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By Other Means: The Political and Economic Motivations for the Formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 in the United Kingdom

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BY OTHER MEANS: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR
THE FORMATION OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

by

David Cornell

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

History

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UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
2023
ABSTRACT

By Other Means: The Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 in the United Kingdom

by

David Cornell, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2023

Major Professor: Dr. Susan Grayzel
Department: History

The United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century had a worldwide empire and the power and prestige that went along with it. Possessing such a massive empire came with challenges, both at home and abroad. Russian advances in Central Asia and economic hardship from the expensive South African War threatened the security of the Empire. Admiralty and Foreign Office officials in the United Kingdom agreed that Britain could keep its supremacy and keep costs down by allying itself with another power. In 1902 with the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain made the first treaty in which a non-western nation was treated on an equal footing by a European nation. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance affected important future events such as the First World War, a war Japan joined on the Allied side along with the UK. This alliance brought Japan onto the stage with the “Great Powers” of the day in a way that nothing else would have. My thesis will fill the gap in the scholarship and argue that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the result of political and economic concerns combining to change the face of international politics by opening the door to a less Euro-centric world.

(114 Pages)
This thesis is an attempt to answer the question of why British political leaders made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. To answer this question, I have used primary sources such as government communications, newspaper articles, and articles from scholarly journals. Also, I have consulted the works of past historians to better understand the complex topic of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One explains the events that led up to the creation of the treaty between Britain and Japan and clarifies why this treaty was so unusual for the British Empire in the early 1900s. Chapter Two is a detailed investigation of how the alliance was actually written, focusing on the British politicians who were involved and their motivations. Chapter Three is a description of the events surrounding the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which lasted from 1902-1922. By the end of this thesis, I hope you will have a better idea of what the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is and why the British leadership thought it was necessary for Britain.
I must acknowledge my major professor Dr. Susan Grayzel, who was invaluable to the completion of this process. I actually could not have done this without her help. I cannot thank my wife Durinda nor my family enough for all of the support they gave me while I slowly lost my hair from stress during this project. But, I cannot understate the role that my sister Mary Cornell played in the creation of this thesis. She was my inspiration for returning to finish my higher education and she is responsible for transcribing many of the Foreign Office documents I used in this work. These documents from the FO-800-134 series are mostly handwritten, with poor handwriting, and are damaged by repeated copying and changing mediums, so this transcription was no small feat. Never underestimate a librarian.
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INTRODUCTION

“My sole desire is to obtain information and explanation; and in view of the abrupt change of policy, of the momentous issues involved in view of the fact that we may be plunged into war for interests not our own, in a cause we did not foresee or create, in a quarrel not of our own seeking, is to ask the two questions: Is it wise? Was it necessary?”

Sir Henry Norman:
Liberal Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton South

On January 30th of 1902, representatives of the United Kingdom and Japan signed an “Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan Relative to China and Corea,” known more commonly as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. This document is remembered today as a landmark document in modern history. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement was a defensive agreement between Japan and Great Britain in which both sides agreed to aid one another militarily in case one of the signatories was attacked by more than one nation. But when this treaty was first released to the public, the response was not always so positive. Members of the Liberal party in Britain expressed doubts about the treaty’s utility as an assurance against future wars. These MPs felt the treaty might have the opposite effect of inciting a war by angering Russia. Russian diplomats were skeptical of the intent of the treaty. Most of the world was simply surprised by the announcement of the treaty. From the Liberal members of Parliament to the diplomats of the world of 1902 down to the historians of today, the same question pervades: Why? This thesis will argue that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was created because of the need for stability in Asia, the desire to contain Russia, and the unexpected compatibility of the

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1 Hansard 4th series, HC Deb 13 February 1902 vol 102 cc1272-313.
two separate concepts for the future envisioned by the leaders of the United Kingdom and the Empire of Japan.

The United Kingdom had a worldwide empire and the power and prestige that went along with it at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Possessing such a massive empire came with challenges, both at home and abroad. The Conservative Party had won the 1900 election, but the South African War was dragging on, and the party was growing more divided on the issue of foreign trade. Additionally, the cost of the upkeep of the empire was on the rise partly because of the expense of maintaining the naval forces needed to secure the lines of trade and communication necessary for empire. The 1889 Naval Defense Bill required the British Admiralty to follow a “two-power standard.” This bill required the RN (Royal Navy) to have enough large capital warships, particularly the new Dreadnaught class battleships equal to any two of the other great powers. To fulfill the terms of the Naval Defense Bill, the cost of meeting this standard rose as newer, larger, and more technologically advanced ships became a necessity.

The costs of maintaining a larger, more technically complex navy can be found in the amounts given to Parliament in the naval estimates, the RN’s request for funds. In two sessions of Parliament before the Naval Defense Bill of 1889, the costs of running the Royal Navy were estimated at £937 thousand and £992 in 1883 and 1887

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3 Hansard 3rd series, HC Deb. 27 May 1889, vol 336 cc 1062.
respectively. These numbers were estimated by naval experts to cover everything needed by the RN from food and weapons to pensions for former members of the navy. Just six years after the defense bill of 1895, the cost of running the RN was increased to £4.13 million, a 31.6% increase in operating costs. By the year before the Anglo-Japanese treaty was negotiated in 1900, the cost had increased by 33.7% over the 1895 estimate to £5.53 million. The cost of running a modern navy under the “Two Power Standard” was becoming an economic burden by the year 1900.

The modern navy was vital to the empire as trade was a necessity to the economy of Great Britain at the time of the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The United Kingdom had outposts on almost every inhabited continent of the world, and was dependent on trade between the far-reaching corners of the world which were only connected by sea lanes. The GDP (gross domestic product) of Britain in 1900 was around £1.963 billion of which trade made up roughly 27%. This amount is not inconsequential as it’s safe to venture that the loss of this amount of GDP would have collapsed the economy of the Empire. British trade for 1900 was valued at £1.231 billion with £877 million in imports and £354 in exports leaving the British economy with a £523 million trade deficit. This large deficit number is important, because it reveals that the British economy was reliant on imports from the Empire and other trading partners and could not

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5 Hansard 3rd series, HC Deb 07 May 1883 vol 279 cc75-147, Hansard 3rd series, HC Deb 21 March 1887 vol 312 cc860-1019. (Exact numbers for 1883 and 1887 are £937,100 and £992,000 respectively.)
6 Hansard 4th series, HC Deb 18 March 1895 vol 31 cc1276-348 (Exact number for 1895 is £4,133,500.)
7 Hansard 4th series, HC Deb 01 March 1900 vol 79 cc1459-508 (Exact number for 1900 is £5,527,000.)
9 The National Archives, “Events of 1901.”
function without them. If Britain lost contact with the empire for a period of time due to supply route interruption by another power, the British economy would be thrown into turmoil.

These numbers give some insight into the reasons behind why a change in British foreign policy was needed but they still do not answer the questions about why Britain chose to pursue Japan as a potential partner and why this treaty was made at this time. This study will answer the “why” questions in three chapters. The first chapter will interrogate the history of 19th-century British treaty-making by looking at three case studies. All these studies are from the Asia-Pacific region to provide a credible comparison to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I have chosen to focus on disparate examples instead of examples solely from China or Japan to illustrate widespread commonalities in British foreign policy during the 19th century. This chapter will then examine another instance of European involvement in Asia, The Boxer Rebellion. Unlike the three cases before, a non-Western power, Japan was an active participant in the repression of China. The examination of Japan’s participation in the suppression of the Chinese will reveal how this involvement led to the recategorization of Japan to something closer to the status of a European power, in terms of the respect afforded to Japanese sovereignty. The next chapter will examine the political and economic events that lead to the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1901-02. An investigation of the economic and military disaster of the South African War in addition to the political anxiety of Great Game political jousting in buffer states with Russia will help illuminate the political and economic motivations of Britain to sign the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Finally, chapter three will examine the aftermath of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance including the Russo-Japanese War, the beginning of the militarization of Japan, and the breakdown of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In searching for remedy to the problem of keeping naval supremacy without bankrupting the United Kingdom, British Officials in the FO decided that making an alliance would be the most efficient route. Admiralty and Foreign Office officials in the United Kingdom agreed that Britain could keep its supremacy and keep costs down by allying itself with another power. Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty wrote in a letter to the Cabinet in September of 1901 that an alliance “would add materially to the naval strength of this country all over the world.”

The debate in Parliament stemmed from the question of with which nation the United Kingdom should attempt to form an alliance. At the turn of the twentieth century, two choices were at the forefront, alliance with Germany or Japan, both budding naval powers. However, Germany put its support behind the Boer government during the South African War, supplying arms and limited support to Britain’s enemy in South Africa. Germany’s goals for East Asia proved incompatible with Britain’s as well. There was thus only one viable alliance left to consider by the fall of 1901.

The compatible military ambitions of the signatory parties of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 aided in making the alliance desirable to both parties. In 1901, the Franco-Russian alliance was finalized, an act that was seen as a great threat to the safety of the British Empire. Russia was an emerging power in Asia and France was one of Britain’s greatest rivals in that area of colonial expansion. That same year, Russia annexed a portion of Manchuria, expanding the already massive Russian Empire. These

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events were the culmination of years, sometimes decades of political intrigue and threats of colonial expansion by both Russia and France. France and Russia had some of the largest militaries at the time and both had shown themselves willing and able to threaten Britain’s colonial interests, the base of the Imperial economy.\textsuperscript{11} France was a major historic enemy of Britain. The two nations had fought for control of land and colonies in the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Africa for hundreds of years.\textsuperscript{12} In India, French forces had allied with Tipu Sultan in an effort to thwart British control of the sub-continent. Russia was a more recent threat to British holdings in China, wanting to gain a hold in the lucrative China trade that Britain was attempting to monopolize. In addition to Russia’s annexation of portions of Manchuria, the Czar’s ministers were also attempting to gain a path to a warm water port by expanding Russian territory south, an oft-recurring theme in Russian territorial expansion.\textsuperscript{13}

This move by Russia into formerly Chinese territory and more recently Japanese territory was seen by British officials as a direct threat to the stability of the British Empire. Russia had gained large portions of northern China in a deal secretly coerced by the Chinese, upsetting the balance of power between those nations that had laid claim to economic pseudo-colonies in China.\textsuperscript{14} In response, Britain sought to find allies to aid in protecting its interests in the chance that war was the outcome of this crisis. With the “two power standard” draining money from the Royal Navy and a lack of public support

\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{11}Neilson, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1902-1914,” 50.
\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{13}T.G.Otte, “Lord Lansdowne, 1845-1927 [Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5\textsuperscript{th} Marquess of Lansdowne] Foreign Secretary, 1900-1905.” In \textit{British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990}, ed. Antony Best and Hugh Cortazzi (Folkestone, Kent: Renaissance Books, 2018), 93.
\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{14}T.G.Otte, “Lord Lansdowne,” 94.
for increased spending on the military, Britain could not face the Franco-Russian alliance alone. With no obvious Western allies available, Britain turned to Japan as a possible ally.\textsuperscript{15}

In the late 1860s, Japan suffered a great upheaval during the Boshin War, a civil war. This war was essentially a conflict between those invested in the feudal past and those who wanted Japan to be a modern nation to prevent Japan from suffering the fate of China after the Opium Wars.\textsuperscript{16} After the victory of the forces in favor of modernity, Japan used advisors from western nations including Britain, to begin a period of rapid modernization, the Meiji period.\textsuperscript{17} Using its modernized military, Japan went to war with China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, winning territory adjacent to Korea.\textsuperscript{18} This territory which granted to Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was taken from Japanese control by the Russian-led Triple Intervention. Sharing a border with Manchuria, Japanese politicians feared that Korea, which Japan had interests in, was directly threatened by Russia’s move into Manchuria.\textsuperscript{19} This shared threat allowed the Japanese Ambassador Baron Hayashi and British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne to have common ground when entering negotiations for the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.\textsuperscript{20}

The claim that the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 was politically and economically motivated agrees in part with much of the current scholarship on the topic. Historians such as Keith Nielson, T.G. Otte, and Ian T.M. Gow all focus their individual

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} S.C.M. Paine, \textit{The Japanese Empire},8.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 15.
\textsuperscript{19} Lansdowne to MacDonald, 30 Jan. 1902, TNA, CAB, 37-60-33.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
scholarship on slightly different aspects of the treaty, but all agree that military concerns were the driving impetus of the British and Japanese treaty-makers. Zara S. Steiner postulates in “Great Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance” that the British government of 1901-1902 agreed to the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance because of the fundamental weakness of empires. Steiner argues that not only the British, but all European empires at the turn of the twentieth century were suffering from a general weakening as domestic issues at home forced cutbacks in spending on the military and Empire. Historians have tended to agree that military necessity was the driving factor behind the creation of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, but have more often neglected the political and economic factors linked to the military necessities that motivated the militaries of Britain and Japan.

Gow and Otte both argued for another common aspect in the historiography of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, that Russian pressures on the region from Russia’s expansion into Manchuria and northern Chinese and Korean territories were a key factor in the need for such a treaty. The Russians’ expansion was seen, at least privately, by British politicians to be a threat to the economic interests of the British Empire. These military interests were important to the creation of the treaty since the military concerns of the British Empire were irrevocably linked to the economic power of the nineteenth-century UK. The United Kingdom’s trade with its Asia/Pacific colonies kept the British economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century functioning, making up roughly half of Britain’s trade, so for the British government stability in this region was paramount.21

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Scholars have filled many of the silences in the history of the events surrounding the alliance, but some aspects still need further attention. Racism played a large part in many interactions between Euro-Americans and is being studied in current works on Anglo-Japanese relations. While the role of racism in the colonial affairs of Britain is not the primary focus of this work, racism is embedded throughout the events detailed within. The party politics, economic motivators, and international events that combined to lead to the choice of Japan as an ally and the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is this work’s focus. The choice of an alliance over self-protection by the strength of arms in the context of the politics of the choice of Japan is also an important topic to investigate. It is important to fill these gaps because a lack of a full understanding of the motivations of historical figures can leave us ill-prepared to meet the challenges of future historical analysis. Even more important than that, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is an often-unacknowledged revolutionary event in world history. This alliance affected important future events such as the First World War, a war Japan joined on the Allied side along with the UK. It has also been argued that the result of the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War led to the militarism and nationalism in Japan that presaged the Second World War in the Asia Pacific area. These important contributions and more to the history of the world by Japan most likely would not have been possible without the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This alliance brought Japan onto the stage with the “Great

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Powers” of the day in a way that nothing else would have; giving non-European and non-
North American peoples a voice in modern world events unknown until this point.

In summation, this thesis will first, establish the norms of British diplomacy in the
19th century when dealing with non-Euro-American people. The choice of disparate
groups is intentional to establish this behavior is the norm and not isolated to East Asia.
Next, I will interrogate the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement to highlight the
motivations of the British government for making this agreement. Following on the first
chapter’s focus on British inequity with non-Western people, this will also serve to
highlight the revolutionary nature of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. Finally, the major
events during the years the treaty was in force and the downfall of the treaty will
conclude this study. In the thesis I intend to show that this treaty was necessary,
revolutionary, and was ended by the innate bias toward non-Western people of the British
colonial mindset.
CHAPTER I: 19TH CENTURY BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND THE ROOTS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

“It is not only, as I said just now, a momentous departure from the time-honoured policy of this country, but for the first time Great Britain has concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with a foreign Power, and it is the first time also in modern history that any European Power has concluded an alliance of this nature not with an Occidental but an Oriental race (The Japanese).”

