Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-Sharing Agreements Between the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998

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by

Brigitte E. Hugh

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

Political Science

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Logan, Utah

2020
ABSTRACT

Perpetuating Peace: Context versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements Between the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998

By

Brigitte E. Hugh, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2020

Major Professor: Dr. Anna O. Pechenkina
Department: Political Science

What accounts for the breakdown of peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the deep institutionalization of peace after the 1998 Washington Agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region? In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships—the institutionalist versus the selection camp—has a greater explanatory power when applied to this research question.

My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping the observed outcomes—peace, or lack thereof—after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998. First, the extensive learning period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting power of each party and the spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement language, reached through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, provides pathways for institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds inadvertently stumbled on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate governorates and, most
importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war more similar to that of an interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more stable arrangement. These three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning periods—wartime and peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the successful establishment of positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement.

The second period, a peacetime period following 1998, enabled the two parties to learn how to run a democratic government until such time as the incentives for the elites shifted in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event which prompted them to believe cooperation was the best path forward for the Iraqi Kurdish parties in the new Iraq.

While the context informed compliance and maintenance of the agreements, the language of the agreements makes a difference, though not sufficient to explain peace on its own. I further argue that the ambiguity negotiated through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process into the structure of the Washington Agreement enabled the two parties to establish patterns of positive peace in their region, culminating in the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement in 2006.

In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the parties choose to sign those agreements. Furthermore, the text of the 1998 agreement also contributes to the absence of armed conflict after 1998, as well as the incentives to deepen cooperation after 2003.
PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements between the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998

Brigitte E. Hugh

In the mid-1990s the two Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—signed two power-sharing agreements, which had dramatically different results. The 1992 50-50 Agreement ended in conflict while the 1998 Washington Agreement ended in long-lasting peace.

I examine both the agreements and their surrounding context to identify what explains the success or failure of these two agreements in establishing long-lasting and cooperative peace. I find that the presence or absence of peace is due to both the language of the agreements and the context in which they were created. I demonstrate this through an examination of the two learning periods the Iraqi Kurds experienced, one through fighting from 1994-1997 and the second through a peacetime separation into two governorates from 1998-2006.

One of the most important conclusions is that the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process between the two Iraqi Kurdish parties prior to the 1998 Washington Agreement resulted in a more ambiguous agreement in 1998 which laid the ground work for greater cooperation over the next decade culminating in the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my mentor Dr. Anna Pechenkina for her tireless, kind, yet rigorous support to help me create the best version of this thesis possible. Also, for believing in me from the very beginning and reading every iteration of this document along the way. I would also like to thank my other committee members: Dr. Jeannie Johnson who has been my number one supporter and most intense critic since day one of my undergraduate career, and Dr. Nicole Allen, without whose help the history of this thesis would be missing necessary nuance. An even bigger thanks goes to Robert Heaton, the indefatigable Political Science librarian who helped me find countless elusive documents, no matter what time of night I emailed him.

A special thanks to my parents, grandparents, siblings, friends, and colleagues for their encouragement, moral support, memes, texts, calls, virtual game nights, and patience throughout the entire process. This thesis would not have been possible without them and their belief in me.

And a final, very heartfelt thanks to the global pandemic which tried to upset my plans to finish this thesis. Despite it all, the force was with me, and I was one with the force.

Brigitte E. Hugh
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INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1990s, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the most powerful political parties representing the Kurdish population of Iraq, had two sequential power-sharing agreements that attempted to end the historical conflicts between them which started in the mid-1970s. In 1992, the 50-50 Agreement ended with a civil war between KDP and PUK. In contrast, the Washington Agreement in 1998—and its subsequent renegotiation, the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement in 2006—have resulted in over two decades of peace in the region. What accounts for the breakdown of peace after the 50-50 Agreement versus the deep institutionalization of peace after the Washington Agreement?

In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships has a greater explanatory power when applied to this research question. On the one hand, the “selection camp” puts forth that the parties strategically select themselves into an agreement based on the contextual learning that precedes negotiations. Therefore, agreements have no independent effect on peace but merely reflect the expectations of the parties that elected to sign them. On the other hand, the “institutionalist camp” argues that the content of agreements has an additional, independent impact on the durability of peace. My analysis shows that contextual factors explain most of why peace succeeded or failed after the signing of these agreements, but that the language of these agreements also contributed to deepen the peace from a negative peace (the cessation of hostilities) to a positive peace (depth of cooperation between the parties.)

Analyzing the agreements brokered during the 1990s in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) through the selection prism, one should ask: since the parties strategically selected
themselves into an agreement, could we attribute any subsequent peace to the language of the agreement itself? That is, a high degree of compliance with agreements among states (or proto-states) is expected because the actors are voluntarily choosing to sign agreements based on their expectations of what arrangement can last, so agreements are merely “scraps of paper.” My analysis indeed yields that the language of the agreements cannot be divorced from the circumstances in which they came about. The history, current events, and personalities involved are critical to understanding the impact and acceptance of the negotiations as well as the components of the substantive deal agreed upon.

Relying on the selection lens, I suggest two major takeaways for how contextual factors shaped war and peace between KDP and PUK. The first conclusion of my case study analysis is that the intermittent fighting between 1994 and 1997 and the subsequent prolonged one-on-one negotiations from 1998 to 2006 provided two extensive learning periods during which the PUK and KDP discovered three important things.

First, they were evenly matched at nearly every level even and especially with the assistance of international and regional governments. The expectations of the two parties as to who was more popular and powerful in the region were ill-informed before the 1992 deal because the two parties had never fought one another. This uncertainty about which side would prevail in a military contest muddied the waters just long enough to suggest to both parties that they were the more powerful actor, causing dissatisfaction with the 50-50 Agreement from its inception. Additionally, the PUK found flaws in the Agreement as it did not guarantee the transparency in the creation of the budget, and since most of the Kurdistan Regional

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Government’s (KRG) money came from trade in the KDP regions, the PUK was concerned that the KDP might not share revenue equally, and as a result grow more powerful.

Second, the conflict period provided time to come to understand the status of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Turkey, and, to a certain extent, Iran as spoilers for the peace process between the KDP and the PUK. Prior to the establishment of the KRG, external backers, specifically Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, saw the Iraqi Kurdish parties as pawns to be used in their attacks on Baghdad. In the wake of the establishment of the KRG in 1992, Turkey and Iran, began to view Iraqi Kurdistan as a threat to their regional autonomy, fearing that Iraqi Kurdish success would incite rebellions from Kurdish minorities within their own borders. Turkey was already acutely aware of this possibility as their insurgent Kurdish party, the PKK, fled to Iraqi Kurdistan during this period. The eventual exclusion of Turkey and PKK from the negotiation process was a major positive development towards peace. My analysis of the case reveals that without the interference of Turkey and the PKK, the armed conflict between the KDP and PUK would have concluded far more speedily than it did.

Third, after learning their true relative parity of power and excluding third parties with spoiler incentives from meddling in the negotiation process, the KDP and PUK were able to enter a second learning period during and after the endemic peace process which began between them in December 1997 and continued until June 1998. Historical accounts of this period largely overlook its contribution towards the US-brokered peace process in September 1998. Most accounts of the war simply do not mention it at all, and Stansfield 2010, the only author who dwells on the Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, places less weight on these early negotiations, emphasizing the role of the United States in the 1998 Washington Agreement. My analysis, by contrast, suggests that without the early groundwork laid by the Koya/Shaqlawa negotiations, the
Washington Agreement would not have been as reflective of the true parity between KDP and PUK and thus less effective for establishing and maintaining peace.

My second major conclusion is that the deeper integration between the KDP and PUK started in response to the US altering incentives for these proto-states. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a major opportunity for greater regional autonomy for the Iraqi Kurdistan region; this external shift altered the incentives of the KDP and PUK elites and allowed for deeper cooperation and the emergence of positive peace as evidence by the 2006 Unification agreement. That is, the collapse of a more authoritarian Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the intent to establish a more democratic government provided an opening for the Kurds to take a more prominent role in Iraqi politics, and in order to do so they felt they needed to present a more legitimate and trustworthy face to the Iraqi government and the world writ large.

In short, relying on the “selection” lens to analyze this case suggests that learning about each other and external spoilers through warfare and negotiations allowed the KDP and PUK to voluntarily select themselves into a 1998 deal that was far more reflective of the true distribution of power between them. That is, these factors largely explain the negative peace (i.e., the absence of warfare between them). Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq altered the incentives of KDP and PUK such that both sought deeper cooperation or the positive peace in order to present a unified front to a nascent Iraqi government and the international community, and pursued such through negotiations for further agreements.²

An opposing camp argues that although circumstances engender a mutual understanding which allows opponents to select themselves into an agreement that reflects their expectations of

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what deal shall endure at the end of conflict, the provisions of the agreement may further clarify and incentivize cooperation—or lack thereof—in the case of resurgent grievances. For instance, agreements may specify enforcement mechanisms that foster trust and increase costs of restarting war. Additionally, agreements may reduce uncertainty about intentions behind the opponent’s actions, thus controlling the damage from accidental violations.

I examine the 1992 and 1998 deals through this lens. To be clear, a mere signing of a power-sharing agreement does not guarantee peace, as illustrated by the 1992 50-50 Agreement, plagued by disagreements about revenue sharing and misunderstandings about the true popularity and power of each group. Instead, what makes a difference is what types of power-sharing provisions the sides were able to agree upon. In those cases when the parties agree on their mutual strength and do not fear the future (the prerequisites for successful bargaining), power-sharing agreements shall reflect the accurate mutual expectations of a hypothetical military contest, perhaps, even contributing to the emergence of positive peace—the presence of harmony and cooperation—by giving rise to a joint project of “we-culture” in the community.

Examining the case through the institutionalist prism, I found that contents of these agreements differed dramatically. The 1992 deal was specific in outlining the governing structure: e.g., each of the ministries was to be staffed by a minister and deputy from opposing parties. By contrast, after two extensive learning periods through warfare and through one-on-one negotiations, the 1998 deal was purposefully ambiguous in reference to the executive structure, that ambiguity allowed for separate, parallel governorates, and separate parallel armies for the KDP and PUK. The second deal also included a built-in ability to renegotiate and

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4 Fortna, 342.
continue to alter the agreement as deemed necessary which was crucial to creating enduring, positive, and institutionalized peace.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the institutionalist literature, the more specific deal failed while the more ambiguous one survived.

Does it mean that the contents of these agreements had no effect on the subsequent war and peace? The evidence suggests that this variation in the chosen language of the agreements is easily explained by the events preceding each deal. Therefore, my major conclusion is that the context surrounding these agreements influences and aids the language of the agreements when explaining the outcomes of war and peace between the KDP and PUK. Nonetheless, the strategic ambiguity and the creation of renegotiation mechanism played a necessary, but not sufficient, role in shaping the eventual readiness of the KDP and PUK elites to deepen their cooperation when the US upended the political order in Iraq.

In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the parties choose to sign those agreements. That is, the contextual variables mostly explain the presence of active conflict after 1992 and its absence after 1998, as well as the incentives to deepen cooperation after 2003; additionally, the text of the Washington Agreement also contributed to the deepening of cooperation post-1998.

\textsuperscript{5} “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement,” January 21, 2006.
Scope Conditions

The two Kurdish Parties are not recognized by the United Nations as states. This raises the question of the scope conditions that my findings have for other cases of postwar peace. Structurally, these actors are operating as proto-states, that is each controls a specific territory, regulates the population residing there, enjoys the monopoly of force to tax the population, and deploys the taxed resources for its protection from challengers—thus, according to Wagner’s (2000) definition of a state, both the KDP and the PUK are unrecognized states.\(^6\) Given that both sides still keep their standing armies (“peshmerga”), the end of the armed conflict between them resembles that of an interstate war rather than a civil conflict, in which one side is expected to disarm. Thus, the findings from this case study could apply to weak states that are not regional powers and, thus, are susceptible to influence by outside actors.

Additionally, the Kurds represent a rare case of the same ethnic group being divided by political conflict. In this sense, this case is similar to Vietnam and Korea. Both south Asian countries were divided by an internecine conflict plagued by the influence of powerful global and regional external actors. The example of Iraqi Kurdistan can provide some insights as to how a thoughtfully created power-sharing agreement can provide a pathway towards reunification in the future for ethnic groups similarly plagued by conflict.

\(^6\) Wagner, “Bargaining and War.”
Case Selection: Why the Kurds of Iraq?

The KRI has been an independently administered region in northern Iraq since 1992 characterized by a power-sharing government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), between the two dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK.) The region has been relatively peacefully run by these coexisting, but politically opposed parties since a ceasefire in 1997 and the subsequent Washington Agreement, a power-sharing agreement brokered in 1998. This peaceful period followed an initial (failed) power-sharing agreement (50-50 Agreement) which was established after elections in 1992 and ended when an armed conflict erupted between the two parties in 1994.7

The KRI is not a state, and most, if not all, theories on the topics of war and peacebuilding are developed to examine state level interactions. Application of these theories to the KRI is justified because of its unique situation as a fairly robust, state-like entity in the region with complicated party systems, elections, and functional government which often outperforms the national government of Iraq. Gareth Stansfield notes that the Iraqi Kurds have been afforded the opportunity to run a fairly autonomous region for so long that their structures have aspects of state characteristics which make it a good candidate for study using theories usually applied to states.8 Additionally, the Kurds developed the first modern regional government in Iraq which had democratic characteristics, making it an all the more interesting topic for study.

8 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 13.
The Kurdish situation is even more intriguing for a study of power-sharing agreements because the parties signed two similar agreements within a short period of time, one ending in war and the other bringing long-lasting peace. These contrasting outcomes of seemingly similar agreements present a puzzle that merits study.

