Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928

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Abstract. In the early twentieth century, Indian Bureau officials noted an increasing incidence of tribal factionalism parallel to changes in Indian reservation leadership. They described this factionalism in terms of a progressive-traditional dichotomy. Modern scholars have unintentionally fallen into this semantic trap. This article explores the complexity of individual motivations and factional politics among the Northern Utes through the life of William Wash and suggests that such cultural middlemen offer a more complete picture of reservation politics.

In June 1865 leaders from the Tumpanuwac, San Pitch, and Pahvant bands of Ute (Nüči) Indians gathered at Spanish Fork to relinquish their lands. In return, O. H. Irish, superintendent of Indian affairs for Utah Territory, promised them a permanent reservation in the isolated Uintah Basin of eastern Utah, where they could hunt and gather until such time as the government saw fit to transform them into settled and self-sufficient agriculturalists. These Ute leaders realized they had few options. They themselves were leaders of recent status—men like Tabby who rallied group consensus away from the Ute war leaders Wakara and Black Hawk. Since the Mormon invasion in 1847, they had watched their people succumb to epidemic disease, starvation, and warfare. In 1865 Ute leaders accepted the Spanish Fork Treaty as a tactical retreat and began moving toward their new homeland.

In that year of change—change in leadership, location, and future—a Uintah Ute child was born. Named Na-am-quitch, he was the eldest son of Zowoff and Nunanumquitch. In later years he became known as Wash’s Son and finally as William Wash. Wash was both ordinary and extraordinary. He never became a formal political leader of his people,
yet his success as a rancher gained him the recognition and respect of both Utes and whites at the Uintah-Ouray Reservation. Agency officials called him one of the more “progressive” full-blood individuals of the Uintah band, one of three Northern Ute bands to share the four-million-acre reservation. Yet Wash frequently frustrated these same agents by rejecting the progressive and acting in what they considered to be very “traditional” ways. Until his death in April 1928, he moved between two cultural worlds on the reservation. He was what Loretta Fowler calls an “intermediary” or a “middleman,” one of the new or transitional types of leader to arise during the early reservation years.

The importance of people like William Wash lies not only in their own unique experiences but in their shared experiences and the larger themes which emerge from study of their lives. Nearly two decades ago Robert Berkhofer, Jr., told ethnohistorians that they must emphasize Indians in their histories, particularly “the uniqueness of the stories of specific individuals.” From works on more famous or infamous individuals, the study of Indian biography has begun to focus on “culturally marginal personages,” those less-known “biculural” individuals who spent their lives on the borders between ethnic groups, mastering the knowledge of two cultures without being immobilized by the process.

Berkhofer also suggests that this individualized focus will aid scholars in untangling the web of inter- and intragroup factionalism. Existing models of tribal factionalism generalize “group” traits without getting “bogged down” in individual motivation and variation. Without paying close attention over time to individual actors (who are difficult to find and trace in most records), scholars tend to perpetuate the static emic categories of “traditional” and “progressive,” an unrealistically neat dichotomy or unilinear continuum created by nineteenth- and twentieth-century observers and frequently used to generalize about the social, economic, and political nature of reservation factionalism. Reliance on these sources, particularly by historians who perhaps have been more susceptible to the generalization, produces a two-dimensional, dichotomous picture of native people, issues, and factionalism.

While anthropologists and ethnohistorians eschew the progressive-traditional dichotomy as ethnocentric and value-laden, the terms and their variants still appear all too frequently. Often qualified with quotation marks, they have become a kind of professional shorthand for describing individuals, factionalism, and the process of acculturation. The unspoken understanding is that we are simplifying a complex, dynamic situation out of necessity, trusting that colleagues will recognize our dilemma and hoping that others will not read overly static meanings into
these useful, if somewhat misleading, terms. We deny the dichotomy but we fall back on it, perhaps because in our histories we do not understand or cannot fully untangle the temporal threads of personal motive and behavior which guide individuals and draw them into factions or groups.

The weakness of this progressive-traditional dichotomy becomes most apparent in attempts to categorize complex individuals, particularly the intermediaries, the middlemen, the cultural brokers, the “150% men” who operate on the cultural margins. William Wash became such a figure among the Northern Utes. Not a recognized “headman” yet vocal in councils, Wash represents the substratum of reservation politics, the influential individuals who worked the margins of tribal leadership and white acceptance. His experience mirrors that of perhaps a majority of early twentieth-century Native Americans struggling to come to terms with their own culture and with American society.

William Wash was born into a world of both change and persistence as his people moved toward the Uintah Basin. We know little about his early life other than what we can assume given the history of the Uintah Reservation. There the different Utah Ute bands coalesced into a single band called the Uintah. The federal government encouraged Utes to settle near the agency and begin farming. Most, however, continued their seasonal subsistence pursuits and drew rations in order to avoid starvation on the agency farms. Some, like Zowoff and Wash, tried their hand at farming, braving the ridicule of other Ute males for gathering vegetal material and digging in the earth, the subsistence province of women. Raising cattle or hauling freight for the agency came much more easily for Ute men seeking to reproduce male work and subsistence spheres. Wash and his father received special gratuity payments from the Indian Bureau for their farming efforts. By 1891, Wash owned a number of cattle and worked part-time for the agency as a herder. Agents viewed him as a progressive Indian.

According to Ute agents, the definition of “progressive” revolved around two elements, economic and historical. First, agents identified progressive Utes by their subsistence activities, particularly by their commitment to a settled and self-sufficient agrarian lifestyle. This lifestyle was defined in part by their willingness to dress, act, and speak like whites, live in houses, and send their children to school. Second, this designation devolved to a comparison of Ute bands and their reservation histories, particularly after the 1881 forced removal of White River and Uncompahgre Utes from their Colorado homelands to the Uintah and Ouray reservations. The consolidation of the Uintah, White River, and Uncom-
pahgre bands created a number of problems, including a series of inter- and intraband factional disputes over leadership, past treaty negotiations, and the distribution of natural resources and annuity payments.