Sir Henry Norman:
Liberal Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton South

Satirists depicted the British Empire of the nineteenth century as an octopus, reaching out and engulfing the world with its grasping tentacles. British “tentacles” clutched at territories to be added. British politicians and officials made treaties with the

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sole purpose of enhancing the wealth and prestige of the Empire. In the Asia/Pacific region, these treaties almost invariably succeeded in leaving the empire with an improved economic outlook while often neglecting the needs of the other signatory group. This inequity was not uncommon for European powers when dealing with non-European or non-North American powers during the nineteenth century. This is why the Anglo-Japanese alliance is so revolutionary; it was the first equitable treaty made by a European or north American power with an Asian power.

This chapter will prepare us for an examination of the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance by exploring British interactions with non-Western people in diverse places during the 19th century. Chapter one is divided into two sections. The first section, explores three cases: the gradual British colonization of the Indian sub-continent, the treaty of Waitangi by which Britain annexed New Zealand, and the Treaty of Gandamak which ended the Second Afghan war. These examples are intended to be representative of the way in which the nineteenth-century British Empire expanded in the Asia/Pacific region. This does not mean that Britain always used the same method of expansion, but instead that while British methods varied, the expansion was generally harmful to the non-Euro-American people who came into contact with the British empire. The next section focuses on the beginning of the revolutionary change in British Imperial policy. This section will focus on Japanese involvement in the Boxer Rebellion and how this led to a fundamental recategorization in the Imperial calculus of how nations would be valued as friends and allies.25

25 The Boxer Rebellion is also known as the Boxer Uprising, the Boxer Insurrection, or the Yihetuan Movement as well as a few other names not listed here. The name of this event depends on the source. I use Boxer Rebellion as it is the most common usage by the British sources I am using.
BRITAIN IN INDIA

To provide context for the uniqueness of the British relationship with Japan, it is necessary to examine the relationship between Britain and other Non-Western groups. No two relationships between groups will ever be identical. For the purpose of creating a comparative norm for 19th-century British foreign relations with groups that Britain and other European nations considered inferior in some way, interrogating disparate relationships provides a well-rounded contextual background. The British began their involvement with India as a place to trade in the early seventeenth century. The first, more forceful steps to establish colonies supported by military arms appeared in the mid-eighteenth century. It is important to note that these first colonies did not belong to the British state, but were owned and administered by British-run companies, eventually primarily the British East India Company. The powers of the Company in India were vast. A British trading company very minimally controlled by the British government, the East India Company had the power to govern the territory, raise armies, and take the land.

Effectively, the Company had sovereignty over the lands it controlled. One East India Company director went so far as to call their rule of India “an empire within an empire” because of the power the Company held. During the period of Company sovereignty, the East India Company conducted local wars against rulers that opposed them and made treaties with leaders who supported them all in the name of increased

power and profit for the Company and to a lesser extent, the British government.\textsuperscript{30} As this power to control large areas became the purview of nations with the evolution of capitalism, the East India Company’s control of India led to some uneasiness in the circles of power in Britain. Between 1773 and 1784 the British Parliament enacted a series of laws that gave the government more control over many aspects of the administration of India that had been under the control of the Company.\textsuperscript{31} The East India Company lost what sovereignty it had retained in 1858 when India officially became a Crown possession. This end of Company sovereignty was due in large part to the incompetence of the East India Company’s bureaucracy, vividly exposed by the 1857 Mutiny of Indian troops. \textsuperscript{32}

This mutiny was a culmination of many years of British East India Company’s political maneuvering, disregard for the native peoples’ cultures, and heavy-handed attempts at forcing British “reforms” onto people unwilling or unready for such changes. Commonly, the use of paper cartridges lubricated with pig and cow’s fat by the BEIC, a violation of the religious culinary restrictions of Muslim and Hindu Indian soldiers is represented as the reason for the beginning of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. These actions were a betrayal of the native Indian troops by the BEIC, but were not the sole incitement for the mutiny. The removal of native rulers, suppression of dissent, taxation, and apparent willful disregard for the local people’s traditions over the entirety of BEIC rule had built a deep resentment for the Company. Forcing people to break religious strictures

\textsuperscript{30} Sen, \textit{A Distant Sovereignty}, xx-xxi.
\textsuperscript{31} Dalrymple, \textit{The Anarchy}, 337.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 390.
by biting the paper cartridge soaked in the fat of a forbidden animal was just the last straw.

A group of soldiers refused to use the offending cartridges, leading to their imprisonment. When a group of their comrades rose and freed them, the spark of rebellion had been lit. As word spread of this rising, more troops and common peoples joined. It is important to note that, many Indian people remained loyal to the BEIC or at least did not join the uprising. The Mutiny was generally located in the northern portions of India and was exceedingly brutal. Killings of non-combatants occurred on both sides. Both the rage that had built in the Indian people about their mistreatment and the Company men’s feelings of deep betrayal engendered atrocities. The Mutiny only ended after brutal battles and sieges had soaked the Indian subcontinent with the blood of hundreds of thousands of mutineers, BEIC soldiers, and Indian and British civilians. It is estimated that Indian civilians made up the majority of these casualties.

As a resolution to the mutiny, Queen Victoria took direct Crown control over the Indian subcontinent with a proclamation on the first of November 1858. The document, which is foundational to the Crown Colony of India is called “Proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India.” It does not mention the incompetence of East India Company’s rule, instead it blames the leaders of the mutiny for the violence. The authors of the proclamation, who are unnamed but undoubtedly members of the foreign office

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and/or other bureaucrats, claim that the mutiny was started by “ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen with false reports.” It offers amnesty to all who will turn against the leaders of the Mutiny, but for the leaders “the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.”

The Proclamation of November 1858 is the first evidence of British government officials mistreating native populations in this study. The first half of this Proclamation is written in terms meant to be pleasing to soften the demands of fealty and hard justice. Justice, not for the wronged natives but for the Anglo-British who were harmed by the rebellion. Religious freedom, territorial integrity, and racial equality are promised to the people in the new Indian colony. But the proclamation reveals itself to be about maintaining the status quo, not about bettering the lives of British Indians. The fourth paragraph states that all treaties previously made with the East India Company will be maintained scrupulously by the new Crown government. This paragraph is referring to the treaties that the BEIC had made that gave away Indian sovereignty and designated how the colony’s bureaucracy operated. The British Empire had no reason to change anything to do with the general administration of the Indian Colony. This colony was extremely lucrative, already established, and now free of the middleman, the East India Company. The British Empire was now at a threshold of becoming even more wealthy, but only if the status quo was maintained or only slightly changed to appease the Indian people who had been mistreated. Any dramatic changes could upset the balance and possibly curtail profits. So, while this first section makes some promises of reform to the

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35 “Queen Victoria's proclamation assuming the Government of India, and proclamation by the Governor-General exacting obedience from 'Her Majesty's Native Subjects of India','” 2.
36 Ibid, 3.
37 Ibid, 2.
people of the new British India, most of the promises were just a sweetener for the bitter vengeance promised in the second half of the proclamation.

The history of Indian-British diplomatic and social relations is much more complex than this summary can hope to encompass, but there are a few key points we can take from this colonial experience which are relevant to establishing a pattern of British behavior toward no-Western people. First, British economic interests drove the colonization of India. Exploiting the wealth of India was the primary impetus for the British East India Company’s and later the British Government’s involvement in the Indian subcontinent. Second, the British subjects involved in this exploitation under the sanction of the Crown Government were not averse to using coercion, bribes, and treaties to gain power and profit. Lastly, the British economic goals for India could only be reached with the aid of the Indian people. The methods used to gain the help of these people were not always violent but were always unfair.

BRITISH INTERESTS AND THE MĀORI

Far from British India in the territory of New Zealand, British imperial interaction with Asian/Pacific people did not involve the control of a vast amount of wealth. Instead, it encompassed the control of fertile farmland for British settlers. But in common with India, the British Empire misused native people in New Zealand when British settlers sought economic gain and were hindered in some way by the native people. At the end of the 1830s, messages reached the British Colony of New South Wales of unrest in the

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islands known today as New Zealand. Foreign raiders reportedly from French colonies had been attacking the native people causing trouble for the British settlers who had begun to carve out settlements. The New South Wales government sent William Hobson, the Lieutenant Governor of New South Wales, to find a solution before these problems became more serious. After negotiations with some of the local Tribal leaders and European settlers, Hobson, along with James Freeman and James Busby authored the Treaty of Waitangi. The translation of the treaty into Māori was made by one man writing overnight so it would be finished by morning. This translation contained flaws that changed the meaning of the treaty between the two versions. This treaty was copied many times in English and Māori and circulated around the two main Islands to get signatures from both Tribal leaders and Settler groups. The treaty became the law of the islands with less than half of the Māori tribal leaders accepting the treaty. This minority was even smaller when we consider that only the local Māori leaders attended this meeting. Only later when the many Māori copies were returned did a majority of Māori tribal leaders sign, but these copies contained the flawed translation.

The English version of the Treaty of Waitangi gave sovereignty over the islands of New Zealand to Queen Victoria of England. This version of the treaty also had a clause ensuring land rights for native peoples, and another declaring that the native peoples would receive the protections of Crown subjects. It is considered a foundational

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document for the New Zealand colony, being ratified by the issue of a Crown charter for

The problems with the Treaty of Waitangi began during the translation process.

Article one of the treaty states that the Māori people will:

“Cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all
the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual
Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to
possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.” \footnote{42 “Treaty of Waitangi,” 2.}

To the English-speaking reader, this transfers sovereignty from the tribal leaders to the
Queen of England. But in the Māori version of the treaty, it says the tribal leaders will
give over the “government” of the land to the Queen. Unfortunately, there was no word
for “government” in Māori. The late Professor Hugh Kawharu explained this section’s
impact: “There could be no possibility of the Māori signatories having any understanding
of government in the sense of "sovereignty" i.e. any understanding on the basis of
experience or cultural precedent.” \footnote{43 Ibid, 2.} The word that was used for government in the treaty
was a word crafted by missionaries, unfamiliar to the majority of the Māori signatories.

With no understanding of what the word used for government meant in this context, the
Māori chiefs signed away their sovereignty without knowing it.

Andrew McIndoe argues in an article for the Auckland University Law Review
that the British negotiators knew from their years of experience with the Māori that the
Western idea of the responsibilities and meaning of sovereignty was different from that
used in Māori society. The signatory Māori were led to believe that the treaty gave the British officials sovereignty over the British colonists while allowing them to retain power over their affairs. The Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission formed in New Zealand in 1975 to make recommendations to the government regarding claims relating to Crown laws found that while the Māori had retained sovereignty in 1840, legally Māori law was subservient to the laws of the Crown at that time. This meant that any laws made by Māori could be overridden by the British making these Māori laws powerless. In this manner, British officials used diplomatic language and unclear translations in the treaty to effectively strip the indigenous peoples of New Zealand of their rights and power of self-rule.

It is arguable that this interaction in New Zealand predates the example given in India and is not as big an economic motivation for Britain and so is not an apt comparison. But the use of The Treaty of Waitangi is applicable in this argument since the argument does not hinge on the economic potential of the unfair move by British Officials, only the discriminatory behavior. In this way, the pre-1902 methods British officials used to deal with non-Euro-Americans shown here in New Zealand are in stark contrast to the treatment of Japan during negotiations for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The imperial land grab executed in New Zealand by Hobson was concurrent with many of the BEIC’s abuses of Indian people. It thus illustrates an expansion of the unsavory methods used by Britain when the empire required something, in this case, land for settlement. The agricultural goods from New Zealand would never outpace the

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46 Ibid, 63.
importance of the wealth of India for economic power. But, feeding and clothing the empire, in part with New Zealand wool and foodstuffs, was a vital function for this distant colony of the empire.

AFGHANISTAN AS BRITAIN’S BUFFER STATE

Twenty years after founding the Crown colony in India, these five men stopped to pose for this photograph. The two on the left-hand side look clean and well-dressed, with medals on their chests and restrained smiles on their faces. The two on the right are not so neat in their non-matching uniforms, bereft of adornment. The man in the middle is in the most elaborate uniform of all, with beautiful embroidery throughout the tunic, neat stripes down the sides of his pants, and in his right hand, a military helmet with a white plume of feathers perched on top.47 This well-attired man is Amir Mohammed Yakub Khan, who

had just signed the Treaty of Gandamak with the two men on the left-hand side who are officials from the British Indian government. The leader of the British Indian government expedition is Major Louis Cavagnari, seated closest to the Amir on the left-hand side of the picture.

The Treaty of Gandamak was drafted to end the Second Afghan War, a war started by Britain to protect its Indian colonial possession from perceived threats from other colonial powers. This treaty was by no means innovative, just another in the long line of British imperial treaties that favored Britain. A brief investigation of the main points of this treaty can clarify the very strong bias toward imperial interests written into this treaty. The first article is a general amnesty for all Afghans who interacted to aid or hinder British forces during the war. This clause is not unusual for a peace treaty. The evidence of bias in favor of Britain begins in the second clause which effectively strips Afghanistan of its sovereignty over its foreign relations. The first sentence of clause two states: “His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government.” This clause goes on to say that Afghanistan is not to make agreements of war without British approval and Afghanistan must allow free passage for British troops through its territory. The only point in this clause that is favorable to the Afghans is that in the event of a foreign army entering Afghanistan, Britain will give money, weapons, and troops to expel these foreigners.

49 “Treaty of Gandamak.”
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
From this point, the treaty lays out items that are generally predictable: agreements on borders, trade, and communication. These clauses address common points in many treaties crafted to end a conflict. Two points merit further examination because they reinforce the power that Britain was taking from the Afghans to administer their nation by aiding Britain in eradicating Afghan sovereignty. The first of these is the installment of a representative of the British Indian government in Kabul. At first reading, this appears to be no more than an exchange of diplomats, since an Afghan diplomat is allowed to go to India as well. But this clause is carefully crafted to give the British representative an advantage over their Afghan counterpart. The Afghans are allowed to send a representative to India, who will be housed at the viceroy’s court. This appears to be added as an afterthought, a single sentence with no other provisions for the Afghan representative made. The Afghan representative is not guaranteed communication with Afghanistan, security while in India, or anything else necessary for a diplomat in a foreign nation other than a room of unknown quality to stay in.

On the other hand, the British required the Afghans to have a representative from the British government in their capital. The treaty stipulates this representative will have “residence appropriate to his rank and dignity.” Britain required the Afghans to provide them with local guards to protect the British representative. The British would be allowed a garrison of British troops, to have access to a telegraph, and enjoy free passage throughout Afghanistan with his “personal safety and honourable treatment” guaranteed by the Amir. This clause may not seem as detrimental to the Afghans as those which

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52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
took away Afghan sovereignty over foreign affairs but in truth, it is vital to the British seizure of Afghan sovereignty. This British representative would be in a position to monitor the Afghan government to ensure compliance with the treaty. But more importantly, since the Afghan government had to ask the British representative for permission to speak to foreign nations and approve any deals made, this representative had more power over Afghan foreign affairs than the Afghans did. The Afghan delegate was assured of no powers at all except to be in India.

But it was not only the British representative who was required to have free and safe passage but also British merchants. The last clause is blatantly unequal, centering on trade between British India and Afghanistan. The treaty here requires the free and protected movement of British trade inside Afghanistan guaranteed by the Amir. This trade will be tariff-free until such time that Britain and Afghanistan make a trade agreement. If peace was maintained and all the stipulations of this treaty were followed exactly, Britain agreed to enter into trade negotiations with Afghanistan one year after the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak. Freely moving, tariff-free trading for around a year for British merchants, with no such trade stipulation for Afghan trade.