Furthermore, an endemic process for peace negotiations began in 1998 and while formalized by the 1998 Washington Agreement, these negotiations did not simply end. There has been at least one formal renegotiation that ended in a signed deal between the parties in 2006—the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement—which further integrated and formalized the executive relationship between the two major parties.9

Thesis Structure

This thesis is organized as the following. The first chapter presents a brief history of the Kurdish Region of Iraq. The second chapter reviews the pertinent political science literature on why peace succeeds or fails. With this background, I begin my analysis of the conflict between the Kurdish parties. I analyze the impact of the context leading to, and the language of, the

9 A note about spelling and terms
English transliterations of certain Kurdish proper names have many different spellings. In the interest of consistency, I have chosen one spelling for some of these words:
- Erbil: also known as Irbil, Arbil, Hawler, and Hewler
- Sulaymaniyah: also known as Sulaimaniya, Slemani, Suleimaniyah
- Masoud Barzani: Ma’sud Bar’zani (leader of the KDP)
- Dohuk: also known as Duhok
- Koya: also known as Koysanjaq, Koye
- Shaqlawa: also known as Seqlawe

Certain terms are found to have different iterations across the literature. In the case of the 50-50 Agreement (1992), it is referred to as the 50-50 deal and the 50-50 system across different analyses and histories.
agreements (the independent variables) on the presence and quality of peace (the dependent variables) after the 50-50 Agreement (1992) and the Washington Agreement (1998). The final chapter discusses the contribution of this project to our understanding of why the 1998 agreement survived while the 1992 agreement failed.
I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE

KURDS IN IRAQ (1941-1998)

Figure 1: Map of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1998

10 “Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”, map edited by the author
1941-1958—Organizing the Kurdish Revolutionary Spirit in Iraq and Iran

Summary

Starting in the 1940s, the Iraqi Kurds, alongside their Iranian counterparts, worked to create parties that brought several tribes together. In Iran, this culminated with the short-lived Kurdish Republic of the Mahabad. In Iraq, this period of organization was characterized by the formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and various revolutionary activities against the Iraqi government that resulted in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s expulsion from Iraq. During the decade of Mulla Mustafa’s exile, the KDP engaged in infighting.

Timeline of Events

The Kurds found in the northern part of Iraq have engaged in extensive revolutionary activity against the governments that have nominally controlled their territory. Until the 1940s this activity had taken place in loosely cooperative tribal configurations, but in the wake of the Treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923)—which included the first promises of autonomy for Kurdistan region before stripping that hope away—the Kurds in Iraq began to bring the tribes together into larger party-like groups.¹¹

The first real party was founded underground by Rafiq Hilmi in 1941, it was called the Hiwa¹² (Hope) party. Membership in the party spanned the political spectrum from left to right among the Kurdish urban intellectuals, but did not manage to draw in rural membership which

¹² Also spelled “Heva”
proved to be its weakness. It collapsed in 1945 paving the way for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP.)

The current status of politics in Iraqi Kurdistan stem from one main figure, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a member of the highly revered Barzan clan, who rose to prominence during the 1940s. Due to revolutionary activities, Mulla Mustafa was placed under house arrest by the Iraqi government in 1941 and escaped two years later in 1943. At that time, Mulla Mustafa fomented a rebellion against the Hashemite Iraqi King. The “Barzani Rebellion” continued for another two years until Mulla Mustafa was forced to flee to Iran in 1945.

While in Iran, Mulla Mustafa was party to the establishment of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In September 1945, Qazi Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, and other officials established the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in preparation to declare the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in northwest Iran on December 15, 1945. The Republic was a relatively short-lived experiment in autonomous rule lasting only one year, but it provided a blue print for future Kurdish autonomous movements.

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13 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 138; Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 9.
14 Due to the sheer number of Barzani’s which will populate this history, Mulla Mustafa Barzani will hereafter be referred to as Mulla Mustafa.
16 “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 2.
Figure 2: Map of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, 1945-1946\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} “Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”
During this time, on recommendation from Mulla Mustafa, and modeled after the KDPI, the Kurdish Democratic Party (later renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party)\textsuperscript{20} was formed in Iraq on August 16, 1946, with Mulla Mustafa elected president \textit{in absentia}. The party was formed from the remnants of four previous parties, including the Hiwa party.\textsuperscript{21}

After the fall of the Mahabad Republic, Mulla Mustafa and his troops were forced to withdraw to the Soviet Union, in what has been termed the “Retreat of the Five Hundred,” where they remained until 1958.\textsuperscript{22} During Mulla Mustafa’s Soviet exile, the Kurds and the Iraqi government did not engage in skirmishes or battles, passing a relatively quiet decade. However, there was quite a bit of internal political struggle between factions of the KDP.

Shortly after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Ibrahim Ahmed, a progressive socialist, joined the KDP in Iraq and took on a leadership role in the party, in which he leveraged his organizational know-how to get the KDP off the ground as a functional party. Ahmed provided the structure while Mulla Mustafa’s name and affiliation provided the legitimacy the party needed to establish itself.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1951, Ahmed was elected the secretary general of the KDP, a party which, partly due to his influence had come to be dominated by the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{24} During this period, Ahmed and Hamza Abdullah (Mulla Mustafa’s representative in the party) and their respective factions often


\textsuperscript{22} Vanly, “Chapter 5: Kurdistan in Iraq,” 163–64; “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 3.

\textsuperscript{23} Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., \textit{The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?}, 165; Gunter, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Kurds}, 190.

\textsuperscript{24} Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., \textit{The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?}, 165.
struggled with one another with regard to the overall goals and policies of the KDP.\textsuperscript{25} The struggle between Ahmed’s leftist faction and Barzani’s traditionalist faction would continue within the KDP until 1975 when the parties split, which will be discussed later. Not only was this a struggle between ideas, but it is said that when Ahmed and Mulla Mustafa met in 1958, Mulla Mustafa seemed to take an immediate disliking to Ahmed, demonstrating interpersonal friction.\textsuperscript{26}

1958-1970— Iraqi/Kurdish Collaboration turned to the Kurdish “War of Liberation”

Summary

Though the period of Iraqi Kurdish history starting in 1958 began with a promising collaboration between a new Republic of Iraq and the KDP that brought Mulla Mustafa back to Iraq, that cooperation only lasted until 1961. Baghdad’s attacks on the Kurdistan region prompted the launch of the “War of Liberation” which saw five total Kurdistan Wars, four of which took place between 1961 and 1970.

Timeline of Events

In July 1958, Abdul Karim Qassim,\textsuperscript{27} an Iraqi army officer, not a Kurd, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of Iraq.\textsuperscript{28} Because his campaign was supported by

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{25} Gunter, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Kurds}, 190.
\textsuperscript{26} Schmidt, \textit{Journey Among Brave Men}, 123.
\textsuperscript{27} Also spelled Qasim or Kassem.
\textsuperscript{28} Yildiz, \textit{The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future}, 16; Vanly, “Chapter 5: Kurdistan in Iraq,” 165; Tripp, \textit{A History of Iraq}, 139–40; “‘Abd Al-Karīm Qāsim | Prime Minister of Iraq.”
\end{quote}
the KDP, Qassim legalized the party and welcomed Mulla Mustafa back to Iraq in October 1958, where he assumed the position of KDP president in person.\textsuperscript{29} However, this cooperation with the new republic was short lived as Qassim attempted to assert his authority through military dictatorship and did so by attacking other political parties. In 1960, his efforts turned towards the Kurds and on September 9, 1961 these efforts culminated in air bombardment against Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{30}

Qassim’s actions in 1960 and 1961 prompted the Kurdish Revolution of 1961 which launched the longest and most sustained period of military and political engagement against the Iraqi government in the history of Kurdish movements, also known as “The War of Liberation.” The revolution sought to gain some measure of autonomy and freedom from the Iraqi government and lasted until 1975.\textsuperscript{31}

However, even leading into this period of conflict, the KDP was witnessing infighting. By 1960, the KDP Politburo, the leftist faction led by Ahmed and Ahmed’s son-in-law Jalal Talabani, only recognized Mulla Mustafa’s leadership out of political necessity and their infighting often precluded even their resistance against the bombardment from Baghdad.\textsuperscript{32} For the first three months of the struggle against Qassim which started in 1961, Ahmed and Talabani’s KDP Politburo refused to take part. It wasn’t until December of 1961 that they stepped up their efforts.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Vanly} Vanly, “Chapter 5: Kurdistan in Iraq,” 165–66.
\bibitem{Vanly2} Vanly, 153, 164–66.
\bibitem{Anderson} Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., \textit{The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?}, 165; Gunter, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Kurds}, 30.
\bibitem{Schmidt} Schmidt, \textit{Journey Among Brave Men}, 128; “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 3.
\end{thebibliography}
The Great Kurdish Rebellion (1961-1963), or the Second Kurdistan War, came to an end when the Ba’ath party eliminated Qassim and signed a cease-fire with Mulla Mustafa, which he signed before consulting the KDP Politburo and ultimately led to increased distrust. Following this action, both KDP factions expelled each other, and then reunited until their permanent divorce in 1975. Meanwhile, the ceasefire between the Kurds and the Ba’ath party was short lived. After internal fighting, the Ba’athist factions which originated the coup, reestablished the Iraqi Republic, this time under the rule of President ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif. The ceasefire ended in 1965 after the president of Iraq launched a spring offensive against the Kurds. The Third Kurdistan War would continue until June 15, 1966 when a new ceasefire was reached.

On July 17, 1968, a revolution in Baghdad brought the Tikriti Ba’athists to power again, this time for a tenure that would see the rise of Saddam and stay in power until 2003. Following the Ba’athist ascension to power, a Fourth Kurdistan War was launched in April 1969. In 1970, the Ba’athist party, headed by Saddam, approached the Iraqi Kurds—at this time still a seemingly unified KDP—to build a peace agreement.

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1970-1975—March Manifesto, Law of Autonomy, the Fifth Kurdistan War, and Party Splintering

Summary

Saddam’s negotiations with the Kurds in 1970 enabled the KDP to draft the best agreement ever offered to the Kurds, the March Manifesto. For four years, the Kurds were granted de facto autonomy by Baghdad, until 1974 when they were presented with a watered-down version of the March Manifesto, The Law of Autonomy. The KDP rejected the latter and again fought Baghdad in the Fifth Kurdistan War. When Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975, Iran withdrew their support of the Kurdish rebellion, which led to its collapse. As the rebellion crumbled, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) splintered from the KDP.

Timeline of Events

In effect, vice president Saddam Hussein gave the Kurdish parties carte blanche to design a satisfactory peace agreement between the Iraqi government and themselves in 1970.\(^{40}\) The resultant March Manifesto (March Agreement) was the best deal ever offered to the Kurds in Iraq, allowing them autonomy over their region in Northern Iraq, Kurdish as an official language in Iraq, Kurdish education and culture reinforced, and Kurds involvement in all levels of government, etc.\(^{41}\) The agreement, though never fully implemented, temporarily suspended a

\(^{40}\) Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 166.

decade of conflict which had resulted in 60,000 casualties for both the Kurds and the Iraqi Government as well as displacing 300,000 people, mostly Kurds.42

The period that followed, from 1970-1974, has been referred to as a “golden era” for the Kurds in which they were largely left untouched by the central government in Baghdad and were able to learn the skills of local administration and direct governance which provided them a foundation on which to build when they would be afforded this opportunity again in 1991.43

However, by 1974 Baghdad had concluded that it could not accept the full terms of the March Manifesto and drafted a watered-down version of the agreement, the Law of Autonomy (Act 33 of 1974) which was presented to Mulla Mustafa without prior approval or agreement from the KDP.44 Mulla Mustafa was expected to comply within 15 days. Instead, he prepared to fight, drawing 60,000 peshmerga and 60,000 irregular fighters into the Fifth Kurdistan War with 90,000 Iraqi forces.45

At the beginning of this conflict, the Kurds were supported by the Iranians, but the conflict ended after the March 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in which Iran agreed to withdraw their support from the Kurds.46 Without Iranian support, the Kurdish front ultimately collapsed, and with it the formalized conflict between the government and the Kurds which began in 1961 ended.47 Following the end of conflict, Mulla Mustafa fled to America for treatment of his cancer, where he would stay until his death in 1979.48

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43 Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?, 166.
In Mulla Mustafa’s absence, as well as the shadow of failed revolution, the internal struggles between the leftist coalition and the more conservative coalition of the KDP came to a head and the party splintered into several pieces. At this time, Mulla Mustafa’s two sons, Idris and Masoud Barzani formed the KDP/Provisional Command (which would retake the name KDP in 1979), and Jalal Talabani, Ahmed’s protégé, formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two parties endure as the main political influences in Iraqi Kurdistan today.


Summary

In the few years following 1975 and before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the PUK and the KDP engaged in an intense power-struggle to become the dominant Iraqi Kurdish power. However, as the war began, both parties saw it as their opportunity to assert power in the Northern part of Iraq and waged parallel but separate attacks against Baghdad. In 1987, Tehran brokered an agreement between the two Kurdish parties that led to the establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front in 1988, just as Iraq began the Anfal campaign, a large anti-Kurdish military operation that included the use of chemical weapons (the most notable attack occurred in March 1988 at Halabja.)

Timeline of Events

During the first years of reorganizing the Kurdish parties following the disastrous fallout from the Fifth Kurdistan War, the PUK and KDP were engaged in an intense power-struggle which was often backed by external actors and consisted of guerrilla warfare. Between 1975 and 1979, more effort was committed to fighting each other for power than was expended towards fighting the regime as had been done in the past.  

As the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, both Kurdish factions saw it as an opportunity to assert their own hold on the northern part of Iraq and force the government to grant meaningful autonomy. In doing so, each retained alliances: the KDP with the new Iranian government headed by Khomeini and the PUK rotated through several alliances during the war, Syria, Iraq and finally Iran.  

During the war, there were multiple popular Kurdish uprisings in 1982, 1984, 1985, and 1987 which were leveraged by the Kurdish parties, though never in cooperation, in order to strike out against the Iraqi government. In 1983, the Ba’ath government worked with the PUK to sign a ceasefire in an effort to stop the KDP’s coordinated attacks with the Iranians. Instead of stopping the attacks, this only further polarized the Kurdish national movement.  

From 1985 to 1988, the Kurdish movement effected the most sustained pressure against the government since the 1975 collapse. As a result, the Iraqi government perpetuated large-scale genocidal acts in 1988 to keep the Kurds in check. In 1987, ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid was

52 Bengio, 172.
53 Bengio, 172.
54 Bengio, 172.
declared the absolute ruler of the north by Saddam and perpetuated a chemical punishment campaign against the Kurds which became known as the Anfal campaigns. From February to September 1988, the eight stages of the Anfal campaign resulted in large scale chemical weapons attacks, physical destruction of villages, and the transfer of Kurds out of the Kurdish heartlands.

However, it was the Halabja Massacre in March of 1988 that earned ‘Ali the nickname “Chemical Ali.” Halabja is one of the single most important events to the Iraqi Kurds and is sometimes described as “Hiroshima of the Kurds” as it is the largest chemical warfare attack since World War I. In one day, some 5,000 civilians of all ages were killed or wounded by a chemical cocktail made up of four kinds of gas including mustard and sarin. Halabja became a large affair because, unlike the rest of the chemical attacks, Iranians witnessed and reported the attack providing evidence to the world of the attacks on the Kurds.

