., 1989) was created in the same format as the SCAAI. It contains 15 "subject-generated" scenarios that have been found to yield data that are equivalent or superior to the SCAAI in terms of reliability and validity (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992); internal consistency reliability was .66 for the TOSCA guilt scale and .76 for the shame scale. Harder et al. (1992) determined that the TOSCA shame scale has construct validity similar to the PFQ2 and suggested that its simpler vocabulary makes it
more appropriate than the ASGS for subjects with less education. However, the TOSCA was the only measure in the Harder et al. (1992) study to obtain highly statistically significant differences between the mean scores of male and female subjects. It is possible that these differences may be due to the tendency of women to self-report more intense emotional experiences than do men in general (cf. Brody, 1996; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991), especially when they are asked directly about their emotional experience, when the emotion is observable, when the emotion occurs in an interpersonal context, and when global rather than situational emotionality is being assessed. An alternative possibility is that the TOSCA captures actual differences between men and women in proneness to the emotional experience of guilt and shame.

An additional concern regarding the TOSCA is the theoretical conceptualization of guilt-proneness as an entirely positive, functional emotion, a reflection of Caprara et al.'s (1992) "empathic guilt." The Tangney et al. (1995) conceptualization suggested that guilt involves
only the negative evaluation of specific action and that any ruminative response to feelings of guilt is an indication of shame. For example, the guilt response to the TOSCA scenario in which a person unintentionally misses a lunch appointment with a friend is, "You would try to make it up to him as soon as possible." Clearly, this response reflects a behavioral response rather than negative self-feeling and taps into the more nonruminative components of guilt. Kugler and Jones (1992) have suggested that Tangney's measure is measuring moral standards rather than guilt per se. Harder (1995) criticizes Tangney's distinction between shame and guilt for being too narrowly focused on whether negative self-evaluation originates in the global self or specific behavior. Harder et al. (1992) criticize the TOSCA as not measuring guilt well and resulting in very weak correlations with other guilt measures when the variance shared with shame is statistically removed. Other researchers (e.g., Malatesta & Wilson, 1988) have determined that any negative or positive emotion can serve the individual maladaptively, depending upon its
regularity of occurrence and appropriateness to the situation. The fact that guilt in excess can be maladaptive points to the limitations of Tangney's measure in assessing guilt-proneness in its ruminative form.

**Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M).**

In an attempt to capture both the ruminative and nonruminative (i.e., empathic and anxious) aspects of guilt, Ferguson and Crowley (1993) have modified the TOSCA by adding an additional response choice to each TOSCA scenario. These additional response items were generated to assess the respondent's level of ruminative guilt-proneness, which is characterized by excessive rumination over the behavior and overcompensation for misdeeds. For example, the ruminative guilt response for the first scenario is, "You cannot apologize enough for forgetting the appointment." The ruminative guilt response implies that it is virtually impossible to make up for having missed the lunch appointment. Rather than providing for appropriate reparation, ruminative guilt is likely to result in the individual's obsessing over the misdeed.

Crowley and Ferguson (1994) found the ruminative
guilt scale of the TOSCA--M to have internal consistency reliability (high .60s) equal to or greater than that of Tangney et al.'s (1989) original guilt scale (high .50s). Correlations between scores for the ruminative guilt scale and the TOSCA guilt and shame scales were positive (.60 and high .60s, respectively) and of greater magnitude than the correlations between the scores for the original TOSCA guilt and shame scales (correlations not reported). Correlations between scores for the ruminative guilt scale and checklist measures of guilt and shame were low to moderate (low .20s and low .30s, respectively), supporting the previous finding that the method of assessment markedly influences the magnitude of the relationship (e.g., Crowley & Anderson, 1993; Ferguson & Stegge, 1993).

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the assessment of guilt- and shame-proneness continues to be a controversial endeavor, plagued by ongoing disagreement regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of the emotion constructs.
Measurement of Psychopathology

Guilt and shame measures are not the only source of measurement difficulty in this body of research. Many measures of psychopathology are limited by the tendency of some test takers to give socially appropriate responses and others to respond with a pathological response set. Although some widely used measures such as the MMPI (Dahlstrom et al., 1989) have validity measures fashioned to detect a social desirability and pathological response sets, it is nevertheless impossible to prevent an individual from responding to these measures in a manner that exaggerates either social appropriateness or pathology. Many measures, such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), lack validity scales and are thus subject to the problems of self-report measures (e.g., lack of reporting, response set). Especially in analogue research, subjects are frequently reluctant to reveal psychological difficulties. In these situations, an indirect measure of psychological functioning may be a more useful means of obtaining information. An additional difficulty is that most
measures focus on pathology and lack indices of healthy functioning. As a result, few have scales that could intuitively be related to the nonruminative conceptualization of guilt. One measure that has the potential for overcoming these limitations is the Rorschach (Exner, 1993).

**The Rorschach: A Measure of Psychopathology**

The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) is considered one of the top measures of psychological functioning. However, much controversy has historically surrounded the Rorschach, which in the past was interpreted using content analysis. How, it has been asked, can one's responses to a set of ambiguous inkblots tell us anything about that individual's psychological functioning? Is it not the subjective impression of the examiner that is reflected in interpretations of Rorschach responses?

Most academics and many clinicians have depicted the MMPI as the "standard of psychological assessment" (Kendall & Norton-Ford, 1982, p. 310), while portraying the Rorschach as interesting but unscientific. In fact,
many concur with the statement of Jensen (1965): "The rate of scientific progress in clinical psychology might well be measured by the speed and thoroughness with which it gets over the Rorschach" (p. 238). Empirical evidence, however, contradicts this viewpoint. The results of meta-analytic studies indicate that the psychometric properties of the Rorschach are adequate and roughly equivalent to those of the MMPI when the research is based on sound theoretical or empirical rationale (Atkinson, 1986; Parker, 1983; Parker, Hanson, & Hunsley, 1992).

Questions of reliability and validity have been addressed by the comprehensive scoring and interpretation system of John E. Exner, Jr. (1993). With the use of a systematic scoring system, specific characteristics of Rorschach responses are scored in a consistent manner, providing the opportunity to compare the psychological functioning of the test taker with that of others who respond in a similar manner. According to Exner (1980), the Rorschach is a set of stimuli which, under a given instructional set, provoke into operation many of the "natural" psychological features of the individual that have formed or are forming; or stated
differently, it provokes the response tendencies or styles that will ultimately be among those features that mark the person as a personality. (pp. 573-574)

The logic behind the Rorschach is that an individual's responses to ambiguous stimuli will be consistent with his or her accustomed manner of responding to the world in less precise situations, thus revealing the test taker's "routine" psychology (Exner, 1980).

The Rorschach is an indirect means of obtaining information about the habitual perceptual-cognitive style, personality style, and psychopathology of the individual test taker. According to Weiner (1995a), the Rorschach measures both personality structure and personality dynamics. It examines many different aspects of personality, including

(a) how people attend to, perceive, and think about events in their lives; (b) how they experience and express affect; (c) what attitudes they hold toward themselves, others, and interpersonal relationships; and (d) the nature and adequacy of their preferred style of coping with life situations and managing stress. (p. 330)

In test-retest studies involving the reliability of the Rorschach (Exner, 1980), the greatest change occurred in scores that were influenced by current stressors, and
thus not expected to be consistent from one testing to the next. In contrast, those scores that reflected the individual's basic style of perceptual-cognitive operations remained relatively consistent ($r = .64$ to $.89$). Even when test takers were instructed in subsequent tests to give responses different from those in the original test, and the verbiage of the two responses differed significantly, the scored characteristics of the new responses were remarkably similar to the original responses and tended to reveal the same psychological processes. Shontz and Green (1992) concluded that the Rorschach is psychometrically sound, with good reliability and validity when used properly.

Rorschach scores are derived from several aspects of the response to each inkblot, including the location of the blot area used in the response, the complexity of the response, the characteristics of the blot that led the respondent to give the response (e.g., form, color, shading), whether what the respondent reported can be easily perceived in the blot, the presence of a pair of objects or the perception of a reflection in the blot, the
object(s) named and whether the response is the same as the most commonly given response, and how much cognitive organization is required for the response. In addition, a number of special scores reflect specific characteristics of the response, such as illogical thinking, implausible relationships between objects, negativism, and a cooperative view of interpersonal relationships (Exner, 1993).

Scores from all responses are summed, and from the summed scores a number of combined scores and ratios are derived in a structural summary of the test. Focusing on structural summary data rather than individual responses allows the examiner to obtain a composite drawing, as it were, of the respondent's overall psychological functioning, in addition to increasing reliability and validity over using individual test items (Weiner, 1995a). Several combined scores reveal the respondent's level of current and chronic stressors, his or her resources for dealing with stressors, and whether the respondent relies more on emotion or thought in problem solving. Other combined scores reveal specific characteristics of
affective functioning, interpersonal behavior, self-perception, and three areas of cognitive functioning (i.e., information processing, mediation, and ideation). Specific psychological symptoms may be assessed by means of scores that reflect narcissism, anger, and dysphoric affect. In addition, various constellations of combined scores reveal the respondent's degree of suicide potential, depressive thinking, hypervigilance, obsessionality, deficient coping ability, and characteristics of schizophrenia such as paranoia (Exner, 1993).

Construct Validity of the Rorschach Indices

Past research has been conducted to examine the construct validity of many Rorschach indices. Selected research findings for some of the indices that are most salient to the present study are reported below.

The depression index (DEPI) accurately identified 81% of depressed persons, with only 3% of nondepressed persons being incorrectly classified. The index is more precise in identifying individuals who exhibit the emotional and
cognitive aspects of depression, while it is less accurate with helpless depressions (Exner, 1993).

Reflection responses are used as the measure of the degree of narcissism and self-centered presentation. Reflection responses to the Rorschach have been shown to have considerable temporal stability (Exner, 1993).

The sum of the shading responses (including achromatic color responses) is used as an indicator of dysphoric affect or subjectively felt distress. Its values were higher in character disordered subjects and in seriously depressed subjects. The diffuse shading portion of the score is highly unstable and appears to relate to situational stress. Of the other contributors to the score, texture and vista are very stable and achromatic color has test-retest correlations ranging from the middle .60s to the middle .70s (Exner, 1993).

The cooperative movement score (COP) is considered to be an indication of the degree to which respondents expect and experience positive interactions with other people. In a study of female college freshmen, individuals with higher COP scores were found to be more trustworthy and
liked by their peers (Exner, 1993).

Texture responses (T) relate to the need for affection. An abnormally high need for affection was found in recently divorced or separated subjects, whereas an apparent abandonment of the need for affection was observed in foster-home children (Exner, 1993).

Form dimensionality (FD) responses are related to positive self-inspection, unless they occur with greater than expected frequency. The number of FD responses tends to be greater in persons undergoing psychotherapy (Exner, 1993).

The Rorschach is appropriate for guilt and shame research because it is useful in assessing the emotional style and self-concept of the respondent (Erdberg, 1990). The Rorschach yields a picture of the respondent that includes the presence or absence of psychological symptoms expected to coincide with proneness to shame and/or ruminative guilt (e.g., narcissism, depressive thinking, anger). In addition, several scores might be expected to correlate with a nonruminative, prosocial conceptualization of guilt (e.g., interpersonal
cooperation, normal need for affection, positive self-inspecting behaviors). But the major advantage of the Rorschach in this research is its ability to indirectly measure psychological functioning, thus avoiding the pitfalls of the social desirability response set that plagues most analogue research examining correlates of psychopathology.

It becomes clear from the foregoing review that the use of the Rorschach as a measure of psychopathology and psychological symptoms provides the potential to overcome many of the limitations of previous research on guilt and shame and answer questions that have been, up to now, answered only tentatively.

Summary

Ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame are complex emotions that share certain phenomenological features while also being, in many respects, distinct in terms of both cognitions and the feeling experience. For individuals who consistently rely on one or more of these self-conscious emotions to organize and interpret
experience, the emotions become personality traits. Limited empirical evidence exists to suggest that women are more prone than men to all three emotions. Recent attempts to measure proneness to shame, proneness to ruminative guilt, and proneness to nonruminative guilt have resulted in more conceptually and psychometrically sound instruments than those used historically.

