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HERENNIUS PHILO AND THE DILEMMA OF LEXICOGRAPHY

by

Alec Smitten

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

Ancient Languages and Cultures

Approved:

_____	_____
Mark Damen, Ph.D. Major Professor	Frances Titchener, Ph.D. Committee Member
_____	_____
Charlie Huenemann, Ph.D. Committee Member	D. Richard Cutler, Ph.D. Interim Vice Provost of Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

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ABSTRACT

Herennius Philo and the Dilemma of Lexicography

by

Alec Smitten, Master of Arts

Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Mark Damen
Department: History

This thesis examines the history of lexicography in the Greek tradition, beginning with Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE) and ending in the Byzantine period, principally focusing on *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*, the epitome of a lexicon written by Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). While early Greek lexicographers opted for a more restrained and descriptive approach, Philo, intending to correct what he saw as common errors in the language, chose a highly prescriptive one, to the point of explicity criticizing Greek speakers from the previous centuries, such as Euripides, Callimachus, Menander, and even Homer. Despite his efforts, the Greek language continued to change, which raises a significant question about the purpose and function of lexicography, both in the Greek tradition and in general.

(114 pages)

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Herennius Philo and the Dilemma of Lexicography

Alec Smitten

This thesis seeks to explore *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*, the surviving epitome of the lexicon of Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). By placing Philo in the timeline of Greek lexica, his prescriptive style and desire for absolute correctness in speech stands out among other lexicographers, and raises this question: what is the purpose of a dictionary, to describe how words are used, or to define "correct" usage?

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Alec Smitten

CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

INTRODUCTION

It is no exaggeration to say that lexica, compilations of words and their meanings, belong to one of the oldest genres of scholarship. From as early as the third millennium BCE, we find the roots of what would ultimately become the idea of a lexicon. This tradition continued after Babylonians took over Sumeria and created correspondence lists of Akkadian words and Sumerian words. The Hittites too found the need to create systematic equivalences between words, producing tablets with Hittite, Sumerian, and Akkadian correspondences. As Rudolf Pfeiffer explains, "The keepers of the clay tablets who had to preserve the precious texts attached importance to the exact wording of the originals and tried to correct mistakes of the copyists; for that reason they even compiled 'glossaries' of a sort."[1] In other words, no pun intended, from some of our earliest recorded history, there has been great meaning attached to the words themselves which we use.

This need to understand words is not unique to the Near East. In the Vedic tradition, *Nirukta*, one of the Vedangas, that is, one of the "limbs" of scholarly study, is dedicated to etymology and the correct understanding of words, in particular archaic or infrequently occurring words, and can be tracked back as far as the end of the second millennium BCE.[2] For reasons perhaps similar to the Sumerians', those in India found a similar need to preserve and explain the meanings of words in texts to which they attached importance. It comes as no surprise, then, that the noun *niruktiḥ* connected to *nirukta* means "explanation of a word," in other words, "definition."

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1 Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 18.

2 Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume 5* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 105.

What is it that drives humanity towards compiling these lists of words and their meanings, often in multiple languages? And who is to say on what basis the created word-lists are complete or correct?

By the time of written literature in western civilization, there is clear evidence of interest in the meanings of words. Plato's *Cratylus* is a dialogue deeply invested in the philosophical implications of words and their relationship to reality, and the orator Prodicus (ca. 465-395 BCE) was fascinated by the distinctions between synonyms and their applications in political oratory.[3] The comedian Aristophanes (ca. 446-386 BCE), too, explored the effect of words. In his play *Clouds*, for instance, Socrates presents Strepsiades with two chickens, and although he claims that Strepsiades wrongly identifies them both as chickens when one is actually "chicken-ness," neither character questions the meaning of *alektruon* ("chicken").[4] Even Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, could not escape the fascination of understanding words and what they mean.[5]

By the time of the Alexandrian scholars in the fourth and third centuries, dictionaries as we would recognize them in the modern sense of the term began to appear. The desire to retain an understanding of the older words in classical Greek dialects and the necessity of understanding new words from recently Hellenized areas gave ample incentive for scholars to devise lexica. Yet even as they were trying to cement the Greek language and its rules into stable, lexical forms, the ground was shifting under their feet. Slowly but inexorably, the language of Homer was beginning to sound more arcane and archaic.

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3 Plato, *Euthyd.* 277 e, *Crat.* 384 b.
4 Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 660-666.
5 Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship*, 77.

During the second century CE, “Atticist Lexica” first appear. These, unlike previous lexica such as that of Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE), were not only reference materials which explained the meanings of words but also didactic tools that explained “correct” usage. However, as quickly as they came about, this brand of lexicon disappeared. It was during this brief moment that Herennius Philo of Byblos lived. He was a Hellenized Phoenician scholar who, among other things, created a lexicon of this sort.

The object of this research is to examine how lexica evolved in the Greek tradition and in particular to explain the important role Philo played in this brief period. His lexicon provides unique insight into the evolution of dictionaries, both in Greek and more broadly. Although Philo was unsuccessful in keeping classical dialects alive and tamping down solecisms — which appears to have been his ambition — what survives of his lexicon offers valuable insight into the mind-set of those who felt compelled to take on the task of systematically defining and differentiating words.

To this end, I will track the development of lexica in the Greek tradition, beginning in the first chapter with one of the earliest texts which we can confidently identify as a proper lexicon: the *Ataktoi Glossai* of the poet and scholar Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE). In the wake of his work, lexicography started developing into a proper academic enterprise, embodied in particular by the *Lexeis* of Aristophanes of Byzantium. Lexicographers, however, were not the only scholars who spent time thinking about words, their meanings, and their uses. As Didymus Chalcenterus (ca. 63 BCE – 10 CE) highlighted in his Homeric scholia, questions about word use permeated Alexandrian scholarship, in particular, the way they pertained to textual criticism and correctness of language.

The second chapter of this thesis entails a detailed analysis of *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*, the lexicon of Herennius Philo as it is preserved in an epitome. The initial discussion will detail what information we have about his life and will attempt to place him in the larger scholarly timeline of ancient lexicography. This will require some attention to our only source for Philo's text, Ammonius Grammaticus' epitome of a presumably much larger work by Philo titled *Peri Diaphorous Semasias* ("On Differences of Meaning"). Unlike his previous works, this one is structured more like a modern dictionary, with some important differences. Here, Philo includes commentary regarding correct usage of the words he defines and, contrary to the practices of his predecessors, he shows a keen interest in making prescriptive claims about the use of words, even claiming predecessors and contemporaries misused them at times.

Based on this, I will conclude that Philo intended, at least to some extent, to use lexica to keep the older, classical form of Greek "alive," if not in a spoken form, at least among literate Greeks. Philo thus represents a last stand for those who wished to preserve classical Greek not as an antiquarian artifact preserved only for those interested in antiquity but as an important cultural attribute in this day.

This chapter will also examine the lexicon created by Ammonius Grammaticus during the fourth century, the same man who made the epitome of Philo's original work. Although there are a great many correspondences between the epitome and Ammonius' complete text, there are also significant and notable differences, chief among them that Ammonius largely avoids the prescriptive tone adopted by Philo, and in some cases even removes the admonitions he encountered in his model.

The final chapter will offer a brief history of lexicography after Philo's time. Looking at the broader context of Greek scholarship, we will see that Ammonius is something of an outlier. In the centuries following his lifetime, lexica trended away from his highly prescriptive style and instead drifted back toward gloss-making. Thus, despite his efforts to amend modern practice in his day, Herennius Philo was unable to halt the changes affecting the Greek language in the second century. In conclusion, this chapter will also attempt to reconcile this failure with the nature of lexicography itself and the ongoing struggle over the fundamental function of dictionaries. Should they prescribe correct usage or only describe the practice of language then and now?

CHAPTER 1: Lexicography before Philo

1. Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE)

Both modern and ancient scholars remember Philitas (or Philetas[6]) of Cos primarily as one of the earliest elegiac poets. Although his verse now survives only in fragments, he remained an important figure throughout most of antiquity. He is said to have been the teacher of other poets such as Hermesianax, Theocritus, and even Zenodotus, the eventual head of the Library of Alexandria.[7] His poetry was itself deeply influential. Philitas' influence on Callimachus was "pervasive," and his reach extended even into the realm of Latin poetry, affecting Propertius and Vergil.[8] Quintilian ranked Philitas a close second to Callimachus.[9]

Today, we know little about him. He wrote a work called *Demeter*, which details the goddess' search for her daughter Persephone in elegiac couplets, and another entitled *Hermes*, a hexameter poem describing Odysseus' meeting with Aeolus and subsequent affair with Aeolus' daughter. He also composed a collection of poems written in the style of epigrams and entitled *Paignia*. Philitas, however, was not solely a poet. In fact, his other scholarly pursuits seem to have been as well-regarded as his poetry.

There is evidence suggesting that during his life and after, he was known for his study of lexicography. In the third century BCE, the comic poet Strato references Philitas in a scene of his play *Phoenicides,* in which a cook insists on using Homeric

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6 Both spellings of the name are attested, but "Philitas" appears to be more frequently used.
7 Konstantinos Spanoudakis, *Philitas of Cos* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 29, 40.
8 Ibid. 42, 59, 66.
9 Quintilian, 10.1.56.

archaisms and forces his master "to take the books of Philitas and look up each word to find its meaning."[10]

Although the name itself is problematical, of particular interest is his *Ataktoi Glossai*, the "Disorderly Glossary." Although it survives only in fragments, we can gather some sense of the original document.[11] For instance, the word *kupellon* occurs ten times in Homer and is regularly translated as "goblet;" in five of those instances it is paired with the epithet "golden."[12] According to Athenaeus, "Philitas says the Syracusans call the remnants of barley cake and bread left on the table *kupella*."[13] From this, it is clear that something is amiss with the definition of *kupellon,* which is, no doubt, what attracted Philitas' attention.

Another example is the word *kreion,* a hapax within Homer, which appears to have radically different meanings. The Homeric sense of this word is evident from *Iliad* 9.206, "So he spoke, and Patroclus trusted his dear comrade. Then he put down a large *kreion* into the light of the fire, and placed on it a sheep's back and a fat goat's."[14] *Kreion* here seems to refer to some sort of surface on which one can prepare meat, what we might term a "butcher block." Philitas, however, provides a very different understanding, again as transmitted through Athenaeus: "*kreion* is a flat bread which Argives bring (as a gift) from the bride to the groom. It is baked on

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10 Austin, *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta*, Fragment 219, 42-44.

11 Many such as Bachius and Pfeiffer have argued, as early as 1829 and as recently as 1968, that the adjective *ataktos* should be understood as meaning that the glossary itself was disorderly – *inordinata* – in the sense that it was not alphabetized. In all likelihood, this statement is correct, since properly alphabetized lexica did not become the norm until long after Philitas' lifetime. In more recent years, there has been increasing resistance to this line of thinking from scholars who argue that the sense of *ataktos* does not refer to the organizational scheme of the glossary, but the words themselves. Upon examination of the fragments, it appears that Philitas is taking interest in words with variable and often inconsistent meanings, in other words, *glossai* which are themselves "disorderly." It is, however, also plausible that both meanings of the word were intended.

12 *Il.* 1.596, 3.248, 4.345, 9.670, 24, 305; *Od.* 1.142, 2.396, 4.58, 10.357, 20.253.

13 Athenaeus 11.483a.

14 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

charcoal, and the friends are invited to partake of it, and it is served with honey. So says Philitas in the *Ataktoi*."[15]

Yet another example of an inconsistent Homeric word which caught Philitas' attention and was quoted in Athenaeus is the word *pella*, "Cleitarchus in his *Glosses* says the Thessalians and the Aeolians call a milk pail *pelleter*, but a cup a *pella*. Philitas in his *Ataktoi* says a wine cup (*kulix*) is called a *pella* by the Boeotians."[16] Once again, we see another instance of Philitas' habit of identifying peculiar usages of otherwise attested words, with special attention to their provenance in the Greek-speaking world. In fact, nearly half of the grammatical fragments of Philitas in Spanoudakis make mention of the fact that the word in question is used in a particular region or regional dialect.

His attraction to curious words went beyond simply their surface meaning and extended to even finer details. In Hesychius, a crucial Byzantine lexicographer, we find a gloss for the word *amalla* ("sheaf"), which is found in the Homeric compound *amallodeteres* and means, according to Bing, "those who bind the *amalla.*"[17] The gloss reads, "*amalla*: sheaves, bundles of grain, a bunch, one hundred sheaves according to Istros; Philitas, though, says two hundred."[18] From this, the sense of *amalla* is clearly some sort of measure of grain. Philitas, however, felt the need to go out of his way to specify the precise number of sheaves. This suggests that Philitas' work is not just an exercise in analyzing random, peculiar vocabulary. Instead, his objective appears to have been to collect unconventional words or their usages and incorporate them into his own verse. A natural consequence of this would have been

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15 Athenaeus, 14.645d.

16 Athenaeus, 9.495e.

17 Peter Bing, "The Unruly Tongue: Philitas of Cos as Scholar and Poet," *Classical Philology* 98, no. 4 (2003): 334, https://doi:10.1086/422370.

18 Hesychius, *alpha* 3417.

the need to provide explanations of the meanings of such words. The scholarship underlying the *Ataktoi Glossai*, then, is not so much Philitas' primary objective as an appropriate complement to his poetry.

In two fragments, the words discussed are explicitly cited in a poetic context. The first comes again from Hesychius and reads, "*Skuzes*: in Philitas, 'I will keep you from your *skuzes*,' instead of 'your *kapras*.'"[19] Since *kapra* is itself an uncommon word, Hesychius also provides a gloss of this term, saying it is synonymous with *akolasia*, "licentiousness."[20] This citation suggests that Hesychius is directly quoting Philitas, who, in turn, appears to be referencing an unknown comedy.[21] The second comes from Strabo in the form of a comment on an elegiac couplet attributed to Philitas in another of his works, the *Hermeneia*: "A wretched, dirtied tunic, a tie of plaited black rushes (*melankraninon*) has been wrapped around a slender belly."[22] The word *melankraninon* is peculiar, and indeed Spanoudakis notes that compounds formed from *melas*- ("black" or "dark") often create Homeric hapaxes, so it is unsurprising to see a poet with a fascination with uncommon words forming his own adjective modelled on a Homeric precedent.[23] Unlike the previous examples, however, this is an instance of Philitas using his own neologism in a poetic context.

This couplet does not appear to be anomalous, since in the *Demeter*, Philitas demonstrates a pattern of using words which are either peculiar cult-epithets of deities, or words which are infrequently attested, even some hapaxes. Among the fragments of this work is an unusual epithet for Demeter, *ompnia thesmophoros*

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19 Hesychius, *sigma* 1148.
20 Hesychius, *kappa* 738.
21 Spanoudakis, *Philitas*, 376.
22 Strabo 3.5.1, II.83, Λευγαλέος δὲ χιτὼν πεπινωμένος, ἀμφὶ δ' ἀραιὴ / ἰξὺς εἵλυται ῥάμμα μελαγκράνινον. This word is surely related to *melankranis*, the plant we call "black bog-rush."
23 Spanoudakis, *Philitas*, 151.

("nurturing law-giver"). Believed to come near the beginning of the work, *ompnios* is an Attic word of uncertain etymology which Philitas is said to have explained in his *Ataktoi Glossai*.[24] Hesychius glosses *ompnia* as meaning *trophe* ("nurturing") or *karpophoros* ("fruit-bearing"), clearly interpreting this epithet as a reference to the generative and agricultural qualities of the goddess.[25] One plausible explanation for Philitas' attraction to this word is its similarity to the more common and metrically identical epithet of Demeter, *potnia* ("revered"). In fact, the opening to Pindar's *Hymn to Persephone* reads, *Potnia Thesmophore*.[26] Spanoudakis goes so far as to say, "Philitas might have been the first to use a dialectal word denoting plenty as an epithet of Demeter."[27] The importance of this intersection between scholarship and poetry should not be overlooked. Philitas is augmenting his poetry by combining an obscure epithet for Demeter (*ompnia*) with one which has strong literary precedent (*potnia*). Then to ensure readers understand his choice, he includes an explanation for the obscure terminology in *Ataktoi Glossai*.

Philitas' usage of regionalisms did not stop there. Elsewhere he describes Dionysus as *bougenes* ("bull-born") which is, according to Spanoudakis, "a specifically Argive cult-epithet of Dionysus referring to his oxen-like appearance."[28] Although this word is attested in two predecessors, Socrates of Argos and Empedocles, Philitas' use of a rare and regionally specific cult-epithet is conspicuous in light of the other instances in which he pays special attention to words from different parts of the Greek-speaking world. This is echoed when Philitas uses *aemma*, related to *hamma* ("cord"), in reference to both Artemis and Apollo. This

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24 Ibid. 142.
25 Hesychius, *omicron* 828.
26 Pindar, *Hymn to Persephone*, fr. 37.
27 Spanoudakis, *Philitas*, 142.
28 Ibid. 184-185.

word seems to have originated in or around Crete, since Callimachus later uses it in the name of a Cretan archer, Echemmas, "he who has an *aemma*."[29]

Furthermore, it appears that Philitas paid attention not only to the regional qualities of words, but their structure as well. As with the *melas*-compounds, there is evidence that Philitas had Homeric precedent in mind when pursuing lexical flare in his poetry. To this point, in another fragment of the *Demeter*, Philitas appears to have invented a new adjective, *nechuton* ("abundant"). As Spanoudakis explains, compound adjectives built from the prefix *ne-* find their basis in the Homeric corpus, and, although this prefix often acts with a negative force, Hellenistic Greeks later viewed it as having an intensifying force.[30]

Perhaps one of the most obscure Homericisms in Philitas comes in an epithet of Athena, *dolichaoros*, used only once elsewhere, and equivalent to the hapax *dolichegches* in Homer, meaning "with a long spear."[31] As opposed to the Homeric term, Philitas constructs his adjective from another term, one that rarely occurs outside of Homer, *aor*, which refers to any pointed weapon.[32] Indeed, it appears Philitas not only employed adjective-forming prefixes and suffixes found in Homer, but also Homeric vocabulary in general. Thus, Philitas not only displays a proclivity for utilizing rare vocabulary in poetry, as he did with *ompnia*, but also for creating neologisms based on archaic linguistic formulae as with *nechuton* and *melankraninon*. In other words, he both gathered and invented exotic words which he used in his poems and later explicated in his lexicon.

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29 Ibid. 193.
30 Ibid. 154.
31 *Il.* 21.155.
32 Spanoudakis, *Philitas*, 219.

The picture of Philitas, then, is of a man who was both poet and lexicographer. Given that his verse fragments outnumber quotes from his lexicon, he seems to have been better remembered as the former; however, the quotation from Strato makes clear that Philitas' lexicographic work had enough of an audience that a comic poet could joke about it. As Pfeiffer says, "his persona must somehow have been familiar to the Athenian audience."[33] In this way, Philitas occupies a fascinating moment in the history of lexicography, one in which the distinction between lexicography proper (the formal academic enterprise) and localized lexicography used as a tool for exploring language was beginning to form. While fascination with the meanings of words and glosses was certainly not a new phenomenon in his day, Philitas must be ranked among the first individuals to purposely couple his scholarly enterprises with his own poetry; as Strabo put it, *poietes hama kai kritikos*, "a poet and also a scholar."[34]

In this regard, Philitas stands in marked contrast to later lexicographers like Aristophanes of Byzantium who were concerned with the precise meanings of Greek words in general. More to the point, there is little evidence to suggest that Philitas was interested in the full breadth of Greek vocabulary as Aristophanes was. Most notably, in strong contrast to later scholars, Philitas' record provides no citation of sources. While it is clear he depended on Homer for both poetic inspiration as well as lexicographic content, Philitas does not show interest in classical authors such as Sophocles and Euripides, whose works would serve as standard fare feeding the engines of post-classical lexicography.

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33 Pfeiffer, *History*, 91.

34 Strabo XIV 657 (= test. 13 K.).

2. Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE)

A century after Philitas, Aristophanes of Byzantium stands as a significant figure in the history of ancient Greek lexicography, and even more important in the history of Alexandrian scholarship in general. By all appearances, he was the first major scholar to develop a consistent methodology for establishing the *pathe* ("what befalls") and *etuma* ("truth") of words, that is, their physical transformations and etymological origins.[35] His works now exist only as fragments preserved in a wide variety of sources. The majority appear to come from his *Lexeis*, a large glossary of Greek terms, both archaic and contemporaneous, drawn from across the Greek-speaking world. Aristophanes' lexical interest embraced a broad array of topics from post-classical vocabulary to kinship terms to terms for certain ages in the human life-cycle.[36] Unlike Philitas, Aristophanes seems to have been solely a scholar, or to borrow Strabo's language, *kritikos ou kai poietes*, "a scholar and not a poet." To judge from the citations of the more gloss-oriented sections of the *Lexeis*, he clearly paid close attention to the texts of Homer and classical authors such as Pindar and the tragedians whom he references by line number in order to support his interpretation of some term. Thus, not only does he follow the more rigorous methodology associated with modern lexicography, but he also establishes, perhaps unintentionally, what will become the standard lexicographic canon of Greek authors from which later scholars would often draw citations.

