Allegory and Nietzschean Values in Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis

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ALLEGORY AND NIETZSCHEAN VALUES
IN KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

by

Paul Kenneth Naylor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
English

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In 1975, I met two men who initiated and nurtured me in my studies of theology and philosophy -- Rev. Eugene Higney and Dr. James Boyack. I would like to thank them both for giving me their time and their insight.

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During the last four years, Aden Ross and Bill Smith have been my guides through the labyrinth of Academia -- I can honestly say that I would not be where I am or who I am without their advice and concern.

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(Also, to the fields of Providence, for calming me enough to write . . .)
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ABSTRACT

Allegory and Nietzschean Values
in Kafka, Camus and Kazantzakis

by

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Master of Arts

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Department: English

The purpose of this thesis is to explore Nietzschean values as they appear in three modern allegories: Franz Kafka's *The Castle*, Albert Camus' *The Plague*, and Nikos Kazantzakis' *Zorba the Greek*. The intent is to illustrate Friedrich Nietzsche's three stages of the overman as they apply to Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis.

(91 pages)
INTRODUCTION

Why does man value what he values? In one form or another, this apparently simple question has haunted and provoked my thinking for the last six years—leading me to wander into the labyrinths of theology, philosophy, and literature in hope of finding a cogent, satisfying answer. I soon learned that labyrinths frustrated me the most when I felt I had somewhere to go, somewhere beyond the labyrinth—like "heaven" or "truth." I also learned it is all too easy to overlook the beauty of the labyrinth itself when I focused my energy and value on something outside the maze.

Unlike Theseus—who was given only one thread by Ariadne to lead him through Minos' labyrinth—I have two threads guiding and focusing me on a path through this thesis, my present labyrinth: Angus Fletcher's theory of allegory and Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of value. Fletcher taught me that allegory fuses together art and philosophy into a mode of expression which often transcends both disciplines. Nietzsche taught me, above all, that we should seek to understand this labyrinth-like world for what it really is—a labyrinth—and, then, embrace every part of it. My intention is to wind these two threads, allegory and value, into one by examining the value systems in allegorical literature, concentrating on modern works directly influenced by Nietzsche's allegory, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Chapter One of this thesis is a definition of my first thread, allegory. Based on Fletcher's seminal work on the genre, *Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode*, it sets up the criteria for determining if a work of literature is an allegory or not. By emphasizing the double intention of allegory, the daemonic, allegorical agent, and the cosmic, allegorical image, we can then apply these three specific aspects to the allegories treated in Chapters Two through Four.

Chapter Two--my second thread--is a comparative study of two distinct views of value, the Christian and the Existential value systems. In *The Faerie Queene*, Edmund Spenser straps the values of renaissance Christianity on his characters for the same reason Icarus straps on his waxen wings: they both concentrate their energy on getting out of the labyrinth--this world--because their values remain outside the walls of the maze. Nietzsche's Zarathustra is Icarus fallen to earth: he concentrates his energy on exploring, fighting, and, finally, embracing the labyrinth. Spenser's Christian value system provides the necessary foil, while Nietzsche's Existential value system provides the essential pattern for the study of modern allegorical literature in the final two chapters of this thesis.

Chapters Three and Four weave the two threads through three examples of modern allegorical literature: Franz Kafka's *The Castle*, Albert Camus' *The Plague*, and Nikos Kazantzakis' *Zorba The Greek*. The first thread, allegory,
supplies the criteria for determining if the three novels are allegorical works. Nietzsche's philosophy of value, my second thread, supplies an interpretive pattern—the three stages of development his overman must pass through—which I apply to the novels in the fourth, and final, chapter of this thesis.

To claim that the primary motive of Kafka, Camus, and Kazantakis in writing their respective allegories was their desire to portray a definite stage of Nietzsche's overman would greatly over-simplify three richly diverse novels. I contend, however, that all three writers were greatly affected by Nietzsche's philosophy, and that they all had Nietzsche's central question in their mind when they wrote their allegories: what is man to do when he realizes that the labyrinth is all there is?
CHAPTER I

A DEFINITION OF ALLEGORY

— Allegories are far less often the dull systems that they are reputed to be than they are symbolic power struggles. —

Angus Fletcher
Allegory, as Angus Fletcher so incisively put it, is a "protean device,"\(^1\) able to change its shape and form without losing the essential aspects which constitute allegorical literature. Allegory is such an eclectic mode of expression that defining it is about as easy as catching a fly with a pair of forceps—but there are certain conventions which allow the reader to determine if a work is allegorical or not. The central reason for allegory's eclectic nature is that form is not one of the conventions: allegory appears in all genres of literature, from epic to lyric to romance to drama. Without a formal criteria for allegory, the critic is forced to rely on the content and intention of the work if he is to determine if it is an example of allegorical fiction. Although the definition of allegory in this chapter mainly concerns the content and intention of the mode, a discussion of the etymology and history of the term is necessary to understand fully the nature of allegory as it appears in literature.

**Etymology and History of the Term**

The term allegory compounds two Greek words: *allos*, which means other, and *agoreuin*, which means to speak openly in the assembly or marketplace. By prefixing *agoreuin* with *allos*, the sense of the word is inverted; therefore, allegory means to speak other than openly or "speaking otherwise that one seems to speak."\(^2\) The connotative use of the word is to
speak of one subject in terms of another; this nuance of the
word is essential because allegory relies so heavily on
double intention, which I will discuss later in this chapter.

The first critical treatment of the term allegory appears
in 46 B.C., in Cicero's Orator:

> When there is a continuous stream of metaphors,
a wholly different style of speech is produced;
consequently the Greeks call it . . . "allegory."
They are right as to the name, but from the point
of view of classification Aristotle does better
in calling them metaphors.³

This statement lays the foundation for the traditional defini-
tion of allegory as an extended metaphor. If metaphor is a
comparative "transfer" of meaning between two unlike classes,
usually moving between the concrete and abstract levels,
then the assertion that allegory is a continuous metaphor
extended throughout a given work is not only justified but
essential to any definition of allegory.

Quintilian, the next rhetorician to discuss the term,
accepts Cicero's definition as fundamentally true, but he
expands on this foundation by adding the essential point
that "Allegory . . . either presents one thing in words and
another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to
the meaning of the words."⁴ Quintilian recognized the im-
plied, connotative meaning of the term (that it very often
says one thing while meaning another), an insight that takes
into account both the double intention and the use of irony
in allegorical literature.
Cicero's and Quintilian's classical definition of allegory as an extended metaphor remained virtually unquestioned throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, not receiving much attention until the Romantic period and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Although Coleridge does not disagree with the traditional definition of allegory, his expansion (and judgment) of the term set the tone for most of the criticism to follow:

We may then safely define allegorical writing as the employment of one set of agents and images with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities or conceptions of the mind that are not in themselves objects of the senses, or other images, agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances so that the difference is everywhere presented to the eye or imagination, while the likeness is suggested to the mind; and this connectedly, so that the parts combine to form a consistent whole.5

Three aspects of Coleridge's definition merit attention: first, the idea that a set of images and agents will correspond to a parallel set of abstractions of the mind; secondly, that this correspondence will express a moral or philosophical value system; and finally, that all the separate parts of the work will "combine to form a consistent whole."

Although Coleridge's definition of the term raises few problems, his judgment that symbolic writing is preferable to allegorical writing has given the genre of allegory more notoriety than it deserves.6 This judgment is based on his decision to value art that flows uninhibited from the unconscious over art that is filtered through the mental faculties.
Many contemporary critics--Frye, Honig, and Fletcher particularly--have pointed out that Coleridge's decision is a value judgment based on taste rather than critical insight, but his opinion influenced many of his contemporaries to assume that allegorical writing was inferior to symbolic writing. This prejudice became so entrenched that the genre received little of its deserved treatment--causing many fine, modern works not to be recognized and appreciated as allegories, something this thesis seeks to remedy.

One major, modern critic who has not slighted allegory is Northrup Frye. His brief yet lucid entry on the topic in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics is one of the best general descriptions of allegory:

> We have allegory when the events of a narrative obviously and continuously refer to another simultaneous structure of events or ideas, whether historical events, moral or philosophical ideas, or natural phenomena.7

Again, the emphasis on the double intention of allegory, the narrative and the ideal level, is the central point of concern here. When a critic of Frye's stature devotes as much of his thought and praise to allegory as Frye has, the door for a more thorough treatment of the genre is wide open: Angus Fletcher's seminal work Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode is just such a treatment, easily the most incisive and insightful exploration of the subject to date.

Most critics prior to Fletcher have been content with providing a general, abstract definition of allegory with-
out a thorough analysis of the particular elements of the mode, but Fletcher moves beyond these somewhat superficial definitions by ferreting out the individual aspects that comprise allegorical literature. His analysis of the content of allegory provides a solid, in-depth foundation for determining if a given work can be considered an allegory.

The Content of Allegory

For the most part, Fletcher accepts the traditional definition of allegory as an extended metaphor, but he uses Coleridge's definition as his springboard, devoting a separate chapter of his book to an analysis of the five elements of allegory that Coleridge mentions: images, agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances. Fletcher adds an essential qualifying point to the traditional definition:

... no "pure Allegory" will ever be found. There is therefore no harm in drawing instances from borderline cases. Even The Divine Comedy, which most readers would assume to be the greatest Western example of allegory, seemed to Coleridge, and has more recently been shown by Auerbach, to be quasi-allegorical work. With such a major example in mind one cannot help wondering if borderline cases are not going to be the norm.

Fletcher first takes up the question of the nature of the agents (or characters) in allegorical literature. He asserts that the major distinguishing mark of an allegorical agent is that it is daemonic:

Daemons, as I shall define them, share the major characteristic of allegorical agents, the fact
that they compartmentalize function. If we were
to meet an allegorical character in real life, we
would say of him that he was obsessed with only
one idea, or that he had an absolutely one-track
mind, or that his life was patterned according to
absolutely rigid habits from which he never allowed
himself to vary.9

The three main points here are that allegorical agents "com­
partmentalize function," that they are "obsessed with only
one idea," and that their lives are "patterned according to
absolutely rigid habits."

To understand what Fletcher means by "compartmentalize
function," we need to examine his definition of daemon, which
is based on Schnewies' Angels and Demons. Fletcher defines
daemon as: "Coming from the term that means to 'divide,'
daemon implies an endless series of divisions of all the im­
portant aspects of the world into separate elements for study
and control."10 If the daemonic agent divides his world
into "endless divisions" and treats the events in his world
accordingly, then his function as an agent will be compart­
mentalized in the sense that his goal will be segmented into
some type of hierarchy: the "endless divisions" and stages
in Dante's spiritual journey are the most obvious examples.

Portraying the allegorical agent as being obsessed with
a single idea is a necessary component of allegory if the
author is to represent an abstract principle through his
character, which is one of the main intentions of allegory.
The author of an allegory is usually concerned with making
one moral or philosophical point, and his main character will
share that same concern: Dante's concern with "the state of souls after death," Spenser's intention of fashioning a "gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline," Melville's "overwhelming idea of the whale," Nietzsche's "overman," and Kafka's "urgent wish . . . to get my business with the authorities properly settled" are all excellent examples of this daemonic obsession with a single idea. One quality of the ideals that obsess allegorical agents is that they all have an "impossible desire to become one with an image of unchanging purity." Whether it is Dante's Paradiso, Spenser's Court of Gloriana, Nietzsche's Day of the Overman, or Kafka's Distant Castle, the agents are all striving for an ideal that is outside of their grasp in this life.

