"A Mob of Women" Confront Post-Colonial Republican Politics: How Class, Race, and Partisan Ideology Affected Gendered Political Space in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia

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“A Mob of Women” Confront Post–Colonial Republican Politics
How Class, Race, and Partisan Ideology Affected Gendered Political Space in Nineteenth–Century Southwestern Colombia

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This essay explores why some groups of women in nineteenth-century Colombia were able to engage in public, political action but others were not. Elite conservative women (mostly white) and popular liberal women (mostly black and mulatta) found ways to participate publicly in republican politics, but elite liberal women (mostly white) and some popular conservative women (mostly Indian) were largely absent from the public sphere. I argue that colonial gender roles, elite and popular visions of citizenship, the contest between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, the structure of indigenous communities, and popular liberal women’s access to independent economic resources all helped shape women’s abilities to publicly practice republican politics. Instead of asserting that the rise of republicanism in nineteenth–century Latin America reduced women’s political space, I propose that race, class, and partisan ideologies acted in complex and locally determined ways to both create male political subjects and open or close possibilities for women to forge political discourses and practices for themselves.

In the southwestern Colombian city of Pasto, women representing the Conservative Party sprung a nasty surprise on the police commissioner who had planned to read publicly the new Liberal constitution on 1 September 1853. Instead of finding a welcoming throng to celebrate the nation’s new governing document, as the commissioner and his veteran force of national guardsmen marched through the streets a “mob of women” confronted them with a volley of “insults, sarcasm, water, and stones.”¹ The commissioner was a Liberal, and his new constitution, which guaranteed unrestricted adult male citizenship for the first time in Colombia, was a product of the Liberal triumph over Conservatives in the past elections and civil war.² Wealthy, white male conservatives detested the new constitution’s assertion of equality, under which no titles of birth, nobility, privilege, or class would be recognized, and worried as well over liberals’ perceived anticlericalism.³ Pasto was very conservative, and the city’s elites, ever proud of their heritage and social station, did not appreciate these appointed Liberal officials’ political theatre; however, any disruption of the constitutional ceremony by
conservative men would no doubt have been answered with arrest or force. Elite conservative women seized the public, political sphere in their stead, and if the protestors failed to stop the reading of the Liberals’ constitution by throwing insults, water, and rocks, they at least, literally, put a damper on the festivities.

A few years earlier, women of a very different social position had also stormed into the public sphere a few hundred kilometers north in the town of Cali. On several different nights from 1848 to 1851, poor Afro–Colombian and mestiza women and men entered the city’s commons (called *ejidos*) to destroy fences that *hacendados* (landowners) had erected in an effort to claim the land as their own private property. The commons were one of the few resources that women, especially women who headed their own households, could exploit. Some families had small houses and garden plots on the *ejidos*; many more (over a thousand by one estimate) used the land to pasture their milk cows and other livestock or to cut firewood further up the mountainous slopes, selling the charcoal in the city for what little subsistence it provided. Without these resources, one observer noted that the “unhappy women wood gatherers” would become beggars and be forced to watch their children starve. “Driven by the pang of hunger and their conscience calmed by the tears of their children demanding sustenance,” the women entered the commons and with “iron and fire” destroyed the new fences, re-claiming the fields for their families from the *hacendados*. The poor men who participated in these raids had recently become popular allies to the Liberal Party (whose elite members justified the fence destruction), supporting the party as soldiers in the civil war against political conservatives that broke out in 1851. The women associated with these poor, liberal men as wives, lovers, sisters, mothers, daughters, fellow workers, and neighbors, whom I call popular liberal women, were not recognized as allies by elite liberals, but they still acted in concert with popular liberal men and would do so in the future to support the Liberal Party. The women were so different from their counterparts in Pasto—black, mulatta, and mestiza instead of white, and poor instead of rich—nevertheless, both popular liberal women and elite conservative women found ways to participate publicly in Colombia’s post-colonial republican politics. Not all women found such ways to enter the public sphere. In contrast to elite conservatives and popular liberals, elite liberal women and many popular conservative women generally were excluded from politics and public voice.

The general consensus among historians of gender is that independence from Spain and the emergence of republicanism did little to increase Latin American women’s status, political rights, or presence in the public sphere during most of the nineteenth century, in some ways similar to Linda Kerber’s analysis of the American Revolution and early U.S. Republic.
breaking of the colonial order signified no disruption in the patriarchal family/political relationship; if anything, postcolonial republicanism may have decreased women’s roles in society and politics. Sarah Chambers has argued that independence and liberal republicanism actually reduced women’s access to the public sphere, as public opinion was now the result of rational debate by male citizens, with women’s former colonial role in forming opinion now denigrated as mere gossip. Elizabeth Dore entitled her essay on women and the nineteenth century “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.” Most would agree with theorists of French history that the exclusion of women from the republican public sphere “was not incidental but central to its incarnation.” Yet did all women experience post–colonial republicanism the same way? May we assume that gender alone determined women’s public and political lives? I will argue that the race, class, and party orientation of women vastly affected their experience of republican politics as well as their access to or exclusion from the public sphere. Beyond the more frequently studied courtroom where family dramas played out for those of all classes, some, but not all, women were able to engage directly in political activity that men assumed they had reserved for themselves. Of course, politics ranged much beyond the public sphere; however, for this article, I wish to concentrate on public, political actions that were recognized as such in the nineteenth century, actions explicitly directed toward influencing the state or larger society beyond the family or community level (which while vitally important, and certainly “political,” are of a different nature than public action). Elite conservative women (mostly white and well-to-do) and popular liberal women (mostly black, mulatta, or mestiza and poor) had the most presence in southwestern Colombia’s public, political world, although for vastly different reasons. Meanwhile, elite liberal women (mostly white and well-to-do) and popular conservative indigenous women (mostly poor) found little space, again due to strikingly distinct reasons.

