Nonstandard Employment and the Risk of Divorce in South Korea

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NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISK OF DIVORCE IN SOUTH KOREA

by

Donghyun Kim

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Sociology

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2018
ABSTRACT

Nonstandard Employment and the Risk of Divorce in South Korea

by

Donghyun Kim, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. So-Jung Lim
Department: Sociology

What type of impact does nonstandard employment have on family dissolution in South Korea? As a result of globalization and policies based on neoliberalism, the number of nonstandard workers has grown rapidly. Generally, job quality and working conditions of nonstandard workers are inferior to those of standard employees. Some scholars state that such worsening employment type is likely to negatively affect marital stability. In this paper, I check whether there is a significant correlation between employment type including standard employment, nonstandard employment, self-employment, and non-employment, and the risk of divorce in South Korea by using the Korean Welfare Panel Study (KWPS). Considering Korea’s cultural characteristics, I estimate models separately by genders. The results indicate that, for men, nonstandard employment is associated with higher likelihood of divorce. However, there are no statistical differences in the risk of divorce among women by employment type.

(53 pages)
PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Nonstandard Employment and the Risk of Divorce in South Korea

Donghyun Kim

Despite a persistent increase in South Korea’s divorce rate, our understanding of the economic determinants of divorce in South Korea is very limited. In particular, the relationship between nonstandard employment and divorce has received little attention, even though the number of nonstandard employees has rapidly increased in recent years. This paper examines the extent to which one’s employment type is associated with marital dissolution in South Korea, using nationally representative longitudinal data (the Korea Welfare Panel Study from 2007 to 2013). Results from discrete-time hazard models show that for men, the odds of divorce of nonstandard workers are estimated to be around 1.82 times the odds of standard employees. However, the risk of divorce for the self-employed is not statistically different from that of standard workers. In contrast, for women, employment type is not associated with divorce. These findings indicate that men’s employment quality and labor market status are still more important for marital stability than women’s in a context characterized by a strong male-breadwinner norm and rigid gender division of labor. This study contributes to the literature on economic determinants of marital dissolution by documenting gender differences in the relationship between various employment types and the risk of divorce in South Korea. Findings of this study will also have important implications for family policies in South Korea.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABSTRACT</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonstandard Employment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precarious Work and Marital Dissolution</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Mechanisms</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Differences</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATA AND METHODS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results from Regression Analyses</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sample Characteristics, by Gender</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Comparison between Discrete-Time Hazard Models regarding Coefficients of Divorce Estimated in South Korea, by Gender</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coefficients of Divorce Estimated from Discrete-Time Hazard Models for Men and Women in South Korea</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Divorce Trend in South Korea: 1993-2016</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Trends of Crude Marriage Rate and Crude Divorce Rate: 1990-2017</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Trend of Nonstandard Employment in South Korea: 2001-2017</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Trend of Self-Employment in South Korea: 1997-2011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Predicted Probability of Getting Divorced by Employment Type for Men</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Predicted Probability of Getting Divorced by Employment Type for Women</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Today divorce is one of the most critical social issues in South Korea. According to Statistics Korea (2017), the number of divorces grew more than 10 times in the past 40 years, from 11,615 in 1970 to 116,858 in 2010. The crude divorce rate, which is measured by the number of divorces per 1,000 persons, rose more than 5 times from 0.4 to 2.3. After reaching the highest point, 3.4, in 2003, the crude divorce rate has slightly decreased since.

The persistently high rate of divorce may have negative implications for individuals and their family members (Kim, Won, Lee, & Chang, 2005). In particular, divorced women with children are found to assume the responsibilities of raising children while experiencing economic hardship, psychological stress, and anxiety regarding the future (Son, 2013). More important, parental divorce could have a negative impact on children since there is still a social stigma attached to being the child of a divorced family (Lee, 2004). In addition, these children are likely exposed to some risks of economic hardship, emotional anxiety, and domestic violence (Yang, Jun, & Kim, 2014). In this context, the Korean government has implemented various support policies, which include economic, legal, and medical support, for parents and children who experienced divorce (Kim et al., 2005).

Increasing labor market inequality and deteriorating employment conditions have been posited as one of the major contributing factors to persistently high divorce rates in South Korea (e.g., Cheong, 2004; Chung, 2008; Jung, 2008). Since the mid-1970s, globalization and economic restructuring have significantly affected the employment relationship in the United States and other industrial countries (Kalleberg, 2009). One
important consequence in this changing labor market is that job quality has been declining and the labor market has been segmented into “good jobs” and “bad jobs” (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2006; Kalleberg, 2009; Schmitt, 2007). South Korea is not an exception to this global trend. In particular, after the 1997 IMF financial crisis, the tide of globalization shook the South Korean society to its very core. Since then, the Korean government and many companies have further adopted employment strategies that promote nonstandard work arrangements on the basis of neoliberalism (Jang, 2011). As a result, nonstandard employment has continued to increase in South Korea in recent decades. Nonstandard employment, also called irregular or precarious work, refers to employment that does not fit the “traditional” definition of standard employment such as full-time and permanent work (House & Osawa, 2003). In contrast to the relative job stability that South Korean workers enjoyed prior to the financial crisis (e.g., permanent employment as the prevalent system in large companies), growth in precarious nonstandard employment not only deteriorated economic stability but also increased inequality and uncertainty among workers (Holzer, Lane, Rosenblum, & Andersson, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009, 2011).