In part due to the increased antagonism from the Iraqi government, and also out of necessity, the PUK and KDP established a tolerance for one another and both initiated actions against the government without interference from the other party in the late 1980s. By 1987, Iran was supporting both Kurdish parties and managed to bring them together and help them develop a working relationship. In July, the KDP, PUK, and four smaller parties announced the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), which was formally established in May 1988. The IKF had little

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55 Bengio, 178–79.
consequence during the 1980s but gave the impression of unity and later played an important role when it came time to organize the autonomous region in 1991.  

1991-1998—Establishing and Fighting Over an Autonomous Region

Summary

In the early 1990s, the KDP and PUK parties continued to maintain a tenuous alliance that, in the wake of the US establishing a no-fly zone, extended to the development of elections for an autonomous region. However, this cooperation ended in 1994 when armed conflict ignited between the two parties and continued intermittently for the next four years, in what has been called the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War.

Timeline of Events

This tenuous relationship continued from 1987 until 1994, even as the United States established the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War. The third-party enforced no-fly zone afforded the Kurds in Iraq a unique and exciting opportunity to develop their own governance system free from military interference from Saddam who was preoccupied trying to maintain control and rebuild the rest of Iraq in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War.  

In 1992, the KRI held its first general election. Largely seen as free and fair by the outside world it resulted in an extremely close margin between the two parties: the KDP received

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60 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 158–59; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 173.

50.22 percent and the PUK received 49.87 percent of the vote to allocate seats within the Kurdistan National Assembly. The margin between the two presidential candidates was even closer. Because both parties were so close in every measure of power and the margin was so small for election results, they came to a power-sharing agreement which split all power almost directly down the middle. This did require that the KDP give up some power, but on the whole, the outcome gave equal amounts of control to both sides. However, this 50-50 Agreement did not prevent conflict between the two parties for long. For reasons that will be discussed at length in this thesis, the two Kurdish parties were engaged in a low-intensity, but prolonged conflict with one another by 1994.

After three years of conflict and attempted negotiations, the conflict ended in 1998 after extensive negotiations brokered by the United States. The Washington Agreement, signed by the leaders of the KDP and the PUK in September of 1998, re-established the cooperative Kurdish National Assembly (KNA) and because of the ambiguous language, led to two executive seats of power each administered by one party. This power-sharing agreement was later renegotiated in 2006 such that the executive branch was once more unified and included some measures for ensuring the continued power-sharing of the two parties within the branch.

II
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE BARGAINING APPROACH TO WAR AND PEACE

To understand why peace succeeds or fails, one must first understand why wars begin. The bargaining approach suggests that the recipe for war is a grievance between two parties accompanied by a bargaining failure. Grievances exist long before war breaks out and thus cannot be the cause of war. The bargaining failures that lead to war—the information problem and the commitment problem—are often the same problems that lead to a breakdown of peace.66

In the information problem, one or both parties have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities or resolve in order to achieve a better deal. This problem leads to war when one or both sides mistakenly believes that they can prevail in a war. In peace, the information problem can lead to a resurgence of war for similar reasons, i.e. if at least one party is overly optimistic about its relative strength or resolve.67

The commitment problem is a situation in which the two sides are unable to settle on a mutually beneficial bargain today because the relative power in the dyad could shift in such a way that creates incentive for at least one side to renege on today’s deal in the future.68 In civil wars this problem is particularly acute since rebel actors are often required to disarm as a prerequisite for civil war settlement: by giving up their military leverage, rebels will become

67 Fearon, 381.
68 Fearon, 381; Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace.”
vulnerable to government reneging tomorrow on its own promises of amnesty today.\textsuperscript{69} The commitment problem undermines peace when relative power is shifting such that one side has the potential to grow rapidly (due to the development of specific weapons or acquisition of strategic territory, for instance). This anticipated unfavorable shift in power puts the growing side in a position to demand more or renegotiate the present-day bargain in the future, which makes war today more attractive for the relatively declining opponent.\textsuperscript{70}

Given this explanation of the bargaining approach to war, I explore the situation between the Kurdish parties. The conflict is referred to as the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War; however, it is not a traditional civil war in which there are power asymmetries between a state and rebel group. At the time of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were relatively well-matched with respect to resources and international backers.\textsuperscript{71}

At the time that conflict began, the two biggest cities were under the control of opposite parties, the PUK in Sulaymaniyah and the KDP in Erbil, in effect splitting the territory and the population in half. Additionally, there wasn’t a “state” power or a “rebel” power because the two parties began the conflict during the process of developing a functional regional government for the first time.\textsuperscript{72} As a result, this conflict does not meet the definition of a typical civil war; nonetheless, I will be using the label “Kurdish Civil War” as that is what it is called in the historical record.

\textsuperscript{69} Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” 246.
\textsuperscript{70} Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?,” 372–73.
\textsuperscript{71} Stansfield, “Governing Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division,” 199.
I posit that the commitment problems often found in civil wars—that the stronger power has no incentive to respect the terms of the peace agreement once the weaker group’s military forces have disbanded—is not present in this case, in part because even in 2020 the parties still control their own separate peshmergas,\textsuperscript{73} so there is no commitment problem that could stem from either party’s fears of disarmament. Thus, the decision to keep separate peshmergas after 1998 has been helpful for maintaining peace between the two parties as it makes the end of this conflict more akin to an interstate war than a traditional civil war.\textsuperscript{74} Even in 2010, when moves were finally made to combine the peshmergas, it was to create Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) which are joint PUK-KDP units of about 40,000 peshmerga fighters each, and are in addition to the party units.\textsuperscript{75}

**Fighting is Learning**

The general bargaining framework has spawned many explanations for why peace endures and what circumstances will ameliorate the information and commitment problems that could otherwise lead to the recurrence of war. I will explore four of these more thoroughly: aspects of the war process; third party influence; and peace agreements, in two categories—those that provide uncertainty reducing measures and those that implement peace institutionalization measures.

\textsuperscript{73} The *Peshmerga*, literally meaning “those who face death,” are the fighting forces of the Iraqi Kurdistan parties.
\textsuperscript{74} van Wilgenburg and Fumerton, “Kurdistan’s Political Armies.”
\textsuperscript{75} van Wilgenburg and Fumerton, 2–3.
War Process

Some scholars, part of the “selection camp” argue that there are features of the war process which correlate with the durability of peace. Since absolute wars, or wars that end in complete destruction of one combatant, are relatively few, Wagner posits that warfare itself represents a bargaining process as it helps identify parameters for negotiation, so that most wars end as limited instead of absolute wars.76

Werner further argues that the demands made by groups are often strategically calculated such that they expect they can receive a redistribution of goods through negotiation or through conflict, if necessary.77 Werner points out that war is also part of the renegotiation process when one side perceives that they might be able to gain more from a settlement by re-entering conflict, or when the underlying issues for a conflict were not resolved by the previous outcome because peace was imposed too early by an external party to adequately solve the bargaining problems.78

Smith and Stam argue that long wars with consistent fighting ameliorates the information problem which initially led to war due to the revelatory nature of conflict—each battle fought reveals more information about the true capabilities of either side of the conflict.79 Slantchev argues that wars terminate only when fighting or negotiations reveal enough information that they are able to coordinate expectations about the results each party expects to receive at the end of conflict.80 Fearon and Smith and Stam additionally argue that wars that are long and/or have

77 Werner, “Choosing Demands Strategically,” 723.
high casualties are much less likely to recur because the costs were so high the first time and revealed information which was not available prior to the conflict.\footnote{Fearn, “Fighting Rather than Bargaining,” 31; Smith and Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” 809–10.}

In the case of the Kurds of Iraq, the duration and intensity of war process cannot account for the fragility of post-1992 peace because there was no conflict between just those two parties before 1994; however, the duration of the war can account for the durability of peace post-1998. The PUK and KDP had been arguing on and off since 1975, when the parties initially split, but had not ever fought one another. This means that by 1992—when the 50-50 Agreement was signed—the PUK and KDP would not have been aware of each other’s capabilities.\footnote{Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 171–202; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 16–80.} The decision to fight was then based in part on a mutual optimism on both sides that they could defeat the other in combat as they had both been largely effective in waging attacks on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.\footnote{Fey and Ramsay, “Mutual Optimism and War,” 750–51.}

Estimates for the total number of fatalities during the Kurdish Civil War range from 2,000 to 5,000 during the three years of combat (1994-1997), with most sources agreeing it was probably closest to 3,000.\footnote{“Timeline”; Hampson and Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention, Appendix 4.1; “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds,” 1; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations; Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31.} On average then, the Kurdish Civil War fits the definition for war from the Correlates of War project which specifies that there must be a total of at least 1,000 battle deaths during each year, an effective resistance, and commitment from both sides of the conflict.\footnote{Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars,” 5.} However, it barely reaches the level to qualify as a war, so that necessarily disqualifies this conflict from the argument that high casualties preserve the peace.
The length of the war does provide a compelling argument here for the peace maintenance. While three years may not seem like a long, drawn-out conflict, the Iraqi Kurdish civil war came on the heels of almost 50 years of non-stop conflict with the government in Baghdad. 86 Three years seems to be all that was necessary for the two parties to reveal the information which had been unknown before the war.

Third-party Involvement

Third parties often shape war and peace, and are usually associated with the “institutionalist camp” as they try to create the circumstances in which a peace could hold. Third-party involvement occurs at two key stages: (i) before the inception of peace through pressure/coercive mediation87 and (ii) after the peace was achieved through peace guarantees or spoiling. When external actors raise the costs of war through threats of punishment or promises of benefits in exchange for peace, they expand the bargaining range, making peace a more attractive option even in the presence of bargaining failures. Often, pressure for peace has a short-term impact because in most cases third-party attention ultimately wanes and the costs they imposed dissipate,88 though there are some notable exceptions, e.g. the US keeps the peace between Israel and Egypt through strategically allocating economic and military aid.89

87 For a long time, facilitative mediation had been viewed as fostering peace; however, more recent work has exposed that only coercive mediation may incentivize peace. Fey and Ramsay, “When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute?”
Coercive mediation, or manipulation, as defined by Beardsley et al., is the process of a mediator increasing immediate costs of continuing conflict and the future costs of reneging.\(^\text{90}\) In cases of coercive mediation, agreements are often accepted more out of concern for the penalties that could be imposed than satisfaction with the terms of the agreement. Thus, belligerents are more likely to return to conflict after coercive mediation or pressure for peace than in the “organic” cases where external parties did not pressure for peace during fighting.\(^\text{91}\)

The peace process between the two Kurdish parties was long and arduous, but while mediators were attempting to facilitate most of those talks, coercive measures were not used. Additionally, the two parties were able to fight until they converged in mutual expectation of parity enough that they started their own peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings.\(^\text{92}\)

Walter shows that civil wars in particular rarely end with a peace agreement due to the need for an agreement guarantor, an external party which will remain active to ensure compliance by both parties. Different from, but sometimes in addition to, coercive mediators in that they don’t manipulate the terms of the agreement, instead they ensure that both parties continue to abide by the agreement made. Guarantors eventually tend to lose interest in maintaining an agreement, and when they do, the chance for conflict reignition is highly likely.\(^\text{93}\)

For the Iraqi Kurds, there was no designated agreement guarantor. The US and Turkish embassy officials visited Kurdistan on June 10, 2000, almost two years after the signing of the Washington Agreement at which time the two parties reaffirmed their commitment.\(^\text{94}\) However,  

\(^{90}\) Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” 64.  
\(^{92}\) Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 134–36.  
this was the only time the US or another party played any role in the Kurdish conflict which could approach guarantor.

Aside from being a guarantor or coercive mediator, a third party can take on the role of facilitator for peace talks. Facilitators must be invited to aid in an agreement and as such do not exert any pressure on belligerents, but once there, they serve as a channel of communication among the parties. For a long time, facilitative mediation had been viewed as fostering peace by revealing all options available to the belligerents; however more recent work has exposed that facilitative mediators cannot make the belligerents (without resorting to pressure) reveal the information that the latter prefer to hide. This means that facilitative mediation cannot precipitate peace: in the cases where facilitative mediation coincides with ceasefire, the belligerents were ready to settle.

For the Iraqi Kurds, the US, Turkey, Iran, and the UK all served as facilitators for some part of the peace process between the PUK and the KDP. With respect to the Washington Agreement, the US played the role of facilitator given that the Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings during February-June 1998 laid the groundwork for the peace process between the KDP and PUK, after which the US facilitated the final agreement, which would be impossible without the long one-on-one negotiations between the KDP and PUK.

The presence of peacekeepers keeps the costs of fighting high while they are present, often, though not always, as a function of an agreement guarantor. Peacekeeping works to

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95 Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” 63.
96 Fey and Ramsay, “When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute?”
lengthen negative peace when most other attempts to keep the peace have already been made. Iraqi Kurdistan hosted several different groups of de facto peacekeepers, but most were not present to keep the peace between the KDP and the PUK. The UN Guards Contingent in Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort peacekeepers, and Oil-for-food administrators were all present to prevent Baghdad from attacking the Kurds, not to prevent the KDP and the PUK from fighting each other. Once, in 1996, Turkish peace enforcers were tasked with maintaining a peace agreement between the two parties, but they did not prevent armed conflict from recurring.

Finally, third parties can serve as spoilers for peace, attacking in an effort to convince the enemy that the moderates who support them are untrustworthy in an attempt to disrupt peace talks. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) served as a classic spoiler for the peace process between the Iraqi Kurdish parties at least once, when they attacked the KDP in order to break up peace talks in 1995.

Provisions of Peace Agreements (Non-power-sharing)

Still other scholars, those squarely in the institutionalist camp, argue that it is the contents of peace agreements which make the difference between recurrence of war and the endurance of peace. Fortna demonstrates that agreements which include measures that alter the incentives of breaking the agreement—such as formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping forces, creation of

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100 Bengio, *The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State*, 239.
demilitarized zones, withdrawal of forces, etc.—lengthen the peace and lessen the likelihood of a return to conflict by increasing the cost of return war and reducing the uncertainty about intentions and actions (information problem.)

Mattes and Savun come to a similar conclusion—carefully constructed peace agreements prevent the recurrence of war by mitigating the information problem. However, Mattes and Savun focus more on third-parties which serve as agreement guarantors as the mechanism which can ensure that parties do not return to war.

In examining the effects of non-power-sharing aspects of peace agreements, the selection camp points out that the simple absence of conflict (negative peace) is not evidence that an agreement has made a difference because the parties elected to sign the agreements and thus likely would have maintained peace regardless. To argue that the agreement made a difference, one must demonstrate evidence of observable effects which could not have been predicted when the parties signed the agreement.