Recent empirical evidence suggests that proneness to shame and/or ruminative guilt is associated with symptoms of various forms of psychopathology, whereas nonruminative guilt is associated with prosocial, altruistic functioning and a lack of pathological symptomatology. However, the conclusions of studies examining this issue are weakened by measurement issues, such as the failure to operationalize guilt and shame according to carefully circumscribed definitions, assessing guilt in a manner that evokes shame, and the lack of both ruminative and nonruminative conceptualizations of guilt. Moreover, most measures of psychopathology are limited by the reluctance of research participants to reveal potentially pathological aspects of themselves.
The TOSCA--M (Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by Ferguson & Crowley, 1993) appears to measure ruminative guilt-proneness, nonruminative guilt-proneness, and shame-proneness as they are conceptualized in the present research. In addition, it measures guilt cleanly, without presenting respondents with a shame-inducing task. The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) indirectly measures psychological symptomatology at the same time that it assesses various facets of prosocial functioning, while avoiding the clouding effect of a defensive response set.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

Since the intent of the present research was to assess levels of guilt- and shame-proneness that exist in a normal, nonclinical population, the subjects for this study were male and female college students in introductory psychology classes at Utah State University. Because introductory psychology is a required course for students across the spectrum of college majors, students in introductory psychology classes at Utah State University are fairly representative of the USU population as a whole. Inasmuch as USU is unique as a rural university with a predominantly Mormon student body, this research attempted to replicate previous research results in other cultures in order to facilitate generalization to the college population as a whole.

Utah State University is located in Logan, Cache County, Utah, a small rural community. According to recent U. S. Census figures (U. S. Department of Commerce,
1990), the median age of Cache County residents is 23.7 years and 94.82% of the population is white. Statistics from the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Utah (1990) indicate that, in 1987, 32% of Cache County residents over age 25 had completed a high school education, and an additional 27.1% had completed at least four years of college. Per capita personal income for 1987 was $10,181.

Research was conducted using preexisting data that were collected by Dr. Susan L. Crowley from members of introductory psychology classes at Utah State University from 1992 to 1994, plus additional data collected from members of introductory psychology classes from 1995 to 1996. A total of 44 male and 48 female volunteer subjects participated. Data from one male subject was excluded from analyses due to language difficulties in completing the Rorschach. Table 1 presents basic demographic information for the sample, minus the excluded subject. Students were given extra credit for their participation. Institutional Review Board approval was obtained by Dr. Susan L. Crowley (see Appendix A), and data collection was
Table 1

Description of Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Variable</th>
<th>Males (n = 43)</th>
<th>Females (n = 48)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (SD)</td>
<td>21.29 (3.07)</td>
<td>19.50 (3.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>18 to 31</td>
<td>17 to 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>37 (86.0)</td>
<td>42 (87.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1 (2.3)</td>
<td>1 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>1 (2.3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>4 (9.3)</td>
<td>5 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>30 (69.8)</td>
<td>38 (79.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>11 (25.6)</td>
<td>6 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2 (4.7)</td>
<td>3 (6.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conducted in accordance with American Psychological Association ethical guidelines for research with human subjects.
Procedure

Students in the introductory psychology classes were informed by their instructors of the opportunity to earn extra credit for the class by completing two psychological measures outside of class time. They were assured that the information they divulged would remain anonymous. Volunteers completed an informed consent form (see Appendix B). Administration of the Rorschach (Exner, 1993) was followed by the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M; Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by Ferguson & Crowley, 1993; see Appendix C). This order of administration was determined because the ambiguity of the Rorschach was unlikely to evoke feelings of guilt or shame in the respondent. On the other hand, feelings raised by administering the TOSCA--M first could conceivably have influenced Rorschach responses. The measures were administered by examiners who were blind to the purpose of the study. Standard instructions for both instruments were given. Demographic information (i.e., gender, age, race, marital status) was also collected.

Standardized administration for the Rorschach has
been developed (Exner, 1993) and was followed. The Rorschach was administered to subjects by several different administrators who had completed a Rorschach course of training and who were judged by the course instructor to be competent in Rorschach administration. The primary researcher did not administer the Rorschach to subjects. Scoring was completed by scorers who had completed the Rorschach course and who were judged by the instructor as competent in Rorschach scoring. The Rorschach computer scoring program was used to detect obvious scoring errors. Shadow scoring (i.e., a second scoring of Rorschach protocols) was performed by the primary researcher on all of the Rorschachs, as recommended (Exner, 1991; Weiner, 1995a). Scoring disagreements were decided by the faculty member who teaches the Rorschach course.

Criteria for exclusion of Rorschach protocols from data analysis included: (a) short protocols (i.e., less than 14 responses) (Exner, 1993); (b) protocols with a number of responses involving sex, violence, or other bizarre content, combined with excellent form quality; (c)
errors of administration (e.g., failure to make appropriate inquiries); and (d) inadequate ability of the subject to respond to the Rorschach. Determination of the last three criteria was made by the primary researcher and a faculty member experienced with the Rorschach. One protocol was excluded from further consideration based on the respondent's difficulty with the English language.

Measures

**Psychological Symptoms and Prosocial Tendencies**

The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) was used as the measure of psychological symptoms. The Rorschach is an indirect measure of the habitual perceptual-cognitive style, personality style, and psychological symptoms of the individual test taker. The test consists of 10 cards, each of which is imprinted with a standardized, symmetrical inkblot. Five of the inkblots are composed entirely of black ink, whereas two inkblots include some red ink along with the black. The remaining three inkblots are multicolored. Reliability and validity information for the Rorschach were reported in Chapter II,
Because three of the Rorschach variables are treated as categorical variables and the other four as continuous variables in the present research, two types of analyses were required for answering each research question involving Rorschach variables. Therefore, a description of each variable and its status as a categorical or continuous variable is in order.

Categorical Rorschach Variables

**Depression.** Depressive symptoms were assessed by means of the DEPI of the Rorschach. Interpretively, DEPI is a dichotomous variable that indicates the presence or absence of depression and should not be used otherwise. A DEPI score of 5 or higher (with a total of 7 possible) is indicative of possible depression. For purposes of this research, DEPI was coded as present (for scores ranging from 5 to 7) or not present (for scores below 5). Twenty-one subjects, or 23% of subjects (12 males, 9 females), were positive on the DEPI.

**Need for affection.** Need for affection was assessed using the texture responses on the Rorschach. Texture is
a categorical variable in which one response indicates an appropriate need for affection. A score of zero suggests that the subject is denying the natural need for affection, whereas two or more texture responses indicate excessive neediness for affection. Sixty-six percent of subjects (31 males, 29 females) did not give a texture response, whereas 24 subjects (26%; 11 males, 13 females) gave one texture response and 7 subjects (8%; 1 male, 6 females) gave two or more texture responses.

**Self-inspection.** Self-inspection was assessed by means of the form dimensionality responses on the Rorschach. A score of zero indicates a lack of positive self-inspection. One or two form dimensionality responses indicate that the individual engages in a typical level of positive self-inspection. More than two form dimensionality responses suggests that self-inspection may be excessive and may not be entirely positive. Half of the subjects (50%; 18 males, 28 females) gave one form dimensionality response, whereas 37 subjects (41%; 21 males, 16 females) did not give a form dimensionality response and 8 subjects (8%; 4 males, 4 females) gave two
or more form dimensionality responses.

**Continuous Rorschach Variables**

**Narcissism.** Narcissism was measured by means of the number of Rorschach reflection responses. The presence of even one reflection response is considered indicative of narcissism. The range for this sample was zero to five reflection responses.

**Anger.** Anger was assessed by means of the Rorschach white space responses. Because fewer than four white space responses are not considered problematic, zero to three white space responses were coded as zero for the purpose of analysis. Scores of four and above were coded according to their actual value. The range for this sample was 0 to 11 white space responses.

**Dysphoric affect.** Dysphoric affect was assessed by the Rorschach sum of shading variables (i.e., C', T, V, and Y). As the number of shading responses increases, the level of dysphoric affect is expected to increase. A mode of three shading responses is expected in a normal population. The range for this sample was 0 to 17 shading responses.
Cooperation. The number of Rorschach COP responses was used as the measure of expectation of cooperation and positive interactions in relationships. A mode of two COP responses is expected in a normal population (Exner, 1993). As the number of COP responses increases, cooperation and likability in relationships are expected to increase. The range for this sample was zero to four COP responses.

Guilt- and Shame-Proneness

The Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M; Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by Ferguson & Crowley, 1993) was employed as the measure of proneness to ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame. The TOSCA--M is a paper-and-pencil measure that the subject completes independently. It consists of 15 brief scenarios characteristic of day-to-day life. For example, subjects are asked to respond to the following situation: "You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him up." Following each scenario, respondents are offered a number of empirically keyed
responses, each of which they rate on a 5-point scale (where 1 represents "not likely" and 5 represents "very likely") as to their likelihood of responding in that manner. The responses to the 10 negatively valenced scenarios indicate shame, ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, externalization of cause or blame, and detachment/unconcern. For example, the responses to the scenario presented above include: "You cannot apologize enough for forgetting the appointment" (ruminative guilt); "You would think, 'I'm inconsiderate'" (shame); "You would think: 'Well, he'll understand'" (detachment/unconcern); "You would try to make it up to him as soon as possible" (nonruminative guilt); and "You would think: 'My boss distracted me just before lunch'" (externalization). Another of the scenarios states: "You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error." The nonruminative guilt response, which evidences an appropriate desire to set things right, is, "You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation." The ruminative guilt response, which suggests that nothing the person does can ever repay the debt, is, "You would feel
horrified about what happened but afraid to correct the situation." The shame response, reflecting negative evaluation of the self, is, "You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker."

The five positively valenced scenarios allow for the evaluation of guilt- and shame-proneness in instances of prosocial behavior. Responses indicate shame, ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, externalization, pride in the self, or pride in behavior. The measure is scored by summing the scores for each scale (e.g., shame, ruminative guilt) across scenarios. Scores for the shame, ruminative guilt, and nonruminative guilt scales range from 15 to 75, with a higher score representing greater proneness. Reliability and validity data for the TOSCA--M were reported in Chapter II, Review of Literature.
The research questions in the present research include investigations of (a) gender differences in the levels of proneness to shame, ruminative guilt, and nonruminative guilt; (b) gender differences in the levels of psychological symptoms, including depression, narcissism, anger, and dysphoric affect; (c) gender differences in the levels of prosocial tendencies, including positive interactions with other people, normal need for closeness, and positive self-inspection; (d) for males and females, the multivariate relationship between the Rorschach symptom variables and the TOSCA--M self-conscious emotion variables; and (e) for males and females, the multivariate relationship between the Rorschach positive psychological functioning variables and the TOSCA--M emotion variables.

Because statistical treatment of the categorical Rorschach variables differed from treatment of the continuous Rorschach variables, it was not always possible to examine the groups of positive functioning variables
separately from the negative functioning variables, and vice versa. Therefore, in many of the following descriptions of statistical analyses, variables are grouped according to their statistical treatment status.

The results of the present study are divided into sections that include preliminary analyses of the internal consistency reliability of the sample data, tests for gender differences, and analyses to determine the relationships between the emotion variables and the psychological functioning variables. Most of the statistical tests did not yield significant differences. However, in view of increasing skepticism about the value of tests of statistical significance (Carver, 1978, 1993; Shaver, 1993), R-squared values and other measures of effect size are reported in order to reveal the magnitude of the detected differences and relationships among the variables.

Preliminary Analyses

Because reliability is not inherent in an instrument itself, but is rather a feature of the data in hand,
preliminary analyses were conducted to determine the internal consistency reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the Shame-Proneness, Ruminative Guilt-Proneness, and Nonruminative Guilt-Proneness scales of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2. Acceptable levels of reliability were observed for each of the scales, ranging from .62 for Nonruminative Guilt to .83 for Ruminative Guilt. Because these levels are consistent with those previously reported for the TOSCA--M, further data analysis is appropriate.

Table 2

**Internal Consistency Reliability of the TOSCA--M Scales**

*(Cronbach's Alpha)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative Guilt</td>
<td>59.55</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative Guilt</td>
<td>48.53</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>44.06</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gender Differences in the Research Variables

Gender Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions

Gender differences in proneness to the emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame were investigated by conducting a two-group MANOVA to determine whether differences exist between the mean scores of males and females on the three self-conscious emotions. The null hypothesis of no difference was rejected (Wilks' Lambda = .77, F = 8.74, p < .0005). Wilks' Lambda, which is conceptually equal to 1 minus $R^2$, is used as the multivariate effect size (Xitao Fan, personal communication, November 18, 1996). Smaller Wilks' Lambda values are indicative of a larger effect size. Using the formula given above yields an $R^2$ value of .23, or 23% of the variance accounted for.