Fletcher contends that when a person is obsessed by an abstract ideal it will be expressed in ritualistic behavior, characterized by a life ruled by "rigid habits." These rituals and habits vary according to the constraints of the ideal, but they all have the same effect: "it would seem that he [the character] was driven by some hidden, private force . . . it would appear that he did not control his own destiny . . ." Because the agent is ruled by an ideal, his actions will be determined by his attitude towards the rules of the ritual, so his behavior will seem somewhat mechanical: Dante's actions are prescribed by the hierarchy of his journey; Spenser's knights are controlled by Providence; Kafka's "K." is bound by the regulations of the Castle;
and the repetitive, ritualistic plague treatments and checks in Camus' *The Plague* are all situations and circumstances when the agent is compelled to express his reaction towards the ideal through ritualistic and mechanistic actions.

Because the allegorical agent compartmentalizes function, is obsessed with one idea, and is controlled by rigid habits, he will appear to be a "flat" or "two-dimensional" figure, more of a caricature than a "real," fully developed character. Furthermore, Fletcher asserts that "agency becomes confused with imagery, and action becomes a diagram"; therefore, the imagery that an author surrounds his agents with will be indicative of both the nature of the character and the nature of the ideal in an allegorical work.

Fletcher bases his description of allegorical imagery on the Greek conception of Kosmos; he argues that "Kosmos has a double meaning, since it denotes both a large-scale order (macrocosmos), and the small-scale sign of that order (microcosmos)." This double function of the cosmic image is perfectly suited for allegory since the essence of the mode is the parallel development of the ideal (macrocosmic level) and the narrative (microcosmic level).

For an image to be considered an example of Kosmos, according to Fletcher, it must exhibit the following characteristics:

First, it must imply a systematic part-whole relationship; second, it should be capable of including "personifications"; fourth, it should suggest the daemonic nature of the image; fifth,
it should allow an emphasis on the visual modality, specifically on visual or symbolic "isolation," not to say surrealism; finally, it should be such that large-scale double meanings would emerge if it were combined with other such images.15

Since the third and fourth characteristics have been examined, the first, second, fifth, and sixth are the most important elements to be considered regarding the nature of cosmic, allegorical imagery.

If the cosmic image includes both the microcosm and the macrocosm, then Fletcher's first two characteristics—that it imply a part-whole relationship and that it be capable of metonymy and synecdoche—will naturally appear in allegorical imagery. Since the cosmic image must serve the double function of referring simultaneously to both levels of meaning, there must be a "symbiosis of part and whole... The whole may determine the sense of the parts, and the parts be governed by the intention of the whole":16 This relationship is known as synecdoche. "Behold, the steers / Bring back the plough suspended from the yoke," is the example Quintilian gives of synecdoche.17 Metonymy, which occurs when one word is substituted for another bearing a close relationship, is very common in allegory because of the necessity of equating the symbol with that which it symbolizes. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the naming of allegorical characters: Spenser's "Red Crosse Knight," Nietzsche's "Zarathustra," and even Kafka's "K." are examples of metonymic substitution.

The key term in Fletcher's fifth characteristic of an
allegorical image is "isolation." Visually, allegories will "present bits and pieces of allegorical 'machinery,' scales of justice, magic mirrors, crystal balls... These devices are places on the picture plane without any clear location in depth." Fletcher distinguishes between three types of cosmic, isolated images: the first is the talisman, which is a source of power or magic for the agent (Zarathustra's eagle and serpent); the second is the insignia or banner (Red Crosse Knight's red cross); and the third is astral symbolism ("It is the stars, / The stars above us, govern our conditions").

If the cosmic image is isolated from normal situations and contexts, then it is essentially a non-mimetic mode of expression, leading the reader to treat the work in an abstract, interpretive manner which results in Fletcher's final characteristic of cosmic imagery: the emergence of large-scale double meanings. These large-scale, macrocosmic meanings—conveyed through the cosmic image—are the moral, ethical, and philosophical ideals that constitute the content of allegorical literature, and they also provide the reader with insight concerning the author's intention and purpose in writing allegories.

The Intention of Allegory

Why write an allegory? Keeping in mind that allegory is admittedly non-mimetic and Coleridge's judgment that allegory is inferior to pure symbolism, why would an author
choose this ambivalently received mode to express his art? Fletcher argues that "The price of a lack of mimetic naturalness is what the allegorist . . . must pay in order to force his reader into an analytical frame of mind." If this is correct, then the purpose of the daemonic agent and the isolated cosmic image is to cause an intellectual, interpretive response in the reader, bringing us back to Coleridge's "disjunction of the faculties." Coleridge declared allegory inferior because he disliked this disjunction; to others, it is one of the most appealing aspects of literature: it all boils down to a matter of taste. Fletcher takes both points of view into account in his final appraisal of the purpose and intention of allegory:

In a word, I suspect they are the monuments to our ideals. They do not mimetically show us the human beings who need these ideals, but they examine the philosophic, theological, or moral premises on which we act, and then they confront us with the perfection of certain ideals, the depravity of others.

Since the author seeks to "force his reader into an analytical frame of mind," then his primary intention would be, as Fletcher said, to "examine the philosophic, theological, or moral premises on which we act," leaving the narrative or plot level as secondary in intention. Even though the best allegories can be appreciated solely for the ornamental beauty of their narrative level, the primary intention of the author is to present a system of ideals, which reveals
itself in the use of the daemonic agent and the isolated cosmic image.

The allegorical agent and image act as catalysts, forcing the reader into "an analytical frame of mind." The allegorist will then "confront us with the perfection of certain ideals, the depravity of others." Fletcher's statement clearly places allegory in the category of epideictic rhetoric, which is rhetoric in either praise or blame of something; therefore, we can expand the scope of the intention of allegory to include both the didactic and persuasive functions. If the primary intention of allegory is to present a system of ideals and values, then the author would naturally use a didactic tone. Allegories are persuasive because they "raise questions of value directly, by asserting certain propositions as good and others as bad," and the author intends for us to accept his system. These systems are traditionally dualistic in essence, so the author uses the tensions between good and evil, heaven and hell, health and sickness (among others) as persuasive tools to convince us to embrace his particular hierarchy of ideals and values.

Edwin Honig--in his excellent book on the genesis of allegory, Dark Conceit--captures the essence of the intention of allegory when he states that the allegorist "attempts to frame an ideal that defines an age's highest aspirations." The focus of this thesis is on the primary intention of allegory, which is to express, through literary expertise, the inherent value system of a given age. By studying the value
systems of a culture, we begin to discover the diverse and manifold ways man seeks to explain the labyrinth to himself. The next chapter compares two different and opposing value systems--the traditional "Christian" system and the modern "Existential" system--by exploring the expressed ideals in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* and Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* which give meaning to the aspirations of the people and society they represent. Zarathustra's words set the stage: "Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow." Through allegory, we can make a "pleasing analysis" of what man esteems. Through allegory, we can feel the value-pulse of culture.
CHAPTER II
ALLEGORY AND VALUE IN
SPENSER AND NIETZSCHE

-- Once one said God when one looked upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say: overman. God is a conjecture, but I desire that your conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will. --

Nietzsche's Zarathustra
Allegory in "The Faerie Queene"

Edmund Spenser laid to rest any serious debate concerning the allegorical nature of *The Faerie Queene* by explicitly stating in his prefatory letter to Raleigh that the poem is "a continued Allegory, or darke conceit." Still, it is important to analyze *The Faerie Queene* according to the definition of Chapter One to establish a solid foundation for comparing and contrasting the other allegories in this thesis.

Spenser also leaves no doubt that his primary intention is to "examine the philosophic, theological, or moral premises on which we act." In the same letter to Raleigh, Spenser states:

> The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fasion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle disipline: . . . perfected in the twelve private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised, the which is the purpose of these first twelve bookees.25

This letter also indicates that Spenser's main characters are daemonic because they represent and are obsessed with one idea. Spenser makes it clear that he means the Queene to represent both glory and Elizabeth, that Arthur represents magnificence (which is all twelve virtues combined), that Redcrosse represents holiness, Guyon temperance, and Britomartis chastity. He also sets up daemonic foil characters which represent the evil opposition of his heroes: Redcrosse battles with Archimago and Duessa, Guyon with Mammon and
Acrasia, and Britomartis with Argante and Ollyphant.

As pointed out in the previous chapter, when characters are daemonic, they tend to be flat or two-dimensional, causing them to appear as nearly static images—cosmic images. Spenser's characters and images fit Fletcher's six-fold definition of cosmic imagery; the first four points are fulfilled by the ability of the agents and images to function on the two levels necessary for allegory.

Fletcher's fifth characteristic of the cosmic image is that it is "isolated." Spenser uses the device of the talisman with most of his major agents: Redcrosse has his armour and Guyon has his Palmer. The best example of the insignia or banner as a cosmic image is the red cross of the Redcrosse Knight; the magical power of his cross saves him more than once in The Faerie Queene. Spenser also relies heavily on astral symbolism, the third characteristic of an isolated image, throughout his poem so that his characters can "read aright / The course of heavenly cause."²⁶

The sixth characteristic of a cosmic image, that it "should be such that large-scale double meanings would emerge," leads back to the central distinction of all allegories: they function on both the ideal and narrative level simultaneously, and Spenser's poem easily fits this and all the other characteristics of allegorical literature.

With the issue of the allegorical nature of The Faerie Queene settled, we can now explore the expressed ideals of the Christian value system in Spenser's poem.
Spenser and the Christian Value System

As Edmund Spenser wrote The Faerie Queene, the sixteenth century came to its close and the Christian value system reached its apex. Spenser fused the essentially Christian values of the renaissance and the reformation together in his allegorical masterpiece by combining the renaissance image of the courtly gentleman with the reformation doctrines of John Calvin. In doing this, he defined his "age's highest aspirations." Spenser's value system in The Faerie Queene revolves around three main axioms of Judeo/Christian thought:

1) There exists a God--omnipotent, providential, teleological--who assigns an external, extrinsic value to all things; an entity has value by virtue of its relation to this deity and its chosen, predestined course.

2) If value is determined by God, then actions which adhere to God's design are GOOD; actions which oppose this design are EVIL: dualism is the essential nature of reality in the Christian world view.

3) Man's course is then set for him: to choose either good or evil, to say either yes or no. Man's purpose, his meaning, is to live in the present in a way which will insure his fate in the future, which is the "other world," which is of more value than the "present, apparent world."
There exists a God: this presupposition is the foundation of all Judeo/Christian thought. All subsequent premises of this system flow directly from it:

Well did Antiquitie a God thee deeme,
   That over mortall minds hast so great might,
   To order them as best to thee doth seeme,
   And all their actions to direct aright;
   The fatall purpose of divine foresight,
   Thou doest effect in destined descents,
   Through deepe impression of thy secret might,
   Which the late world admires for wonderous monument.27

Spenser asserts that God possesses great and secret might (omnipotence) through which he inspires and directs man to high intents, consisting of doing God's will and God's will alone. With this omnipotence, God designs his predetermined plan for his creation, which is "The fatall purpose of divine foresight." Since Spenser wrote within the Calvinistic framework of predestination and determinism, it is natural that he would portray God as the director and instigator of all men's actions.