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35 Varro, *L. L.* VI 2; Nauck p. 269. According to Dickey, he is also credited with being the first editor to arrange lyric poetry into verse and notate their metrical structure. He is also credited with the invention of theatrical *hypotheses*.

36 Eleanor Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commenatries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93.

Some entries are rather simple, summaries, no doubt, of Aristophanes' original text, for instance, "*kokkuzein*: used instead of *aidein* (to sing),"[37] or, "also *kokkuzein* is used of a chicken."[38] But many of the fragments are more robust, especially those which come from Eustathius, a twelfth-century bishop of Thessalonica whose commentary on Homer includes passages like this:

> And in regard to Cratinus, he says in his work, "They did not suffer the chicken to cry (*kokkuzein*)," which is to say *aidein* (to sing) as is appropriate for him. And for this reason, the *kokkux* is said to *kokkuzein* in Hesiod. And the adverb *kokku* is used in comedy. Even Sophocles suggests such a thought, and says in his work, "the *kokkuboas* bird." Diphilos says more clearly in his work, "And indeed, by Zeus, in fact, an *orthriokokkux* (lit. "early-chicken") among chickens just now sent me." And Plato Comicus (the comic playwright) says clearly in his work, "Crying (*kokkuzon*) at you, the chicken calls you forth."[39]

This substantial fragment provides important insight into the lexical work of Aristophanes. Unlike Philitas who seems to have paid careful attention to words mainly for use in his own poetry, Aristophanes, the evidence suggests, examined words for their own sake. Furthermore, while Philitas was fascinated with obscure and unconventional words, Aristophanes instead seeks minor insights about mundane words, as, for instance, in another entry: "even Plato Comicus says 'the *prosopos* ("face, countenance"; masculine) has spoken,' instead of *prosopon* (neuter)."[40] Aristophanes seems to be commenting merely on the gender of the word which is

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37 Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164.
38 Parsinus gr. 1630.
39 Eustathius, 1479,43 in *delta* 10 sine nom. auctoris.
40 Eustathius 1627,46 in *xi* 350.

typically neuter, not masculine. While he shares with Philitas some interest in rare words like those based on *kokku-*, unlike his forebear he is clearly not justifying his use of such words in his own verse. Etymology has turned a corner.

Another notable quality of Aristophanes' work is his citation of literary authors by name who have been drawn from a wide range of literature. For instance, another fragment reads, "And Aristophanes says that Sophocles says in relation to *damalis* ("heifer"), 'earth-born *boubalis* ("heifer"),' and Aeschylus says, 'a new-born *boubalis*, eaten by a lion.'"[41] This is not to say, however, that every fragment contains a citation of authorship. In some cases, what survives is more general: "The tragedians use *prospolos* ("servant") for both men and women."[42] In others, all that exists is a brief reference to an author without even the citation of the work from which the word comes, as in this entry preserved by Eustathius: "The ancients clearly indicate that an agreed upon wage was called a *latron* ("payment"). For this reason, as is attested in the works of the grammarian Aristophanes, the one hired is called a *latris* ("hired servant"). But otherwise, he says, it has been used to refer to slaves."[43]

Despite the incomplete survival of his work, Aristophanes' general practice as a lexicographer is easy to reconstruct. He relied upon the texts of his literary predecessors to validate his interpretations, often suggesting etymological connections between words which he saw as being related. In other words, he seems to have assessed the source texts he used without judging their correct use of Greek. In fact, of the fragments which contain clear citations of classical authors, the majority come from the canon newly formulated by Alexandrian scholars: Pindar, Euripides,

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41 Sophocles fr. 792 R., Aeschylus fr. 330 N.^{2}; Slater, p. 54.
42 Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164.
43 Eustathius 1246, 9 in phi 450 in marg.

Aristophanes Comicus, Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Homer, to name but a few.[44] While these poets were to become the bedrock on which much ancient lexical scholarship rested, not everyone believed in the firmness of that foundation. Some looked to a higher authority for guidance about determining the nature of the Greek language.

3. Didymus Chalcenterus (ca. 63 BCE – 10 CE)

Born a century or so after the death of Aristophanes of Byzantium, Didymus Chalcenterus ("Bronze-Guts") was an Alexandrian scholar known for his prolific publication record. According to Quintilian, he wrote such a large number of texts on so many topics that, "when he opposed someone's argument on the grounds that it was false, a book of his own which contained the same argument was brought forward."[45] Despite this brazen corpus, his work, like that of Aristophanes and Philitas, survives predominantly in fragments, found across a wide array of sources such as scholia for the *Iliad* and quotations preserved in Athenaeus, Eustathius, and Hesychius. More broadly, however, Didymus is representative of some of the ways in which lexicographical questions had influence across the various writings of Alexandrian scholars.

For instance, one fragment attributed to Didymus reads, "… written with an omicron and an upsilon *pou*, instead of *pō* (omega). Such are the opinions of Sosigenes and Aristophanes."[46] This is a reference to *Iliad* which reads "We know not anything at all (*pou*) about a common store of wealth."[47] There is obviously some

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44 Although we now know that Homer greatly predates these authors, ancient scholars included Homer alongside them.

45 Quintilian, 1.9.19.

46 A.124; Didymus Chalcenterus and Moritz Schmidt, *Didymi Chalcenteri grammatici Alexandrini fragmenta quae supersun omnia* (Amersterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1964), 117.

47 *Il*. 1.124: οὐδέ τί που ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά.

question about the reading of this line: should it read *pou* or *pō*? Since both words are metrically identical, the resolution of the matter falls to questions about the manuscripts and the meanings of the words.

When written with an omega, this word is generally taken as the question word for "where" in the Doric dialect. Other uses include its function in compounds, for instance, *oupō* ("never"), and in questions which expect a negative answer. Here, however, Didymus' concern seems to center around which reading makes better sense in the context. It is certainly plausible that there is also a question of transcription, since one can see how an omega and an omicron-upsilon pair could be confused for one another in a handwritten document, yet the invocation of scholarly opinion, particularly that of Aristophanes, as the deciding authority argues otherwise. Didymus' reliance on preceding scholarship as to the proper interpretation of the text offers an important glimpse into the intellectual workings of Alexandria. How prior scholars saw the text affected the way later scholars thought about its correctness. Here, Didymus is choosing to defer to the opinions of earlier scholars since he thinks that they are more correct.

Another scholium, this one on *Iliad* 10.431, is quite succinct, "*hippodamoi*: Aristarchus reads *hippomachoi*."[48] Modern editions of the *Iliad* prefer to read *hippomachoi*, so the full line reads "…and the Phrygians, fighters on horseback (*hippomachoi*), and the Maeonians, arrangers of chariots".[49] It is difficult to believe that the change between *hippodamoi* and *hippomachoi* was the result of manuscript error. Instead, it seems more plausible to suggest that this variation in reading is the result of a question over which Greek base is appropriate given the context of the

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48 K.431; Schmidt, *Fragmenta*, 141.

49 *Il.* 10.431: καὶ Φρύγες ἱππόμαχοι καὶ Μήονες ἱπποκορυσταί.

word, *dam-* ("conquer") or *mach-* ("fight"). That is, should the reader have the sense that the Phrygians are known for their ability to tame horses, or for fighting predominantly on horseback? Although this is the type of question which lexicography could answer, Didymus' attitude indicates that the fact that Aristarchus reads the line one way means it is the correct way. There is a certain prescriptive deference; what older scholars said was more correct and preferable.

Similarly, a scholion on *Iliad* 1.298 reads, "*machēsomai*: written so with an eta *machēsomai,* not with an epsilon-sigma *machessomai*,…"[50]. The full line reads "I will not fight (*machēsomai)* with my hands for the sake of the girl;" the question addressed in the scholium is over the future form of the verb *machomai* ("fight").[51] This is a much more difficult issue to explain by manuscript error alone since there is no clear explanation for the conflation of an eta and an epsilon sigma. A form of *machomai* featuring the stem *machess-* is not without precedent in Homer since there are attested certain forms of the aorist like this, for instance, *machessasthai* at *Iliad* 12.633; however, there is no such precedent for a future tense which uses that stem. Although the two forms are again metrically identical, the question centers on the "correct" formation of the future tense. In this way, the scholia of Didymus show that there was a certain connection between textual problems and issues of proper language within Alexandrian scholarship. The readings suggested by older scholars like Aristophanes of Byzantium had authority for that reason and were preferred. Ideas about correctness had to do with the opinions of one's predecessors and what they wrote about a matter.

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50 A.298; Schmidt, *Fragmenta,* 118.

51 *Il.* 12.633: χερσὶ μὲν οὔ τοι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα κούρης.

In conclusion, over a three-hundred year span, Greek lexicography changed considerably. From Philitas' creation of a glossary to explain his peculiar vocabulary to Aristophanes' eventual formalization of the process to Didymus' invocation of lexical authorities in textual criticism, it took on the attributes of a more scientific process and became an important facet of intellectual endeavor. Although Didymus abided by the opinions of his predecessors and maintained their tendencies, change was on the horizon in the person of someone would challenge the conventions of that Alexandrian tradition.

CHAPTER 2: Herennius Philo

Having now covered the early history of lexicography, we come to the primary item of interest in this thesis, Herennius Philo's *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus.* In stark contrast to the previous lexicographers, whose interests were predominantly descriptive in some form or other, Philo takes a decidedly prescriptive interest by making assertions as to correct usage of words. To understand this change, it's necessary to see the man in his proper historical context.

1. Philo's Life

The available biographical information on Philo's life comes from the Suda, a tenth-century Byzantine lexicon and encyclopedia of the ancient world, which tells us that, "[Philo] was born around the time of Nero (54-68 CE), and lived for a long time; he himself says, when he was seventy-eight years old, the serving consul was Herennius Severus in Olympiad 220 (101-104 CE)." Because there was no consul named Herennius Severus in 101-104 BCE, the evidence here is suspect. Moreover, as Nikos Kokkinos among others points out, to be age seventy-eight in 101-104 CE, Philo could not have possibly been born in the reign of Nero. [52] Kokkinos then argues that the date should be emended to Olympiad 230 (141-144 CE) where there was, in fact, a T. Hoenius Severus who served as consul (141 CE), and whose name, Kokkinos argues, was assimilated to "Herennius" because Hoenius is an uncommon name. This argument is made all the more plausible by the broader association of

[52] Nikos Kokkinos, "A note on the date of Philo of Byblus." *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 62, no. 1 (2012): 433-435. Doi: 10.1017/S000983881100053X

Philo with his patron, one Herennius Severus, who is mentioned in the writings of Pliny the Younger.

Consequently, it seems more reasonable to assume that Philo was indeed born in or around 64 CE, and, if he did in fact live "for a long time," perhaps into his mid-80s, he died sometime around 148 CE.[53] Other scholars have offered different theories for correcting the content of the Suda, but they all conclude that Philo was born in the second half of the first century and lived well into the second.[54]

Among other data about his life, we know that Philo produced numerous works besides *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*, including *Concerning the Reign of Hadrian, On Cities and their Famous Men, On the Acquisition and Choice of Books*, and a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[55]

2. Philo's *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*

The history of this text is complex. As best we understand it, at some point around the beginning of the second century CE, Philo wrote a lexicon comparing different words. It was entitled *Peri Diaphorous Semasias* ("On Differences of Meaning"). This text is now lost. What survives is quoted in two different sources: the writings of Ammonius Grammaticus and those of a mysterious figure named "Ptolemaeus." From Ammonius Grammaticus in the fourth century, we have two separate works: first, the one in question, *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus,* an

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53 We know that Philo authored a work titled *Concerning the Reign of Hadrian*, which suggests that he likely lived beyond 138 CE, the year of Hadrian's death.

54 Vincenzo Palmieri proposes that the Olympiad should be read as Olympiad 226, though this would make Philo well over ninety years old when he could have written his biography of Hadrian, which makes the timeline implausible. Albert Baumgarten also refers to the possibility of reading *eis makron* (for a long time) as *eis Markon* (into the reign of Marcus Aurelius), however this is also implausible.

55 Harold Attridge and Robert Oden, *Philo of Byblos: The Phoenician History* (Washington DC: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1981) p. 2

epitome of Philo's original lexicon, and second, Ammonius' own work, *De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia* ("On the Differences of Similar Words"), which borrows heavily from Philo's original, but with crucial differences in readings. Lastly, the lexicon attributed to "Ptolemaeus" is of uncertain date. Although its contents are similar to those of the epitome, they have been substantially pared down to the point that it pales in comparison to either of the works from Ammonius and has no real bearing on the text of Philo or this thesis.[56]

The critical point here is that what survives of Herennius Philo is seen primarily through the lens of Ammonius Grammaticus. As such, the window into Philo's lexicon is limited; however, examination of the epitome alongside the text of Ammonius' own work nevertheless reveals critical details about Philo's attitude toward his discipline.

Palmieri's critical edition of the text (1988) spans 1125 lines and 180 entries, running from alpha through phi. The table below shows the alphabetic distribution of the entries in the text:

[56] Although it is not attributed to Philo by name, the similarity of its content indicates that it also used Philo's archetype. There is, however, no known scholar of the name "Ptolemaeus" who could have authored this document, nor is this lexicon any more informative about the study of Philo than either of Ammonius' works. It is not known when the first version of Ptolemaeus' lexicon was written, but scholars agree, according to Dickey, that it was written after Ammonius Grammaticus. None of Ptolemaeus' entries contain citations, and many are simply summaries of entries from the works of Ammonius. Consequently, the lexicon of Ptolemaeus does not have immediate bearing in discerning Philo's objectives or approach to lexicography.

Letter	# of Entries
Alpha	36
Beta	3
Gamma	4
Delta	10
Epsilon	29
Zeta	2
Eta	4
Theta	8
Iota	5
Kappa	11 (6*)
Lambda	1 (5*)[57]
Mu	7
Nu	5
Xi	1
Omicron	13
Pi	18
Rho	3
Sigma	9
Tau	8
Upsilon	2
Phi	1

Table 1: Distribution of Entries by Initial Letter

It is important also to note that this distribution closely reflects the distribution of words in the Greek language itself. The following table shows that the number of entries per section in Philo's text roughly corresponds to the proportion of pages spent on any given letter in the LSJ.

[57] Due to what appears to be an issue with the manuscript, a number of entries beginning with lambda occur in the kappa section, prior to the heading which marks the beginning of the lambdas.

Letter	LSJ (pages/total)	Philo (entries/total)
Alpha	0.15	0.2
Beta	0.015	0.016
Gamma	0.015	0.02
Delta	0.05	0.05
Epsilon	0.045	0.161
Zeta	0.0045	0.01
Eta	0.01	0.022
Theta	0.015	0.044
Iota	0.015	0.027
Kappa	0.09	0.033
Lambda	0.025	0.0277
Mu	0.045	0.038
Nu	0.0125	0.0277
Xi	0.003	0.005
Omicron	0.045	0.072
Pi	0.14	0.1
Rho	0.0075	0.016
Sigma	0.085	0.05
Tau	0.045	0.044
Upsilon	0.035	0.011
Phi	0.025	0.005
Chi	0.03	N/A
Psi	0.006	N/A
Omega	0.0065	N/A
Standard Deviation	0.040	0.050

Table 2: Comparison of the Distribution of Words in the LSJ vs. Philo

The distribution of words in the Greek language compared to Philo's range proves that he is looking broadly across the Greek vocabulary, which suggests that Philo is addressing words more or less randomly. Equally important, this implies that his

epitomator, Ammonius Grammaticus, is consulting a complete text of Philo, not selections based on the alphabet. As to the content of the work, it is clear that Philo is principally interested in distinguishing three "classes" of similar words: (1) one class that is based on meaning (false synonyms), (2) one class of words that look alike because of spelling and accentuation (homographs and near homographs), and (3) one class of words which share a common root or base but behave differently (grammatical variants).[58]

Entry 15 is an example of the first class. It explains the distinction between two verbs (referenced as infinitives) which relate to fear:

> *Arrodein* and *orrodein* are opposites of one another. For *orrodein*, written with an omicron, indicates "one who acts cautiously;"…. [For example,] Euripides introduces Perseus, saying "For I have never done wrong against those who have suffered terrible things, I myself fearing (*orrodon*) that I would suffer them."... But *arrodein* is the opposite, this is not "to be cautious," but "to aim at and to have taken courage."[59]

This example is typical of Philo. The entry begins with a clear statement of the words in question and proceeds to explain what one means as opposed to the other, often including some form of literary or scholarly reference, in this case, a quote from Euripides' lost work *Andromeda*. Philo's analysis of this first class of synonyms has the objective of clarifying the difference in meaning between two words.

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[58] See Appendix A for the complete translation of *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*

[59] ἀρρωδεῖν καὶ ὀρρωδεῖν ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρρωδεῖν διὰ τοῦ ο σημαίνει τὸ εὐλαβεῖσθαι·…καὶ Εὐριπίδης τὸν Περσέα εἰσάγει λέγοντα (Andromed. fr. 130 n.2)· 'τὰς γὰρ συμφορὰς τῶν κακῶς πεπραγότων οὐπώποθ' ὕβρισ', αὐτὸς ὀρρωδῶν παθεῖν'. καὶ τὸ [μὲν] ὀρρωδεῖν τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ ἀρρωδεῖν <τὸ ἐναντίον>, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐκ εὐλαβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖν καὶ τεθαρρηκέναι.

The second class of distinct words, those with similar spellings, falls into two types: homographs and near homographs. Entry 6 is a useful example of the latter:

> An *anathēma* differs from an *anathĕma*. For an *anathēma*, written with an eta, is "a thing both consecrated and set up in some divine place;" but an *anathĕma*, written with an epsilon, is "a thing having outrage and a curse."[60]

In this entry, the two words being compared vary by only one letter, but they have a significant difference in meaning. The first (*anathēma*) is a sort of votive offering, whereas the second (*anathĕma*) is something akin to a cursed amulet. This small distinction, however, would have posed a significant problem to Greek speakers in Philo's day since Koine was in the process of losing distinctions in vowel gradations.[61]

Similarly, Philo also takes note of true homographs, words which are spelled the same way except for accent. Entry 7 reads:

> An *ágroikos* with a recessive accent and an *agroîkos* with a circumflex differ. For *ágroikos* with a recessive accent is "one without a share of knowledge;" *agroîkos* with a circumflex is "one passing his time in the field or an untamed man, equal to a wild beast."[62]

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60 ἀνάθημα ἀναθέματος διαφέρει. ἀνάθημα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ η γραφόμενον, τὸ ἀνιερούμενόν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέμενον ἱερῷ τινι τόπῳ· ἀνάθεμα δέ, διὰ τοῦ ε ἐκφερόμενον, τὸ ὕβρεως ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀναθεματισμοῦ.

61 See Geoffrey Horrocks' *Greek: A History of the Language and its Speakers* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) for further details on linguistic changes in Koine. He goes on to discuss also how diacritical marks were being developed during Philo's age to compensate for an increasing loss of tonal distinctions in spoken Greek.

62 ἄγροικος βαρυτόνως καὶ ἀγροῖκος προπερισπωμένως διαφέρει. ἄγροικος μὲν βαρυτόνως ὁ γνώσεως ἄμοιρος· ἀγροῖκος δὲ προπερισπωμένως ὁ ἐν ἀργῷ διατρίβων <ἢ> ὁ μὴ ἥμερος, ἴσος τῷ ἄγριος.

Although these two words differ only in their intonation, they mean different things. In this case, the first is most likely a reference to a stock character in Greek comedy, whereas the second is a generic term for a farmer or any person deemed uncivilized.

In a third class of distinctions, Philo explores grammatical variations of words, such as those between active and medio-passive forms of the same verb. For instance, entry 17 reads:

> *Amunesthai* and *amunein* differ. For *amunesthai* is "to punish those who have done wrong," whereas *amunein* is "to come to the aid of others."[63]

Both of these are infinitives formed from the same verb, yet a simple change of voice affects the meaning dramatically.

While only one of the four examples noted above (*arrodein*/*orrodein*, entry 15) contains a citation drawn from the text of a classical author, this cannot be taken as any indication of Philo's typical practice. Although they are not evenly distributed and quite a few entries have none, 128 include citations to a source. Philo sometimes embeds several citations within the same entry, and while he demonstrates a preference for citing classical authors, he also references a variety of Alexandrian scholars. Homer, for instance, is cited most often, thirty-three times, but the grammarian Tryphon is mentioned ten times, and Didymus Chalcenterus six.