The results of follow-up univariate tests of statistical significance are presented in Table 3. The follow-up tests revealed statistically significant differences on all three emotions, with females scoring higher than males on ruminative guilt, nonruminative...
Table 3

Gender Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Mean (SD) Males</th>
<th>Mean (SD) Females</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>SMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>57.23 (5.69)</td>
<td>61.72 (5.60)</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>44.40 (7.43)</td>
<td>52.32 (9.16)</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>40.00 (8.31)</td>
<td>47.77 (10.55)</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...guilt, and shame. Standardized mean difference (SMD) effect sizes, which are not dependent upon sample size, were obtained for all three variables. SMDs were calculated by dividing the difference of the two means by the pooled standard deviation. Although a certain amount of ambiguity exists in the interpretation of univariate effect sizes, Stevens (1990) has suggested that effect sizes of .2 be considered small, .5 as medium, and greater than .8 as large. Therefore, the effect sizes obtained in this analysis were moderate to large.

Gender Differences in Psychological Functioning

The question concerning the existence of gender differences in psychological functioning was investigated...
by conducting separate tests of statistical significance for the categorical and continuous Rorschach variables. Chi-square tests were conducted for the three categorical variables. No statistically significant gender differences were detected for depression (Pearson chi-square = 1.07, \( p = .30 \)), need for affection (Pearson chi-square = 3.54, \( p = .17 \)), or self-inspection (Pearson chi-square = 2.58, \( p = .27 \)).

A two-group MANOVA was conducted to investigate gender differences in the four continuous Rorschach measures of psychological functioning. The null hypothesis of no statistically significant difference was rejected (Wilks' Lambda = .86, \( F = 3.48, \text{df} = 1,42, p = .01 \)). Using Wilks' Lambda as the multivariate effect size, an \( R^2 \) value of .14 was obtained. Follow-up univariate tests of statistical significance were employed to determine which variables accounted for the differences. The results of the univariate tests are presented in Table 4. A statistically significant difference between males and females was found for narcissism, on which males scored significantly higher
Table 4

Gender Differences in the Continuous Rorschach Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>SMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>.88 (1.10)</td>
<td>1.23 (1.06)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>1.14 (1.39)</td>
<td>.46 (.71)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.93 (2.62)</td>
<td>3.13 (2.27)</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>3.35 (3.51)</td>
<td>3.33 (2.64)</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

than females. A large SMD effect size of .87 was obtained. No other statistically significant differences were detected among the continuous Rorschach variables, and the other effect sizes were comparatively small, ranging from .01 to .33.

Relationships Between the Self-Conscious Emotions and Psychological Functioning

In addition to examining gender differences in the levels of each of the variables, this research also addresses the relationship between proneness to the self-
conscious emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame and the seven Rorschach psychological functioning variables. The bivariate relationships among the variables are considered, followed by an examination of the multivariate relationships between the emotion variables and the psychological functioning variables.

**Bivariate Relationships Among the Variables**

Although the focus of this research is on the multivariate relationships among the variables, bivariate correlations among the self-conscious emotion variables and the psychological functioning variables were computed for the entire sample and separately for males and females. They are offered here as essentially preliminary analyses. For analyses in which both scores are continuous variables, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are reported. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported for analyses in which one or both variables are categorical variables.

**Total Sample**

Table 5 presents the correlations based on the total
Table 5

Correlations (and Probabilities) for the Entire Sample Among the Emotion Variables and the Psychological Functioning Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Nonruminative guilt</th>
<th>Ruminative guilt</th>
<th>Shame</th>
<th>Depression</th>
<th>Narcissism</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Dysphoric affect</th>
<th>Need for affection</th>
<th>Self-inspection</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>.41. (&lt;.0005)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.30 (.004)</td>
<td>.79 (&lt;.0005)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>-.15 (.17)</td>
<td>-.22 (.03)</td>
<td>-.15 (.14)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>.08 (.47)</td>
<td>-.02 (.88)</td>
<td>-.06 (.58)</td>
<td>-.05 (.66)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>-.08 (.44)</td>
<td>-.15 (.15)</td>
<td>-.10 (.33)</td>
<td>.43 (.22)</td>
<td>.14 (.005)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>-.04 (.69)</td>
<td>-.05 (.61)</td>
<td>-.01 (.93)</td>
<td>.42 (.005)</td>
<td>.13 (.22)</td>
<td>.48 (.005)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for</td>
<td>.13 (.22)</td>
<td>.37 (.005)</td>
<td>.35 (.001)</td>
<td>-.14 (.19)</td>
<td>-.14 (.18)</td>
<td>-.01 (.90)</td>
<td>.36 (.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-inspection</td>
<td>.03 (.79)</td>
<td>.03 (.79)</td>
<td>.10 (.36)</td>
<td>.12 (.26)</td>
<td>.07 (.49)</td>
<td>.25 (.02)</td>
<td>.25 (.02)</td>
<td>.22 (.04)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>.21 (.05)</td>
<td>.17 (.10)</td>
<td>.14 (.19)</td>
<td>-.05 (.61)</td>
<td>.02 (.84)</td>
<td>.18 (.08)</td>
<td>-.00 (.99)</td>
<td>.16 (.13)</td>
<td>.18 (.10)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 91. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in italics. All others are Pearson product-moment correlations.
sample among the self-conscious emotions and the psychological functioning variables. Correlations are generally small to moderate, and only those correlations of .20 or above will be discussed. Nonruminative guilt has a small correlation with cooperation (r = .21). Ruminative guilt correlates negatively with depression (r = -.22) and correlates moderately in a positive direction with need for affection (r = .37). Shame also correlates moderately with need for affection (r = .37).

**Gender Differences**

Separate correlations for males and females were calculated and are reported in Table 6. As with the total sample, correlations are small to moderate. A number of interesting differences appeared between men and women in the patterns of correlations between the emotion variables and the psychological functioning variables.

Depression correlated negatively with all three emotion variables for both males and females. However, for males the strongest relationship was with ruminative guilt (r = -.28), whereas for females the strongest relationship was with shame (r = -.20).
Table 6

Correlations (and Probabilities) for Males and Females Among the Emotion Variables and the Psychological Functioning Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Nonruminative guilt</th>
<th>Ruminative guilt</th>
<th>Shame</th>
<th>Depression</th>
<th>Narcissism</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Dysphoric affect</th>
<th>Need for affection</th>
<th>Self-inspection</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilt</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.53)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.72)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilt</td>
<td>(&lt;.0005)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.73)</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.0005)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.40)</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.74)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>(.65)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.74)</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(-.0.0)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>(.74)</td>
<td>(.97)</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.0.005)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.0.005)</td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affect</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.0.005)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.0.005)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.99)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
<td>(.1.6)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affection</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
<td>(.1.6)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-inspection</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.0.03)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.67)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Correlations for females (n = 48) are above the diagonal. Correlations for males (n = 43) are below the diagonal. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in italics. All others are Pearson product-moment correlations.
For the males, narcissism correlates moderately with nonruminative guilt ($r = .36$) and ruminative guilt ($r = .33$) and has a smaller correlation with shame ($r = .20$). In contrast, the correlations for females between narcissism and the self-conscious emotions are negligible ($r = -.02$ to -.12).

Whereas males' correlations between anger and the emotion variables are negligible ($r = -.01$ to .05), the correlations for females are all in a negative direction, with the strongest correlation being between anger and ruminative guilt ($r = -.22$). The same pattern is observed for dysphoric affect, where correlations for males are very small and positive ($r = .03$ to .14), whereas the small correlations of females are all in a negative direction, with the strongest correlation being between dysphoric affect and nonruminative guilt ($r = -.23$).

Males and females differ considerably in the correlations between the emotion variables and cooperation. For females, cooperation correlates moderately with nonruminative guilt for females ($r = $
.36) but negligibly for males (r = -.03). In contrast, the cooperation of males has a small correlation with ruminative guilt (r = .20), compared to females' negligible correlation (r = .06).

One correlational relationship revealed a similar pattern for males and females. The need for affection of both males and females is positively associated with ruminative guilt (r = .38 and r = .32, respectively) and with shame (r = .37 and r = .23, respectively).

Multivariate Relationships Among the Variables

The focus of this research is the multivariate relationships among the three self-conscious emotions and the seven Rorschach psychological functioning variables. The multivariate framework was chosen because it is more powerful and better honors the reality of multiply interacting variables (Pedhauzer, 1982). In the multivariate analyses, as in previous analyses, the specific analysis employed depended upon whether the Rorschach psychological functioning variables under question were categorical or continuous
variables. Each analysis was completed first on the total sample, and then males and females were considered separately.

The categorical Rorschach variables (i.e., depression, need for affection, self-inspection) were each considered separately, by means of discriminant function analysis, to examine the relative relationship of each emotion variable with the individual Rorschach psychological functioning variables. The four continuous Rorschach variables (i.e., narcissism, anger, dysphoric affect, cooperation) were subjected to canonical correlation analyses, with the three emotion variables comprising the second set of variables. Results of the discriminant function analyses will be presented first, followed by results of the canonical correlation analyses. As is common practice in methodological literature, most attention will be paid to those results in which at least 10% of the variance in the psychological functioning variable(s) is accounted for by the relationship with the emotion variables (Pedhauzer, 1982).
Discriminant Function Analyses

Depression. Discriminant function analysis was employed to determine the relative association of each of the three emotion variables with the presence or absence of depression, as measured by the DEPI. The direct entry method, which considers all of the variables simultaneously, was used. The resulting discriminant function accounts for only 6% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .94, $\eta^2 = .16$, $R^2 = .06$) and thus will not be interpreted.

Discriminant function analyses predicting the presence or absence of depression were conducted separately for males and females. The resulting discriminant function for males, presented in Table 7, accounts for 15% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .85, $\eta^2 = .08$, $R^2 = .15$). The results of the discriminant analysis include the structure coefficients (i.e., the pooled-within-groups correlation between the variable and the discriminant function) and the standardized function coefficients (i.e., Beta weights) for each of the emotion variables. Using a structure coefficient
Table 7

**Discriminant Function Predicting Depression in Males**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Function Coefficient</th>
<th>Structure Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>-.98</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cutoff of .3 (Pedhauzer, 1982), ruminative guilt appears to relate most strongly to depression in males. Nonruminative guilt and shame contribute little to an understanding of depression in males.

The results for females yielded one discriminant function that accounts for only 4% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .96, ρ = .58, $R^2 = .04$). It will not, therefore, be interpreted.

**Need for affection.** Discriminant function analysis, using the direct entry method, was employed to determine the relative relationship of the three emotion variables with need for affection (i.e., texture). One discriminant function accounting for 15% of the variance
was identified (Wilks' Lambda = .83, \( p < .01, R^2 = .15 \)) and is presented in Table 8. Examination of the structure coefficients of the function suggests that ruminative guilt and shame play an important role in discriminating between the levels of need for affection, whereas nonruminative guilt contributes little to an understanding of need for affection. A second discriminant function was also identified (Wilks' Lambda = .97, \( p < .25, R^2 = .03 \)). However, it accounts for only 3% of the variance and will be not be discussed further.

Separate discriminant function analyses using the

Table 8

**Discriminant Functions Differentiating Levels of Need for Affection for the Total Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Function Coefficient</th>
<th>Structure Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
three emotion variables to predict the level of need for affection were conducted for males and females. Each analysis yielded one function that accounts for 19% of the variance (Males: Wilks' Lambda = .77, \( p = .12 \), \( R^2 = .19 \); Females: Wilks' Lambda = .78, \( p = .09 \), \( R^2 = .19 \)). Structure and function coefficients for the discriminant functions for males and females are presented in Table 9. The results for males suggest that the level of shame may be the most important self-conscious emotion in predicting males' need for affection, together with lower levels of ruminative guilt. In contrast, females' need for affection is more likely to be related to higher levels of ruminative guilt, with shame playing a secondary role. A second discriminant function for each gender accounts for only 5% of the variance for males and 3% for females (Males: Wilks' Lambda = .95, \( p = .39 \), \( R^2 = .05 \); Females: Wilks' Lambda = .97, \( p = .48 \), \( R^2 = .03 \)) and will not be further discussed.

Self-inspection. The direct entry method of discriminant function analysis was employed to determine the relative association of each of the three emotion
Table 9

**Discriminant Functions Differentiating Levels of Need for Affection for Males and Females**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Function Coefficient</th>
<th>Structure Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Females</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

variables with the level of self-inspection (i.e., form dimensionality). The resulting discriminant function accounts for only 2% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .97, $p = .85$, $R^2 = .02$). It will, therefore, not be interpreted.