Out of these disputes Ute agents identified “progressive” and “traditional” factions. The Uintah Utes, because of their long contact history and exposure to reservation agriculture, were the most progressive of the Northern Ute bands. The Uncompahgre band suffered the most internal divisions between the progressive Indians (led by Shavanaux and Alhandra) who settled on river-bottom farms and those (led by Sowawick) who preferred to maintain a more nomadic, up-country, herding and hunting lifestyle. Finally, there were the White Rivers, whom agents classed as wild and rebellious traditionalists, adamantly opposed to any effort to change their way of life. This growing factionalism, based on what agents perceived as a progressive-traditional dichotomy running along band lines, was in fact individualistic, fluid, and issue- and economics-oriented.

William Wash played some role in these factional divisions by virtue of his Uintah band affiliation and his three marriages, particularly the last, to Lucy Alhandra, daughter of the progressive Uncompahgre leader “Charley” Alhandra. More important factors, however, were his economic activities as a farmer, rancher, and agency herder, as well as his familiar relations with the white agents. As agency herder, Wash came under fire from Tim Johnson, spokesman for the White River traditionalists. Johnson claimed that Wash was in league with agency attempts to lease Ute grazing lands in the Strawberry Valley to white Mormon ranchers. Johnson criticized Wash because “he does all kind of work” and asked that Wash and the agency farmer, men who symbolized progressive agriculture, both be “sent away.”

In 1903, the White River and Uintah bands faced a common threat, the prospect of allotment. Despite widespread Ute opposition, 75 Uintah and 7 White River Utes out of 280 eligible males signed the allotment article. These, Special Agent James McLaughlin acknowledged, signed mainly to show their goodwill in the face of what they understood to be an inevitable process. Yet by signing the allotment agreement, these individuals reaffirmed a perceived division between “progressive” Uintah and “conservative” White River Utes and created a further division within the Uintah band. William Wash, aged thirty-eight, was one of these progressive Uintah signatories. Dissenting White River leaders threatened to leave the reservation if allotment proceeded; indeed, they carried out that threat in 1906-8, leading nearly four hundred Utes to South Dakota.

With this “tribal” division into two apparently distinct factions,
Wash began to consolidate his social and economic position as a progressive spokesman. In 1903, he sold 25,530 pounds of loose hay to the troops at Fort Duchesne, and in 1905 he received his eighty-acre allotment on the southeastern end of Indian Bench above Fort Duchesne. That year he raised ten bushels of potatoes, fourteen hundred bushels of oats, and one hundred bushels of wheat and harvested three hundred tons of alfalfa. His 640 rods of fencing and his log cabin attest to his industry but probably more so to substantial assistance from agency personnel. At the same time, Wash ran a sizable cattle herd in the Dry Gulch region southwest of Fort Duchesne.¹⁷

In a 1907 council with Uintah Utes, Agent C. G. Hall tried to quiet rumors that “Mormons” were going to take over both the opened reservation and allotted lands. In this council, with the absence of so many Utes in South Dakota, William Wash emerged as a Uintah spokesman. He told the assembly:

I hear about the way Secretary of the Interior talk to us. I always take Washington’s advice. About farming, about everything. I never say no any time. This land that is allotted to me is mine. That make my heart [feel good]. I can’t wait to go work my land. I have been working the way Washington want me to. I have a fence around eighty acres. I am putting in some crops. I got hands to work with like everybody. I lost a good deal of money in some way by white men renting my farm. This leasing of land to the whites is a swindle. If I work it myself I get the money that comes from the farming. The Indians do not know how to make money off their land. They don’t know whether the white man is handling it right or not.

Beneath his own espousal of white economic values, Wash was apparently concerned about the vacant allotments of those White River Utes in South Dakota, fearing the land would be leased or sold—lost in either case from Ute control. He continued: “About the White Rivers. Washington never told them to go to another country. They are getting themselves poor. Losing everything. This is their home. . . . I want everything to be right. Don’t want little children starving. It makes me feel sorry when people move around and let little children get hurt. They are pretty hard up I think. Maybe they come back now to raise something.”¹⁸

The White River Utes did return to the allotted reservation in 1908, under military guard, physically defeated, and with little means of support. Many had no idea where their allotments were, had nothing to work their land with if they wanted to, and were reluctant to work for wages on the ongoing Uintah Irrigation Project. Many ultimately leased their
lands to white settlers, hoping to earn some money and protect their water rights against usufruct Utah water laws. Wash’s hopes seemed dim.

At this juncture we get a glimpse of another side of William Wash, one that casts a different light on his economic activities and social aspirations. Inspector Harwood Hall visited the reservation shortly after the White Rivers returned and reported that all the Northern Utes “are quite poor, and were it not for rations issued by the government and assistance given many of them by an Indian by name of Wash, who is fairly well off, it is difficult to see how they would secure sufficient food to subsist.”

From this and other evidence, it appears not only that Wash was accumulating wealth in a white-approved manner (ranching and farming) but that he was using the proceeds (particularly his cattle) to help feed needy members of all three Ute bands. Instead of observing market economy values, he reproduced in part the individualistic role of local Ute leaders by distributing goods in return for sociopolitical recognition. Wash used his position as a cultural intermediary in order to help his people, to gain traditional respect, and to attempt to fill a growing vacuum in Northern Ute leadership.

Between 1912 and 1914, Wash’s visibility in tribal affairs increased. He was not considered a “chief” in general Ute councils with the federal government, but he was actively involved in reservation politics, particularly over issues of ranching and land use. Once we discern some of the cultural values and motives behind his actions, it becomes clear that Wash’s activities are more complex than can be explained with a static model of factionalism based on a simple progressive-traditional dichotomy.