Plausibly, the motivation for such a clause could be to create a market that is required to purchase British trade goods at a disadvantageous rate of exchange. Because the previous clause gave Britain control over much of Afghan foreign affairs Britain would be able to regulate trade between Afghanistan and other powers to favor British merchants. The beneficiary in Afghanistan for this uneven treaty was the Amir and his descendants who were promised “the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness

54 Ibid.
the Amir and his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees” around 600,000 rupees per year. For perspective, using today’s exchange rate and adjusting for inflation that comes to around £873,000 or $968,000 in today’s currency, given as an annual bribe to the Amir and his successors.

The British press viewed the treaty positively as the end of another war with a nation that had been an annoying threat to the Indian colony.55 That being said, even with the view that the treaty was good for Britain, the Times exhibited the treaty in very condescending terms. The Times’ writers make it clear that readers should not trust the word of people like the Amir. The only reason to trust the Amir according to the Times is that it is in their best interest to keep the terms of the treaty.56 The Amir is even mocked in the Times as being weak with the article saying that the former Amir, Shere Ali “would have held out for a much larger sum” when addressing the subsidy paid to Amir Yakub Khan.57 This article also asserts that Amir Mohammed Yakub Khan himself was of no importance to the treaty, only the person who inhabited the leading role of Amir was important. The Times’ writer claims that if an uprising against the Amir should occur, the British would not help.58 The Times’ writer was prescient in this statement because when the Afghan people did rise not long after the treaty was signed, the British did not help. Amir Yakub Khan was assassinated for signing the Treaty of Gandamak because the terms were so bad. But after a few more skirmishes between British forces and the Afghans, the new Amir, who had ordered the death of Yakub Khan was forced to sign the

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
same treaty. This left the Afghans in the position of being almost subservient to the desires of British foreign policymakers, and bereft of sovereignty over their nation.

These three cases are examples of how Britain inequitably dealt with non-Euro-American people in the 19th century. This history of British repression is represented in this study by three official documents: the two treaties, and the Queen’s proclamation. These documents are separated by nearly forty years of Victorian diplomacy in the Asia/Pacific region yet all contain conspicuous similarities. In all three cases, there was some measure of unrest in the area associated with these documents; war in Afghanistan, rebellion in India, and land disputes and piracy in New Zealand. The British Foreign Office and the Crown eventually officially sanctioned all of these documents. Most importantly, all these documents were unfair to the native populations to whom they were addressed, to some degree removing these people’s sovereignty over their property, their nation, and/or over their own lives. Misleading words to the Māori, hollow promises affixed to bloody vengeance in India, and punitive terms with a bribe to sweeten the deal in Afghanistan.

Many of the people on the Indian subcontinent were never content being second-class British subjects. Thus, unrest and protest to some degree continued until independence and the formation of self-governing nations. The Māori did not receive the benefits of citizenship. Most people initially being disenfranchised in the British voting system since land ownership gave enfranchisement, and most Māori did not own land since the land was held in common by the tribe. Additionally, tribal land was not held intact, with some land being sold to settlers practically before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Waitangi. The Tribes lost all sovereignty over themselves because of the
confusing translation of the treaty. In Afghanistan, Amir Yakub Khan lost his life within months, and the war restarted. After that war finally ended, a third Afghan war came in 1919. As of this writing, Afghanistan is still not a completely peaceful country.

JAPAN AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE BOXERS

Western sources often under-value Japanese troops’ vital part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion. European nations and the United States’ exploitation of China is well known, as is the victory of these groups over the Boxers. Japan’s role was vital, both in exploiting China and destroying the Boxers. China endured an era known as the “Century of Humiliation,” during which China endured the Opium Wars, The Boxer Rebellion, regime changes, and territorial appropriation by Western powers and Japan. The end of the 19th century was an unarguably calamitous time for China. Poverty, famine, and discontent were commonplace in this once-thriving nation.

The Boxer Rebellion began as a reaction to Western mistreatment in the spring of 1900 and was essentially over by the end of August of the same year. Many scholars have debated the impact of this event in numerous studies. For the purpose of my argument, examining the Boxer Rebellion allows scrutiny of the role of Japanese troops and how their participation affected Anglo-Japanese relations. This section will show how the relationship between Japan and Britain started to become much more equitable, two sovereign nations instead of one nation exploiting the other as was the case with the other Asian and Pacific groups previously discussed.

With events as chaotic as an uprising or rebellion, it is difficult to pinpoint the specific date they begin. There was a drought in China that caused famine, making the
people suffer. A series of bad treaties had not only allowed Western powers to exploit China legally but had given members of Christian faiths protections from the laws of China in many cases. The discontent among the populace was especially pointed among young Chinese peasants, who were hungry, mistreated, and ready to rise if given the impetus. Boxer groups started as anti-foreigner martial arts groups in rural areas of Shandong and Zhili provinces. These Boxers believed in a form of martial arts that was purported to give them the power to defeat foreign soldiers by making them impervious to bullets and pain. Violence initiated by Chinese peasants began as isolated attacks against foreigners and Chinese Christians. Chinese people who had accepted Christianity, whether for the additional legal protections or not, were seen as traitors by the Boxers for accepting the foreign faith. These early attacks were non-lethal acts that probably aimed at intimidation. But before long, this violence escalated to isolated murders, prompting fear among the foreign populations and Chinese Christians of Northern China.

Fear of the Boxers led the Foreign Councils in Beijing to approach the Imperial Chinese government with a request for troops from their respective nations to protect the legations in Beijing from attack. The Chinese government approved this measure and a small band of American, Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian soldiers and sailors made their way by rail to the Legations in Beijing. An area around the Legations called the Legation district was fortified. During this time the Chinese government was split on whether to support or oppose the Boxers. Some of the Empress’s advisors and generals wanted to seize the opportunity to rid China of

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foreigners, while others hated the Boxers because of the peasant demographics of the Boxers and wanted to suppress them to prevent any more peasant uprisings.

Initially, the Empress sided with the anti-boxer faction, allowing a limited pushback by Chinese troops against Boxer groups. But shortly after the reinforcement of the Legations, with the encouragement of her pro-Boxer advisors, the Empress decided to aid the Boxers with Chinese troops taking part in joint actions with Boxer units. Of the nations who had besieged legations in Beijing, a group called the “Eight Nations” resolved to send reinforcements to break the siege of the Beijing Legations. An initial force of soldiers and sailors was halted when Chinese and Boxer forces cut the rail line to Beijing, forcing them to retreat. Fighting then emerged in all urban areas between Beijing and the coastal railhead. Allied forces took the Chinese coastal forts, and attacked the fortress at Tianjin, a major city between Beijing and the coast. Ultimately, with the aid of further reinforcements from Europe and Japan, the Eight Nations broke the siege of the Beijing Legations after 55 days. The final attack was led by British, American, Russian, and Japanese troops. Once these troops penetrated the city walls, the Empress fled the city and at the recommendation of her advisors decided to sue for peace.

The Japanese involvement in quelling the Boxer Rebellion began with just 24 Imperial Japanese Marines joining the first group of reinforcements to bolster the legations. Arriving by train, this group of marines represented the last Japanese troops to arrive until the legations were relieved 55 days later. Colonel Shiba Goro commanded these Marines and some Sailors who were already at the legation in the defense of one

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section of the defensive perimeter. The de facto leader of the overall defense was Sir Claude MacDonald, a former British Infantry officer. Dissention among the besieged national groups meant that they could not decide on and official leader, with some groups participating little in joint defense efforts. MacDonald’s British defenders reportedly worked well with both the American and the Japanese defenders. MacDonald formed a close relationship with Col Shiba and his close work with the Japanese would have a lasting effect on the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance less than two years later when MacDonald was the Ambassador to Japan. MacDonald’s friendship with and closeness to the Japanese officers he worked with no doubt affected the events in the next chapter since MacDonald was instrumental in the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

Japanese troops under the command of General Fukushima Yasumasa formed part of the Eight Nations force that moved to relieve the Legations starting with the sack of the Chinese coastal forts. Before this Eight Nations force gathered, the Great Powers discussed entrusting the entire suppression of the Boxers to the Japanese. But because of Russian refusal to allow Japan to do this alone, an international coalition of Eight Nations was formed. It is unclear why Russia objected to Japanese leadership in ending the Boxer Rebellion, but it appears that Russia did not want to allow Japan to have greater power in China. Regardless of Russian doubts, Japanese troops played a vital role in the capture of Tianjin, which had to be captured to secure the Eight Nations supply line to the

coast. General Fukushima developed the plan that ended the siege of the walled inner city of Tianjin. Japanese soldiers sacrificed their lives to destroy a gate into the citadel thus forcing the Chinese defenders to attempt a breakout and thereby luring them into General Fukushima’s trap. With the strategically important city of Tianjin secured, the Eight Nations army moved north to relieve the besieged Legations.

This postcard shows the culmination of the Japanese involvement in the campaign, the storming of Beijing by the four chosen groups of British, American, Russian, and Japanese troops from the Eight Nations army. The postcard is of Japanese origin, printed to commemorate the victory at Beijing and highlights the Japanese and British cooperation that helped bring that battle to a successful outcome. This focus on

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67 Torajirō Kasai, “The Fall of the Pekin Castle.”
Japan and Britain with none of the other allies present shows us the importance of the new friendship between Japan and Britain in Japan. Also, the fact that the card is printed with both Japanese and English captions and no other languages is revealing about the target audience of this card, most likely British people who visited Japan.

Japan and Britain had enjoyed a cordial relationship as trading partners before the 1902 alliance. Trade between the nations had been intermittently executed since the 17th century but was not stable and regulated by treaty until the 19th century.68 Interestingly, this first treaty between Japan and England in 1854 was, as was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, partially in response to tensions with Russia.69 Additionally, as with other treaties with the non-white groups already discussed, the 1854 treaty was biased in favor of Britain. Coming soon after the American Perry Expedition which forced Japan to open its ports to Western powers, the Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1854 achieved a similar end making Japan open ports for British use.70 The treaty not only designated ports for British use but prevented Japanese officials from punishing British sailors, by requiring these offenders to be returned to their ships for whatever punishment their captain deemed appropriate. The relationship between Japan and Britain changed slowly over the second half of the nineteenth century becoming closer but remaining essentially trading partners. British aid to Japan in modernizing the Japanese Navy could appear to be more than a simple trade partnership, but it is important to remember that Japan paid for the RN’s service. Industrialized nations have often shared expertise and

68 James Stirling, “Convention for Regulating the Admission of British Ships into the Ports of Japan,” March 31, 1854.
70 James Stirling, “Convention for Regulating the Admission of British Ships into the Ports of Japan,” March 31, 1854.
technology with less-developed nations, as long as the nation does not appear to be a threat. This aid was no different, more of a financial transaction and not necessarily a friendly gesture.

Returning to the battle, it is not clear why the four groups were chosen, but a few reasons can be assumed. First, these groups were the largest of the eight. Second, while there had been some friction between the allies, the Japanese, British, and American leaders and troops had worked well together. These four groups attacked and penetrated the Chinese defenses, first the Americans and then the British followed closely by the Japanese and sometime later the Russians. The Japanese troops inside the Legation had also performed admirably. The Japanese defenders were assigned to a portion of the defensive perimeter that included a small park in the Legation District. Many Chinese Christians had fled the Boxer’s anti-foreign violence to the Legation District, and these refugees camped in the park protected by Japanese troops. As refugees, they had few supplies and most of the defenders were not willing to share anything with them, outside a few who were paid with food for performing labor for the legation defenders. The defenders of the legation were abusive to any Chinese persons who were unfortunate enough to come into contact with them. Murders and assaults against refugees and even unaffiliated Chinese civilians that happened to approach the legations were not uncommon and were usually not punished. After the end of the Boxer Rebellion, these abuses were generally attributed by Western nations to collateral damage, but one group was noted as abstaining from the mistreatment of civilians, the Japanese.
Japanese troops occasionally shared some of what they had with the refugees and generally behaved appropriately toward them. Scholars almost universally condemned the brutality of the Eight Nations forces in suppressing the Boxer rebellion, both in and out of the Legations. In a shocking display of disregard for the humanity of Chinese civilians, Eight Nations troops killed, tortured, raped, and abused them unapologetically. But Japanese soldiers did not take part in this senseless violence. Japanese soldiers were praised as “heroic” universally by the other Eight Nations troops, a group that was so divided that some national units refused to even speak to others. Mary Hooker, a young British woman who was trapped in the Legations wrote in her book about her experiences during the siege that German defenders kept to themselves and would “fraternize with no one.”

The British were especially impressed with their Japanese partners in this endeavor. British observers inside the Legations praised the valor of the Japanese and remarked on how stridently they protected the Chinese refugees. One observer went so far as to claim that the British were “enamored” with the Japanese and that the feeling was mutual. This experience of comradery during stressful times changed how these two nations viewed each other. From the praise given to the Japanese in British sources, the events of the Boxer Rebellion undoubtedly had an effect on how these groups worked together in the future.

72 Ibid, 84.
73 Mary Hooker, *Behind the Scenes in Peking*, 96.
74 Ibid, 95-97.
The Japanese intervention in the Boxer Rebellion changed the views of influential people in Britain. Lord Cranborne, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs said of the Japanese during a session of parliament that “the power of Japan is very important to England” and that “when the representatives of all the Powers were in such imminent danger in Peking, Japan earned the gratitude of the whole of Europe by being first in the field to rescue them”.\(^{76}\) This statement of Lord Cranborne’s was made almost a year after the events of the Boxer Rebellion, showing that the Japanese actions left an indelible mark on his opinion of the value of associating with Japan. British partiality to the Japanese extended to even higher levels of the British government with even King Edward the Seventh becoming amenable to closer relations with the Japanese after the Boxer rebellion. In a letter to Lord Lansdowne the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Claude Macdonald said of a meeting with King Edward in 1901: “we met the Royal Train and I had a long talk with H.R.H. (His Royal Highness) who showed an intelligent interest in “things Japanese”.\(^{77}\) Sir MacDonald, previously mentioned as the leader of the Legation defense, was by 1901 the British Foreign Minister to Japan and an enthusiastic proponent of friendship between Britain and Japan.

In 1913, the Japan Society invited MacDonald to address their annual meeting in London. He chose to relate his experiences from the Legation defense during the Boxer rebellion over any others he had in his many exchanges with the Japanese people. Throughout MacDonald’s speech, he refers to the gallantry, bravery, and self-sacrifice of the Japanese defenders, many of whom, he related, were civilian members of the

\(^{76}\) Hansard 4\textsuperscript{th} series, HC Deb, 13 February 1902, vol 102 cc 1287-1288.  
\(^{77}\) MacDonald to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
Japanese legation armed only with wooden practice swords. MacDonald related his sadness when the Leader of the Japanese legation Mr. Sugiyama was killed by Chinese soldiers. He also shared his pleasure in working and making friends with Colonel Shiba, whom he referred to in his speech as the “quiet, cool and thoughtful” leader of the Japanese defenders to whom “the besieged community owed their lives.” At the conclusion of this speech, MacDonald articulated what he believed was the result of Anglo-Japanese cooperation during the Boxer Rebellion:

“And so ended the memorable “Siege of the Legations,” which undoubtedly had the effect of bringing England and Japan into a closer and warmer relationship, and which, to my knowledge, sowed the seeds of that formal Alliance between the Island Empires of the East and West, which was signed eighteen months later.”