Separate discriminant function analyses were conducted for males and females in order to detect any
gender differences in the relationship between self-inspection and the three self-conscious emotions. The discriminant function for males accounts for only 3% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .94, \( p = .90, R^2 = .03 \)). However, the discriminant function for females accounts for 12% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .88, \( p = .47, R^2 = .12 \)) and is presented in Table 10. Nonruminative guilt appears to be the major self-conscious emotion in the self-inspection of females. However, the near-zero (-.04) structure coefficient for shame, coupled with a much higher function coefficient (-1.32), suggests that shame was operating as a suppressor effect. In other

Table 10

**Discriminant Function Predicting Self-Inspection in Females**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Function Coefficient</th>
<th>Structure Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
words, although shame directly adds almost nothing to the relationship with self-inspection, it indirectly improves the relationship of nonruminative guilt to self-inspection by removing its shared variance with nonruminative guilt. A second discriminant function for females that accounts for only .4% of the variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda = .99, $p = .92$, $R^2 = .004$) but will not be discussed further.

**Canonical Correlation Analyses**

The four continuous Rorschach variables were examined for their relationship with the three self-conscious emotion variables by means of canonical correlation analyses. The first set of variables was composed of the three self-conscious emotions, nonruminative guilt-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, and shame-proneness. The second set of variables was composed of the four continuous Rorschach variables (i.e., cooperation [COP], narcissism [reflection], anger [white space], and dysphoric affect [sum of shading]). Data were analyzed for the total sample, followed by separate analyses by gender.
Total sample. Considering all 91 subjects, a canonical function accounting for only 9% of the variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda = .89, \( p = .62 \), \( R^2 = .09 \)). It will not be interpreted.

Gender differences. The canonical correlation analysis was repeated separately for males and females. The first canonical function for each gender accounts for 19% of the variance for males and 23% of the variance for females (Males: Wilks' Lambda = .72, \( p = .43 \), \( R^2 = .19 \); Females: Wilks' Lambda = .72, \( p = .33 \), \( R^2 = .23 \)). The canonical function for males, together with its structure and function coefficients, is presented in Table 11. The table presents the loadings or structure coefficients (i.e., correlation between each variable and its canonical variate) and function coefficients (i.e., standardized canonical coefficients) that are used to interpret the pair of canonical variates for the canonical correlation.

Examination of the structure coefficients suggests that, for males, ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt are the most important emotions in the
Table 11

Canonical Functions for Males Relating the Emotion Variables and the Continuous Rorschach Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Function Coefficients</th>
<th>Structure Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Conscious Emotion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>-.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rorschach Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>-.94</td>
<td>-.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

multivariate relationship between the two sets of variables. Shame appears to play an important but secondary role in understanding the relationship. Among the psychological functioning variables, only narcissism loads strongly, with cooperation playing a very minor role. It appears, therefore, that the narcissism of
men, and to a lesser extent their cooperation in relationships, are characterized by the presence of all three emotion variables, but especially by ruminative guilt.

The canonical function for females is presented in Table 12. Nonruminative guilt is the strongest emotion

Table 12
Canonical Functions for Females Relating the Emotion Variables and the Continuous Rorschach Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Function Coefficients</th>
<th>Structure Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Conscious Emotion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rorschach Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the relationship between the two sets of variables. Among the psychological functioning variables, cooperation has the strongest relationship. Dysphoric affect, and to a lesser degree anger, appear to be important to the relationship, but in a negative direction. It appears, therefore, that nonruminative guilt in women is associated with high levels of cooperation in relationships and the absence of dysphoric affect and anger.

Follow-up analyses. Because cooperation, which is a positive psychological functioning variable, dominates the canonical correlations in which a considerable percentage of the variance is accounted for, its presence in the analyses may have obscured some of the relationships between the emotion variables and the remaining continuous Rorschach variables, all of which are considered indicative of negative psychological functioning. In order to more clearly identify the multivariate relationship between the three negative Rorschach variables and the emotion variables, follow-up canonical correlation analyses were conducted from which
cooperation was excluded.

For the total sample, a canonical correlation accounting for only 3% of the variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda = .96, \(p = .93\), \(R^2 = .03\)). It will not be discussed further.

Gender differences were also examined. For males, one canonical function accounting for 18% of the variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda = .79, \(p = .42\), \(R^2 = .18\)) and is reported in Table 13. For the females, the resulting canonical function accounts for only 9% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda = .88, \(p = .80\), \(R^2 = .09\)) and will not be interpreted.

For males, examination of the structure coefficients indicates that both nonruminative guilt and ruminative guilt are important emotions that contribute to an understanding of the relationship between the two sets of variables. Shame appears to have a lesser but important role. Among the psychological functioning variables, only narcissism appears to make an important contribution to the relationship. It seems, therefore, that the narcissism of males occurs in the presence of
Table 13

Canonical Functions for Males Relating the Emotion Variables and the Negative Continuous Rorschach Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Function Coefficients</th>
<th>Structure Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Conscious Emotion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.72</td>
<td>-.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rorschach Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt and, to a lesser degree, shame.
The major questions posed in the present research concern the multivariate relationships between measures of the three self-conscious emotion variables and seven Rorschach psychological functioning variables. The research also considers gender differences in the emotion and psychological functioning variables and in relationships among the variables. The following discussion will begin with a brief overview of the results. The results will then be discussed and interpreted in greater detail, including a discussion of factors that may explain the results. The discussion will conclude with clinical implications of the findings, recommendations for future research, and limitations of the study.

Overview of Results

The first research question addressed gender differences in proneness to ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame. Females disclosed much
higher levels than males of all three emotions, with the
differences approaching one standard deviation.

The second research question involved gender
differences in levels of the four Rorschach psychological
symptoms. The only symptom variable for which gender
differences were detected was narcissism, on which males
scored almost one standard deviation higher than females.

The third research question investigated gender
differences in the levels of the three Rorschach positive
psychological functioning variables. No gender
differences were detected on any of the indices of
positive functioning.

The fourth research question addressed gender
differences in the multivariate relationships among the
self-conscious emotion variables and the four Rorschach
symptom indices. For males, ruminative guilt was the
predominant self-conscious emotion in depression, whereas
none of the emotion variables figured prominently in the
depression of females. For males, all three emotions were
associated with narcissism, with ruminative guilt having
the strongest relationship. No association between the
emotions and narcissism was found for females. For females, nonruminative guilt was related to the absence of dysphoric affect and, to a lesser degree, the absence of anger, whereas dysphoric affect and anger did not figure prominently in any of the multivariate relationships for males.

The fifth research question involved gender differences in the multivariate relationships among the self-conscious emotion variables and the three Rorschach positive functioning indices. For males, the level of need for affection was associated with high levels of shame and somewhat lower levels of ruminative guilt. For females, the opposite pattern appeared. Greater need for affection was related to high levels of ruminative guilt and moderate levels of shame. For males, no association was detected between the emotions and self-inspection, whereas the self-inspection of females was associated with moderate levels of nonruminative guilt. Cooperation in males was mildly related to all three emotions, with ruminative guilt having the strongest relationship. In contrast, the cooperation of females was strongly
associated with nonruminative guilt.

Gender Differences in the Emotion and Psychological Functioning Variables

Gender Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions

Consistent with limited previous research (e.g., Harder et al., 1992; Ferguson & Crowley, 1993, 1996; Shiffler, 1993), females exhibited higher levels than did males of proneness to the emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame. These results may be due to the tendency of women to report more intensity of emotional experience than do men (cf. Brody, 1996; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991), especially when the emotion occurs in an interpersonal context. However, Brody (1996) presented a compelling argument that women's report of more intense emotions is representative of actual experience rather than greater willingness to self-report emotional experience. Although the question certainly deserves further study, it is certainly possible that at least some of the difference between men's and women's reports of proneness to the self-conscious
emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame is a result of actual gender differences in the experience of emotion.

This research has examined only sex differences and has not considered the influence of gender role. However, sex appears to have much less to do with the quality and intensity of emotional expression than do certain gender-related personality characteristics, such as nurturance (Brody, Hay, & Vandewater, 1990; Ferguson & Crowley, 1996). The effect of gender role on the experience of guilt and shame—and how that might be captured by the Rorschach—requires further research.

Socialization of Gender Differences in Guilt-Proneness

In light of the greater tendency of women to color their interpretation of and response to their experiences with guilt and shame, it is logical to ask how these emotions originate. Why do women, more than men, tend to rely on the self-conscious emotions? Although some authors present strong arguments for the existence of biological underpinnings to explain higher levels of
guilt- and shame-proneness in females (e.g., Nathanson, 1992), others lean towards the differential socialization of boys and girls. Many of these socialization differences have been substantiated through research.

A ruminative guilt style is believed to be the result of genuine caring and love for others that has become exaggerated and unhealthy (Modell, 1971; Friedman, 1985). Zahn-Waxler et al. (1991) reported that when children are encouraged to feel high levels of empathy and to experience the emotions and problems of others, they eventually have difficulty recognizing their own needs and discriminating their needs from the needs of others. Within the context of these blurred boundaries, children come to behave as if the problems of others were their own and acquire feelings of guilt and responsibility for those problems.

Infant girls tend to be less emotionally expressive than infant boys and, in an attempt to amplify their daughters' emotional responsiveness, mothers tend to talk more about emotions with their daughters than sons, and are also more animated and emotional with them (Barrett,
Barrett (1995) has suggested that this higher level of emotionality in communication increases the hearer's appreciation of the personal relevance of the message. This greater emotionality communicated to daughters may increase their feelings of empathy and responsibility for the distress of others. At the same time, parents tend to emphasize control of emotions more with their sons than with their daughters.

Gender differences in responsiveness to the distress of others appears by the end of the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Because girls receive more empathy training than boys, their vulnerability to guilt-inducing communications is increased (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991). Their higher level of identification with their mothers may also affect the expression of emotions related to maintaining relationships (Brody, 1996).

Guilt feelings are more likely to occur in the presence of real or perceived responsibility for the distress of others (Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Because girls are socialized more than boys to value and nurture relationships, they have increased susceptibility
to guilt when they perceive that they have harmed others.

In their examination of depressed mothers, Zahn-Waxler et al. (1991) found that girls are more empathically involved in their parents' relationships and experience more guilt over parental conflict. Girls more than boys may identify with their mothers, increasing the likelihood that they will imitate a depressed mother's attributional style. Because girls are socialized to express affection and affiliation and to exercise extreme control over aggression and feelings of anger, they are particularly vulnerable to feelings of guilt when they feel angry, act aggressively, or cause interpersonal harm (Potter-Efron, 1989; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990).

Socialization of Gender Differences in Shame Proneness

The socialization of interpersonal needs in girls, coupled with a fear of the loss of love, also increases their vulnerability to shame (Kaufman, 1989; H. B. Lewis, 1979b). Boys, on the other hand, are socialized to value performance related to objects and things. When a boy
acts aggressively, his parents may do nothing to inhibit his behavior, and may even encourage it. When a girl exhibits aggression, thereby threatening valued relationships, her behavior may be met with direct punishment or the withdrawal of love, which elicits feelings of shame (M. Lewis, 1992).

M. Lewis (1992) proposed that the emotional response to success or failure is socialized. Whereas men are taught to reward themselves for their successes but not to blame themselves for their failures, the reverse is true for women. Parents tend to make more positive attributions to boys than to girls and more negative attributions to girls than to boys. This pattern is also found in the interactions of school teachers with their male and females students (Minuchin & Shapiro, 1983), resulting in girls being exposed to more communications that imply that they are in some way defective. In addition, mothers use less physical punishment with their daughters than with their sons and may, therefore, employ more shame-inducing punishments with their daughters (M. Lewis, 1992).
There may, of course, be reasons in addition to socialization differences that females are more prone than males to the self-conscious emotions. However, it appears that women's greater vulnerability to guilt- and shame-proneness may be, at least in part, a result of differences in the socialization of girls and boys.

**Gender Differences in Psychological Functioning**

The only psychological functioning variable in which gender differences were detected was narcissism, which was higher for males than females. This suggests that males are more likely than females to use grandiosity as a defense and may, as a result, keep emotional responses out of awareness.

Although other differences were expected, especially in light of the frequent finding of more depression in females than in males, it is important to recall that the Rorschach normative data show no gender differences for the variables in question (Exner, 1993). It may be that the characteristics of depression that differentiate males and females are not measured well by the DEPI of the
Rorschach (e.g., helplessness and hopelessness, as discussed in Chapter II, Review of Literature).