In 1912, Uintah-Ouray agency stockmen expressed concern with the number of “wild ponies” roaming the 250,000-acre Ute Grazing Reserve. The issue of Ute horses had been a constant source of conflict between Utes and agency personnel. Agents argued that horses gave the Utes too much mobility, perpetuated racing and gambling customs, and grazed ranges more profitably reserved for cattle and sheep. Utes, on the other hand, valued horses as prestige items, traditional forms of wealth, status, and security. They felt (and still feel) an attachment to the horse out of proportion to its market value. The destruction of horses in 1879 precipitated the White River attack on the Utes’ Colorado agency. Agents in Utah came to realize that horses, not cattle, defined the social and economic status of Ute men.

In 1912, Wash was one of these men, wealthy both by Ute standards (he owned about fifty horses) and by white (two hundred cattle and forty sheep). He headed an affinal and kin-based cattle association which
controlled 395 cattle, 115 sheep, and one of the four bands of "wild" horses roaming the grazing reserve. His position gave him a great say in Indian Bureau plans to clear the range. At a gathering of seventeen leading Ute stockmen, Wash initiated a plan to periodically round up unbranded horses and divide them among members of the roundup crew. He offered to supply both mounted men and extra saddle horses for the roundup and agreed to the construction of corrals on his land. Wash may have been interested in rounding up wild horses, but it seems likely that he was interested in doing so not to preserve the range for additional cattle and sheep, as desired by the white officials, but to obtain or retain more horses, thereby adding to his source of traditional wealth and status.22

In 1913, Ute livestock owners met in council to oppose leasing the Ute Grazing Reserve to James S. Murdock, a white sheepman. Once again Wash spoke for his people, summarizing Ute opposition to the proposed lease:

> When we used to talk about this reservation a long time ago, way back in Washington, we leased some land. That is past now. . . . Now the way it is about this land, it is different than before we were allotted. All these Indians understand what you told them to do and now we have talked about it. Now we have some horses, and we know about how to take care of them now and make use of them on this land. The Indian has always held it, they do not want to lease it at all. As we have horses, cattle, and stock there is no place for Murdock to lease, as all the Indians on the grazing land clear up to Lake Fork have stock and we do not want it leased at all. I have the right to depend on that country, I have some cattle of my own.

Superintendent Jewell D. Martin thanked him: "I am glad to hear what Wash has said because he has more stock than any other Indian on the reservation and knows more about the live stock industry here and I am glad he has expressed his judgment."23

Two points of interest emerge from this exchange. First, by his words before his assembled peers, Wash indicated his continuing commitment to horses, even his commitment to horses over cattle and sheep. He came to this point of view as Ute agents attempted to reduce the number of Ute horses by emphasizing improved livestock and range management. Even progressive Ute stockmen like Wash resisted agency efforts to castrate their "ponie stallions," preferring a culturally derived balance between quantity and quality. Wash emphasized the continuity of the horse, as both symbol and reality, in Northern Ute culture.24

Second, Wash opposed leasing the tribally controlled grazing reserve.
In council meetings later that year Wash and other progressive ranchers clashed with a group of White River traditionalists over the creation of a tribal herd. The cattlemen argued that a herd would benefit the tribe economically, provide a market for surplus hay, and keep land-grabbing whites from getting a foothold on the reserve through leasing. The White Rivers also feared the threat of white homesteaders, but they desired cash, not cattle—an equitable distribution of benefits from the grazing reserve in the form of lease monies rather than its use by a select few Ute cattlemen.

Although the council approved the proposed tribal herd when the White Rivers walked out, Superintendent Martin killed the plan, which smacked of "tribal interest rather than individual interest." In his haste to stamp out collectivism, Martin missed the point. These progressive cattlemen intended to partition the herd, "allowing each family to take its share of the cattle and take care of them." In effect, these Utes understood better than Martin that the government would spend tribal funds only for tribal (as opposed to individual) economic development plans, that such communalism clashed with their individualistic subsistence traditions, and that in the past, communalistic policies and agency herds had failed. This proposal by Wash and the progressive cattlemen was both a way to get tribal funds over to individuals and a conservative plan to protect the integrity of the Ute Grazing Reserve. Ultimately, it promised to benefit each Ute household in more ways than the simple lease fees desired by the White Rivers—progressive-sounding means securing an essentially conservative outcome.25

In 1914, Wash appeared in the middle of another reservation power struggle, between an overly enthusiastic superintendent and commissioner and the Ute followers of the Sun Dance religion. As early as 1905, Ute agents had complained that the annual Ute Bear Dance and Sun Dance were morally and economically counterproductive, that they destroyed health and morals and took people away from their farms at critical times in the growing season. In 1913, Martin failed to convince Ute leaders to hold the Bear and Sun dances together at midsummer agricultural fairs as a sort of commercial sideshow. Unable to co-opt or halt them, Commissioner Cato Sells officially prohibited both dances, which were "incompatible with industrial development and altogether out of harmony with a higher civilization."26

While the Bear Dance was one of the oldest of Ute rituals, the Sun Dance religion was a recent innovation.27 Introduced in the 1890s by Grant Bullethead, a Uintah Ute who learned the ceremony at the Wind River Shoshone Reservation, the Sun Dance filled a void for people
struggling with the unrest and dislocation associated with allotment. The dance echoed the individualistic tenor of Ute beliefs while offering group strength through communal participation. The Ute people seized the model, reinterpreted it in terms of their own cultural categories, and reproduced their own religious system, with its emphasis on curing, within the framework of that single dance. The Sun Dance religion offered the Northern Utes an active option for binding themselves together and dealing with the directed changes of an allotted agrarian lifestyle. 28