In the case of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, the Washington Agreement itself did not include any of the conventional mechanisms tested by Fortna, and Mattes and Savun. There was a ceasefire, negotiated in 1997, but it was not necessarily a part of the Washington Agreement, and did not set up a formal demilitarized zone. Additionally, arms control and peacekeepers were not present as part of the Washington Agreement. Although international troops were in the region due to various humanitarian campaigns, they were not there to maintain the peace and

\[105\] Makovsky, “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment”; Howard, “Kurdish Rivals Agree Pact after Pressure from US.”
ensure compliance with the agreement.\textsuperscript{106} This means that conventional peace agreement measures are unlikely to account for the length of the peace post-1998. Additionally, while the Washington Agreement was brokered with the aid of the United States, they did not play the role of agreement guarantor, meaning the United States did not serve as an enforcing power to ensure compliance of the parties with agreement stipulations.

**Institutional Power-sharing Agreements (Consociationalism)**

Consociationalism—the brokering of power-sharing agreements as a solution for ending civil wars—focuses on ameliorating the commitment and information problems on an ongoing basis after the conflict has concluded by creating a system of governance in which both parties get a measure of control commensurate with their strength and are required to work together in the business of governing.\textsuperscript{107} In essence, a power-sharing agreement captures many, if not all, of the mechanisms Fortna discusses which decrease the likelihood of war, such as altering incentives, reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and controlling fallout from accidental violations.\textsuperscript{108}

Hartzell argues that power-sharing agreements address the concern that one party will ultimately gain control of a greater portion of power as the institutions are built or rebuilt.\textsuperscript{109} Furthermore, Hartzell and Hoddie demonstrate that the more diverse the power-sharing agreement across sectors—usually political, economic, territorial, and military—the more

\textsuperscript{106} Gunter, *Historical Dictionary of the Kurds*, 286; Katzman and Blanchard, “Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations.”


\textsuperscript{108} Fortna, “Scraps of Paper?,” 342.

\textsuperscript{109} Hartzell, “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars,” 7.
enduring the peace will be.\textsuperscript{110} Therefore, power-sharing agreements—as their proponents argue—do not simply formalize the arrangements that otherwise would have been reached by the two sides of the conflicts (as the selection camp would argue), but influence the outcome and likelihood of a return to conflict (as the institutionalist camp would suggest.)

Aziz argues that power-sharing agreements create conditions in which all parties are at least partial winners, reducing the perception that elections and democratic entanglement is a zero-sum game for a slightly weaker party.\textsuperscript{111} However, Aziz notes that power-sharing agreements serve first to end violence, they do not then place emphasis on building democracy.\textsuperscript{112} Aziz is not alone in this assessment of power-sharing agreements, most theorists that study the effectiveness of power-sharing agreements for establishing peace, which is defined as the cessation of armed conflict, or, negative peace, agree with him. What goes unexamined is the ability for power-sharing agreements to foster collaboration between the combatant parties, or establishing positive peace. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is all the more interesting because their power-sharing agreements were geared towards achieving greater democracy within their region, and the outcome of this agreement has been a deepening collaboration between the PUK and KDP.

Gareth Stansfield posits that consociational theories can be used to analyze the reasons behind the political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s and the subsequent stability of the later 1990s.\textsuperscript{113} Stansfield argues that in the short term, the natural division between the party’s administrative regions has created an ideal situation, but that further rapprochement may

\textsuperscript{110} Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace,” 318–19.
\textsuperscript{111} Aziz, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan}, 85.
\textsuperscript{112} Aziz, 88–89.
\textsuperscript{113} Stansfield, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan}, 20.
not be successful given the internal competition and the external pressures against Kurds gaining power. However, he does suggest that slow moving unification is not only a possibility but a necessity for maintaining peace long-term.  

Both these arguments rest on an understanding of power-sharing agreements as powerful in their own right, uninformed by the context in which they are created. Stansfield then misses the selection argument, in which case the Kurdish parties might have maintained peace without unification, or may have created a fast-moving unification because they select in to agreements they eventually sign.

Stansfield isn’t alone in this disregard for the selection argument. Most power-sharing theorists seem to fall more in line with an institutionalist perspective. But in order to show that these agreements have some sort of independent impact we have to show that there is evidence of effects that were not anticipated when the original agreements were signed.

In the case of the Kurds, we can see that the 50-50 Agreement which did not allow for renegotiation and provides no opportunities for the parties to experience deeper collaboration between them, or adjustment of the agreement according to changes in their context, is not successful given the outbreak of war in 1994. As such, it is possible that the purposefully ambiguous language of the Washington Agreement also contributed towards preserving negative peace and deepening a ceasefire into positive peace.

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114 Stansfield, 178–79.
III

CASE ANALYSIS

Analytical Approach

This thesis uses a qualitative, within-case study of cooperation (or lack thereof) between KDP and PUK that followed two cases of peace agreements (both power-sharing). This within-case variation (armed conflict after the 1992 agreement and long-term peace after the 1998 agreement) allows me to compare the effects of my independent variables (1) contextual factors, e.g., the costs imposed by third parties, the duration and intensity of warfare, and (2) the provisions of these agreements, ambiguity in the exact integration of structures, on my dependent variables (1) the presence or absence of peace (negative peace) and (2) the quality of cooperation (positive peace).

The advantage of within-case analysis lies in comparison of how the outlined independent variables shaped war after 1992 and peace after 1998 without having to account for the possible effects of different governing parties, cultures, and other variables which could impact a cross-case analysis. In addition, a within-case study requires that the previous agreements, once examined as texts, become context for future agreements.

Table 1 lists the independent variables whose impact this study examines. The three columns separate the events of 1992 vs. 1998 vs. 2006—the three years during which major agreements between the PUK and KDP were reached. Each row in Table 1 outlines an independent variable. Table 1 first lists the context-related independent variables: humanitarian campaigns, regional influences, military maneuvers, and active foreign forces in the region.
Table 1 also includes a breakdown of content-related independent variables, i.e., the agreement components present in (or absent from) the 1992 50-50 Agreement, the 1998 Washington Agreement, and the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context-related independent variables</strong>&lt;sup&gt;115&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated by/with a third-party</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Influences</td>
<td>Iran and Turkey</td>
<td>Iran, Turkey and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)</td>
<td>Iran and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPC forces (1991-1996)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party Leadership involvement</th>
<th>Opportunity for Integration</th>
<th>Communication between parties</th>
<th>Judiciary structure</th>
<th>Executive structure</th>
<th>Legislative structure</th>
<th>Financial control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Office of president never activated</td>
<td>50/50 split in the seats, leftover 5 to the minority parties</td>
<td>Not given to the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministries split 50/50 between the parties</td>
<td>Assembly structure un-dictated, elections mandated</td>
<td>Single Minister of Revenue and Taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Language in the agreement ambiguous, ultimately settled with two executives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unification of ministries, Position: Vice President created</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unchanged as to structure, Speaker and PM given party mandates &amp; rotation schedule</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, regional budget to be prepared by the unified KRG. Ministry of Finance to unite w/in a year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military control</th>
<th>Not given to government</th>
<th>Powers given to government to unify, action still un taken</th>
<th>Ministry of <em>Peshmerga</em> to unite w/in a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Unmandated</td>
<td>Mandated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supreme commission to be established to institutionalize policy and security agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Events of 1992 to 2006 to be Analyzed

From 1992 to 2006, the Kurds in Iraq were involved in a long series of events, outlined in Table 3, that comprised both conflict (section 3.3.1) and peace processes (section 3.3.2). There were nearly as many peace-building events as there were conflict events between the two parties and outlining the full chronology of what happened in 1992-2006 helps identify how the context informed the agreements and how the agreements informed the context.


The establishment of the no-fly zone in 1991 created an environment relatively free of Saddam’s influence, so the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq agreed to hold elections to establish an autonomous Kurdish government. The elections took place in May 1992, and despite being run by a people who were relatively unfamiliar with democratic traditions, they were remarkably free and fair.\textsuperscript{117} The results of the parliamentary election did not fit the expectations of either party. The KDP who had expected to get upwards of 70 percent of the vote, ended up with 50.22 percent. Meanwhile, the PUK had expected to receive 55 to 60 percent of the vote and received 49.78 percent.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, the election numbers for president, a

\textsuperscript{117} Bengio, “Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective,” 177; Leezenberg, “Chapter 8,” 150.
\textsuperscript{118} Aziz, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan}, 85; Gunter, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq}, 92.
race between Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, were too close to call and required a
second round of voting in order to select a president, but second round voting never took
place.\textsuperscript{119}

In the wake of these disappointing election results for all, the Kurdish Front set
about negotiating and developed the 50-50 Agreement in an effort to keep the fledgling
democracy alive.\textsuperscript{120} As part of the agreement, the PUK and KDP each received 50 seats
in the 105-seat Kurdish National Assembly (KNA), and the remaining five were allocated
to the Assyrian Christian minority.\textsuperscript{121} At the time of announcement of the 50-50
Agreement, Barzani and Talabani said that “the elections were a victory for everyone.”
However, later Talabani admitted that no one was truly satisfied with this outcome.\textsuperscript{122}

As part of the 50-50 Agreement, the KDP was required to share revenue with the
PUK. Due to the geographic positioning of the two parties, the KDP controlled the
lucrative border crossing with Turkey, which brought in between $100,000 to $150,000
per day accounting for 85 percent of the KRG’s revenues.\textsuperscript{123} Due to Iraqi sanctions on the
Kurdistan region, much of this was illicit. The PUK was less advantageously positioned
on the Iranian border, which was not as involved in trade with Iraq, illicit or otherwise.
Therefore, the most available income for the Kurds in Iraq at this time was the border

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gunter, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq}, 92; Leezenberg, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society,” 638.
\item Gunter, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq}, 92.
\item Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq,” 4; Qadir, “Iraqi Kurdistan’s Downward Spiral,” 1; Balik, \textit{Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars}, 75; Gumustekin, “Patterns of Support of Ethnic Violent Groups by Co-Ethnic Groups,” 42.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
money from trade with Turkey, and to a lesser extent the foreign assistance programs in the region.\textsuperscript{124}

This collaboration between the two parties even extended to a joint offensive with Turkey against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)—the Turkish Kurdish rebel group—which was hiding in the Iraqi Kurdish territory. Turkey began the offensive on October 16, 1991, and the PUK and KDP joined on October 21, for the relatively short-lived campaign. The PKK later surrendered to the Iraqi Kurdish Front, more specifically the PUK on October 30.\textsuperscript{125}

1994-1995—Conflict and Broken Peace Talks

In May of 1994, after much complaining about the KDP withholding funds, and some increased dispute about land ownership, the PUK attacked.\textsuperscript{126} For one month the KDP and PUK fought, resulting in more than 400 killed and the KDP seizing Dohuk, Zakho, and Ammadiya from the PUK.\textsuperscript{127} After this initial fighting, they instituted a brief (merely hours long) ceasefire, before clashes resumed lasting until June 6. During these

\textsuperscript{124} Hannum, “Recent Developments,” 484.
\textsuperscript{127} Černy, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations}, 190; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, \textit{Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine}, 237.
clashes, more than 600 people were killed. On July 4, 1994, the KDP and PUK announced that they were still unified against the Iraqi Government despite their clashes. In part, however, these clashes may have been started because Baghdad was no longer a unifying foe as US enforced safe haven kept Baghdad out of the Kurdish territories and removed them as an active joint enemy to keep the PUK and KDP in cooperation with one another.

Shortly after the announcement, France, the UK, and the US made their first attempts to broker peace between the KDP and PUK in Paris from July 16-22, 1994. Two factors prevented the Paris Peace talks from brokering an agreement. First Turkey, upset about global power’s intervention into their region without involving them, and reluctant to let a Kurdish state develop, refused Talabani and Barzani the exit visas they needed to go to Paris to sign the accords. Second, clashes once again broke out between the PUK and the KDP beginning on July 19, 1994.

Clashes continued until August 15, 1994, when the PUK and KDP reached a ceasefire, but it was short-lived with clashes starting again less than 72 hours later on August 17. They tried again on November 21, 1994 and reached the “Alliance Pac” or the “Year 2000 Agreement” wherein they agreed not to fight until the year 2000;

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128 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
129 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
130 Plotz, “The Kurds.”
132 Balik, Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars, 77.
133 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
however, this agreement lasted only until December 13, 1994 when another dispute over tax collection sparked further conflict. During this round of fighting, the PUK captured the village of Kasnazan near Erbil (the Iraqi Kurdish seat of government) and then managed to take Erbil from the KDP on January 1, 1995.\footnote{Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 236; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”} Fighting continued until February 17, 1995 when an informal cease fire between the PUK and the KDP ended fighting for a few days until heavy fighting resumed from February 20-22.\footnote{Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 237.}

On the eve of the Kurdish New Year (Nowruz\footnote{Also spelled Newroz}, Turkey launched Operation Steel, a military operation which attacked the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 20, 1995.\footnote{“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 222.} This operation lasted until May 4, and, in the middle of that offensive the PUK and KDP clashed for four hours on March 27, 1995 resulting in 10 deaths. On April 8, 1995, the KDP called for a temporary truce with the PUK, brokered by Turkey.\footnote{“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”} Turkey’s withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan in May was short lived as they launched another offensive against the PKK from July 4-11, 1995. During Turkey’s latest offensive the PUK began to be wary of the KDP, which had been working with Turkey and launched a preemptive attack on July 8, 1995.\footnote{Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 225; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”}
Late 1995—The Drogheda Talks

In June 1995, an US State Department official visited Iraqi Kurdistan to invite the parties to talks in Ireland sponsored by the US, UK and Turkey. From August 11-15, 1995 the parties participated in the first session of the Drogheda talks, during which a preliminary agreement was reached. However, the content was the same as had been the meat of other agreements which had failed because interpretations varied between the parties as to the meaning of certain clauses; in particular those concerning revenue sharing—the PUK’s ongoing concern over KDP’s monopolization of the Kurd’s main source of income along the Turkish border—and the KDP’s demands that the PUK end military occupation of Erbil.

In the midst of negotiations, the PKK attacked the KDP on August 26, 1995 in an effort to break up the peace talks taking place in Ireland. The PKK knew that if the PUK and the KDP were able to reach an agreement, their safe haven would be compromised since the attention of the Kurds in Iraq would not be divided, and they would then be in a position to remove the PKK from their territory. Combined with language which did not address the true conflicts, the second negotiation period from September 11-15 failed to secure an agreement of any kind.