This marks the first of a number of differences between Philo and earlier lexical authors. Although Philo does not fail to reference poets and playwrights such as Menander, his principal focus is fundamentally different from that of Philitas since there is no clear evidence that Philo is expecting his own lexical resource to serve as a

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63 ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ ἀμύνειν διαφέρει. ἀμύνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] κολάζειν τοὺς προαδικήσαντας, ἀμύνειν δὲ βοηθεῖν.

supplement to other work he is doing. Furthermore, unlike Didymus, Philo shows no interest in expanding scholarly debate about the meanings of words since only five entries reference lexical disputes. If any, Aristophanes of Byzantium provides the clearest model for Philo, inasmuch as both share the goal of clarifying the exact meanings of words. Even so, Philo departs from all his known predecessors in one particular aspect: his commentary on correct usage.

3. Philo's Sources

There are sixteen instances in which Philo makes an explicit statement as to correct or incorrect usage, for instance, entry 14:

> *Aûthis* and *aûthi* without the sigma differ; for *aûthis* is "again" or "after these events," but *aûthi* is also "the very thing here". And so Callimachus says wrongly, "Right here (*aûthi*) I would strip this off, my weight," instead of "after these events." And in the *Hecale*, "For this, father, release me, and you would receive safety right here (*aûthi*)," instead of "again" (*palin*).[64]

This criticism of Callimachus' usage of *authi* is striking in light of previous lexical authors, none of whom take a vested interest in the actual usage of words in their context; rather, they use that context to elucidate the meanings of words.[65] Philo, to the contrary, is not arguing that the text of Callimachus is wrong, but that Callimachus himself was wrong to have violated a rule of proper word usage. While that author

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[64] αὖθις καὶ αὖθι χωρὶς τοῦ σ διαφέρει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖθις πάλιν ἢ μετὰ ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ αὖθι καὶ τὸ αὐτόθι. κακῶς οὖν Καλλίμαχός φησιν (fr. 1, 35 Pf.)· 'αὖθι τόδ' ἐκδύοιμι, τό μοι βάρος', ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑκάλῃ (fr. 238, 4 Pf.)· 'τῷ <ῥα>, πᾶτερ, μεθίει με, σόον δέ κεν αὖθι δέχοιο', ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλιν.

[65] While one may argue that Didymus made a number of prescriptive comments, those pertain to the creation of authoritative texts, not the actual usage of the words.

overall receives more admonition than the rest, Philo does not hesitate to critique others: Sophocles, Menander, Euripides, Sappho, and even Homer in one instance, although he immediately provides a justification for Homer's solecism.[66]

This attitude colors the rest of the text, although the critique can be subtextual. Sometimes the objects of Philo's criticism are vaguer, such as in entry 157, where he corrects "the rhetoricians":

> *Pus, pei, po,* and *touto* differ among the Dorians. For *pus* is clearly an indicator of "toward a place," *pei* indicates "in a place," and *po* indicates "from a place," as does *touto*. Consequently, those who doricise and say, "where (*pei*) are you going?" do so incorrectly, because *pei* indicates "in a place." Sophron says, "for where (*pei*) is the asphalt?" and, "where (*pei*) are you, destruction?" instead of "where (*pou*) are you?" Whenever one intends to say "toward a place," they say, for instance, "where (*pus*) are you going, into that corner?" as if to mean, "into the abyss."[67]

It is not clear precisely whom Philo is criticising, but this is obviously directed towards anyone at any time attempting to reproduce classical Doric Greek which to Philo is clearly substandard.

Elsewhere, Philo's admonitions are directed broadly toward all those who speak Greek:

> 18. *Ateles* and *ateleston* differ. For *ateles* is "something which has never been completed," but *ateleston* is "something not able to be finished."

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66 Entries 108 and 164.

67 πῦς καὶ πεῖ καὶ πῶ καὶ τουτῶ διαφέρει παρὰ Δωριεῦσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦς τὴν εἰς τόπον σημασίαν δηλοῖ· τὸ δὲ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ· τὸ δὲ πῶ τὴν ἐκ τόπου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τουτῶ (cf. Sophron. fr. 85 K.). ὥσθ' οἱ δωρίζοντες καὶ λέγοντες «πεῖ πορεύῃ;» ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τὸ γὰρ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ δηλοῖ. Σώφρων (fr. 5 K.)· 'πεῖ γὰρ <ἀ> ἄσφαλτος;'. (fr. 5 K.)· 'πεῖ ἐσσί, λειοκόνιτε; —οὔτα', ἀντὶ τοῦ «ποῦ εἶ;». ὅταν δὲ εἰς τόπον θέλῃ εἰπεῖν, φησίν (fr. 75 K.)· 'πῦς εἰς μυχὸν καταδύῃ;' τουτέστιν «εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον».

> And so those who conflate these speak incorrectly.[68]

It is in light of these sorts of reprimands that the purpose of Philo's work comes into clearer focus. Even though many of the entries are simply restatements of the definitions of words cited in pairs, seen in their larger context they predicate the proper use of Greek per Philo's injunctions.

Of the 180 entries, 85 of them rely on the meaning of the words alone in order to differentiate them. Eighty, however, refer to literary or scholarly precedent in order to establish their difference, for instance:

> 122. *Nees* ("transport ships") differ from *ploia* ("barges"). Didymus says as such in his History that *nees* differ from *ploia*. For *nees* are rounded and used to transport troops. Aristotle says in his *Justification of Wars,* "During that time, after the Tarentines had been sent down to the war against the barbarians, Alexander the Molossian sailed away with fifteen *nees,* and many *ploia* carrying horses and infantry."[69]

Based on this passage, not only should one understand that they are different words but also that a *naus* is a different type of vessel from a *ploion*. Since classical authors, in this case Aristotle, use these terms interchangeably, and even if the Greek speakers around Philo's time conflated them, it is obvious that Philo believes people still ought to respect the difference between the two words and what they mean. More than that, he clearly understands them as different not just because of any variation in the ships'

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[68] ἀτελὲς καὶ ἀτέλε<σ>τον διαφέρει. ἀτελὲς μὲν γ[ὰρ] τὸ μήπω τετελεσμένον, ἀτέλεστον δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον τελεσθῆναι. οἱ οὖν ἐναλλάσσοντες ταῦτα ἀ[κυ]ρολογοῦσιν.

[69] νῆες τῶν πλοίων διαφέρει. Δίδυμος (p. 321 Schmidt) ἐν Ἱστορικῷ φησιν οὕτως· ὅτι διαφέρουσιν αἱ νῆες τῶν πλοίων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ νῆ=ε/ς εἰσι στρογγύλαι, αἱ δὲ στρατιώτιδες. Ἀριστοτέλης (fr. 614 R.) δέ φησιν ἐν τοῖς Δικαιώμασι τῶν πόλεων οὕτως· 'ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μολοττός, αὐτὸν καταπεμψαμένων Ταραντίνων ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πόλεμον, ἐξέπλευσε ναυσὶ μὲν πεντεκαίδεκα, πλοίοις δὲ συχνοῖς ἱππαγωγοῖς καὶ στρατιωτικοῖς'.

construction or use at sea, but because the Greek language has two different words for them. Different words means they must refer to different things.

Similarly, Philo pays attention to accentuation itself and often explains it by analogy:

> 140. *Póneron*, as in *sóloikon*, and *ponerón*, as in *noserón*, are said to differ, just like *móchtheros* and *mochtherós*. For wickedness is *ponerós* with an oxytone, but a labour is *póneros* with a baritone accent. This is because the word demands wisely from necessity to be pronounced with an oxytone. For everything formed by adding the ending *-ros* has an oxytonic accent, such as *kámatos, kamaterós*; *ólisthos, olistherós*; *méli, meliterós*. And if *pónos* and *móchthos* are the originals, then *ponerós* and *mochtherós* should be oxytonic. If Attic speakers pronounce it with a baritone, it is not surprising, for they rejoice in the baritone. And so they say *adelphéon*; so they preserve some habit, and they display it.[70]

Although once again there is no explicit admonition as to correct usage, one cannot help but read the grammatical explanation as a suggestion that one ought to follow these established rules of accentuation according to word formation and avoid the Attic variation.

This prescriptive element in Philo creates a stark contrast to the previous lexical authors. From what we have of Philitas' *Ataktoi Glossai*, there is no evidence

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[70] πόνηρον, ὡς σόλοικον, καὶ πονηρόν, ὡς νοσερόν, διαφέρειν φασίν· ὁμοίως <μόχθηρος> καὶ μοχθηρός. πονηρὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὀξυτόν[ως] ὁ κακοήθης, βαρυτόνως δὲ ὁ ἐπίπονος· ὅτι δὲ ὀξυτονεῖν ὁ λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης σαφές. πᾶν γὰρ παρώνυμον εἰς ρος λῆγον σχηματιζόμενον τοῖς γένεσιν ὀξύτονόν ἐστιν, οἷον κάματος καματηρός, ὄλισθος ὀλισθηρός, μέλι μελιτηρός. εἰ καὶ πόνος καὶ μόχθος τὰ πρωτότυπα, πονηρὸς καὶ μοχθηρὸς ὀξυτόνως. εἰ δ' Ἀττικοὶ βαρυτονοῦσιν, οὐ θαυμαστόν· χαίρουσι γὰρ τῇ βαρύτητι. ἀδελφέον οὖν λέγουσιν· ὡς ἔθος οὖν τι τηροῦντες, οὕτω προηνέγκαντο.

that he was concerned with correct usage. In fact, he appears to have been a proponent of non-standard language in general. Conversely, Philo tells us:

> 12. *Agein* and *pherein* differ; for inspirited things are led (*agein*), but things without spirit are borne (*pherein*). And according to Homer, "here there is not such of mine, as the Achaeans would either bear (*pheroien*) or lead (*agoien*) away." And again "They were leading the sheep, and brought glorious wine."[71]

Clearly, Homer felt there was a distinction between these words. Philitas, however, is notable for using *ago* in reference to an inanimate object.[72] Here we have an interesting glimpse into the scholarly backdrop against which Philo was writing. Given some familiarity with the canon of post-classical authors who wrote lexica, it is plausible to suppose that he knew about Philitas, and perhaps a treatise on Philitas by Aristarchus. After consulting these sources, Philo then made a determination as to what was the correct usage of these terms. In the end, he chose to side with Homer and Aristarchus. Not only does this highlight key differences between Philitas and Philo, but also the evolving methodological differences between Philo and previous lexicographers.

Recalling the earlier discussion, we noted that Aristophanes' aim was to provide clear and cogent explanations of words, both rare and common. His justifications for the definitions appear based primarily on classical literature, and at least as far as the fragments of the *Lexeis* show, he does not explore the idea of proper usage or even textual emendation. While Philo also cites classical authors, his

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71 ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν διαφέρει. ἄγεται μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔμψυχα· φέρεται δὲ τὰ ἄψυχα. καὶ Ὅμηρος (Il. v 483 sq.)· 'οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον, οἷον <κ' ἠὲ> φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἤ κεν ἄγοιεν'.
καὶ πάλιν (od. iv 622)· 'οἱ δ' ἦγον μὲν μῆλα, φέρον δ' εὐήνορα οἶνον'.

72 Spanoudakis, 197-8, speculates that this type of usage was one of the topics on which Aristarchus commented in his work *Against Philitas*.

references are used to present both good and bad examples, albeit more often the latter than the former. This raises an important question: if even the original authors can be wrong about the correct usage of words, who or what is right according to Philo's judgment?

4. Philo's Method

The answer lies in the way in which Philo thought about the mechanics of classical Greek. I propose that Philo created his distinctions according to the following hierarchy, from most to least important: 1) form/morphology, 2) classical usage, and 3) scholarly assessment. In other words, Philo was something of a structural purist; by his reasoning, distinction in form, even if the difference is very small, signals distinction in meaning. To him, this factor outweighs all others. One can only imagine how heretical he would have deemed a thesaurus.

This viewpoint clarifies the difference in some of Philo's entries. The final one of the *alpha* section bears this out:

> 36. *Âthlos* masculine and *âthlon* neuter differ. For the masculine indicates the contest, but the neuter indicates the prize. Homer says, "Indeed this awesome contest (*aethlos*) has come to an end," and about the prizes, "After taking your prizes (*aethlia*),…"[73]

Grammatically, these words come from the same root and differ only in their gender. Even their meanings are similar, but to Philo, because they differ in their gender, they are distinct, and therefore they must mean different things. Otherwise, why would the distinction exist?

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[73] ἆθλος ἀρσενικῶς καὶ ἆθλον οὐδετέρως διαφέρει. ἀρσενικῶς μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀγῶνα δηλοῖ, οὐδετέρως δὲ τὸ ἔπαθλον·Ὅμ[ηρ]ος 'ο[ὖτο]ς μὲν δὴ ἄεθλος ἀάατος ἐκτε<τέ>λεσται' (Od. xxii 5), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπάθλων· 'ἀέθλια ἐπαγαγόντες' (Il. xxii 736).

A further example of this type of entry comes in the *epsilon* section where a small distinction in usage creates a substantive difference in meaning:

> 81. *Euthus, euthu,* and *eutheos* differ. For a straight rod is "*euthus*," *euthu* to the gym is what you say, instead of "the gym down the straight" or "with a straight rod;" *eutheos* is used in place of an adverb of time. And so he is wrong who conflates these, as evidenced by Menander in the *Dyskolos,* "What do you mean? Did you go straight (*euthus*) there, knowing and asking for a freed slave?" … [And Aristophanes] says about the word, "It is necessary to use *euthu* for something straight, for instance, if it is a feminine noun, 'the straight stick,' or a masculine one, 'the straight rod,' and even if it is one we call neuter, 'the straight post.' The ancients also sometimes use *euthu* about a road heading into some place,…[74]

Clearly, the guiding force behind Philo's thinking is the fact that one of these is an adjective (*euthus*), while the other two are adverbs (*euthu* and *eutheos*). His criticism of Menander, then, is guided by the fact that the playwright uses an adjectival form where he ought instead to use an adverbial one. To Menander this was apparently a negligible difference, but not to Philo. Moreover, the invocation of Aristophanes to say that "it is necessary" to use a word in a certain way offers insight into the sort of tradition influencing Philo's thinking. In contrast to Didymus who deferred to his

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[74] εὐθύς, εὐθὺ καὶ εὐθέως διαφέρει. εὐθὺς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κανών· εὐθὺ δὲ το<ῦ> γυμνασίου, ἀντὶ τοῦ κατ' εὐθείαν τοῦ γυμνασίου ἢ εὐθεῖ τῷ κανόνι· τὸ δὲ εὐθέως ἀντὶ χρονικοῦ ἐπιρρήματος. ὁ οὖν ἐναλλάσσων ἁμαρτάνει, καθὰ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Δυσκόλῳ (50.52) 'τί φής; ἰδὼν ἐνταῦθα παῖδ' ἐλευθέραν ἐρῶν ἀπῆλθες <εὐθύς>;' καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης … φησὶ γοῦν κατὰ λέξιν· 'δεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺ λέγειν ἐπί τινος εὐθέος, οἷον, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ θῆλυ τὸ ὄνομα, «εὐθεῖα ἡ βακτηρία», ἐὰν δὲ ἄρσεν, «εὐθὺς ὁ κανών», ἐὰν δὲ τὸ οὐδέτερον καλούμενον, «εὐθὺ τὸ ξύλον». οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ἐνίοτε τὸ εὐθὺ ἐτίθεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ ὁδοῦ τῆς οὔσης ἐπί τινα τόπον…

predecessors when determining correctness, Philo invokes them to demonstrate Menander's incorrectness.

This focus on differentiation between words from the same root shows up again in entry 89:

> *Theoros* and *theates* differ. For a *theoros* is "one sent to the gods," a *theates* is 'a member of the audience" and "one of the spectators." Euripides says in the *Ion*, "As a spectator (*theates*) or to seek an answer from the oracle?"[75] which is to say a *theoros…* Those who say, "I must watch (*theoresai*) the contest," are incorrect; it is proper to say "*theasasthai*..." And *theasasthai*, just as noted above, is used in reference to a spectacle. *Theorein*, they say, is nothing other than "to reflect upon." And for this reason, not only those who are not sent for the sake of sacrifices, but also for the sake of communal offerings and worship, all of those are called *theoroi*. And a theoric payment is given to the Athenians not because of the spectacles, as Caecilius supposes, but because it was given during festivals for the sake of showing honour to the gods, making offerings, and experiencing delight.[76]

There is no doubt that both *theoros* and *theates* come from the same root *the-*, but because the verbs on which they are based, *theasasthai* and *theorein*, have different

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[75] Euripides, *Ion*, 301

[76] θεωρὸς καὶ θεατὴς διαφέρει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς θεοὺς πεμπόμενος, θεωρός, θεατὴς δὲ ἀγώνων καὶ θεάτρων. Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἴωνι (301) 'πότερον θεατὴς ἢ χάριν μαντευμάτων',τουτέστι θεωρός… ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ λέγοντες «θεωρῆσαί με δεῖ τὸν ἀγῶνα», δέον εἰπεῖν «θεάσασθαι»… καὶ ἔστι τὸ θεάσασθαι, ὥσπερ πρόκειται, παρὰ τὴν θέαν· τὸ θεωρεῖν, φησίν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ φροντίζειν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς οὐχὶ θυμάτων ἕνεκα πεμπομένους, τοῦ δὲ συνθῦσαι χάριν καὶ εὐσεβεῖν, πάντες ὀνομάζουσι <θεωρούς>· καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διδόμενον θεωρικὸν οὐ διὰ τὰς θέας, ὡς Κεκίλιος ὑπέλαβεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς δίδοσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβεῖν καὶ ἐπιθύειν καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι.

meanings, so too should the nouns derived from them, according to Philo. Small differences amount to important distinctions.

To return to an entry discussed above, when Philo comments on Homer's usage, he says:

> 164. *Stratopedon* differs from *stratos*. For they say that the *stratopedon* is "the place in which the *stratos* resides," like a camp for the *stratos* ("army"); the *stratos* is "the number of those serving as soldiers."… Homer conflates the place with the *stratos,* saying, "For the paths to the *stratos* are many"[77] and perhaps in Attic fashion he calls the place in which the *stratos* resides the *stratos,* just as it is used in other instances. And so he says, "You will find him staying among the pigs (*suessi*)."[78] For he says *suessi* to mean in the place of the pigs, where they stay…[79]

For Philo, the distinction between these two words rests on the simple fact that one contains *pedon* ("ground") and the other does not. The *stratos* is the army, so surely because *stratopedon* contains *pedon,* it by definition cannot refer to the soldiers as well and must point toward something to do with the land on which the military resides. Similarly, one cannot use *stratopedon* in place of *stratos* because the land where the army is camped is not the same as the army itself. It is not surprising, then, that Philo feels the need to comment on Homer's usage. By Philo's reckoning, when

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77 Il. X 66

78 Hom. Od. XIII 407

79 στρατόπεδον στρατοῦ διαφέρει. στρατόπεδον μὲν γάρ φησιν ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός ἐστιν, οἷον στρατο<ῦ> πέδον· ὁ δὲ στρατὸς αὐτῶν τῶν στρατευομένων τὸ πλῆθος…ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος συγχεῖ τὸν τόπον στρατὸν λέγων (Il. x 66)· 'πολλαὶ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατόν εἰσι κέλευθοι' καὶ ἴσως Ἀττικῶς στρατὸν λέγει τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις χρῶται. φησὶ γοῦν (Hom. Od. xiii 407)· 'δήεις τόν γε σύεσσι παρήμενον'. σύεσσι γὰρ εἶπεν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῶν συῶν ἔνθα αὐλίζονται

Homer uses the word for a military encampment to mean the army, he is making an error.