Elite Women

Since I argue that political affiliation was key to understanding variances in women’s ability to practice politics, this study will focus on the second half of the nineteenth century, after the Liberal and Conservative Parties emerged in Colombia. The parties competed for power via elections in a republican political system that was also punctuated by numerous civil wars (1851, 1854, 1860–1863, 1876–1877, 1879, and 1885). In southwestern Colombia, conservatives had long controlled both the institutions of power and the region’s economic base of plantations, haciendas, and some mining. While liberals tended to be less well–established economically and socially,
many were professionals and artisans, and some liberal families were quite powerful and wealthy. The parties agreed philosophically on many issues, but differed sharply on the role of the Catholic Church in public life, the importance of maintaining strict social control over the poor, slavery, the meanings of citizenship, and, most importantly, who would be citizens in the new republic.\textsuperscript{15} During this period, it is elite women with affinity for the Conservative Party who most appear in the archive as political actors in the Cauca region (the southwest of Colombia).\textsuperscript{16}

One way wealthy conservative women could enter the public sphere in the republican era was by using their traditional public roles from the colonial period concerning charity and religion, which their powerful families dominated. Elite conservative women led charitable efforts in the region, distributing food and clothing to the needy, usually tightly linked with religious ceremonies, and founding schools for girls.\textsuperscript{17} Conservative men approved of women’s work in charity, as they believed such work, tied to religion, helped the poor accept their place in society.\textsuperscript{18} Conservative women also saw the founding of schools as a political act. In the run-up to the 1876–1877 civil war, the conservative women of the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus helped found religious schools for girls, so the children would not have to attend secular state schools (secular schooling being one of the sparks that started the war). The society also provided charity to the needy, through their Hospital de Caridad.\textsuperscript{19} While the Conservative Party controlled the national state in 1858, some of the most powerful women of Popayán wrote a petition requesting funds for a girls’ school, which would benefit “the civilization of woman and the cause of your compatriots.”\textsuperscript{20}

The increasingly bitter divide between the Conservative and Liberal Parties over the role of the Church gave elite conservative women the most political space. Religion was a key definer of conservative and female identity, as expressed in a huge petition from Bogotá protesting attacks on the Church by the Liberal state, in which the female writers argued that religion defined the role of women.\textsuperscript{21} The Liberal Party’s assumption of power in 1849, and its expulsion of the Jesuits from Colombia the next year gave elite conservative women a reason to act. Upon the announcement of the decree in Popayán, four women wrote a letter of protest concerning the Liberals’ action and expressed the city’s appreciation for the Jesuits; over a thousand people quickly signed. Religion allowed elite conservative women not just to enter the political sphere as followers of husbands or fathers, but also to lead their male relatives in action.\textsuperscript{22} The petitions, often stretching page after page, organized by elite conservative women protesting the Liberal government’s attacks on the Jesuits or church property attracted more signatories than any other type of petitions in the Cauca region.\textsuperscript{23} Wealthy mothers in Pasto also refused to allow their children to be baptized by liberal priests.\textsuperscript{24}
During the aforementioned 1876–1877 civil war, a war fought largely over religious issues, liberals had arrested a priest who was participating in the conservative rebellion and brought him to the state capital, Popayán (a traditionally conservative city nestled in the mountains). Almost immediately, two crowds gathered in protest: one made up of the bishop and priests of the city, and the other composed of a large crowd of women and children. The women were “armed with revolvers, daggers, and even forks.” A Liberal official decried the “fanaticism” of the women, who hoped to incite the local militia into rebellion over the priest’s arrest. The soldiers, however, remained loyal and eventually dispersed both groups of protestors. Liberals only saw the women’s actions as zealotry and contrasted the irrational action of the women with the steady response of the male militia, identified as “citizens.” Of course, the women were defending the Church, but they were also criticizing liberal policies as well as playing their own part in the civil war, if not as soldiers, then as demonstrators in support of their ideas and male relatives at war. Religion and charity, while seen as traditional, allowed elite conservative women to enter the novel realm of republican politics.

With men away fighting or unable to act due to wartime restrictions, periods of warfare especially allowed elite conservative women much public space. During the 1854 civil war, “the noble matrons and the fair sex in general of Cali” welcomed the conservative military force that retook the city from the liberals, offering them numerous supplies due to their “ardent patriotism.” During the 1860–1863 civil war, María Jesús Barona, a member of one of Cali’s more powerful and wealthy conservative families, was accused of enticing liberal troops to desert by offering them clothing and money. When a rumor of conservative success in the same war spread north, a Liberal official had to arrest an elite conservative woman who “had started to buy rifles and ammunition” to support the war in Cartago. Other conservative women founded a military hospital.

Finally, elections would seem to be the political space most closed to women, as they were not citizens and could not vote regardless of their race or class. Yet elite conservative women were active campaigners for their party. Conservative men certainly assumed their female relations followed politics, since they used women’s interest in a candidate as a mark of his broad support. A liberal paper noted that some women “had sworn under oath to attend the primary elections of 1852 with their daggers, pointed and sharp, to kill any liberal who went to vote.” Conservative men approved of conservative women’s campaigning, noting the success these women were having in working towards the upcoming elections.

An even more important role these women played was in countering liberal efforts to mobilize the lower–class population in political clubs called
Democratic Societies. The Democratic Societies were a great liberal success, their poor members, many Afro–Colombian, becoming the backbone of the Liberal Party. In the early 1850s, conservative men were stunned by this turn of events, and seemed unsure how to act, as they had no desire to mobilize the poor, whom they believed should refrain from politics. It was conservative women who first began organizing societies for themselves to counter the Liberal Party’s successful Democratic Societies; the women’s example would be followed by elite conservative men, although the male societies seemed less active or threatening. This activity bothered liberals so much that the Liberal governor of the province apparently threatened to dissolve the women’s society. Conservative men were impressed with the women’s organizing, crediting the females’ society with forcing Pasto’s Democratic Society to stop meeting, although the archival record is unclear how they did this. As late as 1879 while conservatives prepared for yet another civil war to try to displace the dominant Liberal Party, it was not the men who organized themselves first into political clubs in small towns, but rather the women. The aim of the women was to found a school for girls, a profoundly political act with the debates over religious versus secular education raging that served as an organizing base for the civil war to come, as it had in the 1876–1877 war.

Elite conservative women used traditional roles as charitable providers, pious churchgoers, or social doyennes to enter republican politics. Conservative women socially enjoyed much power given the prestige of their families and used this position to snub Liberal officials by refusing to attend their dances. These women also created new roles for themselves by participating in elections, civil wars, and founding republican political clubs; therefore, we cannot only ascribe their success at entering the public sphere to their appropriation of colonial roles. Conservative women also managed to exert influence via new republican political institutions and processes.