Alternatively, rather than reflecting methodological limitations, it might be that men and women actually do not differ in the intensity of their psychological symptoms when assessed with measures that are less susceptible to the influence of self-presentational concerns.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Psychological Symptoms

The Rorschach and the TOSCA--M clearly operate at different levels of subject awareness. Because of the ambiguity of the Rorschach testing situation, the Rorschach is likely to elicit responses that are less guarded and less strongly defended than responses to most other instruments. It is possible that, in responding to the Rorschach, subjects may even unknowingly reveal things about themselves that they have not yet allowed into their own awareness. At the same time, the more straightforward approach of the TOSCA--M may activate stronger self-presentational defenses, allowing respondents to put forth
a better front for the world and even to deny awareness of some psychological factors. This disparity in the levels of awareness assessed by the two instruments might account for some of the results, in which unexpected relationships emerged between the emotions and the indicators of psychological functioning (Weiner, 1995a). In fact, it may be possible to explain differences between the results of the present research and the prior research of Tangney and others by examining differences in measurement of the constructs. In most previous research, psychopathology and the self-conscious emotions were measured at the same level of awareness, with face valid instruments, thus raising the possibility that the results were influenced by participant self-presentation response set.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Depression

Nonruminative Guilt and Depression

For the total sample, nonruminative guilt had a very small negative correlation with depression. For males, the negative relationship was negligible, whereas for females, the negative correlation was very small. This
finding is consistent with the prediction that nonruminative guilt would not relate meaningfully to depression.

**Ruminative Guilt and Depression**

Small negative correlations between ruminative guilt and depression were observed for the total sample and for males, whereas the correlation for females was very small. In the multivariate relationships between the three emotion variables and depression, no clear pattern emerged for the entire sample or for females. For males, however, ruminative guilt appeared to function as the best predictor of the extent to which signs of depression were present. This suggests that when the contributions of all three emotions are considered together, higher levels of ruminative guilt account the most for depressive symptoms in men. It appears that the depression of males may be characterized by a tendency towards rumination in which the individual constantly replays unhappy incidents and refuses to let go of feelings of responsibility. The finding that ruminative guilt is more characteristic of
males' depression is consistent with other research results. For example, externalizing behaviors are believed to be more representative of the depression of males and involve (among other behaviors) increased activity level as a form of distraction (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987).

Shame and Depression

Contrary to predictions, the correlation between shame and depression, although small, was in a negative direction for the total sample. For males, the correlation was negligible. Results of the multivariate analysis for males suggest that when all three emotions are considered together, shame is not an important factor in predicting depression.

Contrary to predictions, a small negative correlation between shame and depression was observed for females. Although the multivariate analysis for females did not account for an important portion of the variance and was not reported in the Results section, examination of the structure and function coefficients (see Table 14) suggests that shame no more strongly predicts depression.
Table 14

**Discriminant Function Predicting Depression in Females**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Function Coefficient</th>
<th>Structure Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in females than either ruminative or nonruminative guilt.

Why this is the case is discussed below.

Because past research has consistently found relationships between shame-proneness and depression, the failure of the present research to find a strong link between shame and depression is, at first glance, somewhat puzzling. The bivariate correlations, in which the presence of depression correlates negatively with all three emotions, add to the enigma. However, Tangney (1993) provided a clue that may help to explain the results. She posited that shame-proneness leads to feelings of hopelessness, which have been linked to the development of depression. Helplessness and hopelessness
seem to have strong cognitive components, commonly evidenced by dire predictions about the future, such as "I'll never be able to do it," or "Nothing I do can ever change it." In a like manner, cognitive components of the three self-conscious emotions seem to be reflected in many of the TOSCA--M items, such as "You would think, 'I'm terrible,'" or "You would feel selfish and you'd think you are basically lazy." However, as previously noted, the DEPI of the Rorschach does not do a good job of tapping into helpless, hopeless depression. The DEPI and the TOSCA--M may, therefore, both be measuring important but separate characteristics that contribute to depression.

Perhaps the more salient reason for the negative correlations between the emotion variables and depression has to do with the measures themselves and the differing levels of awareness at which depression and the emotions were assessed. The negative correlations may, in fact, represent an attempt on the part of depressed subjects to guard against negative feelings about the self, and perhaps even to protect themselves from awareness of their feelings of depression. Again, even though the bivariate
correlations revealed negative relationships, it is important to emphasize results of the discriminant analysis, which essentially showed that all three emotion variables were positively related to depression in females.

This finding is reminiscent of observations made by H. B. Lewis (1971), who described a cycle in which any one of the three self-conscious emotions can become part of a sequence that leads to the formation of psychological symptoms. When a shameful event occurs, rumination about the event causes the person to feel guilty. If unresolved, the guilt then leads to feelings of shame. Continuing to snowball, the shame feeds back into guilt, which develops into a sense of "irrational dread." Unless the feelings can be normally discharged (e.g., by the person being forgiven or accepting forgiveness), they come to be expressed as symptoms.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Narcissism

Nonruminative Guilt and Narcissism

For the total sample and for females, correlations
between nonruminative guilt and narcissism were negligible. For males, narcissism correlated positively with nonruminative guilt. Nonruminative guilt as a factor in the self-presentation of narcissistic males may reflect a tendency to do the right thing in social situations in the interest of preserving their mien of superiority.

Ruminative Guilt and Narcissism

For the total sample and for females, correlations between ruminative guilt and narcissism were very small. For males, however, narcissism correlated positively with ruminative guilt at both the bivariate and multivariate levels.

At first glance it seems counterintuitive that both ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt would relate positively to narcissism. However, it is important to recall the nature of ruminative guilt, in which the person may well have done all that could reasonably be done to remedy the situation (reflecting nonruminative guilt), but then continue to feel guilty for the infraction. This continued rumination is the necessary ingredient for ruminative guilt. The narcissist may employ nonruminative
guilt in the interest of protecting his public image, but then continue to ruminate about his actions due to a nagging worry that even more may be required if he is to continue to present himself as superior to others.

Shame and Narcissism

The predicted relationship between shame and narcissism was not found in the bivariate analyses for the total sample or for females. For males the correlation was small. However, multivariate analysis revealed that shame makes a contribution to narcissism in males that is not as strong as the other self-conscious emotions but nevertheless important.

Why the predicted strong relationship between narcissism and shame did not appear may be a function of the dual nature of narcissism. Malatesta and Wilson (1988) have suggested that there are two types of pathological narcissism. Pseudograndiosity, the first type, is a defense against feelings of inferiority. The second, true grandiosity, is diffuse, egocentric grandiosity without the feelings of inferiority. It is the pseudograndiose type of narcissism that would be
expected to correlate with shame. Because the reflection score of the Rorschach considers narcissism as a whole, without distinguishing between grandiose narcissism and narcissism based on defending against feelings of inferiority, any relationship between shame and narcissism based on feelings of inferiority could be masked.

Looking to past research on the relationship between shame and narcissism seems to shed little light on the issue of pseudograndiosity versus true grandiosity. For example, Gramzow and Tangney (1992) found the more pathological aspects of narcissism (i.e., exploitativeness) to be related to shame. However, it is not clear whether there are similarities between the exploitative narcissism measured in their research and pseudograndiose narcissism based on feelings of inferiority. Another important point to consider is that the Gramzow and Tangney conclusions are based on quite small correlations that achieved statistical significance due to a very large sample size. Their "statistically significant" bivariate correlation of .14 between exploitative narcissism and shame is, in fact, very small and is exceeded in the
current research by the statistically nonsignificant correlation of .20 for males between shame and narcissism—also a small correlation. Realistically, the magnitudes of both correlations are very small, and $r^2$ values derived from the correlation coefficients suggest that very little variance is accounted for by the relationships. Therefore, relying on statistical significance to interpret these findings is potentially misleading.

Experienced Rorschachers are able to gain further information regarding the true nature of an individual subject's narcissism by examining the relationships between the number of reflection responses (the measure of narcissism), the number of vista responses (a measure of negative self-examination), and the egocentricity index (a measure of self-esteem). However, the conclusions of such analyses depend on rather complex "if . . . then" relationships involving specific conclusions for different values or ranges of values for each of the variables (Exner, 1991). An oversimplified approach to examining these relationships with aggregated data might be to look at the correlations among the variables. For this sample,
the bivariate correlation between reflection (the measure of narcissism) and vista (a measure of negative self-examination) was .34 ($p = .001$), suggesting that narcissism was related to negative self-inspection. Reflection also correlated moderately with the egocentricity index ($r = .55$, $p < .0005$), suggesting that self-esteem increases as narcissism increases. However, because the reflection responses contribute to the egocentricity index score, the correlation is likely to be artificially inflated and interpretation is difficult.

To investigate the possibility of a trend towards pseudograndiosity in the current sample, protocols containing at least one reflection response were examined for the presence of vista responses. Almost half of the protocols in which one or more reflection responses were given also contained at least one vista response, regardless of the level of self-esteem suggested by the egocentricity index. These subjects appear to be conflicted regarding their feelings of high self-value inasmuch as their self-examination also contains perceptions of negative features. The mean scores for the
self-conscious emotions for males and females in this subsample are presented in Table 15, along with the means for the males and females in the total sample and effect sizes for the differences.

Although these results are preliminary, some interesting gender differences arise. Whereas the males in the subsample scored slightly higher than males in the total sample on both ruminative guilt and shame, subsample females actually scored lower than females in the total sample on the same two emotions, with rather substantial effect sizes for the differences.

### Table 15

**Comparison of Means on the Self-Conscious Emotions for the Total Sample and Subjects with One or More Reflection and Vista Responses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Males Total</th>
<th>Males Subsample</th>
<th>Females Total</th>
<th>Females Subsample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonruminative guilt</td>
<td>57.23</td>
<td>59.91</td>
<td>61.72</td>
<td>63.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminative guilt</td>
<td>44.40</td>
<td>46.09</td>
<td>52.32</td>
<td>45.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>43.91</td>
<td>47.77</td>
<td>41.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It appears that different processes may be at work for males and females who give reflection responses coupled with vista responses on the Rorschach. For males, this combination appears to relate to mildly increased feelings of inferiority and ruminations about perceived infractions. However, females who give reflection and vista responses may be more strongly defended against negative feelings about the self, including a defense against allowing into awareness the negative aspects of their self-inspection. They are, however, alert to the impact of their self-presentation, and believing that revelation of negative emotion states might have an adverse effect on others' perceptions of them, they may guard against disclosing anything that might jeopardize their public image. Clearly, additional research will be required to investigate the nature of Rorschach narcissism as it relates to shame-proneness.

It is also possible that different results would be obtained by conducting the research with clinically narcissistic subjects. College students whose Rorschachs indicate the presence of narcissism may differ
qualitatively from persons in a clinical setting whose narcissism painfully interferes with their relationships. Future research is needed to determine how shame relates to clinically significant levels of narcissism. Such research would provide valuable information that could be applied to improving the treatment of narcissism.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Anger

None of the self-conscious emotions figured prominently in the bivariate or multivariate analyses involving anger for the total sample or for males. For females, however, ruminative guilt had a small negative correlation with anger. In addition, an interesting difference between males and females appeared in the relationships between anger and the self-conscious emotions. For males, all of the correlations were approximately zero (-.01 to .05). However, correlations for females were somewhat larger and were all in the negative direction (-.14 to -.22), with the strongest correlation being for ruminative guilt. It is possible that females, who are socialized more than males to value
relationships, are sensitized by higher levels of ruminative guilt to the potential for damaging their relationships if they openly express anger. Thus, females may be more likely than males to mask or hide their anger. This conclusion would be consistent with recent research by Ferguson and Crowley (in press b) showing that when suppressed anger is taken into consideration, males and females experience similar amounts of anger.

The finding, inconsistent with past research, of no important relationships between shame and anger in any of the analyses, may be a function of measurement. It is possible that Rorschach anger differs in quality from the anger assessed by pencil-and-paper measures used in previous guilt and shame research. Rorschach believed that the use of white space required an alteration in the figure-ground relationship that symbolized a form of negativism or oppositionality (Exner, 1986). At least some empirical support exists for this position (e.g., Stein, 1973). Because the Rorschach assesses anger at a different level of awareness than other measures of anger, cognitive and/or affective differences are likely to exist
between Rorschach's oppositional anger and the hostile anger assessed by other measures.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Dysphoric Affect

No important relationships were detected between dysphoric affect and any of the three self-conscious emotions in either the multivariate analyses or the bivariate correlations for the total sample or for males. In the multivariate analysis for females, a moderate negative correlation was found between dysphoric affect and nonruminative guilt. In addition, different patterns of bivariate correlations between dysphoric affect and the self-conscious emotions emerged between males and females. For males, the correlations ranged between .03 and .14 and were all in the positive direction. However, correlations for females were somewhat larger and were all in the negative direction, ranging from -.15 to -.23, with the strongest relationship being between dysphoric affect and nonruminative guilt.

These results suggest that females may be less likely than males to experience dysphoric affect in connection
with the self-conscious emotions--particularly nonruminative guilt. However, the results may be an artifact of the different levels of awareness assessed by the Rorschach and the TOSCA--M. Females experiencing higher levels of the self-conscious emotions may be more acutely aware of the negative impact that their dysphoria could have on their relationships. Obviously, defending themselves against awareness or admission of dysphoric feelings would be an easier task in responding to the TOSCA--M than to the Rorschach.