Family scholars have long hypothesized that economic resources gained from employment may be associated with the timing and pattern of family formation and dissolution (Becker, 1981; Cherlin, 2014; Oppenheimer, 1988; Ruggles, 2015; Xie, Raymo, Goyette, & Thornton, 2003). Worsening work conditions, for example, have been posited to be responsible for the decline of marriage, especially, among the working class in the United States. (Cherlin, 2009; Ruggles, 2015; Silva, 2013). To the extent that economic benefits and stability generated from marriage motivates people to stay married
(e.g., Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1988), nonstandard employment, which is often associated with employment instability and “bad job” characteristics, might negatively affect the stability of one’s marital union. For instance, prior studies find that stress from economic hardship and job instability has a negative impact on husbands (e.g., depression), which in turn affects wives and then leads to deteriorating relationship satisfaction and marital dissolution (e.g., Conger, Conger, & Martin, 2010).

In spite of theories and empirical evidence on the importance of employment characteristics on marital stability, very little research has examined how nonstandard work is associated with the risk of divorce in South Korea. Additionally, since most of the studies were conducted by using cross-sectional data, it was difficult to understand the trend of each variable according to the change of time. To do away with this limitation, in the present paper I will use multiple years of data from the national representative longitudinal survey (the Korean Welfare Panel Study) and conduct an event history analysis. With this methodological approach, I will ultimately be able to fill this gap by examining the relationship between one’s employment type (i.e., standard, nonstandard, or self-employment) and divorce with a focus on gender differentials. Findings of this study will broaden our understanding of economic determinants of marital dissolution in South Korea in the context of growing labor market segmentation and inequality. Findings of this study will also have important policy implications by documenting the impact of employment insecurity on family dissolution. In light of negative consequences of divorce, especially for women and children, it is important to understand the economic determinants of divorce so as to design policy measures that may prevent divorce.
Theoretical and Empirical Background

Divorce

In South Korea, the number of divorces has increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 1). The number of divorces in 2003 was a historic record high of 166,617. Compared to 1993 (59,313 cases of divorce), this figure is almost 2.8 times higher. The crude divorce rate, which is measured by the number of divorces per 1,000 persons, was only 0.4 in 1970 but had increased to 3.4 by 2003 (Son & Han, 2014). Along with declining marriage rates, such persistently high divorce rates could indicate that the institution of marriage in South Korea has been changing substantially in recent years (Figure 2). Of particular importance with regard to the rapid increase of the divorce rate in Korea is the 1997 IMF financial crisis (Chung, 2008). Right after 1997, the number of divorces and the crude divorce rate exceeded 100,000 and 2.5, respectively (Kim, 2017).
Many Korean sociologists have focused on socioeconomic factors as the main cause of divorce. The influence of financial risks is remarkable. Chung (2008) argues that the IMF financial crisis had a substantive impact on the divorce rate as shown by the rapid increase in the crude divorce rate after 1997. A study on the younger generation’s attitudes toward divorce shows that a substantial proportion of them find economic hardship to be a legitimate cause for divorce (Kim, 2003). According to Jung (2008), when the male unemployment rate goes up, the divorce rate goes up; and there is a significant positive correlation between housing costs and the divorce rate. Similarly, an analysis of time series data from 1970 to 2000 also shows that a high unemployment rate among men contributed to a rise in the divorce rate (Cheong, 2004). In addition, household income is found to affect one’s attitudes toward divorce in South Korea.

*Figure 1. The Divorce Trend in South Korea: 1993-2016. Statistics Korea (KOSTAT, 2017)*
Children and teenagers in families with middle and low income are more likely to show favorable attitudes towards divorce compared to those in high income families (Han, Kang, & Han, 2003; Kim, 2003).

Figure 2. Trends of Crude Marriage Rate and Crude Divorce Rate: 1990-2017. Statistics Korea (KOSTAT, 2017)

**Nonstandard Employment**

Nonstandard employment also called contingent, non-traditional, irregular, and precarious work refers to the type of employment that is different from standard employment, which is regular, full-time, and permanent (Kalleberg, 2000). Examples of nonstandard work include part-time, contract, temporary work, day labor, and self-employment (Houseman & Osawa, 2003; Kalleberg, 2000). The growing share of nonstandard work has been the subject of concern since the quality of nonstandard jobs is
in general inferior to that of standard jobs (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000). Nonstandard workers, for example, are more likely to be exposed to job instability and to receive lower wages than standard workers (Kim, 2015; Lee, 2002). They are also often subject to insecure work conditions (e.g., fixed-term employment) and receive limited social benefits and statutory protections (Hewison, 2016; Kalleberg, 2000; Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013; Rodgers, 1989). For these reasons, nonstandard work is generally classified as “bad jobs” (Kalleberg et al, 2000).

With social structural changes fueled by globalization and economic restructuring, the proportion of such bad jobs has rapidly increased around the world (George & Chattopadhyay, 2015; Olsen, 2006). According to Breen (1997), until the early 1990s, the welfare state, the nuclear family, and businesses acted as protectors from market risks. That is, any risk borne by individuals were offset in a context of “generalized reciprocity,” which existed within institutions of families, firms, and the welfare state. However, all three areas of protection have become less effective in recent decades. As a result, risks have been shifted directly onto individuals and work has become more precarious (e.g., Kalleberg, 2009; Webster, Lambert, & Beziudenhout, 2011). The emergence and rise of nonstandard jobs across developed countries (including South Korea) is posited as an indicator that work has become more precarious in that workers bear more risks than employers (e.g., costs of fringe benefits) (e.g., Kalleberg, 2011; Webster et al., 2011).

