Changing the Role of Appraisal and Interpersonal Factors in Guilt Induction: Time, Perspective, and Responsibility

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CHANGING THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL AND INTERPERSONAL FACTORS IN GUILT INDUCTION: TIME, PERSPECTIVE, AND RESPONSIBILITY

by

Chris Lee Treadwell

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Psychology

Approved:

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

2001
ABSTRACT

Changing the Role of Appraisal and Interpersonal Factors in Guilt Induction: Time, Perspective, and Responsibility

by

Chris Lee Treadwell, Doctor of Philosophy

Utah State University, 2001

Major Professor: Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson
Department: Psychology

Appraisal theories of emotion assert that guilt arises from the evaluations one makes about one's behavior. Perpetrators experience guilt when they view themselves as responsible for harm caused to their victims. Interpersonal theories of emotion hold that guilt is a function of relational factors, including the need to repair relationships. Theorists argue that guilty feelings often arise in spite of appraisals, and that perpetrators feel guilty because of a need to communicate reconciliatory messages to their victims. These two views of guilt are generally seen as mutually exclusive. This study proposed integrating both views of guilt into a single, interactive theory of guilt that includes both appraisals and interpersonal concerns and that asserts that guilt varies as a function of the appraisals one makes about one's own and others' behavior, the nature of the relationship between perpetrators and victims, the perspective from which one views events, and the passage of time. The main question asked was: when taking into account these factors, is guilt better
accounted for by an appraisal, interpersonal, or the newly proposed integrative view of guilt?

One-hundred forty-seven male and 168 female university students were presented with scenarios depicting the interaction of two people who were friends or enemies and were directed to adopt the perspective of perpetrators, victims, or were not given instructions to adopt a perspective. In each scenario, a perpetrator acted to inflict harm that was either unintentional or angrily intended. Participants then rated perpetrators' responsibility appraisals, emotional responses, and forgiveness needs. Additionally, participants were asked to rate how responsible perpetrators believed their victims believed them to be.

Correlational analyses and ANOVA were used to test the effects of the factors in the proposed model on ratings of guilt. Although partial support was found for both the appraisal view and the interpersonal view of guilt, results provided the strongest support for the interactive view of guilt. Discussion focused on the role of appraisals, relational factors, perspective, and time in guilty feelings and the implications of these findings for further research.

(175 pages)
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Chris Lee Treadwell
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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Over the past several decades, researchers have generally concluded that guilt results when an individual appraises the self as personally responsible for a misdeed or negative event (e.g., de Rivera, 1984; Heider, 1958; Izard, 1977; Shaver, 1985; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1986, 1995; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). These models are based, in part, on Heider’s (1958) classic analysis of levels or types of responsibility. Heider asserted that personal and environmental forces combine to form different perceptions of responsibility. According to his formulation, three key factors in distinguishing levels of responsibility are the degree to which a negative outcome is appraised as avoidable versus unavoidable, intentional versus unintentional, and as justified or unjustified. Appraisal-based theories of emotions generally assert that any given emotion is the result of a unique pattern of cognitive evaluations that are based on several dimensions of appraisal. Although various appraisal theorists have argued for slightly different sets of appraisal dimensions as causative of different emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988), all appraisal theories acknowledge an appraisal dimension equivalent to, or analogous to, responsibility. For example, Roseman (1984) and Frijda (1986) have both referred to a causal dimension of agency. Scherer’s (1988, 1997) theory refers to dimensions of fairness and agency that he suggests lead to identification of the responsible agent. Lazarus (1991) included in his theory the appraisal dimension of accountability that leads to blameworthiness. In each of the theories cited,
guilty feelings result from the individual's determination that he or she is responsible for some untoward act or event (in addition to other appraisals). The essential point is that, although different appraisal theories diverge in the language used to describe the appraisal dimensions, most appraisal theorists generally concur that responsibility plays a large role in eliciting guilty feelings.

The predictions made by appraisal theorists regarding a wide range of emotions are supported by empirical findings demonstrating that individuals will report emotions that are consistent with the unique pattern of appraisals they have made. Appraisal theorists have not been without their critics, however. These critics argue that appraisal theorists treat emotions as largely intrapsychic processes that occur because of the emotional individual's own private appraisals, without being directly influenced by factors outside the individual experiencing the emotion.

Recent interpersonal views of emotion, including that espoused by Brian Parkinson (1995, 1997), assert instead that emotions are fundamentally social rather than intrapsychic in origin. In Parkinson's view, emotions arise out of social exchanges because they serve to convey how an individual wishes to be viewed or treated by others. An individual thus becomes emotional as a means of staking a claim about his or her identity. Parkinson argued that as individuals experience dissonance between how they view themselves and how they perceive others view them, they assert their identity claims by becoming emotional. In Parkinson's view, people feel guilty as a means of asserting the identity claim that they wish to be forgiven; alternatively, their angry feelings stake the claim that they deserve to be treated differently. It should be emphasized that Parkinson
did not deny the existence of the private appraisals emphasized and studied so widely in the field of emotions. Parkinson simply questioned their necessary causative role in eliciting emotions. Parkinson explicitly asserted that appraisals are simply a language that individuals use to organize, describe, and make sense of emotions once aroused.

Parkinson’s assertions about the role of identity claims in emotion elicitation have not been tested empirically. But, recent evidence does suggest that emotions (e.g., guilt) arise in the absence of the types of appraisals that the appraisal theorists claim are so central to arousing them. In particular, it has been found that people actually report feeling guiltier when they perpetrate an untoward event for which they feel little or no responsibility compared to cases in which they believe themselves to be highly responsible (e.g., Ferguson, Olthof, & Stegge, 1997; Kroon, 1988). These findings appear to directly contradict appraisal accounts of guilt elicitation. Interpersonal theorists who focus specifically on the emotion of guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) contend that these findings are evidence of the role of interpersonal factors, rather than private appraisals, in eliciting this painful emotion. One might be tempted to conclude that appraisal and interpersonal theories of emotion (including guilt) are therefore incompatible. However, recent evidence suggests that it may be possible to accommodate an interpersonal perspective within the traditional appraisal view of guilt by considering three important factors that can impact this emotion (as well as other emotions).

First, in any emotion-inducing event, one may view the event from multiple perspectives. For example, one might view the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim from either the perpetrator’s point of view (which is typical of traditional appraisal
theories) or from that of the victim (more characteristic of the interpersonalists). Second, instead of viewing emotions as static phenomena, they might be better viewed as dynamic processes that occur, and can change, over time. It is feasible that a perpetrator's private appraisals of responsibility are the primary motivators of guilt at one moment in time (which is consistent with the traditional appraisal view of this emotion), but that the victim's actual or perceived appraisal of responsibility governs the guilt response at other points in time (which is consistent with the interpersonalists' accounts of guilt). And third, the relationship between perpetrator and victim—a central variable in all interpersonal theories of emotion—will affect the likelihood of the perpetrator ever viewing the event from the victim's perspective.

In considering these three factors together, it may well be that the perpetrator's own immediate appraisal of his or her responsibility for an event (self-directed appraisal) interacts with the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim to determine the degree to which the perpetrator relies upon his or her own appraisals versus those of the victim. In turn, the degree to which the perpetrator attends to the victim's appraisals will determine the perpetrator's communicative agenda (identity claims) and the initial emotion elicited. Specifically, it is possible that perpetrators' initial emotional self-reports are influenced by their own personal appraisal of the situation when they perceive their behavior as having proper justification (even if this disagrees with the victim's potential perspective on the event). The latter is especially likely to occur when the relationship between the perpetrator and victim is an enemic rather than friendly one. Similarly, it is possible that perpetrators' initial identity claims are governed more by their
own personal appraisal of the situation when they perceive their behavior as having proper justification, again especially in adversarial rather than close, caring relationships. It is also possible that with the passage of time, the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim will lead to a shift in perspective whereby the perpetrator assumes a different perspective from that initially taken (e.g., the perpetrator begins to attend to the victim’s appraisals). This change in perspective thus leads to a need to strike a different identity claim about the relationship, thereby leading to a change in the emotional response.

This line of reasoning is consistent with Parkinson’s (1995) views on appraisals, that it is the victim’s appraisals of the perpetrator’s responsibility, rather than the perpetrator’s appraisals of his or her responsibility, that underlie guilty feelings. Viewed in this way, it may be possible to explain the conflicting findings with respect to the role of appraisals in arousing feelings of guilt by considering that interpersonal factors, like those posited by Parkinson, often interact with exclusively self-derived appraisals to determine the perspective adopted, the interpersonal claims struck, and the resulting emotions experienced. The precise nature of this interaction also likely changes with the passage of time. It is important, therefore, to investigate how interpersonal factors and appraisals of responsibility affect the elicitation of guilt across time and to test the possibility that both interpersonal and traditional appraisal theories may actually be valid, depending on when emotions are measured during the unfolding emotional process and also depending upon whether appraisals are measured from the perspective of the perpetrator or the victims.
The general problem addressed in this dissertation can therefore be summarized as follows: When taking into account time, the nature of relationship between individuals, and perspective, are feelings of guilt better accounted for by traditional appraisal explanations of emotion (that emphasize cognitive evaluations entertained largely from one's own perspective), by an interpersonal theory that emphasizes the communicative function of emotions (i.e., identity claims) and that stresses one's tendency to adopt outside agents' perspectives, or by an integrated theory that recognizes the importance of both self-directed appraisals as well as interpersonal factors (including other-directed appraisals) in emotional arousal?

This problem was investigated by addressing several component questions: (a) to what extent do appraisals (including those related to responsibility) made by a perpetrator versus those made by the victim substantially affect the emotions experienced by the perpetrator? (b) to what degree are the identity claims communicated by a perpetrator driven by the perpetrator's self-perceptions and motives versus the victim's perceptions or motives? and (c) to what extent do the victim's perceptions govern the perpetrator's emotions and his or her identity claims relatively early in the unfolding emotion process? It will be argued that even in very close, caring relationships, a perpetrator is unlikely to initially adopt the victim's perspective when the perpetrator believes that she or he was justified in harming the victim. That in these close, caring relationships, a perpetrator is more likely to adopt the victim's perspective later in time even when the perpetrator initially felt justified for harming the victim. That in close, caring relationships, a perpetrator is more likely to initially adopt the victim's perspective when the perpetrator
believes that she or he was not justified in harming the victim. And that in more adversarial relationships, a perpetrator is unlikely to adopt the victim’s perspective either earlier or later in time.

The investigation consisted of presenting participants with scenarios that depicted a harmful interaction between two people who were either friends or enemies. In addition to manipulating the nature of the relationship, characteristics of the harmful event were varied such that the harmdoer’s behavior could be seen as having proper initial justification or not in the Heiderian sense. In one scenario, the harm occurred unintentionally but nonetheless could have been avoided, thus representing Heider’s “foreseeable” level of responsibility, and therefore occurring without proper justification from the perpetrator’s initial perspective. In a second scenario, the harm occurred because of “angry intent,” thus representing Heider’s “justified” level of responsibility at least from the perpetrator’s initial perspective. Scenarios were presented with instructions that directed participants to attend to either the perpetrator’s or the victim’s perspective of the events portrayed, or no instructions were provided regarding the perspective to be adopted. Participants’ perceptions of the identity claims struck, the relevant appraisals made from the self’s and others’ perspectives, and the emotions experienced were assessed at two time points (immediately after the emotion-relevant event and one day later). Analyses focused on how the degree of perceived guilt changed as a result of changes in the perspective taken on the event, which was believed to be impacted the most by the direct manipulation of perspective, the nature of relationship manipulation, and the time at which guilt was measured.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Traditional appraisal theories of emotion argue that the persons experiencing various emotions do so because of the different ways in which they have privately or intrapsychically evaluated the event. The first purpose of the literature review is to summarize traditional appraisal-based theories of the elicitation of guilt. Recently, however, these traditional appraisal theories of emotion generally (and guilt, more specifically) have been criticized by those who argue for a more interpersonal view of emotion elicitation. Private, intrapsychic appraisal theories of guilt have been fervently attacked by Brian Parkinson (1995, 1997). The second purpose of this review is to summarize Parkinson’s most pivotal reservations about appraisal theory and to elucidate his (and others’) views of how interpersonal factors are involved in guilt elicitation. The third purpose of the literature review is to profile, if only briefly, some of the actual empirical evidence that supports traditional appraisal theories of guilt as opposed to evidence that better supports Parkinson’s (and others’) interpersonal theories of guilt arousal. In this third section, brief attention is paid to the empirical research that appears overwhelmingly supportive of appraisal theorists’ views of guilt arousal. The third section includes, as well, an overview of the type of evidence that supports or is needed to support Parkinson’s newer and more revolutionary perspective on guilt induction. The chapter concludes with a summary of the some of the factors that need to be examined in
order to discern the extent to which traditional appraisal and/or newer interpersonal views are valid explanations of guilt arousal. These factors are the perspective taken on the event, the time at which guilt is measured, the relationship between the person in whom the emotion is induced and the object of that emotion, and the emotional individuals' responsibility for the events in question. These four factors are then used to suggest a possible design for teasing apart the validity of appraisal versus interpersonal views of guilt arousal. Predictions based on this design are then outlined for the reader.

Traditional Appraisal Views of Guilt Induction

Underpinnings of Appraisal Views of Guilt

Guilt is widely believed to be associated with self-perceptions of blameworthiness (e.g., de Rivera, 1984; Izard, 1977; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Wicker et al., 1983). The notion of blameworthiness stems from a tradition that evolved from theories concerning perceptions of responsibility. The social psychologist Fritz Heider first hypothesized that people's perceptions of responsibility reflect the interplay of personal and situational factors that combine to represent progressively greater degrees of responsibility. Heider's (1958) analysis includes five levels of responsibility: association, commission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justifiability. According to Heider's formulation, the lowest degree of responsibility is ascribed to an individual when he or she is merely associated with a negative outcome. Responsibility increases when the negative outcome is perceived to be the direct result of the individual's behavior (i.e., the behavior caused the outcome in question, but was nonetheless unintended and uncontrollable or
unavoidable). The perception of responsibility further increases when the individual's behavior that caused the negative outcome is thought to have been foreseeable (i.e., was unintended but avoidable or controllable), such as when someone acted carelessly or negligently. When the individual's behavior that caused the negative outcome is believed to have been intentional and controllable/avoidable, perceptions of responsibility increase even further. An evaluation that the individual's outcome-related behavior was avoidable, intentional and unjustified leads to an even greater perception of responsibility. Finally, a belief that the outcome-related act—even if it were intended and controllable or avoidable—was justified serves to mitigate the perception of responsibility. Heider's model is supported by empirical studies that have demonstrated that adults can make responsibility attributions in accordance with it (for a review, see Fincham & Jaspars, 1980).

Traditional Appraisal Approaches to Guilt

Heider's influential treatise has contributed to a variety of theories that assert that emotion arises as a result of individuals' subjective evaluation of an antecedent situation or event, including his or her responsibility for it (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Dalkvist & Rollenhagen, 1987; de Rivera, 1977; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968, 1991; Mees, 1985; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Solomon, 1976; Weiner, 1982, 1986). Arnold (1960) first posited that it is not the cold hard facts of a situation that lie at the heart of emotions. She suggested that something other than
objective perceptions account for emotional responses and concluded that the personal relevance of the event contributes to its emotional impact. Smith and Lazarus (1993) referred to this as the distinction between the knowledge one has about an event versus the evaluation one makes of that knowledge with respect to its personal significance. According to Scherer (1999), appraisal theorists hold that “emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person’s subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event on a number of dimensions or criteria” (p. 637).

An important cornerstone of appraisal theories of emotion is the belief that it is the appraisals themselves that are causative of emotion. For example, Lazarus (1991), a major advocate of the appraisal approach to emotion, sees various dimensions of appraisal as having a direct causal impact on emotion. In Lazarus’ view, we become angry because we perceive a person as blameworthy for infringing upon another’s rightful due; we become afraid because we appraise the situation as dangerous; the feeling of guilt emerges out of a self-appraisal of blameworthiness for violating standards of conduct, and so forth. Appraisal theorists assert that each emotion (e.g., guilt versus anger) is caused by a different pattern of appraisals. Each theorist has argued for the involvement of slightly different appraisal dimensions in guilt. For example, Roseman (1984, 1991) asserted that guilt results when one appraises a situation as motive-inconsistent, perceives the self as the causal agent, and concludes that the self is operating from a position of weakness. Lazarus (1991) described an appraisal process in which guilt is the natural outcome of evaluations of goal relevance and goal incongruence, in which the involvement of the self is to manage
a moral transgression, and in which blame is directed at the self. Scherer (1988) sees guilt arising from a similar, yet also somewhat different, set of appraisals. His theory emphasizes that guilt arises when there is an appraisal of goal hindrance, when causation is seen as internal, and when there is a perception that one has transgressed the standards of one’s social group.

Although these theories and others (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) define the appraisal components of guilt somewhat differently, they agree that guilt is elicited by some form of responsibility appraisal. Thus, according to appraisal theorists, when Sarah arrives home late from work one day and realizes she has forgotten her daughter’s dance recital, she appraises the situation in terms of various dimensions (e.g., goal/motive incongruence, agency, compatibility with standards, controllability), including responsibility, and experiences guilt only to the extent that she perceives herself to be responsible for the situation. The essential message is that appraisal theorists see a direct causal relationship between self perceptions of responsibility and guilt, much as Heider (1958) described.

Parkinson’s Interpersonal Views of Guilt Induction

In his interpersonal model of emotion, Parkinson (1995, 1997) is critical of many long-standing views of emotion in psychology. His criticisms strike a familiar chord with sociologists’ accounts of emotion (e.g., Gordon, 1974; Kemper, 1978; Sarbin, 1986; Scheff, 1988, 1990, 1997; Shotter, 1993; Thoits, 1989) as well as psychological accounts that are firmly rooted in sociology (e.g., de Rivera, 1984, 1992; de Rivera & Grinkis,
Parkinson (1995) asserted that traditionally accepted psychological theories of emotion are misguided in several specific respects—all of which revolve around views that emotions are intrapsychic in nature (cf. Baumeister et al., 1994). The term “intrapsychic” is rife with multiple meanings from the interpersonalists’ views. For purposes of the present proposal, which focuses on guilt, suffice it to note that the interpersonalists take major issue with the notion that guilt arises largely out of the emotional individual’s own private appraisals that they are or are not responsible for a misdeed.

Major Assertions by Parkinson

Parkinson’s primary contention is that emotion is a fundamentally social or communicative process through which people express (if only in their imagination) identity claims to others and themselves. Expressions of anger, for example, can stake various identity claims. They often communicate that one’s rights have been infringed upon (“you’ve offended me”) or they are assertions of one’s rights (“respect me”). But, anger expression can also convey negative self-attitudes (e.g., “How could I be so stupid!”) or communicate one’s loss of control in a situation that merits apologies or excuses for untoward behavior (“forgive me”). In Parkinson’s view, then, emotions serve the critical function of conveying information about the social roles to which we do and do not assent. Parkinson thus reconceptualizes the quality of emotion in terms of relational variables (e.g., conferring status or respect; desiring intimacy or friendship, cf. Kemper, 1978) and the constant readjustments that these relationships entail. Parkinson (1995) stated that “emotion is something that only makes complete sense when looked at in the
context of the encounter within which it arose.... Thus, in order to understand the phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the nature of the relationships that surround it” (pp. 190-191). In his view, emotions exist as a means of communicating one’s view of oneself and how others should treat the self. Emotions are not internal processes but a means of presenting oneself in a certain way to a specific audience (real or perceived) to get them to treat us differently.