Since God is doing the planning, he necessarily assigns value to all entities within his system "as best to thee doth seeme." If value is assigned from a source outside and external to the entity--from outside the labyrinth--then it is an extrinsic value system rather than an intrinsic system, which is one of the main qualities of the existential value system. In an intrinsic system an entity has value in and of itself instead of receiving its value from outside of itself.

If value is assigned extrinsically, then entities within
the system, in the case of The Faerie Queene, derive their value by virtue of their relation to the value judgments of the assigner, God. The renaissance Christianity of Spenser illustrates how his culture perceived God's value judgments in relation to themselves and the world around them. When Arthur says "Full hard it is . . . to read aright / The course of heavenly cause, or understand / The secret meaning of th' eternal might / That rules mens ways, and rules the thoughts of living wight," Spenser gives his quintessential evaluation of man's situation in his culture: to read from the heavens the value judgments of God that rule men's ways and, then, adhere to them. His sole task is to accept or reject the value judgments of God, not to choose his own values but to say yes or no to the values chosen for him.

This tension between the yes and the no produces the dualism of good and evil which is at the heart of Christianity. With this neatly divided dualism, man's course is clearly defined for him, so Spenser can send his Redcrosse Knight forth:

Upon a great adventure he was bond,  
That greatest Gloriana to him gave,  
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faerie lond,  
To win him worship, and her grave to have,  
Which of all earthly things he most did crave;  
And ever as he rode his heart did earne  
To prove his puissance in battell brave  
Upon his foe and his new force to learn;  
Upon his foe, a Dragon horrible and stearne.  

The dualism is now set: Gloriana represents the good, godly way, and the Dragon represents the evil, satanic way. Based
on this dualism of good and evil, an intricate hierarchy of ethical values arises from the interplay of the opposing forces: God and Satan, heaven and hell, heaven and earth, law and lawlessness, spirit and flesh, soul and body, reason and instinct, reason and passion, sobriety and excess.

The dualistic tension between heaven and hell acts as a prod for the Christian value system because the hope of reward in heaven and the fear of punishment in hell motivate the actions of the adherents of Spenser's Christianity. The fifth Bead-man in Spenser's House of Holinessse attends to those on the verge of death, facing either heaven or hell:

For them most needeth comfort in the end,  
When sin, and hell, and death do most dismay  
The feeble soule departing hence away,  
All is but los, that living we bestow,  
If not well ended at our dying day.  
O man have mind of that last bitter throw, . . .

The implication of this statement is clear: man is to live in the present so that on his dying day he will receive eternal reward rather than eternal punishment. If the present is sacrificed for the future, then the future must be of more value than the present. Spenser's "saint," then, concentrates his energy and value on getting out of this life for the same reason Icarus concentrates his energy and value on getting out of the labyrinth: they both value something beyond their particular labyrinth more than the labyrinth itself. Again, the value of an action in this system has extrinsic value because its value is determined not by the action in itself but by a future, external evaluation by God at the moment of
death. Since this decision of God's is eternally binding, it would be wise for man to sacrifice immediate, temporal concerns for future, eternal concerns. The Christian hierarchy of value stems from this tension between the here and the hereafter; therefore, the goal in Spenser's value system is to become what you will be, which, as we will soon see, is the opposite of Nietzsche's goal to "become what you are!"  

If heaven is the ultimate goal in Spenser's Christianity, then what type of ethics and values will his characters strive for and exhibit in their earthly life so they can achieve this goal? The most important virtue would certainly be obedience to the laws of God, and the Redcrosse Knight realizes the importance of this when, in the House of Holiness, Fidelia "taught celestiall discipline, / And opened his dull eyes, that light mote in them shine." If a man sticks to the "Narrow path" and avoids "the wandering wood, this Errours den," he will enter heaven in glory.

Again, the spiritual realm is of more value than the physical realm in Spenser's system, so another Christian value would be to emphasize man's spirit over his fleshly body. Not only does Christianity give priority to the spirit, but it places the blame for most deviations from the "narrow path" directly on the sinful nature of the body. When Redcrosse goes to the House of Holinesse to be healed, "sad Repentance" bathes "His bodie in salt water smarting sore, / The filthy blots of sinne to wash away." To enter heaven, Man must bridle the sinful desires of his body, controlling
his immediate, earthly passions by the grace of God and the use of his reason.

The powers or reason were of great importance to the renaissance culture in which Spenser lived, and he asserts throughout The Faerie Queene that reason is the means to override the desires of the sinful body: "Flesh may empaque, ... but reason can repaire." Man's reason, according to Spenser, will lead him away from excess and towards moderation in all things earthly, an idea directly related to Aristotle's golden mean. Spenser uses the whole of Book II of his work and the allegorical agent of Sir Guyon to illustrate this value, which he calls temperance. Guyon's companion is the Palmer, who represents the controlling power of reason:

Then Guyon forward gan his voyage make,  
With his blacke Palmer, that him guided still.  
Still he him guided over dale and hill,  
And with his steedie staff did point his way:  
His race with reason, and with words his will,  
From foule intemperance he oft did stay,  
And suffred not in wrath his hastie steps to stray.

So the basic character of an adherent of Spenser's Christian value system would be sober, grave, obedient, heavenly minded and temperant; he would always disregard the instincts and passion of his fleshly body to gain his spiritual goal of eternal reward in the after life. This Christian value system of Spenser's The Faerie Queene was the dominant theological and sociological system
throughout the renaissance and reformation, and it is still one of the most influential ethical value systems today. But an antithetical value system began to arise, fostered by the new discoveries of science. Friedrich Nietzsche was one of the first men to recognize this shift in values, and his philosophical allegory *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is his most complete and influential formulation of the new "Existential" value system.

**Allegory in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra***

*Is Thus Spoke Zarathustra an allegory?* Since Friedrich Nietzsche is known primarily as a philosopher and since *Zarathustra* is clearly a narrative work, it easily falls within Frye's statement that "We have allegory when the events of a narrative obviously and continuously refer to another simultaneous structure of events or ideas, . . ." Nietzsche's primary intention was a revaluation of all values in light of the death of God, and he used the narrative line in *Zarathustra* to convey this central concern.

The principal character in Nietzsche's allegory is, of course, Zarathustra, and he is an excellent example of a daemonic agent because he represents and is obsessed with a single idea: "I have the overman at heart, that is my first and only concern . . ." Nietzsche's choice of Zarathustra as his central symbol was intentionally ironic: the original Zarathustra, or Zoraster, was a Persian prophet in the sixth
century B.C. who was one of the first truly dualistic thinkers, influencing both Greek and Christian thought. The irony of Nietzsche's choice lies in the fact that his Zarathustra sought to overthrow this dualistic thinking and replace it with a monism revolving around the "will to power" and its expression by the overman. Nietzsche also ironically sets up his Zarathustra as a type of Christ with his many biblical allusions, especially in "The Last Supper" section in part four. The characters that surround Zarathustra at this supper represent single aspects of Nietzsche's vision of the nature of the overman, making them daemonic also: the leech is the "conscientious in spirit," the ugliest man is the murderer of God, etc.

Nietzsche's agents and images also fit the description of cosmic imagery because they function on both the narrative and ideal level that is essential for allegory. The main characteristic of the cosmic image--its "isolated nature"--is seen throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with Nietzsche providing his protagonist with two central talismans:

An eagle soared through the sky in wide circles, and on him there hung a serpent, not like prey but like a friend: for she kept herself wound around his neck.

"These are my animals," said Zarathustra and was happy in his heart. "The proudest animal under the sun and the wisest animal under the sun-- . . ."38

The eagle is a positive talisman, signifying Zarathustra's
desire to soar above the values of his culture, but by choosing the serpent as an insignia and talisman for his hero, Nietzsche shows his opposition to the Judeo/Christian system where the serpent is associated with Satan and evil. Nietzsche also reverses the use of astral symbolism: Spenser wanted man to look to the stars and heavens for his "heavenly cause" and value, but Zarathustra loves "those who do not first seek behind the stars for a reason to go under and be a sacrifice, . . ." Instead, he uses the sun, which gives the earth its life and energy, as his central astral symbol: "You great star, what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine?"

Yes, Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra clearly fits the definition of allegory in Chapter One, but what type of values does Nietzsche advocate through Zarathustra, and why are they opposed to Spenser's Christian value system?

**Nietzsche and the Existential Value System**

As Nietzsche wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the ideas of Darwin were just taking hold, and the Christian value system was at low tide. Nietzsche, writing some twenty years after the publication of The Origin of the Species, was one of the first men, if not the first, to sense the full impact of Darwin's theory on the theological, psychological, and sociological values of his culture. Since Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a herald of the decay of an "age's highest aspirations,"
Nietzsche's intent is to diagnose that decay and provide a remedy: he must redefine and revaluate his "age's highest aspirations."

In 1883 Nietzsche wrote what serves as a preface to Zarathustra; entitled "The Madman," this parable contains the central axiom of Nietzsche's value system:

... "Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him -you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? ... Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead."

God is dead: with this proclamation, Nietzsche eliminates the foundational premise of all Judeo/Christian thought, chopping off the vital root of a value system such as Spenser's. Just as Spenser takes God's existence as axiomatic, so Nietzsche takes God's death as axiomatic. Neither writer attempts to prove his position because neither writer is concerned with metaphysics: they are both concerned with how to live their lives in light of these axioms.

Another important axiom in Nietzsche's system is the idea that man originally created God to give his values an eternal, absolute reference point. Zarathustra tells of his own belief in God, but he soon realized that "this god whom I created was man-made and madness, like all gods! Man he
was, ... out of my own ashes and fire this ghost came to me and, verily, it did not come to me from beyond.”¹¹ Once created, man used this focal point to define the particulars of his world, rendering value for them according to the dictates of his God. But as man came to understand the particulars, he began to reason back to the general premises, and science was born. Soon, just as Zeus destroyed Cronos, science began to destroy its progenator and reference point: God. The first major step in this parricide was, in the words of the Madman, to unchain this earth from its sun, a step taken by Copernicus and Galileo. The second major step was taken by Darwin with his theory of evolution: by placing the burden of creation directly on the organism (the earth) itself, the idea of a creator was no longer necessary.