The rise in nonstandard work was observed in most industrial countries in the context of globalization and economic restructuring (e.g., Houseman & Osawa, 2003; Kalleberg, 2011). In South Korea, the number of people working in nonstandard employment has grown rapidly since the financial crisis in December 1997. The Korean
government was forced to follow a “Mexican-style” bailout program, which is thoroughly
based on neo-liberal reforms, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These economic
reforms influenced and controlled the labor market, the financial market, and the public
sector (Lim & Jang, 2006; Robison & Hewison, 2005; Shin & Chang, 2005). The radical
neo-liberal policies caused large-scale unemployment along with a series of company
bankruptcies and sweeping reforms in restructuring. Furthermore, the Korean
government implemented market-oriented policies such as reducing the power of labor
unions and removing regulations of labor laws in order to improve the flexibility of the
labor market (Chung, 2009). Companies began to hire nonstandard workers rather than
regular employees (Shin, 2013). In a concrete way, they sought to deregulate the labor
market through legal stipulations that utilized temporary/contingent workers and removed
barriers to layoff (Lee, 2015).

Before 1997 Korean workers generally acquired lifetime employment, the
ultimate in employment security. However, since then, individuals have had to manage
uncertain economic risks by themselves. As seen in Figure 3, the number of nonstandard
workers in Korea has increased steadily since the economic crisis of 1997, with a
substantial increase observed in the early 2000s. Although the percentage of nonstandard
workers (among all waged employees) declined in recent years, more than about 43
percent of waged workers were still employed in some forms of nonstandard jobs in 2017
(Figure 2).\(^1\) Compared to most other Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, such a high level of nonstandard work is very unusual.

\(^1\) It is worth noting that, in Korea, government statistics usually distinguishes wage/salary workers from
non-waged workers (i.e., self-employees and family workers). Wage workers are further classified between
regular standard workers and nonstandard workers (e.g., part-time, temporary, and dispatch workers).
For example, in 2016 the percentage of temporary workers (i.e., whose job has a pre-determined termination date) out of wage and salary workers was 21.9 in South Korea while the OECD average was 11.2 (OECD, 2016).

![Figure 3. Trend of Nonstandard Employment in South Korea: 2001-2017. Statistics Korea (KOSTAT, 2018)](image)

Coupled with the expansion of nonstandard workers, widening wage inequality between regular and irregular employments has become a noticeable social and political issue in Korea (Shin, 2013). The wage gap between two employment types has widened from 33.9% in 2002 to 44.6% in 2011 (Korea Labor Institute, 2011). Under these circumstances, a growing number of studies began to examine how employment status affects the individual’s life outcomes. When it comes to the association between job status and family formation, Kim (2017) analyzed employment history data from the
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) in order to explore the determinants of marriage formation. He found that standard employment was positively associated with the transition to first marriage, for both men and women. On the other hand, there are some studies showing gender differences. While standard work increases the likelihood of marriage formation for men, it rather lowers the marriage probability for women (Yoon, 2012). In addition, nonstandard employment is likely to affect individual health outcomes. Non-regular laborers are not only exposed to more physical risks but also suffer more frequently from health problems compared to regular employees (Kim, 2014). According to Son (2011; 2015), non-regular workers tended to rate their subjective health condition worse than regular workers, and the average health quality of non-regular workers was lower than that of regular workers. Employment status also has an impact on mental diseases: nonstandard employees report frequent thoughts about suicide (Lee & Ha, 2011), and they suffer from severe depression more than other employment groups (Kim, Yoon, Yang, Lee, & Song, 2016).

In addition to nonstandard employment, self-employment is also treated as one of the bad jobs in South Korea, which is unique in that the proportion of self-employed workers is very high, compared to other developed countries (Keum, 2012). On average, 15.4% of the employed population in the European Union (19 countries) are self-employed; the corresponding figure for South Korea was 25.5% in 2016 (OECD, 2016). As is the case with nonstandard workers, the number of self-employed workers has steadily increased since 1997, followed by a substantial increase in the early 2000s (see Figure 4). After the financial crisis in the late 1990s, many major Korean companies were forced to do “corporate restructuring” (gujo jojeong) and, as a consequence, a substantial
number of early retirees (mostly involuntary) poured out of the labor market (Kim & Ok, 2013). Research shows that more than half of all self-employed workers are aged 50 or over and the proportion of these aged workers (50 or over) is steadily increasing (Kim, 2014). In addition, aged workers and those who newly enter into self-employment tend to be disproportionately concentrated in low-profit industries such as transport, retail, and lodging (Kim, 2014). In this context, the job quality and working conditions of self-employed workers are generally inferior to those of standard workers, including longer work hours and lower income (than wage workers) (Jang, Park, Kim, Lee, & Chae, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2016).