Despite the Indian Bureau ban, a number of White River and Uintah Utes proceeded with the 1914 Sun Dance. Upset and uncertain what to do, William Wash telegraphed Interior Secretary Franklin K. Lane: “Indians will hold annual harvest dance about June twenty fifth to thirtieth / ancient custom / supervisor objects / wire reply.” Cloaking the Sun Dance in harvest imagery to make it more palatable to white officials was an old Ute tactic, but the reply shot back that the Sun Dance, “or dance of a similar nature, such as usually held at this season of year,” was prohibited. Superintendent Martin assured the commissioner that after informing a “bunch of the influential ones” who had sent the telegram, the “better class” of Indians agreed not to dance. Still, two Sun Dances went on as scheduled that summer. Martin reported that about 150 “retrogressive White River Indians” insisted on the dance, which was attended by over three hundred Utes—what he dismissed as a “minor fraction.” Martin asked for additional assistance to suppress the dance, for, as they often did, his Indian policemen protected their own people by selectively enforcing Indian Bureau orders. 29

Was William Wash, the leader of the “bunch of the influential ones” who sent the telegram, also one of the “better class” who agreed not to hold the dance? Or did this group concede defeat to Martin and then participate in the dance anyway? After investigating the dance, U.S. Marshall Aquilla Nebeker reported that Martin “believes that the best Indians, and a majority over all, are supporters of his and are in harmony with his ideas; but I am forced to the opinion that in this he is mistaken; and I could recite many circumstances and conversations which I think are withheld from the Agent, but such recitals would burden this communication and probably would not be considered competent.” Nebeker heard and saw what Martin and the Indian Bureau ignored, and he probably heard some of it from Martin’s own progressive Utes. 30

Nebeker reported that the dance took place on the grazing reserve around Lake Fork, thirty-five miles northwest of Myton, Utah. Other records indicate that William Wash “controlled” that particular area of the grazing reserve and thus that he probably knew about and approved
of the dance location. It is possible that Wash was there, supporting the dancers and participating in the group event by his very presence. He was a prominent sponsor of other Sun Dances during this period of suppression. In describing the dances in his youth, Conner Chapoose noted that Ute individuals would sponsor dancers or contribute to the feast following the dance: “They’d either donate a beef if they had any cattle, like for instance Mr. Wash. He would make a statement at the time that he would furnish a beef for the food, and that was supporting the program as they was putting it on.” In this and in other instances, Wash actively supported a ceremony deemed retrogressive and traditional by the very white officials who dubbed him the leading progressive Ute stockman.

Superintendent Albert Kneale, who replaced Martin in January 1915, was not particularly concerned about the Sun Dance. He considered it to be a fairly benign, rather commercialized celebration put on to attract tourist dollars. Kneale was more concerned about the appearance of peyote at Uintah-Ouray and the threat it posed to the welfare and advancement of the Ute people.

In 1914, Sam Lone Bear, an Oglala Sioux, introduced the peyote Cross Fire ritual to the Northern Utes. Working out of Dragon, Utah, an isolated narrow-gauge railroad terminal seventy-five miles from Fort Duchesne, Lone Bear held services and spread word of the benefits of peyote, particularly its curative properties. By 1916, half of the nearly twelve hundred Northern Utes participated in the peyote religion. Once again, Utes integrated the individualistic, power-seeking, and therapeutic elements of a new ritual into their own belief system. In later years, the Tipi Way became more popular among Northern Ute peyotists, perhaps because Lone Bear’s unsavory business dealings and sexual reputation discredited the Cross Fire ritual.

Ute peyotism came under attack between 1916 and 1918 when both Congress and the state of Utah considered bills to outlaw peyote. Witnesses before a House subcommittee testified that peyote roadmen targeted “prosperous” Ute Indians, those with cattle, in order to addict them and “control their funds.” They told of once prosperous Ute farms now “neglected” because of peyote addiction and claimed that Lone Bear counselled Ute stockmen to stay at home and pray to Peyote to look after their cattle. Other experts testified to the deaths and other detrimental physical as well as economic effects of the drug on progressive Indian farmers. Superintendent Kneale informed his superiors that “40 to 50 percent of the Indians on this reservation are, or have been, partakers of this drug.” Lone Bear, Kneale reported, deliberately set out to interest “some of our very best men, particularly McCook, Witchits, Monk Shavanaux, Cap-
tain Jenks, Grant, Corass, and William Wash. These men were all leaders among their people."

As it turned out, Wash, the progressive Uintah Ute farmer, rancher, and emerging leader, was indeed an active and vocal peyotist. In 1917 Kneale called in U.S. marshalls to control the liquor and peyote traffic around Dragon. He advised Utes to abandon peyotism because it would kill them. Once again, Wash took his people’s problems to the commissioner of Indian affairs. On 12 May 1917, Wash dictated the following letter, signing it with his thumbprint:

My Dear Commissioner:

We want to know why these United States Marshalls come in here and try to get us to stop church. We like Church. We want to meet every Sunday and have Church and pray and be good. We don’t want to steal, nor drink whiskey, nor play cards nor gamble nor lie and we want to rest on Sunday and then on Monday we want to work and farm. . . . Sometimes sick people sometimes die and sometimes we eat Peote and it make us better. Sometimes people die and no eat Peote. They die. Maybe eat Peote, no die. Horses die, cows die, sheep die. They no eat Peote. You can’t stop them dieing. Anything die. Long time live maybe so eat Peote. We want to be good and we want you to let us have Church and not send Police from Washington to make us stop. You tell us why you do this. We don’t know.

I have been here a long time and all the Indians like me and they ask me to write and ask you what is the matter. Randlett Indians maybe so they eat Peote. Pretty good, I guess. The White Rocks Indians no eat Peote. No like it and they like Whiskey and they play cards and fight, maybe so kill ‘em. We don’t like that, we want to be good.