Since man created both the reference point (God) and the destroyer of it (science), man is then the cause of the destruction of his own value system, or as the Madman would put it:  "We have killed him--you and I." If God is now dead, man must face his world--his labyrinth--without the help of the providential, guiding hand of God. Without this teleological reference point, man can no longer hope for his values to be given approval from a source outside of himself. Without God, there is not an external assigner of value, so value must come from man himself. Now man's judgment becomes the assigner of value, and we are led back to Zarathustra's statement that "through esteeming alone is there value."
Now that man and his judgment are the center of his value system instead of an omnipotent God, and since man is now responsible for determining his own value, his psychological attitude and opinion of himself is crucial in this search for new values. Zarathustra clearly states his opinion of man, which is the essential starting point for his value system:

Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under.43

"I love man" proclaims Zarathustra, and the basis for this love is the potential of man to move beyond himself towards a higher state of being—the overman. Now, instead of man's meaning being determined by God and the hope of reward and the threat of punishment in the after-life, his meaning resides in himself and his desire to overcome himself: "I will teach men the meaning of their existence—the overman."44

Nietzsche's conception of the overman is probably one of the most misunderstood philosophical ideas in western thought, due mostly to two reasons. First, many English speaking scholars and writers translate the German word that Nietzsche uses, "Ubermensche," as "superman," complete with all the connotations of a power-mad super-being willing to trample on his fellow man in quest of domination. Much of this connotative meaning stems from the second reason this term is mis-
understood. Nietzsche's idea of the overman was unfortunately and erroneously associated with Hitler and the Nazi movement because his sister, who obtained the rights to his work after he went insane, used excerpts of his writing out of context to support a proto-Nazi group led by her husband. The fact that Nietzsche detested any type of nationalism in general and his sister's ideas in particular has been thoroughly and painstakingly treated by Walter Kaufmann in his definitive, critical biography of Nietzsche's life and work.45

What then does Nietzsche mean by overman? The most complete picture of the nature of the overman is in Zarathustra's speech "On Those Who Are Sublime":

He should act like a bull, and his happiness should smell of the earth, and not contempt for the earth . . . Though I love the bull's neck on him, I also want to see the eyes of the angel . . . To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will: that is most difficult for all of you who are sublime. When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible--such descent I call beauty. And there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful: let your kindness be your final self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you.46

Nietzsche's overman is a combination of a bull and an angel, power and kindness, power and beauty. In him, all the dualistic opposites of a system such as Spenser's are united. Nietzsche's overman seeks to overcome himself by fusing together good and evil (thesis and antithesis), creating a higher nature for himself and a higher truth (synthesis): "Everything that the good call evil must come together so
that one truth may be born." Before discussing what the nature of this monism is, it is essential to explore what impowers the overman to achieve this goal.

In a Christian value system like Spenser's, man received the impetus to achieve his meaning and goal from outside the labyrinth—the will of God—but now that man is the source of his own values, he must look within himself for this impetus, finding it in the "ego . . . this creating, willing, valuing ego, which is the measure and value of things." Zarathustra teaches that man's ego and its catalyst, the will, are the source of man's value and his meaning. Man's will determines what is valuable because it has the power to esteem certain events and entities as better than others, and "to esteem is to create."

Since man created God via his will for an eternal reference point for his values and now that he has killed this God via his own will, he must revaluate his entire value system based on his creative ego. He must learn to affirm with his whole being a new pride in his creative ability:

A new pride my ego taught me, and this I teach men: no longer to bury one's head in the sand of heavenly things, but to bear it freely, an earthly head, which creates a meaning for the earth.

With this new sense of pride in his creative ego, man has the impetus to create and achieve his goal—a new meaning for the earth.

In this creating, willing ego Nietzsche found the essen-
tial force of the universe which became the ultimate ground of his monism: the will to power. He discovered this by observing the value judgments of man and concluded that man, through these judgments, created good and evil by his creative will:

Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than good and evil. . . . A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power.51

Many critics treat Nietzsche's idea of the will to power in the same way as the overman: they interpret this drive for power as a desire to dominate others. But the key to a correct understanding of this concept is again in the term "overcome." The will to power is the means for man to overcome himself not his fellow man: "Will--that is the name of the liberator and joy bringer."52 Nietzsche contends that man, through his will to power, created good and evil, heaven and hell, and all the other opposing forces of a dualistic world view like Spenser's. Since the interplay between these opposites was the source of meaning for man and the earth, it is the task of the overman to create a new meaning for the earth now that the old dualism has been resolved into a monism of the will to power.

Without the dualistic tension between heaven and hell, God and the devil, man must find his value and goal in something other than the after-life. Zarathustra might just as well have been speaking to Spenser when he said, "By my
honor, friend, . . . all that of which you speak does not exist: there is no devil and hell. Your soul will be dead before your body: fear nothing further."53 This passage signals one of the most important differences between Spenser's value system and Nietzsche's: instead of man seeking his value and meaning in heaven and the after-life, he must now turn to the earth and his present, temporal life for his value and meaning; he must seek his value in the labyrinth itself:

... remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! . . . Once the sin against God was the greatest sin, but God died, . . . To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth.54

Spenser's value system is based on what man will be and what reality will be in the future; Nietzsche's value system is based on what man is and what reality is now, in the present: Nietzsche's is an "existentialist" value system because it revolves around what man is and how he exists in the present. Zarathustra's supreme ethical demand reflects the difference clearly: "Become what you are!"

If this statement represents the ultimate goal in Nietzsche's system, then what type of values and ethics will his overman strive for and exhibit in order to achieve this goal? Spenser's ethics are based on obedience to the dictates of God, but Nietzsche's ethics are based around the
will to power and its ability to create new values by fusing together the dualistic opposites: "And whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative." The overman must experience both extremes of good and evil, so Spenser's value of temperance and the golden mean would have no place at all in Zarathustra's system. In The Faerie Queene excess is associated with evil (especially in "The Bowre of Bliss") while sobriety and gravity are associated with good, but in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the opposite is true:

I would believe only in a god who could dance. And when I saw my devil I found him serious, thorough, profound, and solemn: it was the spirit of gravity--through him all things fall. Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravity!\[56\]

Nietzsche uses the symbol of the dionysian dance throughout Zarathustra to characterize the overman as one caught in the rapture of excessive joy and laughter --which is one of the main qualities of the overman's nature.

Since excess is a supreme value in Zarathustra's ethics and values, then passion must be valued more than reason and the body valued more than the spirit or soul:

But the awakened and knowing say: body I am entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body. . . . An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my brother, which you call "spirit"--a little instrument and toy of your great reason.\[57\]
Since there is not a heaven or a hell and only this earth, Zarathustra's values center on the physical, sensual reality rather than the spiritual, ideal reality of a value system such as Spenser's.

To "remain faithful to the earth" is the goal of the overman. Instead of turning to heaven for value, he will turn to the earth and embrace and affirm it in all its contrasting and contradicting glory, uniting these opposites by his creative will to power: "And this is all my creating and striving, that I create and carry together into One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident." The overman will ultimately fuse the apparent dualistic opposites into the "One" monistic whole which is the essential nature of reality according to the value system of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Nietzsche's Overman:
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis

In Zarathustra's initial speech--"On the Three Metamorphoses"--Nietzsche provides the reader with the three stages he invisions man passing through on his way to becoming overman: "Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion, finally, a child." The next two chapters of this thesis seek to illustrate how Franz Kafka's The Castle, Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos Kazantzakis Zorba The
Greek, each represent allegorically a character or characters passing through one of the three stages along the path towards the overman: The Castle represents the "camel" stage; The Plague represents the "lion" stage; and Zorba The Greek represents the final stage in becoming an overman—-the "child."

Chapter Three analyzes the three novels in light of the criteria for allegory given in Chapter One, while the fourth, and final, chapter explores the connection between the three allegories and Nietzsche's three stages of the overman.
CHAPTER III
ALLEGORY IN
KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

-- The search for pure power, which is at the heart of all allegorical quests, goes on in spite of its fundamental irrationality. --

Angus Fletcher
The majority of Franz Kafka's works easily fit the criterion of double intention, moving between the narrative and ideal levels, set up in Chapter One. Fletcher refers to Kafka in conjunction with allegory over twenty times in his study of the genre, considering Kafka one of the best examples of a modern allegorist. But the strongest evidence of allegorical intention in Kafka's *The Castle* comes from Edwin Muir--one of the first to translate Kafka's work into English and one of the leading Kafka authorities--who provides this synopsis of Kafka's technique in the novel:

As pure imaginative creations K.'s scenes have this packed fullness which gives them simultaneously several meanings, one concealed beneath the other, until in a trivial or commonplace situation we find an image of some universal or mythical event such as the Fall of Man. It is in this way that Kafka's allegory works. He has been blamed for confusing two worlds; for introducing real people, living in real houses, ... and then by a sudden twist making all their actions symbolical and bringing them into actual contact with emblematical figures. The answer is that this was obviously the thing he was trying to do.60

Along with pointing out the double intention in Kafka's *The Castle*, Muir singles out one of the major differences between an allegorist like Spenser and one like Kafka: the former places his agents in a mythical, romantic setting (Faerie Land), while the latter places his agents in a more
real-life situation, creating the "mixture of realism and allegory which is Kafka's peculiar invention. . . ."61

As one of the masterpieces of the twentieth century, Albert Camus' The Plague has been treated by critics in many different ways, but most recognize it as an allegory. Fletcher refers to Camus' novel as an allegory many times, and Philip Thody, one of the leading experts on Camus' work, calls The Plague an "allegory of the hostile nature of the absurd."62 Donald Lazere--in The Unique Creation of Albert Camus--entitles his chapter on The Plague "Naturalistic Allegory," explaining that

In The Plague Camus audaciously synthesized the ultimate extension of both of the opposing techniques into an allegorical naturalism. . . . [It is an incisive . . . portrayal that reveals universal truths about any group of humans in crisis.63

The final clause of this quote shows Camus moving between the ideal level ("universal truths") and the narrative level ("group of humans"), a point Adele King reinforces: "The form and style of the novel exist on two levels: the level at which Rieux writes his 'cronicle' as objectively as possible and the level at which Camus creates a myth about man's fate."64

Like Kafka, Camus' allegory is much more realistic than either Spenser's or Nietzsche's, so we should look for agents to appear in real-life, rather than imaginary, settings and situations. Camus would not have gone to the trouble of
documenting the plague so thoroughly if he did not intend for it to be taken realistically, yet it still functions on the ideal level at the same time.

If we are to treat Zorba The Greek as an allegory, we must keep in mind Fletcher's statement that "no 'pure allegory' will ever be found. There is therefore no harm in drawing instances from borderline cases." Kazantzakis' novel is on the borderline primarily because his character Zorba is based on his real-life friend, George Zorba, so it will be a much more realistic example of allegory than most allegorical works.

But Zorba The Greek is truly a narrative which "obviously and continuously refers to another simultaneous structure of events or ideas," as Frye would say. Morton Levitt—in his pioneering book on Kazantzakis, The Cretan Glance—asserts that Zorba The Greek is Kazantzakis' "most metaphysical work," and that if we want to "find the truth of the novel, we must look not to history but to its philosophical roots." Still, the best evidence of Kazantzakis' intention to fuse together his philosophy and art is in the novel itself: "If only I could never open my mouth, I thought, until the abstract idea had reached its highest point— and had become a story!" These are the words of the narrator, who many critics feel represents aspects of Kazantzakis himself. We also learn through the narrator who Kazantzakis intends to embody his ideal: "my thoughts flitted around the most remote ideas but came back and settled on Zorba."
These two passages from *Zorba The Greek* show that Kazantzakis intended his novel to function on both the narrative and ideal level, which is the main characteristic of allegorical literature.