Entry 108 reveals a similar mode of thinking:

> *Libanos* ("frankincense tree") and *libanotos* ("frankincense") differ. For *libanos* signifies both the mountain and the plant, a *libanotos* is the burnt sap from the plant. Euripides conflates them in the reverse order, using *libanos* to describe what is burnt, as does Sophocles in the *Tereus* and Sappho, who calls a *libanos libanotos*.[80]

Of these references, only one survives in an extant work, the one from Euripides (*Bacchae* 144): "And Bacchus, holding up a flame, as if from Syrian *libanos*..." Despite Philo's admonition that it is not an entire tree being burned, only its resin, it is clear that Euripides is using the poetic license often afforded to a playwright. This usage recalls Homer's extension of the meaning of "camp" to "army." To Philo, however, this sort of freedom blurs meaning which is clearly unacceptable in his mind because the words differ in their structure, one employing only the stem *liban-* and the other *libanot-*, a compound of the same stem. For this reason, as far as Philo is concerned, they are not interchangeable.[81]

In entry 98, there is more evidence of Philo's attention to suffixes:

> *Italoi* and *Italiotai* differ. For the *Italoi* are "those who have inhabited the land from the beginning," but the *Italiotai* are "such people of the Greeks who inhabited the place after

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[80] λίβανος καὶ λιβανωτὸς διαφέρει. Λίβανος μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὄρος <καὶ τὸ δένδρον>, λιβανωτὸς δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρου δάκρυον θυμιώμενον. Εὐριπίδης (Bacch. 144) συγχεῖ ἐναντίως ὡς ἐπὶ <τοῦ> θυμιᾶν τὸ λίβανον· καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Τηρεῖ (fr. 595a Radt)· καὶ Σαπφὼ (fr. 44, 30 L.—P. = 44, 30 Voigt) ε)ν δευτέρῳ λίβανον τὸ λιβανωτὸν λέγει.

[81] In fact, the *-ot-* affix often has the force of a perfect participle. It is not surprising that Philo would have understood *libanotos* as something which has been produced from a *libanos*, something "having been *liban*-ed."

> these peoples." The same is true of both the Sikels and the Sikeliots.[82]

Philo, here, is making a similar kind of morphological distinction. Because the latter word contains the *-tes* masculine "gentile" suffixit cannot mean the same thing as the base adjective.[83]

The examples above show how Philo pays close attention the morphological elements of words and uses them to demonstrate distinctions in meaning; however, even when two words are morphologically the same, he also seeks to find distinctions, such as entry 29:

> *Asphódelos* and *asphodelós* differ among the Attics according to their oxytone. Tryphon, among others, says this in his second work on Attic prosody. For the one accented with a baritone is the plant among the ancients, but the one accented with the oxytone is the location in which the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon himself is somewhat inclined to write the place with the same accentuation as the plant. For often, he says, the surroundings are said with the same accent as what is being surrounded. For we also speak of garlic heads themselves and this has come to overlap with where they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the crocus plant itself and the place in which it grows.[84]

Although Philo directs us to Tryphon to explain that places and products are interchanged, the tone is negative, leaving the sense that we ought not to be treating

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82 Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Ἰταλιῶται διαφέρει. Ἰταλοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν χώραν οἰκήσαντες, Ἰταλιῶται <δὲ> ὅσοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπῴκησαν μετὰ ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Σικελῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν.

83 Herbet Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2014), 233.

84 ἀσφόδελος καὶ ἀσφοδελὸς κατὰ τὸν ὀξὺν τόνον διαφέρει <παρὰ> τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· ἄλλοι τε καὶ Τρύφων (fr. 14Vels.) ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ Ἀττικῆς προσῳδίας· τὸ βαρυτονούμενον γὰρ τὸ φυτὸν παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, [ὸ]ξυτονούμενον δὲ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀσφόδελος γίνεται· αὐτὸς δέ τι ὁ Τρύφων προκρίνει ὁμοτόνως τῷ φυτῷ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκφέρειν· πολλάκις <γάρ>, φησίν, τοῖς περιεχομένοις τὰ περιέχοντα ὁμοτόνως λέγεται. καὶ σκόροδα γὰρ αὐτὰ λέγομεν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἔνθα συμβέβηκε ταῦτα πιπράσκεσθαι· ὁμοίως κρόκον αὐτὸ τὸ ἄνθος καὶ τὸν τόπο[ν] ἐν ᾧ φύεται.

these words as interchangeable, because even when the distinction comes down to accent alone, the meanings of the words should be different merely on account of their form. Thus, the structure of words appears to be the highest criterion for Philo.

In some instances, however, form and morphology are insufficient to express the distinction. What is Philo to do when, say, two words are treated as interchangeable but come from entirely different roots, as in entry 76?

> *Endon* differs from *eso*. For *endon* is "in places," *eso* is "towards a place." For a child is inside, but I am going outside. And so he is wrong who says, "I am going inside (*endon*)," or "The child is outside (*eso*)." Sophocles confounds this difference and says in the *Trachiniai,* "Women, both those in (*eso*) the house, and those further beyond." It is proper to say, "Women, those within (*endon*) the house." And Euripides says in the *Hercules*, "the old man and old woman in (*eso*) the house," instead of *endon.* And Euboulos the middle comic poet says in the *Kalathephoroi*, "You will find out in some way, it is a certain old man inside (*eso*)," but it is proper to say *endon*.[85]

Here, it was useful to Philo to look at classical authorship. Morphologically, these words are entirely different, yet it appears to Philo they are being used incorrectly even among classical sources. However, just following the pattern used in other entries where the interchange of words is based on shared etymological elements could not work here, since the problem does not lie in the appearance of the words but

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[85] ἔνδον πρὸς τὸ ἔσω διαφέρει. ἔνδον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόποις, ἔσω δὲ τὸ εἰς τόπον. ἔνδον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ παῖς, ἔσω δὲ εἰσέρχομαι. ἁμαρτάνει γοῦν ὁ λέγων «ἔνδον εἰσέρχομαι» ἢ «ἔσω ἐστὶν ὁ παῖς». Σοφοκλῆς τὴν δια[φο]ρὰν συγχεῖ· φησὶ γοῦν ἐν Τραχιν<ί>αις (202 sq.) 'γυναῖκες, αἵ τ' ἔσω στέγης αἵ τ' ἐκτός', δέον εἰπεῖν «γυναῖκες, αἵ τ' ἔνδον στέγης». καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ (cf. Heraclid. 584) 'γέροντα τὴν δ' ἔσω γραῖαν δόμων' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνδον. καὶ Εὔβουλος ὁ τῆς μέσης κωμῳδίας ποιητὴς Καλαθηφόροις (fr. 40 K. = iii 224 M.) 'ὅπως δὲ πε<ύ>σεσθ'· ἔστι τις γέρων ἔσω;' δέον εἰπεῖν «ἔνδον».

with a more fundamental error. To Philo, people fail to understand that "*es*-" should denote "outside" and "*en*-" should denote "inside." As such, Philo resorted to citing classical authors to illustrate the incorrect usages and how to correct them.

This marks an important juncture where citations of classical authors become a critical, back-up tool for Philo. As in entry 76, sometimes he uses these to demonstrate errors, but at other times to underline correct usage as in entry 60:

> *Epikouroi* ("allies") and *boethoi* ("mercenaries") differ. For *epikouroi* are "those who are allies and rally for those under attack," but *boethoi* are "the allies of those attacking." Homer preserves this distinction throughout his poetry, for the *epikouroi* belong to the besieged Trojans and the *boethoi* are the allies of the Greeks. And so one cannot find in his work a named *epikouros* of the Greeks, only the Trojans.

Epikouroi and *boethoi* share no etymological or morphological connection, so it falls to Homeric usage to explain how they are different.

Entry 134 shows an instance in which classical usage provides support for reasoning based on etymology:

> *Orthros* and *proi* differ. *Orthros* is "the time before sunrise," according to which we become upright (*orthos*) after standing up from sleep, *proi* is the first part of the day according to Homer, "early (*proi*) at dawn," and Hesiod says someone died "at the dawn (of his life) without ever marrying at all."[86]

[86] ὄρθρος καὶ πρωῒ διαφέρει. ὄρθρος μὲν ἡ πρὸ ἀνατολῆς ὥρα, καθ' ἣν ἐξ ὕπνου ἀναστάντες ὄρθιοι γινόμεθα, πρωῒ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καθὰ Ὅμηρος (Il. viii 530 xviii 277.303)· 'πρωῒ δ' ὑπηοῖοι'. καὶ Ἡσίοδος (fr. 313 Merk.—W.) τελευτῆσαί τινά φησι 'πρωῒ μάλ' ἠΐθεον'.

Although these words do not share an etymological connection, it is clear that Philo connects the *orth-* stem in *orthos* and *orthros* with the Greek base that means "upright."[87] Since *orthros* refers to early morning, Philo concludes that this alludes to the moment when people tend to stand upright for the first time in the day.

Classical usage is not the basis of Philo's lexicography but in effect this backup plan, and this helps to explain why he feels justified in criticising some historical texts for their purported solecisms. To Philo, all words ought to be instantiations of higher linguistic principles. Unlike traditional lexicographers who look to usage for the rationale behind meaning, Philo treats usage and meaning as separate phenomena that may or may not coincide, and when they do not, meaning must prevail.

If it suits his purpose, scholarly opinion can serve as a helpful supplement to the distinction Philo is making, as is evident in some of the entries above. At other times, however, it is little more than a last resort to explain minute distinctions, as in 161, in which he compares "*staphulé* with an oxytone ("ripe") and *staphúle* with a baritone ("a plummet")." This entry, the longest one surviving, is a grand exercise in understanding ancient scholarly opinion on accentuation. Morphologically, there is no distinction between these words; they differ only in accent. Since these words look all but identical, one can only imagine the number of ancient authors who struggled, by Philo's understanding, to use these forms correctly. Yet because these two words differ in accent, they should be considered distinct, since meaning must follow form.

In sum, Philo's deep concern with the structure and form of the Greek language as something independent of usage represents a striking departure from the

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[87] R. S. P. Beekes and Lucien van Beek, *Eymological Dictionary of Greek* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1101-1102.

work and attitude of previous lexicographers. For this reason, the lexicon of Ammonius Grammaticus, whom one might call Philo's spiritual successor, is also worth examining. It is important to recall that Ammonius is also our best source for the text of Philo whose original lexicon does not survive. We must never forget that we see Philo through Ammonius' eyes.

5. "Ammonius Grammaticus"

It is necessary first to clarify the identity of Ammonius, the epitomator of Philo. There are four potential candidates of varying viability: (1) there was an Ammonius of Alexandria, a pupil of Aristarchus; (2) a third-century CE Platonist Ammonius Saccas; (3) the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius, son of Hermeias, who lived in the sixth century CE; and (4) the fourth-century grammarian Ammonius Grammaticus. According to Dickey, only the fourth lived at the correct time to be the same Ammonius who epitomated Philo.[88] This Ammonius fled to Constantinople from Alexandria and is cited in Socrates Scholasticus' *Ecclesiastical History*.[89]

In addition to his epitome of Philo, Ammonius' other text survives intact, *De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia* ("On the Differences of Similar Words"). The 525 individual entries in Ammonius' lexicon bear a strong similarity to Philo's surviving 180 in that they focus on the different meanings of words, for instance, entry 30, "*Allos* and *heteros* differ. For *heteros* refers to two, but *allos* refers to more than two." Often attention is given to words which look or sound alike. Entry 33, for example, says:

> *Amygdalê* and *amygdále*
> ("almond") differ. For *amygdalê*

88 Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 95.
89 Ecc. Hist. Book 5, Chapter 16

> with a circumflex is clearly the plant. *Amygdále* with an oxytone is the nut, for which reason Eupolis says in the *Taxiarchoi*, "Give to eat the Naxian fruit (*amygdálas*)."

While Ammonius' work is very close to Philo in its approach to lexicography, there are four significant differences.

First, there are a few entries in the epitome with variants in Ammonius' text. For instance, Philo's entry 16 compares *aponoia* and *anoia*, where Ammonius' entry 56 compares *anoia* and *aphrosune* with no mention of *aponoia*. Similarly, Philo compares *andragathia* and *andreia* (30), while Ammonius compares *andragathema* and *andria* (41). There are also entire entries in the epitome which do not correspond to anything in Ammonius. [90]

Second, there are differences in the citations between the two texts. For instance, entry 16 in Ammonius, which corresponds to entry 20 in Philo, compares *aito* and *aitoumai*. However, where Philo attributes a quote to Menander's *Dyskolos*, Ammonius assigns it to the same playwright's *Hymnis.* In addition, entry 249 in Ammonius shows the use of different texts. Although both authors cite and attribute the same lines from Menander's *Hero* and Sophocles' *Palamedes,* Ammonius' version includes a different line from Homer – *Odyssey* 2.356 as opposed to *Odyssey* 11.223 in Philo 97 – and omits Philo's references to Aeschylus.

This suggests that Ammonius is making deliberate changes in Philo's entries, no doubt, emending, in some cases, what he sees as errors or inconsistencies. Of the entries from Philo which correspond with Ammonius, forty-one show there has been

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[90] Entries 3, 6, 10, 16, 23, 25, 30, 41, 53, 61, 79, 80, 85, 88, 93, 95, 119, 120, 125, 142, 144, 153, 170, 173, 180. Some of these entries are redundant since the same information is incorporated into other entries.

some degree of alteration made in the citations, either the inclusion of new ones or the replacement or exclusion of the ones in Philo. For instance, Philo 97 clearly contains a corrupt quotation from Aeschylus' *Choephoroi*. The text in Philo reads *hemin eos isthi* ("Know our dawn"), a phrase that does not occur in the play. It is most likely a misreading of *Choephoroi* 147, *hemin de pompos isthi* ("Be my emissary"). Philo's text appears to have conflated the imperative of *oida* ("know") with the orthographically identical imperative of *eimi* ("be"). How the error crept into Philo's text is not clear. It could have been in Philo's original or the result of later miscopying. Regardless, Ammonius saw what was a clear error and omitted it.

Third, sixty-seven of the entries exhibit some sort of substantial change in the definition.[91] Ammonius also alters and adds to Philo's explanations. Philo 51 reads:

> *Diploun* and *diplasion*, it is said, differ. For *diploun* is said of things based on their size, and *diplasion* based on their number, for instance, "twice as many (*diplasia)* coins." *Diploun* is said of things which are doubled, just as about clothes being folded, "the doubled (*diploun*) cloak," not *diplasion*. For *diplasion* is used for the differences in size or number other than dimension, such as, "This is twice (*diplasion*) the size of that," and, "This city is twice (*diplasion*) as far away as that one," not "*diploun*."[92]

Ammonius 137, however, reorders the language and extends the explanation:

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[91] It is worth noting that there are another, minor differences not counted in these numbers. Some entries in the Ammonius text show either omission or inclusion of particles compared to entries in Philo, and some entries in the Ammonius text reverse the order of the given definitions from how they are laid out in the Philo text. Other differences include ones which can easily be explained by manuscript error, such as the transposition of words.

[92] διπλοῦν καὶ διπλάσιον, φησίν, διαφέρει. διπλοῦν μὲν γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέγεθος, διπλάσιον δὲ τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμόν, οἷον «διπλάσια χρήματα». ἐπὶ τῶν διπλουμένων τὸ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πτυσσομένων ἱματίων· «διπλοῦν ῥοῦν τὸ ἱμάτιον», οὐκέτι «διπλάσιον». διπλάσιον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ πλῆθος διαφερόντων ἢ διάστημα, οἷον «διπλάσιον οὗτος ἔχει τούτου» καὶ «διπλάσιον ἀφέστηκεν ἥδε ἡ πόλις τῆσδε», οὐχὶ «διπλοῦν».

> *Diploun* and *displasion* differ. For *diploun* is used based on size, but *diplasion* is used based on number, just as *triplasion* and *tetraplasion*. For instance, "He has twice (*diplasia*) the number of coins." *Diploun* is used of things which have been doubled, such as folded clothes, "a doubled-over (*diploun*) cloak," not one twice the size (*diplasion*).

In contrast to Philo, Ammonius includes the fact that *diplasion* functions on analogy with higher numbers, the same way we would say "triple" or "quadruple," and trims down Philo's contrasting examples.

In some instances, Ammonius' explanations offer greater clarity. Where Philo 89 says, "*Theorein*, they say, is nothing other than 'to reflect upon,'..." Ammonius 226 reads, "*Theorein*, they say, is nothing other than to watch out for the gods, and that is 'to reflect upon'..." Likewise, Ammonius 362, which reads largely the same as Philo 136, adds this comment to a quotation of Callimachus: "… which indeed is out of place. For he should have said *houneka* ("because of"), so that the sense would become, 'not because of one song.'"

Fourth, and most importantly, Ammonius does not always retain the same criticisms as Philo. Ammonius 301 reads, "*Libanos* and *libanotos* differ. For a *libanos* is in common speech both the plant and the burnable resin, but a *libanotos* is only the resin." However, as noted above, the original citation in Philo (108) goes on to criticize Euripides and other authors, whereas Ammonius offers no quotes or criticisms of classical usage. Similarly, Ammonius 448 reads: "*Stratopedon* and *stratos* differ. For the *stratopedon* is the place in which the army resides, but the *stratos* is the number of soldiers." In the comparable entry, we saw that Philo then proceeds to charge Homer with committing a solecism, a criticism Ammonius omits.

Again, compare Philo 179 and Ammonius 485:

> **Philo:** *Hyposchesis* (promise) differs from *epangelias* (assurance). For one intending to give something worthwhile promises (*hypischneitai)*, but one who intends to provide something without demand assures (*epangelletai)*. *And so it is necessary to take care (italics mine)*.[93]
> **Ammonius:** *Hyposchesis* and *epangelia* differ. For one who intends to give something worthwhile "promises" (*hypischeitai)*, and one who intends to provide something without demand "assures" (*epangelletai*).

The omission of Philo's final admonition is telling. Ammonius is less prone to censure, which is not to say that his text is entirely free of prescriptive injunctions. In fact, of the eighteen entries in Philo which contain some form of cautionary statement, fifteen recur in Ammonius' text, either intact or with only minor changes. Moreover, there are three remonstrations that occur in Ammonius with the same corrective tone and phraseology as Philo, but which lack a counterpart in Philo's original: 64, 413, and 449.[94]

It is noteworthy, however, that the three criticisms which Philo makes and Ammonius omits are all directed at ancient authors (Euripides, Sophocles, Sappho, and Homer). By contrast, Ammonius' three prescriptive entries not found in Philo are not explicitly directed at any ancient author's word choice. This suggests that Ammonius is more reserved in his criticism of the ancient sources than Philo and is

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[93] ὑπόσχεσις ἐπαγγελίας διαφέρει. ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν γὰρ ὁ τὸ ἀξιωθὲν διδόναι θέλων· ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ ὁ δίχα παρακλήσεως παρέχειν τι βουλόμενος. χρὴ οὖν παρατηρεῖν.

[94] See Appendix B

opting only to include those entries with which he agrees. This offers a glimpse into Ammonius' larger purpose. While he is indeed following in Philo's footsteps, at least inasmuch as he is writing his entries according to the same prescriptive, dual-entry contrastive formula, at the same time his tone is less severe as evidenced in his general reluctance to accuse ancient authors of committing solecisms.

CHAPTER 3: Lexicography after Philo

1. A Broad View of Later Greek Lexica

How are we to interpret Philo and Ammonius in the broader context of later Greek lexicography? To this end, let us take a brief look at later lexicographical authors, both those who immediately followed Philo and those who came much later. The pattern that emerges is a marked decline in the chastising tone that Philo embodies, and a rise in what is better described as simple glossaries in which ancient sources are typically viewed as authorities on language, essentially a return to Alexandrian standards.

First, the closest contemporary to Philo is Phrynichus Arabius who lived during the later second century CE. His *Eclogues*, which survive in their entirety, feature short statements quite clearly directed toward changing the reader's usage of Greek, perhaps even more directly than Philo. For instance, he says in entry 6, "*Mechris* ("until") and *achris* ("as far as") with a sigma are improper. Say *mechri* and *achri*." Furthermore, he says in entry 8, "Never say 'he spits (*emptuei*) on me,' but 'he spits (*kataptuei*) at me,' and 'I spat (*kateptusa*) at him.'" Given his use of imperatives, Phrynichus appears even stronger in his censure than Philo, but there is an important distinction. While Phrynichus criticises modern solecisms and even some conventional Attic usages, it is not clear that he ever explicitly condemned the language of specific classical authors.[95]

Another author who lived after Philo but before Ammonius is Moeris, an Atticist lexicographer from the third century. His lexicon is similar to that of

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[95] Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 96.

Phrynichus in that the entries are relatively short and organized in contrasting pairs. For instance, entry 45 under alpha says, "The Attics say *arrena* ("masculine"); the Greeks say *arsena* ("masculine")." Similarly, entry 7 under nu says, "The Attics say *neaton* ("outermost"); *eschaton* ("farthest") (is used) in common speech." The overall attitude of Moeris' text seems to be descriptive. Unlike Philo and Phrynichus, his entries are structured so as to highlight differences between uniquely Attic expressions or words and more general Greek vocabulary. It is plausible that, as with many entries in Philo, there is an undertone of correction. The absence of explicit condemnations, however, reduces that possibility considerably, and we must assume Moeris deliberately chose not to follow Philo in this practice.