Assistant Commissioner E. B. Meritt answered Wash’s letter, explaining that he opposed the use of peyote because attending and recovering from peyote meetings took too much time, and because “it is bad medicine making many Indians sick, some crazy and killing others.” Meritt noted that Utah state law prohibited the sale and use of peyote. He closed in typically paternal fashion by telling Wash, “If you and your people want to be good you should do what we think is right and best for you and what the laws of the State and the United States require that you should do.”

Wash and his friends were not satisfied with this reply or with the suggestion that they talk to Kneale. On 3 July Wash responded to Meritt’s
objections, stressing the positive aspects of peyote use and pointing out that it was no more disruptive than Christian Sunday services:

You say for me to talk the matter over with my superintendent but he won’t talk to me cause I eat peyote. He won’t shake hands with me. When I have my Superintendent to write for me I don’t get any answer for it. . . . He don’t like to write letters for Indians. The Superintendent’s Indians at White Rocks play cards. He lets them play cards and he don’t stop them.

I don’t drink any more and I don’t play cards nor swear. I go to meeting and eat peyote and that made me throw away drinking, playing cards and swearing. Church makes us good people. We are good when we go to Church. We farm all week and just have church on Sunday, just one day. We all work hard all week and go to church on Sunday after week’s work is done. I raise all my own garden, all the food to eat myself and have good garden and just go to Church on Sunday. The Bible say that we should go to church on Sunday and rest. The Missionaries say to go to Church on Sunday too.

Meritt answered quickly this time, apparently aware that he was dealing with an influential and persistent individual. He assured Wash that he would write Kneale and have him explain the laws. He applauded Wash’s “progress” and admonished him to give up peyotism. “If you are anxious to do what is right I hope you will stop using peyote and advise the other Indians to do likewise. Peyote will not make Indians live longer but instead will shorten their lives.” Meritt advised Kneale that “by taking this Indian into your confidence it is possible that he can be induced to give up the peyote habit and use his influence in persuading others to do likewise.” Kneale replied that he had held “many conversations with Mr. Wash relative to the peyote situation,” and that Wash had discussed it with “many other employees in this jurisdiction,” but to no avail.

Wash refused to accept the paternal advice of these two men. His own experiences led him to very different conclusions regarding peyote. He wrote Meritt a final note:

I received your letter of July 18th and will say that I do not wish to hear from you any more. Do not write to me any more and I will not write to you. Indian no eat peyote, he die anyhow. Sometime he die young and sometime live long time. I will die anyhow. I will die if I eat peyote and I will die if I don’t. White people die no eat peyote.

I have a good home and have a good farm. I stay home all the time and watch cattle and sheep. I herd them in the mountain now. I
send my boy to white school to learn and be good. I like to have my boy be good and learn to talk and read and write. They don't learn them to be bad and swear and steal, they teach them to be good all the time. I die sometime and my boy will have my house and farm and cattle and sheep. He stay there and live.  

With that, Wash ended his correspondence, but not his involvement with the peyote religion.

Who was Wash defending and why? From the available evidence it appears that Northern Ute peyotists were mostly older full-blood Utes, frequently the people Kneale deemed progressive, the “very best men,” the “leaders among their people.” Peyote use was centered in the communities of Dragon and Randlett and occurred along the Indian Bench all the way to Myton—areas of predominantly Uintah and Uncompahgre Ute settlement (bands always considered the more progressive and economically self-sufficient among the Utes). Some argue that these progressive full-bloods were seeking a way to maintain particularly “Indian” cultural values in the face of directed culture change, to achieve group solidarity as Utes and as pan-Indians. Contemporaries observed that individuals, particularly young educated Indians, adopted peyotism to gain social prominence and leadership status otherwise denied them under existing tribal structures. Wash’s active participation can be seen as an attempt both to revitalize or perpetuate elements he believed valuable in Ute culture and, despite his age, to gain social leadership status in addition to his economic prominence.

While many Northern Utes accepted peyotism, there remained a significant faction adamantly opposed to its use, deeming it dangerous, expensive, or simply an intrusive cultural element. The White River Utes living around Whiterocks, long considered conservative traditionalists, apparently rejected peyotism. Wash exposed them by playing off the “virtues” of peyote against their “vices” of gambling and drinking and thus claimed the moral high ground. Other peyote opponents included mixed-blood and younger boarding school-educated Utes from all three bands. In 1924, forty-six White River Utes petitioned the Interior Department and Congress to “prevent the traffic of peyote and remove it from the Indian reservations of the United States.” Indian Bureau suppression and factional opposition within the tribe drove peyotism underground in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1930s the issue merged with an increasing antagonism between full- and mixed-blood Utes over mixed-blood control of the tribal business committee. The resulting social and political fac-
tionalism ultimately contributed to the termination of mixed-blood Utes in 1954.44

It is unclear whether William Wash became a peyote leader, yet his open defense of it and his defiance surely increased his influence among segments of the Ute people. Peyote did not physically or financially ruin Wash. Kneale recalled that Wash, “a well-to-do and patriotic Ute,” purchased one thousand dollars’ worth of coupon bonds during World War I.45 In 1923, Wash owned six hundred head of sheep, which he leased to the care of white herders, as well as several hundred cattle, which he personally supervised. “He also controls a large acreage of farming land and this is leased to white men,” wrote Superintendent Fred A. Gross. “He is one of the most progressive Indians we have and is successful in his various activities.”46 While it is possible that Wash’s “lapse” into leasing was a result of his peyote use, it is more probable that, since Wash was getting old and his son was in school, he could not personally manage his considerable estate. Leasing then became a viable short-term option that he could supervise to make sure the land was not lost to white ranchers.