141 Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq.”
143 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 32; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 191; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 216; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
After the Drogheda talks failed, Iran invited the Kurdish parties to Tehran in October 1995 to reach an agreement. While there are reports that an agreement of some sorts was reached, the reports are unclear as to the nature of the agreement, and on the whole, nothing came of it.\textsuperscript{145} US sponsored peace talks resumed on November 13 and 21, 1995, but they also ended without reaching an agreement.\textsuperscript{146} The US tried again on April 18, 1996, when they sent US State Department official Robert Deutsch to Northern Iraq to try to broker a settlement, but no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{147}

1996—Saddam’s Involvement in the Conflict

On August 16, 1996, the PUK broke the relative peace between the two parties and attacked the KDP. As a result, the KDP turned to Saddam for support on August 22, 1996.\textsuperscript{148} On August 28, the PUK and KDP agreed to a new US brokered ceasefire and further agreed to work towards a more comprehensive settlement. However, this only lasted until August 31, when the Iraqi forces arrived to aid the KDP in the fight against the PUK.\textsuperscript{149}

It is with this support that the KDP was able to retain control of Erbil, which they had lost in early 1995, and further took the PUK stronghold of Sulaymaniyah on
September 9. The support of the Iraqi fighting forces was technically in violation of
UNSC Resolution 688, and the safe haven established by the US and allies, resulting in
US strikes in the south of Iraq.\textsuperscript{150} On October 13, the PUK, with assistance from Iran,
took back Sulaymaniyah and two other small towns just prior to the 10-point Agreement,
a ceasefire brokered by the US and Turkey on October 2. The agreement returned the
ceasefire line to the precombat location between Degala and Koysanjaq in the first of the
Ankara Process negotiations.\textsuperscript{151}

1996-1997—The Ankara Process

The Ankara process was a series of peace negotiations brokered in Turkey by the
US, UK, and Turkey in October 1996, and January, March, and May 1997.\textsuperscript{152} In the
midst of these talks, on May 14, 1997, 50,000 Turkish troops invaded Iraqi Kurdistan to
wage Operation Sledgehammer against PKK camps in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{153} On July 10, the
PUK withdrew from the Ankara process citing Turkish involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan
and including bias towards, and support for, the KDP.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{150} Graham and Balz, “Iraqi Attack Raises U.S. ‘Concern’”; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Plotz,
“The Kurds.”
\textsuperscript{151} Stansfield, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan}, 99; Yildiz, \textit{The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future}, 48–49;
Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, \textit{Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and
Palestine}, 237; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
\textsuperscript{152} Stansfield, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan}, 99; Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and
Peace Process 1964-2000,” 226; Balik, \textit{Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord
during the Iraq Wars}, 120; Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 253.
\textsuperscript{153} Černy, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations}, 191; Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in
Historical Perspective,” 32; Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 253.
\textsuperscript{154} Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 255.
Starting in September 1997, the PKK and KDP fought resulting in considerable losses for KDP. Then, on September 23, the Turkish army in cooperation with the KDP attacked the PUK in a campaign known as “Operation Twilight.” The operation ended on October 13, and Turkish troops withdrew, but on the heels of Turkish withdrawal, the PUK launched a military campaign against the KDP known as the “Storm of Revenge” or “Operation Vengeance Storm.”

The campaign continued for five days and was supposed to conclude on October 18 after the US brokered a ceasefire; however, the signing of the agreement was followed by some skirmishes in which members of both sides were killed. Fighting continued between the PUK and the KDP even when the KDP declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 24.

1998—The Koya/Shaqlawa Process and the Washington Agreement

In December of 1997 and January of 1998, the two Kurdish leaders, Talabani and Barzani, begin trading letters which served as the foundation for an endemic peace process between the two parties known as the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings. Historical records indicate that increased Turkish and PKK involvement frustrated the two parties

155 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
158 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
159 Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 134–35; Balik, Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars, 120–22.
and they realized that their conflict was being manipulated by both parties for their own benefit; the PKK so as to keep their safe haven and Turkey so it could continue to attack the PKK.

On February 12, 1998 this peace process began in earnest when delegations from both the KDP and the PUK met in Shaqalawa, the first of a series of meetings which took place every two weeks with the location rotating between Shaqalawa in KDP territory and Koysanjaq (Koya) in PUK territory. These meetings worked to develop confidence building measures between the two parties including prisoner exchanges, enforcing the ceasefire, ending media attacks and establishment of a joint committee to ensure implementation of SCR 986 (oil-for-food).160 However the talks deadlocked over the main issues of territory, revenue-sharing, and military in June of 1998 at which time the meetings became much less frequent.161

In July, the US sent State Department official David Walsh to Kurdistan to invite the two parties to a final set of negotiations meant to create a comprehensive peace settlement. Using the Koya/Shaqalawa agreements as a baseline, the Washington talks developed a power-sharing agreement which included measures addressing the knotty issues that had deadlocked the previous talks. In the company of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Talabani and Barzani announced the signing of the Washington

Agreement on September 17, 1998, ending a three-year conflict that resulted in 2,000-5,000 casualties on either side.\textsuperscript{162}

While the Washington Agreement is on paper a power-sharing agreement meant to unify the two parties, it was in practice a robust ceasefire agreement, at least at first. The PUK and KDP ultimately had different governorates which they controlled and governed separately until the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement. Both parties also maintained their own peshmergas.\textsuperscript{163} However, even a veneer of cooperation and a halt to military combat through the Washington process, enabled them to keep Turkey, the PKK and Iran out of their affairs for a time because of US protection. In doing so, this period where both parties were administering their own regions was helpful when unification occurred because there were double the number of civil servants with experience to lend to the process.\textsuperscript{164}

1999-2003—Challenges to the Washington Agreement

Almost immediately upon the PUK and KDP signing the Washington Agreement, the PKK moved back into Iraqi Kurdistan territory, which put a strain on the agreement since both parties had agreed not to provide any support to the PKK.\textsuperscript{165} The PKK


\textsuperscript{163} Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change, 51; Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 131–39.

\textsuperscript{164} Stansfield, “Governing Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division,” 199, 204.

\textsuperscript{165} Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 67.
presence continued to be a problem for implementation of the Agreement even after Turkey captured Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in February 1999,\textsuperscript{166} because Barzani accused the PUK of helping the PKK in April of 1999.\textsuperscript{167}

Even without the added tension from the PKK, the parties continued to meet to implement the agreement, and hold each other responsible for non-implementation, as the PUK did in June 1999.\textsuperscript{168} On June 10, 2000 the PUK and KDP reaffirmed their commitment to the Washington Agreement when US and Turkish embassy officials visited Iraqi Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{169}

Over the course of the next few years, the two parties operated their separate regions, but would jointly participate in many initiatives and projects, including a joint operation room to address terrorism in the region,\textsuperscript{170} a coalition with other Iraqi groups on the future of Iraq in the event of a US-led military intervention,\textsuperscript{171} a joint federal project in September 2002 that drew Turkish attention and warning,\textsuperscript{172} the Kurdistan National Assembly resuming,\textsuperscript{173} and the opening of offices in each other’s regions as a sign of reconciliation on February 8, 2003.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{166}Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 33; Gunter, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Kurds}, xxviii, 209.


\textsuperscript{170}Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 266, 276.

\textsuperscript{171}Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, \textit{Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine}, 236.

\textsuperscript{172}Bengio, “Iraqi Kurds,” 276.


\textsuperscript{174}Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 276.
2003-2006—The US Invasion: The Kurds and a new Iraq

From 2000-2003, the US continued to be very involved with the Iraqi Kurds. Including Kurdish leaders meeting with several high-ranking US officials: Vice President Al Gore in June 2000, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2000, and President George W. Bush in April 2002. On August 15, 2002, Talabani even issued a public invitation to the US and the UK to invade Iraq from PUK territory. And both the KDP and PUK announced their intention to join the US invasion forces in the war on Iraq on February 15, 2003; there was once again a reason to coalesce against a greater enemy. Many scholars point to the US invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 as crucial in the process of normalizing relations between the PUK and the KDP.

Post-2003 the US seems less involved in Kurdish affairs, and more involved in Iraqi governmental affairs writ large, organizing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and successors, the Iraqi Governing Council and the interim Iraqi Government. As such, the US does not seem to apply any undue pressure for the KDP and the PUK to unite their governorates.

Instead, this seems to come as a result of a Kurdish codification in the Iraqi constitution as one regional governorate with reasonable independence, and the need to

175 Bengio, 265, 266, 276.
177 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 266.
be perceived as strong by their counterparts in the Iraqi government as well as the international onlookers. The announcement of a unified KRG came mere weeks before the announcement of a permanent Iraqi government—one on May 7, 2006 and the other on May 20. While the US did not put any pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish parties towards unification, the 2003 invasion laid the groundwork for their eventual unification.

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Table 2: Peace Negotiations in Iraqi Kurdistan (1987-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Initiating party</th>
<th>Most recent conflict</th>
<th>Immediately following conflict</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Other country</th>
<th>Agreement type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1987</td>
<td>Kurdistan Front</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1987 Popular Kurdish uprising against Iraqi Government</td>
<td>1990 uprising against Iraqi government</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Fighting Coalition against Saddam Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>50-50 Agreement</td>
<td>KDP-PUK</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK attacks 5/1994</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Power-sharing peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/16-22/94</td>
<td>Paris Peace Talks</td>
<td>US/UK</td>
<td>5/3/94 KDP takes Dohuk, Zakho &amp; Ammadiya</td>
<td>7/19-8/18/94 sporadic clashes between parties</td>
<td>Yes—doesn’t allow visas for Kurdish leaders to sign agreement</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td>France (host)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/15/94</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>Ongoing clashes since 8/18/94</td>
<td>8/17/94</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Ceasefire (lasts less than 72 hours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/94</td>
<td>Alliance pact (Year 2000 agreement)</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>8/17/94</td>
<td>12/13/94</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Ceasefire/peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/11-15/95</td>
<td>Drogheda talks</td>
<td>US, State dept</td>
<td>7/8/95 PUK preemptive</td>
<td>8/26/1995 PKK attacks KDP to break</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Ireland (host)</td>
<td>Preliminary Agreement reached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Attack on KDP</td>
<td>Up peace talks</td>
<td>Ireland (host)</td>
<td>Other Remarks</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11-15/95</td>
<td>Drogedia talks</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>8/26/1995 PKK attacks KDP to break up peace talks</td>
<td>None recorded before next peace talks</td>
<td>None reached</td>
<td>Ireland (host)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/95</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>None recorded between peace talks</td>
<td>None recorded before next peace talks</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13-21/95</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>None recorded between peace talks</td>
<td>None recorded before next peace talks</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/18/96</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>None recorded between peace talks</td>
<td>8/16-31/96 Erbil taken by KDP with help from Iraqi Forces</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/96</td>
<td>10-Point Agreement, first phase of Ankara process</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>10/13/96</td>
<td>None recorded before next peace talks</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16/97-3/11/97</td>
<td>Ankara Process</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>None recorded between peace talks</td>
<td>3/16/97 KDP official murdered, PUK denies responsibility</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/97</td>
<td>Ankara process continued</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>3/11/97 KDP official murdered</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>None reached</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/97</td>
<td>KDP official murdered</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/10/97 PUK withdraws from Ankara Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/98</td>
<td>Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>10/13/97 Storm of Revenge</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Meetings—&gt; confidence building measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/98</td>
<td>Washington Agreement</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Power-sharing/ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(following Koya-Shaqlawa Meetings)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1/8/99</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Implementation meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10/2000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>9/14/2000 PUK and PKK fight</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>US and Turkish Embassy officials visit Kurdistan, KDP/PUK reaffirm commitment to Washington Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/23/2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Publish draft joint federal project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8/2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>KDP and PUK open offices in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Region 1</td>
<td>Region 2</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/1/2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>3/20/2003 US invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/21/2006</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7/2006</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement</td>
<td>PUK/KDP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PUK and KDP sign agreement to participate in Iraqi elections as allies.

KNA reaches agreement to reunify the divided KRG administration.

Unification agreement added to 1998 agreement.
Analyzing the Case through the Selection and Institutionalist Prisms

Having outlined the events of 1992 to 2006, this section presents the qualitative examination of these events pursuing the overarching research question of this thesis: what can account for the failure to institutionalize peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the cultivation of positive peace after the signing of the Washington Agreement in 1998.

My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping the observed outcomes after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998. First, the extensive learning period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting power of each party and the spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement language makes a difference as it provides pathways for institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds inadvertently stumbled on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate governorates and, most importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war more similar to that of an interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more stable arrangement. These three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning periods—wartime and peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the successful establishment of positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement.

**Extensive combat learning period**

The first independent variable I examine is the duration of warfare which allowed the sides to learn their relative military capabilities and resolve. The lack of prolonged engaged warfare between the KDP and the PUK before 1992 and the experience of intense fighting in
1994 to 1997 influenced the failure of the 1992 agreement and shaped the duration of peace after 1998, because warfare allowed the sides to learn about each other’s military strength as well as to learn about the intentions and resolve of their international backers as spoilers rather than supporters of the peace process.

*Evenly matched groups (Stalemate)*

Prior to 1992, the KDP and PUK did not directly engage in skirmishes with one another. There was always a greater foe, Baghdad, which drew the attention and violence of the two parties. There was animosity between them, as seen by their reticence to create an alliance to fight their common enemy on top of years of internecine disagreement. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict they briefly teamed up in the Iraqi Kurdish Front which allowed them the coalition to create the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992.\(^{182}\)

However, because the two parties never engaged directly with one another after they split in 1975, they did not have a clear understanding of each other’s fighting strength in 1992. Their long-standing animosity for each other without direct military engagement in combination with their experience engaging militarily with Baghdad created “mutual optimism” for war in 1994.\(^{183}\) Because both parties had only fought the Iraqi government pre-1992, the agreement did not meet any of their expectations. This was especially true with respects to the popularity they expected to enjoy at the ballot box, given that reports and interviews indicate the PUK expected to win between 55 and 60 percent of the vote while the KDP expected to receive 70 percent and the smaller parties affiliated with the Kurdish Front also expected to do better than they did.\(^{184}\) Thus,


\(^{183}\) Fey and Ramsay, “Mutual Optimism and War,” 750–51.

\(^{184}\) Gunter, *The Kurds of Iraq*, 92.
both sides miscalculated expecting to prevail in armed conflict rather than compromising under the 50-50 Agreement.

Engaging in skirmishes for three years with various international backers—the PUK most often enjoying support from Iran, the PKK and Syria (for a short time), while the KDP enjoyed support from Turkey and Baghdad\textsuperscript{185}—informed the two parties that they were relatively well matched on every level militarily.\textsuperscript{186} The PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in October 1997 was the final showcase for understanding that the two parties could not defeat each other, even with the aid of international backers.\textsuperscript{187} Additionally, the conflict over the three years had simply been a tit for tat. The PUK would seize territory only to have the KDP take it back in the next offensive, and vice versa. In short, in a post-war Iraqi Kurdistan, the two parties understood their limitations and they were able to reach an agreement that more fully fit their expectations.