Inherent in Parkinson’s (1995, 1997) claims about the communicative function of emotion is an acknowledgment of the dynamic nature of emotions. He explained his view:

> Emotions are not private messages that pre-exist their transmission into the social world. Rather, emotions arise in the evolving context of communicative interaction. Furthermore, it is not necessarily emotion *per se* that is communicated when we pick up information from other people’s verbal and nonverbal behavior. Rather we coordinate ourselves to what they do and somewhere along the line emotion occurs between us. (p. 182)

Parkinson (1995, 1997) thus argued that emotion research must take into account the unfolding process of emotions across time although, in fairness to appraisal theorists, it should also be noted that they, too, emphasize that emotions are best viewed as processes rather than as static phenomena. For example, the prominent appraisal theorist Scherer (1999) criticized researchers for failing to study “continuously occurring changes in the underlying appraisal and reaction processes” (p. 648) in evolving emotion episodes. These positions echo other descriptions of emotion as dynamic systems (e.g., Fogel et al., 1992; Gottman, 1979; Lazarus, 1991).
Role of Appraisal

Parkinson takes issue with appraisal views of emotion that argue that appraisals are necessary and sufficient causes of emotion (e.g., that we become angry because we perceive a person as blameworthy for infringing upon another’s rights or we become afraid because we appraise the situation as dangerous or that we feel guilty because we perceive ourselves as responsible for a misdeed). Parkinson (1997) argues that empirical support for the causal status of appraisal in arousing different emotions is weak (at best). Specifically, he argues that much of the implied support for appraisal-emotion links stems from self-report methodology that requires participants to make appraisals. Parkinson argues that finding appraisals using this methodology supports a conceptual connection between appraisals and emotion but provides little understanding of the potential causal relationship that may exist.

In addition to his criticisms of the research literature, Parkinson has provided theoretically grounded reasons for doubting appraisal’s necessary causal role in inducing emotion. He asserted that “the expression of emotion in any real-life context does not necessarily follow a process of appraisal, rather it stakes a claim about how the situation should be appraised” (1995, p. 191, emphasis added). Stated differently: People do not become angry because they perceive someone’s injurious behavior towards them as actually controllable. Their anger stems more from a perception that the behavior should have been controlled (regardless of whether it actually is perceived as controllable) and their desire to strike this particular identity claim.
In Parkinson’s model, the type of identity claim communicated in any given situation is affected greatly by the nature of the relationship between the parties involved in the interaction. For example, after a lunch date, Tom may not actually hold himself responsible for his girlfriend being late for class, yet he may nonetheless adopt the emotional attitude of guilt if he perceives it as the appropriate strategy to protect the relationship. Thus, in Parkinson’s view, the individual’s privately held appraisals of responsibility are not what generates the emotional display of guilt. The display, instead, is motivated by relational goals, which are expressed through identity claims.

Of course, Parkinson could be understood as saying that any form of appraisal is unnecessary to account for emotions. This understanding misrepresents his view, however. In Parkinson’s (1995) account, emotions exist to communicate a message about the appraisals that the person expects or wants others to make about the situation. Parkinson himself states that “my argument is that these themes [appraisals] characterize what the person getting emotional is communicating to the target of the emotional action, or rather what effect the emotional display is intended to have on its specified audience” (p. 285). In other words, appraisals simply contribute to the content of the messages communicated by emotions and are not the cause of emotions. Expression of emotion arises from a need to communicate a specific, interpersonal message.

Application of Parkinson’s Theory

Having considered Parkinson’s (1995, 1997) views on the interpersonal nature of emotion in general terms, the focus now shifts to Parkinson’s perspective on the emotion
of guilt. In this view guilt, like all emotions, serves an interpersonal function. Whereas the appraisal approaches to emotion see guilt as the consequence of privately held perceptions of personal responsibility concerning some transgression, Parkinson (1995) holds that guilt is simply a “communicative act directed to the person who has suffered harm, asking for forgiveness from them” (p. 296). For example, a person who is the object of another’s disapproval will experience guilt only to the extent he or she wishes to communicate an appeal for absolution. However, if the person does not seek forgiveness (i.e., he or she does not wish to communicate an identity claim of “forgive me”), the person does not experience guilt. Moreover, if the person interprets the others’ behavior as “angry,” then s/he may wish to communicate a very different identity claim such as “respect me,” and he or she will necessarily experience anger as the strategy for communicating this identity claim.

The essential point from the aforementioned example of guilt in the context of others’ reactions is that people’s emotional response are not necessarily or always a function of the private appraisals they have made about their own behavior. Rather, emotions arise from the need to communicate identity claims and these identity claims may well conflict with private appraisals. Parkinson (1995) holds that the precise identity claim to be communicated is a function of nature of the relationship between individuals. In addition, emotions may indeed express the appraisals as predicted by appraisal theorists, but from the interpersonal vantage point, the presence of appraisals serves only to reinforce ex-post facto the identity claim rather than causing them in the first place. As such, it is the very characteristics of the interpersonal relationship that determine (a) the
identity claims to be communicated, (b) the appraisals made, (c) the emotions that are
experienced, and (d) the intensity of the emotional experience.

Empirical Support for Appraisal and Interpersonal Views of Guilt

Appraisal Theories of Guilt

Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between appraisals and
emotions (see Lazarus, 1991, Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Manstead & Tetlock, 1989;
Parkinson, 1995; Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1993; Roseman,
Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1988, 1999 for reviews). Research paradigms have
included inviting participants to recall emotional experiences and questioning them about
antecedent evaluations (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Frijda,
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992;
Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1993; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985;
Tesser, 1990); relying on naturally emotion-laden events or inducing emotions
experimentally and measuring appraisal judgments (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Smith,
1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997); asking participants to report
their anticipated emotional responses to vignettes that have been manipulated with respect
to appraisal-relevant dimensions (McGraw, 1987; Roseman, 1984; Russell & McAuley,
1986; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Stipek, Weiner, & Li, 1989; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, &
Verette, 1987; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979);
and by presenting emotion words and asking participants to evaluate their appraisal

In terms of guilt, researchers have found support for appraisal views of this emotion (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Weiner, 1985). For example, Smith and Lazarus (1993) presented participants with scenarios that depicted harmful events (e.g. a friend betraying a confidence, a student being persecuted by a teaching assistant, a favorite relative contracting cancer, and students performing poorly on an important test). Scenarios were presented in two stages. During the first stage, participants were provided with details to evoke appraisals of either other-blame or loss/helplessness. In the second stage, participants in both the other-blame and the loss/helpless condition at Stage 1 were provided with additional information designed to evoke appraisals of other-blame, self-blame, threat, or loss/helplessness. At the end of both stages, participants rated their appraisals and emotions. Consistent with appraisal views of guilt, results indicated that guilt was rated low in the other-blame and loss/helplessness conditions of Stage 1. With the introduction of the self-blame manipulation at Stage 2, ratings of guilt and self-accountability increased to significantly higher levels.

A study by McGraw (1987) also exemplifies research conducted to investigate the appraisal antecedents of guilt. McGraw developed scenarios or had participants generate their own scenarios in which a perpetrator harmed a victim and which were meant to
reflect Heider’s (1958) levels of responsibility. Participants were requested to identify with either the harmdoer or the victim, or to read and respond to each scenario as an objective outside observer. Participants rated their attributions concerning the justification, intentionality, and overall responsibility of the harmdoer’s behavior, as well as harmdoer guilt and victim distress. Results showed that participants attributed increasing levels of responsibility to the harmdoer through the Heiderian levels of unforeseeable, foreseeable, and unjustified harm, with a decrease in perceived responsibility when the act was justified. In addition, as predicted by appraisal theories of emotion, harmdoers’ self-attributions of responsibility were strongly positively correlated with guilt.

Parkinson’s Interpersonal View of Guilt

Support for Parkinson’s theory has emerged in the form of evidence that suggests that guilt arises in the absence of the type responsibility appraisals that are so central to appraisal accounts of guilt. There are many literary and philosophical examples of people who feel horrendously guilty for the misfortune of others, even in the absence of the kinds of responsibility-related self-appraisals that are considered to be critical in appraisal views of guilt (cf. Ferguson, 1999). Examples of guilt in the absence of wrongdoing include survivor guilt, victim guilt, feeling guilty for being overbenefitted relative to another, and feeling guilty for not reciprocating another’s love (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kroon, 1988). It is also well understood that the offices of mental health professionals are filled with clients who suffer from tremendously painful and chronic levels of guilt, even when they possess the objective understanding that they have done nothing for which they should be
held accountable (e.g., Caprara, Manzi, & Perugini, 1992; Ferguson & Eyre, 1998; Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999; Kubany et al., 1996; O’Connor, Berry, & Weiss, in press; Stegge & Ferguson, in press).

In a very recent study, Parkinson (1999, Study 1) asked participants to describe situations in which they had experienced guilt and they had concluded that there “was a good reason for feeling this emotion” (reasonable guilt) or their guilt was experienced “without good reason” (unreasonable guilt). Some participants were also asked to recall situations in which they believed that they were to blame for disadvantaging another but did not feel guilty (the nonemotional incident). Parkinson found that those participants who recalled “reasonable” guilt incidents were just as likely as those who recalled “unreasonable” guilt incidents to perceive their guilt as being caused by having disadvantaged the other person, having done something that was inconsistent with the others’ motives, or wanting to apologize. In addition, ratings of the degree of self-blame in the reasonable and nonemotional accounts were equally high. Nonappraisal relevant explanations (e.g., the harm suffered by the other) were seen as more causative of guilty reactions than guilt-relevant appraisals (e.g., self-blame).

Treadwell (1999) also found evidence that contradicts the appraisal views of guilt by investigating the extent to which controllability (a component of responsibility appraisals) affects the degree of guilt experienced by perpetrators of various untoward events. Treadwell compared the impact of appraisals of controllability on the intensity of guilt experienced to that of interpersonal variables (operationalized as the nature of the
relationship between a perpetrator and his or her victim). Contrary to appraisal views of emotion, guilt intensity was found to be more affected by the quality of the relationship—whether the perpetrator and victim were friends, strangers, or enemies—than by beliefs about the controllability of the perpetrator’s behavior in contributing to the negative outcome. Perpetrators felt most guilty when they had disadvantaged a stranger or especially a friend as opposed to an enemy, even though ratings of the perpetrator’s ability to control the untoward outcome were highest in the enemy condition.

A study by Ferguson et al. (1997) provides additional support for two central assertions made by Parkinson, namely, that guilt arises in the absence of one’s own personal appraisals of responsibility and that guilt can change radically with time. Among other scenarios, participants read about events in which a perpetrator damaged another’s property in a way that was unintended but controllable (called “foreseeable”) or intended and controllable (called “unjustifiably intended” or, alternatively, “angry revenge”). Participants then rated the intensity of the guilt response that the actor would experience immediately following the event and then again after 24 hours had elapsed. Participants in the unjustifiably intended condition correctly acknowledged a high degree of responsibility but reported feeling little guilt immediately following the incident. In contrast, participants in the foreseeable condition, despite correctly acknowledging their minimal responsibility, imagined feeling the most guilt immediately following the incident. These results are consistent with interpersonalists’ views that self-perceptions of responsibility do not automatically elicit feelings of guilt. It is particularly noteworthy that one day later,
participants’ ratings of guilt increased as a function of the actor’s perceived level of responsibility, rating guilt as highest in the unjustifiably intended responsibility condition and lower in the foreseeable condition.

Ferguson et al. (1997) suggested that—among other potential explanations for the observed reversal in guilty feelings from Time 1 to Time 2—is the possibility that perpetrators in the foreseeable condition adopted the victims’ perspective on the event from its very beginning because perpetrators were concerned that their victims might hold them responsible. Ferguson et al. reasoned that as time passed and perpetrators and victims had the opportunity to interact, perpetrators became aware that their victims in this condition did not hold them responsible. In contrast, perpetrators who willfully took revenge on victims likely had little cause to attend to victims’ perspectives immediately after the event, since perpetrators felt justified in exacting vengeance on them. Ferguson et al. suggested that with the passage of time, allowing for anger to diminish, perpetrators in this condition were able to attend to their victims’ potential views of the event, including their victims’ appraisals that perpetrators were responsible. In essence, then, Ferguson et al. provided evidence consistent with the notions that: (a) unintentional yet controllable events prime the victim’s perspective at the outset; (b) people in them are concerned that their behavior will be viewed as both intentional and controllable, and thus morally reprehensible; and (c) this is the reason they report relatively high immediate posttransgression feelings of guilt, with their guilty feelings declining with time because they realize that the victim’s real perspective on the causes of the event is similar to their own perceptions that they knew were true from the outset.
Ferguson and colleagues’ findings (Ferguson et al., 1997) align closely with interpersonal views of guilt. In particular, although certain interpersonalists like Baumeister et al. (1994) downplay the importance of responsibility perceptions in accounting for guilt’s arousal, Parkinson (1997) nonetheless explicitly recognized their critical role within the interpersonal context in which guilt plays out. He stated:

From an interpersonal point of view, ... the guilt does not depend purely on personal appraisals or evaluations, but also on the relational position and assumed interpretation of the individual to whom the guilt is directed.... From the imagined perspective of the victim, the guilty person is seen as someone who ought to have been able to help with or avert whatever went amiss... [and] the perpetrator feels a communicative need for apology in order to avert the inferred reflected blame. (1997, p. 75, emphasis added)

Parkinson thus implies that the perpetrator must attend to the victim’s perspective in order for the person to feel highly guilty. Of course, as Ferguson and others suggested, the perpetrator may not always adopt the victim’s perspective or feel the need to avert the inferred reflected blame when they feel justified or when other instrumental considerations are salient. It is also important to note that not everyone will shift, with the passage of time, to the victim’s perspective on an event that perpetrators initially view as justified. Whether a shift occurs across time under these conditions obviously depends very greatly on a wide variety of factors, including the nature of the relationship between the involved parties, which also is a variable heavily emphasized by the interpersonalists. As Ferguson et al. stated, “Not all individuals...undergo this particular shift in perspective. For example, had we changed the relationship between perpetrator and victim to one of arch enemies rather than intimate relatives or friends, we might easily imagine no shift in perspective” (pp. 671-672).
Although the assertions of Ferguson et al. (1997) regarding the role of shifts of perspective in guilty feelings have not been empirically tested, they do suggest that a test of the comparative roles of appraisal and interpersonal factors in guilt must take into account the perspective taken by participants and how perspective may shift with time as a function of the nature of the relationship.

Integrating Appraisal with Interpersonal Accounts of Guilt

Research evidence supports the conclusion that shifts in perspective (an interpersonal event) across time account for shifts in emotional response. Furthermore, empirical evidence is consistent with the notion the nature of relationship between perpetrators and victims (yet another interpersonal factor) is also likely to influence whether a shift in perspective ever occurs. On the other hand, it has been shown that shifts in perspective are likely to be affected by perpetrators’ appraisals of justification. Moreover, it has been argued that shifts in perspective impact feelings of guilt because they lead perpetrators to attend to their victims’ appraisals of perpetrators’ responsibility. Thus, it appears that in order to begin to appreciate the origins of guilty feelings, one must attend to both interpersonal and appraisal factors.

But what of Parkinson’s (1995, 1997) assertions concerning identity claims, which ascribe little causal role to appraisals? Parkinson’s premise concerning identity claims is based on the belief that emotions are communicative phenomena. Implicit in the expression of emotion is a claim regarding how one wishes to be viewed or treated. Expressions of guilt thus serve to convey a request for forgiveness—“view me differently,
not as the terrible person that I perceive you see me as.” It is here that Parkinson’s views rejoin the ideas set forth in the preceding paragraphs. Put simply, this analysis suggests that embedded within identity claims are the acknowledged appraisals of others. Thus, consistent with Parkinson’s views, a perpetrator feels guilty as a means of communicating that he or she wishes to be forgiven because the perpetrator acknowledges the victim’s appraisals. Viewed logically, it is the perpetrator’s perceptions of victim’s appraisals that lead him or her to conclude that the relationship is threatened. According to Parkinson, it is this threat that leads one to communicate that one values the relationship and wishes to make amends. This communication of valuing the relationship and desiring to make amends elicits guilt. Thus logically, appraisals lead to interpersonal threats which, in turn, give rise to identity claims, which elicit guilt. Viewed in this way, it appears possible that both interpersonal and traditional appraisal views of guilt may actually be valid, depending on when emotions are measured during the unfolding emotional process and also depending upon whether appraisals are measured from the perspective of perpetrators or their victims.

Implications and Prediction

Implications

There are several empirical implications of the above line of reasoning. The first is that whether one finds support for traditional, appraisal-based predictions regarding feelings of guilt depends on whether the appraisals measured are those of the self versus the victim. As noted, the self’s and victim’s perceptions do not necessarily agree. That is,
people can know they did not intend to harm another, yet feel concerned that the other will nonetheless hold them responsible. The second is that people will be more likely to weigh (albeit unconsciously) the victim’s perceptions (rather than their own, sometimes contradictory attributions) in their immediate and subsequent feelings of guilt the less they had a justification for the event prior to its unfolding. The third is that pre-event justifications delay the transgressor’s likelihood of adopting the victim’s perspective and thus of feeling guilty; all that matters for them immediately is their own sense of justification. The fourth is that the nature of the relationship importantly affects whether the shift in perspective will ever take place when one initially feels justified, no matter how much time passes (as attested to by the behaviors of many unrepentant criminals, who persist in dehumanizing their victims, thereby refusing to engage in a psychological relationship with them, which decreases taking the victim’s perspective and therefore experiencing feelings of guilt).

The overall purpose of the present study was to examine these empirical implications in a way that would build upon appraisal and interpersonal theories of emotion to explore how these theories may be integrated into a more comprehensive theory that takes into account perspective shifts across time as a function of the nature of relationship between perpetrators and victims. These empirical implications were examined by exploring one major question: How are emotions differentially affected by interpersonal factors (i.e., communication of identity claims or the tendency to weigh heavily the victim’s perspective) and the private appraisals an individual makes about his or her own behavior at different points in time and from different perspectives? This major
question was investigated by addressing five component questions: (a) do identity claims take precedence over one’s own private beliefs regarding the “correct” appraisals when a person first responds emotionally to an event that they did not intend?, (b) do identity claims in these kinds of situations affect the appraisals the person makes from the victim’s point of view?, (c) when the self’s appraisals are incongruent with those expected by victims, as is the case in unintentionally harmful events, do the latter impact the initial emotional response more than the former?, (d) do the self’s private appraisals take precedence over identity claims or the victim’s appraisals when a person first responds emotionally to an event which they intended, but for which they feel justified?, and (e) how does this emotional response change across time in connection with potentially changing identity claims and adoption of the victim’s perspective on the event?

Study Predictions

Responses to the foregoing questions emerged from tests of the following predictions:

1. In cases of harm unintentionally inflicted upon a friend, perpetrators’ identity claims of “forgive me” and perpetrators’ perceptions of victims’ appraisals immediately following a harmful event will equally predict the degree of guilt experienced by perpetrators immediately following the event. Perpetrators’ perceptions of victims’ appraisals will also predict perpetrators’ identity claims of “forgive” me both immediately following the event and later in time.
2. In cases in which the harm is intentionally caused to a friend, perpetrators' perceptions of victims’ appraisals immediately following the incident will not predict perpetrators’ immediate emotional response but will predict perpetrators’ guilty feelings later in time.

3. In cases of intentional harm to a friend, perpetrators’ identity claims of “treat me differently” immediately following the event will predict perpetrators’ guilty feelings immediately following the event.

4. In cases of intentional harm to a friend, perpetrators’ identity claims of “forgive me” later in time will predict perpetrators’ guilty feelings later in time.

5. In cases of either unintentional or intentional harm inflicted upon an enemy, perpetrators’ self appraisals will predict perpetrators’ guilt feelings both immediately following the incident and later in time.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

Participants

Three-hundred fifteen participants (147 males and 168 females) were recruited from among students attending undergraduate courses at a medium-sized university in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. Students were offered extra-credit points in exchange for their participation. The discussion of power below explains the number of people targeted for participation.

Research Design and Operationalization of Independent Variables

A 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship x Time) mixed factorial design, with time assigned as a within-subjects factor, was used to investigate their effects on ratings of emotions experienced, the relevant appraisals made, and the identity claims struck. The operationalization of the first independent variable, responsibility level, was achieved by presenting participants with scenarios that described the interaction of two persons in which the behavior of one person (perpetrator) caused harm to the other person (victim). Participants received one of two scenarios, representing the two levels of the responsibility level factor: (a) the perpetrator unintentionally caused harm by engaging in behavior that was negligent or reckless and which could have been avoided (labeled the “foreseeable” condition) and (b) the perpetrator intentionally acted out of anger to inflict harm (labeled the “angrily intended” condition), see Appendix A.
The second independent variable, perspective, included three levels. Prior to being presented with a scenario, one third of participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the perpetrator. This perpetrator condition most closely resembles all prior research studying guilt and its antecedents, be they interpersonally or appraisal-related. Another third of the participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the victim. In addition, a third level of this factor was a no perspective condition, in which the remaining third of the participants received no instructions pertaining to perspective, but were presented with the scenarios as an outside, neutral observer. The wording of scenarios was appropriately altered to support the perspective instructions (see Appendix A).