The success of elite conservative women in entering the political realm stands in sharp contrast to elite liberal women, who only make sporadic appearances in the public record. Charity was less of an option, as conservative families controlled most of the region’s charitable institutions. In one of very few recorded public appearances, “seven liberal ladies” placed garlands of flowers over the heads of the newly freed in a ceremony that celebrated the manumission of slaves (and linked that manumission to the Liberal Party). As we will see below, elite liberal women had as much interest in politics as their conservative counterparts, yet they were unable to publicly act on their political ideas. To understand this curious discrepancy, we have to look at men’s gendered visions of politics as filtered through partisan ideology.
In general, it seems conservative men were more comfortable than liberal men with women’s participation in the public sphere. Liberals vociferously attacked conservative women, mocking them as “old, ugly matrons” and claiming they were controlled by the Church. Liberals also claimed that women really did not support republicanism but secretly wanted monarchy, thus hoping to delegitimize their actions within a republican system. Liberals celebrated their own male popular liberals entering politics by joining the Democratic Societies, and they mocked conservatives’ fear of the “equality” preached in the clubs. Yet these same liberals denigrated conservative efforts to form their own political club, called the “Society of Baby Jesus,” as their club was only made up of “noble and the most important” women.

Liberals also lamented that women would be corrupted by entering politics. A liberal paper chastised conservatives for allowing women to enter political clubs, thereby “degrading them.” Another paper warned women to stay in their homes: “Your mission is the domestic life, the care of your husbands and children. Look, mothers [madres de familia] while you leave your homes to occupy yourselves in political conquests, perhaps your daughters, those delicate little flowers, will hear the voice of the seducer.” Thus, women’s abandonment of the private sphere and their role as republican mothers would only lead to the sexual corruption of their charges. Worse, claimed liberals, since women would not be able to convince men through reason and argument, they would have to rely on money and feminine wiles to have success in the political sphere. This argument formed the core of the elite liberal position—women lacked rationality, therefore they could not be citizens, and thus they had no role in politics, especially partisan politics (as historian Melanie Gustafson has shown for the nineteenth-century United States, women’s entry in partisan politics was particularly worrisome). If they still sought a role, it would only lead to the corruption of their daughters, themselves, and politics as a whole, since women would have to rely on sex, instead of reason—an argument shared by republican societies across the Americas.

It is not that conservatives were automatically comfortable with the increased role of women around mid-century, since it seemed part of a general opening of political roles to include the previously excluded, which conservatives deplored. One conservative newspaper worried about the increasing politicization of society, particularly the entrance of the lower classes into the public sphere, which was also beginning to involve elite women: “Even the fair sex . . . from whose lips there should not pass anything but words of consolation, peace, and reconciliation, very recently, with few exceptions, has occupied itself in politics, so intensely, with such vehemence.” While this worried conservatives of “the strong sex” and while the paper aggres-
sively condemned political action by popular liberal men, it nevertheless supported this novel and disquieting action by elite conservative women: “However, we do not want one to believe that we condemn the interest that many women take in encouraging a friend, a brother, a son, a husband to save their country.” 49 Of course, the paper hoped to position this political action in the context of supporting patriarchal figures in women’s lives, yet conservative men’s view of women’s participation in politics sharply contrasted with that of liberal men.

Elite conservative men were not so tolerant of elite liberal women, for even if they made their presence felt less frequently on the public stage, they still took a fervent interest in politics. During the 1860–1863 civil war, a conservative paper chastised liberal women for supporting a party whose program promoted “the degradation of women, the persecution of the Catholic faith and the disrespect of Christian morals.” The paper described such liberal women as liable “to commit more crimes against society than the bandit” and “bastardizing their angelic mission of peace and charity,” with the result that they would eventually be abandoned by their friends and relatives to be alone in society. 50 It is significant that the paper notes no action taken by these liberal women, save an intense interest in the news of the day. The paper described such women as desperate to hear the latest word on the civil war and able to recite verbatim the proclamations of their favorite politicians. Surely the paper would have eagerly reported if these liberal women had taken to the streets demonstrating or insulting conservative men, yet the writer described no such action by these women. As vociferously as the paper denounced liberal women, it did not oppose all women in politics: “We do not censure the woman who adopts a political opinion that agrees with her sex, her heart and her mission. Thus, not only do we not condemn the conduct of conservative women, but, rather, we applaud it and celebrate it for its dignity and good judgment. In addition, if you think about it, conservative women have not embraced any political party; they have not done more than follow their natural inclination of their makeup, defending what their sex has always defended, to wit, their religion, their honor, their dignity.” 51 As in the nineteenth–century United States, men could celebrate women’s public activity as long as such activity was cast as fulfilling women’s natural roles. 52

How could conservative women participate in politics and not liberal women? Religion and visions of citizenship are both key. Women had always had a public role in religious rituals and charity since colonial times. Conservative women had entered politics to defend the Church and the family, by protesting against the Liberal Party’s support of civil marriage—a challenge to the institution of matrimony that united religion and family life. As long as women were engaged in activities involving religion, char-
ity, and the family, they could promote these traditional concerns in the nontraditional sphere of party politics. Of course, while conservative men recognized “conservative women” and supported and even celebrated their actions, in the quotes above we see how they hoped to classify such action as natural, as opposed to being political. Since conservatives controlled most charitable institutions, liberal women could not pursue that path to political involvement; since liberals sought to decrease the role of religion in society, liberal women could hardly use religion as a means to enter politics.

Perhaps even more important were conservatives’ and liberals’ visions of citizenship that determined who had a right and duty to practice politics. Liberal thought allowed political participation for all citizens. Poor men had already asserted that when they lacked legal citizenship (such as before the Constitution of 1853), they could seize effective citizenship through political action, which liberals had to accept given their support for supposed universal citizenship. Political participation, therefore, made the citizen and not vice versa. This seemed to open the door to women, which liberals promptly tried to shut by excluding women from politics. Liberal schools regularly offered classes on “the rights and duties of citizens” to boys but only very rarely to girls. While the Liberal Party was in power, the new election code stipulated that any votes “given in favor of women” would be considered null and void, raising the question if there had been votes for women in previous elections. While liberals did seek to allow civil marriage and divorce, this did not mean they were prepared to allow female citizenship or fundamentally alter male prerogatives as patriarchs. The liberals’ 1863 constitution not only formally excluded women from citizenship, but also barred them from being “active members” of the state, thus removing them from the public sphere. Liberals could not allow women any political participation, as claiming political space would make them citizens; they justified this exclusion, as we saw above, by claiming women lacked rationality and independence.