Wash’s wealth and political recognition increased dramatically in his later years. He was a leading member of the council which chose R. T. Bonnin as the Ute tribal attorney in 1926, and he represented the Uintah band in council meetings designed to form a tribal business committee in 1927. His age, wealth, peyotism, and outspokenness are probably what kept him off the final business committee, yet they gained him the recognition of both Utes and whites as a spokesman for the full-blood and Uintah Utes.47

Wash spoke with particular authority on issues affecting Ute lands and land use. In 1925, Uintah Utes included Wash in a delegation bound for Washington, DC. While other members focused on “missing” annuity payments, siphoned off to pay for the Uintah Irrigation Project, Wash articulated the fears of his people that whites were scheming to gain control of the grazing reserve. Wash told bureau officials that he ran about 570 cattle, 800 sheep, and 70 horses on the grazing reserve, and that “we do not want any white men to come and take that piece of land away from us again because it is very small.” He complained of having trouble with trespassing white ranchers and with forest rangers who restricted his access to former Ute grazing lands within the Uinta National Forest, “so that it makes it pretty hard for me to get along with these fellows.” And in particular he complained that white homesteaders and irrigation companies took water properly belonging to Ute allottees.
In the second half of his speech, Wash moved from issues affecting Ute ranchers to the desires of those who were not so economically progressive—those without cattle or allotments. In an apparent ideological flip-flop, he suggested that unused portions of the grazing reserve be leased “so all Indians could get a little benefit of it, those that don’t own any stock.” He also suggested that arable areas of the grazing reserve be allotted to Ute children. He told the commissioner: “I am making this statement because I am old. I may not live long but I would like to have these children allotted because by and by white men might take it away and the children would be homeless. We would like to have the children allotted so that they will have something when they grow up.” Wash, the “progressive” farmer and cattleman, recognized both the needs and rights of those Utes without cattle or land to share in the tribal estate. At the same time he reiterated his desire to preserve the integrity of what was left of the Ute land base, to leave enough land and water to sustain Ute identity and independence against the wave of white homesteaders. 48

Indian Bureau officials listened to Wash and the other Ute delegates and ultimately acted on Wash’s recommendation, but they twisted his intent in the process. In 1927 the bureau levied grazing fees on ranchers running more than one hundred horses or head of cattle or five hundred sheep on the grazing reserve. Ostensibly, the point was to provide a more equitable distribution of tribal assets between those using the range and those without livestock, but in fact the fees promised to open more of the reserve to white stockmen who could afford to pay them. These fees posed a major problem for stock-rich but cash-poor Utes who found few outside markets and low prices for their livestock. The fees and regulations themselves posed a threat to Ute sovereignty. Wash, the premier stockman and cultural middleman, was the one individual most threatened by this fee system.

In January 1928 a number of older full-bloods from all three bands gathered in council to petition the Indian Bureau to lift the fees on livestock. Most owned no stock and had no vested interest in the outcome. Sampannies (Saponeis Cuch), a conservative White River leader, vigorously argued that Wash (and all full-bloods) should be allowed to run his stock on the grazing reserve without paying a fee. “We want his stock to be left alone. They have a right on our grazing land,” Sampannies told the council. “We are doing this in order that Mr. Wash can hold our grazing land for us for some day some of us other Indians may have stock and want to run our stock on the grazing land.” Sampannies, voicing full-blood Ute resentment toward the growing number and the political and economic
influence of mixed-blood Utes, declared that anyone of less than one-half Ute blood had no right to use the tribal grazing reserve. Older full-blood leaders like John Duncan, Cesspooch, and Dick Wash and newer Business Committee leaders like John Yesto agreed. They defended Wash’s right to use the grazing reserve, praised him as an example for the younger generation, and denied the mixed-bloods. Yet underpinning their support for Wash was an understanding that the real issue was sovereignty, the ultimate right to control their tribal resources. “Why,” asked Cesspooch, “should we pay for our own land?”

Wash spoke at the end of the council, summing up the arguments of sovereignty by recapping his life experiences as a cultural intermediary, as one who tried to play by two sets of changing rules and expectations:

When the agency was first established I was advised that stock raising was very profitable and I took that advice and I have found that it is so. Later on arrangements were made and the grazing land set aside for our use. It was then said that the grazing land was for the Indians’ own use and that they could increase their herds as much as they wanted as long as they had grazing land and were not to be charged any fee whatever. At the present time why should we be charged for our grazing land? I feel that I should be given a little consideration because I am the leading example of the whole tribe. I feel that I have been capable of holding the grazing land as a whole because I have more stock on the grazing land than any other Indian and the other Indians appreciate the fact that I have held the grazing land for them. That is why they have made their statements here today.

Wash played on his dual role, first in holding tribal land against outsiders and secondly in providing a progressive example of the benefits of work and self-sufficiency for Ute schoolchildren. In closing, he reiterated his long-standing objections to the alienation of Ute land and his hopes for an independent future for his people: “We have always been peaceable people and we intend to live here that way always. This is our home and we do not want to be disturbed. . . . We do not like for any white persons or anybody else to try to have our grazing land thrown open. We object to that very much. We feel that our younger people are beginning to realize the benefits derived from our grazing lands. We do not want to be discouraged by such hard regulations.” Yet in the end the commissioner ignored the council and reaffirmed the new fee regulation. Shortly after word of the decision reached Uintah-Ouray, William Wash fell ill.
Following a month-long struggle Wash, aged sixty-three, died on 30 April 1928 at his home on the Indian Bench near Fort Duchesne.51

Wash's life illustrates some of the fundamental problems scholars face in defining individual Indians, or entire factions, for that matter, as progressive or traditional on the basis of narrow social or economic issues. Defining factions is difficult enough. What variables (kinship, residence, economics, religion, etc.) defined factional groups? Were they “floating coalitions of interests rather than of persons,” and were the ends always disputed, or just the means to those ends?52 The activities of William Wash indicate that individuals frequently transcend the bounds of static factional categories; that these coalitions were informal, fluid, and issue-oriented as frequently as not; and that the means were perhaps more divisive than the ends. Wash plotted a course different from the traditionalist White Rivers, clashing with them over certain issues. Each undoubtedly suspected the other’s methods and motives. Yet Wash and his White River opponents united on a number of other issues. Factionalism at Uintah-Ouray evolved from preexisting kinship and band differences, bloomed with economic and land use disputes from the 1880s through the 1930s, and played itself out under the guise of mixed-blood–full-blood politics in the 1950s.53