**The Daemonic Agent in**

*Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis*

In a traditional Christian allegory like *The Faerie Queene*, the daemonic nature of the agents stands out clearly because they are placed in fantastic, unrealistic settings; therefore, the more realistic the allegory, the less obvious the daemonic agents will be. Since it was Kafka's "peculiar invention" to mix realism and allegory, his agents will be subtly and realistically daemonic. Fletcher's first point about daemonic agents is that they "compartmentalize function," which means the procedure and goal of the agent is divided into a hierarchy of separate segments. The intricate, bureaucratic hierarchy K.--the central agent in *The Castle*--contends with is an excellent example of compartmentalizing function.

Kafka's Land-Surveyor, K., fits Fletcher's second characteristic of a daemonic agent because he is clearly obsessed and motivated by a single concern: "It's my most urgent wish, really my only wish, to get my business with the authorities properly settled." This single-mindedness, according to Fletcher, causes the agent to limit his freedom, and action to a single goal:
The daemonic agent has no choice but to go and then stay bound on his quest, whether for learning and self-knowledge, or for holiness, or for simple power, or for some object he himself cannot define, which may be the case with Kafka's favorite hero, K.70

Even though K. is not compelled by an outside force to stay in the village and fight the authorities, when Frieda (K.'s fiancee) begs him to leave the village he replies: "I can't go away, I came here to stay. I'll stay here."71

When a character's life is controlled by "rigid habits," they are, according to Fletcher, daemonic, and Kafka's K. is just such a character. If he is to realize his goal of settling his business with the authorities of the Castle, he must work within the strict rules and regulations of the bureaucracy he faces. Burgel, one of the few Castle officials K. actually speaks with, explains why the process of communicating with the Castle is so "ruthless": "Actually this ruthlessness, when you come to think of it, is nothing but a rigid obedience to and execution of their duty,..."72

Indeed, a great deal of K.'s problem in getting through to the authorities stems from his unwillingness, at first, to adhere to this rigid system of "habits."

In many ways, Camus' *The Plague* is a more realistic work than Kafka's *The Castle*, so the daemonic nature of Camus' agents will be even more subtle than Kafka's agents. The plague itself is the central agent in the novel, and it obviously "compartmentalizes function" because it imposes a rigid hierarchy of procedures on the people of Oran which they
must follow if they are to avoid and defeat it.

Before the plague descends on Oran, Camus portrays the citizens of the town as daemonic—for they are obsessed with a single idea:

Our citizens work hard, but solely with the object of getting rich. Their chief interest is in commerce, and their chief aim in life is, as they call it, "doing business."73

When the plague does descend on Oran, the people become obsessed with another, more important, single concern: "Since plague became in this way some men's duty, it revealed itself as what it really was; that is, the concern of all."74 Each of the main agents in the novel has a central concern that they must learn to adapt to situations they are put in by the plague: Rieux wants only to cure; Tarrou wants only peace of mind; Rambert wants only to see his lover again; and Grand wants only to hear "Hats off!" in praise of his novel.

The people of Oran, both before and during the plague, base their lives around their own "rigid habits." Prior to the plague, Rieux says of his fellow citizens,

[The] truth is that everyone is bored, and devotes himself to cultivating habits, . . . It will be said, no doubt, that these habits are not peculiar to our town; really all our contemporaries are much the same.75

During the plague, these people must change their habits from swimming, making love, and making money to the rigid habits
imposed on them by the plague: they must now center their lives around the ritual regulations and quarantines if they hope to survive the epidemic. Rieux is forced to make habits out of the constant diagnoses, inoculations, and lancing of buboes if he is to help save his fellow citizens; these "habits" make him a realistically daemonic agent.

As with Kafka and Camus, the more naturalistic the allegory, the less apparent the daemonic aspects of the agent will be, but these aspects are still present in a very complex way in Kazantzakis' central agent, Zorba. That Kazantzakis intended Zorba to represent a single idea--the child stage of Nietzsche's overman--will be more than evident when the connection between Nietzsche and Kazantzakis is made clear, so it will suffice now to say that Zorba is obsessed with a single idea, and, therefore, he is a daemonic agent. This daemonic aspect is more obvious in Kazantzakis' narrator-agent, the Boss: "... I have always been consumed with one desire: to touch and see as much as possible of the earth and sea before I die." 76

Again, because of the nature of the ideal, Kazantzakis wanted to portray in Zorba, we will not see his main character being controlled by "rigid habits." Nietzsche's child--like Zorba--is one who is free from and unconstrained by "rigid habits." But we do see this aspect of the daemonic agent in the character who acts as a foil to Zorba, the Boss: he is controlled by his habits of "chewing up" books and pencil-pushing.
When characters fit this three-fold description of the daemonic agent, they appear—according to Fletcher—to be static, two dimensional figures, causing "agency [to be] confused with imagery." The two assistants assigned to K. by the Castle are an excellent example of this fusion of agent and image; after K. throws the assistants out of the school he and Frieda are employed as janitors in, they run to the railings of the school's garden, climbing around like monkeys on bars:

There they ran to and fro holding onto the railings, then remained standing and stretched out their clasped hands beseechingly toward K. They went on like this for a long time, without thinking of the uselessness of their efforts; they were as if obsessed, ... So as not to have to hold on all the time, one of them had hooked himself onto the railings behind by the tail of his coat.77

In *The Plague*, one of Rieux's patients—an old man with asthma—becomes a static image because his only activity in life is to transfer peas from one pan into another. Kazantzakis provides our final instance of the allegorical fusion of agent and image with his description of Zorba's "fiancée," Madame Hortense, who looks like

a noble three masted frigate and all her lovers—she had seen forty-five working years—were boarding her, climbing into the holds, onto the gunwale, into the rigging, while she sailed along, ... 78

This type of static, constant action by allegorical agents makes them appear as "cosmic images," or, as Albert Camus
so aptly described Kafka's agents, as "inspired automata."  

The Cosmic Image in

Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis

In traditional Christian allegory, the cosmic image—especially the talisman or insignia—is a source of power for the agent, but Fletcher contends that "with Kafka kosmos becomes imbued with doubt and anxiety; hierarchy itself causes fear, hatred, tentative approach, tentative retreat." Consequently, the talismans and insignias Kafka surrounds K. with in The Castle should deprive him of power rather than provide him with it. The letters K. receives from Klamm, the authority in charge of his case, illustrate this use of the talisman. The first letter gives K. "proof" of his identity as a Land-Surveyor; he is so empowered by this letter that he nails it on the wall of his room, replacing a religious picture that previously hung there. But this elation and security does not last for long, because the mayor and others point out that it is not an "official" letter, and it could even be a forgery, thus rendering it powerless in K.'s quest for recognition from the Castle.

A traditional Christian allegory like The Faerie Queene will also employ cosmic, astral imagery to show the power the heavens can offer the agent, but, again, Kafka reverses this practice to illustrate the powerlessness of K. in his attempt to penetrate into the Castle. When K. realizes that his messenger Barnabas—K.'s only means of communication with
the Castle--will be unable to help him in his quest, he muses to himself that Barnabas "was of just as little help as the stars up there against the tempest down below."^82

Fletcher asserts that one of the main characteristics of the cosmic images is its "isolation," and Camus' The Plague employs this "isolation" imagery to convey one of the main themes of the novel--portraying the effects of plague-like evil when it cuts off a group of people from the rest of humanity. Rieux describes Oran as "humped snailwise on its plateau and shut off almost everywhere from the sea,"^83 and as "a lost island of the damned,"^84 which are both isolated, cosmic images.

Camus uses talismans and insignias in portraying the plague itself since it is such an abstract, unseen agent in the novel. The first sign of the plague is the rats that infest the town and then die of the plague. Its first victim, M. Michel, intuitively knows of the connection between the rats and his disease, constantly babbling "Them rats! Them damn rats!" as death approaches.^85 Father Paneloux provides the plague with another talisman in his first sermon during the epidemic:

He bade his hearers picture a huge wooden bar whirling above the town, striking at random, swinging up again in a shower of drops of blood, and spreading carnage and suffering on earth,. . .^86

He uses this winnowing blade or bar in his analogy of the Christian explanation of why the town has been struck with
the plague: God is using it to separate the wheat from the chaff, and those that die deserve it because they have sinned against God. Like Kafka's talismans, these cosmic images do not provide the agents with power, instead, they deprive them of both power and life.

Camus reverses astral imagery for the same reason, to show that man cannot rely on the heavens for help or power:

Thus each of us had to be content to live only for the day, alone under the vast indifference of the sky. This sense of being abandoned, which might in time have given characters a finer temper, began, however, by sapping them to the point of futility. . . . they seemed at the mercy of the sky's caprices--in other words, suffered and hoped irrationally. 87

In Zorba The Greek, Kazantzakis provides both of his main characters, the Boss and Zorba, with talismans or insignias. In keeping with the bookish nature of the Boss, Kazantzakis has him carry "a little edition of Dante--my travelling companion" 88 and write a book on the Buddha. Both of these talismans work in the same way as Kafka's and Camus' talismans since they represent the ideas keeping him from becoming like Zorba and the idea he represents. Zorba's talisman, on the other hand, impowers him with the strength to be his ideal, functioning as Spenser's talismans do. Zorba's talisman is the santuri, a dulcimer-like instrument, that he bought at the age of twenty with the money he intended to use for his upcoming wedding:
Since I learned to play the santuri, I've been a different man. When I'm feeling down, or when I'm broke, I play the santuri and it cheers me up. When I'm playing, you can talk to me, I hear nothing and even if I hear, I can't speak... A passion, that's what it is!

Kazantzakis often uses astral imagery as metaphors that show the state of mind of his characters. The longer the Boss is with Zorba, the more he is affected by his outlook on life, and Kazantzakis employs astral imagery to illustrate this change:

I [the Boss], for my part, stayed awake a long time, watching the stars travel across the sky. I saw the whole sky change its position—and the shell of my skull, like an observatory dome, changed position, too, together with the constellations. "Watch the movement of the stars as if you were turning with them..." This sentence of Marcus Aurelius filled my heart with harmony.

Zorba's child-like nature, one of the most important aspects of the Nietzschean overman, is conveyed by Kazantzakis with the help of astral imagery: "Zorba looked at the sky with open mouth in a sort of ecstasy as though he were seeing it for the first time."