![Trend of Self-Employment in South Korea: 1997-2011](image)

**Figure 4.** Trend of Self-Employment in South Korea: 1997-2011. Statistics Korea (KOSTAT) – Economically active population survey (2012)

The number of self-employed workers has begun to decline since the late 2000s
due in part to declining income of self-employed individuals (e.g., too much competitions from other self-employment businesses and larger companies). In particular, due to the global financial crisis at the end of 2008, many of them were forced to close down their businesses (Ban, 2011). As a result, the polarization of wealth between self-employed workers and wage earners has become more pronounced (Ban, 2012; Keum, 2012). According to the Korea Statistical Bureau, the average monthly household income of standard waged employees was 4,606,000 won (approximately USD 4,000), while that of self-employed workers was 3,492,000 won (approximately USD 3,035) (Kim, 2014).

**Precarious Work and Marital Dissolution**

Many scholarly works have reached nearly universal consensus that economic resources can function as one of the primary determinants for union formation and dissolution (Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1988; Smock, Manning, & Porter, 2005). Considering that most people derive economic resources from employment and that labor market inequality has been widening, the type and quality of employment should have become an important factor for marital stability (e.g., Cherlin, 1979). Employment quality is also important for a stable marriage since marriage is increasingly a “marker of prestige,” and securing a high-quality job (i.e., a full-time standard job with benefits) can be considered a symbol of economic achievement (e.g., Cherlin, 2014; Smock et al., 2005). Securing a “good job” may have become more important for participants in the marriage market as the perceived economic risks and the instability of employment have increased. Indeed, studies document that most workers across income distributions fear about the possibility of income decline and economic uncertainty (Hecker, 2006; Jacobs
& Newman 2008). Therefore, to the extent that nonstandard employment is associated with economic uncertainty and insecurity, the type of employment may be associated with marriage behaviors (e.g., Cherlin, 2014; Ruggles, 2015).

**Potential Mechanisms**

Given that wages account for substantial proportion of household income for most workers (Mishel, Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2005), nonstandard work may lead to marital dissolution through diminished economic resources (e.g., low wages). Evidence shows that nonstandard workers receive low wages as well as limited fringe benefits compared to standard workers in many developed countries (e.g., Kalleberg et al., 2000; Kim, 2014). The importance of wages in determining one’s economic well-being becomes greater over time in a society where wage inequality has widened like the U.S. and South Korea (e.g., Fischer & Hout, 2006). It is not surprising, therefore, that wages (or income) were considered as a fundamental dimension of job quality and a rise in wage inequality has been cited as a driving force for the decline of the middle-class (Fischer & Hout, 2006).

In addition to the direct effect of nonstandard work on divorce through low wages, nonstandard work may also have indirect effects on marital instability. For example, there is evidence that economic hardship and employment instability lead to marital dissolution: husbands’ unstable work conditions (e.g., unemployment) increase their stress and depression, which lowers wives’ marital satisfaction and ultimately result in marital break-up (Conger et al., 2010). In light of inferior work conditions and greater job instability prevalent among nonstandard jobs compared to standard jobs (e.g., Kalleberg, 2011; Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013), it is plausible that nonstandard workers are exposed
to stressors which compromise their mental health (e.g., increased depressive symptoms) and that such mental health issues may have negative impact on marital stability.

**Gender Differences**

It is important to note, however, that the relationship between employment type and the risk of divorce might differ by gender. More specifically, specialization model argues that economic resources may increase women’s risk of divorce because they lower economic gains from marriage for them (e.g., Becker, 1981). According to this model, therefore, women’s high-quality job, i.e., a full-time standard job, would be negatively associated with marital instability by increasing women’s economic independence. By contrast, women’s employment might be good for marital stability since it might be risky to rely on the husband’s employment/income in the context of growing labor market uncertainty (e.g., Oppenheimer, 1988, 1994; Sweeney, 2002). In this scenario, securing a high-quality job would be conducive to marital stability, for both men and women.

Reflecting these theoretical debates, empirical evidence on the association of women’s economic resources with the risk of divorce is inconsistent (e.g., Sweeney, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). For men, various measures of income (or wages) are associated with marital stability; however, evidence is mixed about the role of economic resources for women’s marital stability (see Sayer & Bianchi, 2000 for a detailed literature review). It is important to note that the most widely used economic indicators are income and/or education; relatively little attention has been paid to differentials in employment quality (e.g., Smock, 2004). It would pose a serious limitation since the quality of an individual’s job may become an important consideration for those in the marriage market as the labor
market has been increasingly polarized into “good jobs” and “bad jobs” (Kalleberg, 2011). In addition, job quality might affect marital stability since having a “good job” could symbolize one’s economic achievements required for marriage (e.g., Cherlin, 2004). In fact, research on the United States documents that the perception of an “economic bar” for marriage is prevalent among people of low-income as well as the working- and the middle-class (Smock et al., 2005). If employment quality is important for marital stability, its importance will be more salient in a setting like South Korea, where the labor market is rigidly segmented. In addition, securing a “good job,” i.e., a full-time, standard job will be more important for men’s marital stability than for women’s in the South Korean labor context because men are still expected to be providers and wives’ economic roles are often supplementary to husbands’ (e.g., Brinton, 2001).