That the new republican politics broadened subaltern men’s role in public life was disconcerting enough. Women’s participation threatened the viability of the whole republican system in two ways. First, it made republicanism simply seem too frightening and strange. Second, by making women equal, it removed them from the control of their husbands and fathers, thus eroding the base of the citizen as a padre de familia. Most male republicans feared disruption of the family, from which the male citizen sprang, and therefore, constructed their citizenship by excluding women. Crimes of adultery and family abandonment were often punished with harsher penalties (prison, fines, and even exile), including loss of “political rights” for men, than were crimes of assault or robbery. Of course, men, at least at times, received less harsh punishments than women for adultery,
who could suffer public flogging.\textsuperscript{61} A congressional report on divorce noted that marriage was the difference between “civilization and barbarism.” For republican males, “domestic order [is the] fundamental base of public order.”\textsuperscript{62} Both liberals and conservatives at best saw women’s place as republican mothers, educating future male citizens, which as other scholars have shown isolated women from the republican public sphere.\textsuperscript{63} We cannot underestimate how revolutionary the republican experiment was, but what made such innovation possible was the security of the family and that men would rule over women.

Conservative men had become comfortable with conservative women participating in politics, but only because their actions did not threaten to change the political system. By assuming that women’s actions were natural, men were able to reassure themselves that women were not seeking more political power, especially citizenship. Liberalism, however, only allowed citizens to participate in politics, so it had to exclude women unless it could accept them as equals (which did begin to happen later in the century). Conservatism, not quite so bound, saw room for certain forms of participation for all members of society. Since conservatives imagined society as inherently unequal, women could be allowed to participate in certain ways, as it in no way gave them a claim of equal standing with men. It was not that conservatives thought differently than liberals regarding women’s fitness as citizens. It was simply that for them women’s political participation was not a claim on citizenship. For conservatives, citizenship was still an inherited, not an earned, right, and women’s actions at that time seemed not to pose a threat but rather to provide a valuable weapon against liberal power.\textsuperscript{64} Ironically, liberals’ more expansive vision of citizenship, which could include illiterate ex–slave tenant farmers, could not accept any public political action by women.

**Popular Women**

If elite male liberals’ conception of citizenship and religion excluded wealthy, white liberal women, how then did poor, black, mulatta, and mestiza popular liberal women manage to enter the public sphere? They mostly did so through a political repertoire of direct actions in the supposedly male–dominated “street,” including participation in demonstrations or riots, or soldiering in war. Popular liberal women regularly participated in demonstrations (perhaps called riots by the authorities) in Cali, marching alongside men to rally support for Liberal Party candidates, to denounce abuses such as the aguardiente (cane liquor) monopoly, or to simply show the force of the Democratic Societies.\textsuperscript{65} They also had recourse to petitions, although most often, as with demonstrations or riots, they did so in concert
with popular liberal men. They could act in the public sphere independently of men as well, unlike poor Indian women, whose villages developed a vision of popular conservatism in order to protect their communal landholding and governance from liberal individualism. Popular liberal women’s relative independence from male control, compared to elite liberal women and popular conservative women, was the key factor that allowed them to enter the public sphere.

Just like elite conservative women, popular liberal women also participated in warfare or revolts, not through provisioning male troops or establishing hospitals, but often as agents on the field of battle. In the early 1850s, popular liberals went beyond knocking over fences, as we saw in the opening vignettes, to physically attacking conservatives and their haciendas. While men mostly participated in these invasions, women did as well, and some were arrested from time to time. During the 1854 civil war, women were held as spies against the Conservative government, accused of hiding soldiers in their houses, and after the war, they were arrested for joining bandit gangs (what conservatives called “liberal guerrillas”). Following the war, in one case eleven women abetted the jailbreak of liberal rebels (some identified as “black”) held by the Conservative state government. In 1856, women were accused of being spies and smuggling arms to the popular, liberal, Afro–Colombian guerrilla leader Manuel María Victoria. In the 1860–1863 civil war, a Liberal official in a region with much popular liberal support noted that “even the women want to take up arms in defense of the government.” Lower–class women ran a great risk, as conservatives treated poor prisoners, especially those of African descent, harshly. Liberals accused conservatives of forcing “poor black women,” charged with supporting popular liberal bands, to flee their homes by foot and “almost naked.” Worse, conservatives tortured “poor women” by hanging them in the air upside down by their ankles; such brutality “offended decency and morality.”

Perhaps during the sack of Cali in the 1876–1877 conflict, popular liberal women participated in public politics more dramatically than they ever had before. Conservatives seized Cali in a surprise uprising. Popular liberals hurried to retake the city, urged on by their female relations: “Women encouraged their husbands and brothers to the battle, mothers returned to the campaign their deserter children.” The women not only cheered on their compatriots, but also accompanied them, retaking the city for the liberals and participating in the looting of conservatives’ property.

While in some ways action during war was the most transgressive, popular liberal women most regularly claimed the public sphere in disputes over aguardiente; many poor women, especially those of African descent, often distilled and sold liquor. Taverns were an important site of subaltern
political activity, where men and women (especially the owners/barkeeps) discussed the events of the day and where visions of popular liberalism for both men and women developed. In the 1880s, a traveler noted the local pulpería (tavern), run by a woman, was a center of discussion and gossip. Of course, taverns also gave women an important economic resource they sought to defend. Some “miserable women” petitioned the state to lower taxes on aguardiente, noting that only poor people engaged in such commerce, transporting “four or six bottles” to Cali, which only earned two or three pesos a month once peddled. Women alone signed this petition.

Disputes over aguardiente often led women into confrontations with authorities who hoped to tax or limit such entrepreneurship. In the village of La Cruz, “an immense mob of men and women” confronted the mayor who was trying to stop contraband liquor sales. While the official described a mob, another way of thinking about the activity of these poor men and women would be a demonstration, designed to convince more senior authorities of the injustice of the local liquor monopoly. Many inhabitants of La Cruz defended the liquor producers as “wretched people,” trying to provide food for their children, and lamented the violent actions of the monopoly holders against “a poor and defenseless woman” who needed to sell liquor to survive. Similarly, an anonymous and threatening letter sent to the Conservative Party leader Sergio Arboleda, accused him of “taking away from poor women the only industry that they work in order to survive” when he tried to keep them from producing aguardiente as he held monopoly privileges. The writers warned, “It is better to steal 500,000 or more pesos from the government than to make war on women.” Popular liberal men and women often worked together to ensure the rights—be they to land, industry, or liberty—that they needed to survive. When it came time, however, to legally address the state and Liberal Party via petitions—as opposed to active demonstrations—women were almost always excluded since they were not citizens. It was popular liberal men in the Democratic Societies who demanded the state allow freedom to sell aguardiente, “the only industry of our women.” Elite liberals often accepted these appeals, since they philosophically opposed monopolies on liquor production and sale as a block on freedom of industry and since Conservatives traditionally had controlled said monopolies.