\textit{Peace Spoilers (Turkey, PKK, Iran)}

The extensive fighting period also provided an opportunity for the PUK and KDP to come to understand the role that Turkey, the PKK, and Iran played as spoilers in their peace process. Prior to 1992, the support from outside backers was both plentiful and welcome in the fight against Baghdad.\textsuperscript{188} As a result, support for the parties during the conflict was not only normal, it was expected. It took time for both parties to learn the ulterior motives that Turkey—

\textsuperscript{185} Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 171.
\textsuperscript{187} Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 134.
\textsuperscript{188} Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31, 38; Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 171; Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations”; Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage?,” 97; “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds.”
who was heavily involved in Kurdish matters\textsuperscript{189}—and to a certain extent Iran—as the other, less involved regional power\textsuperscript{190}—had in supporting either of the Kurdish parties.

In the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, and still trying to build a new identity as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran was less involved in Iraqi Kurdish affairs than it had been in the past. But it, along with Turkey, was still invested in whatever came of the Kurdish struggle in Iraq given that an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan would have ripple effects among the Kurds in Iran.

This section presents the major pieces of evidence that demonstrate that Turkey, PKK, and Iran were not interested in a peace settlement between KDP and PUK.

\textsuperscript{189} Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective”; Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq.”

\textsuperscript{190} Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq”; Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 251; Černy, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations}, 166, 191; Charountaki, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government,” 189; Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations,” 2; Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan.”
Turkey

Table 4 presents the peace talks which took place between the Kurdish parties between 1987 and 2006, with specific reference to Turkey’s involvement. The most salient conclusion from this table is that agreements in which Turkey was involved were less successful. While those where Turkey was not a key player, such as the Koya/Shaqlawa, Washington Agreement, and Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement were able to establish lasting peace.

Table 3: Turkish Involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1987</td>
<td>Kurdistan Front</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>50-50 Agreement</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/16-22/1994</td>
<td>Paris Peace Talks</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/15/94</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/94</td>
<td>Alliance pact (Year 2000 agreement)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/11-15/95</td>
<td>Drogheda talks</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11-15/95</td>
<td>Drogheda talks</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/95</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13-21/95</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/18/96</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/96</td>
<td>10-Point Agreement</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16/97-3/11/97</td>
<td>Ankara Process</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/97</td>
<td>Ankara process continued</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/98</td>
<td>Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/98</td>
<td>Washington Agreement</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/8/99</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10/2000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/23/2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8/2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/21/2006</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7/2006</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, Turkey became much more involved in the affairs of the Kurds of Iraq during the 90s and in the middle of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War because its own Kurdish insurgents—the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), formed in 1978\textsuperscript{191}—were at this point taking refuge in the Kurdish run territories in Iraq. Their presence in Iraq informed Turkey’s motivation to be the staging ground for Operation Provide Comfort—the US-led effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds—as it gave them free reign to go after the PKK. The US’s attention was focused on providing aid and they were reliant on Turkey’s good will for the continuation of their operations, a circumstance Turkey took advantage of quite frequently.\textsuperscript{192} The first and last of these efforts to wipe out the PKK to take place before the Washington Agreement with the assistance of both the PUK and the KDP was an offensive against the PKK in October of 1992.\textsuperscript{193}

At least once during the Iraqi Kurdish Wars, an action taken by Turkey prevented the signing of a peace agreement that could have ended the war early on. During the 1994 Paris Peace talks, the Turkish Government did not allow Talabani and Barzani the necessary visas to go and sign the accords, in part because Turkey was frustrated with powers such as the US and the UK getting involved in their region.\textsuperscript{194}

But Turkey’s involvement was not limited to this overt attempt to subvert the peace process. It was involved with almost all the peace talks after Paris and before the Washington Agreement (see Table 4), to the extent that it hosted the Ankara Process talks during 1996 and

\textsuperscript{191} Černy, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations}, 147; Gunter, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Kurds}, 207.

\textsuperscript{192} Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan.”

\textsuperscript{193} Černy, \textit{Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations}, 182–83; Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”

\textsuperscript{194} Yildiz, \textit{The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future}, 49; Balik, \textit{Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars}, 77.
During one such negotiation period in May of 1997, Turkey sent 50,000 Turkish troops into northern Iraq to attack some PKK strongholds. This was an overt demonstration that they were not committed to the peace talks they were trying to broker.

In fact, when Talabani and the PUK withdrew from the process later that summer Talabani said, “The Ankara negotiations were foiled on 14 May because of the Turkish-Barzani collusion and their agreement to invade Iraqi Kurdistan on the pretext of chasing terrorists.” Talabani’s statement further demonstrates how Turkey served as a spoiler for peace. At a time when the country was supposedly serving as an unbiased broker for peace, Talabani notes that “Turkey has discarded its neutral role and is now an ally of Barzani.” To which Barzani retorted that the PUK and the PKK “have made an alliance.”

The PKK served as a similar spoiler for peace due to their presence in the region, which was a direct effort to take advantage of the tumult in a majority Kurdish region. The PKK often allied itself with the PUK, as noted by Barzani, but this effort was often passive on the part of the PUK, which simply allowed the PKK to exist in its territory, but not did provide or receive

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197 Gunter, “Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: Their Influence on Neighbouring States and the Kurdish Movements in Surrounding States,” 79.

198 Gunter, 79.

199 Gunter, 80.
support from the PKK. For a time in the early 1990s, the PKK even allied itself with Baghdad, its every action geared towards survival. In August 1995, the PKK launched an attack on the KDP with the express purpose of spoiling the Drogheda talks which were taking place between the KDP and the PUK in Ireland and were initially promising. They did so in an effort to maintain their safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would have disappeared had the PUK and KDP achieved peace because every agreement included provisions which would have ended any cooperation between the PKK and the PUK. Their worries were well founded as the Washington Agreement did strip the PKK of their safe haven.

Iran

Iran and the Kurds have a long relationship before the Kurdish conflict. Most of Iran’s direct involvement and support for the Kurds came during the 1980s when the two Kurdish parties were still trying to (re)establish their reputations after the 1975 split. Iran’s eagerness to support both parties was a result of the Iran-Iraq war, for which Iran saw the two parties as useful proxies.

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201 Černy, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 171.
203 “Text of the Accord Signed by KDP and PUK Leaders in Washington.”
204 Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations.”
This relationship somewhat changed after the war, there was no need for Iran to be as involved in Kurdish affairs, but it did maintain good relationships with both parties even establishing the first offices in the newly established Kurdistan region in 1993. However, Iran also has a substantial population of Kurds, and the establishment of an autonomous region in Northern Iraq was as concerning to them as it was to Turkey. Thus, Iran’s involvement in tripartite talks between themselves, Syria, and Turkey to try and prevent an autonomous Kurdistan from 1992-1995. Meanwhile, Iran was one of the PUK’s most consistent, if quiet, backers as a counterweight to Turkey’s backing of the KDP. Direct Iranian involvement in the Kurdish conflict came only one time when they hosted peace talks in 1995 after the Drogheda talks failed.

KDP and PUK strive to overcome the spoilers’ influence

It was the PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in late 1997 after Turkey’s withdrawal from Operation Sledgehammer that served as the final wake-up call to the two parties as the Turkish backing of the KDP showed just how easily a regional power could involve itself in Kurdish affairs. Additionally, the two parties recognized on a strategic level that unity (or at least a show of it) would be better than letting their division serve as a way for regional powers to get involved in their affairs. It was after the close of this offensive that they started their

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205 Entessar, 2.
206 Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan.”
208 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 38; Prados, “The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq.”
210 Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 134.
endemic peace process in the form of the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings followed by the Washington Process which excluded Turkey as part of the peace process, eliminating them as a biased broker.211

My analysis suggests that the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings in early 1998 did more to develop peace between the PUK and the KDP than other scholars give them credit. Many scholars simply don’t mention this endemic peace process, or when they do, they refer to it in passing and laud the Washington Agreement as the US bringing an end to the conflict. However, the confidence building measures put in place by these bi-weekly meetings did more to establish an atmosphere of cooperation towards the establishment of positive peace than the Washington Agreement would have been able to do on its own, even with the aid of the US. Not to mention, that the two parties were meeting bi-weekly for five months—approximately 10 total meetings, after a series of letters traded between their leaders—to negotiate, already establishing a pattern of negotiation without interference from other spoiler powers like Turkey.212

Extensive peacetime learning period

My analysis shows that learning during peacetime was as important as the learning that took place during conflict. I also argue that two independent variables influence this peacetime learning. First, the ambiguity of the agreement language, specifically found in the Washington Agreement, set the stage for the two parties to be able to learn more about the arrangements that

211 Stansfield, 134–36; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 100–101; Balik, Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars, 120–22.
212 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 100–101; Balik, Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars, 121–22; Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 136.
were necessary and most useful for embedding positive peace in the community. This is in large part due to the extensive negotiations which took place between the Kurds from December 1997 to June 1998 (the Koya/Shaqlawa process) which allowed them to select themselves into language that would most effectively maintain the peace. Second, by establishing two governorates and keeping separate peshmergas the parties stumbled on an effective method for preventing further combat. This because the parties were able to avoid the commitment problem that stems from disarming in addition to their preoccupation learning how to run an effective government.

Strategic Agreement Language

Literature on power-sharing agreements has examined them as powerful peace-keeping measures, given that they ameliorate the commitment problem between two parties of approximately equal strength splitting the political power according to the expectations of each.213 These studies have focused more on ending conflict (i.e. negative peace) and less on institutionalizing peace for the future (positive peace).

I argue that during the warfare period the KDP and PUK were able to learn of their true parity. I further argue that their endemic peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa process, allowed them to utilize what was learned from their previous agreement about ineffective language such that they were able to create a wisely ambiguous agreement that allowed for renegotiation once the elites’ incentives allowed for deeper cooperation. This was possible since they were not the

213 A few scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie) suggest that the more sectors included in power-sharing arrangements, the stronger the agreement.
subjects of coercive mediation which could have pigeon-holed them into language that was too specific and unachievable.

This ambiguity is a form of the flexibility that Werner and Yuen posit is important to ensure that both parties do not feel the need to reignite conflict in the future because they have recourse, such as changing circumstances through negotiation.\textsuperscript{214} For the Kurds, this ambiguous agreement language enabled them to deepen their cooperation over the course of several years rather than all at once; e.g. the establishment of a joint federal project in 2002,\textsuperscript{215} opening offices in each other’s regions in 2003,\textsuperscript{216} and participating in the Iraqi elections in 2004 on a joint ticket.\textsuperscript{217} The lengthy deepening of cooperation transformed what had been a negative peace into a positive peace, which was institutionalized in the community.

\textit{The 50-50 Agreement (1992)}

The 1992 power sharing agreement had a strict and straight-forward structure in both the legislative and executive branches. The 105-seat Kurdistan National Assembly was allocated by the agreement, 50 seats for each party, with the remaining five seats given to the minority parties. However, plans for future elections for these positions were not made at the time of the agreement.

In the executive branch, in an attempt to be flexible, the ministries were run by both parties. Each government department had a minister from one party and a deputy from the other. While the minister was intended to have greater power than the deputy, the power dynamics

\textsuperscript{214} Werner and Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” 289.
\textsuperscript{215} Bengio, \textit{The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State}, 276.
\textsuperscript{216} Bengio, 276.
were such that the minister and deputy had equal power which created deadlock over even the most menial of decisions.218

The election results between Barzani and Talabani for president of the KRG were so slim that a second election was deemed necessary; however, they were never held and the office of president was never activated, in part because of the refusal of the two leaders to hold second elections. Furthermore, the two leaders declined to be involved in the government formed as a result of the 50-50 agreement, but they still exerted influence over the ministries. Given that the leaders were meddling with decisions made by the ministries for the benefit of their own parties and their refusal to engage in the agreement negotiated, the rigidity of the 50-50 Agreement created an untenable situation which soon became too brittle to continue to function well.219

In addition to its inflexible nature, the 50-50 Agreement had at least one other major failure. While the agreement mandated that the parties split their income between them equally, it did not cede control of the money to the main government. This omission laid the groundwork for the fallout that would ultimately cause the PUK to attack the KDP in 1994.220

The 50-50 Agreement was a rudimentary power-sharing agreement, one that did not have the flexibility to withstand the tests of change and disagreement. The ministries were deadlocked due to the ministers and deputies having equal power and both parties then trying to impose their wishes. Thus, without the flexibility to adapt to change, or the willingness of the parties to negotiate, the 50-50 Agreement only had the ability to maintain negative peace, the absence of conflict, for a short while, stopping a seemingly inevitable conflict for at least two years.


After the extensive learning period mentioned above, the Washington Agreement solved for some of the missteps taken in the creation of the 50-50 Agreement. For instance, the Washington Agreement included measures for ongoing discussion and negotiation after the final agreement had been signed, building on the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings which took place prior to the agreement signing.221

The structure of the Kurdistan Regional Assembly was to be determined by elections, which were mandated, rather than seats apportioned by the agreement. Thus, as political winds changed, and party power ebbed and flowed (as demonstrated by the rise of the Gorran party in 2009)222 the legislature would be the measure of democracy that the Kurds were hoping it to be.

Ambiguity in the details about the executive branch was also helpful in allowing them to create a structure that would work for them. In a post-civil war Kurdistan this was the creation of two governorates with separate ministries. This ended up being one of the most effective ways of maintaining and institutionalizing the peace in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and agreement.223

Even with this ambiguity of structure, the agreement included measures that would assure eventual integration. For instance, there was an initial deadline for reintegration, but even in that there was some flexibility. The agreement used phrases such as “on or before” and

221 Stansfield, 193–97.
223 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan; Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq”; Stansfield, “Kurdistan-Iraq: Can the Unified Regional Government Work?”
“beginning”—language which allowed the parties to make changes and work on reintegration in a manner and timeframe which was right for both of them, as long as they could point to some measure of compliance.224

In addition to solving for the inflexibility of the 50-50 Agreement, the Washington Agreement tried to account for the adequate sharing of revenue through the creation of a single minister for revenue and taxation.225 While this part of the agreement was not accomplished before the Unification Agreement in 2006, the inclusion in the Washington Agreement shows just how effective the conflict was as a learning period for creating a more effective power-sharing agreement.


In 2006, the KDP and the PUK determined to reunify their two governorates and in doing so renegotiated the Washington Agreement, something that would not necessarily have been a possibility after the 50-50 Agreement. The two parties were willing to negotiate because they were both trying to gain back some of the reputation they had had with the international community prior to 1994, and they were trying to position themselves as the only competent and trustworthy leaders in a newly forming Iraq, having successfully run their own region for many years. They knew that positioning themselves as a unified front would make both the other Iraqi parties and the international arbiters more likely to trust them.226 The Kurdistan Regional

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225 Stansfield, 195.
Government Unification Agreement is a good example of how ambiguity in the original agreement can lead to effective renegotiation that further institutionalizes peace in the region.