All three of these modern works—*The Castle*, *The Plague*, and *Zorba The Greek*—function simultaneously on the narrative and the ideal level, showing the double intention so important to this genre. Kafka and Camus extensively use both the daemonic agent and the cosmic image, while Kazantzakis employs enough aspects of the allegorical agent and image to be considered a borderline case of allegory until the best
evidence for allegory in Zorba The Greek is presented—the connection between Kazantzakis and Nietzsche.
CHAPTER IV

NIETZSCHEAN VALUES IN

KAPKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

-- I love those who do not first seek behind the stars for a reason to go under and be a sacrifice, but who sacrifice themselves for the earth, and the earth may some day become the overman's. --

Nietzsche's Zarathustra
Kafka and the Camel

What is difficult? asks the spirit that would bear much, and kneels down like a camel wanting to be well loaded. What is most difficult, O heroes, asks the spirit that would bear much, that I may take it upon myself and exult in my strength? --

Nietzsche's Zarathustra

What type of value system is Kafka trying to portray in The Castle? Most critics—including Thomas Mann, Angus Fletcher, Albert Camus, and Walter Kaufmann—view Kafka as primarily a religious, theological writer, concerned primarily with the effect of religion on the values and actions of man. Camus calls The Castle a "theology in action," and Muir points out how important religion is to Kafka and his work:

We must give a contingent assent to Kafka's religion, therefore, before we can understand the world of his imagination. . . . At its center and in its most remote manifestations, lies the dogma of the incommensurability of divine and human law which Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard. The idea that Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard comes from the latter's book Fear and Trembling in which he uses the story of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham to illustrate the difference between divine and human law. Kierkegaard was constantly concerned with the apparently unbridgeable gulf between the orders and laws of the deity and the abilities of
man to carry out these orders and laws, which seem to conflict with his own moral values.

If this central religious idea is allegorically applied to *The Castle*, then the Castle represents the divine realm, the village represents the human realm, and the task of Kafka's protagonist is to accept the policies of the divine and incorporate them into his human situation. As the head of the Castle, Count Westwest would then represent God, and the workers and officials of the Castle would then represent the priests of God's church, acting as mediators between the divine and the human.

There has been a good deal of critical debate about the existence of God in the theological framework of *The Castle*. Critics such as Mann and Muir assume that God exists but that man is unable to communicate with him. The late Walter Kaufmann, probably the leading authority on Existentialism, offers a different interpretation of *The Castle*'s allegory:

In the usual exegesis, Kafka's Castle stands for God: the hero is remote from God, while the people of the village are nearer to God, and the problem is one of divine grace. At the beginning of the novel, however, we are told that the Castle is the castle of Count Westwest, and after that the count no longer figures in the story. The German "west" means "decomposes." I suggest that in *The Castle* God is dead, and we are faced with a world devoid of sense. The villagers are not close to God: in the words of Nietzsche's "madman" in *The Gay Science* "this tremendous event... has not yet reached the ears of men." 94

Although Kafka never gives much substantial "proof" for either the existence or death of God, Kaufmann's interpeter-
tion seems the most probable because no one has ever seen the Count. When K. asks the teacher if he knows the Count, he replies, "No, . . . Why should I? . . . Please remember that there are innocent children present." Kaufmann's point about the German word "west" would also seem to indicate that God is dead, but the most important question is what effect does it have on man and his human situation. Man's existential situation is the same whether God exists or not: either way he is unable to communicate with the deity, and he must face his life without it.

I contend that Kafka, like most people, does not know for sure if God exists or not--but what he does know is that he must live in a culture where all values flow from the premise of God's existence. In _The Castle_ K. is not very concerned with whether there is really a Count Westwest or not, but he is obsessively concerned with getting approval from the Castle of his position in the village--in the labyrinth. K. has supposedly been contracted by the Castle to function in the village as a Land-Surveyor; but when he arrives he is unexpected and unwanted: in fact, he is asked on his first evening in the village to "quit the Count's territory at once." Without divine sanction from the Castle, K. is an alien and a stranger in the village, and he must obtain this sanction before he will be accepted in the village.

This obsessive concern with man in his temporal, human situation is the existential element so important to Kafka's work.

If K. is to be accepted in the village and achieve his
goal, he must take on the values and "rigid habits" of the Castle. It is in this sense that K. can be seen as an example of the first stage, or metamorphoses, of Nietzsche's overman—the camel:

Like a camel, he kneels down and lets himself be well loaded. Especially the strong, reverent spirit that would bear much: he loads too many alien grave words and values on himself, and then life seems a desert to him.97

It is highly probable that Kafka—a man so deeply influenced by existentialism via Kierkegaard—was familiar with Nietzsche's idea of the overman and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which was extremely popular in Germany during Kafka's lifetime. Walter Kaufmann is not the only critic to compare Nietzsche and Kafka: Albert Camus and Eric Heller also draw connections between the two writers. Heller, author of The Disinherited Mind, writes that Nietzsche is "in many respects a legitimate spiritual ancestor of Kafka"; he also draws a comparison between Kafka and Nietzsche's overman/superman:

If Nietzsche's Superman is the aesthetic counterbalance to the weight of the curse, then Kafka is its chosen victim. What some of his critics interpret as signs of religious achievement in his later writings, is merely the all-engulfing weariness of a Nietzschean Prometheus, which Kafka expressed in the fourth of his Prometheus legends: "Everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair. The gods grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the wound closed wearily."98

Just as Nietzsche's camel is overcome with weariness when he allows himself to be loaded with the burden of alien values,
so Kafka's K. is overcome with weariness under the burden of the alien values of the Castle and its village.

Nietzsche's camel is one who willingly allows the values and burdens of an alien culture to be loaded upon himself in order to become part of that culture. He starts out as a strong and reverent spirit but is soon crushed by the load of a value system that either will not or cannot deliver what it promises. K. is just such a camel.

K.'s attitude at the beginning of the novel is one of a strong, self-confident man who feels he is due respect because of his prestigious position of Land-Surveyor that the Castle has supposedly given to him. When he is asked to "quit the Count's territory " he reacts with great assurance and indifference:

"Enough of this fooling," said K. in a markedly quiet voice, laying himself down again and pulling up the blanket. "You're going a little too far, my good fellow, and I'll have something to say tomorrow about your conduct. . . . Let me tell you that I am the Land Surveyor whom the Count is expecting." 99

After this initial encounter with the bureaucracy of the Castle, he feels more than up to the small challenge he expects from the authorities, and he is still under the illusion that he can get what he wants in his own way. Like the camel, K. willingly takes on the load of alien values, expecting to carry them easily to his destination--the Castle.

But K.'s self-confidence and strength start to deteriorate after his very first attempt to penetrate the Castle.
On his first full day in the village, K. decides to walk to the Castle, meeting the teacher along the way. After their conversation about the Count, K. feels disconcerted, irritated by the conversation. For the first time since his arrival he felt really tired. . . . He felt irresistibly drawn to seek out new acquaintances, but each new acquaintance only seemed to increase his weariness.¹⁰⁰

Not only is K. beginning to learn that his battle is going to be much harder than he thought, but he soon discovers as he seeks out these "new acquaintances," that all the "respectable" people in town reject him because he is not recognized by the Castle. In fact, the only family in the village who will have anything to do with K. is Barnabas'--his messenger--family, and they are the outcasts of the village. Kafka uses this family primarily to show what happens to someone who refuses to submit to the values of the Castle. Amalalia, one of Barnabas' sisters, refused to sleep with a high ranking Castle official, Sortini, so the entire family was "excommunicated" from the village.

So if K. hopes to get through to the Castle, he must accept and abide by the rules of the Castle, by the rules of tradition. Early in the novel, the landlady tries to explain to K. why his approach will not work:

I don't deny that it's possible once in a while to achieve something in the teeth of every rule and tradition, I've never experienced anything of that kind myself, but I believe there are
precedents for it. That may well be, but it cer-
tainly doesn't happen in the way you're trying to
do it, simply by saying, "no, no," and sticking
to your own opinions and flouting the most well-
meant advice.101

With each futile attempt to get his case dealt with, K.
learns how true the landlady's advice was. At every junc-
ture in his quest, K. is blocked by either the bureaucracy
of the Castle, petty officials, his assistants, or even his
fiancée, Frieda. K.'s weariness and fatigue increase with
every fruitless attempt to gain access and sanction from the
Castle. When he is finally granted an interview with an
official, Erlanger, he is so overcome with fatigue that he
stumbles into the wrong room, meeting the wrong official,
Burgel. For some unexplained reason, because he is caught
by surprise and unprepared by K., Burgel is placed:

... in a situation in which it very soon becomes
impossible to refuse to do a favor, ... [a] de-
defenseless position in which one sits here waiting
for the applicant to utter his plea and knowing
that once it is uttered one must grant it, ... 102

K. is now in the perfect position to realize his ulti-
mate goal, to be recognized and sanctioned by the Castle so
that he will be accepted in the village: all he has to do
is speak up. But K. is so overcome with fatigue that all he
can do is fall asleep, missing his prime opportunity. Later,
K. is painfully

aware that his weariness had today done him more
harm than all the unfavorableness of circumstan-
ces, but why could he, who had believed he could
rely on his body and who would never have
started out on his way without that conviction,
why could he not endure a few bad nights and
one sleepless night, why did he become so un­
manageably tired . . . ?

Like Nietzsche's camel, K. is weary because he loaded alien
values on himself; the weight of the values of the Castle is
far too much for him to bear, and K. becomes a beaten, pas­
sive man following his encounter with Burgel. Although Kaf­
ka left his novel unfinished, Thomas Mann, in his "Homage"
to The Castle, tells of the account that Kafka gave to his
friends of the novel's ending: "K. dies--dies out of sheer
exhaustion after his desperate efforts to get in touch with
the Castle and be confirmed in his appointment."

K.--the camel--is finally crushed by the weight of the
alien values he loaded upon himself. Because of his desire
for and obsession with gaining divine sanction from the
Castle so that he will be accepted in the village as the Land­
Surveyor, he willingly burdens himself with their values,
only to be destroyed by the value system he hoped would "save"
him. This is what Nietzsche expects will happen to one who
loads himself with alien--in this case, Judeo/Christian--
values, but he sees this as a necessary stage or metamorphosis
on the path towards the overman. The second step on this
path is the "lion" stage, which Albert Camus personifies in
his allegory, The Plague.
Camus and the Lion

In the loneliest desert, however, the second metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last master: he wants to fight him and his last god; for ultimate victory he wants to fight with the great dragon. --

Nietzsche's Zarathustra

Camus is clearly not an advocate of a traditional Christian value system like Spenser's; Henri Peyre, in his essay Camus the Pagan, states that

Camus is profoundly opposed to all Christianity stands for: first the notions of incarnation, of grace, of redemption, of repentance, and of collective guilt for some sin committed, unbeknown to us.104

The quote in the previous chapter concerning Camus' use of astral imagery also indicates that Camus did not accept an extrinsic value system such as Christianity: man must face the "indifference of the sky" without the hope that something outside the labyrinth will give his values sanction.

Camus' antagonism towards Christian reasoning like Paneloux offers in his two sermons again shows how he feels about Christianity and the explanations it provides. The only time Rieux loses his composure in The Plague is when he confronts Paneloux and his Christian explanation of the reason for the plague, which is that man deserves his suffering because he
is disobedient to God: "Rieux swung round on him fiercely. 'Ah! That child, anyhow, was innocent, and you know it as well as I do!'" The child is M. Othon's son who has just died from the plague.

If Camus does not rely on Christianity for the basis of his value system then what does he use? Peyre cites Camus as one "who attempted to derive the logical consequences from the Nietzschean death of God." Since many critics—including Germaine Bree, Lev Braum, and Adele King—draw the connection between Camus and Nietzsche, a representative quote from Walter Kaufmann will suffice to confirm this connection:

"... Camus's Notebooks are studded with references and quotations from Nietzsche, including a great many from Twilight of the Idols. He once jotted down as a chapter heading, "We Nietzscheans," and he was certainly very much influenced by Nietzsche."