The third independent variable, nature of relationship, was operationalized by explicitly informing participants that the actors depicted in each scenario were either friends or enemies, as further described in Appendix A.

Finally, the manipulation of the fourth independent variable, time, was operationalized by requesting that participants complete dependent measures assuming that the event portrayed in the scenario has just happened. Participants were then scheduled to return again after the passage of a least 24 hours and they completed the same series of questionnaires.

For each of the 12 primary conditions, three different scenarios were developed and presented to participants. Including three different scenarios was done to enhance generalizability, but effects due to specific scenarios were not analyzed. Of the 24 participants in each of the 12 primary cells, 4 male and 4 female participants were randomly assigned to each of the three scenarios. Some scenarios were based on those
used successfully in past research (e.g., Treadwell, 1999). However, since new scenarios were also included, all scenarios were pilot tested to ensure that the independent variables were perceived as intended.

**Power Analysis**

There are 12 primary cells in the between-subjects portion of the design. Equal numbers of males and females were randomly assigned to each of these cells. Given these parameters, each cell was to include 24 participants (12 male, 12 female). Note that the additional factor of participant gender was included to enhance generalization and is not a focus of this dissertation. The power analysis thus focused on the three between-subjects factors—responsibility level, perspective, and nature of relationship. A power analysis (Glass & Hopkins, 1996) for main effects for these 12 primary between-subjects cells only, with effect sizes estimated at 0.50 and cell sizes of 24, resulted in power greater than 0.99. The cell size needed to assure adequate power to test the main effects automatically assured adequate power for testing the interactions (Cohen, 1988).

**Manipulation Checks**

It was imperative to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of the independent variables perspective, responsibility level, and nature of relationship. At the same time, it was also important not to focus participants’ attention on these aspects only, since doing so would sensitize them to the demands of the experiment. Participants were asked to respond to a series of questions, some of which measured their perceptions of the
manipulated variables and others of which were meant as distractor items, immediately after completing the dependent measures at Time 1 and Time 2. The manipulation control questionnaire included a total of 15 questions (see Appendix B), with 8 of them representing distractor items dispersed throughout the questionnaire.

Checks on the Perspective Manipulation

To assess the effectiveness of the perspective manipulation, participants in the perpetrator and victim conditions (but not the “no perspective” condition) were asked to (a) freely recall what they (as the perpetrator or victim) were doing in the scenario and (b) rate how successful they were in putting themselves in that perspective. These participants were asked these questions only with regard to the actual perspective they were encouraged to adopt. Participant responses to the question of what they were doing in the scenario were coded for content that reflected behavior of the perpetrator, the victim, both, or neither. For example, if a participant indicated that “I broke my friend’s statue,” this would have been coded as reflecting behavior of the perpetrator and received a score of 1 for that statement. A description that “I fell and spilled my drinks all over the floor,” was coded as reflecting behavior of the victim and received a code of 2 for that statement. Responses that suggested behavior of both the perpetrator and the victim, such as, “I hurt my friend and she hurt me,” received a score of 3. Any response that was not eligible for a score of 1, 2, or 3, received a score of 4 for that response. Thus, coding resulted in a categorical variable with a range from 1 to 4. Coding was completed by a research assistant who was blind to the study’s hypotheses. A sample representing 10% of
responses was randomly selected, recoded, and analyzed for inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliability was found to be acceptable (81\%) based upon a two-way random intra-class correlation procedure.

Participants in the “no perspective” condition were not given instructions to adopt a particular perspective. Because the design of the study is based on allowing participants in the no-perspective condition to freely and unconsciously adopt or not adopt a perspective, or to shift from one perspective to another, it seemed that asking participants in the no-perspective condition which perspective they had taken might risk firmly anchoring their judgments, leaving them little room to demonstrate a shift in perspective from Time 1 to Time 2 as would be expected based on the Ferguson et al. (1997) study. Thus, it was deemed ill-advised to directly or indirectly assess the perspective taken by those in the no-perspective condition.

Checks on Perceptions of Responsibility

To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of responsibility, participants were asked to rate the degree to which the perpetrator’s behavior was foreseeable (avoidable), intentional, and justified at Time 1. The wording of questions was appropriately altered for each of the three perspective conditions. For scoring purposes these scales were divided into seven intervals (1 = Slightly, 4 = Moderately, 7 = Extremely) An example of questions to assess the manipulation of responsibility in the perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows:
It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase could have been avoided?

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase was intentional?

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, how justified did you feel in having broken the vase?

Checks on Perceived Nature of Relationship

To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of the nature of relationship, an additional set of questions asked participants to choose the word that best described the nature of the relationship between the individuals portrayed in the story (i.e., strangers, friends, siblings, neighbors, enemies) and to rate the degree of likeability between the two people depicted in the story. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from Not at All to Very Much. The two questions used to assess the manipulation of nature of relationship follow:

The two people involved in the incident that you just read were:

- enemies
- siblings
- friends
- strangers
- I don’t remember

Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people generally like each other?
Dependent Variables

Three dependent variables were measured at Time 1 and again at Time 2 for all participants: appraisals regarding the responsibility of the perpetrator for the damage caused, the nature and intensity of the emotions experienced by the perpetrator, and the identity claims struck by both the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were provided with the text of the applicable scenario at the beginning of each dependent measure section at Time 1. At Time 2, participants were provided with a gist of the scenario once, prior to beginning the section containing the dependent measures. An overview of these measures is provided below (more specifics regarding these questions are included in Appendices C, D, and E). All dependent measures were pilot tested to ensure their effectiveness.

Appraisals

After having been presented with an interaction between the two people, participants were asked to re-read the scenario. Participants in all conditions were then asked to focus their attention on specific elements of the scenarios they had read from the perspective they had been asked to adopt earlier (e.g., In the Perpetrator/Time 1/Friend condition: “Focus your attention on the fact that you just destroyed your friend’s vase...”) or they were not reminded of the need to adopt a perspective (“no-perspective” condition). They then were asked to separately rate the degree to which the perpetrator’s behavior was avoidable, intentional, and/or justified. The wording of questions was appropriately altered for each of the three perspective conditions (see Appendix C). For scoring purposes these scales were divided into seven intervals (1 = Slightly,
4 = *Moderately*, 7 = *Extremely*) An example of questions to measure appraisals in the perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows:

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase could have been avoided?

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the vase was intentional?

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, how justified did you feel in having broken the vase?

Participants in the Perpetrator condition were also asked to adopt the perspective of their victims and to make similar ratings of avoidability, intentionality, and justification from the point of view of their victims at Time 1 and again at Time 2. For scoring purposes these scales were divided into seven intervals (1 = *Slightly*, 4 = *Moderately*, 7 = *Extremely*; see Appendix C). These questions were positioned after all other dependent measures.

**Emotional Responses**

Participants in all conditions were again asked to focus their attention on specific elements of the scenarios they had read (e.g., In the Perpetrator/Time 1/Friend condition: “When you focus on your having *just* destroyed your friend’s vase...”) and were asked to rate the degree to which the perpetrator felt any of seven emotions, including guilt (i.e., angry, proud, happy, guilty, afraid, ashamed, and/or embarrassed). Ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from *Very Mildly* to *Extremely*. Participants were asked about several different emotions to avoid focusing them on the target emotion of guilt, yet their
guilt ratings were the ones used to test the main predictions. The wording of questions was appropriately altered for each of the three perspective conditions (see Appendix D).

An example of questions designed to measure emotional response in the perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows:

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, to what extent were you really feeling any of the following feelings deep down inside?

angry
proud
happy
guilty...and so forth.

Identity Claims

Participants in all conditions were then presented with 15 brief statements reflecting various identity claims (e.g., “I wish to be forgiven”) and were asked to rate the extent to which the perpetrator was attempting to make each claim. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale anchored by Not at All and To a Great Extent (1 = Not at All, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = To a Great Extent). Wording of questions was altered to fit each perspective condition (see Appendix E). For purposes of this dissertation, ratings of the identity claims pertinent to guilt (I wish to be forgiven) and anger (I want to be treated better) only were incorporated into analyses.

An example of the questions relating to identity claims for the perpetrator perspective condition at Time 1 follows:

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, I was communicating that (followed by series of identity claims)
I deserve to be respected
I wish to be forgiven
I expect better treatment...and so forth.

Procedure

Participants were scheduled in small groups to arrive at an unoccupied classroom. Upon arrival, students were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions. All participants were asked to complete a statement of Informed Consent, a copy of which is found in Appendix F. Participants then received a brief explanation of the purposes of the experiment. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to “explore how people perceive everyday events as well as their thoughts and emotional reactions to those events.”

Having been presented with the purpose of the study, participants next received a description of the written materials they were asked to read and the responses they were required to give. Participants were instructed that they were to read a brief story and to respond to the questions that followed. Research packets were then distributed. Research packets contained a cover page, which included directions for completing all materials in the packet, a scenario page, which provided the experimental manipulation, and four to six pages that included the questions and scales comprising the dependent measures and the manipulation check questionnaire (see Appendix G). An effort was then made to resolve any procedural questions. Upon completion of the instructions and resolution of any questions, participants were encouraged to begin. When they had completed the dependent measures at Time 1, participants were asked to complete and retain the
Research Packet Tracking Sheet (see Appendix H) that was affixed to their packet of questionnaires and were reminded to return to the same classroom approximately 24 hours later. Upon returning, participants presented the Research Packet Tracking Sheet to receive the appropriate Time 2 research packet (see Appendix G) and were asked to complete the same series of dependent measures.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Organization of Results

The results of analyses are presented in two main sections. The first section summarizes results regarding participants' perceptions of the independent variables that were manipulated. The second section presents the results of the analyses that were designed to test each of the specific predictions outlined in Chapters I and II. Each section or subsection begins with a statement of the particular set of questions or specific prediction to be addressed. This restatement of the question or prediction is followed, first, by a brief review of the analyses that were chosen to address the question or prediction; and second, by the results of the analyses.

For tests of any of the specific predictions involving correlation coefficients and planned comparisons involving means or correlation coefficients, an alpha level of .05 was selected. Tests of statistical significance of differences between pairs of correlation coefficients were computed using the Hotelling $t$ method in the case of dependent correlations (i.e., when drawn from the same subjects) and using a Fisher $Z$ transformation in the case of independent correlations (i.e., drawn from different subjects). Planned comparisons of statistical significance of mean differences were conducted using the Dunn method with a family-based alpha level (Glass & Hopkins, 1996). Of course, the "statistical significance" of any of these effects does not mean that they are practically or substantively significant (e.g., Cohen, 1988). That is, the size of the effects also needs to
be considered. What is a small, moderate, or large effect size is subject to lively debate and relative to the area of study. For purposes of this investigation, correlation coefficients less than .30 are considered small, since the variance shared is less than 10%, but coefficients of .50 are considered "large," as the linear variance they share is 25% or greater (cf. Cohen, 1988). Estimates of effect size concerning the magnitude of mean differences were evaluated using one of two methods. For simple main effects, estimates of eta squared were used to highlight the proportion of variability in the dependent variable that was explained by variation in the independent variable. Small, medium, and large effects for eta squared are generally considered to be .01, .06, and .14, respectively (Cohen, 1988). For more sophisticated analyses, involving several levels of the independent variable or complex interactions, estimates of the magnitude of mean differences were computed using the standardized mean difference effect size (Glass & Hopkins, 1996). Conventional standards for interpreting standard mean difference effect sizes are .2 for a small effect, .5 for a medium effect, and .8 for a large effect (Cohen, 1988). Due to the exploratory nature of the study and the limitations of power associated with analysis of interactions involving five independent variables, effects involving gender of the participant were not considered. Because of the considerable number of predictions to be tested there are many results to be reported and digested. As an aid to the reader, the major results are summarized at the end of each section.
Checks on Effectiveness of Manipulations

The first series of analyses focused on whether participants in each of the 12 primary conditions correctly perceived the manipulated level of responsibility (foreseeable or angrily intended), perspective (perpetrator, victim, or no perspective), and nature of relationship (friend or enemy) at Time 1. Checks of these same perceptions at Time 2 were not conducted for the dissertation, since it was primarily appraisals at the time the event initially occurred in which the author was interested. Furthermore, it was deemed unnecessary to assess participants’ perceptions of the manipulation of time, as time was not “manipulated” as were other independent variable though materials presented to participants but was an experimental effect actually experienced by participants.

In all, as the reader will see below, the manipulations were generally successful. The two harmful events were differentiated appropriately in terms of intentionality and justification and, as expected, they did not differ in terms of avoidability. The perspective manipulation generally worked, with participants in both the perpetrator and victim conditions correctly identifying with their assigned roles. The same is true for the relationship manipulation, in which participants perceived the nature of the relationship as being more amicable in the friend condition as intended. There were, however, some statistically significant interactions that indicate limitations on some of the manipulations. These variations are reported in detail in the following section.
Responsibility Manipulation

It was important to ascertain the extent to which participants correctly interpreted the information provided regarding the perpetrator’s responsibility for the harm done. Viewed in terms of Heider’s (1958) analysis of the components of responsibility, the incidents of angrily intended harm portrayed events that were intended, justified, but that could have been avoided. The incidents labeled as “foreseeable,” on the other hand, were not intended, they could have been avoided, but because there was no provocation for the incident they likely also would be perceived as less justified. Thus, participants in the angrily intended condition should have perceived perpetrators as acting with greater intentionality and greater justification than those in the foreseeable condition. The two responsibility conditions were not expected to differ with respect to participants’ perceptions of the extent to which the harm could have been avoided (Heider, 1958).

Perception of avoidability. The first analysis considered whether participants in both the foreseeable and the angrily intended conditions perceived the harm as similarly avoidable in the two conditions. In this analysis, a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of the extent to which they viewed the harm inflicted at Time 1 as avoidable (1 = Not at All; 7 = Very Much). The results of this analysis, shown in Table 1, revealed no statistically significant main effects or interactions. An estimate of effect size for the factor of responsibility level, also shown in Table 1, revealed that essentially none of the variability in ratings of avoidability was explained by differences in responsibility level. This result suggests that participants in both the foreseeable (\(\bar{X} = 5.23, SD = 1.82\))
Table 1

Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Foreseeability Ratings at Time 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Eta²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between subjects effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility Level (RL)</td>
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<td>.262</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective (P)</td>
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<td>2.430</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.777</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.303</td>
<td>.015</td>
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<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.545</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>305</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.557)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors.

and the angrily intended ($\bar{x} = 5.13, \text{SD} = 1.99$) conditions perceived the perpetrator’s behavior as equally avoidable, consistent with the intended effect of the manipulation of responsibility level.

**Perceptions of intentionality.** The second series of analyses was based upon the results of a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on participants’ ratings of the degree to which participants viewed perpetrators as acting to intentionally inflict harm at Time 1 (1 = Not at All; 7 = Very Much). The results, shown in Table 2, revealed a main effect of responsibility
Table 2

Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Intentionality Ratings at Time 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Eta²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Between subjects effects</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility Level (RL)</td>
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<td>82.507***</td>
<td>.213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perspective (P)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.637</td>
<td>.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.277**</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.476</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.203</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.561</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>(4.079)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors.

**p < .01; ***p < .001.

level and of nature of relationship. The Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction was not statistically significant.

With respect to the main effect of responsibility level, mean ratings of intentionality in the angrily intended condition ($\bar{X} = 5.54$, $SD = 1.83$) were statistically significantly greater than those in the foreseeable condition ($\bar{X} = 3.48$, $SD = 2.24$). The eta squared estimate of effect size (.21) indicates that a significant proportion of the variability in ratings of intentionality was explained by responsibility level. These findings demonstrate that participants in the angrily intended condition viewed perpetrators as acting with
greater intent than those in the foreseeable condition, consistent with the intended effect of the manipulation of responsibility level.

The main effect for nature of relationship shows that mean ratings of intentionality in the enemy condition ($\bar{X} = 4.80, SD = 2.21$) were statistically significantly greater than mean ratings in the friend condition ($\bar{X} = 4.23, SD = 2.34$). The eta squared estimate of effect size for the main effect of nature of relationship, however, revealed that only a very small proportion, 2%, of the variability in ratings of intentionality was explained by variation in the nature of relationship. These results suggest that participants’ perceptions of the intentionality of perpetrators behavior were not meaningfully different with respect to nature of relationship condition.

Perceptions of justifiability. The third series of analyses, similar to those just described, began with a $2 \times 3 \times 2$ (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on participants’ ratings of the extent to which they perceived perpetrators as being justified for inflicting harm at Time 1 ($1 = \text{Not at All}; 7 = \text{Very Much}$). The results, shown in Table 3, revealed a main effect of perspective and two statistically significant interactions for Responsibility Level x Perspective and Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship. Notably, there was no main effect of responsibility level. These results indicate that the intended manipulation of justifiability was not uniformly successful. That is, participants’ perceptions that angrily intended harm was more justifiable than foreseeable harm did not hold irrespective of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim or the perspective taken.
Table 3

Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Perpetrator Justification Ratings at Time 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>F</th>
<th>Eta²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Between subjects effects</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility Level (RL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.142</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective (P)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.671***</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.315**</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.400</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.092**</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>(3.682)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Values in parentheses are mean square errors. **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction is graphically depicted in Figure 1. To better understand perceptions of justifiability, a Responsibility Level x Perspective ANOVA was conducted on these ratings in each of the two relationship conditions separately. This analysis revealed a main effect of perspective, \( F (2, 153) = 12.40, p < .001 \), in the enemy condition. In the enemy condition, participants in the perpetrator (\( \bar{x} = 3.77, SD = 1.96 \)) and victim (\( \bar{x} = 3.59, SD = 2.29 \)) conditions viewed perpetrators as being more justified than participants in the no-perspective condition (\( \bar{x} = 2.04, SD = 1.60 \)). In the friend condition, a Responsibility Level x Perspective interaction was found to be statistically significant, \( F (2, 151) = 6.30, p < .01 \).
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction for mean ratings of justifiability.
To further understand this two-way interaction, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted on ratings of justifiability for each of the three perspective conditions separately within the friend condition. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of responsibility level, \( F(1,50) = 10.29, p < .01 \), for participants in the victim/friend condition, such that participants viewed perpetrators as more justified in the angrily intended (\( \bar{X} = 4.12, SD = 1.67 \)) than the foreseeable (\( \bar{X} = 2.48, SD = 1.99 \)) condition. The same difference was not found to be statistically significant in either the perpetrator/friend or the no-perspective/friend condition. The eta squared estimate of effect size associated with the main effect of responsibility level in the victim/friend condition (eta squared = .17) suggests that a significant proportion of the variability in justifiability ratings was accounted for by the responsibility level factor.

Considered as a whole, the expectation that participants would view perpetrators’ behaviors as more justifiable in the angrily intended than in the foreseeable condition was confirmed only when they were asked to adopt the victim’s perspective and when the characters in the story were depicted as friends.

**Perspective Manipulation**

Several analyses bear on the question of whether participants perceived the manipulation of perspective in the intended manner. In the first analysis, participants in the perpetrator and victim conditions were reminded that they were asked to imagine that they were one of the people in the scenario they read. Participants were then asked, “What did you do in the story?” Responses were coded for content that reflected behavior of the
perpetrator, the victim, both, or neither (see Chapter III for a complete description of coding method and coefficients of inter-rater reliability). The proportion of participants’ responses (perspective perceived) was then compared across perspective conditions using a chi-square analysis. This analysis resulted in a statistically significant association between perspective condition and perspective perceived, \( \chi^2 (2, N = 206) = 190.65, p < .001 \).

Analysis of the proportions in Table 4 revealed that participants were able to correctly identify their role as perpetrator in the perpetrator condition and victim in the victim condition.

A follow-up analysis addressed the question of whether participants in the two perspective conditions differed with respect to their ability to assume the assigned role of perpetrator or victim. A 2 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on participants’ Time 1 ratings of the degree to which they were able to “put themselves in the shoes of the person [they] were asked to identify with” (1 = Not at All; 7 = To a Great Extent). The results of the analysis are shown in Table 5. These analyses revealed main effects of perspective and of relationship. Identification ratings in the victim condition (\( \bar{x} = 5.39, SD = 1.24 \)) were greater than in the perpetrator condition (\( \bar{x} = 4.97, SD = 1.52 \)) and identification ratings were greater in the friend condition (\( \bar{x} = 5.42, SD = 1.25 \)) than in the enemy condition (\( \bar{x} = 4.95, SD = 1.49 \)).