With MacDonald’s enthusiasm, Lansdowne and his party’s support, and the tacit approval of the King, some kind of closer relationship was more than a distinct possibility following the Japanese contribution to suppressing the Boxer Rebellion.

CONCLUSION

What do three separate diplomatic situations in different circumstances, parts of the world, and at different times have to do with the Boxer Rebellion? This chapter began by showing a pattern of behavior in British diplomatic dealings with non-Euro-American peoples. Even though the methods used by the representatives of the British Empire differed for each interaction, the overall intent was comparable. British people with power consistently treated native peoples unfairly and with little to no respect, regardless of location. The outcome of the interaction was important, not the people being interacted.

78 Claude MacDonald, “The Japanese Detachment During the Defence of the Peking Legations, 1900,” 5-6.
80 Ibid, 19.
with. People from the Indian sub-continent were forced to serve the Empire whether they liked it or not. The Afghans were not to allow any other powers to enter their territory so the Indian Raj would be protected from outside influence. And the Māori were just supposed to get out of the way and let Britannia rule their land. It is vital to point out that these examples are not alone, exploitation by the British Empire was happening everywhere in the empire where the Sun never sets.\textsuperscript{81}

This is why what happened next was so vital to bring into conversation with this exploitative behavior. Britain did not exploit the Japanese and did not use them as expendable cannon fodder to protect the legation district because the Japanese were not non-Western people to use, but competent Eastern allies. When all was over the British lauded the Japanese worldwide instead of heaping shame and disrespect upon them as Britain so often had done to other non-Euro-Americans. This behavior change justifies the usage of “revolutionary” when referring to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 because Britain decided it was time to set aside the tradition of might makes right. These diplomats and politicians decided for the first time to move just a little bit beyond racial prejudices to see a good and faithful partner in a type of people that were traditionally viewed as “inferior.” And to codify that partnership in a formal treaty, not a handshake deal that could be discarded at a whim. Britain decided it was time to secure its interests in Asia by other means.

“Here begins the Great Game.”
Rudyard Kipling: *Kim.*

The end of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 left some disquieting problems in China and the international community at large. Russia had moved into Manchuria and obstinately refused to budge. This move by Russia concerned Japan. Only a few years before, Russia had taken the Liaodong peninsula from Japan as part of the Triple Intervention. This area had been granted to Japan as part of the settlement following the Sino-Japanese War, a settlement objected to by Russia, Germany, and France. This seemed like another disturbing Russian land grab. But, perhaps more concerning to Japanese leaders, the Great Powers that Japan aspired to join seemed unconcerned. All except for their new friends in Britain. The UK was very worried about Russia moving further into Asia. For years, Russia and Britain had been encountering each other in a dangerous real-world chess game called today “The Great Game.” Unfortunately, Britain had a problem. The South African war had devastated the UK national treasury, costing the nation around two hundred million pounds over two and a half years, (a little over thirty-one billion pounds in today’s money). Britain could not afford to push Russia out of Manchuria, nor could it afford to fight the French who were allied with Russia. In fact,

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82 Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (New York: The American Reprint Company, 1901), 132, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafNwmgNT_hAqabr6qUomiEC_JO18R TpVrDgd8MtWboiaHjdv25suDAQhSj5DgNJKlcwvmMe95aNLfurzqAA3I3Vr7QzjLvtVLoVmhmZfh5XjH05EMT WevFy8ACsWjmlMmms5_WrpLvkYA-UMLSpu9Ub7wyo3VpSuy565xYvPMDGqxdRIW09qohtLQtoilFRf_1WdLvd- YjLMSYDGo2NfjmdlkareWkstuc4vwQQ.

British politicians had begun to oppose any additional funding to the military, disenchanted with the military’s performance in the South African War.84

A person unfamiliar with the workings of the British government may be forgiven for thinking that Parliament would have a say in the formation and ratification of treaties. In fact, Parliament held no real sway over treaties with foreign powers. Members of Parliament could debate a treaty’s merit and make their opinions known, but the ratification of treaties was up to the monarch. An article written for the UK Constitutional Law Association recently said:

“Treaty ratification is a royal prerogative, exercised by the monarch on the advice of the government. By a convention called the Ponsonby Rule, treaties were usually placed before Parliament for 21 days before ratification, but Parliament has no power to veto or to ratify.”85

This did not mean that sovereigns necessarily force their will upon the UK when it comes to treaties nor that the sovereign did what they were told by their government advisors. But it does mean that if the Foreign Office officials wanted the monarch to agree to a treaty, it was important to convince them that it is in the best interests of the realm.

It was necessary for the crafting of the 1902 agreement between Japan and Great Britain for a specific set of events to occur and for the right group of people in leadership. This chapter will examine the politics surrounding the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Britain and to a lesser extent in the world. The evidence will illuminate the role that fears played in the surprisingly rapid creation of the alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement from its first mention in FO dispatches to the signing of a final

treaty took under six months from the beginning of September 1901 to the end of January 1902, a remarkably short time for such a revolutionary document. In addition, British politicians feared the economic impact that the South African War would impede the ability of Britain to protect its Empire and the fear that others might take advantage of this weakness. Finally, it is vital to examine the person in Britain central to the creation of the alliance, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne. This chapter will show how the fortuitous combination of talent, economic necessity, fear, and an intractable Russian Bear led to the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902.

HOME RULE

It is fortunate for historians that nothing happened in a vacuum; otherwise, we would not have untangled these fascinating complexities. The complexity of UK party politics that surrounded the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance owed much to the situation in Ireland. In the late nineteenth century, the question of Irish Home Rule split the Liberal Party. Succinctly, Home Rule was intended to give Ireland limited independence from the UK by giving Ireland control over some aspects of its own domestic government. A great irony of the Victorian liberal movement of the mid-19th century was that the Liberal Party supported self-government and self-determination, but was also committed to maintaining an Empire that denied these things to imperial subjects. This dichotomy was at the core of the Liberal Party split over the first Home Rule bill. The division was not a reaction to the idea of limited autonomy for Ireland.

specifically but because of what such a split would mean for the four nations in the kingdom.

The United Kingdom was formed from four nations of the British Isles: England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Britain’s imperial outposts were not included in the UK since they were considered to be more like property of the UK than separate nations that were part of the union. Those politicians who opposed Irish Home Rule feared that if one part of the UK broke away, even partially, it would weaken the Imperial State. When Home Rule was proposed by some members of the Liberal Party, it was opposed by the members of the Liberals including Lord Lansdowne. This group split from the Liberals and formed a new party called the Liberal Unionists. Since this group was more closely aligned with the Conservative Party, the two parties eventually formed a coalition and worked together to challenge Liberal control of the government. The parties in power in the government changed a few times in the 1880s and ’90s. When the Anglo-Japanese alliance was working its way through the halls of the Foreign Office, there was a Unionist Prime Minister in Parliament and a Unionist head of the Foreign Office in Lansdowne.

In public forums such as newspapers and in parliamentary sessions, Liberal Party MPs did not hide their misgivings about the proposed agreement with Japan. While claiming that concerns over this treaty were “not a party matter,” Henry Norman a Liberal MP spoke at length about his reservations with the treaty. Norman questioned the wisdom of forming a treaty that could anger Russia and in turn, may involve Britain

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89 The political affiliation of the Prime Minister is not generally important to the internal workings of the Foreign Office other than having the power to recommend who is appointed to lead the F.O.
in a war with Russia and France. He wondered about the timing of this agreement and why the treaty was drafted so quickly. Norman worried about the possibility of being forced into a war by Japanese duplicity. Finally, Mr. Norman questioned the wisdom of allying with an “Oriental race” or in fact allying with any nation at all. He argued that the status quo would be best served by continuing the policies of the past that is the UK avoiding treaties and foreign entanglements.

These concerns were not limited to members of the opposition. Publicly, political allies of Lansdowne in the Conservative and Liberal Union parties were generally supportive of the alliance, yet in private letters, some of these men voiced concerns similar to Norman’s. The Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer Michael Hicks Beach wrote to Lansdowne on January 2nd, 1902 to express his dissatisfaction with the treaty. His first of two major objections was that he was not happy that, within the government, there was little sharing of the details of the treaty in progress. This first objection relates to Beach’s second, that this treaty may be used as an excuse to demand a larger naval budget. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Beach oversaw the dispersal of funds to government departments like the Royal Navy. Beach would have been involved with the budgetary changes restricting military spending because of the ongoing South African War. Early drafts of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement included a naval parity clause. This clause would have made both parties responsible for maintaining a naval force of either a specific tonnage or a certain number of warships of specified classes, ie.

92 Beach to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
93 Beach to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
battleships or cruisers, in the Pacific area in case of war. At the time of Beach’s letter, people were worrying about this kind of military spending.

On January 4th, 1902, Lord Lansdowne received a letter from the Conservative Home Secretary Charles Ritchie. Ritchie’s objections to the treaty mirror some of the points made by Mr. Norman. Ritchie was apprehensive that the Japanese were using Britain so they could start a war with Russia and that the treaty would thus force Britain to fight France as well as Russia. He worried that any alliance with Japan would spell a no-win scenario for the UK because Britain did not have the military force nor the money to fund such a force to fight both nations at the same time. Another point where Ritchie’s letter agreed with Norman’s statement is that both thought that any agreement with Japan would anger the Russians and could lead to war. In addition, Ritchie was concerned that the MPs in the House of Commons would be unhappy with the agreement and would in turn communicate that discontent to the British public, possibly weakening the Conservative/Liberal Union coalition’s chances in the next elections. Ritchie’s letter concludes by stating that a treaty with Japan could be a good thing, but only if it did not commit the UK to fight any Japanese wars of aggression. This apprehension over Britain being drawn into wars that the nation does not get to choose and may not be in favor of was a recurring theme throughout many of the statements in opposition to the treaty.

Members of Lansdowne’s own party held reservations about the treaty as well. Joseph Chamberlain, the Liberal Union Secretary of State for the Colonies, had concerns he communicated on January 5th. His major objection was that the treaty appeared to

94 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
95 Ritchie to Lansdowne, 4 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
96 Ritchie to Lansdowne, 4 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
benefit the Japanese more than Britain. He suggested rewording the treaty in order that the benefits would be more even. Out of loyalty, Chamberlain ended his letter by assuring Lansdowne that he would support the treaty no matter what was negotiated for inclusion in the final draft.\textsuperscript{97} Even Lansdowne’s partner in the treaty’s creation, Sir MacDonald, voiced some concerns during the process of creating the treaty. In a cable from Tokyo, MacDonald warned that in the treaty’s version of January 9th, it appeared to give Japan a blank check to start hostilities with Russia. MacDonald also opposed tonnage or force commitments as being untenable and warned that as the treaty stood, the Parliament and voting public would not support it.\textsuperscript{98}

The issues of a possible Japanese agreement primarily disturbed the political elites of Britain, not the average Briton. There is little to no mention of the talks between Japan and Britain in popular news media sources until near or after the agreement was finalized. The two more probable explanations for this lack of coverage are that the people either did not know or did not care about any such agreement. But the agreement worried these political leaders. These politicians did not want to diminish the power or prestige of the Empire, and they were hesitant to change the path that the Empire was on. The UK had traditionally avoided foreign treaties and binding international agreements. There were some who were resistant to such changes because of the choice of Japan as an ally. The Empire had always been run by Britons for Britons with no thought of consulting foreigners, especially non-white foreigners when considering its defense. While the racism inherent in the empire made making a defensive agreement with non-

\textsuperscript{97} Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 5 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{98} MacDonald to Lansdowne, 9 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
euro-American people difficult, the political leaders of the UK had some legitimate fears as well. The years of war in South Africa had depleted the nation, especially financially. Could this treaty destroy it by igniting war with Russia? Could Japan be trusted as an ally? Only time would tell, but it was certain that as much as these men may have feared what an alliance could do to their Empire, these political leaders could have been more apprehensive because they knew that the decision to make or reject this treaty was out of their control.

**LANSDOWNE**

In October 1901 Sir Claude MacDonald wrote to Lord Lansdowne and informed him of MacDonald’s conversation with King Edward VII. As discussed in chapter one, MacDonald was keen to promote an agreement between Britain and Japan. When he spoke to the King about the Japanese he aimed to persuade the King that Japan was a good candidate for an international partner since any treaty had to be approved by the King. Lansdowne had encouraged MacDonald to support the proposed agreement with Japan in early September in correspondence between the two just as Macdonald was leaving for his new post as minister to Japan. In addition to the work done by MacDonald and Lansdowne to promote the Japanese agreement with the King, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury entertained the famous Japanese statesman Itō Hirobumi and the King during Itō’s visit to the UK in January of 1901.

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99 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
100 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 3 Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134. Lansdowne to MacDonald, 4 Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
Itō Hirobumi was the first Prime Minister of Japan. At the time of his visit to London, he had vacated that post but was still on Japan’s privy council. The King was impressed with Itō, awarding him the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.\textsuperscript{102} Political allies of Lord Lansdowne such as Lord Salisbury and Sir Claude MacDonald were willing to publicly support the alliance and risk their reputations for this project, even with their reservations about the alliance. Who was Lansdowne and how did he engender such loyalty?

Any work about the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Requires an understanding of the role of Lord Lansdowne. Since a full biography of the life of Lord Lansdowne is outside the scope of this work, much of the biographical information to follow has been gleaned from previously written biographies. Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice was born in January of 1845, just over fifty-seven years before the signing of the agreement. He was tutored at home when he was a young man until he started school at Eton in 1858. Some of his future political colleagues were at school with him, most notably Arthur Balfour, who was the Conservative leader of the House of Commons when the agreement was signed. In 1863 Henry entered Balloil College at Oxford where he received a classical education and learned to embrace both an unemotional worldview and the benefits of empire.103

It would require a dedicated book to detail the entirety of Lord Lansdowne’s career, and much of his service to the empire is outside the scope of this work. During his long career, Lansdowne was a polarizing force in politics, gaining the admiration of some, like Queen Victoria who wanted to ennoble him further by making him a duke or perhaps reward him with the Order of the Garter after his time as Viceroy of India.104 Others like political rival William Gladstone were unwilling to credit Lansdowne’s work calling it very checkered.105 It is unsurprising that Gladstone and his allies had unfavorable opinions of Lansdowne. Gladstone believed in Home Rule to the extent that after Lansdowne and the Unionists broke from the Liberals, Gladstone called for elections, hoping that the public would support Home Rule with their votes.106

103 Simon Kerry, Lansdowne, chapt. 2, Kindle.
104 Ibid, 16, Kindle.
105 Ibid, 16, Kindle.
Rule failed in the Commons, failed to win the hoped-for votes in the election, and failed again in the House of Lords before Gladstone retired.\textsuperscript{107}

For this work, a relevant episode to examine in Lord Lansdowne’s history is during his tenure in the War Office. His service as Secretary of State for War did not win Lansdowne many political allies.\textsuperscript{108} His detractors maligned Lansdowne as a politician meddling in military matters that he did not understand.\textsuperscript{109} Unfortunately for Lansdowne, the South African War occurred during this time. The lack of quick success and the huge expense was seen as a failure on the part of Lansdowne by his political rivals.\textsuperscript{110} The post of Secretary of State for War is considered one of the most challenging in the British government because of its complexity and the high standards expected of the British military.\textsuperscript{111} In addition to needing to handle the complex finances, deployments, and staffing of the branches of the military, the leadership of the War Office also had to deal with internal political and personal rivalries between high-ranking officers, competition between service branches, and manage external pressures from civilian politicians.