The Unification Agreement not only had the endorsement of both the party leaders, as the 1998 agreement had, but their full participation. In order to assure that the presidency would be activated this time, the Unification Agreement created a position of Vice President as part of the executive branch. Additionally, the ministries were unified under the KRG, with each party in charge of approximately half the ministries—the KDP headed 13 ministries and the PUK headed 14—each controlling two of the four major ministries, Peshmerga & Finance (KDP), Justice and Interior (PUK.) And, once again drawing on the experience of the past, there was specific language in the agreement which encouraged the preparation of a regional budget within one year by the unified KRG.

The structure of the KNA remained largely unchanged from the Washington Agreement, but the Unification Agreement created a rotating schedule for the positions of Speaker and Prime Minister. With every new Assembly, the position of prime minister and speaker were to be from different parties. The designation of a rotating schedule proved most important because the power of the government lies with the prime minister, and for only one party to consistently be in control of the most powerful position, could upset the power-sharing agreement as a whole.

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Building a State Within a State, 287; Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 238.


228 “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.”


230 “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.”

231 “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.”
Finally, the Unification Agreement created joint committees in each of the governorates with members from both the PUK and the KDP. The purpose of these committees was to provide a venue in each of the governorates for resolving any issues that might arise between the parties. This provision of the Unification Agreement again shows that the learning period was effective and the language of the agreement was more tailored to increase the institutionalization of peace in their community. The Kurds created a full committee which was dedicated toward negotiation to settle conflicts that may have arisen in a period of tumult, instead of defaulting to conflict.

The Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement in 2006 is a compelling piece of evidence for the argument that the contents of an agreement actually do make a difference in fostering positive peace in a community. The Washington Agreement helped to shape an environment in which renegotiation instead of conflict was preferable, in part because of the parties’ explicit commitment towards negotiation over fighting in the wake of outside commitments from the US to continue to protect the Kurds from Baghdad’s intervention. Furthermore, the Unification Agreement provided a joint project that enabled the two disparate parties to collaborate in building something new—a unified and vastly more functional government—a core tenet of positive peace.

Importance of Explicit Revenue-Sharing Measures

The Kurdish Civil War hinges on one issue more than any other: revenue sharing. In 1992, the KDP-controlled border with Turkey was providing approximately 85 percent of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues, bringing in approximately 150,000 dollars per day through taxation of oil trucks and illicit trading.²³⁴ The PUK, whose territory bordered Iran, did not have the same access to revenue, and it was therefore very important to them that they receive a fair portion of the revenue received by the KDP.

With this knowledge in mind, the 50-50 Agreement tried to ensure that the KDP was sharing this revenue with the PUK through a mandate that the revenue was split 50-50. But it was only language in an agreement, and there was no central ministry for finance, or requirement that the KRG be put in control of the region’s finances. This lack of structural methods for revenue-sharing prevented transparency and thus fostered distrust among the PUK. While the KDP assured the PUK that they were receiving their half of the revenue received by the KDP, the PUK remained unconvinced. In fact, the major substantive reason the PUK cited for starting the conflict in 1994 was that the KDP was withholding revenue. This claim illustrates that in addition to mutual optimism for war (the information problem), the PUK was likely also fearing the KDP’s steady increase in power over time if the revenue sharing was not reformed (the commitment problem.)

Having fought a war which revealed to both sides that they were rather evenly matched, the Washington Agreement included explicit measures for revenue sharing. First it was established that the Higher Coordination Committee (HCC)—a committee established to oversee

the reconciliation between the parties—would oversee the flow of funds between the two parties while an interim government was selected. Then, the responsibility of collecting and distributing the revenue in the region would be delegated to a single Ministry of Revenue and Taxation which would do so at the direction of the Kurdistan National Assembly.235

Although the measures put in place in the Washington Agreement were not enacted before 2006 due to the choice to administer two separate governorates between 1998 and 2006, the lessons learned between 1998 and 2006 allowed for an even better, more specific arrangement for finances in 2006. This included specifics as to who and how the budget should be prepared—by the Kurdistan Regional Government approved by the Kurdistan National Assembly—as well as how revenue allocation was to be administered between the parties.236

On the whole, the two periods of learning engrained in the two parties how important specificity and transparency in the arrangements for revenue sharing were for the maintenance and institutionalization of peace. It was only through the two learning periods, the first after the 50-50 Agreement, when a shoddy revenue-sharing arrangement ultimately led to fighting, and the second after the Washington Agreement, that the two parties could reach an arrangement that was satisfactory to both parties. Revenue-sharing was the main grievance which launched the two parties into violence in 1994, so finding a solution to prevent a similar resurgence of this grievance is crucial for developing a long-standing, positive peace.

236 “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.”
Two Governorates, Two Peshmergas—How post-1998 administrative style set the Iraqi Kurds up for Peace and Governing Success

Stansfield has noted previously that keeping two governorates was an inadvertently genius way to not only keep the peace, but provide a sort of school for developing double the number of experienced civil servants than would otherwise have been available. Separate governorates themselves did have some level of effectiveness in the preservation of the peace because both parties were focused on providing services to the populations under their control, and in this case that took nearly all the concentration of the two parties to learn how to govern effectively because they had never had this opportunity before. However, Stansfield’s analysis does not allow for two circumstances.

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First, Stansfield does not discuss how effective keeping the peshmergas separate and supporting each party was in promoting peace. Civil wars are generally prolonged due to a

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239 “Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”
commitment problem on the part of the weaker party. They fear that should they surrender their military the ruling party will immediately renege on the agreement that has been made. Because this is a civil war, the issue of party militaries needs to be addressed. Before the 50-50 Agreement, the two parties were not engaged in a civil war with each other, instead they were involved in parallel civil wars with the Iraqi government.

When initial power-sharing government was created, the issue of peshmerga control was not discussed as part of the arrangements. Although, there had been some rumors of peshmerga unification as early 1991, these seemed half-hearted, and commitments were never made.\textsuperscript{240} The unwillingness from all parties to cede military control could reflect their wariness of each of the other Kurdish parties which was only overwhelmed by their strong desire to create an autonomous region. But the fact that peshmerga unification was not a serious part of the conversation in 1992 meant that they were prepared and somewhat primed to fight when they were unable to resolve a disagreement about revenue through negotiation in 1994.

At the close of the conflict, the Washington Agreement did address, to a certain degree, the unification of peshmerga. The commitment was once again half-hearted, and left mostly up to the discretion of the parties. However, in implementation, a unified peshmerga was not pursued, and as a result of keeping their separate militaries, the Kurds stumbled onto a particularly effective way of maintaining the peace: ending the conflict like an interstate war.

Even at the end of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were so well matched that there wasn’t a “weaker” party to disband their troops, as we would expect in a civil war situation. Instead, each party kept their own peshmergas which became an insurance measure against the

\textsuperscript{240} van Wilgenburg and Fumerton, “Kurdistan’s Political Armies”; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
other party. Thus, the Kurdish Civil War ended in a way that mirrored the end of an interstate conflict between minor parties. Each military supported one of the two distinct governorates that blossomed after the signing of the Washington Agreement giving the parties the ability to ensure compliance with the agreement through violent means, if necessary.

While keeping separate peshmergas was an unexpectedly effective way of maintaining peace between the two parties, so was the unwritten agreement to divide the territory into two separately run governorates, the PUK administering Sulaymaniyah and territories to the east, and the KDP administering Erbil and territories to the north. The only thread connecting them was the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) which was not especially active during the period when the governorates were administered separately.

Second, Stansfield argues that while separate governorates preserved the peace, he did not see a circumstance where there could be unification. However, he wrote this analysis in 2003 before the increased talks between the PUK and KDP in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq and the new discussion about the future of Iraq, a discussion in which both parties wanted a part. In some small part, the separate governorates were a byproduct of a more flexible agreement, one that enabled the parties to have an additional learning period about their capabilities and the skills required to administer a semi-democratic region.

In the wake of the Washington Agreement, having two governorates both distracted each party from fighting in the near term and in the long term enabled both parties to train people in


Stansfield, *Iraqi Kurdistan*. 
the practice of running a government. Thus, when the time was right to renegotiate, after the 2003 invasion shifted internal political equations, there were people who were trained in the process of running a government.

In 1992, the Kurds had never run a democratic government, nor had they really ever had a government of their own. So, the way they chose to build a government was based to a certain extent on what they had observed in other countries, or read about. The learning period from 1998-2005 for both parties to grasp the mechanics and difficulties that came with running a government responsible for providing goods and services—and therefore accountable to—a population was of paramount importance for the two parties. It enabled them to better plan for reunification when the time came to do so in 2006.

244 Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 131, 134, 138–39; Stansfield, “Governi...
CONCLUSION

My analysis of conflict and peace in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from 1991 to 2006, shows that both of the competing scholarships on peace—institutionalist camp and the selection camp—have some power in explaining the conflict between the PUK and the KDP, both camps bringing part of the solution for lasting peace. The selection camp demonstrates that lasting peace is more likely when the two parties agree on the outcomes possible, and demonstrate it through the agreement language leading to negative peace in the very least. The institutionalist camp demonstrates that the strategic choice of language is powerful in enabling negative peace to flourish. Both of these camps together explain more positive peace or greater cooperation in the community.

I show that power-sharing agreements, when informed by the context in which they must function have great power towards fostering the cooperation necessary for achieving positive peace. The Kurdish case allows us to examine this through the three agreements which we have to study, each of which demonstrates the tangible institutionalization of peace, or lack thereof, in the community.

In 1992, the Kurds were largely naïve about the way that a government should function. They were building democratic structures from the ground up with little aid from more established democratic powers, and even less personal experience in running a government. This led to some avoidable, but certainly understandable mistakes. First that the 50-50 Agreement was not flexible enough to deal with changes that would inevitably come. Second, neither party truly
trusted the evidence of popularity provided by the elections in part because they had no experience with them.

With their history of nearly 20 years of internecine animosity, and a background in fighting for power with the government in Baghdad, experience taught them that conflict was the only way to identify a top power. Their mutual optimism for success was quickly banished through the conflict, which served as a learning period during which the parties learned two things.

First, that they were evenly matched in every respect no matter who was backing them. Having not fought one another before this was an important lesson to learn. Second, that when they were establishing a regional government and not fighting Baghdad, their external backers had ulterior motives which did not necessarily match the motives of the Kurdish parties. As a result, their external backers were acting more as spoilers for the peace process than as aids. Without the conflict, it is unlikely that the parties could have learned that particular piece of information as well or as quickly.

The Koya/Shaqlawa process and ultimately the Washington Agreement demonstrate that the two parties had learned something from the previous agreement as well as their conflict. The endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process enabled the parties to reach understandings for creating agreement language which enabled a lasting peace agreement. So, while it had concrete goals, the Washington Agreement did not try to mandate how the executive was structured which meant that the parties had the flexibility to arrive at an arrangement, through further negotiation, which suited both of them. In this case, they established separate governorates and kept their militaries, inadvertently stumbling on a particularly effective method of avoiding the commitment problem in civil wars because both parties had a method to enforce compliance with
the major pieces of the agreement such as revenue sharing and the commitment not to support the PKK.

For eight years, the Washington Agreement’s ambiguity and the subsequent creation of two separately administered governorates provided double benefits. First, the two parties were so focused on providing adequate goods and services to those under their rule that they were distracted from fighting one another. Second, twice as many people were trained in bureaucracy and democratic-esque structures so that when unification came, there were many qualified people to be able to fill the roles necessary in a region that had once had not a single experienced bureaucrat.

Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement of 2006 shows us just how well the Koya/Shaqlawa process and Washington Agreement set the Kurdistan Region up for deeper cooperation and positive peace between the KDP and the PUK when incentives changed for their leaders after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The lessons learned from 1992 again appear in this agreement, the division of the ministries is more flexible, and there is better division of the ministries between the parties providing an escape from the bureaucratic deadlock that came from the division made in the 50-50 Agreement. But perhaps the most meaningful steps towards positive peace was the establishment of joint committees in each governorate which were meant to provide a place to negotiate disagreements between members of each party.

Not only did the Unification Agreement bring two parties together to work in a functional government after decades of animosity, but they were aware of the possible friction that unification might cause even then and provided a way for diffusing the conflicts without resorting to violence. While the two parties are still at odds with one another, the cooperation between then runs deep and that is evident through these three power-sharing agreements.
This thesis demonstrates the influence of context-driven power-sharing agreements for developing, establishing, and institutionalizing positive peace in communities which may have been involved in heated internecine conflicts for long periods of time.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


———. “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government.” PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 4 (January 1, 2012): 185–208.


### APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1940-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hiwa (Hope) party established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa Barzani placed under house arrest for revolutionary activities²⁴⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mulla Mustafa Barzani escapes house arrest, and foments the Barzani Rebellion²⁴⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hiwa party collapses, Barzani Rebellion collapses, Mulla Mustafa exiled to Iran²⁴⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qazi Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, established Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I)²⁴⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kurdish Republic of Mahabad declared in Iran²⁴⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa elected president in absentia²⁵⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mahabad Republic falls, Mulla Mustafa and best troops forced to withdraw to the Soviet Union “Retreat of the Five Hundred”²⁵¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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#### 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim Ahmed elected secretary general of KDP, beginning of divisions between KDP politburo (erudite, intelligentsia) and the conservative Barzani faction²⁵²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mulla Mustafa returns to Iraq from Soviet Union at invitation of Abdul Karim Qassim, new president of Iraq²⁵³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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²⁴⁶ “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 2; Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future*, 16.
²⁵² Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 165.
### 1960

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
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<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Iraqi government begins air bombardment of Kurdistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Revolution of 1961 launches longest and most sustained period of military and political engagement in the history of Kurdish movements also called the War of Liberation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revolution of 1961, second Kurdistan war comes to an end with Qassim's ouster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Division of the Kurdistan Democratic Party along ideological lines, left-wing (Ibrahim Ahmad [Jalal Talabani’s Father-in-law]) versus the establishment (Mullah Mustafa Barzani).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ceasefire between Baghdad and Kurdistan comes to an end. Spring offensive against the Kurds, Third Kurdistan War begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Third Kurdistan War comes to an end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Revolution in Baghdad brings Ba'athists to power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baghdad launches Fourth Kurdistan War.</td>
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### 1970

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<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Baghdad approaches Kurds to build a peace agreement, resulting in the March Manifesto (March Agreement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Iraq instigates Law of Autonomy (Act 33 of 1974), Kurds refuse to comply and fight the Fifth Kurdistan War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran results in loss of Iranian support for Kurds, Kurdish Front collapses.</td>
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255 Vanly, 153, 164–66.
259 Vanly, 167.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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\(^{266}\) Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 147; Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 207.