The statistically significant Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction indicates that participants’ ability to identify with their assigned role did not hold independently of the perspective taken or the relationship between the perpetrator
Table 4

Percentage and Number of Participants Identifying Their Role as Perpetrator, Victim, or Neither as a Function of Perspective Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective perceived</th>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator</td>
<td>93% (n = 94)</td>
<td>4% (n = 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>0% (n = 0)</td>
<td>96% (n = 101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>7% (n = 7)</td>
<td>0% (n = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (n = 101)</td>
<td>100% (n = 105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Identification Ratings at Time 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Eta(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between subjects effects</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility Level (RL)</td>
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<td>1.747</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective (P)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.987**</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.351**</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P</td>
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<td>3.371</td>
<td>.017</td>
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<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.636**</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Note.** Values in parentheses are mean square errors. **p < .01.
and victim. The interaction is graphically depicted in Figure 2. In an effort to decompose the Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction, two follow-up ANOVAs were conducted on identification ratings using perspective as the factor for each level of nature of relationship. This analysis revealed no statistically significant main effect in the friend condition for the identification rating and the eta squared estimate of effect size was 0. With respect to the enemy condition, a statistically significant main effect of perspective was found, \( F(1, 103) = 10.07, p < .01 \). Identification ratings in the victim condition \( (\bar{x} = 5.38, SD = 1.29) \) were statistically significantly greater than those in the perpetrator condition \( (\bar{x} = 4.49, SD = 1.57) \). An estimate of effect size associated with this main

![Graphical representation of the Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction for mean identification ratings.](image)

*Figure 2.* Graphical representation of the Perspective x Nature of Relationship interaction for mean identification ratings.
effect (eta squared = .09) suggests that variation in identification ratings was only moderately explained by variation in the perspective condition.

Taken together, these results indicate the participants in the perpetrator and victim conditions were able to correctly identify the role to which they were assigned. Participants in the victim and friend conditions were able to identify with their assigned role to a greater degree than those in the perpetrator or enemy conditions.

**Relationship Manipulation**

Two analyses bear on the question of whether participants perceived the manipulation of the nature of the relationship in the intended manner. The first analysis approached the question of whether participants correctly perceived the relationship manipulation by conducting a 2 x 3 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Perspective x Nature of Relationship) between-subjects ANOVAs on participants' Time 1 ratings of how much the two primary characters in each scenario liked one another (1 = *Not at All*, 7 = *Very Much*). The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6. The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect of nature of relationship, such that mean ratings for liking were highest in the friend condition (\( \bar{X} = 6.29, SD = .95 \)) and lowest in the enemy condition (\( \bar{X} = 1.68, SD = 1.42 \)). The estimate of effect size for the main effect of nature of relationship revealed that 78% of the variability in likeability ratings was explained by variation in the nature of relationship factor.

In addition to the main effect of nature of relationship, the Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction was also found to be statistically significant for ratings of likeability. Figure 3 presents this interaction graphically. To further explore this
### Table 6

**Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check on Mean Likeability Ratings at Time 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between subjects effects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsibility Level (RL)</td>
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<td>.002</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective (P)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
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<td>864.209***</td>
<td>.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.589</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.609**</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x P x R</td>
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<td>.956</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>(1.446)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors.

**p < .01; ***p < .001.**

Interaction, two follow-up ANOVAs were conducted on likeability ratings for each level of nature of relationship. This analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect of responsibility level in the friend condition, F(1,129) = 4.11, \( p < .05 \), such that participants viewed the perpetrator and victim as liking each other more in the foreseeable condition \( (\bar{x} = 6.44, SD = .83) \) than in the angrily intended condition \( (\bar{x} = 6.10, SD = 1.03) \). However, the estimate of effect size for the responsibility level main effect revealed that very little of the variation in likeability ratings was explained by this factor (eta squared = .03). No statistically significant differences were found in the enemy condition.

Likewise, an estimate of effect size for the responsibility level factor revealed that less than
2% of the variation in likeability ratings was explained by variation in responsibility level. Thus, these results revealed that participants perceived protagonists as liking each other more in the friend than enemy condition at both levels of responsibility, indicating a successful manipulation of relationship.

In the second analysis, participants were asked at Time 1 to select from a list of five choices, the word that best characterized the relationship of the two primary characters in the scenario (1 = enemies; 2 = siblings; 3 = friends; 4 = strangers; 5 = I don't remember). The proportion of participants' responses (relationship perceived) was then compared across relationship conditions using a chi-square analysis and resulted in a
statistically significant association between nature of relationship and the relationship perceived, \( \chi^2 (1, N = 312) = 300.23, p < .001 \). Analysis of the proportions, shown in Table 7, revealed that participants were able to correctly identify the relationship between the two primary characters as friends in the friend condition and as enemies in the enemy condition. These results provided additional support to the finding that participants correctly perceived the relationship manipulation.

Summary of Results Relevant to Manipulation Checks

Several analyses were conducted to assess the degree to which participants in each of the twelve primary conditions perceived the level of responsibility (foreseeable or angrily intended), perspective (perpetrator, victim, or no perspective), and nature of relationship (friend or enemy) as intended. Analysis of the responsibility level manipulation revealed that consistent with the intended effect, participants viewed the harm inflicted as equally foreseeable for both levels of responsibility. Also consistent with the intended manipulation of responsibility level, participants viewed perpetrators in the angrily intended condition as acting with greater intent than those in the foreseeable condition. Checks on the manipulation of justifiability revealed that participants viewed perpetrators as acting with greater justification in the angrily intended condition when asked to take the perspective of victims or when perpetrators and their victims were characterized as friends.

Results of analyses relevant to the manipulation of perspective revealed that consistent with the study design, participants were able to correctly identify their role as
Table 7

Percentage and Number of Participants Identifying the Relationship as Friends or Enemies as a Function of Nature of Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship perceived</th>
<th>Nature of relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>100 % (n = 153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td>0 % (n = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 % (n = 153)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

perpetrator in the perpetrator condition and victim in the victim condition. The degree to which participants were able to adopt their assigned role varied somewhat by condition, such that participants in the victim and friend conditions were more likely to identify with their assigned roles.

Finally, checks on the manipulation of nature of relationship demonstrated that participants were able to correctly label the relationship between the two characters depicted in the scenarios as friends in the friend condition and as enemies in the enemy condition. In addition, participants clearly rated these relationships as more friendly in the friend condition and less friendly in the enemy condition.

Taken together, the results of analyses used to check the effectiveness of the manipulation of independent variables provided evidence that, with some minor variation, participants perceived the manipulation of independent variables in a manner consistent with the design of the study. The limited variation in participant perceptions of
independent variables does not pose a significant threat to the validity of the results of the main analyses.

Analyses Relevant to Study Predictions

This section presents the results of the analyses that were designed to test each of the very specific predictions outlined in Chapters I and II. Due to the large number of predictions and results, each prediction, along with its relevant results, are presented one at a time. Some synthesizing and reordering of predictions was undertaken to more closely align related predictions and their results.

Two statistical paradigms were employed to test the predictions. The first series of analyses relied on Pearson product-moment bivariate correlations between ratings of perpetrator guilt, ratings of perpetrators’ self appraisals of responsibility, ratings of perpetrators’ perceptions of victims’ appraisals, and ratings of perpetrator identity claims to investigate the extent to which any two variables were linearly related. Correlation coefficients were summarized in tables that include coefficients not bearing on the specific predictions outlined in Chapters I and II, but were included for the sake of completeness. Those coefficients that are germane to the test of a particular prediction are highlighted within the relevant table(s). The second series of analyses relied on analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the effects of responsibility level, perspective, nature of relationship, and time on ratings of perpetrator guilt.
Correlational Analyses Regarding the Role of Responsibility Appraisals in Guilt

Predictions were introduced in Chapters I and II that specifically concerned the extent to which perpetrators' feelings of guilt should be associated with perpetrators' own appraisals of responsibility versus perceptions of victims' appraisals of their responsibility. These predictions all focused on the differential relationship of the two sources of appraisal (self-perceptions of responsibility versus projections regarding how responsible victims thought the perpetrators were) with the perpetrators' guilty feelings, taking into account differences in responsibility level, nature of relationship, and time. It should be remembered that these predictions were to be tested in the perpetrator condition only, since it was in this condition that ratings were assessed of the extent to which the perpetrator thought that the victim held them responsible.

To test these predictions, two composites of responsibility appraisal were calculated. One of the composites concerned perpetrators' self-appraisals of responsibility and the other involved perpetrators' perceptions of victims' responsibility appraisals. The first appraisal indicator was obtained by summing participant ratings of the degree to which the harm inflicted by perpetrators was viewed by perpetrators as foreseeable/avoidable, intentional, and justified, to form a composite rating of responsibility. Because high ratings of justifiability were associated with a reduction in responsibility (in Heiderian terms), justifiability scores were reversed prior to summation. Similarly, a summary appraisal indicator of perpetrators' perceptions that the victim held them responsible was obtained by summing participants' ratings of the degree to which the victim saw their
behavior as foreseeable/avoidable, intentional, and unjustified (with justifiability scores again reversed prior to summation). These composite scores representing perpetrator self appraisals and perpetrators perceptions of victims' appraisals were used in all tests of predictions involving appraisals. From this point forward, the label “perpetrators’ appraisals” (or slight variations thereof) is used to refer to the composite index of responsibility that was based on ratings of the how much the perpetrator perceived that the harm could be avoided, was intentional, and was unjustified. In contrast, the term “victims’ appraisals” (or minor variations thereof) is used to refer to the composite index of how much participants thought that victims perceived that perpetrators were responsible, that is, could have avoided the harm intended it, and were unjustified for committing the deed. These descriptors were used for the sake of brevity. It should be noted further that the short-hand terms “guilt,” “felt guilty,” “feelings of guilt,” and variations thereof are used to denote ratings or projections of how guilty the perpetrator felt.

Semi-partial versus zero-order correlation coefficients. In order to accurately compare the relationships between ratings of perpetrator guilt and the other variables of interest, it was necessary to take into account the degree to which these other variables (i.e., ratings of perpetrators’ self appraisals of responsibility, ratings of perpetrators’ perceptions of victims’ appraisals, and ratings of perpetrator identity claims) were correlated. Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients that reflect the degree of interrelatedness between variables. Many of the correlations between perpetrator appraisals and victims appraisals, between guilt-related and anger-related identity claims, and
Table 8

Correlations Between Composite Perpetrator Appraisal Ratings, Composite Victim Appraisal Ratings, and Identity Claim Ratings at Time 1 and Time 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Perpetrator appraisal composite</th>
<th>Victim appraisal composite</th>
<th>Identity claim “I wish to be forgiven”</th>
<th>Identity claim “I want to be treated better”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator appraisal</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>composite</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim appraisal</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>composite</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity claim “I</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wish to be forgiven”</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity claim “I</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>want to be treated</td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly.
*P < .05, **P < .01.
between both sources of appraisal and both types of identity claims were statistically significant. Although the strength of the relationships varied from nonexistent ($r = .00$) to large ($r = .57$), these results indicate that the degree of association between variables necessitates calculating the correlation between guilt and other variables of interest, removing the target variable’s association with related variables. For example, to more clearly understand the association between perpetrator guilt and perpetrator appraisals, one must look to the correlation between perpetrator guilt and perpetrator appraisal once the association between perpetrator guilt and related variables (e.g., victim appraisal) has been removed. This correlation coefficient, denoted as $r_{1(2,3)}$ (Glass & Hopkins, 1996; Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988), is the semi-partial or part correlation coefficient and is used in this and subsequent sections to describe correlations. Again, for the sake of completeness, the zero-order correlation coefficients (reflecting the correlation between variables without taking into account the relationship between the target variable and related variables) are made available in the relevant table(s).

**Appraisal-guilt associations: Relationship and time.** The association of guilt with perpetrator appraisal and victim appraisal was examined first ignoring the perpetrators’ level of responsibility for the harm done, but taking into account the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and victim as well as the time at which these judgments were offered.

Appraisal-guilt associations were examined first in the *friend* condition as a function of time. It will be recalled that the friend condition was meant to arouse perpetrators’ concerns with their victims’ points of view on the harm done. A part of the
victims' concerns could be expressed as the perpetrators' beliefs regarding how responsible victims held them. At the very least, then, there should be a significant guilt-victim appraisal association in the friend condition which, if Parkinson is correct, should be statistically significant at both time points. This view does not, however, preclude predicting significant associations between guilt and perpetrators' own appraisals. In fact, if the present study is to replicate previous studies, one should show a statistically significant association of guilt with perpetrator appraisal at least at Time 1. The results shown in Table 9 reveal the following: The guilt-victim appraisal link was not statistically reliable nor practically meaningful either at Time 1 ($r_{1(2,3)} = -.10$) or Time 2 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .12$). Although there is a tendency for guilt to be associated with perpetrator appraisal at Time 1 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .24$), this effect is neither statistically nor substantively significant. It is at Time 2 only ($r_{1(2,3)} = .39$, $p < .01$) that a notable association occurred between guilt and perpetrator appraisal.

Appraisal-guilt associations were examined next in the enemy condition as a function of time. It was hypothesized that the guilt-perpetrator appraisal correlation coefficient should be statistically significant in the enemy condition and that these coefficients should not differ significantly as a function of the time at which judgments were made. The results in Table 9 bear out these expectations. The guilt-perpetrator appraisal association is significant at both time points in the enemy condition; both of these coefficients are large in terms of Cohen's rules of thumb ($r_{1(2,3)} = .49$ and .54, respectively), and they do not differ significantly.
Table 9

Correlations between Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings, Composite Appraisal Ratings, and Identity Claim Ratings as a Function of Nature of Relationship and Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Guilt Rating</th>
<th>Perpetrator appraisal composite</th>
<th>Victim appraisal composite</th>
<th>Identity claim “I wish to be forgiven”</th>
<th>Identity claim “I want to be treated better”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
<td>Semi*</td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
<td>Semi</td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.10a</td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.12a</td>
<td>.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12a</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.03b</td>
<td>.51**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The semi-partial correlation coefficients indicate the association between guilt and the target variable (e.g., perpetrator appraisal) once the target variable's association with related variables (e.g., victim appraisal) has been removed. Across rows, cells sharing subscripts in common do not differ significantly. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
It was expected that the guilt-victim appraisal correlation coefficient should not be statistically significant either at Time 1 or Time 2 in the enemy condition. Congruent with this prediction, the guilt-victim appraisal correlation coefficients are not statistically significant ($r_{1(2,3)} = .12$ and $.03$, respectively) and share little variance in common (see also Table 9).

Guilt in the enemy condition was expected to be more strongly correlated with perpetrator than with victim appraisal, a difference that should have been especially apparent at Time 1 but also true at Time 2. Table 9 shows that the association between guilt and perpetrator appraisal at Time 1 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .49$) and Time 2 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .54$) was stronger than between guilt and victim appraisal at Time 1 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .12$) and Time 2 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .03$), although difference was statistically significant at Time 2 only.

Based on these results from Table 9, it seems reasonable to conclude that perpetrator appraisals of responsibility do play a role in guilt (a) even when the perpetrator should be more motivated to adopt the victims' points of view (i.e., friend, particularly at Time 2) and (b) especially when one should not be motivated to be concerned with the victims' perspective (i.e., the enemy condition). Thus, the assertion that responsibility appraisals from the self's point of view are irrelevant to guilt (as the interpersonalists have argued) is not supported by these results. It is additionally crucial to recognize that the predicted role of victim appraisals in the guilt one feels is not supported by these results.

Appraisal-guilt associations: Relationship, time, and responsibility. Important predictions were offered regarding whether the guilt-perpetrator appraisal and guilt-victim appraisal associations would differ as a function of the nature of the perpetrators'
responsibility level. The results relevant to responsibility level-based predictions are presented first for the friend condition and then for the enemy condition.

It was argued that even those perpetrators who were close friends of the victims would not be motivated to adopt the victims’ points of view on the harm when this harm was angrily intended immediately after the harm took place. The expectation was that the association of guilt with victim appraisals would be significantly lower than the association of guilt with perpetrator appraisals at Time 1 in the angrily intended condition. A related implication was that the guilt-perpetrator association but not the guilt-victim association should be statistically significant at Time 1. Table 10 presents results bearing on both of these predictions.

Let's examine the guilt-appraisal associations found in the angrily intended/friend condition at Time 1. In the angrily intended/friend condition at Time 1, the guilt-victim appraisal correlation is small and statistically nonsignificant ($r_{1,2} = -.14$), but the guilt-perpetrator appraisal correlation ($r_{1,2} = .40, p < .05$) is statistically significant and somewhat more than “small” in size in Cohen’s terms. These two coefficients were not statistically significantly different. In general, however, the magnitude of the difference between the two was as expected.

Do the nature of the appraisal-guilt associations change at Time 2 in the angrily intended/friend condition? Recall that it was expected that perpetrators of angrily intended harm against their friends would tend to adopt the victims’ viewpoints more with the passage of time. The implication was that guilt at Time 2 would be more strongly associated with victim appraisals at Time 2 than they were at Time 1. Is there evidence
Table 10

Correlations Between Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings, Composite Appraisal Ratings, and Identity

Claim Ratings as a Function of Responsibility Level, Nature of Relationship, and Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility level</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Guilt rating</th>
<th>Perpetrator appraisal composite</th>
<th>Victim appraisal composite</th>
<th>Identity claim “I wish to be forgiven”</th>
<th>Identity claim “I want to be treated better”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
<td>Semi</td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
<td>Semi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angrily Int.</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.40*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreseeable</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angrily Int.</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.51*</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.72***</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreseeable</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.46*</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *The semi-partial correlation coefficients indicate the association between guilt and the target variable (e.g., perpetrator appraisal) once the target variable's association with related variables (e.g., victim appraisal) has been removed. Across rows, cells sharing subscripts in common do not differ significantly. In columns, cells sharing superscripts in common do not differ significantly.

*\( p < .05 \), **\( p < .01 \); ***\( p < .001 \).
for this assertion? One can see in Table 10 that the guilt-victim appraisal association at Time 2 ($r_{1(2.3)} = .08$) is not statistically significantly different from the same association at Time 1 ($r_{1(2.3)} = .14$) There is thus no evidence for the assertion. It should be noted that the links between guilt and the perpetrators’ own appraisals at Time 1 ($r_{1(2.3)} = .40$) and at Time 2 (.37) are not statistically significant, although they are moderately strong in terms of practical significance. In point of fact, the link between perpetrators’ own appraisals of responsibility and guilt is higher at Time 1 and Time 2 than the guilt-victim appraisal link in the angrily intended/friend condition, but the differences were not statistically significant. All things considered, there is little evidence in the angrily intended/friend condition that victim appraisals of responsibility play a more crucial role in guilt as time passes.

The guilt-appraisal associations found in the foreseeable/friend condition were examined next. When the harm was foreseeable, the idea was that perpetrators as close friends of the victims would be motivated to adopt the victims’ points of view immediately after the harm occurred. This idea does not necessarily imply that the guilt-victim appraisal association will be statistically stronger than the guilt-perpetrator association at Time 1, however. It simply asserts that there should be a practically meaningful relationship between guilt and victim or perpetrator appraisals of responsibility at Time 1 in the case of foreseeable harm. Is there evidence supportive of these assertions? The results in Table 10 show that neither of the associations ($r_{1(2.3)} = .16$ and $r_{1(2.3)} = .04$, respectively) is statistically or practically significant! In contrast to the results in the angrily intended/friend condition, the link between guilt and perpetrator appraisals tended to increase at
Time 2 (to $r_{1(2,3)} = .43$), whereas the link between victim appraisals and guilt tended to remain constant (to $r_{1(2,3)} = .18$). The difference between guilt-perpetrator appraisal links and guilt-victim appraisal links at Time 1 did not differ significantly and it is noteworthy that the guilt-perpetrator appraisal association is much stronger in a practical sense than that for guilt and victim appraisals at Time 2 in the foreseeable condition.