In 1895, Lansdowne began a series of reforms meant to improve the overall efficiency of the War Office and the army.\textsuperscript{112} These reforms were designed to alter the chain of command by delegating control of aspects of the army (such as discipline and supply) from the Commander-in-Chief to his subordinates. Also, the Cabinet Defense Committee was formed to aid in setting clearly understood long-term goals for the

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, 55-58.
\textsuperscript{111} Simon Kerry, \textit{Lansdowne}, chapt. 16, Kindle.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
development of the army. Regrettably, these reforms were unpopular with Liberals in parliament and with the army. Army leadership feared that this delegation would diminish the role of the Commander-in-Chief in addition to the higher-ranking members of the army being resistant to change in general. The Cabinet Defense Committee was an utter failure, composed of mostly civilian politicians who could not even agree on what roles the Cabinet Defense Committee should have.\(^\text{113}\) After five years at the War Office between 1895-1900, the political machinations, war, and obstinate opposition from military commanders set in their ways left Lansdowne frustrated and finished. In August of 1900, Lansdowne offered Prime Minister Salisbury his resignation. Fortunately for Lansdowne, Salisbury did not accept this offer asking Lansdowne to remain at his post until after the possible coming elections. Two months after this exchange, with the blessing of Queen Victoria, Salisbury offered Lansdowne the job of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

**THE EMPIRE UNDER PRESSURE**

At the beginning of Lansdowne’s term in the Foreign Office in November of 1900, Britain and her empire were at a turning point. The aforementioned economic woes combined with the expansion of imperial rivals caused concerns among British political leaders for the security of the Empire. The world was witnessing the decline of the Chinese, Ottoman, and Persian empires. The Great Powers of Europe vied for influence in these areas. For the last twenty years, since the mid-1880s, Russian troops had been threatening the Afghan border which Britain viewed as an important buffer between

\(^{113}\) Ibid.
Russia and their Indian holdings.\textsuperscript{114} Persia was another area Britain perceived as a buffer between India and Russia, and now it too fell under threat from Russian incursion; in this case, not military but diplomatic.\textsuperscript{115}

The Persian empire was in financial difficulty and had sought a loan from both Britain and Russia to prop up their failing government.\textsuperscript{116} While British diplomats debated whether they could afford to give such a loan given the economic situation, Russia took the initiative and agreed to loan Persia the money. As a last-ditch effort to salvage the situation, Britain offered to loan the money to Persia.\textsuperscript{117} However, the Persians declined, preferring the Russian offer.\textsuperscript{118} In an unsent draft letter written by Lord Lansdowne to Lord Hardinge, the First Secretary in Tehran, Lansdowne expressed the interest that Britain has in Persia. In this letter, Lansdowne says that the policy of Britain was to strengthen all nations that border India in an effort to protect its holdings.\textsuperscript{119} He encouraged Harding to pressure the Persians not to take the Russian loan or to give the Russians any concessions such as coaling rights on the Persian Gulf. This is significant because, unlike other Great Powers, Russia had no colonies to serve as convenient coaling ports for any fleet they might send into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This lack of coaling ports would be important for limiting the utility of the Russian fleet outside their home waters. Lansdowne even made a veiled threat, saying that “It would be necessary for His Majesty’s Government to take in the Persian Gulf such measures they


\textsuperscript{115} Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-137.

\textsuperscript{116} Beach to Lansdowne, Oct. 12, 1901, TNA, FO, 800-137. Simon Kerry, \textit{Lansdowne}, chapt. 22, Kindle.

\textsuperscript{117} Simon Kerry, \textit{Lansdowne}, chapt. 22, Kindle.

\textsuperscript{118} Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 18, 1901, TNA, FO, 800-137.

\textsuperscript{119} Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-137.
might consider necessary for the protection of British interests.” Fortunately, Lansdowne decided not to send this letter as it conceivably may have led to a conflict with Russia or Persia that Britain could not afford.

The anxiety over Russian pressure in Afghanistan and Persia, and the continued Russian presence in Manchuria heightened the sense that the Empire was no longer as secure as it had been. There were two prominent schools of thought on how to ensure its security. The first was to increase the size of the military and especially the navy to secure better routes of trade and protect British colonial possessions. But with the current economic problems, this was understood by many as an untenable option. The other option was to stabilize foreign policy by the creation of a series of treaties so that the economic situation could return to normal. In the view of Lansdowne and his political allies, making treaties was the best option. Britain was not the power that it had once been. Britain no longer enjoyed the vast lead in manufacturing that it once had with rising powers like Germany and the United States beginning to take shares of the market for manufactured goods. While the British economy still held power in the world, Britain could not leverage this economic might to protect itself as it could in the past. This in concert with the weakened British military and considering the threats from powers to the imperial holdings that were supporting the British economy meant that changes in international relations were necessary in order to maintain the Empire.

In order to illustrate the damage that the South African War had done to the British economy, we can examine the numbers. The overall cost of the war was around £120 million.

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120 Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-137.
two hundred million pounds, stark when compared to the original number estimated by the Office of the Exchequer of ten million pounds. The final number of two hundred million pounds was twenty times more than what was initially estimated. In fact, the initial figure of ten million pounds was exceeded in less than one year, (the first-year cost was over twenty-three million). In response to the cost overrun of the South African War, taxes were increased, passing the financial burden of the war onto British citizens. The first two years of the war expressed in the budgets of 1899-1900 and 1900-1901 required Britain to run a deficit of just under fifty-five million pounds for both years combined. Not only did this require an income tax increase to try to make up the deficit, but it forced the introduction of taxes on everyday items like beer, tobacco, spirits, and tea. Income taxes increased again in 1901 and additional taxes and duties were also put on sugar and coal. When Chancellor of the Exchequer Michael Hicks Beach received the proposed budget for the year 1902-03 the deficit for that year was estimated at around forty-five million pounds. This number was after the projected revenue from additional taxes on corn, flour, and meal. The corn duty was especially harmful, since it not only hurt the poorest people harder than the elites, but it also added import duties which it was feared would hurt foreign trade. Furthermore, since the nation was running a high deficit to fund the war, the nation was putting itself further into debt with each budget year. The expanding national debt, increased tax burden, and higher trade duties hurt the British

123 Ibid, 61.
124 Ibid.
126 Ibid, 70-71.
economy from the working class which suffered greater difficulty in affording necessities to the elites who experienced diminishing profits from vital trade goods.

Lansdowne entered the Foreign Office intending to secure the Empire in addition to improving relations with nations like France, Germany, and the United States. In the Foreign Office, Lansdowne was able to make the appointments and encourage the working environment he preferred with a more open sharing of opinions. This had not been possible in the War Office, in part due to the military hierarchy that required deference to those of higher rank. Initially, Lansdowne had judged that the best options for an alliance were Germany or Japan. These were reasonable choices for Lansdowne since Japan was a growing power in East Asia and had regional motivations to help secure Asia from Russian expansion. Germany was rapidly gaining power in many regions and Lansdowne considered that they may be natural allies against Russia despite the Germans aiding the Boers in the South African War. While feelers were being put out towards an Anglo-French agreement, the French already had agreements with Russia that would preclude them from aiding Britain against Russia. There were even some proposals for an agreement with Russia, but the Russians saw their position as one of strength because of the sheer size of their military. Because of Russian military strength, Russian diplomats did not believe it was necessary for them to accede to anyone’s demands.

**PARTNERS**

By the beginning of 1901, the two powers of Germany and Japan were identified by the FO as the most viable options. Both nations had expressed displeasure with the

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Russians landgrab in Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion. Lansdowne had his representative in Germany attempt to get a sense of what they would want out of an alliance and if they would be amenable to forming a triple alliance with Britain, Germany, and Japan. Even though FO officials quickly understood that Germany had no interest in protecting Chinese sovereignty and was only interested in gaining territorial concessions for themselves, the idea of adding Germany to the Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted well into treaty negotiations.\(^{128}\) The possibility of creating an agreement with both Germany and Japan was mentioned in the FO as early as February 1901.\(^ {129}\) The decision to cut Germany completely out of the negotiations for the alliance, which had informally begun in September, did not come until October 1901.\(^ {130}\) This decision not to work with Germany was, in part due to the Cabinet’s preference to make an agreement with France instead.\(^ {131}\) It was feared that the French would not make an agreement with Britain if Britain was involved with Germany. But, due to France’s existing agreement with Russia, any French agreement would be separate from the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

Without German cooperation, there was a moment when any potential agreement was in jeopardy. In July 1901, when the Japanese asked Lansdowne through diplomatic channels if there was a possibility of an agreement of some kind between the two nations, Lansdowne stalled.\(^ {132}\) This prevarication came from Lansdowne’s uncertainty about the British public accepting an agreement with Japan. This fear was not entirely unfounded.

\(^ {131}\) Monger, “The End of Isolation,” 120.
In both Canada and Australia, semiautonomous parts of the British Empire at this time, distrust of the Japanese was high. Much as there had been on the west coast of the United States, British Columbia passed laws to restrict and exclude Asian refugees. During his visit to British Columbia, Claude MacDonald noted that the Japanese were being disproportionately targeted as undesirable additions to the province.\textsuperscript{133} British Officials with whom he spoke told MacDonald that they had encouraged members to back off from their anti-Japanese stance because it was counterproductive to the diplomatic situation of the Empire.\textsuperscript{134} In a reply to this letter sent on December 4, 1901, Lansdowne agreed with this sentiment and criticized these kinds of laws that limited the rights of specific groups as short-sighted.

But despite these misgivings, Lord Lansdowne was aware that an alliance with Japan was the best option for him and for the Empire. Lansdowne was an imperialist, not because he craved conquest, but because he felt that Empire was good and most certainly better than the alternative. The paternalistic idea that Lansdowne, and others who shared his opinion about the empire, held was that The Empire benefitted all the people in it. Britain gained financially and, while they occupied these colonies, the less developed people in these regions would be civilized, becoming better socially and financially as they learned to emulate their colonizers. Thus, when MacDonald communicated Baron Hayashi’s desire to start discussions in earnest about an agreement in September, Lord Lansdowne agreed since he believed that the Empire and its subjects would be imperiled without the agreement.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{133} MacDonald to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} MacDonald to Lansdowne, 3 Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
Baron Hayashi produced the first draft of a treaty. In its preamble, Hayashi included in this draft was almost entirely changed in the months of negotiation. This preamble was very rough and the only part kept for the final draft was part of one sentence mentioning the “maintenance of the status quo.” This draft contained only three articles. There were a few articles in the Japanese proposal, which almost until the signing, gave British politicians pause. In response to British concerns, Baron Hayashi wrote a letter explaining why the Japanese government included each of the three articles. The first says:

“The naval forces of Japan and Great Britain will so far as it is possible act in concert in times of peace and mutual facilities will be given for docking and coaling vessels of war of one country in the ports of the other as well as other advantages conducing to the welfare and efficiency of the respective navies of the two powers.”

Hayashi said this one requires no explanation, and the British seemed to agree. In subsequent letters, there was no mention of this clause for good or ill yet it does not appear in the final draft. This seems to suggest that the parties agreed that this stipulation was unnecessary and could be left out as this kind of common courtesy between two allies was the norm not exceptional. Aiding an ally’s ships with repairs, fuel, and supplies was and still is common practice assuming that both nations are conducting a war in common.

Article two was a little more contentious. It read:

“Japan and Great Britain being convinced that a continuation of the rule which each of them has hitherto pursued with advantage of maintaining in the far east a naval force in efficacy to the naval strength of any third power will tend to the

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136 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
consolidation of peace in that quarter are each resolved to maintain so far as it is possible the same naval superiority in the future.”

Hayashi explains this was only intended to express the intention of both parties to maintain naval superiority in the region. Unfortunately for Hayashi, much of the British politician’s anxieties were caused by this superiority clause. We have already discussed the issues that the Chancellor of the Exchequer Michael Beach had with this clause, seeing it as an excuse to enlarge the naval budget, but this clause caused other worries. Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, said in a letter to Lansdowne that this article would be problematic for the UK Navy. Not only was Selborne worried about the cost, but he was also apprehensive that if Britain had problems fulfilling these terms, as he was sure they would, Japan would use the lapse as a reason to accuse Britain of violating the treaty. Being the political head of the RN, the clause troubled Lord Selborne because if a lapse happened it would hurt British credibility in international relations and make the RN and the UK itself look weak.

The negotiations could have ended at this impasse, the Japanese negotiators thought a naval force requirement was important and the British were against this clause. But, wisely, Lord Selborne decided to consult Admiral Walter Kerr the First Naval Lord because Kerr could better understand the technical difficulties with this Japanese proposal and give knowledgeable advice to Selborne. Admiral Kerr replied to Selborne in two letters, which Selborne shared with Lansdowne. First, Admiral Kerr advised that a

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139 Ibid.
140 Selborne to Lansdowne, 2 January. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134. The First Lord of the Admiralty (1628-1964) was the political head of the Royal Navy, not to be confused with the Frist Naval Lord (1771-1904) or First Sea Lord (1904-1917) which was the military leader of the RN. All these terms are archaic and are no longer used for the modern RN.
141 Selborne to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
142 Selborne to Lansdowne, 7 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
system with force requirements would overcomplicate the agreement, making it easier to be in violation of such a treaty.\textsuperscript{143} Also, he warned that using ship tonnage as a metric for a force requirement, if there has to be one, was unwise. The tonnage of a ship only measures the overall size of the ship by expressing how much water is displaced by the ship and is not an accurate measurement of that ship’s fighting power.\textsuperscript{144} Using the number of ship types i.e., the number of battleships, cruisers, etc., would be better, but Kerr advised against any force requirements.\textsuperscript{145} Finally, Admiral Kerr stated that in this force requirement scheme, if any naval engagement happened away from either of the party’s home islands, their islands would be left undefended because of the amount of tonnage required to be sent to the fight. To these comments, Selborne added his recommendations, or as he colorfully termed them, things to “teach the Japs.”\textsuperscript{146} One, if Britain got beat at sea, no one else would help Japan. Two, both nations would have to maintain a large fleet, something Selborne doubted the Japanese economy would support. Finally, Selborne agreed with Kerr’s assessment that the rating by numbers of capital ships was better, but the overall requirement was bad for both parties.\textsuperscript{147} Many in the British government shared this poor opinion of a force requirement so, eventually, Lansdowne was able to convince the Japanese to drop this requirement.