The problem with dichotomizing factions into progressive and traditional elements is, as Fred Hoxie points out, that “there were usually more than two sides to most questions, and no single side coincided with the cause of resistance for the survival of tribal culture.” Indian communities contained “a variety of interest groups which took a variety of positions on public issues,” and accounting for community or cultural survivals by praising one group as traditional against all others “flattens history and distorts the complexity of reservation life.”54 Equating progressive with change and traditional with resistance sacrifices individually complex behavior, diminishing our understanding of Native Americans’ rationales and responses.

Defining traditional and progressive elements or actions is equally difficult because what passes for tradition changes over time. When innovations can be and are interpreted as cultural continuities, the category traditional becomes little more than a temporal indicator.55 Institutions today regarded as conservative among the Northern Utes (the Sun Dance and peyotism, for example) were revitalized or innovative features in Wash’s time. The most conservative elements of Ute society opposed peyote, while so-called progressives embraced the pan-Indian religion. Today at Uintah-Ouray, that group definition would be reversed. Wash’s actions,
which appeared progressive to agents and other Utes, in time manifested rather conservative intents or results.

Then there is the jockeying for semantic position or advantage. Different sides in a dispute might claim to be traditional in order to gain the moral high ground and discredit the others. Each side usually has some legitimate claims to tradition, and yet each is equally untraditional. The opposite strategy, claiming progressive attitudes and actions for moral or political advantage, is also possible. As Loretta Fowler points out, "Indians have often . . . tried to influence federal policy by presenting themselves and their constituents as 'progressive,'" to preserve or protect certain cultural elements. But this strategy is double-edged.6 The real problem begins when modern readers see this dichotomy and unwittingly read in a whole set of values and traits which may not be present, allowing no leeway for individual and qualitative distinctions. Given the modern predisposition towards cultural pluralism and the emergence of "pan-traditionalists," progressives have become politically suspect and are not considered particularly "authentic."57 The result: simplifying or discrediting through semantics alone.

A final problem with the progressive-traditional dichotomy is that it too frequently implies either that one is progressive and committed to change or that one is traditional and resists attempts to alter cultural features. It also suggests a zero-sum equation, a "cultural replacement" in which one discards Indian ways in proportion to the assimilation of white goods or ways. There appears to be no middle ground in the dichotomy, no ambiguity in individual thought, action, or value, no notion of differential as opposed to unilinear (or unidirectional) change. And yet we acknowledge the presence and importance of certain individuals who embody these ambiguities as cultural middlemen, intermediaries, bicultural brokers in search of balance. As middlemen, they exemplify the coexistence of oppositions. They frequently work both sides (or multiple sides) and run the danger of alienating both reservation officials and various Indian factions.58 Ambivalence appears more frequently than a progressive-traditional dichotomy among established and emerging leaders and, I would argue, among the more numerous and less visible individuals like William Wash.

These terms are not inherently problematical; indeed, they have some descriptive merit, even if simply as academic shorthand for issuespecific situations. The problem lies in their misuse, in the simplification, the dichotomization, of complex issues, personalities, and relationships. Creating new sets of terms will not solve it. Dividing the progressive-traditional dichotomy into three or four categories—for example, "native-
oriented,” “transitionals,” “lower- and upper-acculturated”—is perhaps better but still suggests overly static organization and a unilinear progression.59 Describing a group or faction demands a generalization, a search for the “common.” But in that search we should never lose sight of individual complexity and variability over time. We must define and redefine circumstances and try to convey the ambiguity of human motive and action within the common. Nowhere are those complexities and ambiguities greater than in the changing nature of nineteenth- and twentieth-century reservation leadership and in the emergence of the intermediaries, the cultural brokers, the William Washes.

Notes

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1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Indian Census Rolls, 1885–1940, Microcopy 595, Reels 608–12. William Wash’s Indian name was recorded variously as Na-am-quitch, Ot-tum-bi-asken, and Witch-chee-wig-up. He was called Wash’s Son, William Wash, and William Wash, Jr., to distinguish him from his father, Wash. Little is known of Wash’s parents, who disappear from the census records in 1903.


6 “Factionalism,” Berkhofer wrote, “was a creative response to external white pressures as well as to internal cultural values, and its chronicling provides an Indian view of an Indian way of handling change and persistence.” Berkhofer, “Political Context,” 379–80. See also Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., “Native
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In many cases the terms are used in rendering nineteenth- and early twentieth-century emic norms, yet the problems with those terms are left unexplained for the uninitiated reader. Most notably among the studies of individuals, the terms recur in the commentary and articles in Clifton, Being and Becoming Indian, and in Moses and Wilson, Indian Lives, particularly in George M. Lubick, "Peterson Zah: A Progressive Outlook and a Traditional Style," 189–216. The dichotomy appears in numerous other recent works, including, but not limited to, Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indian, abr. ed. (Lincoln, NE, 1986); Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (New York, 1984); James S. Olson and Raymond Wilson, Native Americans in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, IL, 1984), 123; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Now That the Buffalo’s Gone: A Study of Today’s American Indians (Norman, OK, 1984); James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York, 1985), 78, 117–18, 280–81.

The terms setting out this dichotomy include traditional (traditionalist, conservative, retrogressive, unprogressive, unassimilated, unacculturated, hostiles, pagans, backward, blanket, country, old, old-fashioned, real, full-blood) and progressive (progressive, assimilationist, acculturated, Christian, friendlies, town-dweller, young, white-eyes, apples, Uncle Tomahawks, mixed-blood), among others. Even the alternatives proposed by anthropologists fared little better: native, native-modified, American marginal; unacculturated, marginal, acculturated; native-oriented, transitionals, lower- and upper-status acculturated. See McFee, "150% Man," 1096.