In spite of the various ways popular liberal women entered the political sphere, they generally could not claim the vital mantle of citizenship, with a few notable exceptions. In a petition signed by eight women to the municipal government, although written by a man, the undersigned described themselves as “citizens [ciudadanas] of Colombia.” The women sold cane liquor off Cali’s main square and were protesting a new tax on their establishments, which they described as “very poor.” They argued
they should not be taxed as they had no capital beyond a few bottles of liquor and some tobacco, and because “they have suffered exile and a thousand persecutions for their loyalty to the noble cause of Liberty.”

While we cannot be sure of the social class or even political sympathies of the women, that they sold aguardiente (a profession dominated in Cali by poor women, especially those of African descent) and used a language designed to appeal to liberals, suggest they were popular liberals (male popular liberals—many of African descent—often defended the rights of women to sell liquor in their Democratic Societies, as we have seen). That the women could hire a lawyer or at least a scribe and that they rented rather prominent taverns, which, even if they were still barkeeps, suggest perhaps a slightly higher class. While their personal circumstances are unclear, these women’s efforts reveal how popular liberal women appropriated the language of citizenship and liberty from the popular liberal men who drank in their bars. Certainly, as we have seen, popular liberal women were the most active participants in politics of all lower–class women in the region. It would have been tempting for them, especially given the sacrifices made by all popular liberals in the 1860–1863 civil war, to assert claims on the state due to their status as citizens. This strategy would not succeed in general—popular liberal women, unlike the same class of men, were not successful in claiming citizenship—although these eight women did succeed in having the liquor tax overturned!

A petition such as this was very rare. More common was one signed by poor women and men in Cali complaining about the city closing a stream they used for water. Their argument centers not on rights to the water but on a claim of custom going back to the founding of the city. By looking back to the past, and not asserting a political right as citizens, women could play a role denied them in the more common petitions from Cali’s male poor, which demanded action based on their rights as citizens and defenders of the Liberal Party. Other petitions from women focused on family relationships as a justification for their raised voices. A liberal paper printed a petition asking for pensions for “widows, sisters and mothers of Caucano soldiers, sacrificed in defense of the rights of the pueblo.” Popular liberal women, who, while excluded from joining the Democratic Societies, could petition the influential Democráticas to represent them—as did sixteen women who wrote to the president of Cali’s Democratic Society to ask him to intercede with the government on their behalf to secure the pensions owed to them since their husbands’ deaths in fighting for the Liberal Party in the past civil wars. These women’s political action had to be filtered, however, first through their relationship to liberal men (even if these men were dead) and through the male, if popular liberal, Democratic Society. The Liberal Party’s norms of political action were denied to them, as they were not
recognized as citizens. In general, all women of this time period had to channel their political actions and demands around issues of the general or familial good or through the discourses of the two political parties; we do not yet see openly feminist movements demanding women’s rights, which tended not to emerge in Latin America until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.  

When female aguardiente producers petitioned the Liberal government without the support of popular liberal men in the Democratic Societies, their petition was soundly rejected by the state (although liberals had often supported similar petitions by men on behalf of women). Yet if their cause could be linked to popular liberal men, then they had a greater chance of success. A Liberal Party legislator demanded the repeal of a law taxing aguardiente, as it hurt “poor women,” especially since they bore “the honorable titles of mothers, sisters, and wives of those innumerable patriots who without any pretensions to personal gain came generously offering their blood on the sacred altar of Liberty and the Republic since 1810.” Women deserved recompense and political consideration due to the sacrifices made by their male relatives to the nation and especially to the Liberal Party. 

As a whole, the discourse of popular liberalism still envisioned a male political subject. Unlike elite conservatives who saw citizenship as based on social status and elite liberals who saw it as a right conditioned by rationality, for male popular liberals service to the state and party created the good citizen, and women could rarely perform such services. Women legally were not citizens and therefore could not support the Party with votes. Possibly more important from the standpoint of popular liberalism, men shed their blood in wars against the rich, the conservative, and the otherwise bad citizens. Thus, the armed citizen became central to popular liberals as it gave them a new public identity that elite liberals recognized. Although women did play a role in wars, as we saw above, it was informal—they were not officially recognized as soldiers. By making the armed citizen so important to popular liberal political identity, men excluded women from the equality they themselves held so dear. That said, women ran the taverns where popular liberals met and talked politics, participated in protesting the aguardiente monopolies, and tore down fences in the ejidos alongside men. Nonetheless, they remained ideologically excluded from the liberal conception of politics and public life. 

While popular liberal women’s relation with the ideas of citizenship limited their ultimate inclusion, they still managed a much more active role in the public sphere than some other female subalterns in the region, namely Indians. In the state archive, among hundreds of petitions sent by Indians, I only found one that included female signatories, concerning the return of three Indians jailed for perjury so they could continue their
work as teachers. Unlike popular liberal women who appear in public, in political space that is constantly in the historical record, Indian women are almost entirely absent. This is not to say that poor Indian women had no interest in politics or played no internal role in their communities’ political decisions—they certainly did and this familial or community political action was no doubt vital. Yet they could not enter the public, political sphere since they had to act through their patriarchal villages.

Indian men employed a discourse of patriarchal authority to justify their role as leaders of their communities and citizens with a right to place demands on the state and nation. The construction of this patriarchal authority was based on two intertwined institutions: communal landholding (called resguardos) and the family. Indian officials, acting through the cabildos pequeños (councils chosen or elected by villages) of Túquerres and Ipiales, who represented all of the parcialidades (subdivisions of a resguardo usually representing a village) of the area, explicitly linked their resguardos with family life: “Communal property in our class is not prejudicial, but, rather, advantageous, because by conserving it, one also conserves our domestic relations, so that there never will appear among us the horrible monster of discord.”

Like the father of the individual family, the cabildo pequeño assumed patriarchal power over the “family” of the Indian community as a whole. A coalition of Indians explained the link between patriarchy and their resguardos in a metaphor, “Our parcialidades, Honorable Deputies, are like a family that lives under one father.” Patriarchal power and political subjectivity were tied together. When the village of Guachavéz lost its status as a parish, and therefore its men lost leadership positions, the moral life of the village declined. Before their power was taken away, they noted that “the habits of disorder and libertinism, that are so common in places where the immediate weight of authority is not felt, became habits of obedience, all the inhabitants respecting the lowliest constable as much as the ultimate local authority.” Male indigenous leaders used a language of domestic harmony through family life to both maintain consensus in villages with internal divisions and to claim political legitimacy in the public sphere. These men warned of the consequences if they lost their positions: “Without the authority of their governors, their town councilors [regidores], and their mayors [alcaldes] who incessantly and daily keep vigil over each house, each family, each individual Indian, they would lose themselves in their passions, and very soon, the customary links of union, order, and obedience broken, they would commit the most atrocious crimes.” Indigenous leaders linked their ability to control and regulate the moral and family life of their villages—to be, in other words, wise, powerful, and controlling fathers—to their rights to enter the political sphere as representatives of their communities.
Yet did male popular liberals not share similar gendered visions of citizenship? Their elite allies certainly did. Popular liberals, however, did not imagine citizenship as constructed on the backs of the family. Popular liberals mentioned families much less in their discourse than did indigenous villagers. The good citizen did not have to be married and no patriarchal figure controlled their communities as in Indian villages. Instead, as we saw above, the armed citizen, serving the nation and party, earned citizenship for popular liberals. This too was gendered, even if in a very distinct way that nevertheless excluded women. However, the lack of male family control, reflected in the distinct gendered visions of citizenship, did allow popular liberal women much more political space than their indigenous counterparts.