Like Ammonius', the entries of both Moeris and Phrynichus are similar to Philo in disposition. All center around pairs of words and state how they differ in meaning. Philo, however, stands apart from the others in that he offers more explanation for the reasoning behind the differences he cites and a much greater willingness to criticize ancient sources. While Phrynichus and Moeris appear more focused on correcting the Greek of the living speakers in their time, Philo was intent on correcting the Greek of any speaker, past or present.

Despite its popularity in the second and third century, this dual-entry contrastive style of lexicon did not persist. Instead, in the fifth and sixth centuries, it was replaced by simpler glossaries. By the Byzantine period these had become the norm and are best represented by the important early medieval lexicographer Hesychius, who lived sometime around the fifth or sixth century CE.

Much of Hesychius' importance comes from the fact that his lexicon is the only source for a number of obscure words and proper names, such as those of Attic

gene ("clans").[96] The entries are structured not in paired groups but as straightforward glosses presented in both their dictionary and inflected forms. For instance, entry 63 under alpha says, "*abalis*: a wretched olive tree," and entry 22 under lambda reads, "*labreusai*: to speak boisterously and incessantly (cf. *labros*, "lip")." Although not as abbreviated as Moeris', the main distinction is that, even when Hesychius references classical authors, his lexical entries do not exhibit or even hint at any sort of corrective attitude.

It is important to be aware, however, that this lexicon has been "severely abridged" and "heavily interpolated" in its transmission.[97] As a result, there is a possibility that these entries may have contained more detail, though one of the most interpolated sources, the lexicon of Cyrillus which also contain many brief entries, militates against that possibility.

Cyrillus' lexicon was created around the same time as that of Hesychius, but has a different focus. It focuses the majority of its entries on biblical terms.[98] Stylistically, it closely follows Hesychius.For instance, the second entry under the heading *beta-alpha-gamma* reads, "*bagion*: large," and the eighth entry under *lambda-alpha-upsilon* reads, "*laura*: a road, a single street." Some entries contain more detail, such as the fifth entry under *theta-epsilon-omega*, "*theoria*: the act of perceiving sensations in the presence of those more divine. Properly, *theoria* is witnessing God, inasmuch as it is possible for a human to perceive Him." In conjunction with Hesychius, these lexica suggest that the fifth century marks a turning point in the general style of lexica.

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96 Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 88.
97 Ibid. 89.
98 Ibid. 100.

Lastly, the work of Photius, a ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, represents the culmination of the glossary style of lexicon. Although some of the entries are rather long, the majority are quite short, some only one or two words in length, and few contain citations of literary authors. For instance, entry 21 under gamma says, "*Galeos*: a type of fish," and entry 107 under delta reads, "*Deile*: the part of the day after midday." What is most important here is that even in the longer entries there is little evidence of a corrective attitude.

This brief survey of the evolution of Greek lexica before and after Philo's lifetime shows that during the second century there was a shift in lexicographical thinking toward prescriptive entries. Herennius Philo, the important figure among these corrective lexicographers, not only cautioned his readers about their use of words but also censured classical authors for what he saw as improper usage. But what are we to make of the fact that, despite the efforts of Philo and others, the corrective attitude in their lexica did not persist for long, even as the language continued to change? Plato phrased the question this way:

> Then, if I take something from reality, for instance what we now call a "man," and I call this a "horse," and that which we now call a "horse" a "man," will the name for this be "man" for the public, but "horse" for me, and "man" for me and "horse" for the public?[99]

In other words, can language be arbitrary, or is there an essential correctness to it?

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[99] Plato, *Cratylus*, 385a.

2. Conclusion

What is it that causes someone to pay such close attention to words and language that they feel the need to admonish perceived linguistic lapses even in past speakers? Indeed, what is it that motivates a person to codify and refine linguistic rules, even when meaning and understanding are not impeded? The preface to Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary of the English language offers valuable insight into what goes on in the mind of those compelled to this extreme:

> Having therefore no assistance but from general grammar, I applied myself to the perusal of our writers; and noting whatever might be of use to ascertain or illustrate any word or phrase, accumulated in time the materials of a dictionary, which, by degrees, I reduced to method, establishing to myself, in the progress of the work, such rules as experience and analogy suggested to me; experience, which practice and observation were continually increasing; and analogy, which, though in some words obscure, was evident in others.[100]

He later comments, "I have endeavoured to proceed with a scholar's reverence for antiquity, and a grammarian's regard to the genius of our tongue." While we have no such preface from Philo, it is not hard to believe he shared a purist mentality with his distant scholarly descendant.

While on the surface Johnson's project appears to be merely descriptive, it's clear that his goal was to look through the corpus of English texts, as many as he had access to, and to render out comprehensible explanations of the meanings of the

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[100] "Preface," Samuel Johnson, last modified May 24, 104, https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/preface/.

words he found. His "reverence for antiquity" hints at a prescriptive underpinning, inasmuch as one way to slow change in language is to keep older forms alive.

Philo, however, seems even more driven than Johnson towards some sort of perfectionism in language and does not share with him the sort of democratic, descriptive method of lexicography characteristic of Aristophanes of Byzantium. Indeed, all evidence suggests Philo took the much more extreme position that there is some sort of higher order directing language and that words must adhere to certain absolute and immutable rules. It is no concern of his, for example, that an adjective form is regularly used as an adverb, even if an ancient source treats it that way. The rules of the language mandate that adverbs must form and be used in a prescribed manner, and so wherever he finds a usage that does not accord with the rules, he brands it incorrect, no matter the authority of the user.

For this reason, Philo appears to have much more in common with the thinking of Noah Webster. In the 1828 preface to his dictionary, Webster says:

> I spent ten years in this comparison of radical words, and in forming a synopsis of the principal words in twenty languages, arranged in classes, under their primary elements or letters. The result has been to open what are to me new views of language, and to unfold what appear to be the genuine principles on which these languages are constructed.[101]

In this regard, his mode of thinking is closer to Philo's. Webster, for instance, pursues the principles which underlie the language, whereas Johnson employs the usage of words only in order to extrapolate their meaning. In this way, Webster provides a

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101 "Preface," Noah Webster, last modified February 24, 2020, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Preface.

valuable point of comparison in the broader lexicographic tradition because his preface suggests that Philo's principle-based mode of thinking is not restricted to ancient scholarship. It is, rather, something that may drive the work of anyone who is inclined to put rules above practice. For this reason, perhaps, it is not surprising that few scholars are known to have emulated and reproduced Philo's approach to lexicography in late antiquity. But he did find sympathizers elsewhere.

In 1926, H. W. Fowler published *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage*. It is a nearly 750-page volume of alphabetized comments concerning the use of different English words and phrases such as this one:

> **Imaginary/Imaginative**. The meanings of the two are quite distinct, and never interchangeable. That is imaginary which exists only in someone's imagination; he, or his powers or products, is imaginative who is able or apt to form mental pictures. Any confusion between the two is due to the fact that there are things to which either can be applied, though in difference senses, and with some such things the distinction is not always apparent. The difference between an imaginary and an imaginative person is clear enough, but that between imaginary and imaginative distress is elusive; the begging impostor exploits the former; the latter is created and experienced...by the tragic or lyric poet.[102]

Also this passage:

> **Historic(al)**. The differentiation between the two forms has reached the stage at which it may fairly be said that the use of one in a sense now generally expressed by the

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102 H. W. Fowler, *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), 257.

> other is a definite backsliding. The ordinary word is *historical*; *historic* means memorable, or assured of a place in history; *historical* should not be substituted for it in that sense; the only other function retained by *historic* is in the grammarians' technical terms *historic tenses, moods, sequence, present*, etc., in which it preserves the notion *appropriate to the narration of the past* of which it has been in general use robbed by *historical*.[103]

Fowler's resemblance to Philo in methodology is notable, especially in that two individuals so far apart in time were both driven to sanction use of their respective languages in this way and to this extent. The answer can be nothing so simple as labelling them grammarians gone mad. More likely, they were both highly educated scholars who came to understand a simple yet profound concept of language: words have a special relationship to reality. They are the unique mechanism by which people can relate the world to one another: as it is, as it seems, or even as it may never be but could.

This relation, however, operates correctly only when all the parties involved have a mutual understanding of the meaning, constituent elements, and proper function of words. In that case, the lexicographer's task is to record this relationship in the form of a definition which identifies as precisely as possible what thing or action a word represents. Aristophanes of Byzantium made this connection through a careful examination of usage, past and present, domestic and foreign. The way in which a word was or had been employed dictated its meaning.

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[103] Ibid. 235.

For Philo and Ammonius − also Fowler and to some extent Webster as well − this was not satisfactory. That a word was used to mean something which it should not by reason of its etymology or form was an error in need of correction, a violation of the "genuine principles" that govern, or should govern, language. From this radical perspective, there must be a strong logical connection between the form and the meaning of a word based on higher linguistic principles such as grammatical rules or etymology. These supersede established use or tradition or authority.

The work of later lexicographers shows that Philo's attitude did not persist long in the tradition of ancient Greek scholarship. The fact is, the meanings of words change often without any obvious rationale. Thus, Philo's was a noble but losing effort. How then to understand the impulse behind his attempt to bring the Greek language to heel and impose some sort of ideal state that recalls but is not slavishly addicted to the classical standard, to impose the rule of truths that prevail over time and tradition? Again, Samuel Johnson offers one solution:

> Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries; whom mankind have considered, not as the pupil, but the slave of science, the pioneer of literature, doomed only to remove rubbish and clear obstructions from the paths of Learning and Genius, who press forward to conquest and glory, without bestowing a smile on the humble drudge that facilitates their progress. Every other authour may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach and even this negative recompense has been yet granted to very few.[104]

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104 Johnson, "Preface."

Johnson's lexicographer receives neither the grand accolades of an author nor the recognition of a scientist, but without the lexicographer's labour of identifying and codifying language, all written work teeters on the brink of unintelligibility. He who chooses to write a dictionary attempts to render into a static and stable form something not only intangible, but mercurial and metamorphic. Although Philo's work may seem to some to have "a certain amount of banality," his intention is far from commonplace.[105]

There have always been those who ask "What's the right way to say this word?" or "Am I using this phrase correctly?," to whom the purists of the world are bold enough to rise and answer their questions. Herennius Philo sought to impose a certain level of logical consistency on ancient Greek, but it was a losing battle. One need only compare modern English to Fowler's prescriptions to understand that even the most extensive and detailed commentaries on what purports to be correct usage can only do so much or be so effective. Despite Fowler's caution that, "*Between you & I* is a piece of false grammar not sanctioned, like the contrary lapse *It is me*, even by colloquial usage," everyone knows that denunciations of this sort have not conditioned English speakers to say "It is I," at least not without projecting grandiosity and excessive propriety.[106] To many ancients, Philo's admonitions surely sounded the same.

The reason why the corrective attitude of Philo and others fell out of favour is that it was unable to overcome the changing tide of the language. If Fowler were alive today, he would, no doubt, lament how today's English usage has ignored most of his rules. Consider one last passage from Philo:

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105 Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 95.
106 Fowler, *Modern English Usage*, 249.

> 87. *Eis* and *estha* (two ways of saying "you were") are said to differ among the Athenians. For it is clear that *estha* expresses past time, while *eis* expresses potential. And so Hector says, "Deiphobos, truly before now you were (*estha*) far from my dearest friend." And Menander says in the *Kolax*, "Sir, last year you were (*estha*) a corpse and a beggar, but now you are wealthy." And about *eis,* again Menander says in the *Pseuderakles*, "Over wine, and not a small portion, nurse, speak, and you would become (*eis*) blameless, and you will always have a perpetual 16th of Boedromion."[107] And in general the word is used in this way about the future and follows our common usage, such as, "if you know, if you speak, if you are good."[108] And so he who says to someone, "You were (*eis*) rich," will prove ignorant of the difference; for it was proper for him to say *estha*.[109]

Clearly, ancient Greek speakers in the second century were apt to confuse these forms, and Philo was, no doubt, just as ineffective as Fowler in steering his peers back toward what he deemed proper usage. Indeed, in similar fashion, Fowler felt the need to spend nearly four pages discussing correct subjunctive usage, and no one today who understands English grammar is unaware that people regularly conflate the indicative and subjunctive of "to be" forms like "was" and "were" in common usage.

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107 In the Athenian Lunar Calendar, the 16th of every month was considered one of the days on which the moon was full. According to Plutarch's *Life of Phocian*, this was a day on which the Athenians celebrated the "great mysteries."

108 This is a reference to future more vivid conditions, such as "If you are good, you will be happy."

109 ἦις, ἦσθα, φησίν, διαφέρει παρὰ το[ῖς] Ἀττικοῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦσθα τὸν παρῳχημένον χρόνον δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ᾖς τὸν μέλλοντα. ὁ γοῦν Ἕκτωρ φησίν (Hom. Il. xxii 233)· 'Δηΐφοβ', ἦ μέν μοι τὸ πάρος πολὺ φίλτατος ἦσθα'. καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Κόλακι (50 sq. Keo.—Th.2) 'ἄνθρωπε, πέρυσι νεκρὸς ἦσθα καὶ πτωχός, νυν<ὶ> δὲ πλουτεῖς'. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ᾖς πάλιν Μένανδρος (fr. 454 Keo.—Th.2) ἐν Ψευδηρακλεῖ 'ὑπὲρ μὲν οἴνου μηδὲ γρύ, τίτθη, λέγε, ἂν τἄλλα δ' ᾖς ἄμεμπτο[ς], ἕκτην ἐπὶ δέκα Βοηδρομιῶνος ἐνδελεχῶς ἕξεις ἀεί'. καὶ καθόλου πάντα οὕτως λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ κατὰ τὴν <ἡμ>ετέραν συνήθειαν, οἷον «ἐὰν νοῇς· ἐὰν λαλῇς· ἐὰν ᾖς ἀγαθός». ὁ γοῦν λέγων πρός τινα «ᾖς ποτε πλούσιος», ἀγνοήσει τὴν διαφοράν· δέον γὰρ ἦν φάναι «ἦσθα».

Although millennia apart, both Fowler and Philo were gripped by this same desire to preserve moribund distinctions in their languages, and while some may argue it is too soon to say that Fowler failed, it is clear that Philo did.

According to Samuel Johnson's interpretation, lexicographers make language intelligible, yet their attachment to the past, to the word already written, simultaneously makes them obsolete and irrelevant. While the language continues to evolve under their feet, they spend their time forging a set of rules for a communication system that has already outpaced them. Such was Philo's fate. To judge from what remains of *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*, we can see that Philo expended considerable effort in analysing his native tongue and uncovering the deeper linguistic principles which inform it, yet the Greek from which he derived these principles was already dying in his day. It is true of every lexicographer that the connection between his rules and the language to which they are meant to pertain grows more and more strained over time, until eventually the tether that holds them together snaps. In Philo's case, that tie was slender to start with and broke within a matter of centuries.

What, then, are we to make of Philo's attempt to control language? It would be far too simplistic to identify his effort as a failure and move on, especially in light of modern parallels. Whether one chooses to look at the Académie française and its efforts to preserve the "purity" of the French language, or Katharevousa Greek, the eighteenth-century compromise between Demotic and Ancient Greek, questions of controlling language are never simple or insignificant. Instead, let us ask this question: was Herennius Philo's failure born of a perverse and contagious obsession, or does it offer a glimpse into the nature of lexicography itself?

The thread common to Aristophanes, Johnson, Philo, and Webster is that they all understood that lexicography is fundamentally a boundary. The regularized and consistent entity which we call "correct language" lies within the cover of a dictionary, yet we know well that slang, colloquialisms, idioms (or idia, perhaps), and euphemisms are used widely, even though they live outside the dictionary. Does one speak "incorrectly" when describing the deceased as "pushing up daisies?" Philo's restrictions on language proved too narrow to be tenable, but even so, it is difficult to imagine that Aristophanes, even with his lack of prescription, managed to fully encapsulate the Greek of his time. For while much information is contained in lexica, both ancient and modern, they are often limited by their inability to illuminate usages and meanings that lie outside of the self-imposed boundaries of their discipline.

It is the burden of those who wish to understand the meanings of words to realize that whatever meaning they grasp will never be completely and utterly comprehensive. Language, by its nature, is amorphous and variable, while any lexicon which endeavours to control it is static and fixed. It is incumbent upon us, then, to realize that the definitions we find in dictionaries are not necessarily absolute or objective. They exist as a consequence of human judgement, where, at some level, an individual made the decision to assert a particular meaning on a word and pronounce certain usages and definitions correct and others not, if only by implication. Although we often treat words as the ground floor of language, the starting point from which we determine meaning, it is equally important to recognize that our understanding of such is not based on some objective measure, but instead layers of human interpretation.

Yet this was unsatisfactory for Herennius Philo. As a result of his erudition, Philo sought to refine language into a logically consistent entity, excluding the irregularities that human speakers create. As history unfolded, however, his mandates

proved insufficient. The human variability of language prevailed. Despite Philo's failure, later scholars nevertheless picked up a similar banner for their own languages, only to meet a similar fate. Perhaps this is simply the destiny of the learned.

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Appendices

APPENDIX A: Translation of *De Diversis Verborum Significationibus*

De Diversis Verborum Significationibus

Beginning of *alpha*

1. *Athlon* differs from *epathlon*; for an *athlon* is “the struggle itself”, but the *epathlon* is “the gift given to the one victorious.”

2. *Astron* differs from *aster;* for *astron* is “the form established from many stars,” but an *aster* is “the object itself shining.”

3. *Astrologia* differs from *astronomia*; for *astronomia* is “the apprehension of the stars,” but *astrologia* is “the knowledge which makes manifest the results from the motions of the stars.”

4. *Arachne* differs from *arachnes*; for the *arachne* is “the thinnest web of the animal,” that is to say of the spider, but the *arachnes* is the animal itself, pronounced as a masculine noun.

5. *Aner* differs from *anthropos*; for an *aner* is properly “one who is distinguished in some virtue,” but an *anthropos* is distinguished in nothing.

6. An *anathēma* differs from an *anathĕma*. For an *anathēma,* written with an eta, is “a thing both consecrated and set up in some divine place;” but an *anathĕma,* written with an epsilon, is “a thing having outrage and a curse.”

7. An *ágroikos* with a baritone and an *agroîkos* with a circumflex differ. For the *ágroikos* with a baritone is “one without a share of knowledge;” the *agroîkos* with a circumflex is “one passing his time in the field or an untamed man, equal to a wild beast.”

8. *Apokeruktos* and *ekpoietos* differ; for an *apokeruktos* is "the one who has been thrown from his home due to some wrong doing," but an *ekpoietos* is "one given up for adoption."

9. *Apekéruxe* and *epekéruxe* differ. For they say that *kerûxai* and *apokerûxai* are "to give away something for another because of a herald." Menander says, "Agamemnon renounced her,"[110] as if by a herald. But *epikerûxai* is "to promise to give money to the one who has gathered and killed one of the condemned."

10. *Aparaskeuos* differs from *aparaskeuastos.* For the one who has the office of producer through himself would be called *aparaskeuos*, but one who has it from another would be called *aparaskeuastos*. For the arch-priest intending to give gladiators is *aparaskeuos*, but those gladiators are *aparaskeuastoi*. For the first attacks the appearance by another because it is passive, the other is free power. And so the one conflating these speaks incorrectly.

11. *Halipaston* differs from *halispartos.* For they say that the meat or fish sprinkled with salt is *halipaston*, but a space having been sown with salt is *halispartos*. For some of the ancient, hostile barbarians neighbouring the Greek lands sowed salt till the land was no longer able to bear fruit. For this reason, life calls those who have been terribly mistreated and have hard to cure bodies *halispartoi*.

12. *Agein* and *pherein* differ; for inspirited things are led (*agein*), but things without spirit are borne (*pherein*). And according to Homer, "here there is not such of mine, as the Achaeans would either bear (*pheroien*) or lead (*agoien*) away."[111] And again "They were leading the sheep, and brought glorious wine."[112]

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110 fr. 658 Kow.-Th.
111 Il. V 483
112 Od. IV 622

13. *Arrostos* differs from *arroston*; for one who is unable to accomplish something according to their desires is *arrostos*, but one who is diseased is ill (*arrostei*). So Aristotle says.

14. *Aûthis* and *aûthi* without the sigma differ; for *aûthis* is "again" or "after these events," but *aûthi* is also "the very thing here". And so Callimachus says wrongly, "Right here (*aûthi*) I would strip this off, my weight,"[113] instead of "after these events." And in the *Hecale*, "For this, father, release me, and you would receive safety right here (*aûthi*),"[114] instead of "again" (*palin*).