It is also important to consider that the dysphoric affect variable is a rather broad variable, being composed of four shading variables. Of these four variables, diffuse shading (Y) is believed to reflect distress that is more situational and transient in nature. Achromatic color (C') responses represent any of a number of internalized negative feelings. Vista (V) is indicative of negative self-examination, whereas texture (T) responses signify the level of need for affection (Exner, 1991). These four variables each have a very low base rate, with the general population mode for C' and T being
1, and for Y and V being 0 (Exner, 1993). Although aggregating the data increases reliability, the low base rate hinders the measurement of subclinical levels of dysphoria, which were more likely to occur than were clinical levels with this sample. Also, it is likely that these four variables differ in their relationships to the three self-conscious emotions. Aggregating them into one variable may disguise the unique nature of the individual variables and how they relate to guilt and shame. The intercorrelations in this research among the four variables, presented in Table 16, suggest that because

Table 16
Correlations Among the Rorschach Variables Composing Dysphoric Affect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>C'</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C'</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
there was little relationship among most of the variables, they may, in fact, have canceled each other out. However, because of the low base rates, it would not be prudent to examine correlations between the emotion variables and the four components of dysphoric affect.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Positive Psychological Functioning

Self-Conscious Emotions and Cooperation

Nonruminative Guilt and Cooperation

The predicted bivariate association between nonruminative guilt and cooperation in relationships appeared in the total sample and for females, but not for males. In the multivariate analyses, the expected relationship appeared only for females. This result may be a reflection of the greater value placed on relationships by females, as opposed to males. Females who are more trustworthy and likable in their relationships may rely on nonruminative guilt to prompt behaviors that increase the likelihood of maintaining
their interpersonal relationships.

**Ruminative Guilt and Cooperation**

Ruminative guilt did not have an important association with cooperation in either the bivariate or multivariate analyses for the total sample or for females. For males, however, ruminative guilt had a higher bivariate correlation with cooperation (.20) than with any of the other emotion variables. In the multivariate analysis, cooperation was mildly associated with all three emotions, particularly with ruminative guilt. It is possible that males who place greater value on relationships than males in general are more likely to ruminate about behaviors that they perceive as having the potential for harming their relationships. Their cooperation may then take on a negative quality, such as is observed in abusive relationships and in persons with strong dependencies in their significant relationships.

**Shame and Cooperation**

Shame was not associated with cooperation in any of the bivariate or the multivariate analyses for the total
sample, nor for males and females separately.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Need for Affection

Perhaps the most striking result of the current research was the association between the need for affection and levels of the self-conscious emotions. Although need for affection is healthy and positive at the optimal level, unhealthy levels of neediness in relationships do exist and appear to be associated with the self-conscious emotions.

Nonruminative Guilt and Need for Affection

Nonruminative guilt did not figure prominently in the bivariate correlations, nor in the multivariate analyses of the total sample, or of the genders separately.

Ruminative Guilt and Need for Affection

In the bivariate correlations, ruminative guilt was moderately correlated with need for affection for the total sample and for males and females when considered separately. In the multivariate analysis for the total
sample, ruminative guilt was associated more strongly with the need for affection than any other emotion variable. For males, ruminative guilt was associated with the need for affection but was not the chief self-conscious emotion. For females, ruminative guilt appeared to be the predominant emotion associated with an unhealthy neediness for affection. Ruminative guilt may prompt females who are needy in relationships to ruminate about behaviors that they believe may have harmed their relationships (Baumeister et al., 1994). Emotionally needy women probably tend to repeatedly relive their relationship transgressions in imagination and believe that there is nothing they can do to ever make up for them. Their ruminations may also serve as a defense against shame.

Shame and Need for Affection

For the total sample, a moderate bivariate correlation was obtained between shame and need for affection. In the multivariate analysis, shame was associated with the need for affection, although to a lesser degree in the total sample than did ruminative guilt. For males, shame was moderately correlated with
need for affection, and when the three emotion variables were considered together, shame had the strongest relationship with the need for affection. For females, shame had an important association with need for affection, but less so than ruminative guilt.

It appears that for men, an unhealthy level of neediness in relationships corresponds to high levels of shame. Men who are emotionally needy in their current relationships or who have experienced some type of emotional loss may see themselves as defective and worthless. In contrast, emotionally needy women appear less likely to focus their attention on their own unworthiness and more on their relationships.

The finding that ruminative guilt in females was more strongly associated with need for affection than was shame, whereas shame was the chief emotion for men, is somewhat surprising in light of the current wisdom suggesting that women rely more heavily than men on the emotion of shame to organize their experience (e.g., H. B. Lewis, 1971). However, such conclusions were reached before serious consideration was given to the role of
ruminative guilt in the formation of psychological symptoms. It is possible that ruminative guilt, in which the focus is on inadequate behavior, functions either as a defense against shame or, alternatively, as a necessary precursor to shame, in which the focus is redirected onto the inadequate self. In either case, the presence of ruminative guilt suggests an increased vulnerability to shame. However, some women may be more successful than others at defending themselves against feelings of shame, and the shame may never emerge. Thus, although the presence of ruminative guilt may signal the presence of defended shame, it does not necessarily guarantee that shame is present or even predict that it will follow.

Interestingly, the tendency to deny the need for affection, at the opposite end of the need-for-emotion continuum, appears to be associated with lower levels of ruminative guilt and shame. However, this may be a function of the manner in which the variables were assessed, with the need for affection being measured at a lower level of awareness than were the self-conscious emotions. It is logical that individuals who are denying
their need for affection would also tend to defend
themselves from appearing to be ruminatively guilty or
shameful.

It is also interesting to speculate about why a large
proportion of subjects gave no texture response,
indicating that they were denying the need for affection.
Perhaps this relates to the fact that many introductory
psychology students are freshmen, away from home for the
first time. This is a time of individuation for many
students, when they learn to exercise their autonomy and
are making decisions about how heavily they will rely on
their parents for emotional support. It may be that these
very struggles to define themselves and strengthen their
self-reliance prompt a temporary denial of the need for
affection--a least as far as that affection would come
from their parents. This would be an interesting question
for future research.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Self-Inspection

Nonruminative Guilt
and Self-Inspection

No important relationships were found in the
bivariate or multivariate analyses between self-inspection and nonruminative guilt for the total sample or for males. For females, however, the multivariate analysis revealed that nonruminative guilt contributes to higher levels of self-inspection, possibly promoting appropriate reparation for transgressions, followed by a sense of closure.

**Self-Inspection and Ruminative Guilt**

Ruminative guilt did not appear to be important in understanding the level of self-inspection of the total sample or of the two genders separately.

**Self-Inspection and Shame**

Shame did not factor significantly in the level of self-inspection for the entire sample, nor for the two genders separately.

Although Rorschach self-inspection is generally considered to be a positive activity, higher levels of self-inspection are unusual and may be related to negative self-value. However, higher levels of self-inspection are not uncommon during certain periods of change in the life cycle (Exner, 1991). Certainly, college age represents a
time of change, and this may account for the positive relationship of self-inspection with nonruminative guilt but not with ruminative guilt or shame.

**Difficulties in the Measurement of Guilt and Shame**

Only one measure of guilt- and shame-proneness (TOSCA--M) was employed in this research. Tangney (1996) contends that among the various assessments of these emotions, the TOSCA is the superior measure. However, the current literature reflects considerable discussion and controversy regarding what is the best and most accurate measure of these self-conscious emotions. Ferguson and Crowley (in press a) contend that there is not a "best" measure of proneness to guilt and shame but, rather, that the various measures assess different things. Consistent with this view, selection of a measure would depend on which aspects of guilt- and shame-proneness the researcher wished to measure. Only in the TOSCA is guilt represented as a positive, adaptive emotion. The focus of the current research on both the ruminative and nonruminative features of guilt-proneness led logically to use of the TOSCA--M,
in which both are considered.

Adequate measurement of the guilt and shame constructs has historically been difficult, and the TOSCA--M is not without its critics. The fact that the Shame and Ruminative Guilt scales are strongly correlated has drawn criticism. However, these correlational results do not prove that the two scales are measuring the same thing. Consider, for example, that height is strongly correlated with level of education. That fact does not mean that height and level of education are the same. Rather, both are often a function of age. In the present research, the relationships of ruminative guilt and shame with the psychological functioning variables are clearly different. In addition, the TOSCA--M scales have been shown to have predictive validity (Ferguson & Crowley, in press a).

This does not mean, however, that the TOSCA--M is the perfect measure of guilt- and shame-proneness. Because of the established psychometric soundness of the Rorschach, the lack of striking results in many areas of this research probably derives from the TOSCA--M. TOSCA--M
scenarios describe situations in which some type of feeling or action is unquestionably called for. In fact, in most of the scenarios, it would be socially inappropriate not to have some type of negative feeling in response to the event. It is possible that the TOSCA--M, particularly the Nonruminative Guilt scale, is strictly a measure of moral standards for which there is general societal consensus (Ferguson & Crowley, in press a; Kugler & Jones, 1992) and of the negative affect that accompanies violation of those standards.

Because this research has examined both the positive and negative aspects of guilt, one might ask why shame was not similarly represented. Clearly, shame has positive functions, such as promoting adherence to society's norms. However, for the purposes of this research, shame was considered to operate on a continuum, with the difference between pathological shame and healthy levels of shame being assessed only in terms of quantity rather than quality. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the crushing shame of persons whose lives are ruled by shame--a shame that defines their very existence--differs
qualitatively from the shame measured by the TOSCA--M. Had these individuals been assessed, each and every scenario would undoubtedly have evoked levels of shame that most persons cannot even imagine, resulting in a ceiling effect for the instrument. Thus, regardless of whether the differences between healthy and pathological levels of shame are quantitative or qualitative, the TOSCA--M clearly falls short of measuring the debilitating shame experienced by a segment of the clinical population.

The results of this research might also have been influenced by the self-presentation style of the subjects. Just as most humans apply an evaluation process to help them choose what to say or do in a given situation, research subjects might edit their responses in order to present themselves as more psychologically healthy than they actually are. The Rorschach elicits a certain amount of editing from most respondents in order to censor socially unacceptable responses to the inkblots, especially blatantly violent or sexual responses (Exner, 1993). But because of the ambiguous nature of the Rorschach, impression management is more difficult than
with many other measures, and respondents may unintentionally reveal characteristics that they might otherwise have concealed. On the other hand, less ambiguity is associated with scenarios of the TOSCA--M. Even though the indirectness of the scenario method may prevent respondents from ascertaining the exact purpose of the measure, most respondents would have little difficulty gauging the social appropriateness of each potential response and evaluating the relative health or wellness revealed by responding in that manner. Thus, the Rorschach and the TOSCA--M differ in their degree of indirectness, and any one subject may have unknowingly responded to the two measures with differing levels of guardedness. With this in mind, the need exists for a more veiled emotion measure that either matches the indirectness of the Rorschach or in some way avoids the pitfalls of social desirability response sets.

Problems in Rorschach Research

The Rorschach is unlike any other assessment instrument, and as such, a unique set of problems faces
researchers who wish to use the Rorschach in their studies. Included among these problems are the issues of using volunteer subjects, expecting congruence between the Rorschach and other measures, and examining individual Rorschach variables without consideration of their interactions with the other variables.

Volunteer Subjects

Participants in research studies have less at stake than do psychiatric patients who are referred for evaluation. As a result, they may respond differently than if they were concerned that the test results would be used to make decisions about their lives (Weiner, 1995a). As a result, the Rorschach results used in this research—and the corresponding relationships with the self-conscious emotion variables—might differ from those that would have been obtained from psychiatric patients.

Congruence with Other Instruments

Weiner (1995a) has warned that researchers who expect congruence between Rorschach variables and other
instruments that measure the same aspect of personality are likely to be disappointed. The different tests assess psychological functioning at differing levels of awareness. Respondents' degree of objectivity and subjectivity will vary between the tests. An additional area of variation is the sensitivity of the variables to the test-taking attitudes of the respondents. Weiner has suggested that a preferred method of research would be to link Rorschach findings to observable personality characteristics of participants.

**Interactions Among Variables**

Weiner (1995b) also cautioned that the best understanding of an individual's personality functioning using the Rorschach is obtained by noting the interactions among the Rorschach variables and features. Using individual variables in isolation and expecting that they will reveal meaningful information will often lead to disappointment. Observing variable interactions increases the validity and the utility of information obtained from the Rorschach.
Implications for Future Research

Future research might be directed towards using populations for which the measures are more relevant. There are inherent problems with using research findings from a normal population in formulating conclusions about psychopathology. It is a giant leap to assume that results from a normal population will generalize to clinical subjects. We may be wrong to assume that the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychopathology is a linear one, when instead the processes may not be the same at all and the quality of the emotion may be more critical than quantity. We would be better informed by future research that made use of a clinical sample to examine issues related to psychopathology.