In place of this tonnage requirement, the final treaty included two articles that fulfilled the spirit of this article, ensuring that aid would be forthcoming in a time of war. Article two stated that if either party entered into a defensive war, the other would remain

\textsuperscript{143} Kerr to Selborne, 6 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{144} Kerr to Selborne, 5 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Selborne to Lansdowne, 7 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
neutral. But, article three added that if another party entered the war against the already warring ally, the neutral ally would come to the aid of the other. Hayashi and MacDonald formulated the idea of intervention in war only if one party was attacked by two or more belligerent powers in September 1901.\textsuperscript{148} This idea formed part of the letter in which MacDonald asked Lansdowne if they should begin seeking an alliance with Japan.\textsuperscript{149} Lansdowne never said whether this proposal made him more willing to begin negotiations. But this addition assuaged some of the concerns held by British politicians because article two stipulates a defensive war, meaning that fears of Japan starting a war and forcing Britain in were now improbable. Being conscious of his colleagues’ concerns, it is logical to assume that this idea helped to move Lansdowne from the uncertainty he exhibited early in 1901 to his approval of MacDonald starting negotiations with the Japanese. This presupposition is strengthened by the fact that Lansdowne seemingly made up his mind about going forward with the treaty after receiving MacDonald’s letter with this proposition on September 3\textsuperscript{rd} and replied on the 4\textsuperscript{th} with permission to begin negotiations.\textsuperscript{150}

The final article is the only one that partially remaining in the final draft of the treaty. It reads:

“Japan and Great Britain recognize the independence of Corea and declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in that region. But in view of Japan’s preponderating interest in that country Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures she may find necessary to safeguard and promote those interests.”\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{148} MacDonald to Lansdowne, 3 Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134. 
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. Lansdowne to MacDonald, 4 Sept. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134. 
\textsuperscript{151} Lansdowne to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
Baron Hayashi communicated that the Japanese Government felt that this statement would be sufficient to assuage any anxiety that other nations may have had about the intent of the treaty.\textsuperscript{152} He specifically mentioned that Lord Lansdowne communicated this anxiety to him, the concern about other nations feeling threatened. The fear that Russia and Germany might be upset by any agreement was mentioned in correspondence to and from Lansdowne repeatedly. Members of the opposition had openly spoken of the treaty possibly causing war with Russia and France. Lansdowne agreed with Hayashi that this declaration of non-aggressive intent and maintenance of the status quo was a wise inclusion, but he argued that it would be more appropriately placed in the preamble.\textsuperscript{153} In the final draft, both Britain and Japan compromised on this issue. The final preamble contained the line, “The governments of Great Britain and Japan actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo” and “maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea” both of which seem to be sentiments communicated in Hayashi’s first draft.\textsuperscript{154}

In addition, the first sentence in article one of the final treaty reads: “The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country.”\textsuperscript{155} Later in the same article, the treaty states that each party has “special interests” in either China or Korea” and that “it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests.”\textsuperscript{156} Again, these lines are

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan Relative to China and Corea, U.K.-Japan, Jan. 30, 1902, U.K.T.S. 03, 1902.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
almost exactly what Hayashi wrote in his third article. The fact that portions of this article appeared in both the final preamble and in the body of the treaty itself shows a willingness to compromise. This compromise is evidence that the treaty was important to the British for a few reasons. First, if the treaty was not important to the British there would be no reason to compromise, they could have simply insisted it be written how Lansdowne originally suggested. A second point is that Hayashi wrote the article because of the anxieties communicated to him by Lansdowne. If there was little to no significance in the treaty for Britain, these anxieties would have been a good reason to back out of treaty negotiations. Instead, Lansdowne gave Hayashi an opportunity to address his concerns and then returned the courtesy by working with Hayashi to make the proposed treaty work for both parties.

FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EMPIRE

To better understand the extent of the compromises that were necessary to complete the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, it is beneficial to examine the initial objections that British politicians had to the agreement to better understand if and/or how Lansdowne and Hayashi addressed them in their negotiations. Some of these points will be succinct since they have been, to some extent, examined previously in this work. First, quite a few politicians such as Sir Claude MacDonald and Home Secretary Charles Ritchie were concerned that making a treaty with Japan would anger Russia and to a lesser extent Germany. Article one of the final treaty was designed to address this issue by making clear to other powers that the treaty was defensive in nature.\(^\text{157}\) Mostly, this article appears to have done so. Although Russian diplomats still made negative

\(^{157}\) Ibid.
statements about the treaty, since the treaty was obviously targeted at curtailing their expansion even if it did not explicitly say this, the displeasure went no further.\footnote{MacDonald to Lansdowne, 16 Feb. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.} Article one also answered two other anxieties about the alliance, that Russia would go to war with Britain over the treaty and that Japan would use the treaty to force Britain into a war of aggression. Russia did not declare war on the UK, and Japan did not drag Britain into a war for the reason that the treaty was defensive only.

The defensive nature of the agreement combined with article five helped to alleviate the concerns about Japan entering a war it could not win and bringing Britain down with it. Article five says: “Whenever in the opinion of Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with each other fully and frankly.”\footnote{Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan Relative to China and Corea, U.K.-Japan, Jan. 30, 1902, U.K.T.S. 03, 1902.} This article was intended to help prevent one or the other governments from entering into an unwise war by allowing them to consult the other to be sure if they could win together or if a negotiation was wiser given the readiness of both parties for war. There are five more concerns about the alliance worthy of mention.

The timing and speed of the agreement and the secrecy surrounding the agreement will be explained in the next section as they are more complex topics. British politicians’ apprehension of the treaty necessitating greater military spending instead of lowering it, as it was supposed to, was handled neatly by removing the force requirement clause. This left Britain with the ability to reorganize its force deployment in order to protect its holdings more economically, with the Japanese ready to aid them if needed.
Finally, Lansdowne and his colleagues were anxious about the treaty favoring Japan and the possibility of it upsetting the British public. It would not become apparent to all the naysayers immediately, but the savings on pricy naval deployments and stabilization of the Asian political environment that existed for a time while the alliance was in effect proved invaluable to the British Empire.\footnote{Lansdowne to MacDonald, 31 March 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.} Three years after the signing of this treaty Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. Britain did not directly aid Japan, but the knowledge that Britain was treaty-bound to do so if another power entered the war was a factor in preventing Russia’s allies from aiding them. The end of the Russo-Japanese War left the Russian military in shambles and the nation in rebellion. Because of this weakening of Russia, Britain was allowed almost ten years to benefit from its Asian colonies without any serious challenges to its holdings. This arguably left Britain in a much better condition than it would have been in 1914 if it had spent the intervening years fending off constant challenges from Russia in the region. That security helped in Britain’s economic recovery after the Great War by allowing Britain to exploit its colonies’ resources virtually unchallenged.

The treaty makers took a gamble on the last point, that the British public might have been upset. There was no assurance that the public would support or condemn the treaty in Japan or Britain, but the diplomats hoped that they had enough of the public’s trust to make what they perceived was a necessary shift in foreign policy. MacDonald contacted Lansdowne from Japan around two weeks after the signing of the treaty.\footnote{MacDonald to Lansdowne, 16 Feb. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.} He told Lansdowne that the mood in Japan was one of tempered enthusiasm. The Japanese
people perceived that the agreement was motivated by a desire for “fair play” in the region, to prevent powers from taking advantage of Japan.\textsuperscript{162} Lansdowne was less sanguine about the response in Britain. The opposition was upset because they perceived that the treaty favored Japan.\textsuperscript{163} To be fair, the average British citizen probably still thought that Britain was still the most powerful nation and did not understand why any treaty was necessary. Generally, the British and Japanese diplomats had done their best to assuage the anxieties of their peoples and the world by showing a remarkable ability to compromise. All the major issues that caused Britain and Japan anxiety during the treaty discussions had been addressed and resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.

But what then can account for the British willingness to compromise other than the professionalism of their diplomats? Throughout the treaty negotiations and the years before there are hints at why this treaty was important to the British government and why the British were so eager to finish the treaty so quickly once the process had started. In a letter dated October 31, 1901, Sir MacDonald wrote that Japanese minister Komura had given positive indications when asked about the possibility of an alliance. He continues his letter by recounting a party he attended with various national delegates in Tokyo. At this time, Germany had been excluded from the alliance negotiations, but MacDonald remarked how attentive the German delegate had been to their Japanese hosts. He wondered why this was, since all the Germans he had ever spoken to had been openly racist towards the Japanese. He related one occasion when “Prince Henry of Prussia was in Peking in 1898, he said to me, “You surely would not make an alliance with these

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Lansdowne to MacDonald, 31 March 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\end{flushright}
yellow barbarians.”

MacDonald followed this remark by noting that there were pro-Russian and pro-French factions in Japan which had him as concerned as this sudden change of course from the Germans. Near the end of the letter, he added that, “if anything was to be done it should be done quickly” thus communicating anxiety that the treaty might not go forward due to outside interference.

In another letter from the 27th of November, MacDonald related that German observers had been invited to Japan’s annual military maneuvers. There is nothing odd about this, there were observers from many nations in attendance, but Macdonald was disturbed by the Germans specifically since they seemed to be monopolizing the time of the Emperor’s advisors. MacDonald expressed anxiety that the negotiations for the agreement may stall since Komura could not attend due to a reported illness. Added to this, MacDonald related that an unnamed party sent a story to the Japanese newspapers that said that the British and Japanese had fallen out. MacDonald’s remarks about the story in the newspaper read like a man on edge, afraid of what this portends.

Lansdowne echoed this anxiety in his reply where he agrees that the Germans are up to something and exhorts MacDonald to move faster. Later that month Lansdowne told Salisbury that Hayashi had expressed to him that they could afford no more delays. Even after the treaty had been signed, Lansdowne had attempted to prevent the Germans from finding out about it asking Hayashi to withhold the news. It was only after

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164 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 31 Oct. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
165 Ibid.
166 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 27 Nov. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Lansdowne to MacDonald, 4 Dec. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
170 Lansdowne to Salisbury, 31 Dec. 1901, TNA, FO, 800-134.
171 Lansdowne to Hayashi, 2 Feb. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
Hayashi replied that Lansdowne was too late that the FO made the decision to rapidly release the text of the agreement to the public and other nations.\textsuperscript{172}

It appears from the letters cited above that Lansdowne was anxious to conceal the alliance negotiations from other nations. Concurrently, it also seems that Lansdowne was attempting to control the information about the treaty passed on to his own government. In the letter between Lansdowne and Michael Hicks Beach, one of Beach’s first complaints about the proposed alliance with Japan was that information was being kept from the government.\textsuperscript{173} As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Beach was worried about what he already heard about a possible agreement possibly inflating the naval budget. His anxiety about what he did not know could have made him fear additional costly concessions that Lansdowne might make in order to seal his treaty with Japan. Fortunately, the portion of the agreement that Beach was anxious about, the force requirement, was removed from the final treaty. When questioned about the treaty in the House of Lords, Lansdowne refused to share any details stating that they were confidential.\textsuperscript{174} Keeping Beach and other government officials uninformed about the progress of treaty negotiations is an important example of Lansdowne’s desire to keep the details of the agreement undisclosed. Beach was a political ally and colleague whom Lansdowne had known and worked with for years. Since the agreement with Japan was important to the finances of the UK, logically, Beach would have been a good person to

\textsuperscript{172} Lansdowne to Hayashi, 3 Feb. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134. Hansard 4\textsuperscript{th} series, HL Deb, 13 February 1902, vol 102 cc 1173-1174.
\textsuperscript{173} Beach to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, TNA, FO, 800-134.
\textsuperscript{174} Hansard 4\textsuperscript{th} series, HL Deb, 13 February 1902, vol 102 cc 1174.
consult about the treaty. Regardless, Lansdowne was determined to conceal the treaty until it was finished and signed.

Lansdowne’s attempt to conceal the treaty begs the question of why there was such a need for this secrecy around the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Additionally, why there was such a rush to complete the treaty? From all of the mentions of other nations’ delegates and factions that favored other powers, we can conclude that one source of this secretive and urgent behavior is the fear that someone else might preempt their treaty with Japan. Article four of the final treaty says: “The High Contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice to the interests above described.”\(^{175}\) The article is a reaction to the fear of other nations meddling with their alliance with Japan. This article may also be an example of why the treaty was rushed to completion. British diplomats were apprehensive that another power might make an agreement with Japan, with a clause similar to this that may have prevented them from making an alliance with Japan.

Furthermore, the British were worried for the security of their empire because of the threat of Russian expansion and were uncertain about French or German intentions in the region. These fears could only be exacerbated by German attention paid to the Japanese Emperor and to leaders in the Japanese government. As we have discussed, these fears were not entirely unfounded as Russia openly opposed British control over the so-called buffer states that Britain relied upon to protect the borders of India. The anxiety was enhanced when, after the Eight-Nations intervention during the Boxer Rebellion,

\(^{175}\) Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan Relative to China and Corea, U.K.-Japan, Jan. 30, 1902, U.K.T.S. 03, 1902.
Russia refused to leave Manchuria and instead stationed thirty thousand troops in that area supposedly to guard their railroad.\textsuperscript{176} Russia went so far with its determination to not back down that it forced the Chinese to sign a treaty that leased the land Russia wanted in Manchuria to the Russians, giving their occupation a semblance of legality. Due to Japanese interests in that region, it became a natural ally for Britain to help contain the Russian expansion. Additionally, Japan was just as anxious to halt Russian expansion as the British were if not more. These other nations seeking favor with Japan would have seemed to be a direct threat to the interests of Britain. Even worse, the faction of Japanese elites that favored the Russians was encouraging the Japanese government to make a treaty with Russia. A treaty between Japan and Russia would turn a possible good ally into a faction working with an enemy of the Empire. Britain quickly and quietly negotiated and completed a history-making alliance with the best possible candidate they could find, at least partially, because British diplomats were afraid of the alternatives if they did not do so.

CONCLUSION

Britain needed an ally to make the empire work, given that it was on the decline, weakened by an expensive and embarrassing war against irregulars in the Transvaal. Lansdowne was intimately aware of the loss of treasure and prestige that was plaguing the empire. He believed in the empire and knew that if the empire was strengthened those losses could be made up, but only if their enemies could be held at bay. In 1901, Japan was the right place in Asia. Japan was strong enough to help bolster Britain without overpowering them. And they shared similar goals in Asia, to hold on to those territories

\textsuperscript{176} Edgerton, \textit{Warriors of the Rising Sun}, 97.
that would help strengthen their empire economically for the future. Britain would recover its losses by reaping the wealth of its Asian colonies. Japan was eager to use Korea to strengthen its own resource-poor economy. But both Japan and Britain knew that having Russia on their doorsteps was a threat to these plans. Japan had just suffered the ignominy of the Triple Intervention, losing the hard-fought gains designated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the Sino-Japanese war to a coalition of Great Powers. If Russia decided that Korea was its next avenue of expansion, Japan would need an ally to help it in case Russia enlisted the aid of other powers again. Both powers understood they were stronger together and feared the consequences of losing the opportunity that an alliance offered them. So, they compromised, they made an agreement they could both support and on January 30th, they signed the “Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan Relative to China and Corea,” the first major treaty made in good faith between a European and non-Euro American power.177

CHAPTER III: THE END OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

“It lasted for a long time, I believe. ” "A very long time. It was a great success, but even great successes come to a natural end.”179

Isaac Asimov:
Robots and Empire

The revolutionary alliance was formed through the diligent efforts of British and Japanese diplomats. The diplomats were rewarded with titles and positions; the British government even changed the law regarding The Order of the Garter so it could be awarded to the Emperor of Japan. But this outpouring of excitement and well-meaning honors did not last. The Anglo-Japanese alliance survived consistent opposition inside both the British and Japanese governments and several wars including the First World War before ending in 1922. This chapter will survey the events between the signing of the treaty in 1902 and the dissolution of the treaty in 1922. The chapter will begin with the first test of the treaty’s efficacy, which came within just two years after the signing when Japan went to war with Russia. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05’ was another revolutionary event in world history and has rightfully commanded the attention of many scholars. This section will examine some key events from that conflict to scrutinize how they affected the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Alliance was not up for renewal in 1905, but it was renewed with some changes to the terms of the treaty. These two events, both the war and the renewal, happened concurrently and I will argue that the renewal was a response to the Japanese success in the war.