Along with the numerous references to Nietzsche in his Notebooks, Camus devotes an entire chapter of his philosophical essay, The Rebel, to Nietzsche and his central axiom concerning the death of God:

"With him [Nietzsche] rebellion begins with "God is dead," which is assumed as an established fact; ... Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God. He found him dead in the soul of his contemporaries. He was the first to understand the immense importance of the event and to decide that this rebellion on the part of man could not lead to a renaissance unless it was controlled and directed."

Later in the same essay Camus states, "We must be the advo-
cates of Nietzsche," and Camus had the same desire as Nietzsche to direct this rebellion against the traditional value system by an active resistance towards Christianity and its explanations.

If we interpret the allegory of The Plague in light of this attitude of active rebellion against the traditional Christian value system, then we begin to get an idea of how Camus' "Rebel" should react towards the senseless "evil"--which the plague represents--in his world, his labyrinth. But first, we need to examine the Christian reaction to the plague which Camus' rebel will react against.

Father Paneloux personifies the Christian reaction to and explanation of the plague; he sets the tone for his first sermon during the epidemic in "emphatic tones: 'Calamity has come on you, my brethren, and, my brethren, you deserve it,' . . ." The citizens of Oran deserve the plague because they have sinned against God. Paneloux explains that God sent the plague as both a punishment and as a sign of his "love." The plague shows God's love because it will chastize them in a way that will cause them to return to him:

And thus, my brothers, at last it is revealed to you, the divine compassion which has ordained good and evil in everything; wrath and pity; the plague and your salvation. This same pestilence which is slaying you works for your good and points your path.

Camus' rebel refuses to accept this explanation; instead, he chooses to call evil what it is--evil--and fight the plague
in another way, with another explanation.

It is in this sense that Camus' *The Plague* can be seen as exemplifying Nietzsche's "lion" stage of the overman. Nietzsche says that the lion wants to fight the "great dragon," which does not symbolize the evil, Satanic force like it does in *The Faerie Queene*; as usual, Nietzsche reverses the symbolic meaning of the dragon, aiming it right back at the Christian value system:

Values, thousands of years old, shine on these scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all dragons: "All value of all things shines on me. All value has long been created, and I am all created value."

This dragon that the lion seeks to do battle with is the creator of the old value system and the extrinsic reference point from which all traditional values stem: the Judeo-Christian God. Camus' opposition to this type of value system has already been pointed out, so all that needs be done is see how he works this out in his allegory *The Plague*.

Camus shied away from creating one central hero--one lion--in *The Plague* because he was far too realistic to expect one man to be a total hero or overman. I contend that Camus uses four principal agents in his novel to personify the lion hero: Grand, Rambert, Tarrou, and Rieux. Each of these men embody different attributes of the hero that seeks a solution other than the Christian explanation for dealing with the plague and what it represents, so a brief look at
each of these characters will produce a composite sketch of the second stage of Nietzsche's overman--the lion.

Joseph Grand--the man obsessed with writing the perfect novel who never gets past the first sentence--is signified by Rieux as the "hero" of his narrative because he "had to his credit only a little goodness of heart and a seemingly absurd ideal." Why would Rieux pick a "man of about fifty years of age, tall and drooping, with narrow shoulders, thin limbs, and a yellowish mustache" as his lion hero? Precisely because Grand is one of the few human beings that has his values and desires centered around this life and man instead of an abstract ideal. Through Rieux, Camus makes his admiration for this type of man evident:

Rieux was thinking it was only right that those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love should enter, if only now and then, into their reward.

Camus also shows his respect for men like Grand by making him the first to recover fully from the Plague, leaving Rieux " Completely baffled by this 'resurrection.' " The final scene with Grand in the novel is when he says goodbye to Rieux, and tells him that he made a "fresh start" on the first sentence of his novel: "'I've cut out all the adjectives.' And, with a twinkle in his eye, he took his hat off, bringing it low in a courtly sweep.

Raymond Rambert--the visiting journalist who is trapped in Oran by the plague--is in many ways the opposite of Grand:
he is "short, square shouldered, with a determined-looking face and keen, intelligent eyes,..." He is also able to come straight to the point whenever he has something to say, which is quite different from Grand's inability to find his words.

His only desire is to escape plague-stricken Oran and return to Paris and the woman he deeply loves. At first he is unable to escape Oran, but when he finally succeeds in making arrangements to escape, he realizes he belongs in Oran fighting the plague. When he tells Rieux of his decision to stay and do battle with the plague, Rieux replies that "there was nothing shameful in preferring happiness." Although Rambert agrees he feels that "it might be shameful to be happy by oneself." This attitude is exactly what makes Rambert one of Camus' lion heroes: he, like Grand, has his values in this world, especially in his love for his fiancee, but he knows that this love would never be fulfilling or complete if he left his fellow-man in a state of suffering. Also like Grand, Rambert is allowed to enter into his reward when he is reunited with his fiancee after the plague finishes with the town.

Jean Tarrou is another visitor to the town of Oran, and it is through his actions and his diary that we see a third aspect of Camus' lion hero. Rieux describes him as looking "like a big grey bear," and his only concern "is acquiring peace of mind."

In a lengthy conversation with Rieux, Tarrou reveals
that his father was a lawyer who was instrumental in imposing the death penalty on criminals. This so horrified Tarrou that he ran away from home and dedicated his life to fighting the death penalty. First he joined a social resistance group but soon realized that they too imposed the death penalty. If Tarrou is ever to gain the peace of mind he desires, he must walk "The path of sympathy," and avoid condemning anyone to death.¹²¹

Tarrou knows that his fight against the death penalty and his fight against the plague are one and the same: he must fight evil, be it human or natural, that senselessly puts men to death. Through this fight Tarrou hopes to become a saint, but when Rieux reminds him that he does not believe in God, he replies: "Exactly! Can one be a saint without God!—that's the problem, in fact the only problem, I'm up against today."¹²² Here we have another aspect of Camus' lion hero: to love and fight for man without relying on the rewards of God for motivation—to become a saint without God, without anything beyond the labyrinth.

Bernard Rieux—the doctor and, it turns out, the narrator of the novel—is the fourth example of Camus' lion hero. When Rambert first encounters the doctor, he wants some information on the sanitary conditions among the Arab population of Oran. But Rieux refuses to give any information unless Rambert will publish a complete condemnation of the conditions because he will accept nothing but the full truth. When Rambert replies, "You talk the language of Saint-Just,"
Rieux thinks to himself:

The language he used was that of a man who was sick and tired of the world he lived in—though he had much liking for his fellow men—and had resolved, for his part, to have no truck with injustice and compromises with the truth.

His desire for complete honesty and his commitment to helping his fellow citizens during the epidemic are the elements of his lion-like heroism, and, like Grand, Rambert, and Tarrou, he is willing to fight the plague without any hope of an eternal reward for his service.

Rieux tells us that during the plague many "fledgling moralists" tried to explain why the plague had come and what course of action should be taken; the two most common were the Christian explanation and the fatalist explanation. The narrator of the story sums up how a lion hero will react to the senseless evil in the world—not with words and explanations but with actions:

And Tarrou, Rieux, and their friends might give one answer or another, but its conclusion was always the same, their certitude that a fight must be put up, in this way or that, and there must be no bowing down. The essential thing was to save the greatest possible number of persons from dying and being doomed to unending separation.

To take up this battle against the plague without the hope of reward from God in the next life is what makes these four characters representative of Nietzsche's lion. They take on the dragon of the traditional Christian value system and its explanations of evil and win this battle because they
fight the plague without relying on the extrinsic value system and its explanations of evil and win this battle because they fight the plague without relying on the extrinsic value system that it represents:

Nonetheless, he knew that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could only be the record of what had to be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.125

None of Camus' heroes become saints, but neither is Nietzsche's lion a saint, for that, we need the third stage of his overman--the child, which is personified in Zorba The Greek.

Kazantzakis and the Child

Nietzsche's Zarathustra

In his autobiography, Report to Greco, Kazantzakis tells of how a young girl came up to him in a library in Paris with a picture of Nietzsche, telling Kazantzakis it looked just like him. She was so surprised that Kazantzakis did not know it was Nietzsche that she gave him a copy of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "That was one of the most decisive moments of life," writes Kazantzakis.126 Levitt points out just how decisive this encounter was:
His dissertation, completed in 1909 was on "Friedrich Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Right"; he translated Zarathustra and The Birth of Tragedy into demotic Greek; he followed the path of Nietzsche across Europe as if on a "pilgrimage" and for years kept a deathmask of the philosopher over the doorways to his various homes.127

Andreas Poulakidas contends that Kazantzakis met the real George Zorba while he was in the process of translating Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and it was George Zorba who "unknowingly converted" Nietzsche's philosophy "into flesh and blood, into a living reality,... Kazantzakis realized this, and was able to develop his hero, Alexis Zorba into the real overman that Zarathustra was seeking..."128 This evidence shows that not only was Kazantzakis very familiar with Nietzsche's allegory, but that he also used it as a model for his own overman: Alexis Zorba. This is the philosophical ideal which Kazantzakis wanted to portray in his novel, placing it within the criteria for allegory in Chapter One. Since the "child" stage is the final "metamorphoses" of the overman, we can use the description of Nietzsche's overman in Chapter Two as a comparative device to show how Kazantzakis uses this ideal as his model for Zorba The Greek.

The child is "innocence" and a "new beginning," says Zarathustra, and Alexis Zorba embodies both of these qualities: "Like a child, he [Zorba] sees everything for the first time,"129 with all the freshness and innocence of Adam. This aspect of Zorba's nature never fails to amaze the Boss, who understands that this
is how great visionaries and poets see everything—as if for the first time. Each morning they see a new world before their eyes; they do not really see it, they create it.130

If the overman is to create a new value system, then he must approach the world like Zorba, combining both innocence and Nietzschean pride.

This pride is essential for the overman and Zorba because they must be the reference point for their value systems. Zorba's reaction to the Boss' question, "But don't you believe in anything?" shows that Zorba considers himself as his reference point:

No I don't believe in anything. How many times must I tell you that? I don't believe in anything or anyone; only in Zorba. Not because Zorba is better than others; not at all, not a little bit! He's a brute like the rest! But I believe in Zorba because he's the only being I have in my power, the only one I know.131

Zorba knows his ego is the only reference point he has, and all his values proceed from and are derived from his will.