15. *Arrodein* and *orrodein* are opposites of one another. For *orrodein*, written with an omicron, indicates "one who acts cautiously;" they think the word follows thus, the *orros* is said to be the place about the buttocks, they say also that it is the *tauros*; and because of this, this place of the birds is called the *orropugion*, not, as some are unaware, the *orthopugion*. It has been said truly, that *orros* is the place of the rump and is just as the *orropugion*. Those who are cautious are accustomed to drawing back their genitals when faced with something, often the irrational ones of the animals are accustomed to draw back the tail when one is cautions about something. And so sensibly, from the previous reasoning, *orrodein* is said in regard to being cautious. And Euripides introduces Perseus, saying "For I have never done wrong against those who have suffered terrible things, I myself fearing that I would suffer them."[115] and *orrodein* is such an action. But *arrodein* is the opposite, this is not "to be cautious," but "to aim at and to have taken courage."

16. *Aponoia* differs from *anoia*. *Aponoia* is "some rage and hateful arrogance;" but *anoia*, being a loss of the mind, is pitied rather than hated.

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113 fr. 1,35 Pf.
114 fr. 238,4 Pf.
115 Andromeda fr. 130 N.2

17. *Amunesthai* and *amunein* differ. For *amunesthai* is "to punish those who have done wrong," whereas *amunein* is "to come to the aid of others.*"*

18. *Ateles* and *ateleston* differ. For *ateles* is "something which has never been completed," but *ateleston* is "something not able to be finished." And so those who conflate these speak incorrectly.

19. *Apologeisthai* differs from *apologizesthai*. For *apologizesthai* is "to give a necessary speech of expenses," and the mathematicians say "to account a single thing." *Apologeisthai* is "to dismantle an accusation with a speech."

20. *Aito* and *aitoumai* differ. For *aito* is said in regard to taking and not returning, but *aitoumai* is said in regard to needing to return. Menander expresses this difference in the *Dyskolos*: "For I am not asking for fire, nor asking to borrow dishes."[116]

21. *Aidos* and *aischune* differ. For *aidos* is "reverence for each which one considers venerable," but *aiskune* is "a shameful feeling about those actions which each person has done in error so that they not accomplish some action." And one reveres (*aidetai*) their father, but feels shame (*aischunetai*) for becoming intoxicated. Aristoxenos the musician demonstrates this in his *Laws of Teaching*.[117] Indeed, he says one must understand a distinction between *aidos* and *aischune,* because *aidos* concerns age, virtue, experience, and honour. For he who knows to show reverence towards the eminence of each of the items mentioned comes to be so disposed, not through some fault, but through revering and honouring the aforementioned eminences. *Aischune* is first an offence against every man in regard to customary disgraces and also against oneself, for one also shames themselves.

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116 fr. 123 and 410 Koe.-Th.

117 fr. 42A Wehrli

22. *Ámetos* and *ametós* differ. For *ámetos* is “the season of summer,” but *ametós* is “the harvest,” as if one is harvesting fruit.

23. *Apoleipei* and *ekballei* differ. For a woman leaves (*apoleipei*) a man, but a man casts out (*ekballei*) a woman.

24. *Antikru* is “piercingly straightforward,” *antikrus* is “expressly visible.”

25. *Amphi* is “around,” *amphis* is “apart at either side.”

26. *Aktai* are “rocky places lying in the ocean,” *thines* are “beaches.”

27. *Apophora* and *eisphora* differ. For *apophora* is “the payment by the subjugated to their masters,” but *eisphora* is “the product given to the public by the citizens.”

28. *Harpagé* and *harpáge* differ among the Attics, as Tryphon says in his third work concerning Attic prosody.[118] For if we speak it with an oxytone, as is convention, it will be clear that it is “a sudden and violent seizing.” If we should speak *harpáge* with a baritone, as with *anágke*, it is “that on which they take up water vessels from wells.” And we realize this from Menander, “A cup, a table, a downward hook, water,”[119] and in the *Hydroxous,* “We do not know the child but the robbery which he himself prepared,”[120] and Aristophanes says as much in the *Niobos*.[121]

29. *Asphódelos* and *asphodelós* differ among the Attics according to their oxytone. Tryphon, among others, says this in his second work on Attic prosody.[122] For the one accented with a baritone is the plant among the ancients, but the one accented with the oxytone is the location in which the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon himself is somewhat inclined to write the place with the same accentuation as the

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118 fr. 12 Vels.
119 fr. 657 Koe.-Th.
120 fr. 180 Koe.-Th.
121 fr. Nov.
122 fr. 14 Vels.

plant. For often, he says, the surroundings are said with the same accent as what is being surrounded. For we also speak of garlic heads themselves and this has come to overlap with where they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the crocus plant itself and the place in which it grows.

30. *Andragathia* differs from *andreia*. For *andreia* is "the commendable power of the body," but *andragathia* has apparent mental virtue.

31. *Hama* and *homou* differ. For *hama* is an adverb of time, but *homou* is an adverb of place. And so Solon lived at the same time (*hama*) as Anacharsis the Scythian, if indeed he did flourish at that same time; however, they were not at the same place (*homou*). For they were not born in the same place, but one in Athens, the other in Scythia. Homer also shows this, "There then arose both (*hama*) a wailing and a shout of triumph from the men,"[123] referring to the same time. And, "But when they were prepared, each with (*hama*) their generals…,"[124] and, "Together (*hama*), they all raised their reins upon their horses."[125] And about place, he says, "I grew up together with (*homou)* her,"[126] and again, "But together (*homou*) the planks of the ships and the bodies of the men…," instead of saying in the same place. "Lord Agamemnon took his two sons in one chariot, together (*homou*) restraining the swift horses."[127] But there are times when Homer employs the word *homou* in a temporal sense, as Asklepiades says, "If indeed both war and plague together (*homou*) overpower the Achaeans…,"[128] unless one then also says "now together" in the same place, such as "in Troy, war and plague are overpowering the Achaeans."

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123 Il. IV 450 sq. VIII 64 sq.
124 Il. III 1
125 Il. XXIII 362
126 Od. XV 365
127 Il. XI 126 sq.
128 FHG III 299

32. *Ainos* and *paroimia* differ. For an *ainos* is "a mythic story brought out from unreasoning animals or plants meant for the advice of humans," as Lucillius Tarraius says in his first work concerning fables.[129] For instance, one may come from the unreasoning animals as with Archilochus, "This is a certain legend of men, wherein the fox and the eagle established a partnership…,"[130] and so on. And again whenever he says, "I will tell a certain legend to you, Kerykide, sorrowing staff,"[131] and then puts forward, "The ape had been separated from the animals, alone at the far reaches. There, the wily fox, with his firm mind, met him."[132] And Hesiod says, "Now I will tell a legend to the wise kings and others, this hawk addressed the nightingale with variegated neck, holding it high above in the clouds, caught in its talons…,"[133] and one may come from plants, as in Callimachus, "Indeed, hear this legend. Once, on Mount Tmolus, the ancient Lydians say a struggle brought about a grove at an olive tree,"[134] and so on. And an *ainos* is an unfolded proverb. A *paroimia* has the reference from the main point upon the worse, lacking the legend, and is received from something outside, such as, "Leave the bulls ever in the field," and "Ivy after Anthesteria."

33. *Arti* and *artios* differ. For *arti* is an adverb of time, but *artios* concerns a finished, completed work, just as Sappho says in error, "Completely (*artios*), Gold-Sandalled Dawn…,"[135] instead of the temporal *arti*. Among the Attics, *artios* is an indication of the current year, but *arti* the year on-going and about the time past.

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129 fr. 1 Linn.
130 fr. 174 W.
131 fr. 185, 1-2 W.
132 fr. 185, 3-6 W.
133 Opp. 202 sqq.
134 fr. 194, 6-8 Pf.
135 fr. 123 L.-P., cf. 123 and 103, 10 Voigt

34. *Âra* and *ára* differ. For the one said with a circumflex is a dubitative conjunction, and we say it when we are in doubt, "How, then (*âra*), will he do the deed?" The one with the shortened accent is logical, "If it is day, there is light. But in fact it is day, so then (*ára*) there is light." "If it is useful to do this, then (*ára*) we must do it."

35. *Aithe* and *ophelon* differ. For the first expression does not show person, but *ophelon* does show person, such as "if only I, if only you, if only he." And otherwise, *aithe* is an adverb, *ophelon* is both a verb and an adverb.

36. *Âthlos* masculine and *âthlon* neuter differ. For the masculine indicates the contest, but the neuter indicates the prize. Homer says, "Indeed this awesome contest (*aethlos*) has come to an end,"[136] and about the prizes, "After taking your prizes (*aethlia*),…"[137]

Beginning of *beta*

37. *Bomos*, *hestia, eschara,* and *megaron* differ, and just as Ammonius Lamptreus says in his first work concerning offerings, "*Bomoi* are those which have entryways, an *eschara* is the one begetting a use for life on the earth, *hestiai* are extravagant, and a *megaron* is the enclosed *hestia* symbolizing the home."[138] "The *hestia* of noble Odysseus, at which I have arrived..."[139] and he is both hearth-less and homeless. And the goddess is corporeal according to Hesiod, "Hestia and Demeter, and Gold-Sandalled Hera,..."[140] And Neanthes Cyzikus says in his third work on the

136 Od. XXII 5
137 Il. XXIII 736
138 FgrH 361 F 1 a
139 Hom. Od. XIV 159 XVII 156 XIX 304 XX 231
140 Theog. 454

city that *bomoi* are for the gods, *escatai* are for heroes. In Euripides, *esxara* appears instead of *bomos* in the *Pleisthenes*, "Offer the sheep upon the altars (*escharais*) of the gods," as does Sophocles in the *Chryse*.

38. *Basileus* and *koiranos* differ. For *basileus* is "the one who inherits from his father the right to rule from birth," but a *koiranos* is "one who accomplishes the due deed of a *basileus*," such as Achilles was for his wrath, "So masterfully did he manage his army,"[141] Moreover, a *hegemon* is the one conducting military arrangement, as Homer says, "Now when they were organized, each with their generals...'

39. *Boulei* and *boule* differ. This is because they say the word *boulei* indicatively, for instance, "You intend (*boulei*) to be angry with me," but the word *boule* we understand subjunctively, "If you should intend (*boule*) it, we shall find a way." *Boulê* written with a circumflex indicates "an idea."

Beginning of *gamma*

40. *Gamelion* and *epithalamion* differ. For an *epithalamion* is "a poem of marriage written at sea," but a *gamelion* is "he who is not limited by time."

41. *Gamélia* and *gamelía* differ. *Gamélia* are "the things accomplished on the day on which the wedding is completed," or "the gifts given in the wedding." *Gamelía* is "the registration and legal cause for marriage given to the community," which they also call *koureotis*. And they use the phrase "wedding rites," which those who register the youths and intend for them to marry make offerings to their fellow

141 Hom. Il. II 207

people. The ceremony is carried out for Hera, Aphrodite, and the Wedding Graces; or it is an offering for the deities of the deme.

42. *Geron, presbutes,* and *probebekos* differ. Alexion says thus in his epitome of the collected works of Didymos, "From the works of Aristophanes concerning Man, it ranges from birth and growth until old age. For a *brephos* is 'one newly born,' a *paidion* is 'one being nourished by a nurse,' a *paidarion* is 'one already walking and grasping speech,' a *paidiskos* is 'one in the clinging age,' a *pais* is 'the one able to go through daily education.' Some call this clinging age *pallax,* others say *boupais,* or *antipais,* or *mellephebos*. After these, he is called *ephebos*. In Cyrene, they call the *epheboi triakatios,* and in Crete, they call them *apodromoi* because they do not yet take part in communal races; the Achaeans say *kouros* and *agouros,* as also do the Attics. After this, one is called *meirakion* or *meirax,* then *neaniskos,* and *neanias,* then *aner mesos,* then *probebekos* – which they also call *homogeros* –, then *geron,* then *presbutes,* and finally *eschatogeros*."[142]

43. *Gramma* differs from *stoicheion.* For a *stoicheion* is "the very pronunciation and sound," from which comes the representation in letters, the form, or the appearance, as in forming *delta* the triangle, the delta is with three lines, the *omicron* is formed as a circle. The *stoicheion* is complete, such as *alpha, beta, gamma,* and the remaining *stoicheia*. *Stoicheia,* however, are wrongly called *grammata*. Already the ancients were calling *suggrammata grammata*, and again, "But after Plato had picked up one *gramma*, the one about the soul,..."[143] And we say in common speech, "He knows many *grammata*." For he is not acquainted with the 24

142 Frr. 37-66 Sl.
143 Callim. Epigr. 23, 3-4 Pf.

letters, but many *grammata*. In this way, the one acquainted with many words is called *grammatikos*.

Beginning of *delta*

44. *Diskos* and *solos* differ. For a *diskos* is "a pierced stone," as Tryphon says in his fifth work on Hellenism, and a *solos* is "a solid lump of copper." Homer also says, "the massive *solos*,"[144] and elsewhere, "Take the *diskos*,"[145] and then continues, "And the *lithos* sounded."[146] Pindar says, "Whenever with the stone *diskoi,...*"[147]

45. *Dikastes* and *diaitetes* differ. A *dikastes* is "the judge selected according to custom," a *diaitetes* is "the one chosen according to the good collective fortune of coincidence." Menander says in his *Pais*, "If some *dikastes* or *diaitetes* of the gods..."[148]

46. *Diephthartai* and *diephthore* differ. One has been sacked (*diephthartai*) by others, but has sacked (*diephthore*) another. Aristophanes says in the *Horas*, "You have violated (*diephthoras*) our oath,"[149] and Menander says in the *Adelphoi*, "If this man has violated (*diephthoros*) the girl,"[150] and Homer says, "Crazed man, you have defiled (*diephthoras*) your mind,"[151] instead of saying that he had defiled (*diephtharakas*) his mind.

144 Il. XXIII 826
145 Od. VIII 186
146 Od. VIII 190
147 Isthm. 1,25
148 fr. 316 Koe.-Th.
149 fr. 568 K.
150 fr. 5 Koe.-Th.
151 Il. XV 128

47. *Dyspeithes* differs from *apeithes.* For the first is "one who angrily accepts a believable definition," but *apeithes* is "one who is knocked over and is unable to feel the pain."

48. *Demeter* and *Damater* differ among Attic writers. Tryphon says, "For *Demeter* is the name of the goddess, *Damater* is the name of the miracle."[152]

49. *Douloi, oiketai,* and *therapontes* differ among the ancients. *Douloi* is said of pleasures and all the people organized by a king, *oiketai* by a *despotes,* and *therapontes* of organized allies, by whom those who have arrived are served.

50. *Diaboetos* and *epiboetos* differ. For a *diaboetos* is "one recognized for his virtue," but an *epiboetos* is "one who has a wretched reputation." Anakreon in his second work says, "And you will make me a wretch (*epiboeton*) among my neighbours."[153] Some of the poets call this *epiphatos* and *epirretos.*

51. *Diploun* and *diplasion,* it is said, differ. For *diploun* is said of things based on their size, and *diplasion* based on their number, for instance, "twice as many (*diplasia)* coins." *Diploun* is said of things which are doubled, just as about clothes being folded, "the doubled (*diploun*) cloak," not *diplasion.* For *diplasion* is used for the differences in size or number other than dimension, such as, "This is twice (*diplasion*) the size of that," and, "This city is twice (*diplasion*) as far away as that one," not "*diploun*."

52. *Dichótomos* with the baritone, as in *antítupos,* and *dichotómos* with the paroxytone, as in *oikodómos,* differ. For the first is passive, while the second is active. For when we pronounce it with the baritone, they are clearly "being split in two," but when we pronounce it with a paroxytone accent, they "are splitting in two."

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152 fr. 107 Vels.

153 PMG 354

53. *Doasato* and *doiasato* differ, because *doasato* is equivalent to *edoxe*, but *doiasato* with the iota is equivalent to *edistasen*.

Beginning of *epsilon*

54. *Eleatros* and *edeatros* differ. For an *eleatros* is "a cook at the *eleoi*" – *eleoi* are the cooking tables – but an *edeatros* is "the one who tastes the food."

55. *Epítimos* and *epitímios* differ. For an *epítimos* is "an honoured citizen," an *epitímios* is "one liable for punishment and reprehensible." For this reason, we call *epiplexis epitimesis* and say, "Punish (*epitimeson*) him," instead of *epiplexon*.

56. *Endoxos* and *epidoxos* differ. For the first is "one who is remarkable," but *epidoxos* is "one who is expected."

57. *Hetairos* and *philos* differ. For a *philos* is also a *hetairos,* but a *hetairos* is not always a *philos*. For a *hetairos* is also a colleague. For this reason, Homer says about the wind, "a good sail-swelling companion (*hetairos*)."[154]

58. *Ekgonos* and *apogonos*, they say, differ clearly. For an *ekgonos* is "a son," but an *apogonos* is "a grandson or further descendent." The rhetoricians misuse it when they say *apogonos* instead of *huios*.

59. *Helkos, oteile, trauma,* and *plege* differ. For a *helkos* is "a singular, lingering pain caused by an iron," and can also be self-inflicted. It is also said about wounding the skin. *Oteile* is similarly "a beating from an iron." A *trauma* is "a wound inflicted by an iron upon a sound body." A *plege* is "a strike from a hand."

60. *Epikouroi* and *boethoi* differ. For *epikouroi* are "those who are allies and rally for those under attack," but *boethoi* are "the allies of those attacking." Homer

154 Od. XI 7 XII 149

preserves this distinction throughout his poetry, for the *epikouroi* belong to the besieged Trojans and the *boethoi* are the allies of the Greeks. And so one cannot find in his work a named *epikouros* of the Greeks, only the Trojans.

61. *Herkos* and *herkion* differ. A *herkos* is "a wall for cities," a *herkion* is "a wall for homes."

62. *Heterophthalmos* and *monophthalmos* differ. A *heterophthalmos* is "one who has been mutilated in one of the eyes through a puncture wound," but a *monophthalmos* is "one who has always had only one eye," like a Cyclops.

63. *Eoikota* differ from *eikota*. For *eikota* are believable, *eoikota* are appearances.

64. *Euphyes* and *eumathes* differ among the Attics. For they say *euphyes* as a joke, and *eumathe* for "one well disposed to learning."

65. *Exanepsioi* and *anepsioi* differ. And this is because the Attics distinguish the nouns by the accent, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody, "*exanépsioi* is like *amérimnoi*, with a recessed accent," he says, "different than the noun *anepsiós* with the oxytone."[155]

66. *Echthros* differs from a *polemios* and a *dusmenes*. For an *echthros* is "one who was once a friend," a *polemios* is "one advancing with arms against his neighbours," and a *dusmenes* is "one who has maintained hatred for some long time against an ally and is unable to reconcile."

67. *Exeleutheros* and *apeleutheros* differ. For they call "those born and given up to money-lenders due to a debt" *exeleutheros*, then *apoluthentas*, and then

155 fr. 8 Vels.

eleutherothentas. Commonly, they call those presently free from slavery *apeleutheros,* as Tryphon says in his fifth work on Hellenism.[156]

68. *Epikedeion* and *threnos* differ. For an *epikedeion* is the word for "burial," *threnos* is the word for "such and such a time" as Tryphon says.[157] Aristokles of Rhodes says to the contrary in his work on poetics, "*Threnos* is the song of misfortune which has a personal name, for it has lamentation along with praise of the departed. And so some in general say *threnos,* while others make a distinction between *threnos* and *epikedeios,* that the *threnos* is sung at the time of the misfortune in front of the tomb and after the burial, as well as on the anniversary of the funeral, and sung by the handmaids and those with them, but that the *epikedeion* constitutes praise of the deceased amidst some lamentation in verse."

69. *Emeio* and *emoio* differ. For *emeio* is without an article, as Homer says, "Compose my word (*emeio de suntheo muthon*)," and *emou* is with an article. For instance, "my child (*paida emou*)," and, "of my child (*tou emou paidos*)." And Homer says, "Remember your father (*patros soio*),"[158] instead of, "your father (*tou sou patros)*."