Popular liberal men seemed much less able to exercise control over popular liberal women than indigenous officers. Since most popular liberals did not own land (the commons were not individual property) or not enough to support a family, male land ownership did not lend itself to gender control. Also, some Afro–Colombian women had an independent economic resource in small–scale liquor production and sale, a resource popular liberal men were more than willing to defend. Unlike the constant legal battles in which Indians engaged to protect their land, wherein women did not play a public role, popular liberal women did act with men to try to gain access to landholding, as we saw most powerfully with the destruction of fences in Cali’s ejido. They also signed petitions with men, again something largely unseen with Indians. In Cali, women not only destroyed fences to secure the commons, but entered the legal realm as well, signing demands for land in the ejido along with men.101 In the coastal region of San Juan, popular liberal women signed a petition with men claiming land rights; they described themselves as some “farmers desiring work, but without land” who had occupied some uncultivated land and now wanted title. Since popular liberal women were more likely than indigenous women to head households, and own or at least manage commons land, they would have been in a position to include themselves in petitions for land rights.102

Finally, although the evidence is far from conclusive, on the city commons that popular liberals did exploit, women seemed to control a good amount of the land, often heading their own households. In 1866, a partial census of Cali’s ejido listed 166 plots of land. Of these, single women (or at least no male relation listed) controlled seventy–four of the plots (44 percent) and most women had children. Only twenty–six two–parent households were listed (16 percent). The remaining plots were occupied by single men or multiple users (40 percent). Other fragmentary evidence of the ejido does not show women controlling as much land, but they are
represented as heading farming households with no male present. These independent women faced intense pressure, including from elite families, especially conservatives, who claimed the women’s small farms were frequented by “drinkers and vagabonds,” and whose progeny should be removed to “honorable homes in order to prevent the corruption of these poor children.”

While women in indigenous villages running their own farms were seen as a deviation from the ideal, their actions were usually the result of being widowed. Around Cali, female–headed households seemed to be much more the norm, and thus the family ideal, and the patriarchal male citizen seemed less powerful. Popular liberal women had much more independence than other subaltern women and correspondingly participated more overtly and regularly in the region’s politics.

**Gender and Republican Political Culture**

In spite of the formal exclusion of women from the political system, gender affected all aspects of nineteenth–century republican politics. This article has focused on how women of different social standings and ideological camps managed or failed to enter the public, political sphere, in which they were supposed to play no direct role. Instead of assuming a unity of experience for women, the archive reveals that possibilities varied greatly depending on class, race, and whether one was liberal or conservative. Class was vitally important: Colombia, with such a weak middle class in the nineteenth century, demands that the scholar, as historian Paula Baker has suggested is necessary, move beyond a study of middle–class women. By doing so, however, one does not find “a distinct nineteenth–century women’s political culture” as Baker did for middle–class women in the United States, but rather a complex multiplicity of political cultures created by women of different classes, races, and political parties, influencing and influenced by male political culture. Perhaps not surprisingly, elite women, whose husbands, brothers, and sons controlled the two political parties, had great advantages for entering the political realm; however, not all elite women were able to do so. Liberals’ vision of citizenship as the ultimate political identity prevented women from playing much of a role, since they were not citizens. Because conservatives saw citizenship as naturally closed to most people, including women, female participation in politics was more tolerable, perhaps even welcome, especially if oriented around traditional, colonial religious or charitable space women had long claimed as their own. Conservative women made impressive use of this political opening, often acting well ahead of male relatives in responding to the Liberal Party’s initiatives.
It would seem that lower-class women, with so few resources, would have fewer public roles, but popular liberal women belied that assumption by demonstrating, fighting, rioting, and petitioning alongside, or even independently of, men. Again, however, not all lower-class women had the same options. Indians’ distinct communities had specific gendered constructions of male political identity, which acted to limit women’s public participation in politics. Here party ideology seems less important. Indians mostly supported the Conservative Party in the 1850s, but by the 1860s were generally not tightly allied with either party.

What seems key is that indigenous villages had an organizational structure and discursive ideology dominated by the male village officer. Popular liberals did not tend to control their own independent villages and thus, had no organizations that men dominated. Popular liberal women had more control over resources, be it land in the commons or liquor production, thus giving them some independence from patriarchal power—something elite liberal women lacked. Nevertheless, party ideology did play a role here, as popular liberals’ construction of the armed citizen limited the public role popular liberal women could play.

Just as scholars can no longer understand nineteenth-century political history without reference to subalterns, they can also no longer ignore gender or just state that women were excluded from politics. Likewise, we must not just leave the story as one of a simplistic all-encompassing patriarchy that underwrote the male political subject. Gender interacted with race, class, and partisan ideologies in complex and locally determined ways to both create male political subjects and open or close possibilities for women to forge political discourses and practices for themselves.

Notes

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1 All translations are by author. Nineteenth-century orthography has not been altered in the notes. Report of Juan Antonio Arturo, Governor of Pasto, to the Provincial Legislature, Pasto, 20 October 1853, Archivo Muerto, paquete 54, legajo 26, Archivo Central del Cauca, Popayán, Colombia, hereafter ACC. The elite class of these women is revealed by the debates on their activities between liberals and conservatives, presented below.
Given that political parties in nineteenth–century Colombia were very amorphous affairs, it is very difficult to determine who was actually a party member or not. This is even more difficult concerning women or the lower class. Therefore, unless actually referring to the Liberal or Conservative Party or an official of the state (controlled by one of those parties), when referencing the political sympathies of any particular person or social group, I will simply label them “liberal” or “conservative.”


While there has been less work done on women’s access to public, political space, much work has been done on how class and race affected gender in the fields of law, labor, and family. See Dore and Molyneux, eds., *Hidden Histories*; Dore, “One Step,” 20. Yet class is surprisingly ignored in such classic texts of gender and republicanism as Mary P. Ryan, *Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).