See Floyd A. O’Neil, "A History of the Ute Indians of Utah until 1890" (Ph.D.

12 J. B. Kinney, Agent, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA), 16 January 1886, National Archives, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, General Records, 1824–1907, Letters Received (hereafter NA, RG 75, LR); William Parsons, U.S. Special Agent, to CIA, 29 May 1886, NA, RG 75, LR; T. A. Byrnes, Agent, to CIA, 24 July 1888, NA, RG 75, LR; Byrnes to CIA, 10 August 1888, NA, RG 75, LR; George W. Parker, Special Agent, to CIA, 18 July 1891, NA, RG 75, LR.


14 Wash lived with three wives during his lifetime and had ten children. The first two marriages, which were exogamous, broadened his kin network throughout the three bands; the final one aligned Wash with the progressive Uncompahgre and Uintah factions. It is also interesting that he named his sons after Ute agents James Randlett, C. G. Hall, and Albert Kneale. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Indian Census Rolls, 1885–1940*, Microcopy 595, Reels 608–12.


17 Lieut. Charles A. Hunt, Quartermaster, Ft. Duchesne, to Capt. W. A. Mercer, Agent, 3 December 1903, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O; “Houses for Indians, Built by Government,” c. 1905, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O; C. G. Hall, Agent, to Deputy Sheriff Clyde, 15 June 1906, NA, RG 75, General Records, Central Correspondence Files, 1907–1939, Uintah and Ouray Agency (hereafter GR, CCF, U&O), 126. The actual working size of Wash’s allotment was 160 acres, his 80 acres and 80 acres belonging to his wife and son.
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19 Harwood Hall, Inspection Report, Uintah and Ouray, Utah, 10 August 1909, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, 150.

20 Jasper Pike (b. 1885), interviewed in 1969, noted this breakdown in Ute leadership. He mentioned Uintah leaders Tabby, John Duncan, and David Copperfield, then observed, “Well, at that stage of the game, they was about past having chiefs, you know.” Jasper Pike, Interview, August 1969, Doris Duke Oral History Project, Marriott Library, University of Utah, MS. 417, No. 267, p. 5. See also Anne Milne Smith, Ethnography of the Northern Utes, Papers in Anthropology, No. 17 (Santa Fe, NM, 1974), 124-27.


22 C. C. Early, Farmer, to CIA, 25 May 1912, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 301; George W. Harmes, Stockman, to Jewell D. Martin, Supt., 15 March 1913, in Martin to CIA, 18 October 1913, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O. For Wash’s cattle association see his will of 1911 in Capt. Herbert J. Brees, Agent, to CIA, 12 April 1911, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 351.

23 Jewell D. Martin, Supt., to CIA, 25 March 1913, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O.

24 Jewell D. Martin, Supt., to CIA, 19 July 1913, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 916; Martin to CIA, 18 October 1913, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O. On the continued push-pull of communalism versus individualism in Indian policy on the Ute reservations, see Jorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 216-20.

25 Oscar M. Waddell, Supt. of Uintah-Ouray Boarding School, to W. A. Mercer, Agent, 17 February 1905, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O; Charles L. Davis, Agency Farmer, to CIA, 14 May 1912, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; Jewell D. Martin, Supt., to CIA, 14 August 1912, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; Martin to CIA, 24 June 1913, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; CIA to Martin, 11 August 1913, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63.

26 For information on the Bear Dance (mama'qunikap') see Verner Z. Reed, “The Ute Bear Dance,” American Anthropologist 9 (July 1896): 237-44; Smith, Ethnography of the Northern Utes, 220-27.


28 William Wash to SI, telegram, 23 June 1914, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; Cato Sells, CIA, to William Wash, 24 June 1914, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63;
Jewell D. Martin, Supt., to CIA, telegram, 30 June 1914, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; Martin to CIA, 7 July 1914, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63; Martin to CIA, 4 September 1914, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 63.


George W. Harmes, Stockman, to Jewell D. Martin, Supt., 15 March 1913, in Martin to CIA, 18 October 1913, FARC-D, RG 75, U&O.


Albert H. Kneale, Indian Agent (Caldwell, ID, 1950), 156–58.


William Wash to CIA, 12 May 1917, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126.


E. B. Meritt, Asst. CIA, to William Wash, 18 July 1917, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126.

E. B. Meritt, Asst. CIA, to Albert H. Kneale, Supt., 18 July 1917, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126; Kneale to CIA, 24 July 1917, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126.

William Wash to E. B. Meritt, Asst. CIA, 7 August 1917, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126.


Jim Atwine to Cato Sells, CIA, 29 November 1918, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 126; Dick Wanrodes and Sam Robinson to Charles H. Burke, CIA, 27 Septem-


Kneale, Indian Agent, 313–15.

Fred A. Gross, Supt., to CIA, 24 September 1923, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 916. See also J. B. Wingfield, Supervisor of Livestock, to CIA, 6 July 1923, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 916; Charles H. Burke, CIA, to Wingfield, 5 November 1923, NA, RG 75, GR, CCF, U&O, 916.


Ibid., 4–5.


Fowler, “Local-Level Politics,” 132. See also White’s comments about factionalism for the Choctaws in Roots of Dependency, 64–65.
57 Berkhofer, “Native Americans,” 142.
58 Examples of this are numerous, but see Clifton, Being and Becoming Indian, x–xi, 29–31, and passim; Fowler, “Political Middlemen,” 54–63; White, Roots of Dependency, passim; McFee, “150% Man,” 1097–1101.
59 See McFee, “150% Man,” 1096.