Prior research identified several correlates of divorce. For instance, age is found to be related to the risk of divorce: South Korean young adults tend to hold more permissive attitudes toward divorce compared to the middle-aged or elderly people (Han et al., 2003; Kim, 2003). The presence of a child appears to have an impact on marriage stability. Evidence shows that the presence of children negatively affects family relationship satisfaction (Spanier & Lewis, 1980). However, it is possible that the existence of children can play a positive role in improving marital satisfaction in South Korean society. In-depth interviews with working parents showed that the sense of unity between a couple was strengthened after they had children (Lee, 1989). In addition, there is a positive association between education attainment and divorce for both men and women. Those with higher education are less likely than lower-educated individuals to get divorced according to a study conducted in the United States. (Chan & Heaton, 1989;
Martin & Bumpass, 1989). In the case of South Korea, similarly, those with a college degree or higher, for instance, are more accepting divorce compared to those without college education (Kim, 2003). It is worth noting that there are gender differences in terms of the role of educational level in divorce. For men, the higher the educational level, the lower the possibility of divorce. However, for women, when educational levels increase, the possibility of divorce shows a bell-shaped curve (Oh, 1995). These gender differences in the association between education and divorce are consistent with theoretical perspectives for economic determinants of marriage, which vary by gender, as discussed above (e.g., Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1994).

The importance of employment type in marital stability can be more pronounced in a setting like South Korea where the labor market is highly segmented and mobility from nonstandard to standard employment is limited. In such a context, whether one holds (non)standard employment determines one’s labor market status, beyond differentials in economic resources from employment. Therefore, the negative association between nonstandard employment and marital instability, if any, will be more pronounced in a country like South Korea compared to other countries with more a fluid labor market. In spite of a potentially important role that employment type may play in marital stability, in South Korea, no direct evidence has documented the extent to which nonstandard work is associated with the higher risk of divorce. But, prior research shows that unemployment, a strong correlation with economic instability, is found to account for rising divorce rates in recent decades (e.g., Jung, 2008). Another study also found that, for men, the higher the status of occupation, the lower the probability of getting divorced (Oh, 1995). While very limited, all this evidence implies that nonstandard work may also
be detrimental to marital instability in South Korea. In the case of Japan with a similar labor market and gender context to South Korea, the probability of getting divorced among non-regular employees is higher than that of regular workers (Osawa, Kim, & Kingston, 2013). As discussed above, the implications of nonstandard work for the risk of divorce might be different across genders in South Korea. Empirical evidence is not conclusive but there is some evidence that job status is significantly associated with the risk of divorce for men but not for women (Oh, 1995).
Data and Methods

Data

The data for the present analysis is the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KWPS), an annual representative longitudinal study. According to the 2005 Census, there are 237,000 enumeration districts (EDs) that represent about 90% of the 2005 Census tracts excluding islands and special facilities. In the first sampling stage, 517 EDs (24,711 households) were selected from these 237,000 EDs through double sampling for stratification. In the second sampling stage, a total of 7,000 households were extracted from the 517 EDs. The sample consists of 3,500 households with more than median income and 3,500 households with less than median income in order to secure representativeness. As a result of an additional survey through the weight adjustment method, the first wave includes 15,251 individuals from 7,072 households. In wave 8, the retention rate of households that participated at the baseline survey was 72.17%. Due to the declining retention rate over time, the survey has added more than 1,500 new respondents to the survey since 2012 (wave 7).

In this paper, I use data from wave 1 (2006) to wave 8 (2013), i.e., the most recent survey available at the time of conducting this analysis. I restricted the analytical sample to men and women between 20 and 60 years old considering that the legal age for marriage (without parental consents) is 20 and the official retirement age is 60 in South Korea. The final sample size in the analytic sample is 19,557 (person-years) for men and 22,863 for women.
Measures

The dependent variable of interest was whether a respondent got divorced between waves. Using information on marital status updated in every survey, divorce is defined when a respondent in a first marriage at the previous year (t-1) left the marital union at year (t). The measure for divorce includes those who are being separated. Unfortunately, due to the fact that the KWPS data do not contain information on the date of marriage and divorce, I cannot identify marital duration for those who are in first marriage.

An independent variable is the type of employment, which includes standard employment (reference group), nonstandard employment, self-employment (also includes family business), and non-employment. Based on the classification by the Korean Statistics Bureau and prior research (e.g., Kalleberg et al. 2000), I define nonstandard employment as temporary work, part-time jobs, and other short-term contract jobs, in contrast to standard employment, which refers to full-time regular jobs (without expected termination of contract). Self-employment is considered a separate category since the rate of the self-employed is relatively high in Korea compared to other OECD countries (Kim & Ok, 2013). As noted above, many early retirees, who are mostly laid off or displaced from salaried positions, are often forced to create their own businesses due to the difficulty of obtaining standard jobs.

In light of evidence from prior research, in all models, I included several control variables that may affect both employment status and the risk of divorce (Chung, 2008). In particular, I control for age (measured linearly), place of residence (urban vs. rural), educational attainment (a categorical variable that consists of high school degree,
junior/2-year college, and university degree or more), the number of children (0 or 1+), and income (logged annual household income). All controls are time-varying, measured at the previous interview (year t-1) since I lagged the measure of divorce by one year so that an independent variable (employment type) and all controls precede a dependent variable.