*Los Principios* (Cali, Colombia), 31 March 1876 and 10 October 1873; Directory of the “Sociedad de educacion para las niñas del sur,” Archivo Muerto, paquete 62, legajo 43, ACC; The Director, Rafaela Urrutía, and Members of the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesuś to the Municipal Council, Popayán, 8 January 1876, Archivo...

Residents of Cali to Members of the Municipal Council, Cali, 9 December 1884, Tomo 164, p. 394, Archivo Histórico Municipal de Cali, Archivo del Concejo Municipal, Cali, Colombia, hereafter AHMC.

Valencia Llano, Mujeres, 180–82; Los Principios (Cali, Colombia), 18 February 1876, 31 March 1876.

Matilde Pombo de Arboleda and 36 other women to Senators and Representatives, Popayán, 28 February 1858, Cámara, Proyectos de Ley I, p. 75, Archivo del Congreso, Bogotá, Colombia, hereafter AC.

Ladies of Bogotá to Senators and Representatives, Bogotá, 6 March 1867, Cámara, Solicitudes X, p. 72, AC.

Antonio Olano, Opúsculo sobre la expulsion de los Jesuitas (Popayán, Colombia: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1850), 1. Obviously, the petition was written by elite women, but some of the more respected poor would have participated, albeit only in a more subservient role as signatories.

The undersigned residents of Pasto to Senators and Representatives [6 pages of women’s names, all seemingly signed in their own hand], Pasto, 11 March 1864, Senado, Solicitudes VIII, p. 265, AC.

Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 12 December 1850, Fondo Arboleda, document 1505, ACC.

Manuel Sarria to Commander in Chief of the Army of the Cauca, Popayán, 19 July 1876, Sección República, Fondo Libros Manuscritos y Leyes Originales, Tomo 195, p. 10, AGN.

Valencia Llano, Mujeres, 141–56; also see Arrom, The Women of Mexico City, 32–38.

Carlos Holguín, Noticia histórica del origen, formacion i campaña de la columna Torres (Cali, Colombia: Imprenta de Velasco, 1854), 20.

Testimony of Matias Antonio Gutiérrez, Cali, 7 May 1860, Tomo 149, p. 286, AHC. For the Barona family, see José Escorcia, Sociedad y economía en el Valle del Cauca, Tomo 3 (Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1983), 101–2, 109, 119, 127.

Governor of Quindío Province to Secretary of Government, Cartago, 8 December 1862, Archivo Muerto, paquete 83, legajo 16, ACC.

Military Hospital Administration of Cali, Cali, 22 October 1861, Fondo Arboleda, document 580, p. 16, ACC.
Vicente Javier Arboleda to Tomás Mosquera, Popayán, 30 May 1855, Sala de Manuscritos, MSS 558, Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá, Colombia.

*El Cernícalo* (Popayán, Colombia), 22 August 1850.

Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 3 August 1850, Fondo Arboleda, document 1505, ACC.

Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 1 November 1850, Fondo Arboleda, document 1505, ACC. For conservative men’s reluctance to found such societies, see Julio Arboleda to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 7 January 1849, Sala Mosquera, document 26,383, ACC; Vicente Cárdenas to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 10 January 1849, Sala Mosquera, document 26,470, ACC.


Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 7 February 1851, Fondo Arboleda, document 1505, ACC.

*El Ferrocarril* (Cali, Colombia), 9 January 1880; *Los Principios* (Cali, Colombia), 11 February 1876.

Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 7 February 1851, Fondo Arboleda, document 1505, ACC.

Valencia Llano sees women’s participation as part of the clientalist politics of the era; I see it as much more mitigated by the various aspects of republicanism. Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 144–45.

“Programa Solemnidad del 2 de febrero de 1851 por la manumisión de 46 esclavos,” Cali, 29 January 1851, Tomo 114, p. 478, AHMC.

For a view on conservative visions of gender relations that sees women’s role as more limited, although still crucial to the Conservative Party, see Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 172–77.

*El Cernícalo* (Popayán, Colombia), 22 August 1850.

Ibid., 8 September 1850.

*Las Máscaras* (Pasto, Colombia), 7 November 1850.

*El Guaitara* (Pasto, Colombia), 20 December 1864.

*Las Máscaras* (Pasto, Colombia), 7 November 1850.


49 *El Ciudadano* (Popayán, Colombia), 5 August 1848.

50 *El Espectador: Dios, Relijion i Libertad* (Pasto, Colombia), 15 May 1862. Valencia Llano examines the voluminous correspondence women, many of them liberals, kept up with powerful generals during the war. Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 145–56. However, while certainly political, I would not classify this activity as part of the public sphere.

51 *El Espectador: Dios, Relijion i Libertad* (Pasto, Colombia), 15 May 1862 (emphasis in the original).


53 In the twentieth century, explicitly feminist movements would use these older avenues of charity and concern for the family as a way to gain further entrée into politics; see Asunción Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, 1890–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 97–124.

54 *Gaceta Oficial del Cauca* (Popayán, Colombia), 9 June 1866. Also see Julián Trujillo, *Mensaje del Presidente del Estado sobre instruccion pública, presentado a la legislatura de 1869* (Popayán, Colombia: Tipografía de Balcazar G., 1869).

55 *Ordenanzas espedidas por la Cámara Provincial del Cauca en sus sesiones ordi- narias de 1852*, (n.p., 1852), 7.


57 Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 135–36. There was a variant of Colombian liberalism that sought to include women in liberal universalism, to the point that one province in eastern Colombia voted to extend suffrage to women in 1853. However, this was soundly rejected by Colombian liberalism generally and the national Liberal government, which annulled the law. Future constitutions, such as that of 1863, were written to ensure explicitly that citizenship was closed to women; see Bushnell, *The Making*, 108–9. Also note that liberals elsewhere sought to incorporate women into the public sphere, in order to both educate women and “civilize” the public realm; see Christopher Schmidt–Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), 88–97.

Chambers, *From Subjects*, 214–15; Dore, “One Step,” 17–21; and Díaz, *Female Citizens*, 168–70. Also see Landes, *Women*. Sueann Caulfield notes that gender historians have emphasized how the “professional discourses” of law and medicine helped regulate citizenship and nationalism, but I would argue the internal dynamics of republican political discourse was equally, if not more, important. See Sueann Caulfield, “The History of Gender in the Historiography of Latin America,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 3-4 (2001): 449–90, esp. 473–75.