Even with a normal sample, a better vehicle for measuring pathological levels of guilt- and shame-proneness within a scenario format might include more ambiguous situations, in which responsibility and/or controllability is not clear, or where pride might be evoked (Ferguson & Stegge, in press). Clinical experience
instructs us that the client whose identity is based on shame is ashamed about things that would elicit little or no shame response in other people. That being the case, scenarios that would be more useful in differentiating pathological levels of guilt and shame might be constructed with the help of clinical clients who feel guilt and shame in situations where those emotions are not commonly evoked. Such a scale would have the potential to more clearly differentiate problematic levels of the self-conscious emotions.

In order to further investigate the possibility that persons with clinically significant psychological symptoms would demonstrate different patterns of relationships between the emotion variables and the Rorschach variables, the bivariate correlations were repeated using only the 21 subjects whose scores on the DEPI were 5 or higher. The raw scores for white space responses were used in place of the adjusted scores in order to increase the range for that variable. Results of the correlations are presented in Table 17. Although these results are preliminary and must be viewed with caution, some appeared that differed
from results in the total sample.

Three interesting findings appeared in this subsample that differed from the results in the total sample. First, in contrast to the total sample where the

Table 17

Correlations (and Probabilities) for Subjects Positive on the DEPI Between the Emotion Variables and the Psychological Functioning Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rorschach variable</th>
<th>Nonruminative guilt</th>
<th>Ruminative guilt</th>
<th>Shame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>.01 (.76)</td>
<td>.07 (.76)</td>
<td>-.07 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>-.19 (.41)</td>
<td>.05 (.83)</td>
<td>-.02 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysphoric affect</td>
<td>-.03 (.88)</td>
<td>.37 (.10)</td>
<td>.07 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for affection</td>
<td>-.13 (.58)</td>
<td>.63 (.00)</td>
<td>.56 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-inspection</td>
<td>.18 (.44)</td>
<td>.46 (.04)</td>
<td>.51 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>.05 (.84)</td>
<td>.39 (.08)</td>
<td>.26 (.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 21
relationships between the emotions and dysphoric affect were very small and positive for males and small and negative for females, dysphoric affect in this small subgroup has a moderate positive relationship with ruminative guilt, suggesting that the dysphoric affect of depressed persons may be related to their guilty ruminations.

The second difference is that self-inspection appears to be more negative in these depressed persons than in the normal population. Whereas self-inspection in these depressed subjects relates positively to both shame and ruminative guilt, self-inspection in the total sample was related only to nonruminative guilt for females.

Finally, cooperation in depressed persons appears to take on a negative character, correlating positively with ruminative guilt and shame. In the total sample, cooperation was only mildly associated with ruminative guilt in males and moderately associated with nonruminative guilt in females, whereas for the depressed sample ruminative guilt and shame appear to be important elements of cooperation. It may be that depressed
individuals ruminate about their inability to do more in an attempt to mend breaches in their relationships and see themselves as defective for having transgressed in the first place.

Consistent with the findings for the total sample, the contributions of shame and ruminative guilt to an unhealthy level of neediness for affection in relationships are observed in this segment of the sample.

Implications of Guilt and Shame for Psychotherapy

Because shame and ruminative guilt are frequent inhabitants of the therapy room, strategies for dealing effectively with these maladaptive emotions are vital.

Treating Shame in Therapy

The preliminary results of this study suggest that shame in depressed persons is related to high levels of self-inspection. Associated with this finding, Lindsay-Hartz et al. (1995) have suggested that shame may arise when an individual accepts the opinion of others that some possibly unchangeable aspect of the self is unacceptable.
In such cases of negative self-inspection, the client might be encouraged to challenge or educate others concerning the characteristic, or to accept that his or her perception differs from the perceptions of others. Encouraging the client to seek out social support from individuals who share the characteristic may also be helpful.

Shame-prone individuals frequently magnify one characteristic or aspect of their being to include their entire identity. This thinking interferes with their acknowledgment of other facets of their identity, and frequently they feel helpless to change. Such clients may benefit from learning to accept that although some aspect of their identity conflicts with their ideals, they need not view this feature as their entire entity. Where change is possible, they may be motivated to effect changes in their problem area (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995).

Ward (1972) proposed that shame protects the client by preserving a certain stability of defenses. The client gauges the safety of revealing secrets and paces his or
her revelations accordingly. Such pacing serves to protect the client from the identity disorganization that might be the result of bringing material too rapidly into therapeutic focus. When the rate of exposure to shame is under the client's control, the exposed shame becomes less painful over time.

Shame in the current research was related to unhealthy levels of neediness in relationships. Healing that shame, then, would be expected to reduce the need for affection to normal levels. Ward (1972) has suggested that the healing of shame can occur within the context of a therapeutic relationship in which the client feels safe to gradually reveal shameful material without the risk of being rejected by the therapist. Therapists who are willing to admit their own mistakes and model for their clients the ability to survive the experience give clients permission to risk revealing some of their own shameful experience. By labeling the shame emotion and identifying processes that lead to it, some of the power of the emotion is dissipated. Therapists might also urge clients to evaluate the costs in terms of emotional energy of
keeping some aspects of themselves hidden in their relationships.

**Treating Guilt in Therapy**

In this study's depressed subsample, ruminative guilt contributed to dysphoric affect, self-inspection, and an unhealthy need for affection. Ruminative guilt often persists in spite of reassurances from others that the person either has done all that is humanly possible to rectify a situation, or that he or she is not responsible for a perceived infraction. Epston (1991) effectively treated this irrational guilt through the use of paradoxical techniques, in which the client was assigned to confess the "sin" and then perform rather extreme--to the point of being humorous--acts of penance before absolution could be obtained. It seems logical that if clients can learn to view themselves with humor, their self-inspection will take on a more positive character. The resulting increased self-acceptance would likely contribute to decreased dependency in relationships.

Cognitive-behavioral techniques are also used in the
treatment of ruminative guilt (Parsons, 1988). This psychotherapy focuses on making a connection between guilty thoughts and feelings of guilt, recognition that the cognitive distortions logically lead to guilty feelings, and forgiving rather than forgetting as the way to move beyond the guilt feelings.

Limitations of the Study

The current study has four general limitations, the first of which relates to additional concerns regarding the assessment of guilt and shame. The assessment of emotion constructs in general is imprecise, with a history of questionable success in operationalizing the theoretical constructs. Self-report measures are vulnerable to the desire of subjects to present themselves well. Also, the results of studies of guilt- and shame-proneness are influenced by the choice of assessment strategy (Crowley & Anderson, 1993; Ferguson & Crowley, 1996). Clearly, highly accurate measures of guilt- and shame-proneness remain as yet undeveloped, possibly reflecting the ongoing theoretical confusion that exists
in the conceptualization of self-conscious emotions.

The second limitation of the study involves the generalizability of the results. The sample used in this research, reflecting the unique nature of the Utah State University population, was mostly white and predominantly members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Whether this sample provided data similar to that which would be found in other college settings is uncertain. In addition, generalizing data obtained from college students to other populations, which in this case would be a clinical population, is fraught with pitfalls. Clearly, the two populations are not equivalent, and the preliminary results of this study suggest that findings in a clinical sample would be different from those used in analogue research. Certainly, the very nature of the study, in which volunteer subjects were asked to meet individually with an examiner, restricted the sample to those subjects who would be somewhat comfortable in this type of situation, virtually eliminating persons who might have exhibited the highest levels of shame. The resulting sample is likely to have been composed of the "healthiest
of the healthy," thus restricting the range of shame and other variables of interest evidenced by the participants. Obviously, further research is needed to clarify the role of gender differences in guilt- and shame-proneness as they relate to psychological functioning in a clinical population.

Third, the relative level of inexperience of the persons administering the Rorschach to subjects may have influenced the Rorschach results. For instance, some responses may not have been adequately inquired, with the result that determinants important to the questions in this research may have been underreported. Thus, the results of this research may differ from results that might be obtained by using more experienced Rorschachers.

Finally, although this research is based on the theoretical assumption that proneness to guilt and shame creates increased vulnerability to various forms of psychopathology, the correlational results merely indicate that guilt- and shame-proneness are associated with elevated levels of psychological symptomatology. No causal link has yet been established. Clearly,
longitudinal risk studies are needed to more directly investigate the possibility that guilt- and/or shame-proneness function as etiological factors in the development of psychopathology.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
MEMORANDUM

TO: Susan L. Crowley
FROM: Sydney Peterson
DATE: August 10, 1992
SUBJECT: Proposal Titled, "The Relationship Between Personal Attitudes and Cognitive-Perceptual Problem Solving"

The above referenced proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board. If you have any questions, please call me at 750-6924.

sp
APPENDIX B:

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
CONSENT FORM

The purpose of this study is to examine how personal attitudes affect cognitive-perceptual abilities in college students. Interested students can earn extra-credit for participation in this study (the value of such credit has been determined by each course instructor, check with yours for specific details). Participation requires (1) completion of questionnaires and (2) for a selected group (2) participation in an individually administered cognitive-perceptual task (additional extra-credit will be earned by students who participate in this task). The questionnaires will be completed during class time and will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. The cognitive-perceptual task will take approximately 45 minutes and will be conducted in the USU Psychology Department Clinic.

This experiment does NOT involve deception, nor risk of any kind. However, the questionnaires require self-disclosure of personal attitudes and the cognitive-perceptual task requires responding to ambiguous stimuli. If any distress is observed in participants, the study will be stopped and the student will be referred to a local mental health facility (usually the Student Counseling Center) for an evaluation.

Participation is voluntary and students may discontinue at any time during the experiment. However, extra-credit can only be given to those students who complete their participation in the study.

All information is confidential and will be seen only by research assistants and the principle investigator. Student names or other personal identifiers will be recorded only to notify class instructors of student participation for extra-credit.

This project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Utah State University. Any questions or concerns should be directed to Dr. S.L. Crowley, Assistant Professor of Psychology and Principal Investigator (750-1251).

If you wish to participate in this research study, sign below.

I HEREBY AGREE TO VOLUNTARILY PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND UNDER THE CONDITIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

Print name                      Student Signature                      Date
APPENDIX C:

TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT--MODIFIED
TOSCA-M

Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.

As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times.

For example:

A. You wake up early one morning. It is cold and rainy outside.

1) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.
   1--2--3--4--5
   not likely very likely

2) You would take the extra time to read the paper.
   1--2--3--4--5
   not likely very likely

3) You would feel disappointed that it's raining.
   1--2--3--4--5
   not likely very likely

4) You would wonder why you woke up so early.
   1--2--3--4--5
   not likely very likely

In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a "1" for answer (1) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on Saturday morning -- so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a "5" for answer (2) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a "3" for answer (3) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't -- it would depend on what I had planned. I circled a "4" for answer (4) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.

PLEASE DO NOT SKIP ANY ITEMS -- RATE ALL RESPONSES.
A. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him up.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1) You cannot apologize enough for forgetting the appointment.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) You would think: &quot;I'm inconsiderate.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) You would think: &quot;Well, they'll understand.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) You would try to make it up to him as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) You would think: &quot;My boss distracted me just before lunch.&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1--2--3--4--5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very likely</td>
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</table>

B. You break something at work and then hide it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6) You would think: &quot;This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or get someone else to.&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) You would think about quitting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8) For days would worry and are afraid what will happen if someone finds out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9) You would think: &quot;A lot of things aren't made very well these days.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10) You would think: &quot;It was only an accident.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1--2--3--4--5</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not likely</td>
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<td></td>
<td>very likely</td>
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</table>

C. You are out with friends one evening and you're feeling especially witty and attractive. Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11) You would think: &quot;I should have been aware of what my best friend is feeling.&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12) You would feel happy with your appearance and personality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13) You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14) You just know that your best friend will blame you forever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15) You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her spouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16) You would probably avoid eye contact for a long time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1--2--3--4--5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very likely</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
D. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan and project, and it turns out badly.

17) You would bend over backwards to make it up to your boss and colleagues. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
18) You would feel incompetent. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
19) You would think: "There are never enough hours in the day." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
20) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
21) You would think: "What's done is done." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

E. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.

22) You would think the company did not like the co-worker. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
23) You would think: "Life is not fair." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
24) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
25) You would feel horrified about what happened but afraid to correct the situation. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
26) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

F. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.

27) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive than I thought." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
28) You would regret that you put it off. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
29) You would feel like a coward. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
30) You would think: "I did a good job." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
31) You would feel badly about getting off so easily and feel "funny" whenever you thought about the call. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
32) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls you feel pressured into. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
G. You make a commitment to diet, but when you pass the bakery you buy a dozen donuts.

33) Next meal, you would eat celery to make up for it. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

34) You would think: "They looked too good to pass by." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

35) You would feel disgusted with your lack of will-power and self-control. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

36) You would think: "Once won't matter." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

37) You keep thinking: "How could I do something I know I shouldn't?" 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

H. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.

38) You would feel inadequate that you can't even throw a ball. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

39) You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

40) You would feel horrible, apologize over the next several days, and not want to play ball again. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

41) You would think: "It was just an accident." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

42) You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

I. You have recently moved away from your family and everyone has been very helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money but you paid it back as soon as you could.

43) You would feel immature. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

44) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

45) You would return the favor as quickly as you could. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

46) You would think: "I'm a trustworthy person." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

47) You would be proud that you repaid your debts. 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely

48) You would think: "I should never have to ask for things from my family." 1-2-3-4-5
   not likely very likely
J. You are driving down the road and you hit a small animal.

49) You would think the animal shouldn't have been on the road.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

50) You would think: "I'm terrible."
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

51) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

52) You just know you could've done something to avoid it.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

53) You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have avoided it.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

K. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did poorly.

54) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

55) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

56) You would think: "I should have studied harder."
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

57) You would feel stupid.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

58) You keep thinking back to all the things you did wrong in preparing for the exam.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

L. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out for a bonus because the project was such a success.

59) You would feel the boss is rather shortsighted.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

60) You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

61) You would feel your hard work paid off.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

62) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

63) You would feel you should not accept it.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely

64) You would think: "I didn't work hard enough to deserve a bonus" and would feel badly for getting one.
1--2--3--4--5  
not likely very likely
M. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.

65) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

66) You would feel small--like a rat. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

67) You would think that perhaps that friend should have been there to defend himself/herself. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

68) You would berate yourself for it and vow to never do it again. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

69) You would apologize and talk about that person's good points. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

N. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you, and your boss criticizes you.

70) You would think your boss should have been more clear about what was expected of you. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

71) You would walk around for days kicking yourself because you think the criticism was well deserved. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

72) You would feel like you wanted to hide. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

73) You would think: "I should have recognized the problem and done a better job." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

74) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

O. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are.

75) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are basically lazy. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

76) You're appalled that you would even consider letting those kids down. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

77) You would feel you were forced into doing something you did not want to do. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

78) You would think: "I should be more concerned about people who are less fortunate." 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

79) You would feel great that you had helped others. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely

80) You would feel very satisfied with yourself. 1-2-3-4-5
not likely very likely
VITA

Julie Bingham Shipfler

294 South 50 West, Orem, UT 84058  (801) 224-3547

EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy
Professional-Scientific Psychology (APA accredited)
Utah State University, Logan: 1997 (expected)

Master of Science
Counseling Psychology (APA accredited)
Utah State University, Logan: 1994

Bachelor of Arts
Psychology
Utah State University, Logan: 1991

Attended
Ricks College, Rexburg, ID: 1970-71, 1982
Southern Utah State College, Cedar City: 1982
Utah Technical College, Salt Lake City: 1973

DISSERTATION TITLE

"The Relationship between Guilt- and Shame-Proneness and Rorschach Indices of Psychological Functioning"
Chairs: Susan L. Crowley, PhD; Tamara J. Ferguson, PhD

THESIS TITLE

"The Role of Gender Differences in the Relationship Between Guilt- and Shame-Proneness and Depressive Symptomatology"
Chairs: Tamara J. Ferguson, PhD; Susan L. Crowley, PhD
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE

8/96 to Present
Pre-doctoral Intern, Counseling and Development Center, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Full-time position (40 hr/wk).
Provide individual, marital, and group therapy to college students presenting with a variety of behavioral and emotional problems; career counseling; psychological and psychoeducational assessments; teaching; biofeedback and relaxation training; outreach; case presentations; intakes; supervision of doctoral level counseling students; walk-in crisis coverage; diversity committee; intern selection committee.
Supervisors: L. DeMoyne Bekker, PhD, Licensed Psychologist; Patricia A. Esplin, PhD, Licensed Psychologist

9/95 to 6/96
Graduate Assistant Therapist. Utah State University Counseling Center, Logan, Utah. Half-time position (20 hr/wk). Provide individual, marital, and group therapy to college students presenting with a variety of behavioral and emotional problems; conduct intake interviews and prepare reports; supervise peer counselors; case presentations; walk-in crisis coverage; outreach presentations to university and community groups.
Supervisors: Gwena Couillard, PhD, Marriage and Family Therapist, Janis G. Neece, PhD, Licensed Psychologist

9/94 to 6/95
Inpatient Practicum. Behavioral Health Unit, Logan Regional Hospital, Logan, Utah. (10 hr/wk). Co-lead group therapy with adolescents and adults in an inpatient locked facility; complete psychological assessments and dictate reports; participate in multidisciplinary treatment team meetings.
Supervisor: Bruce Johns, PhD, Licensed Psychologist.

9/93 to 9/95
Learning Disabilities Specialist. Utah State University Disability Resource Center, Logan, Utah. Part-time position (11 hr/wk). Conduct intake interviews with university students who report learning difficulties; complete psychoeducational assessments; prepare comprehensive reports; provide feedback and one-time counseling to clients; lead support/therapy group for students with learning disabilities; consult with Center staff regarding learning disabilities, ADHD, and brain injuries.
Supervisor: David W. Bush, PhD, Licensed Psychologist.
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE (Continued)

1993 to 1994
Counseling Center Practicum. Utah State University Counseling Center, Logan, Utah. Provide individual, couples, and group therapy to university students presenting with emotional and behavioral problems; intake; case presentations.
Supervisors: David W. Bush, PhD, Licensed Psychologist; Mary E. Doty, PhD, Licensed Psychologist.

1991 to 1996
Psychology Practicum. Utah State University Psychology Department Community Clinic, Logan, Utah. Provide individual, couples, family, and group therapy to children, adolescents, and adults presenting with various emotional and behavioral problems; conduct intake interviews and prepare reports; conduct psychodiagnostic assessments and prepare comprehensive reports; case presentations.
Supervisors: Susan L. Crowley, PhD, Licensed Psychologist; David M. Stein, PhD, Licensed Psychologist; Kenneth W. Merrell, PhD, Licensed Psychologist.

Fall 1990
Interviewer. Eating Disorders Project, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. Conduct clinical interviews to identify psychopathology coexisting with eating disorders.
Supervisor: David M. Stein, PhD, Licensed Psychologist.

Spring 1990
Volunteer. Day Treatment Center, Bear River Mental Health, Logan, Utah. Conduct group sessions and goal-setting interviews with clients; assist staff with reports and other tasks.
Supervisor: Daryl Duffin, MFT.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Fall 1996
Instructor. Student Development 358R, Student Leadership Development, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Two-credit class of 18 undergraduate students comprising Helaman Halls Activity Council. Develop and present interactive lectures on time management, building self-esteem, assertiveness, values-based decision making, effective communication, stress management, and peer counseling.
Supervisor: Eileen Booth, PhD
TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE (Continued)

Spring 1993  Instructor. Psychology 510/610 History and Systems of Psychology, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. Four-credit class, 10 graduate and 130 undergraduate students. Prepare and present lectures, prepare exams, grade assignments and exams, supervise teaching assistant, office hours.
   Supervisor: Michael R. Bertoch, EdD, Licensed Psychologist

1991 to 1993  Research Assistant. Guilt and Shame Project, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. Part-time position (10 hr/wk). Code, enter, and analyze data concerning guilt- and shame-proneness in children as it relates to parenting practices; assist in preparation of grant proposals; conduct library research; summarize literature; make telephone and personal contacts to obtain information and letters of support; prepare grant budget; edit grant proposal and book chapter.
   Supervisor: Tamara J. Ferguson, PhD, Social Psychologist.

PAPERS PRESENTED  (Note: Last name was formerly Anderson)


PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS AND WORKSHOPS

Behavioral Medicine Unit: Multidisciplinary Treatment of Anxiety Disorders. Clinical Psychology graduate students, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. April 7, 1997
PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS AND WORKSHOPS (Continued)


YIKES, It's Time for Midterms and Finals! Helaman Halls, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. October 15, 1996.

Helping Students in Crisis. College of Family Life faculty, Utah State University, Logan, UT. February 26, 1996.


PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS ATTENDED

Campbell Interest and Skill Survey (CISS) Workshop, by David Campbell, PhD. University of Utah Counseling Center, April 11, 1997, Salt Lake City, UT.

Assessment and Treatment of Trauma, by John Briere, PhD. Third Annual Utah State University Counseling Center Conference, April 4, 1997, Logan, UT.


Contemporary Gender Issues in Counseling and Psychotherapy, by Susan D. Lonborg, PhD. Counseling Issues Seminar, Department of Educational Psychology, Brigham Young University, January 17, 1997.


1996 Utah Counseling Center Conference. November 1, 1996, Park City, UT.
PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS ATTENDED (Continued)


The Psychobiology of Health and Well-Being: A Conference on Healing and the Mind, by Patch Adams, MD, Barry Bittman, MD, Alistair Cunningham, PhD, James S. Gordon, MD, Lawrence LeShan, PhD, Patricia A. Norris, PhD, and Susan Rose Parenti, PhD. Brigham Young University Department of Health Sciences, October 3-4, 1996, Provo, UT.


Assessment and Treatment of Anxiety and Panic Disorders, by David H. Barlow, PhD. Utah Psychological Association, Salt Lake Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Utah Nurses Association, February 19, 1996, Salt Lake City, UT. 6 hrs.


In Search of Good Form, by Dr. Joseph Zinker. First Annual Utah State University Counseling Center Conference, April 14, 1995, Logan, UT.


Therapeutic Pathways to the Self: A Gestalt Outlook, by Erving Polster, PhD, and Miriam Polster, PhD. Twenty-Sixth Annual Brigham Young University Counseling Workshop, March 2-3, 1995, Provo, UT.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Student Affiliate, American Psychological Association, 1992-present.

Student Affiliate, American Psychological Society, 1993-94.

Student Affiliate, Utah Psychological Association, 1994-present.

Student Member, Association of Mormon Counselors and Psychotherapists, 1994-present.

Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 1989-94.

ACADEMIC AWARDS AND HONORS

1994 Full Tuition Scholarship, Psychology, Utah State University.

1993 Pamela Cheney Scholarship, Utah State University.

Full Tuition Scholarship, Psychology, Utah State University.

1991 Valedictorian, College of Education, Utah State University.

1991 Bachelor of Arts Degree with Summa Cum Laude Honors, Utah State University.

Outstanding Student, Psychology, Utah State University.

1990 Elected to Blue Key Honor Society, Utah State University.

Elected to Golden Key Honor Society, Utah State University.

Seely-Hinckley Scholarship, Utah State University.

1990-95 Psi Chi Honor Society, Utah State University.

1990-94 National Dean's List.

1990-91 Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges, Utah State University
ACADEMIC AWARDS AND HONORS (Continued)

1990-91 Executive Officer, Utah State University Psi Chi Honor Society.
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society, Utah State University.
Full Tuition Academic Scholarship, College of Education, Utah State University.

1989-90 Full Tuition Scholarship, Women's Center, Utah State University

1970-71 Full Tuition Academic Scholarship, Ricks College.
Honors Program, Ricks College.

REFERENCES

L. DeMoyne Bekker, PhD
Clinical Director
Counseling and Development Center
Brigham Young University
149 SWKT, P. O. Box 25548
Provo, UT 84602-5548
(801) 378-3035

Patricia A. Esplin, PhD
Licensed Psychologist
Counseling and Development Center
Brigham Young University
2246 SFLB
Provo, UT 84602
(801) 378-6284

Susan L. Crowley, PhD
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322-2810
(801) 797-1251

David W. Bush, PhD
Adjunct Clinical Professor
Staff Psychologist
University Counseling Center
Utah State University
Logan, Utah 84322-0115
(801) 797-1012

Patricia A. Esplin, PhD
Licensed Psychologist
Counseling and Development Center
Brigham Young University
2246 SFLB
Provo, UT 84602
(801) 378-6284

David W. Bush, PhD
Adjunct Clinical Professor
Staff Psychologist
University Counseling Center
Utah State University
Logan, Utah 84322-0115
(801) 797-1012

Tamara J. Ferguson, PhD
Associate Professor
Department of Psychology
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322-2810
(801) 797-3272