As noted above, the measure of divorce was created based on annually updated information on marital status. The underlying assumption is that divorce would occur at the end of the calendar year so that employment type, the independent variable of main interest, would precede the event of divorce. To further avoid the reverse causality, I lagged the measure of divorce by one year. However, it is plausible that a respondent got divorced at the beginning of calendar year (t+1) and changed to a new job at the end of calendar year (t). In this scenario, the duration between the beginning of employment and the event of divorce could be short: the possibly shortest duration would be 1 month if a respondent started a new job in December of year (t) and got divorced in January of year (t+1). Due to the limitation of the data, it is impossible for me to identify exactly when a respondent got divorced or changed jobs in order to establish an accurate time line between divorce and employment. Nevertheless, one needs to keep in mind the potential bias that such cases could cause when interpreting results.

In light of the characteristics of the outcome variables and structure of data (i.e., annual survey), I used logistic regression models to evaluate how one’s employment type is associated with the risk of divorce. Since theoretical expectations about the relationships between employment type and divorce differ by gender, I estimate models separately for men and women. More specifically, the baseline model estimates the
relationships between one’s employment type and divorce while controlling for potential confounders (e.g., age, urban/rural residence, and educational attainment). The next two models introduce posited mechanisms linking nonstandard employment and the risk of divorce, i.e., income (second model) and depressive symptoms (third model) in order to examine what factors may account for the relationships between (non)standard work and marital instability observed in the baseline model.
Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows sample characteristics (means/percentages and standard deviations) for the entire sample and also by gender. For men, 42.08% of total respondents are working in standard jobs, 19.96% are in nonstandard work, and 20.20% are self-employed (including family business workers). For women, around 43% of total respondents are unemployed, 19.54% are standard workers, 23.02% are employed as nonstandard workers, and 14.46% are self-employed workers. The sum of nonstandard employment and self-employment is almost 40% for both men and women while the proportion of nonstandard workers is higher than that of self-employment among women. These results are consistent with prior research that found that a substantial proportion of the South Korean labor force is engaged in nonstandard jobs and self-employment (Keum, 2012; OECD, 2016). The mean age of respondents in the analytic sample is 41.27 for men and 40.74 for women. With regards to educational attainment, Table 1 shows that men are more educated than women. For women, the proportion of those with a high school degree or lower is higher than that of men, whereas the percentage of those with a university degree or more is lower. More than half of total respondents have no children and more than four-fifths live in urban areas.

[Table 1 about here]

According to supplementary analysis that examines sample characteristics by employment type, there are notable differences across various employment types (results not shown). Standard employees tend to have higher educational attainment than nonstandard workers or those who are self-employed. Of the respondents who work in
standard jobs, 38.35% have graduate degrees. Among those in nonstandard employment and those who are self-employed, only 16.46% and 9.69% respectively have a graduate degree or more. Average annual household income is also much higher among standard workers than among nonstandard employees or the self-employed. This may be why more standard employees have children (89%) compared to nonstandard workers (60%) and self-employed workers (44%). Indeed, raising children in Korea is an overwhelming financial burden due to the high expense of childcare and education. Under the conditions of worsening employment security, couples who cannot secure standard employment might delay childbearing. Such substantial differences between standard employees and other groups suggest that differences in the risk of divorce across employment type may result from compositional characteristics such as lower income and educational level. Therefore, I will employ multivariate regression models that control for several characteristics that may be likely to affect outcome variables.

Results from Regression Analyses

Table 2 presents results from discrete-time hazard models, which estimate how employment type is associated with the risk of divorce. As noted, I estimated models separately for men and women. Previous studies indicate that many of the correlates considered in this study can have a different impact on marital behaviors across gender. For instance, income is found to be a primary determinant for men’s entry into and exit out of marriage (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, & Lim, 1997). However, there is no consensus yet about the direction about the relationship between income and women’s marriage and divorce for women (e.g., Xie et al., 2003). Moreover, East Asian countries such as South
Korea are likely to have a substantive difference by gender in light of distinctive gender expectations and sociocultural characteristics. In terms of marriage formation, for example, good employment status facilitates men’s marital entry, whereas it has no statistically significant effect for women (Kim, 2017).

[Table 2 about here]

The outcome variable is whether a respondent got divorced between waves and all the models include well-established confounders including demographic/family and socioeconomic characteristics as noted above. Results from the baseline model show that, for men, the risk of divorce is higher for nonstandard workers (1.82 times) compared to standard workers (reference group). It is interesting that self-employed men do not differ from those in standard employment in terms of the likelihood of divorce. This result is due to the fact that self-employed men have lower education than their counterparts in standard employment (supplementary analyses, results not shown). That is, initially negative association between self-employment and men’s divorce disappears once educational attainment is introduced into the model. Not surprisingly, the likelihood of divorce is higher for the men who are not employed (reference is standard employment). It is important to note that this significant association between nonstandard employment and men’s risk of divorce is found, net of various background characteristics and socioeconomic resources (e.g., education and income). In contrast, for women, the coefficients for all the employment types are not statistically significant compared to those in standard employment. Combined, these results show that men’s nonstandard employment is associated with higher marital instability (Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer 1988), while women’s employment type may not matter in terms of marital stability in a
context in which women’s employment might still be supplementary to men’s income and women have limited career opportunities (e.g., Lim, 2018).