To summarize: There was little evidence that guilt directed toward friends was more strongly associated with victim appraisals at Time 2 than at Time 1 in both responsibility conditions, suggesting that the passage of time did not encourage greater focus on the victims' points of view. Moreover, ratings of guilty feelings toward their friends tended to be more highly associated with perpetrators' own estimates of their responsibility than with their victims' appraisals of responsibility (especially at Time 2) in both the angrily intended and foreseeable conditions, even after taking into account the variance shared between perpetrator and victim and appraisals of responsibility.

Turning now to the enemy condition, it was argued that there would be no motivation for perpetrators to adopt their victims' perspectives at either level of responsibility or as a function of either time period. The general prediction in the enemy condition was, therefore, that guilt would be more strongly associated with perpetrator than with victim appraisals in all four of these cells. This general prediction was borne out, as seen in Table 10. It should be noted that (a) guilt ratings were positively associated, both statistically and practically speaking, with perpetrator responsibility appraisals in the four cells ($r_{1(2,3)}$ ranged from .41 to .69), but (b) guilt ratings were not associated,
statistically or practically speaking, with victim responsibility appraisals in the four cells \((r_{1(2,3)}\) ranged from -.02 to .29).

To close this section regarding guilt’s association with appraisals, two conclusions are offered. First, it is possible to find a significant role for perpetrator responsibility appraisals in guilt. Finding evidence supportive of this role is possible even in conditions that should actually reduce that association (i.e., in close friendships; with the passage of time; in cases of foreseeable harm). Second, there is little evidence to support the role of victims’ perceived responsibility appraisals in guilt. Stated differently, although the victims’ views may well play a role in guilt, little evidence was found for this role when it was operationalized as the victims’ perceptions of the perpetrators’ responsibility.

**Correlational Analyses Regarding the Role of Identity Claims in Guilt**

The goal in this section of the results is to consider the extent to which there were statistically and substantively significant associations between guilt and identity claims. It will be recalled that Chapters I and II of the dissertation focused on two different types of identity claims. The primary identity claim considered was that of “I wish to be forgiven” (hereinafter labeled “forgiveness”). The secondary identity claim assessed was that of “I want to be treated better” (hereinafter labeled “treat me better”). Parkinson, the eminent interpersonal theorist, asserted that the communicative claim in guilt is a desire for forgiveness. In general, then, one should find positive associations between ratings of guilt and desires for forgiveness. Parkinson also views the identity claim of treat me better as the identity claim involved in anger (not in guilt). In fact, if anything, there generally
should be a *negative* association between the anger-related identity claim of treat me better and guilt, since guilt and anger, according to many, are antithetical. Results bearing on guilt-forgiveness and guilt-treat me better associations are presented below.

**Guilt-forgiveness associations: Nature of relationship.** Is there any evidence supportive of Parkinson's view that ratings of guilt are associated positively with ratings of desires for forgiveness? By reexamining Table 9, it can be seen that the guilt-forgiveness correlations were statistically and substantively significant in all four cells. Parkinson's assertion of a strong link between guilt and forgiveness is thus generally supported.

It should be recalled further that the guilt-forgiveness association was expected to be especially strong in the friend compared to the enemy condition. After all, people presumably desire forgiveness more in closing, caring relationships than from people they hate! By referring again to the findings in Table 9, it can be seen that the association between guilt and forgiveness is indeed higher in the friend than in the enemy condition at Time 1 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .50$ vs. .30) but this difference is not statistically significant. Interestingly, however, the guilt-forgiveness link is equally high in the friend and enemy condition at Time 2 ($r_{1(2,3)} = .61$ vs. .46). Thus, the need for forgiveness is associated with tendencies to express guilt later in time even toward people with whom one has an adversarial relationship. (Although this is generally supportive of Parkinson's expectations guilt-forgiveness associations, it presents an interesting conundrum regarding his interpersonal view of guilt, which will be addressed in the Discussion.)
Guilt-forgiveness: Nature of relationship, time, and responsibility. Beyond these general associations, more refined predictions regarding guilt-forgiveness associations were presented in Chapters I and II. A central prediction in this respect was that the guilt-forgiveness link would be stronger at Time 1 in the friend condition when the event was foreseeable rather than angrily intended. The assumptions underlying this prediction were that (a) there would be a high need for a perpetrator to seek forgiveness, via expressions of guilt, in the foreseeable harm condition even immediately after the event occurred, since there was absolutely no justification for the harmful event produced via foreseeability, but (b) there would not be a need for the perpetrator to seek forgiveness, via guilty expressions, in the angrily intended condition at least immediately after the event transpired, since the perpetrator felt he had good justification for harming the victim. Do the correlational results presented in Table 10 support either of these expectations?

Examining the correlations between guilt and forgiveness at Time 1 reveals a stronger association in the foreseeable/friend condition \( r_{1.2} = .55 \) than in the angrily intended/friend condition \( r_{1.2} = .42 \), although this difference was not statistically significant. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the guilt-forgiveness relationship is moderate even in the angrily intended friend condition at Time 1.

Another prediction regarding guilt-forgiveness associations was that their strength would actually reverse at Time 2 in the friend condition. That is, after time had passed, the expectation was that the guilt-forgiveness relationship in a friendship would actually be stronger in the angrily intended than in the foreseeable condition. The rationale for this reversal was that (a) there would be a greater need to ask for forgiveness, via guilty
expressions, in the angrily intended condition after time had passed because the time passage would allow anger to subside and the perpetrators to reconsider the importance of these friendships, and (b) there would be a lesser need to ask for forgiveness, again via the expression of guilt, in the foreseeable condition because this type of harm did not really threaten the relationship. Support was also found for this prediction, as seen in Table 10. Specifically, the guilt-forgiveness correlation was higher in magnitude at Time 2 for the angrily intended/friend condition \((r_{1(2,3)} = .69)\) than for the foreseeable/friend condition \((r_{1(2,3)} = .54)\), but this difference was not statistically significant. Note again, however, that both coefficients are substantial in magnitude in the two responsibility conditions.

One final prediction concerning the expected associations of guilt with forgiveness pertains to the enemy condition. It will be recalled that no differential responsibility-related associations were expected between guilt and forgiveness in this adversarial relationship. In general, it was simply expected that guilt would be associated less with forgiveness at Time 1 than at Time 2, because especially immediately in time the perpetrator is not concerned with preserving the relationship. Inspection of the coefficients in Table 10 reveals some support for the validity of these expectations. In an absolute sense, the guilt-forgiveness association in the foreseeable/enemy condition was lower at Time 1 \((r_{1(2,3)} = .36, \text{ ns})\) than at Time 2 \((r_{1(2,3)} = .41, p < .05)\), but this difference was not statistically significant. The guilt-forgiveness link in the angrily intended/enemy condition shows a clearer difference between Time 1 \((r_{1(2,3)} = .20, \text{ ns})\) and Time 2 \((r_{1(2,3)} = .64, p < .001)\), but this difference was not statistically significant. In all, then, although people who express greater guilt also tend to express greater desires for
forgiveness, even toward people they dislike, it appears that guilty expressions toward one’s enemies incorporate desires for forgiveness especially after time has passed.

In concluding this section, several assertions seem reasonable. First, there is a close connection between the tendency to see the self as feeling guilty and the desire to be forgiven. Second, however, the strength of this association varies (as predicted)—its magnitude increases or decreases with time as a function of one’s responsibility and relationship with the victim. Third, and importantly, some of these results raise some interesting conundrums for Parkinson’s interpersonal view of guilt which will be discussed in Chapter V (e.g., why would there be a significant guilt-forgiveness association in the enemy condition if guilt truly is meant to repair one’s relationships)?

Guilt-treat me better associations. Predictions were offered earlier regarding another identity claim discussed by Parkinson, that is, the so-called anger-based identity claim treat me better. The general idea was that ratings of this identity claim should be significantly negatively associated with ratings of guilt. After all, the desire in guilt is presumably to repair the broken interpersonal bridge between perpetrator and victim as opposed to damaging it even further by demanding reparative behavior on the victim’s part. Was the association between guilt and treat me better a significant negative one in general? By reexamining Table 9, it can be seen that there is essentially little association between this identity claim and ratings of guilt across the four cells.

A more specific prediction regarding the treat me better identity claim was that it should be most negatively associated with guilt in those conditions in which the perpetrator should be least concerned about the victim or the relationship. Specifically,
this link should be most negative in the friend condition for angrily intended harm at Time 1 compared to all other friend conditions. It can be seen from Table 10 that this prediction was not supported. If anything, the negative relationship is strongest \( (r_{1(2,3)} = -.29) \) in the friend/foreseeable/Time 1 condition. It was further expected that the guilt-treat me better association should be more negative in the friend conditions as a whole when compared to the enemy conditions as a whole. Examining the coefficients in either of Tables 9 or 10 does not show support for this prediction.

The final question asked regarding the identity claim of treat me better was whether it was associated less with ratings of guilty feelings than the identity claim so central to guilt (i.e., forgiveness). A comparison of the guilt-forgiveness versus guilt-treat me better associations revealed significant practical differences between the two correlation coefficients in almost all pertinent rows of Tables 9 and 10. That is, forgiveness was statistically significantly associated with guilt in all but the enemy conditions at Time 1, whereas treat me better was not statistically significantly associated with guilt in any condition. It is clear that guilt is more highly associated with forgiveness than the competing identity claim.

In general, there was little support for the expected negative associations between guilt and the identity claim of treat me better. However, this section of the results does support the conclusion that guilt is much more strongly associated with the desire for forgiveness than the self-oriented, anger-related identity claim of treat me better.
Correlational Analyses Relevant to the Relationship
Between Responsibility Appraisals and Identity
Claims in Perpetrator Guilt

Thus far, the results have separately focused on the role of appraisal and the role
of identity claims in guilt. This section highlights results which are relevant to predictions
outlined in Chapters I and II regarding the interactive roles of appraisal and identity claims
in eliciting guilty feelings. The reader will recall that central to the thesis of this
dissertation was the assumption (a) that a perpetrator’s communicative agenda (i.e.,
identity claims) reflects the perpetrator’s choice to attend to his or her own appraisals of
responsibility versus those of his or her victim; and (b) that the nature of the relationship
and perceptions of responsibility importantly affect whether this shift in perspective ever
takes place as the event unfolds over time. For example, when perpetrators adopt the
perspective of their friend victims, either early on, as in the case of foreseeable events, or
later, as in the case of angrily intended events, they should experience a desire to
communicate a request for forgiveness. This section examines these assertions by
considering additional results that shed light on the question of whether the
communicative agenda of a perpetrator is reflected in his or her choice to attend to self or
victim appraisals. These results are then followed by a review of previously reported
results relevant to guilt-appraisal and guilt-identity claim links that when integrated,
address the question of whether the anticipated pattern of association between identity
claims, appraisals, and guilt is observed when taking into account relationship,
responsibility level, and time.
Appraisal-identity claim links. This section is concerned with the hypothesis that a perpetrator’s choice to express a particular identity claim reflects the degree to which the perpetrator attends to his or her own appraisals of responsibility or those of his or her victim. A relevant prediction in this respect addressed the degree to which identity claims communicated by a perpetrator are driven by the perpetrator’s self-appraisals versus the victim’s appraisals. Stated differently, is the communicative agenda of a perpetrator more highly associated with his or her own appraisals or those of his or her victim? One method of examining this assertion was to compare the degree to which guilt-related identity claims (i.e., forgiveness) were correlated with victims appraisals versus perpetrators’ appraisals; and the degree to which anger-related identity claims were correlated with perpetrators’ appraisals versus victims’ appraisals. The expectation was that the correlation between forgiveness and victims’ appraisals would be statistically significantly greater than the correlations between forgiveness and perpetrators’ own appraisals. The corresponding prediction for anger-related identity claims was that one should find a significantly stronger association between anger-related identity claims and perpetrators’ appraisals than between anger-related identity claims and victims’ appraisals.

The results pertaining to this analysis are shown in Table 8. The first observation is that victims’ appraisals were not statistically nor meaningfully associated with forgiveness, either at Time 1 ($r = .00$, ns) or Time 2 ($r = .03$, ns). Interestingly, the association between perpetrator appraisals and forgiveness at Time 1 ($r = .08$, ns) and Time 2 ($r = .17$, ns), though not statistically nor meaningful significant, was greater in absolute terms than the association between victims’ appraisals and forgiveness! Although
comparison of the forgiveness-perpetrator appraisal and forgiveness-victim appraisal links at Time 1 and Time 2 revealed no statistically significant differences, it is striking that forgiveness was more highly correlated with the perpetrators’ than with the victims’ appraisals of responsibility.

With respect to anger-related identity claims, the association between perpetrators’ appraisals and anger-related identity claims was weak at best at both Time 1 and Time 2 ($r = .01$, ns, and $r = .14$, ns, respectively). Even more interestingly, the association between victims’ appraisals and anger-related identity claims was statistically and meaningfully significant at Time 1 ($r = .23$, $p < .05$), though not statistically significant nor substantively meaningful at Time 2 ($r = .19$, ns)! The association between anger-related identity claims and either perpetrators’ or victims’ appraisals did not differ statistically significantly at either Time 1 or Time 2.

Contrary to the primary thesis of this study, these findings suggest that there was little or no association between perpetrators’ beliefs about how responsible their victims thought them to be and perpetrators’ desires to communicate a request for forgiveness; but victims’ appraisals were associated with perpetrators wanting their victims to treat them better.

Another key prediction emphasized the relationship between guilt-related identity claims (i.e., forgiveness) and victims appraisals specifically. Rather than exploring this relationship directly, as in the results just presented, it was possible to examine the relationship between forgiveness and victims’ appraisals by analyzing their respective relationships to a third variable, perpetrator guilt. This prediction stated that perpetrators’
need for forgiveness and victims’ appraisals would equally predict the degree of guilt experienced by perpetrators. This assertion implies that forgiveness and victims’ appraisals must co-occur. In other words, one would expect that requests for forgiveness would be present when perpetrators attend to their victims’ appraisals but that they would not be present when perpetrators do not attend to their victims’ appraisals. Thus, the expectation was for correlations between guilt and forgiveness and between guilt and victims’ appraisals to each be statistically and practically significant but not statistically significantly different from each other. Moreover, this pattern of correlations was not expected to vary in any of the four responsibility level/nature of relationship conditions. So, for example, whether in situations where perpetrators would be expected to feel very guilty (as in the foreseeable/friend condition) or to feel little guilt (as in the angrily intended/enemy condition), the expectation was for equally significant correlations between guilt and victims’ appraisals and between guilt and forgiveness.

The relevant correlation coefficients are shown in Table 10. Results indicate that whereas forgiveness was, with the exception of the Time 1 enemy conditions, statistically and meaningfully significantly associated with ratings of guilt at both Time 1 and Time 2, the association between guilt and victims’ appraisals was low and not statistically nor meaningfully significant in any of the conditions at either Time 1 or Time 2. Comparing guilt-victim appraisal links to guilt-forgiveness links for all conditions revealed that guilt-forgiveness links, though not statistically significantly different, were meaningfully greater than guilt-victim appraisal links in all conditions. Thus, the expectation of a consistently equal relationship between guilt and forgiveness or victims’ appraisals was not supported.
This result suggests that victims' appraisals and guilt-related identity claims do not share similar relationships with perpetrator guilt as hypothesized.

**Integrating guilt-appraisals and guilt-forgiveness links.** Results presented in previous sections separately addressed the links between guilt and appraisals and between guilt and identity claims. In this section, these previously reported results are integrated and summarized briefly to investigate the assertion that the degree to which perpetrators shift their perspective to attend to their own or their victims' appraisals and consequently assert a need for forgiveness (thereby feeling guilty) is largely determined by the relationship between the perpetrator and victim, the foreseeability or angrily intended character of the harm inflicted, and the passage of time. The predictions in this section were concerned with whether the anticipated pattern of guilt-appraisal links occurred concurrently with the anticipated pattern of guilt-forgiveness links across the four responsibility level/relationship conditions. Results from these analyses are presented first for the friend condition and then for the enemy condition.

The prediction in the *friend* condition examined whether the self's private appraisals (i.e., perpetrator appraisals) take precedence over identity claims or the victim's appraisals when a person first responds emotionally to an event that was angrily intended. Recall that perpetrators who intentionally act to harm their victims would be expected to attend, at least initially, to their own personal motivation and justification for inflicting harm; and to not attend to their victims' beliefs about their responsibility. In not attending to the appraisals of their victims, perpetrators would not be expected to communicate a desire for forgiveness. Thus, in the case of harm that was angrily intended, the
expectation was that at Time 1, perpetrator guilt would be more highly correlated with perpetrator appraisals than with victim appraisals; and concurrently, the link between guilt and forgiveness would not be statistically significant. With the passage of time, however, the guilt-perpetrator appraisal link would be expected to weaken, whereas the guilt-victim appraisal would be expected to strengthen; and concurrently, the link between guilt and forgiveness would be expected to become statistically significant at Time 2.

As previously reported (see Table 9, cf. p. 65), guilt was more highly correlated with perpetrator appraisals than with victim appraisals at Time 1, consistent with expectations. Contrary to expectations, however, the link between guilt and forgiveness was also found to be statistically significant. With the passage of time, the guilt-victim appraisal links were not observed to strengthen, nor were the guilt-perpetrator appraisal links shown to weaken as expected. Nevertheless, the guilt-forgiveness correlation was higher in magnitude at Time 2, as anticipated.

The corresponding prediction in the case of foreseeable harm asserted that in these circumstances, perpetrators are likely to adopt their victims perspective from the outset and would therefore be expected to communicate a request for forgiveness early on. Thus the correlation between guilt and victim appraisals was expected to be statistically significant but not necessarily greater than the correlation between guilt and perpetrator appraisals at both Time 1 and Time 2; and concurrently, the link between guilt and forgiveness was expected to be statistically significant at Time 1 and weaken from Time 1 to Time 2 because the nature of the harm did not present a fundamental risk to the relationship.
Integrating results previously reported reveals that the association between guilt and victims’ appraisals at Time 1 was not statistically or practically significant, contrary to expectations. Nevertheless, the guilt-forgiveness link was statistically and substantively significant at Time 1. The guilt-forgiveness link was not observed to weaken from Time 1 to Time 2 as expected.

The integrative prediction with respect to harm in the enemy condition was that perpetrators would have little motivation to attend to the views of their victims early or later and would therefore have little desire to request forgiveness from them either. Thus the expectation was that guilt would be more strongly associated with perpetrators’ appraisals than with victim appraisals in both cases of foreseeable and angrily intended harm; and concurrently, that forgiveness would be less associated guilt. Results shown in Table 10 supported these assertions. Specifically, guilt-perpetrator appraisal links were significant in both the angrily intended and foreseeable conditions at Time 1 and Time 2, whereas guilt-victim appraisal links were not significant in any of the conditions. The guilt-forgiveness links were also found to be relatively weaker in the enemy versus the friend condition, although the differences were not statistically significant.

Taken together, these results provide mixed support for predictions regarding the patterns of guilt-appraisal and guilt-forgiveness that were expected to operate concurrently. Specifically, when the link between perpetrators’ appraisals and guilt was significant and strong, guilt-forgiveness links also tended to be significant and strong. In conditions in which links between victim appraisals and guilt were expected to be high, but were not, the guilt-forgiveness links were nonetheless significant.
Summary of Results from Correlational Analyses

Predictions that were originally presented in Chapters I and II were tested using semi-partial correlational analyses. Predictions asserted links between perpetrator guilt and perpetrators’ own appraisals of responsibility, between perpetrator guilt and the responsibility appraisals of their victims, and between guilt and identity claims. Predictions also described the differential roles of appraisals and identity claims in guilt feelings when taking into account whether harm was foreseeable versus angrily intended, the nature of the relationship between perpetrator and victim, and the passage of time.

Results relevant to the asserted links between appraisals and guilt did not support the study hypotheses. Results suggest that perpetrator appraisals, much more than victim appraisals, are related to guilty feelings, even in the conditions that should actually reduce the role of perpetrators’ appraisals. Whatever role victims’ appraisals play in guilt, it does not emerge when their perceived appraisals are assessed. Additionally, there was little evidence that the passage of time encouraged greater focus on the victims’ points of view.