\(^{269}\) Bengio, 172.


\(^{272}\) Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 160.

\(^{273}\) Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations.”

\(^{274}\) Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 160; Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 40.

\(^{275}\) Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 172.

\(^{276}\) Bengio, 172.
1986  Iran mediates agreement between Talabani and Barzani, agreement signed by Jalal Talabani & Idris Mustafa Barzani (son of Mullah Mustafa) agreement shaky after Idris passes away in Jan 1987. Lays the groundwork for the Kurdistan Front.\textsuperscript{277}

1987  Popular Kurdish uprising\textsuperscript{278}
1987  Ali Hassan al-Majid declared absolute ruler of the north by Baghdad\textsuperscript{279}
1987  7 Establishment of Kurdistan Front which did not truly unite the Kurdish parties because each was looking out for their own interests, but did prevent them from fighting each other\textsuperscript{280}

1988  2 Anfal Campaigns begin\textsuperscript{281}
1988  3 Halabja Massacre\textsuperscript{282}
1988  5 IKF formally established\textsuperscript{283}
1988  8 26 UNSC resolution 620 condemning chemical weapons use by Iraqi government\textsuperscript{284}
1988  9 Anfal Campaigns end\textsuperscript{285}

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>US encourages Kurdish uprising against Saddam intimating support but does not follow through.\textsuperscript{286}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 4 6</td>
<td>Operation Provide Comfort begins (Operation Poised Hammer—the military component). Establishment of no fly-zone\textsuperscript{287}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 4 8</td>
<td>OPC expanded to a combined joint task force to recognize international cooperation\textsuperscript{288}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{278} Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 172.
\textsuperscript{279} Bengio, 181.
\textsuperscript{281} Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 181; Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 130–31.
\textsuperscript{282} Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 130–31; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 181.
\textsuperscript{283} Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 158–59; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 173.
\textsuperscript{284} Gunter, “The United Nations and the Kurds,” 46.
\textsuperscript{286} Gibson, “The Secret Origins of the U.S.-Kurdish Relationship Explain Today’s Disaster.”
1991 4 15 **UNSC Resolution 688**

1991 4 17 Task Force Encourage Hope (part of OPC) launched to construct a series of resettlement camps where dislocated civilians found food, shelter, and a secure environment.

1991 5 19 UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) UN forces based in Iraq to protect the UN humanitarian missions in Iraq, involved soldiers from 35 different countries.

1991 6 7 Humanitarian relief efforts taken over by the UNHCR

1992 Links between PKK and Baghdad through the early 1990s comes to light. PKK gave Baghdad intel on Iraqi Kurds.

1992 5 19 First general election and establishment of 1st KRG government, 105 elected members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (later renamed the parliament). Turnout 90% of eligible voters. Results favored the KDP.

1992 5 PUK refuses to accept results of the general election.

1992 50-50 Agreement between KDP and PUK to avoid civil war

1992 7 24 PKK puts embargo on trade between Turkey and northern Iraq.

1992 10 16 Turkey launches attack on PKK.

1992 10 21 PUK, & KDP (IKF) join Turkish attack on PKK.

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293 Černy, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 171.


297 Černy, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 181.


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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10 30</td>
<td>PKK surrenders to IKF, specifically PUK&lt;sup&gt;300&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran on good terms with both Iraqi Kurdish parties, consulates in both regions&lt;sup&gt;301&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Parties fall out over division of oil revenues (PUK suspicious the KDP was hoarding the money earned from oil smuggling through the KDP controlled territory into Turkey) and also concerns over control of the major cities. Particularly that PUK had control of Erbil where the assembly met.&lt;sup&gt;302&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brief unilateral cease-fire between PKK and Turkey&lt;sup&gt;303&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5 1</td>
<td>Tensions reach their height between KDP and PUK. Due to land disputes over area northeast of Sulaymaniyah, fighting begins.&lt;sup&gt;304&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5 3</td>
<td>KDP takes Dohuk, Zakho and Ammadiya from PUK&lt;sup&gt;305&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6 1</td>
<td>First round fighting ends, more than 400 killed in the month. Second round clashes begin.&lt;sup&gt;306&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6 5</td>
<td>More than 600 people killed in second round clashes between PUK and KDP&lt;sup&gt;307&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7 4</td>
<td>KDP and PUK announce that they are still unified against the Iraqi Government&lt;sup&gt;308&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7 16</td>
<td>France hosts peace talks in Paris (brokered by US and UK), two weeks of negotiation, parties reach an agreement, have to wait on approval from party leaders (Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani)&lt;sup&gt;309&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7 19</td>
<td>PUK and KDP Clash sporadically until August 18&lt;sup&gt;310&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>300</sup> Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31; Černy, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 183; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”

<sup>301</sup> Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage?,” 97; Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations,” 2.


<sup>303</sup> Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31.


<sup>306</sup> “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Černy, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 190.

<sup>307</sup> “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”

<sup>308</sup> “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”


<sup>310</sup> “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Paris peace talks conclude, because visas were not allowed by Turkey and the agreement died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Talabani and Barzani sign agreement in official KNA meeting, lasts less than 72 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sporadic clashes between PUK and KDP end for a time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>&quot;Alliance pact&quot; or &quot;Year 2000 agreement&quot; both parties agree not to fight again until the year 2000, agreement did not last even until the end of the month. PUK captures village of Kasnazan near Erbil, and then retake Erbil by the end of 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fights break out between PUK and KDP over disputes in tax collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PUK supports the PKK, which had previously clashed with the KDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PUK and KDP fight, after the worst of it, PUK takes Erbil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Informal cease fire between PUK and KDP ends fighting which began 1/1/95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP ends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkish army launches major incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan on the eve of the Kurdish New Year Nowruz, Operation Steel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>PUK and KDP clash for 24 hours, at least 100 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KDP calls for temporary truce w/ PUK, brokered by Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Oil for Food program in Iraq established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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313 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
317 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
319 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
320 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
322 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
323 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operation Steel ends, Turkey withdraws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Over two days, PUK and KDP meet on neutral ground to extend KNA mandate for another year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkey invades Kurdistan to attack PKK positions in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PUK launches preemptive attack against KDP, rationalizing through asserting the KDP would have launched an attack within a short time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Turkish invasion concludes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Initial Drogheda talk begin brokered by US (Turkey and UK also involved).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>PUK and KDP at US brokered talks in Dublin, Ireland reach an agreement to demilitarize Erbil, turn over by the KDP of customs revenues to joint bank account and reconvening of KRG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>PKK attacks KDP to break up peace talks between PUK and KDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Drogheda talks resume, attempt to mediate full agreement based on progress made in August talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Peace talks in Ireland conclude without agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran brokered peace talks between KDP and PUK in Tehran, supposedly reach some agreement, but details are scarce and inconclusive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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325 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 222.
326 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
327 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
329 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
332 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 32; Černý, *Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations*, 191; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 216; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
336 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
337 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
1996

Mediation led by Turkey in the presence of the UK & US—produces Ankara declaration which had 22 articles. Only 5 of which KDP accepted. PUK accepted all.\(^{338}\)

1996 4 18

US State dept official Robert Deutsch travels to Northern Iraq to try to broker a settlement\(^{339}\)

1996 5 29

PUK and KDP officials agree to extend the term of the assembly of the power-sharing agreement\(^{340}\)

1996 7 16

US petitions sides to stop fighting, again did not hold\(^{341}\)

1996 7

PUK allows Iranian troops to go after Iranian Kurds which had been using their bases in the area in return for the support of the Iranian government.\(^{342}\)

1996 8

Operation Provide Comfort ends, US withdraws personnel, NGO employees\(^{343}\)

1996 8 16

PUK breaks year-long armistice, attacks KDP, giving KDP reason to turn to Saddam for support. Engage in the most serious fighting since ceasefire in 1995\(^{344}\)

1996 8 22

Barzani asks Saddam to send Iraqi National guards to help take back Erbil\(^{345}\)

1996 8 28

PUK and KDP agree to new US brokered cease fire and work towards more comprehensive settlement\(^{346}\)

1996 8 31

Iraqi help arrives and the KDP quashes the PUK, taking back control of Erbil\(^{347}\)

1996 9 4

KDP declares amnesty for PUK members who want to return to their homes if they sign a declaration of surrender and pay "caution money"\(^{348}\)

1996 9 9

KDP takes Sulaymaniyah from PUK\(^{349}\)

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339 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
340 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
342 Waisy, 225; Gunter, “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan.”
343 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 258–59; Kirisci, “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 285.
347 Waisy, “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ankara Process (US, Turkey and Iran broker) denounced by Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>PUK takes back Sulaymaniyah with Iranian support + two other towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ceasefire and the 10-point agreement (US, Turkey, Kurds) Peace monitoring force implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operation Northern Watch begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>PUK takes back Sulaymaniyah with Iranian support + two other towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ceasefire and the 10-point agreement (US, Turkey, Kurds) Peace monitoring force implemented</td>
</tr>
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355 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
360 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's side. Turkey announces end of Operation Twilight, PUK launches military campaign "Storm of Revenge" against KDP on the heels of Turkish withdrawal. After fighting for 5 days, PUK and KDP agree to US brokered ceasefire. Signing of the agreement is followed by some skirmishes in which members of both sides killed. Fighting continues between PUK and KDP, but KDP declares unilateral cease-fire. Relationship between Turkey and KDP strengthens.

Talabani and Barzani exchange letters leading to a series of meetings to discuss normalization measures, Koya-Shaqlawa meetings. PUK and KDP start talks including confidence building measures, ceasefire enforcement, release of prisoners and establishment of joint committee to ensure implementation of SCR 986. PUK and KDP working out lower level concerns first, meeting every two weeks. Koya-Shaqlawa meetings.

Talks between PUK and KDP deadlock over main issues, parties stop meeting as frequently. US invites leaders of PUK and KDP to US for negotiations on a final, comprehensive peace settlement. David Walsh (State dept) goes to regions to issue invitations.

As a sign of good faith, PUK and KDP exchange more than 200 prisoners from conflict.

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364 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
365 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.”
371 Refugees, “Refworld | Chronology for Kurds in Iraq.”
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Peace agreement reached, brokered by US. Called the Washington agreement. Post-civil war there were two seats of executive power KDP administered in Erbil, PUK administered from Sulaymaniyah. After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey monitors situation after US brokers Washington Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PKK fighters move back to Iraqi Kurdistan straining Washington Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish factions meet in northern Iraq to discuss implementation of the peace plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turkey captures Ocalan, leader of the PKK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Masoud Barzani accuses PUK of helping PKK in breach of agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>PUK holds KDP responsible for non-implementation of the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Turkish and US embassy officials visit Iraqi Kurdistan. At this time PUK and KDP reaffirm commitment to Washington Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kurdish officials meet with vice president Al Gore in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Talabani meets with Turkish PM, in the Turkish capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>PUK and PKK fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Masoud Barzani meets with Turkish officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Barham Sali (Head of PUK govt) meets with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PUK and PKK fight again.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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373 “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds.”


375 Refugees, “Refworld | Chronology for Kurds in Iraq.”

376 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 33; Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, xxviii, 209.


378 Waisy, 230.

379 Waisy, 230.

380 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 265.

381 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 34; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 257.


383 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 256.

384 Bengio, 266.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>KDP/ Turkey relations cool[^386]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4 Secret meeting between Barzani, Talabani, and President George W. Bush; PUK and KDP set up a &quot;joint operation room&quot; to deal with terrorism in the region[^387]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6 PUK, KDP join talks with other Iraqi groups about the future of Iraq in the event of a US-led military intervention[^388]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8 15 Talabani publicly issues invitation for US/UK to invade Iraq from PUK’s territory[^389]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9 23 PUK and KDP publish draft of joint federal project, draws warning from Turks[^390]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10 5 Kurdistan National Assembly resumes, both parties participate[^391]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11 7 Draft constitution for Iraqi accepted in the regional assembly[^392]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Operation Northern Watch ends[^393]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2 8 KDP and PUK open offices in each other’s regions as a sign of reconciliation[^394]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2 15 KDP and PUK declare intention to join the US invasion forces in the anticipated war against Iraq[^395]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3 20 US invasion of Iraq, been crucial in the endeavor to normalize relations between the 2 KRG administrations[^396]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4 9 Join US and Kurdish troops take over Mosul and Kirkuk[^397]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created[^398]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7 13 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed[^399]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^386]: Gunter, 35; Bengio, *The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State*, 257.
[^393]: Gunter, *Historical Dictionary of the Kurds*, 258.
[^395]: Bengio, 266.
[^399]: Yildiz, 121.
2003 11 21 Oil for food and UNGCI terminated\textsuperscript{400}

2004 CPA passes law of administration for the state of Iraq in the transitional period, recognized the KRG as a federal region of Iraq by legalization all its institutions built since 1992\textsuperscript{401}

2004 3 8 New Iraqi Governing council signs a provisional constitution (the Transitional Administrative Law, TAL)\textsuperscript{402}

2004 6 1 IGC dissolved, Interim Iraqi Government introduced\textsuperscript{403}

2004 6 8 UNSC resolution 1546 adopted, endorsing formation of interim government in Iraq\textsuperscript{404}

2004 12 1 PUK and KDP leaders sign agreement in which both agree to participate in the Iraqi elections as allies. Parties run on a joint ticket in Iraqi elections of 2004\textsuperscript{405}

2005 Permanent Iraqi Constitution written and ratified, maintained existence of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)\textsuperscript{406}

2005 1 30 KNA elections held, same day as Iraqi Elections in which PUK and KDP participated as a united election list: Kurdistan Alliance\textsuperscript{407}

2005 1 31 Barzani elected president of KRG, informal referendum on independence for Iraqi Kurdistan conducted\textsuperscript{408}

2005 10 15 Iraqi Constitution passed\textsuperscript{409}

2006 1 21 Kurdistan Parliament reaches an agreement to reunify the divided KRG administration\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{400} Katzman and Blanchard, “Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations”; Mays, Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping.


\textsuperscript{403} Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 123.

\textsuperscript{404} Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 238;SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSES FORMATION OF SOVEREIGN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ; WELCOMES END OF OCCUPATION BY 30 JUNE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS BY JANUARY 2005 | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.”


\textsuperscript{408} Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 238.


<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nechirvan Barzani announces formation of unified KRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>al-Maliki's cabinet approved, Iraqi government formed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timeline Color Key:
- PKK-Turkey involvement in PUK-KDP fight
- Humanitarian efforts
- Peace processes in the KDP-PUK civil war
- Post-agreement negotiation between KDP and PUK
- PUK/KDP fighting

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