What causes such different results between men and women? Traditionally, based on a culture of Confucianism, it is common for men to take more responsibility for the household economy than women in East Asian countries. In spite of the expansion of female education and women’s labor force participation, in South Korea, the female labor force participation rate is much lower than that of men and is still largely affected by family obligations (especially the birth of a child) (e.g., Brinton, 2001). Women who take part in economic activities are also less engaged in occupations that are guaranteed a long-term career, such as professional or managerial positions compared to men (Cho, 2003). As a consequence, the type and quality of men’s employment, which is more important for household income and financial security, has a greater impact on marital stability than that of women.

The second model adds income (logged annual household income) to examine the extent to which income accounts for the relationship between employment type and the risk of divorce observed in the baseline model. Higher household income is associated with the lower risk of divorce, regardless of gender. However, adding income does not change relationships between employment type and divorce for both men and women.

In Model 3, depressive symptoms are introduced to examine whether they mediate the association between nonstandard work and divorce. Not surprisingly, those with higher depressive symptoms are more likely to experience marital dissolution. More important, with the inclusion of depressive symptoms, the significant association of non-employment with men’s divorce disappears. It implies that stress and compromised
mental health of non-employed men, measured by depressive symptoms, may explain their higher likelihood of divorce compared to those in standard employment (Model 1). In addition, the magnitude of nonstandard employment (relative to standard employment) in terms of the risk of divorce reduces when depressive symptoms are considered (98% to 58%) in Model 3. This change suggests that, to some extent, nonstandard work is associated with higher depressive symptoms, which may lead to marital instability. However, it is worth noting that men with nonstandard jobs still have higher odds of divorce than their counterparts with standard jobs (58%, \( p<0.05 \)) even with the inclusion of depressive symptoms. That is, the negative association between men’s nonstandard work and marital stability observed in the baseline model is not completely explained by compromised mental health of nonstandard workers. It is plausible that other factors associated with nonstandard employment in the South Korean labor market such as job instability, bad work conditions, and unstable labor market status with limited prospects for mobility and promotion may account for elevated risk of divorce among male nonstandard workers (e.g., Kim, 2014).

Table 3 also presents results from the supplementary analyses that examine whether the coefficient for each employment category in the male model is significantly different from that of the female model (column titled “Difference”). Estimates are based on results from Model 2 of Table 2. The results show that there is significant interaction between non-employment and gender (i.e., significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term between non-employment and female). It indicates that non-employment is associated with lower risk of divorce among women, which is consistent with the idea that women derive economic benefits from marriage through spousal specialization.
(Becker, 1981). However, non-employed men have a higher risk of divorce compared to their employed counterparts. There is also weak evidence ($p<0.1$) that self-employed women have a lower likelihood of divorce than self-employed men. However, no significant interaction of nonstandard employment with gender was found. It appears that nonstandard employment is associated with higher risk of divorce, regardless of gender.

Figures 5 and 6 present the predicted probability of divorce for men and women according to age. These predictions are based on the results from Table 2 (Model 2) and all covariates, except for employment type, are held at their means. Figure 5 shows that standard workers have the lowest probability among all other employment groups. It is interesting that the probability of divorce of nonstandard workers is almost the same as that of the non-employed. This result suggests that nonstandard work is seen almost as “bad” as non-employment in South Korean context with its rigid labor market segmentation, which has negative implications for marital stability for men. The high risk of divorce for nonstandard workers is also found among women: according to Figure 6, the probability of divorce is highest among nonstandard workers, followed by those in standard employment, self-employment, and non-employment. Results for the high risk of divorce among women in nonstandard employment appears to be consistent with the idea of the emergence of “dual-earner” families in which both spouses hold low-quality nonstandard jobs (rather than career jobs) (Lim & Raymo, 2015) and the idea of the shifting economic foundations of marriage from that based on specialization to that based on cooperation, in which women’s economic contributions are expected and conducive to marital stability (Oppenheimer, 1994; 1998). On the contrary, the lower probabilities of divorce for self-employed and non-employed women are consistent with the idea that
women’s economic independence might have a negative impact on marital stability by reducing economic gains from marriage (e.g., Becker, 1981). These seemingly complicated results for women may reflect tensions between “old” patterns (e.g., cultural norm emphasizing women’s roles as wives and mothers and traditional labor market discrimination against women) and “new” changes (e.g., increasing career opportunities for women with higher education and labor market skills), which appears to have begun changing the economic foundations of marriage in East Asia (Lim, 2018; Lim & Raymo, 2014; Raymo & Lim, 2011).
Conclusions and Discussion

Prominent family theories suggest that nonstandard employment may lead to marital instability since nonstandard jobs are often precarious and insecure (e.g., Becker, 1981; Kalleberg, 2011; Oppenheimer, 1988). However, as discussed, it is also important to note that theoretical predictions about women’s nonstandard employment are often contradictory in regards to marital stability (e.g., Oppenheimer, 1988; Sweeney, 2002). Using nationally representative longitudinal data from South Korea, in this paper I aimed to first evaluate how nonstandard work is associated with the risk of divorce with a focus on gender differences. South Korea is a great setting for this purpose in that one’s employment type (e.g., standard or nonstandard employment) reflects one’s current labor market status as well as future career trajectories in a rigidly segmented labor market. More important, South Korea provides a great case to examine whether the association between nonstandard employment and the risk of divorce differs by gender. As noted in the previous sections, major family theories have different predictions about the role of economic resources for marriage behaviors for men and women (e.g., Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1988; 1994). In light of distinctive gender expectations in South Korea due to the influence of a patriarchal ideology causing low female labor force participation (Brinton, 2001), the findings of this study will foster a better understating of the impact of labor market insecurity and inequality for other countries with similarly gender cultural structures (e.g., all of East Asia).