The second part of this chapter will summarize some of the major events that led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance's dissolution. The Japanese involvement in the First World War left Japanese leaders feeling as disappointed as many nations that participated in the war. Nations like Italy and Japan that helped the allies expected to receive a significant part of the spoils. Even though Japan did receive some of the expected rewards for aiding the Allies, the post-war settlements left the Japanese nation deprived unfairly of the rewards it had expected to receive. This section will conclude with an examination of post-war agreements that left Japan entirely disenchanted with the West and helped lead to the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I will argue that the creation of the League of Nations without a racial equality clause and the building of mutual distrust between Britain and Japan contributed to the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Japan and Russia have a history of disputing ownership of territories in the eastern part of Asia. When viewed from a detached perspective on a computer screen, some of these territories do not seem to be very important. Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Isles seem to be cold and remote northern outposts. The island’s growing season is short and the locals traditionally survived by fishing and trading furs. But these islands have historically held significance to the Japanese and the Russians. Japan viewed these islands as the northern end of the Japanese island chain. Russia claimed that the islands were part of their eastern expansion into Siberia. The tension between Russia and Japan over ownership of these lands was a contributing factor in the Japanese decision to sign a
treaty with Britain in 1854.\textsuperscript{181} In an attempt to end this tension amicably, Russian and Japanese diplomats signed the Treaty of Shimoda of 1855, this split the islands between the two parties.\textsuperscript{182}

![Sakhalin Island Map](https://geography.name/sakhalin-island/)

The Treaty of Shimoda opened diplomatic relations but did not end the territorial competition between Japan and Russia. Russia’s eastern expansion in the 19th century brought them into opposition with Japan in Manchuria and Korea. Japan had fought for control of Korea intermittently since the late-sixteenth century in wars against the Chinese and it became one focus of Japanese expansion during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{183} The Japanese argued that with Japanese aid, Korea could become a modern nation as Japan had become. This sanitization of colonial expansion as a paternalistic benefactor

\textsuperscript{183} Edgerton, \textit{Warriors of the Rising Sun}, 22-23.
was an idea borrowed from the European powers that sold aid to modernize Japan. But this argument of the necessity of Japan as a modernizing benefactor of Korea was repeated by supporters of the Japanese in Europe.¹⁸⁴ Japan’s claim to the Liaodong Peninsula, which Japan won in the Sino-Japanese War, was disputed by Russia during the Triple Intervention. The loss of this territory served to heighten the Japanese government’s ill will towards Russian territorial claims. Japan had little claim on the rest of Manchuria outside of the Liaodong peninsula. Japan’s interest was primarily as one of the guarantors of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. But along with Britain, Japan perceived Russian moves into Manchuria through railway construction and garrisoning of troops in strategic areas as a threat to the security of East Asia. Manchuria abutted Korea, and the Russian annexation of portions of Manchuria was a threat to powers like Britain who profited from free trade with China.

These aggressive moves by Russia were among the reasons for the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After the Boxer Rebellions, Russia refused to remove its soldiers from Manchuria. Russia argued that it needed to leave 30,000 troops in Manchuria as railway guards because the branch of the trans-Siberian railway which ended at the Russian base of Port Arthur passed through Manchuria.¹⁸⁵ This action angered the Japanese leadership so much that Japanese military leaders considered war with Russia as early as 1900.¹⁸⁶ The war was averted when calmer heads reasoned that the Franco-Russian alliance would leave Japan outnumbered fighting France and Russia in a losing effort. This same power imbalance hamstrung Japan five years earlier after the

¹⁸⁴ Hansard 4th series, HC Deb 13 February 1902 vol 102 cc 1277.
¹⁸⁵ Robert B. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 97.
¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 96.
Sino-Japanese War when Japan claimed the Liaodong peninsula adjacent to Korea which also contained the Russian base at Port Arthur.

The Triple Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany stripped Japan of the Liaodong peninsula which it had received by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese war. The three powers threatened war if Japan would not repudiate its claim over the Liaodong peninsula. Japan was powerless to refuse because an unwinnable war with these three powers was the only other option. The embarrassment of the Triple Intervention and the powerlessness Japanese leaders felt in the face of such a powerful rebuff made the Japanese leadership more willing to approve the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In 1904, the power balance was different, Japan had a powerful ally. With the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, Japan protected itself from being overwhelmed by multiple powers. Japanese leaders approached Russian diplomats with a draft agreement that both sides would remove troops from Manchuria (Russia) and Korea (Japan).\textsuperscript{187} The draft presented by the Japanese included articles asking for both nations to respect the sovereignty of China and Korea and the right of all nations to conduct business freely in these areas.\textsuperscript{188} Even though the Russian government agreed to enter negotiations over the proposed treaty, it took two months of work by diplomats to decide where the negotiations should take place and who would conduct these negotiations.

\textsuperscript{187} Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, Tokyo, July 18, 1903. From Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia 1903-1904, \url{https://archive.org/details/correspondencere00japarich/page/n6//mode/1up?view=theater}, Accessed January 28, 2023.

\textsuperscript{188} Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, Tokyo, August 3, 1903. From Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia 1903-1904.
After these two months, the Russian government replied to the Japanese proposal with a counter-proposal. The Russian counter-proposal claimed that Russian moves in Manchuria were not Japanese business, but the proposal assured that Russia would allow the Japanese to continue their efforts in Korea if Japan would leave Russia alone. Russian negotiators replied to the Japanese diplomats’ consternation over this heavy-handed Russian counter-proposal by claiming that Russian activity in Manchuria was strictly between China and Russia.

Russian diplomats were unyielding in this position; Manchuria was no one’s business but their own. The Japanese government realized quickly that these negotiations were going nowhere. The Russians had no interest in negotiating in good faith with the Japanese. The Russian counter-proposal’s wording was so heavy-handed that it appears to be meant as a threat; Russia would take Korea from Japan if Japan did not let Russia have its way in China. At an impasse, Japan chose not only to break off the negotiations but also to sever diplomatic relations with Russia in February of 1904. Japanese leaders in Tokyo advised the Japanese minister to Russia to remove himself and his staff from the consulate before February 8th, 1904, which was the day that Japan would declare war on Russia. There is a certain irony in this situation when examining the British involvement in the Russo-Japanese War. Opponents of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had argued that Japan would use the treaty to conduct an offensive war, drawing Britain into

189 Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, Tokyo, October 5, 1903. From Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia 1903-1904.
190 Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, Tokyo, October 22, 1903. From Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia 1903-1904.
191 Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, Tokyo, February 5, 1904. From Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia 1903-1904.
Japan’s wars. Even though Britain did not openly enter the Russo-Japanese War, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to involve Britain peripherally in a pre-emptive war declared by Japan on Russia.

While Japanese and Russian diplomats were negotiating a possible peace treaty, the British government was considering what the implications of a Russo-Japanese war would be. A December of 1903 analysis of foreign office intelligence by Arthur Balfour predicted that Japan would lose a war with Russia. Japan would lose the battle at sea but Russia would not be able to invade Japan; Russia would only take Korea. The author of the memorandum recommended that no British political figure should give any advice to Japanese officials for fear that when Japan lost the war the Japanese politicians would blame Britain for the loss. In 1903 Britain was hedging its bets so that Britain would take no loss when its ally failed. But at the beginning of 1905 the outlook had changed, Japan appeared to be winning but had not won yet. In the 1903 document, analysts had concluded that Russian battleship strength would effectively cut Japan off from Korea. When Lansdowne was approached by Hayashi about the renewal, Lansdowne delayed giving an answer to the question. In fact, Lansdowne delayed giving Hayashi an answer, repeatedly giving excuses ranging from the Easter holiday, travel, and bureaucratic slowness, to simply needing time to consider the question carefully. These delays, on Lansdowne’s part, might have been because the officials in the Foreign

192 Hansard 4th series, HC Deb 13 February 1902 vol 102 cc 1275.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
Office were unwilling to show such open support for the Japanese at that time due to their uncertainty about the outcome of a potential war.

Undoubtedly, given the public terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, any nations that may have considered aiding Russia had to account for Britain’s intervention on Japan’s behalf. But Japan never needed this active intervention during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Britain’s participation in the war involved solely diplomacy and espionage. British merchant ships were used for clandestine reconnaissance including following Russian naval movements and relaying them to Japan. It is unclear from available information if the people who relayed this information were working for some sort of British spy service or if they were simply private individuals, but the effect was the same; Japan was aware of Russian movements. Additionally, the maturation of telegraphic services allowed news to be transmitted around the world in days or hours instead of weeks or months. News organizations would occasionally transmit militarily relevant information in their reports. In the interest of neutrality, Britain attempted to discourage British news organizations from disseminating this information but they were not always successful. For example, in the Times on February 12th, 1904, there was a story titled “Russian Naval Movements.” In this article, the locations and movements of some Russian Naval units are given for the day before this paper was published. If a Japanese diplomat in London wanted, he could have gained valuable military intelligence by simply purchasing the day’s newspaper. There are many similar examples in this day’s Times that include troop movements, command appointments, and notes on

fortifications.\textsuperscript{199} Even with the limited nature of this contribution, it helped convince Japanese officials, who claimed to be pleased with Britain’s conduct during the war, that an early renewal of the Alliance was desirable.

The majority of the fighting in the Russo-Japanese War took place in and around Port Arthur on the Liaodong peninsula and in the Straits of Tsushima. As with any war, the battles, strategies, and combatants are complex subjects that cannot be explored in detail in a study of British diplomacy. To summarize, the war started with a nighttime sneak attack on the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur by torpedo boats of the Japanese Navy.

This image represents that fighting, showing Russian and Japanese torpedo boat crews taking part in hand-to-hand fighting, shown here during daylight, most likely for the ease of reprinting.\textsuperscript{200} The engagement began during the night and continued into the next day.


when larger surface ships entered the combat. These fights did not destroy either force, but the damage was significant enough to keep the Russian Pacific fleet in Port Arthur. Overall, the Russians suffered more from this engagement since the Japanese ships damaged were repairable in relatively close ports, but the Russians lacked the facilities to repair severe damage in Port Arthur.  

This was the end of major naval battles around Port Arthur, but not the end of fighting in the area. There were other land battles in the Russo-Japanese War, but the Japanese siege and capture of Port Arthur were important since the port was the most significant point on the Liaodong peninsula. Japanese forces fought their way down the peninsula until they surrounded the Russian base. Over the course of around five months, the Japanese army and navy forces bombarded Russian positions. The siege ended shortly after the Japanese army artillery was able to move into range and sink the majority of the Russian fleet still at anchor in Port Arthur. The Japanese undermined the Russian lines around Port Arthur and the Russian forces surrendered at the end of 1904.

TSUSHIMA

In May of 1905, two major events had an impact on both the Russo-Japanese War and Anglo-Japanese relations. The first draft of a possible early renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was proposed by the Japanese, and the Battle of Tsushima effectively

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201 Edgerton, *Warriors of the Rising Sun*, 120.
204 Undermining is a siege technique in use since the Middle Ages or earlier in which the attacking force digs a mine under a defending enemy’s position to weaken the position or, in more modern examples, detonate explosives underneath the enemy.
ended the Russian Navy’s involvement in this war. The Russian Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky left port in September of 1904 to reinforce the Russian fleet in the Pacific. Unfortunately for the Russians, the fleet also left its home port short of ammunition, coal, and experienced sailors. The fleet departed with faulty intelligence that reported that the Japanese had torpedo boats waiting for them all along their route to the war zone. This report would lead to a diplomatic incident that had the potential to bring Britain into the war without the intervention of another power on Russia’s behalf.

During a dark night off of Britain near the Dogger Bank, the Russian ship Suvorov opened fire on a group of suspected Japanese torpedo boats that, according to its captain, were approaching the ship with no running lights on. Possibly unknown to the Russian captain, these boats were a British fishing fleet. A British fishing captain, interviewed after the event, disagrees with the Russian description of the Dogger Bank Incident. The fishing captain claimed that visibility was reduced but not poor, the fishing fleet had lights on, and the Russians had inspected some of the ships before opening fire. The discrepancies in these stories may be due to the Russian admirals not having all the facts before relating the Russian version of events. The undertrained Russian officers could have panicked and attempted to justify their actions after the fact or the fishermen could have been lying to inflate their claims of being misused by the Russians. Or, indeed, any combination of these explanations for the discrepancy between a suspicious, dark fleet approaching unseen and attacked in self-defense and a well-lit fleet

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205 Constantine Pleshakov, *The Tsar’s Last Armada*, 84-85.
207 Constantine Pleshakov, *The Tsar’s Last Armada*, 96.
approaching, being inspected, and then attacked. The British government and people were outraged by this event, aided by inflammatory depictions in newspaper stories that reported “mutilated” fishermen and “callous” Russians who knowingly killed British seamen before fleeing the scene of the incident.  

Almost immediately, King Edward VII requested a meeting with Foreign Minister Lord Lansdowne to discuss the issue. Lansdowne was instructed by the King to draft an official protest to the Russian government demanding apologies and reparations for the attack. The outrage expressed in the Foreign Office note was not simply a diplomatic show, but deadly serious. After meeting with Lord Lansdowne, the King then met with Lord Selborne of the Admiralty, who in turn mobilized three British fleets with orders to shadow the Russians in preparation for possible retaliation. Soon after Admiral Rozhdestvensky brought his fleet into a Spanish port for coal and supplies, British warships took up station outside the port, monitoring the Russians while awaiting orders. While in Spain, Rozhdestvensky received confirmation from Russia that his ships had killed unarmed fishermen, and he was ordered to issue an apology, which he did. The Russian fleet was allowed to continue on, and eventually, Russia agreed to pay reparations to Britain for the attack. The Dogger Bank incident was a close call for the Russian fleet and perhaps a portent of unfortunate things to come for Rozhdestvensky’ fleet.


The Russian fleet’s journey onwards from Russia to the Japanese Sea took approximately seven months and was plagued with problems of supply and lack of communication with Russia. The Battle of Tsushima began in the pre-dawn hours of May 27th, 1905 just as the Russian fleet began to transit the Sea of Japan while heading for Vladivostok. The much-depleted and exhausted Russian fleet met with the Japanese fleet commanded by Admiral Tōgō. Captain Thomas Jackson, the Royal Navy attaché to the Japanese fleet said, “Admiral Tōgō’s victory (was) won in the first quarter of an hour (and) had become more and more thorough and sweeping as the day wore on.” The Japanese fleet was well-trained and consisted of modern vessels as compared with the Russian fleet, which was a combination of modern, outdated, and reserve vessels called into action with undertrained officers and sailors. Captain Jackson reported that the Russian fleet never attempted to make any tactical maneuvers, but had simply continued in a double line as it was decimated by slow deliberate Japanese fire. Russian sources later clarified this assumption. Admiral Rozhdestvensky had ordered a more appropriate tactical formation, but his undertrained officers had bungled the maneuver on some ships, forcing him to rescind his order and put his ships back into the double line. As Captain Jackson reported, within the first hour of the battle, many of the Russian battleships were sunk, disabled, or on fire and the rest of the fleet was attempting to flee. There were isolated battles between the Japanese destroyer and cruiser forces and Russian stragglers,

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212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Constantine Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada, 267.
but the majority of the surviving fleet surrendered and were taken as prizes by the Japanese navy by the morning of May 28, 1905.