Results regarding the relationships between identity claims and perpetrator guilt provided mixed support for the relevant predictions. Results indicate that the tendency to see the self as feeling guilty is closely related to the desire to be forgiven. The strength of this association varies in magnitude as a function of one’s sense of responsibility, the relationship with the victim, and the passage of time. There was little support for the expected negative associations between guilt and the identity claim of treat me better. Results do clearly support, however, the assertion that guilt is much more strongly associated with the desire for forgiveness than a self-oriented, anger-related identity claim.
Importantly, some of the results relevant to guilt-identity claim links raised questions for Parkinson’s interpersonal view of guilt and are discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, results pertaining to predictions about the relationship between appraisals, identity claims, and guilt feelings revealed that, contrary to expectations, there was little or no association between perpetrators’ beliefs about how responsible their victims thought them to be and perpetrators’ desires to communicate a request for forgiveness; nor did victims appraisals and guilt-related identity claims share similar relationships with perpetrator guilt as hypothesized. Mixed support was found for predictions regarding concurrent patterns of guilt-appraisal and guilt-forgiveness links. Specifically, strong guilt-perpetrator appraisal links were accompanied by strong, rather than weak, guilt-forgiveness links. In addition, the lack of significant guilt-victim links, even in the very conditions that should have encouraged them, did not preclude the guilt-forgiveness links from being significant.

Analyses of Variance

Thus far in the results section, attention has focused on relationships among participants’ ratings of guilt, appraisal, and identity claims. In this section, attention is paid specifically to the extent to which guilt ratings differed reliably as a function of all manipulated variables. These mean differences in guilt are important to attend to in light of previous studies of guilty feelings and for comparison with the results of previous studies.

It will be recalled that almost all previous studies of effects on perpetrators’ guilty feelings presents them with vignettes in which their responsibility for a “harmful” outcome
varies after which they offer judgments of their responsibility and guilty reactions. Thus, these studies have looked at guilt and appraisal from the perspective of the perpetrator only. It will be further recalled that these studies are unclear in terms of whether the effects support an appraisal perspective and/or the interpersonal perspective. A part of the problem with the studies has been their failure to take into account the nature of the relationship between the involved parties and the effects of time. In this section of the analyses, these variables are taken into account, using them to test whether there is support for either the appraisal and/or the interpersonal view of guilt. Results are analyzed first from the perspective condition that best matches previous research—the perpetrator condition, ignoring the other two perspective conditions. Then, results bearing on the remaining two perspective conditions are presented.

Predictions regarding guilty feelings in the perpetrator condition. The appraisal perspective leads one to expect that feelings of guilt should be affected by one’s depicted level of responsibility for the event in question. Using ANOVA, it should be possible to show that the objective (manipulated) nature of one’s responsibility does impact how guilty one feels. This would be reflected in a main effect for manipulated responsibility level. Strong support for the appraisal perspective can be declared only if two results are obtained. First, there would only be a main effect of manipulated responsibility and second, the nature of that effect must be such that ratings of guilt are greater when the perpetrator’s sense of responsibility cannot justify the perpetrator’s harmful actions; in essence, the perpetrator must report greater feelings of guilt when his behavior was
foreseeable (but unjustified) as opposed to angrily intended, because there is in his view justification for the angrily intended event but not for the foreseeable one.

The interpersonal perspective on guilt leads one to expect that guilty feelings depend heavily on the nature of one’s relationships with the victim in question. People should report stronger feelings of guilt when they are in close, caring relationships than when they are in enemic ones (this is because guilt has a communicative function of asking for forgiveness and one wants forgiveness only in relationships that one cares about!). If this line of reasoning holds, one would expect to find a main effect of relationship on feelings of guilt. If one were to find only a main effect of relationship, this would be complete support for the interpersonal perspective. People simply feel guiltier when they hurt someone they care about than someone they hate.

In reality, this study hypothesized that guilt feelings are much more complexly determined than either of the main effect predictions outlined above would lead one to think. Guilty feelings are interactively determined both by responsibility (appraisal) and by interpersonal factors and by time. The bottom line expectation was that: objective responsibility (appraisal) should make a bigger difference in the degree of guilty feelings reported in close, caring relationships but not in enemic ones. Thus, at the very least, a statistically significant Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction was expected with differences in guilt between the angrily intended versus foreseeable condition being larger in the friend than in the enemy condition. On its own, this two-way interaction would support a combined appraisal-interpersonal view of guilt. Importantly, however, the expectation was for a three-way interaction among responsibility,
relationship, and time such that in close, caring relationships (i.e., friend condition), people should feel less guilty for angrily intended than foreseeable events at Time 1; however, at Time 2 people in close, caring relationships should actually feel guiltier for angrily intended than for foreseeable events. In contrast, neither time nor responsibility were expected to affect ratings of guilt in the enemy condition. Given the expectation for a statistically significant three-way interaction among responsibility, relationship, and time for ratings of guilt, follow-up analyses in the form of a Responsibility Level x Time ANOVA of guilt were planned to be conducted separately in each relationship condition in order to break down the interaction. A statistically significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction was expected in the friend condition. The only potentially statistically significant result expected in the enemy condition was a main effect for time (with guilt declining across time).

Results relevant to predictions regarding guilt in the perpetrator condition. To test these predictions, a 2 x 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship x Time) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted, treating participants’ ratings of the extent to which they perceived the perpetrator would feel guilty (1 = Very Mildly; 7 = Extremely) at Time 1 and at Time 2 as the within-subjects factor. The results, shown in Table 11, revealed no statistically significant main effects and one statistically significant interaction of Responsibility Level x Time.

The absence of main effects of responsibility level and nature of relationship was corroborated by the finding that the estimates of effect size associated with the responsibility level and nature of relationship factors were essentially zero, indicating that
Table 11

Within-Subjects Analysis of Variance on Mean Perpetrator Guilt Ratings at Time 1 and Time 2 in the Perpetrator Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between subjects effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility level (RL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within + Error</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>(7.186)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within subjects effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (T)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x T</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.341**</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R x T</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.094</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL x R x T</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within + Error</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>(2.476)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors. **p<.01.

none of the variability in guilt ratings was explained by variation in either responsibility level alone or nature of relationship alone. Recall that the presence of a statistically significant main effect of responsibility level was essential to the case in support of a uniquely appraisal view of guilt and that a main effect of nature of relationship would have been necessary to support a purely interpersonal view of guilt.

Contrary to study predictions, the anticipated three-way interaction between Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship x Time was not statistically significant;
neither was the Responsibility Level x Nature of Relationship interaction found to be statistically significant. Indeed, both of these interactions were found to account for less than 1% of the variability in guilt ratings. As reported previously, however, the Responsibility Level x Time interaction was statistically significant. The interaction is graphically depicted in Figure 4.

Review of the cell means underlying the Responsibility Level x Time interaction reveals that perpetrator guilt ratings in the angrily intended condition increased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 4.08, \text{SD} = 2.37 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.92, \text{SD} = 1.90 \)), whereas in the foreseeable condition, guilt ratings decreased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 4.76, \text{SD} = 2.18 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.20, \text{SD} = 2.25 \)), irrespective of the nature of the relationship between perpetrator and victim. Analysis of the same interaction conducted separately in the friend and enemy conditions revealed that the Responsibility Level x Time interaction was stronger in the enemy condition, \( F(1, 48) = 6.57, p = .014 \), than in the friend condition, \( F(1, 49) = 3.85, p = .06 \). In the enemy condition, mean guilt ratings increased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 3.75, \text{SD} = 2.25 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.96, \text{SD} = 1.76 \)) in the angrily intended condition but decreased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 4.58, \text{SD} = 2.23 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.12, \text{SD} = 2.42 \)) in the foreseeable condition. A similar pattern was revealed in the friend condition, such that mean guilt ratings increased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 4.38, \text{SD} = 2.48 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.88, \text{SD} = 2.07 \)) in the angrily intended condition but decreased from Time 1 (\( \bar{X} = 4.96, \text{SD} = 2.15 \)) to Time 2 (\( \bar{X} = 4.28, \text{SD} = 2.11 \)) in the foreseeable condition. Estimates of effect size for the Responsibility Level x Time interaction for both the friend and enemy conditions revealed that a moderate amount of the variability in guilt ratings
Predictions regarding the effects of perspective. In presenting the rationale for the study, it was hypothesized that perpetrators of angrily intended harm do not take the victim's point of view on the event until later in time, after the anger has subsided. Perpetrators of foreseeable harm were believed to adopt the victim's perspective more immediately after the event. This was the basis for expecting perpetrator guilt in the perpetrator condition—at least when they are good friends with the victim—to increase with time in the angrily intended condition but to decrease with time in the foreseeable
condition. The idea, then, was that those participants asked directly to adopt the victim's point of view should produce a pattern of perpetrator guilt at Time 1 that resembled guilt in the perpetrator condition at Time 2 when they are friends. All things considered, then, 2 x 2 (Responsibility Level x Time) ANOVAs conducted on guilt in the friend condition should have resulted in a statistically significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction for those in the perpetrator condition, such that guilt increased with time for angrily intended events but decreased with time for foreseeable events. The same ANOVA conducted in the victim condition should have resulted in statistically significant main effects of responsibility level and of time in the victim condition, such that victims project perpetrators to feel guiltier at Time 1 than Time 2 and to feel guiltier for angrily intended than foreseeable events at both time periods. Because participants in the no-perspective condition were not provided with explicit instructions to adopt either the perpetrator or the victim's perspective, these participants were in a position to more easily shift perspective from Time 1 to Time 2. It was anticipated that they would attend initially more to perpetrator motivation and later to the interpersonal nature of the harm inflicted. Conducting the same ANOVA in the no-perspective condition should have resulted in an even more significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction with a pattern of mean guilt ratings similar to those predicted in the perpetrator condition.

Results pertaining to predictions about the effects of perspective. The first analysis pertaining to predictions regarding the effects of perspective was conducted and reported in the previous section. The reader will recall that when analyzed from the perspective of perpetrators, guilt increased with time in the angrily intended condition but decreased with
time in the foreseeable condition, consistent with expectations. When the victim condition was analyzed separately, the ANOVA resulted in a statistically significant main effect of responsibility level, $F (1, 48) = 41.54, p = .001$, as anticipated. Mean guilt ratings in the foreseeable condition at Time 1 ($\bar{X} = 5.15, SD = 1.85$) and Time 2 ($\bar{X} = 4.39, SD = 1.58$) were statistically significantly greater than mean guilt ratings in the angrily intended condition at Time 1 ($\bar{X} = 3.29, SD = 1.83$) and Time 2 ($\bar{X} = 3.67, SD = 1.71$). An estimate of effect size for the main of effect of responsibility level revealed that a large proportion of the variability in guilt ratings (20%) was explained by variation in responsibility level alone. The main effect of time was not statistically significant, indicating that guilt did not decrease from Time 1 ($\bar{X} = 4.22, SD = 2.05$) to Time 2 ($\bar{X} = 4.03, SD = 1.67$) to the extent predicted (eta squared = .01), but remained relatively high even at Time 2. Results in the no perspective condition were also consistent with expectations. The Responsibility Level x Time interaction, graphically depicted in Figure 5, was statistically significant, $F (1, 51) = 18.60, p < .001$, such that mean guilt ratings increased from Time 1 ($\bar{X} = 3.11, SD = 2.15$) to Time 2 ($\bar{X} = 5.04, SD = 1.93$) in the angrily intended condition but decreased from Time 1 ($\bar{X} = 4.69, SD = 2.22$) to Time 2 ($\bar{X} = 3.73, SD = 2.59$) in the foreseeable condition. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect, as estimated by eta squared, was much larger in the no-perspective (.27) than in the perpetrator condition (.07) as predicted.

**Summary of Results from ANOVAs**

Analysis of variance was used to examine whether the pattern of mean ratings of
perpetrator guilt was best explained by a purely appraisal view of guilt, by an interpersonal view, or by a interaction view in which appraisals and interpersonal concerns interact to affect guilty feelings. Analyses were initially conducted in the perpetrator condition that best aligns with previous research. Analyses were then conducted in the remaining two perspective conditions for purposes of comparison. Results relevant to the purely appraisal and uniquely interpersonal views of guilt revealed no support for either noninteractive view of guilt. That is, there was no main effect of responsibility level or of nature of relationship, nor were the estimates of effect size associated with the responsibility level and nature of relationship factors meaningful. Results relevant to the interaction view of guilt revealed only partial support for the hypothesized interactions. None of the expected interactions involving nature of relationship were statistically significant nor did they
account for more than 1% of the variability in guilt ratings. Importantly, however, support for the interaction view of guilt did emerge in the form of a significant Responsibility Level x Time interaction such that guilt increased with time in the angrily intended condition but decreased with time in the foreseeable condition. This result was consistent with the hypothesis that perpetrators of angrily intended harm do not take the victim’s point of view on the event initially but may later in time, whereas perpetrators of foreseeable harm adopt the victim’s perspective soon after the event.

To further examine the effects of shift in perspective, the effects of responsibility level and time in the perpetrator condition were compared to the same effects in the victim and no perspective conditions. Although there were no main effects for time, results supported the more important expectation for a main effect of responsibility level in the victim condition, such that mean guilt ratings in the foreseeable condition were statistically significantly greater than mean guilt ratings in the angrily intended condition at both Time 1 and Time 2. Support also emerged for the expectation that in the no perspective condition, the Responsibility Level x Time interaction would be significant and stronger than the comparable interaction in the perpetrator condition.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

Summary and Conclusions

As elaborated in Chapters I and II, the overarching purpose of this dissertation was to assess the relative validity of three competing views of the factors affecting feelings of guilt, that is, appraisal views, interpersonal views, and a new view of guilt, offered for the first time in this dissertation, that emphasizes the interactive role of appraisal and interpersonal influences on guilty feelings. It will be recalled that appraisal theories of guilt all emphasize the perpetrators' feelings of responsibility in impacting how guilty they end up feeling for harming someone. From the appraisal perspective on guilt, any factor that increases the perpetrator's feelings of responsibility, should also increase their feelings of guilt. In terms of the data collected for this dissertation, two primary findings would have supported a uniquely appraisal-based account of guilty feelings. That is, guilty feelings should have thus been greatest when perpetrators viewed themselves as unjustified for causing harm, as in foreseeable as opposed to angrily intended acts, and there should have been significant associations between guilty feelings and the perpetrators' appraisals of their responsibility. The interpersonal approach to guilt, in contrast, focuses on the role that guilt plays in mending relationships because of the harm done and the threat it portends for the integrity of these bonds. Several primary predictions should have received statistical support to buttress the validity of the interpersonal approach to guilt. Specifically, validity of the interpersonal view of guilt
required finding that guilt varied systematically as a function of the nature of one’s relationship with the victim; that guilt covaried substantially with the need for forgiveness; and that, whatever role that responsibility plays in increasing guilty feelings, it does so because the victim’s point of view on responsibility is adopted. Finally, to provide support for the *interactive* view of guilt, one needed to find that guilt did not vary simply as a function of either perpetrator appraisals alone or interpersonal concerns alone but as a function of an interaction between appraisal and interpersonal concerns. This interaction would have been such that guilty feelings would have varied as a function of shifts in perspective (from perpetrators’ views to those of victims) that were determined by perpetrators’ sense of responsibility, the relationship between perpetrators and victims, and the passage of time.

These competing views of the factors influencing guilt were tested in two primary ways, as explained in Chapter III. First, an experimental design was implemented that incorporated independent variables meant to operationalize the appraisal, interpersonal, and interactive models of guilt. In this design, the perpetrators’ responsibility for the harm inflicted was varied, which was one way of operationalizing the appraisal theorists’ emphasis on responsibility precursors to guilty feelings. Also included in this design were factors meant to impact interpersonal concerns. That is, by varying the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, the communicative need to express (or even feel) guilt should have been impacted. The independent variables of the time at which guilt was assessed and the perpetrators’ perspectives on the event were intended to operationalize the more interactive, appraisal, and interpersonal, view of guilt’s origins. By
manipulating time, the intent was to allow for events to unfold such that perpetrators could attend to additional influences that they might not have attended to initially (e.g., interpersonal concerns). By manipulating perspective, the intent was to compare guilt feelings as rated by perpetrators to ratings made by victims to determine whether perpetrators’ guilt ratings later in time are similar to those of victims early on. Analyses were conducted primarily in the perpetrator condition as this was the only condition in which perpetrators’ perceptions of their victims’ appraisals were assessed. Second, in addition to the main dependent variable of feelings of guilt, other dependent variables were included that were needed to assess the validity of the three theories of guilt. Obviously, assessments of perpetrators’ appraisals of responsibility were included to measure the extent to which any validity was found for traditional appraisal theories of guilt. Assessments of the victims’ appraisals of responsibility were included to measure the extent to which guilt experienced by a perpetrator is a function of how responsible perpetrators perceive their victims believe them to be. Measures of the need for forgiveness and the need to be treated better were included to assess the degree to which assertions about the role of interpersonal concerns could be supported.

Using this design and these dependent measures allowed very specific predictions to be tested regarding each of the three views of guilt. Chapter IV of the dissertation presented in great detail the results bearing on each of these specific predictions. The best way of summarizing these results is as follows: What support was found for the appraisal view of guilt? This study demonstrated that perpetrators’ appraisals do figure prominently in guilt, even in situations which, from an interpersonal view, would argue against a
significant role. Moreover, perpetrators' inferences about how responsible their victims viewed them appear to have little impact on the guilt perpetrators experience. Thus, perpetrators appeared to care far more about their own sense of responsibility than how responsible their victims thought them to be. Additionally, guilt ratings were observed to be higher when perpetrators viewed themselves as having less justification for their actions. What support was found for the interpersonal view of guilt? These results indicate that guilt is strongly associated with a need for forgiveness and that the degree to which perpetrators will experience this need is associated with the type of relationship shared with the victim. What support was found for the interactive view of guilt? The presence of support for both the appraisal and interpersonal views of guilt is, of itself, compelling evidence in support of an interactive view of guilt. Beyond this observation, however, were results that demonstrated that guilt does vary as a function of perpetrators' own appraisals of responsibility that change with time and the perspective taken on the events. Although the specific interaction between appraisals of responsibility, the nature of the relationship, and the perspective taken across time was not observed in this study, evidence did emerge to suggest that these factors do affect one another in important ways.

In general, then, the results as a whole provide the best support for the interactive view of guilt. Although support for the appraisal view is strong, in order to back this view one would need to ignore other, important results that demonstrate that appraisals do not operate independently of the perspective taken on events or the nature of the relationship between individuals. To support the interpersonal view would require dismissing significant findings relevant to the central role of appraisals that emerged throughout the
results. Only a view that provides for both appraisals and interpersonal concerns in guilty feelings is sufficiently comprehensive to explain guilt. Although support for the specific interactive model set forth in this dissertation was not overwhelmingly favorable, results do argue, nonetheless, for an interactive view of guilt that allows for the operation of the appraisal and interpersonal factors emphasized in this study.

Implications for Understanding Guilt

Given that the best support was found for the interactive view, what are the implications of these findings for subsequent theory development and research (past and future) in the area of guilt? These results indicate that guilt cannot be readily explained in the manner that strictly appraisal or uniquely interpersonal accounts of guilt have implied. In particular, factors that have been found to play a role in guilt when investigated separately from the appraisal and the interpersonal view were found to have a role in guilt in this study. This finding requires explanation. One possible interpretation is that studies based on either view of guilt have focused only on those factors that mostly closely align with their respective views. Thus, each line of research, like the sages and the elephant, has been left to draw conclusions based on a limited view of the whole. A more holistic investigation of guilt would do well to take into account the influence of perspective and time, in addition to recognizing the important role of both appraisals and interpersonal concerns in guilt. In this regard, evidence in this study suggests that the roles with which individuals identify significantly impact their views about emotion. This makes intuitive sense but has been ignored in past research efforts that have relied on vignettes in order to
assess factors relevant to emotion but have failed to control for the perspective taken by participants. By controlling for perspective it might be possible to more clearly understand how shifts in perspective play a role in the elicitation of guilt. Although this study provides only limited direct evidence for shifts in perspective, indirect evidence does suggest that a process is operating to account for the interaction between a perpetrator’s sense of responsibility and the passage of time to affect the perpetrator’s feelings of guilt. For example, what occurs from the time a perpetrator first acts to intentionally inflict harm to impact the perpetrator’s guilt response later? One possibility is that the perpetrator’s anger merely subsides, allowing the person to attend to his or her own sense of responsibility. The finding that victims’ appraisals did not figure prominently in the guilt of perpetrators would support that conclusion. However, an alternative explanation might be found in the influence of interpersonal concerns that operate independently of any attention that might or might not be paid to the victim’s appraisals. After all, guilt was more highly associated with a desire for forgiveness after the passage of time when perpetrators acted in anger to intentionally harm their victims. Could it be that the passage of time does, in fact, allow perpetrators to attend to the impact of their behavior and that it is the need for forgiveness, prompted by a shift in perspective, that accounts for the increase in guilt? Although this study provides no definitive response, it does suggest that these questions merit further investigation. At the very least, one must conclude that guilt is a process that does evolve over time (Ferguson et al., 1997; Parkinson, 1999; Scherer, 1999) and that investigations of guilt (and potentially other emotions) that are static in nature and do not attend to issues of perspective will fail to capture the complexity of the
event and risk misdiagnosing the true nature of the emotional episode. Future research must address these concerns or risk pursuing explanations of guilt that are too narrow to be generalizable to real-life situations.