Remembering that Nietzsche contends that this will created all the opposing, dualistic forces in a value system such as Spenser's, we should see Zorba the overman fusing together opposites like God and Satan, good and evil, heaven and hell. During their Easter feast, Zorba explains his view of God to the Boss:

God enjoys himself, kills, commits injustice, makes love, works, likes impossible things, just the same as I do. He eats what he pleases; takes
the woman he chooses. If you see a lovely woman going by, . . . Suddenly the ground opens and she disappears. Where does she go? Who takes her? If she's a good woman, they say "God has taken her." If she's a harlot, they say: "The devil's carried her off." But, boss, I've said it before, and I say it again. God and the devil are one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{132}

If God and the devil are one in same, there will not be an absolute reference point to determine man's ethics. Then how is one to tell the difference between good and evil? Again, the individual, as his own reference point, will decide what good and evil mean. For Zorba good means full\textsuperscript{133} because this is the only life he can be sure of living: "The only thing that makes any difference is whether I'm alive or dead. Whether the devil or God calls me . . . I shall die turn into a reeking corpse, and stink people out."\textsuperscript{134}

Zorba is, like a child, inconsistent in his view of God—saying at one point "there's no God and no devil," but later saying, "I can't say I do\textunderscore{ }believe in God\textunderscore{ }either. I can't for the life of me."\textsuperscript{135} But Zorba is not a metaphysician, nor does he care to be one; he is concerned only with his immediate, existential situation:

Yet, if there is a God, I shan't be afraid to appear before him when the time comes. I don't know how to put it to make you understand. I don't think any of that's important, do you see? Would God bother to sit over the earthworms and keep count of everything they do? And get angry and storm and fret himself silly because one went astray with the female earthworm next door or swallowed a mouthful of meat on Good Friday? Bah! Get away with you, all you soup-swilling priests! Bah! 136
The final line of this speech of Zorba's reveals his attitude towards the organized religion of the priests which dictates the morals of the people with the threat of eternal punishment. When the Boss and Zorba visit the monastery, Zorba is described as "suffocating" while in the building, and as he finds out just how corrupt the priests are, he calls them "Swine! Liars! Mules!" Zorba soon discovers that the priests shot the young monk, Demetrios, and as he and the Boss ride away on their horses, he cries out, "Give me your curses, Holy Fathers!"

Although Zorba despises the Christianity of the priests, his attitude towards Christ himself is very different. During their Easter feast, Zorba exults, "Come on, let's celebrate the Resurrection, boss! ... Christ is reborn, my friend!" This is similar to Nietzsche's attitude towards Christ; his attack was against the organized Christianity of the German churches, not against Christ himself:

Mankind lies on its knees before the opposite of that which was the origin, the meaning, the right of the evangel; in the concept of "church" it has pronounced holy precisely what the "bringer of the glad tidings" felt to be beneath and behind himself--one would look in vain for a greater example of world-historical irony.

So Nietzsche's overman, like Zorba, fuses and unites together another of the central dualisms of a value system such as Spenser's--the distinction between Christian and non-Christian. Zorba gives us an indication of how he perceives this fusion when he tells the Boss what remains acceptable for
him in the Christian conception of life: "There's something which stays, something that's saved and turns into good humor, dancing, singing, wrangling even--that's what I call Resurrection."141

This last quote gives us a synopsis of the values Zorba and Nietzsche's overman advocate, the first of which is "good humor." In a conversation with Zorba, Zaharia--the "mad," runaway monk--claims that

> God must like fun and laughter. "Come inside my little buffoon, come inside," he'll say to me one day, I know. "Come and make me laugh!" That's the way I'll get into Paradise, as a buffoon!

When Zorba hears this, he jumps up and says, "You've got your head screwed on the right way, old fellow!"142 Zarathustra--who said "we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh"143--would certainly agree with Zorba; furthermore, he asserts

> What has so far been the greatest sin here on earth? Was it not the word of him who said, "Woe unto those who laugh here?" Did he himself find no reasons for laughing? Then he searched very badly. Even a child could find reasons here.144

Zorba is just such a child because he has no problems finding plenty to laugh about on this earth, inside this labyrinth.

Another value shared by the overman and Zorba is their love for the dance, which in many respects symbolizes all the values they represent and advocate. Zarathustra will
"believe only in a god who could dance," and Zorba swears "the gods and devils must talk to each other" by dancing.\textsuperscript{145} Both Nietzsche and Kazantzakis use the image of the dionysian dance to characterize their heroes as being overcome by the rapture of excessive joy and laughter, and this spirit of excess is one of the highest values in both writer's value systems. When Zorba totally exhausts himself in a dance, the Boss asks what made him do it: "What could I do Boss? My joy was choking me. I had to find some outlet."\textsuperscript{146} This philosophy of excess, of "no half-measures,"\textsuperscript{147} is what Zarathustra says will kill the "spirit of gravity," which is his arch-enemy and devil.

Since this value of excess is the opposite of Christian value of temperance--personified by Sir Guyon in Spenser's The Faerie Queene--we can conclude that Nietzsche's overman, his child, and Alexis Zorba, Kazantzakis' child, create a new value system, a "new beginning." This system is not based on an extrinsic reference point--such as God--but on an intrinsic reference point--the creative, willing ego of the overman--located directly in the labyrinth instead of outside it. Because their values are centered around this earth and this life, Nietzsche's overman and Alexis Zorba both value, above all, a life that affirms and embraces this world in all its beauty and ugliness: they both proclaim a sacred "Yes" on existence.
Friedrich Nietzsche's incisive psychological analysis of his "age's highest aspirations" is, in many ways, the most complete diagnosis of the profound shift in the values of Western Culture. Reacting to Darwin's conclusion that man is a natural rather than divine creation, Nietzsche advocated a new value system based on loyalty to the earth to replace the old value system based on loyalty to heaven. The influence of Nietzsche's philosophy of value extends deeply into most fields of modern, humanistic thought: in philosophy, Heidegger and Sartre—in theology, Buber and Tillich—in psychology, Freud and Jung—and, as this thesis sought to prove, in literature, Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis.

These last three authors have each written an example of a modern allegory (The Castle, The Plague, and Zorba The Greek) which I have interpreted as personifying the three developmental stages of Nietzsche's overman. If these three works represent attempts by man to learn to live in his world—his labyrinth—without the consolation and hope of an after-life or an extrinsic sanction for his values, then I offer these generalizations.

Kafka—the "camel"—depicts man caught in a power struggle with the prevailing value system of his culture. K. is required to load himself with the burden of the
Castle's values if he wants to be accepted in the culture—the village. Yet he soon realizes that the values of the Castle are not effective when he is forced to deal with the reality of his present, existential situation. K. is an allegorical example of a modern man who seeks sanction for his actions and values outside the labyrinth: after loading alien values on himself like Nietzsche's camel, K. dies as a result of his futile attempts to gain recognition from the Castle—which represents the divine, heavenly realm.

In *The Plague*, Camus portrays the overman in the "lion" stage, fighting with the evil of the plague and with the Christian explanation for it. His four main characters—Rieux, Tarrou, Rambert, and Grand—all choose to fight the plague without the hope of a reward in the after-life. Unlike Father Paneloux, who seeks an explanation for the evil of the plague in a source outside the labyrinth, these men are willing to face the evil within the labyrinth without an explanation or justification from an extrinsic, external source—like God.

Kazantzakis uses his character, Zorba, to personify the overman in the final stage of development—the "child." In this stage, man has learned how to embrace his world in all of its paradoxical beauty. Like Nietzsche's child, Zorba fuses together the dualistic opposites—God and Devil, Heaven and Hell, Good and Evil—of the Christian value system to create his own values that allow him to accept and love
his labyrinthian world without an extrinsic sanction for his values.

Following in Nietzsche's path, Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis all reject Christian, teleological values in favor of Existential, humanistic values. Like Nietzsche, the emphasis of their value system is on man and his reaction to the realization that there is nothing beyond the labyrinth. These three modern writers portray the abstract ideal of Nietzsche's overman in the narrative lines of their novels, synthesizing the two levels of meaning necessary for allegorical literature, and synthesizing the two primary threads of this thesis: allegory and value.
NOTES


5. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Miscellaneous Criticism, p. 30, quoted in Fletcher, p. 19.

6. "Of most importance to our present subject is the point that the latter (allegory) cannot be other than spoken consciously;--whereas in the former (the symbol) it is very possible that the general truth may be unconsciously in the writer's mind during the construction of the symbol; . . . The advantage of symbolic writing over allegory is, that it presumes no disjunction of the faculties, but simple dominance." Coleridge, p. 29.


10 Fletcher, p. 59.
11 Fletcher, p. 65.
12 Fletcher, pp. 40-41
13 Fletcher, p. 69.
14 Fletcher, p. 110.
15 Fletcher, p. 109.
16 Fletcher, pp. 84-85
17 Fletcher, p. 85
18 Fletcher, p. 87.
19 Fletcher, p. 88.
20 Fletcher, p. 107.
21 Fletcher, p. 360.
22 Fletcher, p. 306.
26 Spenser, p. 99.
27 Spenser, p. 225.
28 Spenser, p. 99.
29 Spenser, p. 7.
30 Spenser, p. 119.
31 Nietzsche, p. 351.
32 Spenser, p. 114.
33 Spenser, p. 9.
34 Spenser, p. 116.
35 Spenser, p. 84.
36 Spenser, p. 157.
37 Nietzsche, p. 399.
38 Nietzsche, p. 137.
39 Nietzsche, p. 127.
40 Nietzsche, p. 121.
41 Nietzsche, p. 95.
42 Nietzsche, p. 143.
43 Nietzsche, pp. 126-127.
44 Nietzsche, p. 132.
46 Nietzsche, p. 230.
47 Nietzsche, p. 312.
48 Nietzsche, p. 144.
49 Nietzsche, p. 171.
50 Nietzsche, p. 144.
51 Nietzsche, p. 170.
52 Nietzsche, p. 251.
53 Nietzsche, p. 132.
54 Nietzsche, p. 125.
55 Nietzsche, p. 228.
56 Nietzsche, p. 153.
57 Nietzsche, p. 146.
58 Nietzsche, p. 251.
59 Nietzsche, p. 137.
61 Muir, p. 42.
64 Adele King, Camus (New York: Capricorn Books, 1971) p. 78.
65 Morton P. Levitt, The Cretan Glance (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1980), XIV.
66 Levitt, p. 91
68 Kazantzakis, p. 250
70 Fletcher, p. 157.
72 Kafka, p. 338.


75 Camus, *The Plague*, p. 4.

76 Kazantzakis, *Zorba The Greek*, p. 139.

77 Kafka, pp. 178-181.


80 Fletcher, p. 143.

81 Kafka, p. 33.

82 Kafka, p. 155.


84 Camus, *The Plague*, p. 158.


90 Kazantzakis, *Zorba The Greek*, p. 230


93 Muir, p. 36.

95 Kafka, pp. 13-14.
96 Kafka, p. 5.
97 Nietzsche, p. 305.
99 Kafka, p. 5.
100 Kafka, p. 14.
102 Kafka, p. 348.
103 Kafka, p. 356.
106 Peyre, pp. 69-70.
109 Camus, The Plague, p. 89.
110 Camus, The Plague, p. 93.
111 Nietzsche, p. 139.
112 Camus, The Plague, p. 130.
113 Camus, The Plague, p. 17.
114 Camus, The Plague, p. 280.
115 Camus, The Plague, p. 246.
117 Camus, The Plague, p. 11.
119 Camus, *The Plague*, p. 117.
127 Levitt, p. 92.
133 Kazantzakis, *Zorba The Greek*, p. 221.
140 Nietzsche, p. 609.
141 Kazantzakis, *Zorba The Greek*, p. 232
143 Nietzsche, p. 322.
144 Nietzsche, p. 405.
147 Kazantzakis, *Zorba The Greek*, p. 35.
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ALLEGORY AND NIETZSCHEAN VALUES
IN KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS

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