THE EARLY RENEWAL

The negotiations for the early renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance began before the Battle of Tsushima, with the earliest draft proposed early in 1905. Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador to Japan communicated in correspondence with Lord Lansdowne in March of 1905 that he had an interesting conversation with the Japanese ambassador and members of the Japanese government at a state dinner in Tokyo. A diplomat in the Japanese delegation at the dinner remarked that the alliance with Britain had helped the Russo-Japanese war remain limited to the two nations in a specific region.\(^{216}\) The party agreed, and another Japanese dignitary had mentioned in passing, that an early renewal would be beneficial to both nations. In the informal atmosphere of this party, MacDonald communicated to Lansdowne that he had agreed that it was a pleasant idea but had not said anything binding, and no more was said about the idea at the party.\(^{217}\)

Lord Lansdowne was surprised when Viscount Hayashi approached him the day after he had received the communique about the party asking about an early renewal.\(^{218}\) The Viscount presented Lansdowne with an argument for the renewal based on the popularity of the alliance in both nations and a need to “make the alliance more solid.”\(^{219}\) During the time this conversation took place, Japan was doing well in the war. The

\(^{216}\) MacDonald to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, TNA, CAB, 37-76-64.
\(^{217}\) Ibid.
\(^{218}\) Lansdowne to MacDonald, March 24, 1905, TNA, CAB, 37-75-53.
\(^{219}\) Ibid.
Japanese Army had already captured Port Arthur and was keeping the pressure on the Russians. Britain and Japan had been successful to this point in a diplomatic campaign to keep Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s fleet from gaining the time in port it needed to obtain coal and provision, as well as conduct repairs properly. European nations that allowed the Russian fleet to enter their port quickly received diplomatic protests from Britain and/or Japan. The Anglo-Japanese diplomats formed their protests based on the prohibition of neutral nations aiding combatants. Even France, an ally of Russia, half-heartedly expelled the Russian fleet from Indochina.\textsuperscript{220} With the apparent success of the treaty in aiding the Japanese war effort both overtly and inherently, Japan’s motives for wanting an early renewal seem clear.

Japanese officials wrote the first draft of the early renewal that was handed to Lansdowne on May 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1905. Lord Lansdowne told Viscount Hayashi that he would be happy to accept the treaty proposal, but that no decision had been made yet on whether Britain would consent to an early renewal.\textsuperscript{221} The Japanese minister gave a revised draft of the proposed treaty to Lansdowne on the 26\textsuperscript{th} of May, but still, there was no firm answer from the British.\textsuperscript{222} Significantly, there was no British reply to the question of renewal until June 6\textsuperscript{th}, ten days after the Japanese victory at Tsushima. This does not necessarily mean that no member of the British Foreign Office was willing to renew the alliance early before Japan appeared to be sure of victory, but that there was not a consensus on the question until after the victory of May 27-28. In another intelligence analysis by then Prime Minister Arthur Balfour originally dated May 27\textsuperscript{th} but amended on
the 31st after Tsushima, the recommendations were vastly different from the December 1903 memorandum. Far from distancing Britain from sure defeat, this report made recommendations about how Britain could amend the Anglo-Japanese alliance to allow Britain to profit from an inevitable Japanese victory.223

The treaty crafting process itself took a few days shy of three months from the presentation of the first draft by Viscount Hayashi on May 10th to the signing on August 12th of 1905. The treaty signed in 1905 was in some ways very similar to the 1902 treaty but contained some key differences. The scope of the 1905 treaty was expanded from covering only the interests of the UK and Japan in China and Korea to take in all of East Asia and India as well.224 The use of the blanket term East Asia seems to cover the areas already mentioned in the 1902 treaty but would enlarge the protection to areas like Formosa (Taiwan), which was an area of Japanese expansion that may not have been previously covered. Significantly, the requirement that either party must be attacked by more than one other power to gain the other party’s aid was modified. The new provisions implied much more trust between the parties, requiring instead that both parties communicate frankly with the other in case of hostilities and if either party was attacked, the other party agreed to help no matter if it came from one or more powers.225

The 1902 treaty said, “Japan… is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea.” In 1905, the rights of Japan and Britain under the treaty were broadened. The wording of article three says that the Japanese nation has the right to do anything it sees fit, even militarily, in Korea as long as it does not impede the rights of other nations. Article four is complementary to article three because it acknowledges that Britain has the same rights in India but without concern over other nations’ rights. These two articles changed nothing for Britain since India was a British colony and Britain already had freedom of action there. For Japan, article three did not change much, but simply supported Japan’s planned actions in the region. The biggest change for Japan was that article three supported the Japanese in moving military forces into Korea, a move not supported by any great power before this. There are two more differences written into the revised treaty. First, Britain is not to enter the Russo-Japanese war unless Russia gains an ally, even though under the new treaty it would be bound to. And lastly, the renewal period was changed from every five years with a requirement for a one-year warning before either party plans to withdraw to ten years with the same grace period.

The most drastic difference between the two treaties is found in article seven of the 1905 treaty. The 1905 revised treaty took what could be rightly considered a fair defensive treaty from 1902 and molded it into a virtual military partnership. Article Seven in the 1905 treaty even creates a basic framework for military cooperation and

226 “Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and Corea,” signed January 30, 1902, Treaty Series no. 3, 1902.
227 “Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Japan,” signed August 12, 1905, Treaty Series no. 25, 1905.
228 Ibid.
encourages consultation on tactics in areas with joint interest. Combined with the removal of the restriction on joining any war only if the war was defensive and the attacked party was outnumbered, the 1905 revision made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a potentially unassailable military power in East Asia.

**DISTRUST AND THE END OF THE ALLIANCE**

This concept of military cooperation would be a factor that brought Japan into the First World War. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan annexed Korea in 1910. This action worried British leaders, who viewed this move as duplicitous by the Japanese, who had claimed to only want to help the Koreans and now had appropriated the nation. The distrust of Japanese motives had not disappeared in the intervening years leading up to the First World War, but British military forces were busy in Europe and needed Japanese help to protect the British colonies in Asia from the German forces in the area. A note-worthy Japanese contribution to the war effort was the capture of the German colony and naval base at Tsingtao in China. Japanese forces (in cooperation with a small British contingent) laid siege to the port city. In just over two months, the German forces were forced to surrender with around 4500 men taken prisoner. Japanese Naval forces helped protect the Pacific and Indian Ocean shipping lanes during the war and sent a destroyer force to the Mediterranean Sea to bolster the Allies.

At the end of the war, Japanese politicians and military leaders assumed that since Japan helped the allies in their time of need, Japan would share in the spoils. Protecting shipping lanes coming from the European colonies in the Asia/Pacific region was an

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229 Ibid.
important, unglamorous, task. Japanese monetary contributions were not insignificant either, lending around six hundred and forty million yen to Britain, France, and Russia to help these nations continue their war efforts.\(^\text{232}\) Japan did receive a share of the spoils, gaining some of Germany’s Pacific Island colonies and a seat in the League of Nations. But the Japanese bid for adding a racial equality clause to the charter of the League of Nations was very publicly refused to the humiliation of the Japanese.\(^\text{233}\) It is noteworthy that this failed addition to the League charter came after a series of racist anti-Japanese laws had been put into effect in nations like Canada, Australia, and the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.\(^\text{234}\) Additionally, this clause was not a bid for universal racial equality but instead for the equality of Japan with the rest of the Great Powers.

The Japanese were becoming more and more skeptical of British motives and more unsure if Britain had their best interests at heart. British official distrust of Japan can be found soon after the signing of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The 1903 Balfour Intelligence brief implied in the summary at the end of the report that the Japanese government is weak, corrupt, and duplicitous, more than willing to defame its allies to maintain its own status.\(^\text{235}\) Distrust is evident during a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense chaired by the British Prime Minister in April 1905. In this secret document, a discussion on the possibility of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was


\(^{234}\) Cees Heere, Empire Ascendent, 100-103.

\(^{235}\) “Memorandum by Mr. Balfour respecting Japan and Russia,” December 22, 1903, CAB, 37-67-92.
recorded with possible ideas for expanding the scope of the treaty’s protection.\textsuperscript{236} When the idea of reinforcing India with Japanese troops was mentioned the idea received immediate pushback. Could the Japanese even work with Indian troops? Once in India would Japanese troops voluntarily leave? These types of questions being asked about an ally that has been nothing but faithful for three years at that point show an intrinsic level of distrust by the British government.

This mistrust was not confined to the government of Great Britain but continued in the people of Britain and the people of the Commonwealths of the Empire. The \textit{Times} on October 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1905 does an efficient job of painting the Japanese as liars and cheats without directly saying as much.\textsuperscript{237} The writer paints a racist picture of a beautiful and clear day in Korea. The Koreans are ‘filthy, lazy, idle over their work, good-natured, ugly, and well fed’ but not in any uproar of discontent as the Japanese said in their annexation order.\textsuperscript{238} The author does not expound on this argument based on the view from his hotel window in one city in Korea but leaves it to the reader’s powers of reasoning to figure out that the Japanese lied to annex Korea unjustly. This assertion may have very well been true, but it does not seem like something an ally would put into a popular newspaper. At the beginning of the First World War, the Governor-General of Australia mentioned that it was only because of the Japanese protection of isolated Australia that anti-Japanese articles disappeared from their newspapers for a time.\textsuperscript{239}

During this same time, both in Britain and in Canada, politicians were saying similar

\textsuperscript{236} “Committee of Imperial Defence: Minutes of 70\textsuperscript{th} Meeting,” April 12, 1905, CAB, 38-9-32.
\textsuperscript{237} “Korea: The Annexation and After,” \textit{Times}, October 10, 1910, 5.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{239} Cees Heere, \textit{Empire Ascendent}, 192.
things, that Japan should be appeased or they would definitely join the Germans against the Entente.\textsuperscript{240}

This distrust and ill feeling between the powers came to a head when the 1921 date for renewal of the treaty was approaching. In a 1920 session of the House of Commons, members made clear that they wanted out of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.\textsuperscript{241}

The agreed-upon reason given to the public was that,

\begin{quote}
“The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 13th July, 1911, now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments earnestly desire to respect.”\textsuperscript{242}
\end{quote}

This explanation does not conform with the discussion held in the House of Commons just two years later. In March of 1922, Japan was repeatedly named as the next great enemy for the RN, the focus of naval building and training for the future.\textsuperscript{243} This treaty was ended because of mutual distrust that had built until the treaty could no longer be justified by either side.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had served its purpose for both parties. Britain had outmaneuvered its colonial rivals and made its empire safe, and Japan had made good its shift from a target for colonizers to one of the Great Powers. The Japanese combat prowess proven by the Russo-Japanese war cemented Japan as a powerful ally, but paradoxically also revealed Japan as a possible rival to British power in East Asia. The mistrust fostered in Britain by having an ally that was powerful enough to protect British

\textsuperscript{240} Cees Heere, \textit{Empire Ascendent}, 162, 192-93.
\textsuperscript{241} Hansard 5\textsuperscript{th} series, HC Deb, July 15, 1920, vol 131, cc 2589-91.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid, vol 131, cc 2590.
\textsuperscript{243} Hansard 5\textsuperscript{th} series, HC Deb, March 16, 1922, vol 151, cc 2409-57.
assets, but also powerful enough to challenge British control of those assets, grew with Japanese military prowess. Racist policies in Britain, its Commonwealths, and in the Western world at the beginning of the 20th century fueled distrust of Japan in the West, and of the West by Japan. Would Britain have been as distrustful of an Anglo/European nation as it was of Japan? It is impossible to say with surety, but anyone reading the minutes of British imperial meetings or transcripts from Parliamentary sessions would have difficulty in saying that Japan was not treated with more suspicion because of the issue of race. And it was this distrust that ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after a short and tumultuous twenty years.
CONCLUSION

The history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is complex, including the histories of many nations, more people, and a fascinating amount of political brinkmanship. This treaty should not have happened according to the political tenets of the time. Britain’s record with non-Euro-American people shows a tendency for underhanded and unfair practices in these dealings. These people were perceived as racially and technologically inferior. Unfortunately for them, they possessed something Britain and her people desired. So, they were lied to and cheated or outright bullied out of what Britain wanted. In exchange, they were allowed to serve the Empire, but they were not the equals of a British citizen. Giovanni Arrighi, the late noted sociologist and world-systems analyst, addressed this inequality in an article on the great hegemonies of the modern world. Dr. Arrighi said:

“Under British hegemony, non-Western peoples did not qualify as national communities in the eyes of the hegemonic power and of its allies, clients, and followers. While the right of Western nations to pursue wealth was elevated above the absolute rights if government of their rulers, non-Western peoples were deprived of their customary rights to self-determination.”244

These non-Western people, both subjects of the empire and those who Britain chose to interact with outside the empire were just pawns for the enrichment of the empire.

Britain’s unequitable domination of non-Western peoples is key to the agreement that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement was no less than revolutionary. When Britain’s hold over its portions of China was threatened, Britain could have brought in its navy and army as it did during the Opium Wars, and destroyed all semblance of resistance in

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China. If full mobilization was not desirable, Britain could have lied to the Chinese as it did to the people in New Zealand or bribe the Chinese leaders as it did the Amir in Afghanistan. But instead, something revolutionary happened. Britain joined a coalition in which the army used to re-subjugate the Chinese was largely a non-Western force: a modern, powerful Japanese Army. These troops were not colonial subjects, armed by their masters, but members of a strong, independent, non-Western nation.

As revolutionary as the treaty was, the British government’s reasons for making such a groundbreaking change in its foreign policy are even more fascinating. Britain was reeling from the financial burden of the South African War. In the estimation of the other Great Powers, Britain was being embarrassed by a small force of irregular troops, made worse by Britain’s vast outlay of funds and troops. The threat of Russian expansion coming into contact with areas such as Persia and Afghanistan spurred Britain on into a search for an alliance that would help bolster the Empire and lighten the financial burden of maintaining a vast naval force. Fortunately for Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues in the Foreign Office, the recent experience in the Boxer Rebellion had revealed some possible partners. Germany and Japan were both likely candidates and were willing to make an agreement. During the negotiations, the British Foreign Office concluded that non-Western nation of Japan, not the European nation Germany, had the most compatible goals with Britain for Asia. Japan was motivated by the embarrassment of the Triple Intervention and Russia’s seizure of lands given to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Additionally, Japan and Britain shared compatible visions for the future of Asia. Lastly, the fear of what could happen to the British Empire pushed the UK into jointly crafting
with the Japanese delegates, a treaty that showed the best of what British diplomacy could achieve if the diplomats were willing to compromise.

After the exciting history of the conception and creation of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the last chapter of this history is tragic. Initially, the benefits of the alliance during the Russo-Japanese War and the early renewal of the treaty in 1905 were encouraging. But the parting of the British and Japanese visions for Asia that led to the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an unhappy turn of events. The trust that had been fostered between Britain and Japan was eroded partially by those who could not appreciate what a revolutionary step the treaty had been. This distrust was fostered by diplomats and politicians who could only see an alien “other” from both East and West, not a partner who could be trusted in spite of their differences. The dissolution of the treaty ended, for a time, a promising step forward in international relations as the world move inexorably towards the greatest world conflict of the 20th century. The diplomatic relationships built in the tense days of 1900-1902 would not be rebuilt until after the Second World War as the world struggled to recover from that conflict.

In 1901, British political leaders were anxious for their empire and were desperate to save it because they understood the empire to be a force for good in the world. The British Empire was stretched all over the world and Britain was short on both funds to protect the empire and friends to help them. These leaders knew that if they lost the empire, Britain would be thrown into political and economic turmoil. With Russia encroaching further each year into Asia, Lord Lansdowne and the Foreign Office made a fateful and ultimately courageous and unpopular decision to save the empire by allying with Japan. Japan was an ally that shared Britain’s goals to contain Russia and to secure
an empire in Asia. This was an alliance made to fulfil a specific set of needs for both parties and it was successful on all counts. Though it ended in suspicion and ill will, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lasted almost twenty years, an unprecedented success for a European and a non-Euro-American nation. Ultimately, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was created because of the need for stability in Asia, the desire to contain Russia, and the unexpected compatibility of the two separate concepts for the future envisioned by the leaders of the United Kingdom and the Empire of Japan.
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