Criminal sentences of José Antonio Fajardo and Dolores Crespo, Cali, 31 May 1855, Tomo 129, p. 407, AHMC. For more on gender and criminal law, see Díaz, *Female Citizens*.

Criminal sentences of Juan Manuel Obando and Concepción Tanquino, Popayán, 11 May 1848, Sección República, Fondo Asuntos Criminales, legajo 90, p. 181, AGN; for whipping, see District Alcalde to Jefe Municipal, Totoró, 4 August 1867, Archivo Muerto, paquete 97, legajo 8, ACC. Also see Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 136.


Ramón Bermúdez and 13 others to Senators and Representatives, Cali, 15 April 1853, Senado, Informes de Comisiones VI, 169, AC.

Valencia Llano also notes how in warfare elite conservative women agitated while popular liberals fought; see Valencia Llano, *Mujeres*, 183–84.

Report of the Circuit Court, Palmira, 3 November 1863, Archivo Muerto, paquete 86, legajo 104, ACC; *Los Principios* (Cali, Colombia), 31 December 1875.

Judicial Report, Popayán, 21 May 1855, Archivo Muerto, paquete 60, legajo 62, ACC.

*La Paz: Periódico Oficial* (Popayán, Colombia), 24 March 1855.


Governor of Cali Province to General Commander, Cali, 29 December 1860, Archivo Muerto, paquete 78, legajo 44, ACC.

Miguel Cabal, *Contestacion al inmundo pasquín titulado “La revolucion del Cauca”* (Cali, Colombia: Imprenta de Hurtado, 1866), 15.

Ibid.
74El Estado de Guerra (Bogotá), 9 January 1877.

75Manuel Sinisterra, El 24 de diciembre de 1876 en Cali (Cali, Colombia: Imprenta de Manuel Sinisterra, 1919), 8.


77Charles Safray, Viaje a Nueva Granada (Bogotá: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1948), 216.

78The Unhappy Women of this Parish [18 names signed by others] to the Parish Personero, Yumbo, 17 July 1852, Tomo 148, p. 577, AHMC.

79Testimony of M. Ruiz, La Cruz, 4 June 1868, Archivo Muerto, paquete 99, legajo 14, ACC.

80One critically important contribution of recent scholarship has been to define these activities of women to protect their families’ wellbeing as definitely “political” and central to democracy; see Temma Kaplan, Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements (New York: Routledge, 1997).

81The undersigned citizens of the state [over 70 names] to President of the State, La Cruz, 8 July 1868, Archivo Muerto, paquete 99, legajo 14, ACC. For another petition describing “poor women” being persecuted for selling liquor, see The undersigned residents of Buenosaires to Jefe Político of Santander, Buenosaires, 29 October 1852, Archivo Muerto, paquete 53, legajo 77, ACC.


84El Sentimiento Democrático (Cali, Colombia), 12 July 1849.

85We the Undersigned, Citizens of Colombia [eight names] to President and Members of the Municipality, Cali, 29 May 1863, Tomo 150, p. 556, AHMC.

86Note of Belisario Zamorano, Cali, 29 May 1863, Tomo 150, p. 556, AHMC. For women’s growing role in commerce, see Valencia Llano, Mujeres, 158.

85The Undersigned Residents of la Fraternidad Parish [over 150 names, most signed by another] to Jefe Político, Cali, 22 July 1853, Tomo 124, p. 500, AHMC.

88“12 Women to President, Popayán, 15 April 1868,” El Republicano (Popayán, Colombia), 19 April 1868.

89La Voz del Pueblo: Organo de la Sociedad Democrática (Cali, Colombia), 29 August 1878.
Lavrin, Women, Feminism, and Social Change.

The undersigned residents of Pasto [86 women’s names] to Deputies of the Legislature, Pasto, 7 August 1873, Archivo Muerto, paquete 124, legajo 56, ACC.

Gaceta Oficial del Cauca (Popayán, Colombia), 21 September 1867.

The Undersigned Indians of Both Sexes to State President, Muellamuez, 23 March 1870, Archivo Muerto, paquete 144, legajo 64, ACC.


Alcaldes Mayores of Túquerres and Ipiales Cantones to President of the Provincial Legislature, Túquerres, 17 September 1848, Archivo Muerto, paquete 44, legajo 39, ACC.

The cabildos pequeños de indígenas of Túquerres, Obando and Pasto to Citizen Deputies of the State Legislature, Pasto, 29 July 1873, Archivo Muerto, paquete 124, legajo 60, ACC. Steve J. Stern also discusses the link between domestic and political language in colonial Mexico, in The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

Cabildo pequeño de indígenas of Guachavéz to Honorable Deputies, Pasto, 6 October 1856, Archivo Muerto, paquete 61, legajo 6, ACC.

Also see Nancy P. Appelbaum, Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and Local History in Colombia, 1846–1948 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 84–93.

Indian Alcalde Mayor of Obando Municipality to Secretary of State Government, Ipiales, 4 March 1866, Archivo Muerto, paquete 94, legajo 54, ACC.

Susan Kellogg notes that generally throughout Latin America “patriarchal structures of authority within indigenous families” seemed to grow more powerful in the nineteenth century. Susan Kellogg, Weaving the Past: A History of Latin America’s Indigenous Women from the Prehispanic Period to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 88. Men in New York formed a similarly gendered vision of popular republicanism, in which “republican patriarchalism was synonymous with citizenship; independence demanded the subordination of morally suspect dependents.” Stansell, City of Women, 21.

Concepción Larraondo and Juan de Dios Larraondo to Council President, Cali, 19 May 1853, Tomo 124, p. 515, AHMC.
The Undersigned of this Petition, Colombian Citizens [over 40 names, most signed by another] to Secretary of the Treasury, Villa de Bao, 20 August 1883, Sección República, Fondo Ministerio de Fomento, Tomo 4, p. 274, AGN.

“Lista de las familias que ocupaban el terreno del ‘Ejido,’” Tomo 126, p. 293, AHMC. Also see “Registro sobre concesion de terrenos de ejidos,” Tomo 154, p. 152bis, AHMC.

Parish Alcalde to Provincial Governor, Tambo, 22 February 1858, Archivo Muerto, paquete 66, legajo 2, ACC. Also see District Alcalde to Jefe Municipal, Usenda, 23 April 1865, Archivo Muerto, paquete 87, legajo 14, ACC. For economic independence and nineteenth-century patriarchy, see Sarah C. Chambers, “To the Company of a Man Like My Husband, No Law Can Compel Me,” Journal of Women’s History 11, no. 1 (1999): 45.

Baker, “Domestication of Politics,” 225 (quote); also see 622.