If researchers are to attend to both appraisals and interpersonal factors, as well as the effects of perspective and time, what implications do these findings have on the respective roles of appraisal and interpersonal factors in guilt? Although Parkinson’s (1995, 1997) assertions about the role of identity claims in emotion have been largely untested, this study provides an initial test and does suggest that identity claims, at least in the case of the guilt-related identity claim of wanting forgiveness, do play an important role in guilt feelings. In fact, the significant role of the forgiveness identity claim extended even to those situations in which interpersonal views of guilt would have predicted no need for forgiveness. That is, forgiveness identity claims were highly associated with guilt even when the perpetrator and victim were enemies and there was little or no motivation to attend to the damage inflicted on the relationship! One possible explanation of this finding is that participants defaulted to choosing the forgiveness identity claim because other possible forced-choice responses on the dependent measure of identity claims did not accurately capture the communicative agenda ascribed to perpetrators. Nonetheless, requiring participants to choose from among the list of 13 separate identity claims included on the dependent measure of identity claims, derived directly from Parkinson’s (1995, 1997) assertions regarding identity claims and successfully used in previous research (Treadwell, 1999), does not appear to fully explain this result.
The finding that forgiveness identity claims were associated with guilt even in enemic relationships might also be partially explained by the failure to control for the potentially varied responses of victims. It is possible that perpetrators experienced a need for forgiveness because they projected highly distressed responses to their victims, and that these severely distressed victim responses generated needs for forgiveness that overwhelmed any feelings of dislike for their enemies. Another potential explanation is that, as Parkinson has asserted (1997), the presence of forgiveness identity claims says as much about how the individual wishes to see him or herself as it does about the value the perpetrator places on the relationship. These findings can be interpreted to mean that perpetrators assert a need for forgiveness for reasons that go beyond concern for a relationship; that having harmed someone, they experience dissonance between their behavior and how they believe they ought to have behaved (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985). Perpetrators thus may not only be concerned with mending a damaged relationship, but also with mending their own image of themselves. By communicating a need for forgiveness, the perpetrator is thus able to reassure him or herself that he or she is not such a bad person after all. This line of reasoning would be consistent with the finding that perpetrators’ views of how responsible victims thought them to be did not play a role in how guilty perpetrators felt. Parkinson has asserted that appraisals really do not play a causal role at all in emotions, that it is the need to communicate a wish for forgiveness that elicits the guilt response. If, in fact, my need for forgiveness is more about maintaining a particular image of myself, then what my victims think about me may have very little relevance. Thus, it is possible that forgiveness identity
claims do reflect a need to restore a damaged relationship, but in addition, they serve to
restore one’s image of oneself as a good person.

Of course, the observation that people may have asked for forgiveness because
they were just as concerned about their own self-image as they were about their
relationships, raises some interesting issues that need to be considered by researchers in
this area. The main issue is whether requests for ratings of guilt are uncontaminated from
other emotions. That is, when rating guilt (and its supposed uniquely associated identity
claim of “forgiveness”), were the participants rating guilt and guilt alone? Could it be that
they were also implicitly rating how ashamed they felt? Shame is, after all, supposedly
driven by concerns with one’s self-image (Ferguson et al., 2000; Lewis, 1971; Tangney,
1995). That is, shame is said to arise when individuals see themselves as falling short of
their ideal selves. It is possible that measures designed to assess guilt and the guilt-related
identity claim of forgiveness actually tapped participants’ ratings of perpetrators’
unwanted views of themselves, particularly considering the abundant evidence that
measures of shame and guilt are correlated (Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Harder & Zalma,
1990; Lindsay-Hartz, deRivera, & Mascolo, 1995). Data collected during the course of
this study, not directly relevant to this study’s hypotheses, sheds light on this question.
Specifically, the correlation between guilt and the shame-related identity claim, “I am a
bad person,” taking into account the correlation between shame and the same identity
claim, was found to range from zero to very low ($r_{1(2.3)} = .07$) across the four responsibility
level/nature of relationship conditions. The correlation between forgiveness and ratings of
shame, taking into account the relationship between guilt and forgiveness, ranged from
zero to moderate across the four responsibility level/nature of relationship conditions ($r_{1(2,3)} = .01$ to $.31$). Finally, the correlation between the guilt-related forgiveness identity claim and the shame-related identity claim of “I am a bad person,” taking into account the association between guilt and forgiveness, was moderate to high across the four responsibility level/relationship ($r_{1(2,3)} = .16$ to $.54$). Taken together, these results suggest that strong guilt-forgiveness links cannot be entirely explained by the possibility that in addition to rating how guilty they felt, participants rated how ashamed they felt. Rather, these results indicate that the links between guilt and forgiveness were strong in spite of the association between ratings of guilt and shame.

Limitations

Finally, are there any limitations to the study that would urge caution? The primary concern in all investigations into the antecedents of emotion is whether results are generalizable to real-life emotion experiences. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge design characteristics of the present study that may place limits on external validity. The first consideration is whether simply telling participants to adopt the identity of a friend or an enemy allows participants to respond as if they really were a friend or enemy. People generally like to think of themselves as likeable and may struggle to imagine themselves interacting with someone whom they dislike and who dislikes them. When participants are not able to truly adopt this role, regardless of whether they recognize that the assigned relationship is enemical or amicable, the effects of relationship may be lost. This may explain why the nature of relationship factor as operationalized in
this study was not a significant factor in any of the predicted interactions involving responsibility level, perspective, nature of relationship, and time. One way of overcoming this challenge might be to encourage participants to come up with real experiences from their own lives and to identify individuals with whom they share positive and negative relationships. Using these real relationships, participants could participate in experiments that seek to understand factors that contribute to emotion.

A similar question arises regarding the ability of participants to adopt the perspective of perpetrators or victims. Although checks on the manipulation of perspective indicated that participants were able to accurately identify the role to which they were assigned and did not differ with respect to the degree to which they were able to identify with their assigned role, these measures tapped only the degree to which participants were able to \textit{cognitively} adopt the assigned perspective. The question remains as to whether participants were able to \textit{experientially} adopt either the perpetrator or victim perspective. One could expect that the findings observed in this study with respect to perspective shifts would be even more significant were participants able to more fully adopt their assigned roles.

An associated problem of external validity, that may also limit a study’s ability to distinguish between factors that are central to emotion and those that are epi-phenomenal, arises when studies rely exclusively on individuals’ reports of events. Relying on participant report is problematic because people are not always aware of what is really driving their emotional responses. Thus, relying on self-reports to measure appraisals, identity claims, or other variables may fail to capture processes that may actually be
involved but that operate outside the conscious awareness of participants (Duck, 1991; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Schorr, 2001). One potential strategy for addressing these concerns would be to conduct observational studies, perhaps along the lines of those conducted by Gottman and colleagues (e.g. Gottman, 1998) in which people’s emotional experiences are recorded and later reviewed to understand the factors to which they were attending, and importantly those to which they were not attending, during the unfolding of the experience. This recommendation notwithstanding, it is obvious that finding appropriate methodologies to assess the antecedents of complex emotions, like guilt, remains a challenge for researchers.

Another source of limitation on the applicability of these findings arises from this study’s reliance on assessing perpetrators’ perceptions of how responsible their victims believed them to be. If the accuracy of one’s self-reports about one’s own behavior is suspect, then what can one say about the accuracy of relying on what someone perceives someone else is thinking? This raises an important question for research that attempts to explore how people’s thoughts (e.g., appraisals) and feelings (e.g., guilt) may be related to what others think about them. The support for Parkinson’s theory (1997) that emerged in this study might be difficult to replicate were it possible to accurately assess the appraisals made by victims and the degree to which those appraisals impacted the emotional response of perpetrators.

Another series of questions that remain unanswered by this study is whether and how gender and relational factors interact to impact the emotion aroused. Due to its exploratory nature, this study did not investigate gender effects in terms of men’s and
women's perceptions of the events depicted. Future research that relies on portrayals of emotion must consider not just the gender of participants but also the congruence between the gender of participants and the gender of actors. Gender is a crucial variable to explore especially when emotion is conceptualized in relational terms (Brody, 1997; Brody & Hall, 1993). Obviously, people have different relational goals in many same-sex versus opposite-sex interactions that are capable of significantly influencing the identity claims they wish to express with their emotions.

One question that may be asked regarding the applicability of these results reflects concerns about the population from which participants were recruited and whether that population may differ from the larger population to which these results may be applied. It is true that a majority of the population from which the sample was drawn are affiliated with the LDS church and that potentially a majority of participants in the study are or have been affiliated with the LDS church in some way. However, data have yet to emerge to suggest that the experience of guilt is any different for those who profess a particular religious or spiritual belief. On the contrary, researchers investigating guilt-proneness relying on samples involving disproportionately large numbers of LDS church members have not reported differences in guilt-proneness attributable to religious affiliation when comparing results to research conducted with samples that were not predominantly LDS (e.g., Ferguson & Crowley, 1997). In spite of research that suggests that there is little evidence to suggest that the results reported here may be ungeneralizable due to the somewhat unique population from which the research sample was drawn, it is nonetheless important to recognize that LDS religious doctrine, like that of many faiths, specifically
encourages adherents to forgive others, even one’s enemies. Thus, it is possible that the results of this study may have been influenced by a culture that encourages victims to forgive their perpetrators regardless of the nature of the relationship between perpetrators and victims. Future research into the role of forgiveness identity claims will need to take religious and cultural differences into account and would do well to replicate these findings in varied religious and cultural settings.

Other factors, not specifically addressed in this study, may also potentially affect the relationship between responsibility appraisals, perspective, nature of relationship, and time in feelings of guilt. For example, a recent study found that the degree to which individuals sought forgiveness was a function of variability in the degree to which they were able to take the perspective of their victims due to the influence of self-monitoring (Sandage, Worthington, Hight, & Berry, 2000). It is possible that high self-monitoring perpetrators might attend more to the appraisals of their victims relative to those who are less inclined to self-monitor and therefore experience a greater need to seek forgiveness. On the other hand, Sandage et al. speculated that those who engage in a high degree of self-monitoring were less likely to seek forgiveness because self-monitoring, which is an effort to maintain one’s social impression “interfere[s] with perspective-taking and impair[s] empathy” (emphasis added, p. 30). In addition to self-monitoring, individual differences have been shown to affect perspective taking and forgiveness seeking. Researchers have noted links between empathy and forgiveness seeking (McCullough et al., 1998) and between personality traits and forgiveness seeking (Gramzow & Tangney,
1992). These factors should be explored for their contribution to the integrated view of guilt presented in this study.

Finally, in addition to this study's efforts to understand guilt, future research must also broaden its scope to investigate how the factors highlighted here may operate to affect other emotions, both positive and negative.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES
Appendix A:

Scenarios and Instructions Used to Operationalize Independent Variables
Scenario 1: A Day at the Ceramics Lab

Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who hurts someone or causes damage. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who causes damage. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been enemies for many years. YOU can’t stand her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.
Foreseeable/Victim/Friend Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you were actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after, YOU are walking by the sink and slip, dropping YOUR newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOUR statue is the one YOU have spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for YOUR spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse’s gift.

Foreseeable/Victim/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you were actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been enemies for many years. YOU can’t stand her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after, YOU are walking by the sink and slip, dropping YOUR newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOUR statue is the one YOU have spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for YOUR spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse’s gift.
Foreseeable/No Perspective/Friend Condition:

(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario.

(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been friends for many years. The two spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after, Liz is walking by the sink and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

Foreseeable/No Perspective/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario.

(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been enemies for many years. The two can’t stand each other. They consider each other to be number one on their respective lists of enemies. The two go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and spills some water around the sink. Sandy does NOT clean it up. Soon after, Liz is walking by the sink and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

Angrily Intended/Perpetrator/Friend Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who causes damage. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and are standing by the sink. Liz approaches and starts yelling at YOU for something she believes YOU did. She is in YOUR face, yelling, and accusing YOU of terrible things. Liz holds
in her hands a statue she has been working on. As she turns to walk away YOU stick out YOUR elbow to hit her statue. The statue falls from her hands and onto the floor. It breaks into a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

Angrily Intended/Perpetrator/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who causes damage. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you are actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who caused the damage and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Liz have been enemies for many years. YOU can’t stand her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and are standing by the sink. Liz approaches and starts yelling at YOU for something she believes YOU did. She is in YOUR face, yelling, and accusing YOU of terrible things. Liz holds in her hands a statue she has been working on. As she turns to walk away YOU stick out YOUR elbow to hit her statue. The statue falls from her hands and onto the floor. It breaks into a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

Angrily Intended/Victim/Friend Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you were actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day
while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. YOU approach Sandy and start yelling at her for something YOU think she did. YOU are in her face, yelling, and accusing her of terrible things. YOU hold in YOUR hands a statue that YOU have been working on. As YOU turn to walk away, YOU see Sandy stick out her elbow to hit YOUR statue. It falls from YOUR hands and onto the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. YOU have spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for your spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse’s gift.

**Angrily Intended/Victim/Enemy Condition:**

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you were actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Sandy have been enemies for many years. YOU can’t stand her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. YOU approach Sandy and start yelling at her for something YOU think she did. YOU are in her face, yelling, and accusing her of terrible things. YOU hold in YOUR hands a statue that YOU have been working on. As YOU turn to walk away, YOU see Sandy stick out her elbow to hit YOUR statue. It falls from YOUR hands and onto the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. YOU have spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for your spouse. YOU are in shock, staring at the remains of YOUR spouse’s gift.

**Angrily Intended/No Perspective/Friend Condition:**

(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario.

(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been friends for many years. The two spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. Liz approaches Sandy and starts yelling at her for something she thinks Sandy did. Liz is in her face, yelling, and accusing her of terrible things. Liz holds
in her hands a statue that she has been working on. As Liz turns to walk away, Sandy sticks out her elbow to hit Liz's statue. It falls from Liz's hands and onto the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift.

Angrily Intended/No Perspective/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) Please read the following scenario.

(Scenario:) Sandy and Liz have been enemies for many years. The two can't stand each other. They consider each other to be number one on their respective lists of enemies. The two go to great lengths to avoid one another. One day while working at the ceramics lab, Sandy is cleaning up and is standing by the sink. Liz approaches Sandy and starts yelling at her for something she thinks Sandy did. Liz is in her face, yelling, and accusing her of terrible things. Liz holds in her hands a statue that she has been working on. As Liz turns to walk away, Sandy sticks out her elbow to hit Liz's statue. It falls from Liz's hands and onto the floor. The statue breaks into a million pieces. Liz has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting the statue as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift.

Scenario 2: The Dinner Party

e.g., Foreseeable/Victim/Enemy Condition:

(Instructions:) When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who is hurt or whose property is damaged. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person’s “skin” as though you were actually acting out the entire event as though you were the person who gets hurt or whose property is damaged and really identify with being this person.

(Scenario:) YOU and Sarah have been enemies for many years. YOU can’t stand her. YOU consider her to be number one on your list of enemies. The two of you go to great lengths to avoid one another. One evening, YOU and Sandy find yourselves at the same dinner party. Later in the evening, near the buffet table, YOU become aware that Sandy is standing directly behind YOU, with her back to YOU. Just then, YOUR very attractive friend walks up to join YOU. As YOU
and your friend reach out to take each other's hands, Sarah explodes into laughter. This startles YOU and YOU flinch, spilling YOUR drink and food. YOU look down at your clothes and find them thoroughly stained.

**Scenario 3: A Night at the Movie Theater**

e.g., *Angrily Intended/No perspective/Friend Condition:*

(Instructions:) Please read the following story.

(Scenario:) Jeff and Casey have been friends for many years. The two spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day Jeff asks a friend to accompany him to view a new movie playing at a local theater. Independently of Jeff, Casey, also decides to go to the theater with several of his friends. Throughout the movie Casey and his friends are laughing and making distracting noise. Jeff repeatedly leans forward to tell them to be quiet. Casey and his friends continue to make noise and tell Jeff to "shut up." About half-way through the movie, Casey leaves the theater to get some drinks for himself and his friends, passing Jeff on his way out. As Casey returns with the drinks, Jeff sticks his leg out into the aisle. Casey trips over Jeff's leg, falls to the ground and the drinks go everywhere.
Appendix B:

Manipulation Control Questionnaire
Some Questions about You and the Story You Read

Please answer the following questions concerning the story you read. Circle the number that you believe is the best answer or respond in the space provided.

1. Where did the event take place?
   a. in a movie theater
   b. at a grocery store
   c. in a ceramics studio
   d. at a dinner party
   e. I don't remember

2. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 1 above.
   
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Not at all confident Somewhat Very confident

3. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm?
   If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this:
   ____________________________________________________

4. Did the story describe how the harm came about?
   If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this.
   ____________________________________________________

5. What is your age?

6. Are you male or female? (Circle one)
7. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. What did “you” do in the story?

8. The two people involved in the incident that you just read were:
   1. enemies
   2. siblings
   3. friends
   4. strangers
   5. I don’t remember

9. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people generally like each other?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | | | |
   Not at all Somewhat Very much

10. What is your major?

11. What is your occupation?

12. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. Who were you?

13. How successful were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were asked to identify with?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | | | |
   Not at all Somewhat to a great extent

14. At what time of day did the story you read about take place?
   1. morning
   2. mid-day
   3. evening
   4. night
   5. the time of day was not specified.
15. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 14 above.

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<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all confident</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very confident.</td>
<td></td>
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Appendix C:

Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Appraisal Rating Forms
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Self Appraisals
Time 1 Example
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition–Ceramics Studio Scenario:

Part A

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.

1. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | | | |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

2. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | | | |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

3. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, how justified did you feel in having broken the statue?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | | | |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Self Appraisals
Time 2 Example
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition–Ceramics Studio Scenario:

Part A

Review: You were working in a ceramics studio with your friend, Liz. YOU noticed that you left water on the floor. Liz passed by, slipped on some water, and dropped her statue. Liz’s statue was destroyed.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE YESTERDAY.

1. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree do you believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | |
   Not at all Somewhat Very much

2. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree do you believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | |
   Not at all Somewhat Very much

3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, how justified were you in breaking the statue?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   | | | | |
   Not at all Somewhat Very much
Appraisal Rating Form: Perpetrators Perceptions of Victims Appraisals
Time 1 Example
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition–Ceramics Studio Scenario:

Part D

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE.

Now that you have read the story and understand what you did and how you harmed someone, please think about how LIZ, the person you have harmed, thinks about what you did. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what you did and try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior. Keeping LIZ's thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions.

1. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   |   |   |   |   |   |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

2. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   |   |   |   |   |   |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much
3. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue?

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<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Focus your attention on the fact that Liz's statue was destroyed yesterday.

Think back to yesterday and what you did to harm someone. Please think about how Liz, the person you have harmed, thinks about what you did now, one day later. Try to really imagine how Liz is responding to what you did yesterday and try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior now. Keeping Liz's thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions.

1. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does Liz (not you) believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   |   |   |   |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

2. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does Liz (not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   |   |   |   |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does Liz (not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   |   |   |   |
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much
Appendix D:

Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Emotional Response Rating Forms
Emotional Response Rating Form
Time 1 Example
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition–Ceramics Studio Scenario:

**Part B**

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

**FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.**

Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions immediately after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are experiencing each emotion. For example, if YOU are feeling very mildly angry, circle the number 1. If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Mildly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Pity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Guilty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Afraid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ashamed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Embarrassed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Let’s think about how guilty YOU felt immediately after the statue was broken. Why was this your immediate feeling?
Emotional Response Rating Form  
Time 2 Example  
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition–Ceramics Studio Scenario:

**Part B**

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ's STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions one day after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are experiencing each emotion. For example, if YOU are feeling very mildly angry, circle the number 1. If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Mildly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Angry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Afraid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ashamed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Happy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Embarrassed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Proud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken. Why is this YOUR feeling now?
Appendix E:

Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Identity Claims Rating Forms
Identity Claims Rating Form
Time 1 Example
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition—Ceramics Scenario:

Part C

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.

Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU were trying to communicate each of the following messages. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU wished to communicate each message. For example, if YOU were communicating a very mild message of “respect me” to Liz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message was not being communicated at all, circle zero.

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, I was communicating that...

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<tr>
<th>Very Mildly</th>
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<th>Extremely</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I deserved to be respected</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I care for you</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I wish to be forgiven</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I want to be treated better</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I’m better than you</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I am inadequate</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I don’t want to be hurt</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Look up to me</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I submit to you</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I don’t hurt me again</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I’m a bad person</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. I need help</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I need you to comfort me</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I want you to recognize me</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
15. I'm glad I'm not you

16. Let's think about how guilty you felt immediately after the statue was broken....In feeling this amount of immediate guilt, what were you communicating?
FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ’S STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

If Liz happened to be with YOU today, what would YOUR feelings today be communicating? Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU would be communicating each message. For example, if YOU would be communicating a very mild message of “respect me” to Liz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message would not be communicated at all, circle zero.

It is one day after the vase was broken. If Liz happened to be with YOU, YOUR feelings would be communicating that...

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I deserved to be respected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I care for you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I wish to be forgiven</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I want to be treated better</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I’m better than you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I am inadequate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>I don’t want to be hurt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Look up to me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I submit to you</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>I don’t hurt me again</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>I’m a bad person</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>I need help</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>I need you to comfort me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>I want you to recognize me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>I’m glad I’m not you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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16. Let’s think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken...In feeling this amount of guilt, what are YOU communicating?
Appendix F:

Informed Consent Form
Informed Consent
Human Perceptions of Everyday Interactions

Introduction/Purpose: Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson in the Department of Psychology at Utah State University is conducting a research study to find out more about people’s perceptions of everyday events as well as their thoughts and emotional reactions to those events. You have been asked to take part because you are a student at Utah State University. Approximately 400 students will be invited to participate.

Procedures: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be required to read a short story of less than 200 words. You will then be asked to complete a series of questionnaires that ask you about your memory of the events you have described and how you thought and felt.

New Findings: During the course of this study, you will be informed of any significant new findings (either good or bad,) such as changes in the risks or benefits resulting from participation in the research, or new alternatives to participation which might cause you to change your mind about continuing in the study. If new information is provided to you, your consent to continue participating in this study will be re-obtained.

Risks: Some people may have experienced situations in their lives which they would rather not recall and may find the experience distressing. You may experience distress as a result of remembering an experience from your past.

Benefits: There may or may not be any direct benefit to you from these procedures. A potential benefit to you is knowing that you are contributing to a scholarly investigation designed to increase our understanding of the way people think and feel in response to the actions of others. Another benefit to you is that you will receive extra class credit for your participation in this study. If you choose not to participate in this study, there are various other projects on which you may earn equivalent extra credit.

Explanation & offer to answer questions: A research assistant has explained this study to you and answered your questions. If you have other questions or research-related problems, please contact Tamara J. Ferguson at (435) 797-3272 or Chris Treadwell at (435) 797-1460.

Voluntary nature of participation and right to withdraw without consequence: Your decision to participate in this study is completely voluntary. You will receive class credit if you decide to participate. If you decide not to participate, you will not be penalized in any way. Participation in this project has no bearing on your grade in the class other than your receipt of extra credit. You may withdraw at anytime without consequence, other than you will not receive extra-credit points if you do not complete all study requirements. You may be withdrawn from this study without your consent by the investigator if you chose to not complete all participation requirements.

Extra Costs: There will be no cost to you for participating.
Confidentiality: Research records will be kept confidential consistent with federal and state regulations. Access to data collected during the course of this study will be limited to the Project Investigators and research assistants. Your completed consent form will be kept on file and will be checked against your completed packet of questionnaires to ensure that a signed consent form is obtained for each completed packet of questionnaires. Your student identification number is requested for purposes of communicating your student identification number to your instructor for recording of extra-credit points. No personal identifying information will be put on your questionnaires. All information that you provide for this study will be anonymous. Your name will not be requested on the questionnaires or be connected in any way with any of the data. Therefore, your anonymity will be fully protected. Data will be maintained indefinitely.

IRB Approval Statement: The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human subjects at Utah State University has reviewed and approved this research project.

Copy of consent: You have been given two copies of this Informed Consent. Please sign both copies and retain one copy for your files.

Investigator Statement: “I certify that the research study has been explained to this participant, by me or my research staff, and that the individual understands the nature and purpose, the possible risks and benefits associated with taking part in this research study. Any questions that have been raised, have been answered.”

Signature of PI & Student PI:  
Dr. Tamara Ferguson  
Principal Investigator  
797-3272  

Chris Treadwell  
Student Researcher  
797-1460

If you feel fully informed about the study and are willing to participate, please complete the information requested below and return this form to the research assistant. The research assistant will provide you with your questionnaire packet.

Your participation is greatly appreciated.

Signature of Subject:  
(Your signature)  
Date

Student Identification Number  
(must be provided to receive extra-credit)
Appendix G:

Sample Time 1 and Time 2 Research Packets
Sample Time 1 Research Packet
Foreseeable/Perpetrator/Friend Condition:

Human Perceptions of Every Day Interactions
Phase 1
(Form FPF1)

Last six digits of student identification number:

IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS!!! PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!!

1. To participate in this study you must demonstrate your willingness to participate by reading and signing a statement of Informed Consent. A copy of the Informed Consent for this study should have been provided with this research packet. You may obtain a copy of the Informed Consent form from the research assistant. If you have not already done so, please take time to read and sign the Informed Consent before continuing to item 2 below.

2. Your participation in this research effort has two parts. In Phase 1, which takes place now, you are required to read some information and answer some questions. You will then be required to return to this room in approximately 24 hours for Phase 2 of your participation. When you return, you will be required to complete a second set of questionnaires. You should have already been scheduled for your return appointment.

3. In order to prepare for your participation in Phase 2, please record the last six digits of your student identification number (or any other number) in the space at the top of this page. Now, locate the small colored sheet attached to this packet. Fill in the same six digit number in the space provided on the colored sheet. You will need to take this colored sheet with you when you leave today. Place the completed colored sheet in a safe place. This colored sheet will be your ticket to participate in the second phase of this study. When you return tomorrow to complete Phase 2, you will be required to present this colored sheet to receive the second set of questionnaires. Your identity will not be revealed. YOU MUST BRING THIS COLORED SHEET WITH YOU TOMORROW TO RECEIVE EXTRA-CREDIT!!!

4. After you have finished reading the instructions on this page, you will turn to the next page where you will find a brief statement followed by a short story. You are to carefully read the statement and the story that follows. Feel free to take whatever time you need to read and understand these items.

5. When you have finished reading the story, turn to the next page and answer questions 1-44. Please be sure to respond to ALL questions.

6. When you have responded to all questions, please return these materials to the research assistant and confirm your appointment to return for Phase 2.

7. Turn the page to begin Phase 1.

<<begin new page>>
INSTRUCTIONS:

When you have read these instructions, please read the scenario that follows. While you are reading this scenario, we would like you to try your hardest to imagine that you are the person who hurts someone or someone's property. Try to imagine everything that this person was thinking, feeling, and wanting to do or say before the event took place and while it was unfolding. You should try to crawl into this person's "skin" as though you are actually acting out the entire event. Imagine that you are the person who hurt someone or damaged someone’s property and really identify with being this person.

STORY:

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift.

<<begin new page>>
Part A

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips—dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.

1. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

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<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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2. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

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<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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3. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, how justified did you feel in having broken the statue?

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<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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</table>

Part B

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.

Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions immediately after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are experiencing each emotion. For example, if YOU are feeling very mildly angry, circle the number 1. If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Very Mildly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Pity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Guilty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Afraid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Ashamed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Embarrassed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
Let's think about how guilty you felt immediately after the statue was broken. Why is this your immediate feeling?

<<begin new page>>

Part C

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse’s gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND’S STATUE.

Think back to the story you just read. Indicate the degree to which YOU were trying to communicate each of the following messages. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU wished to communicate each message. For example, if YOU were communicating a very mild message of “respect me” to Liz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message was not being communicated at all, circle zero.

It is immediately after the vase was broken. Right then, I was communicating that...

14. I deserve to be respected
15. I care for you
16. I wish to be forgiven
17. I want to be treated better
18. I’m better than you
19. I am inadequate
20. I don’t want to be hurt
21. Look up to me
22. I submit to you
23. I don’t want you to hurt me again
24. I’m a bad person
25. I need help
26. I need you to comfort me
27. I want you to recognize me
28. I’m glad I’m not you

Let’s think about how guilty you felt immediately after the statue was broken....In feeling this amount of immediate guilt, what were you communicating?
Part D

For your convenience, the story you read earlier is presented below. Please re-read the story (if necessary) and answer the questions that follow.

YOU and Liz have been friends for many years. You spend several hours a week together and consider each other to be a trusted confidant. One day while working at the ceramics lab, YOU are cleaning up and spill some water around the sink. YOU do NOT clean it up. Just as YOU are about to step away from the sink, Liz walks by and slips, dropping her newly fired statue. The statue is in a million pieces. YOU recognize the statue as the one LIZ has spent the past four months meticulously sculpting as an anniversary gift for her spouse. Liz is in shock, staring at the remains of her spouse's gift.

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT YOU JUST DESTROYED YOUR FRIEND'S STATUE.

Now that you have read the story and understand what you did and how you harmed someone, please think about how LIZ, the person you have harmed, thinks about what you did. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what you did and try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior. Keeping LIZ's thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions.

30. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

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<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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</table>

31. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

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32. It is immediately after the statue was broken. Right then, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue?

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<td>Very much</td>
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Some Questions about You and the Story You Read

Please answer the following questions. Circle the number that you believe is the best answer or respond in the space provided.

30. Where did the event take place?
   a. in a movie theater
   b. at a grocery store
   c. in a ceramics studio
   d. at a dinner party
   e. I don't remember
31. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 30 above.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all confident  Somewhat  Very confident

32. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm? If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this:

________________________________________________________________________

33. Did the story describe how the harm came about? If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this.

________________________________________________________________________

34. What is your age?

35. Are you male or female? (Circle one)

36. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. What did "you" do in the story?

________________________________________________________________________

37. The two people involved in the incident that you just read were:

1. enemies
2. siblings
3. friends
4. strangers
5. I don't remember

38. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people generally like each other?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

39. What is your major? ________________________________

40. What is your occupation? ________________________________

41. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. Who were you?

________________________________________________________________________
42. How successful were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were asked to identify with?

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<th>7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>to a great extent</td>
<td></td>
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43. At what time of day did the story you read about take place?

1. morning
2. mid-day
3. evening
4. night
5. the time of day was not specified.

44. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 43 above.

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<tr>
<td>Not at all confident</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very confident.</td>
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IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS!!! PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!!

1. Please record the last six digits of your student identification number (the same six-digit number you used yesterday!) in the space at the top of this page. Your identity will not be revealed.

2. After you have finished reading the instructions on this page, you will turn to the next page where you will find a brief review of the events that transpired yesterday.

3. When you have finished reading the review, turn to the next page and answer questions 1-47. Please be sure to respond to ALL questions.

4. When you have responded to all questions, please return these materials to the research assistant.

5. Turn the page to begin Phase 2.

<<begin new page>>

INSTRUCTIONS:

Please read the following review

Review:

You were working in a ceramics lab with your friend, Liz.

YOU noticed that you left water on the floor. Liz passed by, slipped on some water, and dropped her statue. Liz’s statue was destroyed.

<<begin new page>>
Part A

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ’s STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

1. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

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<tr>
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<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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2. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree did you believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

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3. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, how justified were you in breaking the statue?

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Part B

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ’s STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

Indicate the degree to which YOU are feeling each of the following emotions one day after the statue was broken. Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU are experiencing each emotion. For example, if YOU are feeling very mildly angry, circle the number 1. If YOU are not feeling a particular emotion at all, circle zero.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Very Mildly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Guilty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Afraid</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Ashamed</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Sad</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Embarrassed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

13. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken. Why is this YOUR feeling now?

<<begin new page>>
Part C

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ's STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

If Liz happened to be with YOU today, what would YOUR feelings today be communicating? Circle the number corresponding to the degree YOU would be communicating each message. For example, if YOU would be communicating a very mild message of “respect me” to Liz, circle the number 1. If you think a specific message would not be communicated at all, circle zero.

It is one day after the statue was broken. If Liz happened to be with YOU, YOUR feelings would be communicating that...

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<th>None</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>14. I deserve to be respected</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I care for you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. I wish to be forgiven</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. I want to be treated better</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I'm better than you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. I am inadequate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. I don't want to be hurt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Look up to me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. I submit to you</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. I don't want you to hurt me again</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. I'm a bad person</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. I need help</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. I need you to comfort me</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. I want you to recognize me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. I'm glad I'm not you</td>
<td>0</td>
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29. Let's think about how guilty YOU feel one day after the statue was broken.... In feeling this amount of guilt, what are YOU communicating?

________________________________________

<<begin new page>>
Part D

FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT LIZ'S STATUE WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

Think back to yesterday and what you did to harm someone. Please think about how LIZ, the person you have harmed, thinks about what you did now, one day later. Try to really imagine how LIZ is responding to what you did yesterday and try to understand what she is thinking about your behavior now. Keeping LIZ's thoughts in mind, please respond to the next three questions.

30. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue could have been avoided?

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<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very much</td>
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31. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe the breaking of the statue was intentional?

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<td>Not at all</td>
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32. It is one day after the statue was broken. Now, to what degree does LIZ (not you) believe you were justified in breaking the statue?

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</table>

Some Questions about You and the Story You Read

Please answer the following questions. Circle the number that you believe is the best answer or respond in the space provided.

33. Where did the event take place?
   a. in a movie theater
   b. at a grocery store
   c. in a ceramics studio
   d. at a dinner party
   e. I don't remember

34. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 33 above.

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<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Very confident</td>
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35. Did the story describe how someone experienced harm? If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this:
36. Did the story describe how the harm came about? If yes, please elaborate what the story said about this.

37. What is your age?

38. Are you male or female? (Circle one)

39. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. What did "you" do in the story?

40. The two people involved in the incident that you just read were:
   1. enemies
   2. siblings
   3. friends
   4. strangers
   5. I don't remember

41. Outside of this particular incident, how much would you say that the two people generally like each other?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   Not at all  Somewhat  Very much

42. What is your major? ______________________

43. What is your occupation? ______________________

44. You were asked to imagine that you were one of the people in the story you read. Who were you?

45. How successful were you at putting yourself in the shoes of the person you were asked to identify with?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   Not at all  Somewhat  to a great extent

46. At what time of day did the story you read about take place?

   1. morning
   2. mid-day
   3. evening
   4. night
   5. the time of day was not specified.

47. Rate your confidence about the answer you selected in question 43 above.

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   Not at all confident  Somewhat  Very confident.
Appendix H:
Research Packet Tracking Sheet
Human Perceptions of Every Day Interactions

Last six digits of student identification number:

BE SURE TO COME BACK TO THIS SAME ROOM, AG SCIENCE 234 TOMORROW BETWEEN 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXTRA-CREDIT
CURRICULUM VITAE

Chris Lee Treadwell
(August 2001)

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY

Utah State University, Logan, Utah
Doctor of Philosophy Aug 2001

Major: Combined Clinical/Counseling/School Psychology
Dissertation: Changing the role of appraisal and interpersonal factors in guilt induction: Time, perspective, and responsibility
Chairperson: Tamara J. Ferguson, Ph.D.

Utah State University, Logan, Utah
Master of Science 1999

Major: Counseling Psychology
Thesis: Interpersonal factors in attribution and emotion
Chairperson: Tamara J. Ferguson, Ph.D.

Brigham Young University
Bachelor of Science cum Laude 1987

Major: Accounting
Minors: Finance, Marketing, Economics
Honors: Presidential Scholar 1981-1982
Deans List, College of Business 1984-1985

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

Psychology Intern, Counseling & Career Center, Brigham Young Univ. 2000-2001

Duties: Clinical intakes; individual, couple, and group psychotherapy; crisis consultation; walk-in consultation; program outreach (depression screening, multi-cultural student orientation, career assessment–Navajo Reservation; communication workshops); and consultation to student housing. Full-time pre-professional APA approved internship.
Supervisor: Richard Isakson, Ph.D., Psychologist and Training Director

Therapist, University Counseling Center, Utah State University. 1998- 2000

Duties: Clinical intakes; individual, couple, and group psychotherapy; crisis consultation; walk-in consultation; program outreach (depression screening, anxiety screening, eating disorders screening, communication workshops); and supervision of peer counselors. Half-time position.
Supervisor: Mary E. Doty, Ph.D., Psychologist and Center Director
Psychological Assistant, Hillside Living Center, Logan, Utah. 1998-2000

Duties: Psychological assessment of adult schizophrenic males; individual and group psychotherapy with adult schizophrenic males; development of behavioral interventions, consultation with professional and non-professional staff, and weekend on-call crisis/consultation coverage. Part-time position.
Supervisor: Kevin S. Masters, Ph.D., Psychologist

Psychometrician/Mental Health Specialist, Community-Family Partnership, Center for Persons with Disabilities, Utah State University. 1997-1998

Duties: Developmental assessment of low-SES children, individual psychotherapy provided in-home for fathers in low-SES families, program development to enhance fathers' participation in child rearing activities, program development to improve fathers' wage earning abilities. Half-time position.
Supervisor: Patricia Truhn, Ph.D., Psychologist and Director

Therapist, University Counseling Center, Utah State University. 1997-1998

Practicum position.
Duties: Clinical intakes; individual, couples, and group psychotherapy; program outreach (depression screening, anxiety screening, eating disorders screening, communication workshops).
Supervisor: David Bush, Ph.D., Training Coordinator

Instructor, Introduction to Psychology 101, Utah State University. Jan-May 1997

Duties: Curriculum development, lectures, test preparation, grading, course administration, and supervision of undergraduate lab instructors. Half-time position.
Supervisor: Tamara Ferguson, Ph.D., Professor

Psychological Assistant, Clinical Services, Center for Persons with Disabilities, Utah State University. 1996-1997

Practicum position.
Duties: Clinical intake; psychological evaluation of developmental, learning, social and emotional disorders (particularly ADHD) in children and adolescents; development of treatment interventions; individual psychotherapy; social skills groups for youth ages 8-14; and parenting skills workshops.
Supervisor: Phyllis Cole, Ph.D., Psychologist and Director

Graduate Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Psychology 101, Utah State University. 1995-1997

Duties: Course administration, test and quiz preparation, grading, development of procedures and curriculum for weekly psychology labs for all students, lectures, and administration of Internet-based psychology labs. Half-time position.
Supervisor: Tamara Ferguson, Ph.D., Professor
Therapist, Psychology Community Clinic, Utah State University 1995-1996
Practicum position.
Duties: Clinical intakes, psychological evaluation of adults, and individual psychotherapy.
Supervisor: Susan L. Crowley, Ph.D., Director of Training

Business Consultant, Customer Services Division, Novell, Inc., 1995
Provo, Utah.
Duties: Business planning support and organizational consultation to division executives.

Vice-President, Strategic Planning, Worldwide Sales, Novell, Inc., 1994
Provo, Utah.
Duties: Integration of international affiliate offices and business activities of WordPerfect Corporation and Novell, Inc. outside North America. Full-time position.
Supervisor: Joe Marengi, Executive V.P., Worldwide Sales

Supervisor: Bruce Bastian, President; John Lewis, Executive V.P.

PROFESSIONAL WORKSHOPS & TRAINING


PRESENTATIONS


PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Outreach Presentations


Guest Lectures & Training


MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

American Psychological Association, Student Affiliate

Association of Mormon Counselors and Psychotherapists, Student Affiliate