In recent years, numerous studies have attempted to find and explore the causes of rising divorce rates in South Korea. Yet, how employment type is associated with divorce has been largely ignored. Existing evidence is also limited in that it is mostly based on
cross-sectional analyses and, to the best of my knowledge, no study has examined the relationship between nonstandard employment and the risk of divorce with a focus on gender differences by utilizing longitudinal data analyses as my study does. To address this gap in the literature, I estimated discrete-time hazard models to predict marital dissolution (from first marriage) as a function of one’s employment type (i.e., non-employment, standard employment, nonstandard employment, and self-employment).

To summarize, the results of this study show that, for men, nonstandard employment is associated with higher likelihood of divorce. It is also worth noting that self-employed men do not differ from those in standard employment in terms of the risk of divorce. As noted in the Results section, self-employed men are lower educated than their counterparts holding standard jobs and the initially significant association between self-employment and divorce for men disappears once educational attainment is controlled for. These findings are consistent with evidence that self-employment is often an involuntary choice due to corporate restructuring and/or lack of full-time employment opportunities for those lacking labor market skills (e.g., Kim, 2014). However, there are no statistical differences in the risk of divorce among women by employment type. These results are consistent with the idea that men’s economic resources are critical to maintain marriage, especially in a context characterized by a strong male-breadwinner norm (e.g., Becker, 1981; Bernard, 1981). In addition, women’s employment type appears to be less relevant for marital stability because meaningful career opportunities are still limited for South Korean women and women are still expected to assume most family responsibilities (Brinton, 2001). In light of very limited evidence on the role of nonstandard employment in family formation and dissolution in South Korea, the
findings of this study add important information to the literature.

My study also examined potential mechanisms linking nonstandard employment and marital instability with a focus on (household) income and depressive symptoms. I found that non-employed men report more depressive symptoms, which explains their higher likelihood of divorce relative to standard workers. However, the elevated risk of divorce found among male nonstandard workers is not explained by (household) income and depressive symptoms (Models 2-3, Table 2). I speculate other factors such as unstable labor market status of nonstandard work and poor work conditions may mediate the negative association between nonstandard employment and marital stability for South Korean men.

Certainly, the present paper is limited in scope. While I control for various confounding factors, both observed and unobserved characteristics might still account for the observed association between employment type and the risk of divorce. Considering the potential role of selection is very important since individuals with different characteristics may be selected into different employment types, which may in turn affect the risk of divorce. For instance, prior research on South Korean workers shows that those in nonstandard work and self-employment have worse health outcomes than standard workers in OLS regression models; however, much of these negative health implications disappear when endogeneity is taken into account in fixed-effects models (Lim et al., 2018). This indicates that those with unobserved characteristics that are detrimental to health (e.g., personality, unmeasured health conditions) are more likely to be selected into precarious work conditions such as nonstandard work. Therefore, further studies that explicitly deal with selection issues will be useful to evaluate the causal
impact of employment type on marital dissolution in South Korea.

In addition, based on my study findings, future research will need to further examine what factors account for the relationship between nonstandard/self-employment and the risk of divorce. For example, stress from undesirable work conditions (and the resultant decline in marital quality) may be a pathway to link nonstandard work and higher risk of divorce. Understanding these potential mechanisms underlying the relationship between nonstandard/self-employment and divorce will further help us understand how nonstandard work affects men and women’s marital stability in a different way.

In modern Korean society today, the prevalence of nonstandard employment is a big social problem. The issue of nonstandard work has drawn public concern and, consequently, has been increasingly studied by many researchers. But our understanding of the social and familial impact of nonstandard work in places like South Korea is still limited. As demonstrated in this paper, non-regular employment not only has an impact on individual workers but also on the process of family formation and dissolution. Therefore, the familial and social impact of nonstandard work in South Korea warrants more research in the future.
References


Press.


Kim, Y., & Ok, S. (2013). Mental health of self-employed individuals: Focusing on


https://doi.org/10.1177/0731121418782186


Table 1. Sample Characteristics by Gender

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Table 2. Comparison between Discrete-Time Hazard Models regarding Coefficients of Divorce Estimated in South Korea, by Gender

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N 19,557 22,863

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3. Coefficients of Divorce Estimated from Discrete-Time Hazard Models for Men and Women in South Korea

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<tr>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>High School or Less</td>
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<td>Junior College</td>
<td>-0.51*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.30*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>University or More</td>
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<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>Number of Kids</td>
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<td>0 (omitted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.66***</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<td>Rural (omitted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Income (log)</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
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</table>

N 19,557 22,863

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Getting Divorced by Employment Type for Men

Note: This figure shows the predicted probability of getting divorced for men by employment type. These predictions are based on Table 1 and Table 2, which include each measure of employment type and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. All covariates are held at their means except the explanatory variable related to employment.
Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Getting Divorced by Employment Type for Women

Note: This figure shows the predicted probability of getting divorced for men by employment type. These predictions are based on Table 1 and Table 2, which include each measure of employment type and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. All covariates are held at their means except the explanatory variable related to employment.