70. *Erotan* and *punthanesthai* differ. For *punthanesthai* is "to listen to what is said by someone exactly as reported," the listener not making an *erotesis*; *erotan,* however, is "to intend to grasp some summary said in regard to an undertaken action." And indeed Telemachus says to Nestor, "You have asked (*eireai*) from what place we are, and indeed I will tell you,"[159] and Achilles says, "But come now, Patroclus, friend of Zeus, ask Nestor."[160] Because it is agreed that *punthanesthai* is plainly listening to

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156 fr. om. Vels.
157 fr. 114 Vels.
158 Hom. Il. XXIV 486
159 Hom. Od. III 80
160 Il. XI 611

those speaking, and it is evident when Telemachus says, “Now indeed I am grown and I seek (*punthanomai*) advice listening to others,”[161] and Odysseus says, “I inquired (*punthanomen*) about Ithaca.”[162] According to the philosophers, *erotesis* is “an utterance seeking a guaranteed reply,” for example, “Yes, No, Uncertain, Certain, Unclear.” For these five replies are called “symbolic.” When, however, it is not so, we instead reply otherwise to these questions, for instance, “Is it daytime?” and so we will say, “It is daytime,” “It’s day,” or, “Yes it is.” *Peusis* is “a question to which is not possible to be answered in a guaranteed fashion,” for instance, “Where does Ariston live?” For you will say, “In this place.” Hektor says, “Where has Andromache gone?”[163] and the handmaiden replies that, “She has gone to the great tower of Troy.”[164] For this was not a guaranteed matter of “Yes” or “No.” According to an agreement on the preferred usage, the philosophers differ on this distinction, inquiring they talk about the difference.

71. *Erotesis* differs from *peusis* and *anakrisis*. For *erotesis* is “a brief answer,” *peusis* is “a report of a long deed,” *anakrisis* is “an examination of the two.”

72. *Estai* differs from *genesetai*. For *estai* refers to things now in reality, whereas *genesetai* refers to things about to chance upon creation, just as a young man will be (*estai*) old, but children will be born (*genesetai*) to the childless.

73. *Heurein* and *heurasthai* differ. For *heurein* is as in common speech, *heurasthai* is “to have found some such way.” Menander says in the *Dyskolos*, “I have

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161 Od. II 314
162 Od. XIII 256
163 Hom. Il. VI 377
164 Il. VI 386

found the skill for this,"[165] and Diphilos says in the *Pyrrha*, "My own gift, found from the gods."[166]

74. *Eran* differs from *pothein*. *Eran* concerns those in one's eyes, *pothein* concerns things far away. Homer distinguishes these,"As I love you (*eramai*) now and sweet longing seizes me,"[167] Zeus says to Hera while she is present, but in absence, "But it was a longing (*pothos*) for you and your counsel..."[168] Homer keenly preserves such differences.

75. *Eumorphos* differs from *eueide*. For *eumorphos* is "one who has a good figure," such as one with a fair face, as we also say "configuring the face." *Eueides* is "one who has a beautiful appearance," such as the entire body.

76. *Endon* differs from *eso*. For *endon* is "in places," *eso* is "towards a place." For a child is inside, but I am going outside. And so he is wrong who says, "I am going inside (*endon*)," or "The child is outside (*eso*)." Sophocles confounds this difference and says in the *Trachiniai,* "Women, both those in (*eso*) the house, and those further beyond."[169] It is proper to say, "Women, those within (*endon*) the house." And Euripides says in the *Hercules*, "the old man and old woman in (*eso*) the house,"[170] instead of *endon*. And Euboulos the middle comic poet says in the *Kalathephoroi*, "You will find out in some way, it is a certain old man inside,"[171] but it is proper to say *endon*.

77. *Entauthoi, entautha,* and *enthade* differ. For it is clear that *entauthoi* is the indication of "in a place," *entautha* is both "in a place" and "toward a place;" *enthade*

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165 489
166 fr. 68 K. = IV 408 M.
167 Il. XIV 328
168 Od. XI 202
169 202 sq.
170 cf. Heraclid. 584
171 fr. 40 K. = III 224 M.

is similar. *Entha* is the word for both "in a place" and "toward a place" and is used instead of the temporal adverb *tote*. Homer uses the word *entauthoi*, "Sit there (*entauthoi*) now, keeping away the pigs and dogs,"[172] and Sophocles in the *Electra* says about *entautha*, "to send you there (*entautha*), into that place (*entha*) where you will not see the light of the sun."[173] For it has the indication of both "towards a place" and "in a place." Similarly, Calypso says it to mean "from a place," "Staying here (*enthade*) in this place you would hold this house with me."[174] And Hektor says, "But here the vultures will devour you."[175] For these uses indicate in a place. As regards toward a place, "Odysseus will go there (*enthade*) within this very year."[176] For the usage of *entha* as "in a place," "There (*entha*) lies war-like Ajax, there lies Achilles,"[177] and towards a place, "There (*entha*) we sailed, and some god guided us,"[178] instead of the temporal adverb *tote*, and, "And here Pallas Athena gave to Diomedes, son of Tydeus..."[179]

78. *Entha*, however, can also mean *tote*, as in, "Then (*entha*) the rest of the Achaeans showed their approval," and "place where," as in "There (*entha*) we sailed, and some god guided us," as well as "in this or that place," as in, "There lies war-like Ajax, there lies Achilles, there lies Patroclus."

79. *Ex hosou* and *ex hotou* differ. *Ex hosou* concerns time, *ex hotou* concerns someone or something.

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172 Od. XVIII 105
173 380 sq.
174 Hom. Od. V 208
175 Il. XVI 836
176 Od. XIV 161
177 cf. Od. III 109
178 Od. IX 142
179 Il. I 22

80. *Epistrephes* differs from *eustraphes*. For *epistraphes* is “one who is careful,” *eustraphes* is “one who is capable of handling changes.”

81. *Euthus, euthu,* and *eutheos* differ. For a straight rod is “*euthus,*” *euthu* is used of the path to the gymnasium, instead of “straight to” the gymnasium or “like a straight rod;” *eutheos* is used in place of an adverb of time. And so he is wrong who conflates these, as evidenced by Menander in the *Dyskolos,* “What do you mean? Did you go straight (*euthus*) there, knowing and asking for a freed slave?”[180] And Aristophanes the Grammarian in his work On the Pinakes of Callimachus and On Antiphanes distinguishes this word. He says, however, that some of the ancients use *euthus* as a temporal adverb. And so he says about the word, “It is necessary to use *euthu* for something straight, for instance, if it is a feminine noun, ‘the straight stick,’ or a masculine one, ‘the straight rod,’ and even if it is one we call neuter, ‘the straight post.’ The ancients also sometimes use *euthu* about an extant road in some place, according to …, “I will go down that road as a free man,” and, “Since he knew this, he was acting up and down.”

82. *Enthumema* and *enthumion* differ. For an *enthumema* is “the form of an argument,” but an *enthumion* among the ancients is used in place of *prostropaios*; and so Antiphon says in the *Phonikoi*, “After he has died, we will have a great sorrow (*enthumion*).”

Beginning of *zeta*

83. *Zelos* and *zelotupia* differ. For a *zelotupia* is “something which has arisen in hatred,” but *zelos* is “an imitation of something noble,” “A neighbor rivals (*zeloi*)

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180 50.52

his neighbor."[181] Hera, however, is jealous (*zelotupei*) of Heracles, of Selene and Semele.

84. *Zone* and *zonion* differ. A *zone* is "a belt for men," a *zonion* is one for women.

Beginning of *eta*

85. *Hesuchazein* and *sigan* are said to differ. For *hesuchizein* is "to be still throughout the entire body," *sigan* is "not to speak."

86. *Hemera* differs from *eos*. For *hemera* is incorporeal, which Hesiod traces to Nyx, "And from Nyx were born Aither and Hemera."[182] And *eos* Hesiod attributes to Theia, "And Theia begot great Helios and bright Selene, and Eos, who shines upon everything on earth."[183] And about her corporeal form, Homer says, "However indeed gold-throned Dawn seized Cleitus."[184]

87. *Eis* and *estha* are said to differ among the Athenians. For it is clear that *estha* expresses past time, while *eis* expresses potential. And so Hector says, "Deiphobos, truly before now you were far from my dearest friend."[185] And Menander says in the *Kolax*, "Sir, last year you were (*estha*) a corpse and a beggar, but now you are wealthy."[186] And about *eis,* again Menander says in the *Pseuderakles*, "Over wine, and not a small portion, nurse, speak, and you would become (*eis*) blameless, and you will always have a perpetual 16th of Boedromion."[187] And in general the word is used in this way about the future and follows our common

181 Hes. Opp. 23
182 Theog. 124
183 Theog. 371 sq. 374
184 Hom. Od. XV 250
185 Hom. Il. XXII 233
186 50 sq. Koe-Th.
187 fr. 454 Koe.-Th.

usage, such as, “if you should know, if you should speak, if you should be good.” And so he who says to someone, “Should you ever be (*eis*) rich,” will prove ignorant of the difference; for it was proper for him to say *estha*. To the contrary, Homer employs *e* instead of *ephe*, “And the son of Cronos spoke and bowed his dark brow.”[188] The verbs differ in this way: *e* is employed in regard to the appearance of a single third-person, but *ephe* is about a third person, “I said, you said, that man said.”

88. *Engua* and *enguato* differ. *Engua* means “it was agreed to give,” *enguato* refers to the one receiving. *Enguo* means “I agree to give,” *enguomai* means “I take and guard in my hands.” For this reason, *egcheirisai* also means “to give.” For *engue* is “trust in safety and a safe and secure gift.”

Beginning of *theta*

89. *Theoros* and *theates* differ. For a *theoros* is “one sent to the gods,” a *theates* is ‘a member of the audience” and “one of the spectators.” Euripides says in the *Ion*, “As a spectator (*theates*) or to seek an answer from the oracle?”[189] which is to say a *theoros*. And Aeschylus says, “You speak, as one who has consulted the god (*theoros)* about such a deed.”[190] Those who say, “I must watch (*theoresai*) the contest,” are incorrect; it is proper to say “*theasasthai*.” Lysimachides carefully demonstrates this in his work against Caecilius *About the Attic Rhetoricians*, and makes many comparisons. And *theasasthai,* just as noted above, is used in reference to a spectacle. *Theorein*, they say, is nothing other than “to reflect upon.” And for this reason, not only those who are not sent for the sake of sacrifices, but also for the sake of communal offerings and worship, all of those are called *theoroi*. And a theoric

188 Il. I 528 XVII 209
189 301
190 fr. 289 Radt

payment is given to the Athenians not because of the spectacles, as Caecilius supposes, but because it was given during festivals for the sake of showing honour to the gods, making offerings, and experiencing delight.

90. *Thuesthai* differs from *sphattesthai*. This is because *thuesthai* concerns the worship of a god, and we say that *thuesthai* is "to form a prophecy through viscera." *Sphattesthai* is to kill according to some cause. The first is said of the irrational, the second is said of a human.

91. *Thebaioi* and *Thebageneis* differ. Didymus says in his Memorandum of the Paianes of Pindar, "The *Thebageneis* send a tripod of gold from this place first to Ismenius. What, then, is the difference between the Thebageneis and the Thebaioi? Ephoros says, 'And so these people were drawn up to Boeotia, the Thebans personally led the tribes neighbouring the Athenians after many years. And so the commingled people came from many places, and they were distributed across the land below Cithaeron and opposite Euboia; these people were called altogether Thebageneis, because they came to be among the other Boiotians through the Thebans.'[191]"[192]

92. *Thuousi* and *thuontai* differ. Those who kill the sacrificial animals *thuousi*, those who form prophecies through the viscera *thuontai*.

93. It is said that *thuran* and *thuraian* differ. For a *thuraia* is "that which is just before the doorway," a *thura* is "the one present from the beginning," as Menander says in the *Parakatatheke*.[193]

94. *Thalamás,* as in *agathás,* and *thalámas,* as in *megálas,* are said to differ, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic Prosody.[194] For if the accent is pronounced

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191 FgrH 70 F 21
192 fr. 66 Sn.-M.
193 fr. 331 Koe.-Th.
194 fr. 9 Vels.

with an oxytone, it will be clear that it refers to the place of the Dioscuri; if the accent is pronounced with a baritone, *thalámas* as in *megálas,* it signifies places of descent.

95. *Thólos* and *tholós* differ. A *thólos* is "the structure which they now call a *kamara;*" *tholós* is "the ink of the cuttle-fish."

96. *Thes*, *latris*, *amphipolos*, and *atmenos* are said to differ. For a *thes* is "one who slaves away for money." A *latris* is "one who has been captured in the midst of war and has been forced into slavery." *Amphipolos* is the name for both male and female servants. An *atmenos* is not only a slave, but also a subjected free person.

Beginning of *iota*

97. *Isthi* and *ginou* are said to differ. Homer uses *isthi* to mean *ginoske*, "Know (*isth'*) all these things, so that you may say them to your wife,"[195] and the plural form *iste* as opposed to *ginoskete*. And Euripides says in the *Chrysippus*, "…," and Menander, "Know (*isthi*) well,"[196] and Sophocles in the *Palamedes*, "Know (*isthi*) this, singular youth,"[197] instead of *ginou*. And Aeschylus says in the *Choephoroi,* "Know our dawn."[198] And in the *Alope*, "Do not know this, sullen man...you all know these facts of the law."[199]

98. *Italoi* and *Italiotai* differ. For the *italoi* are "those who have inhabited the land from the beginning," but the *italiotai* are "such people of the Greeks who inhabited the place after these peoples." The same is true of both the Sikels and the Sikeliots.

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195 Od. XI 223 sq.
196 Herois fr. 5 Koe.-Th.
197 fr. 478 Radt
198 cf. v. 147
199 fr. om. Radt, but see Eur. Inus fr. 406,1 N.-Sn.

99. *Isthmos* and *porthmos* differ. For an *isthmos* is "a narrow passage of land with sea on both sides." A *porthmos* is "a narrow area with different lands on either side."

100. *Hikesthai* and *aphikesthai* differ as Heracleides says. For *hikesthai* is the opposite of *elthein*, *aphikesthai* is the opposite of *epanelthein.* Homer preserves this distinction, "Harpalion, who fighting the war followed his dear father to Troy, and did not return again to his fatherland,"[200] and again, "He came to Marathon and the wide streets of Athens."[201]

101. *Ioudaioi* and *Idoumaioi* differ as Ptolemaios says in his first work on Herod the King.[202] For the *Ioudaioi* are those who were naturally there from the beginning; the *Idoumaioi* were not initially called *Idoumaioi*, but Phoenicians and Syrians; however, after they had been conquered by them and had been forced to be circumcised, to incorporate themselves into their race, and follow their own laws, they were called *Idoumaioi*. It is necessary to understand that some of the Greek historians, since they are ignorant of the divine texts, have an incorrect understanding of the *Ioudaioi* and the *Idoumaioi*. For those who come from Judah, the fourth son of Jacob, are called *Ioudioi*, and they are descended from the child of Abraham. The *Idoumaioi* descend from Esau, brother of Jacob, son of Isaac, who was the son of Abraham, and were born in Edom.

Beginning of *kappa*

102. *Kurios* and *despotes* differ. For a *kurios* is "the husband of a wife and a father of sons," a *despotes* is "one who commands those bought with silver."

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200 Il. XIII 644 sq.
201 Od. VII 80
202 FgrH 199 F 1

103. *Kuein* and *tiktein* differ. For *kuein* is “to be pregnant,” and *tiktein* is “to be freed of pregnancy.” Euripides says in the *Antiope*, “Pregnant as I am, now I give birth.”[203]

104. *Koman* differs from *gaurian*. The ancients said that *koman* is “to pride oneself on something,” as Tryphon says. Now, *koman* is “to have long, aristocratic hair.” Simonides says in his first iamb, “And being unwashed, do not be proud, marvel neither at water nor your short beard, and do not place a garment of filth upon your skin.”[204]

105. One who is *eneos* was termed *kophos* among the ancients, as “one who does not make noise.” Homer says, “the soundless (*kophoi*) swell,”[205] meaning *apsophos*. And the Pythia says, “And I will hear what is silent (*kophou*) and I will listen to what is unspoken,”[206] since they are used in parallel. Now, however, *kophos* is “one who is hard of hearing.”

106. Aristoxenus says that *kitharis* and *kithara* differ in his work on instruments, explaining that a *kitharis* is a lyre and those who use it are *kitharists*, whom we call *lyrodoi*, and a *kithara* is what the *kitharodoi* play. Aischines also in his work Against Timarchus says in demonstration of this, “He had around himself both *kitharistai* and *kitharodoi*.”[207]

107. *Katoikisis* and *katoikesis* differ, as Apollonides the Nicaean says in his first work on falsified histories. And he says, “For *katoikisis* is ‘the act of foundation commenced upon others;’ *katoikesis* is when a certain group themselves found cities or take over a certain place. Such as how the Athenians have now settled around the

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203 fr. 207 N.
204 fr. 10 a W.
205 Il. XIV 16
206 Parke-Wormell, The Delphic Oracle, II n. 52 = Herod. I 47, 3 ,2
207 1, 41

acropolis, but they colonized the Ionian people. And *katoikesis* concerns the act of settlement, while *katoikisis* is about the act of colonization."

108. *Libanos* and *libanotos* differ. For *libanos* signifies both the mountain and the plant, a *libanotos* is the burnt sap from the plant. Euripides conflates them in the reverse order, using *libanos* to describe what is burnt, as does Sophocles in the *Tereus* and Sappho, who calls a *libanos libanotos*.

109. *Lemma* is profit with two mus, *lema* is *andreia* written with one mu.

110. *Lachein* and *klerosasthai* differ. For one person is selected (*lachei*) from everyone, but everyone casts a lot (*klerountai*).

111. *Lechos* and *eune* differ. For a *lechos* is "a bed," but *eune* is "the bedding upon it." And so Penelope says, "Cast upon it the bedding (*eunen*), the fleeces and cloaks."[208] She sends for the bedding, which consists of *demnia* and *chlainai*.

112. *Luchnion* and *luchnouchos* differ. For a *luchnion* is "the lampstand," as Antiphanes says in the *Aphrodite*, a *luchnouchos* is "the light." Menander says in the *Nomothetis*, "the light of another, the oil-flask of another."[209]

Beginning of *lambda*

113. *Labein* and *dexasthai* differ. For *labein* is "to take from one who is not giving." Homer says, "But do you take the tasselled aegis in your hands..."[210] *Dexasthai* refers to an item being offered to someone, and it is formed on account of the right hand (*dexian*), and the right hand itself on account of the verb *dexasthai*, "She accepted (*dekto*) the beautiful goblet from fair-cheeked Themis."[211]

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208 Hom. Od. XXIII 179 sq.
209 fr. 291 Koe.-Th.
210 Il. XV 229
211 Il. XV 87 sq.

Beginning of *mu*

114. How *meirax* and *meirakion* ("boy") differ is said so in the difference between *geron* and *presbutes*. Now, according to another perspective, Aristophanes uses the noun, and so he says in the *Gera*, "Seeing a *meirax* pinching the testicles of the *meirakion*..."[212] Recalling this drama and after adding to the verse, Didymus says that a *meirax* is female, and a *meirakion* is male.

115. *Mneme* and *mneia* differ. For if something is a *mneme*, this is not always a *mneia*. If something is a *mneia*, then this is clearly a *mneme*. A *mneme* is related to the impression of the soul, a *mneia* is an account told according to recollection. For one who is recalling also always has remembered, but one who has recalled has not always remembered. Still, a *mneme* is associated with recollection, and a *mneia* is a memory of one's prior existence, and consequently, he is a fool who uses these terms in reverse.

116. *Metabalein* differs from *metamorphousthai*, *alloiousthai*, and *heteroiousthai*. A *metabole* is a common experience, since *metabolai* come about from opportunities, actions, and pleasures. And so, demonstrating the power of the word in the *Orestes*, Euripides says, "The change of all things is sweet."[213] *Metamorphosis* is "an alteration of shape and a transformation of the body into another character." *Alloiosis* is not only the alteration of character, as Homer says, "Now, stranger, you appear different to me than before,"[214] but also another creation of earlier belief. *Heteroiosis* is like the change from one body into another, like Niobe into stone.

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212 fr. Nov.
213 234
214 Od. XVI 181

117. *Miseté* with an oxytone and *miséte* with a baritone differ among the Attics, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody. For if we pronounce it with an oxytone, he says, it is clearly "the cause of hatred," and if we pronounce it with a baritone, it is "a woman inclined towards intercourse." Archilochus says that the difference between these words is preserved among the Dorians and the Ionians, "*miséte* woman."

118. *Mache* and *polemos* differ. A *mache* is an activity in wars, a *polemos* is a time and preparation for *mache*.

119. *Meria* and *meroi* differ. For *meria* are "sacrifices to the gods," *meroi* are offerings which are not so.

120. *Mnatai* and *mnesteuetai* differ. For a man courts (*mnatai*) a woman, but a woman seduces (*mnesteuetai*) a man.

Beginning of *nu*

121. *Nearon* differs from *neales* and *prosphatos*. For the water just recently brought in is *nearon*; for "to draw off water" is implied by this word. Meat is *prosphaton*, for the word is built from the verb *phemi*, which is to make a sound, from which also comes the word *phasganon*. Something just recently captured is *neales*, for instance a fish; it can also be used of something just eaten with salt.

122. *Nees* differ from *ploia*. Didymus says as such in his History that *nees* differ from *ploia*.[215] For *nees* are rounded and used to transport troops. Aristotle says in his *Justification of Wars*, "During that time, after the Tarentines had been sent

215 p. 321 Schmidt

down to the war against the barbarians, Alexander the Molossian sailed away with fifteen ships (*nees*), and many *ploia* carrying horses and infantry."[216]

123. *Nereidas* and *Nereos thugateras* are said to differ. Didymus says about the words in his Remembrance of the Victory of Bacchylides, "Moreover, there are those who say that the *Nereidas* differ from the *Nereos thugateras*, and believe that the *thugateras* are the very descendants of Doris, and call them more commonly than others *Nereidas*. They believe that the descendants are six in number, the others are more. Mnaseas says these things in this way in his works concerning Europa."[217] And so it is plausible to say that the *Nereos thugateras* are those more genuinely descended from one individual, Doris, than others, and that the *Nereidas* are their relatives.

124. *Nun* and *nuni* with an iota differ, as Heracleides says in his first work on general prosody. For the adverb is generally used in three contexts, inceptive, bygone, and impending, such as, "Now, the game has begun," "Now the game will begin." *Nuni* is used of in the one inceptive context.

125. *Neaniskos* and *neanias* differ. It has been discussed in the differentiation between *geron* and *presbutes*.

Beginning of *xi*

126. *Xoanon*, *bretas*, and *agalma* differ. For a *xoanon* is "a smoothed likeness of wood or ivory," a *bretas* is "a likeness of a human made of copper or wood," and an *agalma* is prepared from Parian marble or some other stone.

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216 fr. 614 R.

217 p. 300 Schmidt

Beginning of *omicron*

127. *Oikeioi* and *oikees* are said to differ. For *oikeioi* are "those who come as a result of marriage connections," *oikees* are "all those who are members of the household, both those who are slaves and those who are free." And so Hektor says, "And I will go to my home, so that I may see my household (*oikeas*),"[218] "lest in Aegialeia, the thoughtful daughter of Adrastus groan and wake her household from their sleep,"[219] and in the Odyssey, "who cared for his own life more than the slaves whom divine Odysseus had acquired."[220]

128. *Oiktos* differs from *oiktismos*. For an *oiktos* is "pity for the one being pitied," an *oiktismos* is "the expression of feeling pity."

129. *Ornitheutes* differs from *ornithoskopos*. An *ornitheutes* is a hunter, an *ornithoskopos* is a prophet.

130. *Houtos* and *houtosi* differ. *Houtosi* with an iota is deictic only, but *houtos* is both deictic and anaphoric. It is deictic, as in, "This man, Diomedes, comes from the camp,"[221] and anaphoric, as in, "This is the best of all, he who knows everything in himself."[222] The word itself is so, as it is in the case of *touton* and *toutoni*.

131. *Ouden* with a delta and *outhen* with a theta differ in extent. For *ouden* is said in general, for instance, whenever we say, "nothing in the cosmos is empty." The one said with a theta is taken from *oute* and *hen*, for instance, "neither one nor two." And so he who conflates these is incorrect. For this reason, they guide Zenodotus as he writes, "nothing (*outhen*) weaker,"[223] with a theta.

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218 Hom. Il. VI 365 sq.
219 Hom. Il. V 412 sq.
220 Od. XIV 4
221 Hom. Il. X 341
222 Hes. Opp. 293
223 Hom. Od. XVIII 130

132. *Oligon* and *mikron* differ. For the first is used in regard to number, the second is used in regard to size. Nicias says in his Memorandum of Hecale about the line, "'few along the islet,'[224] it is *mikran* use hypallagically. For *oligon* is about number, and *mikron* is used regarding size." And Homer says indistinguishably, "a small table,"[225] instead of *mikran*.

133. *Hosia* and *hiera* differ. For *hosia* are "the private items which one desires and is able to touch," but *hiera* are "the items of the gods, which one is unable to touch." Demosthenes says in his *Against Timokrates*, "And so he established this custom, through which he despoiled the gods of their divine (*hieron*) property, and the city of its holy items (*hosion*)."[226] He said similarly, "*Hosia* are permitted for human use, as if they are accessible, *hiera* are not permitted, as if inaccessible."

134. *Orthros* and *proi* differ. *Orthros* is "the time before sunrise," according to which we become upright (*orthos*) after standing up from sleep, *proi* is the first part of the day according to Homer, "early (*proi*) at dawn,"[227] and Hesiod says someone died "at the dawn (of his life) without ever marrying at all."[228]

135. *Opse* and *hespera* differ. For *hespera* is "the state after the setting of the sun." *Opse* is "the time long after the setting and generally much later." Homer says, "When it was night (*opse*) he spoke." [229]

136. *Houneka* and *heineka* differ. For *houneka* indicates cause, *heineka* indicates the purpose. Homer says, "because (*houneka*) Chryses,"[230] and, "for the sake

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224 Callim. fr. 470b Pf.
225 Od. XX 259
226 or. 24,9
227 Il. VIII 530 XVIII 277 303
228 fr. 313 Merk.-W.
229 Loc. Ign.
230 Hom. Il. I 11

(*heineka*) of horrid Helen."[231] And so Callimachus incorrectly said, "not for the sake (*heineka*) of one song."[232]

137. *Ophlein* and *ophelein* differ. For one pays a fine (*ophlei*) in court, but one is in debt (*opheilei)* as also we say.

138. *Hoti* and *dioti* differ. For *dioti* indicates the cause, and *hoti* sometimes indicates cause, and other times confirmation. We immediately know that (*hoti*) the moon has left, because *(dioti*) it is no longer there.

139. *Oikade* differs from *eis oikon*. For the first is "to proceed to one's own house," and so we say *oikade*, the second is "to proceed to another's house," *eis oikon*.

Beginning of *pi*

140. *Póneron*, as in *sóloikon*, and *ponerón*, as in *noserón*, are said to differ, just like *móchtheros* and *mochtherós*. For wickedness is *ponerós* with an oxytone, but a labour is *póneros* with a baritone accent. This is because the word demands wisely from necessity to be pronounced with an oxytone. For everything formed by adding the ending *-ros* has an oxytonic accent, such as *kámatos*, *kamaterós*; *ólisthos*, *olistherós*; *méli*, *meliterós*. And if *pónos* and *móchthos* are the originals, then *ponerós* and *mochtherós* should be oxytonic. If the Attics pronounce it with a baritone, it is not surprising, for they rejoice in the baritone. And so they say *adelphéon*; so they preserve some habit, and they display it.

141. *Presbeuesthai* differs from *presbeuein*. *Presbeuesthai* is "to send the elders," *presbeuein* is "to send for ambassadors."

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231 Hom. Il. XIX 325

232 fr. 1,3 Pf.

142. *Politai* and *patriotai* differ. *Politai* are "those who have a share in the city itself," *patriotai* are "those who are not in the city according to custom."

143. *Polis* and *astu* differ. A *polis* is the structure, and *astu* is the preparation for a *polis*.

144. Frost is *págetos*, winter is *pagetós*.

145. *Patria, patriokoi,* and *patroia* differ. For *patroia* are "the items given from fathers to their sons," *patrikoi* are "the friends or guests," and *patria* are "the ethnicities of the fatherland."

146. *Proxenos, idioxenos,* and *doruxenos* differ. For a *proxenos* concerns cities and ethnic groups, as Thucydides says.[233] A *xenos* is "the guest of one other person," and an *idioxenos* is the person himself. A *doruxenos* is "one who has become a friend in the course of war;" for after acquiring this and being deemed worthy of guesthood, one has been sent forth to the ransom taken from war.

147. *Pelastes* and *penestes* differ. The first is "one who seeks protection," a *penestes* is "one who has been sold to others or enslaved during the course of war," as the Helots were among the Laconians.

148. *Plousios* differs from *aphneios* and *olbios*. For one who has a great deal of property is *plousios*; one who gathers property from the year is *aphneios*; one who has perfect fortune is *olbios.*

149. *Penes* and *ptochos* differ. For *penes* comes from labouring and toiling throughout one's life; a beggar is *ptochos,* which Homer supports from etymology, saying, "But cowering (*ptosson*) throughout the countryside he intends to fill his belly."[234]

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233 cf. e.g. II 29,1

234 Od. XVII 227 sq.

150. *Parechein* and *parechesthai* differ. For one provides (*parechei*) dresses, drinking cups, and such, but displays (*parechetai*) their thoughts and opinions.

151. *Pedalion* and *plethrion* differ. For *pedalion* is said of boats, *plethrion* is said of rafts.

152. *Paidiske* and *pais* differ. For a *paidiske* is "a free girl among the Attics," a *pais* is "a slave girl."

153. *Paidion, paidarion, paidiskos,* and *pais* differ. For a *paidion* is "one being fed by a wet-nurse," a *paidarion* is "one already walking around and grasping words," a *paidiskos* is "one in the clinging age," and a *pais* is "one who is able to go through daily education."

154. *Plethos* and *ochlos* differ. For an *ochlos* is properly "a disturbance," a *plethos* is "an organized group of people."

155. *Pei, poi,* and *pou* differ. For the first two mean "to a place," the last one means "in a place." And *pei* and *poi* do mean "to a place," "Where (*pei*) has Andromache gone?"[235] and, "Where (*poi*) are you fleeing?"[236] And *pou* plainly indicates "in a place," "Where (*pou*), now, as you came here did you leave Hector?"[237]

156. *Polemikos* and *aichmetes* differ. For "one who is acquainted with war" is *polemikos,* but an *aichmetes* is "one who skilfully uses weapons during the course of war."

157. *Pus, pei, po,* and *touto* differ among the Dorians. For *pus* is clearly an indicator of "toward a place," *pei* indicates "in a place," and *po* indicates "from a place," as does *touto*. Consequently, those who doricise and say, "where (*pei*) are you

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235 Hom. Il. VI 377

236 cf. Hom. Il. VIII 94 Ar. Plut. 438 Eur. Or. 598

237 Hom. Il. X 406

going?" do so incorrectly, because *pei* indicates "in a place." Sophron says, "for where (*pei*) is the asphalt?" and, "where (*pei*) are you, destruction?" instead of "where (*pou*) are you?" Whenever one intends to say "toward a place," they say, for instance, "where (*pus*) are you going, into that corner?" as if to mean, "into the abyss."

Beginning of *rho*

158. *Rhis* and *mukter* differ. The *rhis* is "the descent from the space between the eyebrows to the lips," *mukter* refers to the apertures of the *rhis*, through which it is possible to expel water.

159. *Rhephanon* and *rhaphanon* are said to differ among the Ionians and the Attics. For *rephanon* is that which we say, but *rhaphanon* is the cabbage.

160. *Rhethron* differs from *rheuma*. For a *rhethron* is "the place through which the *rheuma* is carried," the *rheuma* is "the fluid itself."

Beginning of *sigma*

161. Ptolemaios of Ascalon distinguishes *staphulé* with an oxytone and *staphúle* with a baritone in his second work on prosody in the Odyssey. The baritone one, he says, is "the noun used among architects to refer to a falling lead weight," the oxytonic one is used of fruit. And he says about the word in his second work on prosody in the Iliad, "' their backs, equal to a plummet,'[238] *staphúle* must be pronounced with a baritone as in *Nióbe,* for it is not the same as the fig (*suke*), because the first distinguishes fruits, the second does not."[239] Our Heraclides says that an error was made among Greek speakers as to the noun being oxytonic. Since none

238 Hom. Il. II 765

239 p. 42 Baege

of the nouns ending in *-le* are feminine, they no share in the neuter gender, since the upsilon is penultimate, it is pronounced with an oxytone, but all the neuter nouns longer than two syllables are accented with a baritone, not an oxytone, because the upsilon is a short vowel, as in *krobúle*, *Kardamúle*, *Phaisúle* – this one seems to be of those who had tended to Dionysus, whom Lycurgos "rushed down over holy Nysa," – *hedúle, kordúle*; for this reason *staphúle* must be pronounced with a baritone. And so those who pronounce it with an oxytone say that neuter nouns ending in *eta* are pronounced oxytonically, apart from masculine baritone nouns ending in *os*; for if one pronounces masculine nouns with an oxytone, the feminine nouns will have a baritone, such as *póthos*/*pothé*, *nómos*/*nomé*, *ônos*/*oné*, *tîmos*/*timé*, *phónos*/*phoné*, "in painful slaughter,"[240] and conversely *Danaós*/*Danáe*. "And so," he says, "when *stáphulos* is in the masculine – for the son of Dionysus was called such –, the feminine *staphulé* must be pronounced oxytonically. Against these, one must reply, see *kógchos/kóngche*, *phílos*/*phíle*, *mónos/móne*, *múlos/múle*, and about the oxytonic pronunciation, *kalós/kalé*, *sophós/sophé,* and myriad other baritones have the same accent as baritones, and oxytones as oxytones; for this reason, it is not surprising that it has been pronounced based on the baritone *Stáphulos* and the feminine *staphúlen* is pronounced with a baritone.

Some, intending to come to the aid of common pronunciation and oxytonic pronunciation, say that as many as are indistinguishable from this accent and have the same indication, so many conflate the accent and will conflate the tone. *Phílos* and *phíle*, and *xénos* and *xéne* and the other preceding examples are indistinguishable, for which reason they are given the same accent, and are not distinct; accordingly

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240 Hom. Il. X 521

chólos/cholé, trópos/tropé, nómos/nomé, gónos/goné, dómos/domé, stróphos/strophé, póthos/pothé are– about this it has been said completely among others that there is a difference. And so if *Stáphulos* is a masculine noun, and there is a difference in meaning, *staphulé* – the fruit – is necessarily oxytonic. The reasoning is such, indeed the preceding observation from Heraclides is valid, in so far as he recommends making it baritone not only because of the construction following the noun, but also because it is longer than two syllables, but the former examples are disyllabic. And so the observation of Ptolemaius is acceptable, according to which the nouns do differ in their accents, he says, and in their definition.

162. *Semeion* differs from *teras*. A *semeion* is "a signal originating from the air," a *teras* is "one in the earth."

163. *Summachein* and *epimachein* differ. For *summachein* is "to be with others," as Didymus says, "whether enemies are upon them or they march against others." *Epimachein* is whenever they only protect those being attacked. Thucydides has doubted this, saying in his first work on the Corcyrians that the Athenians did not make a *summachia*, but an *epimachia*.[241]

164. *Stratopedon* differs from *stratos*. For they say that the *stratopedon* is "the place in which the *stratos* resides," like a camp for the *stratos*; the *stratos* is "the number of those serving as soldiers." Aeschylus says, "the army (*stratos*) has resigned, after abandoning the camp (*stratopedon*),"[242] and Homer conflates the place with the *stratos*, saying, "For the paths to the *stratos* are many"[243] and perhaps in Attic fashion he calls the place in which the *stratos* resides the *stratos*, just as it is used in other instances. And so he says, "You will find him staying among the pigs

241 Thuc. I 44,1
242 Septem 79
243 Il. X 66

(*suessi*)."[244] For he says *suessi* to mean in the place of the pigs, where they stay, and specifies, "they are feeding by the rock of Corax."[245] Thucydides confuses the distinction of *stratos* to mean *stratopedon*, saying "the army (*stratopedon*) of the Corcyrians, as many as could hear, called out."[246] And Herodotus says, "The camp fought so through both sides."[247]

165. *Semeion* and *tekmerion* differ. Antiphon says in his first work of Skill, "Things which have passed by are made believable by *semeia*, things which are yet to come by *tekmeria*."

166. *Seio* and *soio* differ in their precise understanding. For *soio* is a declined pronoun, for instance, "Remember your father, Achilles, alike to the gods,"[248] for it means of your father. *Seio* is without an article, "And for your own life, your sons must pay three times the ransom,"[249] instead of *sou,* and not *tou sou*. And these are preserved in Homer.

167. *Skomma* differs from *geloios, eutrapelismos,* and *gephurismos*. For a *skomma* is "something said in disparagement of someone, as if a plot;" a *geloion* is something said by those listening in merriment, without any insult;" an *eutrapelon* is "something said beautifully without seriousness" – it has been described similar to a good turn of phrase – and *gephurismos* comes from "to write disparagements about someone with or without meter upon the bridges in Athens."

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244 Hom. Od. XIII 407
245 Ibid. 407 sq.
246 I 53,3
247 I 76,4
248 Hom. Il. XXIV 486
249 Ibid. 686

168. *Stenai* and *stathenai* differ. For *stenai* happens according to personal volition, *stathenai* happens from the volition of another, for instance, a human stands by himself, a statue is stood up by another.

169. *Sisura* and *sisuris* differ, as Eratosthenes demonstrates. For he says that a *sisura* is "a cover crafted from the hides of goats," and a *sisuris* is "a shawl fashioned from fleece."

Beginning of *tau*

170. *Turannoi* and *basileis* differ. *Turannoi* was said in regard to *basileis*. Herodotus says regarding Croesus that he was "a *turannos* of the people,"[250] and later, "after the death of Alyattes, he received the kingship."[251]

171. *Trochós* with an oxytone, as in *sophós*, and *tróchos* with a baritone, as in *nómos*, differ among the Attics. For *trochós* they pronounce oxytonically just as we do, but they talk about *tróchoi* as the words for races. Euripides says in the *Medea*, "But see her children coming, after stopping their races (*trochon*)."[252] For just as it goes *légo/lógos*, *pléko/plókos*, *phéro/phóros*, so too it goes *trécho/tróchos*.

172. *Tríetes* with a baritone and *trietés* with an oxytone differ according to Ptolemaius of Ascalon. For the first is accented baritonically concerning time throughout which, and Homer says, "And so for three years (*tríetes*) she hid with her trick."[253] If it should be pronounced with an oxytone, *trietés*, like *euphués*, it refers to the age of a small child.

250 I 6,1
251 I 26,1
252 46
253 Od. II 106

173. *Teichos* and *teichion* differ. A *teichos* surrounds cities, a *teichion* surrounds a farm.

174. *Titthe* and *tithenos* differ. And so Aristotle says in his work on children, "*Titthai* comes from the fact that they provide nourishment from the breast; *tithenoi* are those who undertake another task. And I say that they carry them about, play with them, clean them, wash them, lull them to sleep, and are involved in other tasks, such as all the care involved after weaning."[254]

175. *Timorein* and *timoreisthai* differ. For *timorein* is "to come to the aide of those being wronged," *timoreisthai* is "to punish the wrongdoer." Achilles was the avenger (*timoros*) of Patroclus, and he punished (*timoreitai*) Hektor.

176. *Touneka* and *houneka* differ. For *touneka* is "for the sake of this," and *houneka* is "because of this." Callimachus makes an error in the *Hecale*, it is proper for him to say *houneka*, instead he says *touneka*.[255]

177. *Tethe* and *tethis* differ. For a *tethe* is "a grandmother," a *tethis* is "the sister of the father or mother," as Aristotle says. [256]

Beginning of *upsilon*

178. *Hupopsia* differs from *huphorasis*. For *hupopsia* is "the suspicion of some evil," *huphorasis* is "the reputation given for something worse."

179. *Hyposchesis* differs from *epangelias.* For one intending to give something worthwhile undertakes (*hypischneitai)*, but one who intends to provide something without demand offers (*epangelletai).* And so it is necessary to take care.

254 Ar. Byz. fr. 296 Sl.
255 fr. 232 Pf.
256 Ar. Byz. fr. 227 Sl.

Beginning of *phi*

180. *Phlauron* and *phaulon* differ. For a *phlauron* is “a small and unsubstantial evil,” a *phaulon* is “a great evil.”

APPENDIX B: Selections from Ammonius' *De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia*

64. *Apo* and *para* differ. For *apo* is used in regard to inanimate object, such as "from Athens." *Para* is used of animate objects, for instance, "from Socrates." Those who conflate these make an error or they make an exchange of the preposition, as even Homer does, "the two, going away from the ships." (Odyssey, 14.28)

413. *Protos* and *proteros* differ. For *protos* concerns many, but *proteros* concerns two. And a follower of the first (*protos*) is last, but a follower of the former (*proteros*) is the latter. And *proteros* is used in regard to the order of things, but *protos* in regard to their quality, such as whenever we say about glory in a skill that someone is first (*protos echein*), just as someone is outstanding. And so Plato says that in dividing governments, he considers one first (*protos*) and the other second. It is clear that one is considered the first, and the other following it. If one should say, "He came to Athens firstly (*protos*)," he is incorrect, for it is proper to say "*proton*."

449. *Strateia* with a long syllable refers to the act, but *stratia* with a short vowel is the number of the soldiers. The difference is often conflated in usage.