DEMOCRACIES WAGING WAR IN A FOREIGN CONTEXT:
THE PAST AND PRESENT

by

Scott J. Winslow

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Approved:

Dr. Veronica Ward                          Dr. Jeannie Johnson
Major Professor                          Committee Member

Dr. Abdulkafi Albirini                     Dr. Mark McLellan
Committee Member                          Vice President for Research and
                                          Dean of the School of Graduate Studies

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ABSTRACT

Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context:
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Scott J. Winslow, Master of Arts

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Major Professor: Dr. Veronica Ward
Department: Political Science

Why have Western democracies been successful in conducting external counterinsurgency operations in the past and unsuccessful recently? This thesis conducts a comparison between two successful past interventions, and a recent unsuccessful one using three variable groupings. These variable groupings contain factors drawn from non-kinetic areas related to counterinsurgency operations, in order to draw attention to the holistic nature of successful counterinsurgency operations.

The results of this comparison did indicate differences in the variable groupings between the successful and unsuccessful campaigns. The resulting findings could have an impact on the formulation of future interventions of this nature.

(104 pages)
The lack of favorable outcomes produced by recent attempts at counterinsurgency by Western countries shows that the importance of uncovering a more effective approach for conducting external counterinsurgency operations cannot be downplayed. In an attempt to discover what this approach might entail, prior successful interventions conducted by democracies in the Philippines and Kenya were compared to the recent failure in Iraq, using three variable groupings as a lens through which to view all three conflicts and allow cross-conflict comparison of conditions that contributed to success or failure. Through evaluation of indicators linked to these variable groupings, it was determined that there were many similarities in conditions between the two successful examples and an inverse correlation for those conditions in the unsuccessful example. In order to be more successful in the future, intervening states should attempt to replicate the specified conditions found in Kenya and the Philippines, approach interventions with a strategic mindset, and execute interventions holistically instead of with a narrow tactical approach. Finally, planning for counterinsurgency contingencies during an intervention should start before the first dollar is spent or the first bullet fired.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Staff Sergeant Zachary Tomczak, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion 325\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Infantry Regiment, killed in action on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of September, 2007, in Baghdad, Iraq.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and other like democracies have been involved in a variety of low and high-intensity conflicts across the globe. While the terrain and climate have differed, one thing remains the same; while being able to defeat determined opponents in ground combat operations, these states have been unable to prevent an insurgency from attaining their major political objectives in this time period. Currently, the United States and allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany are still engaged in combat with insurgent forces in Afghanistan, with the bitter specter of a failed campaign in Iraq hovering over their shoulders.

It seems possible that in light of the considerable amounts of time and treasure unsuccessfully expended on recent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, that it is not possible for the United States and their Western allies to achieve their stated and implied goals in a conflict while combating an insurgency. However, in the past this has not been the case.

The practical definition of insurgency, given in a counterinsurgency guide issued by the U.S. Government, is “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” The same publication defines COIN as “the blend of civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency
and address its root causes.”¹ For the sake of clarity, these definitions will be assumed for the length of this paper.

The controversy generated from these recent involvements and the inability of these countries to meet their own stated objectives, or prevent their enemies from achieving their own (admittedly some conflicts are still undecided, but the consensus seems to be that it does not look good for Western interests in places such as Yemen, Afghanistan, and Syria), has been a matter of public and academic debate. A large portion of this discussion has been entangled in domestic electoral politics, and politicized to the point that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are unable to be separated from domestic political conflict in the minds of the American people, which may not have necessarily been the case in the past.

The difficulties recently experienced by Western democracies in these conflicts (i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), and the ensuing controversy bring us to the central research question being addressed by this paper. Why have Western democracies been recently unsuccessful at achieving political objectives during counterinsurgency campaigns when they have been successful in the past? The tentative hypothesis is that the military forces involved in these conflicts have been executing their portion of the counterinsurgency campaign (at a marginally sufficient level), so there are factors

outside the military spectrum that determine the success or failure of the counterinsurgency campaign.

The meaning of the word “success” can be quite ambiguous, and as such will need to be defined. The tendency for stated and implied goals and objectives to change over time makes this a difficult task, but a combination of statements made by the executive branch to the legislature and to the public prior to and during the initial stages of intervention gives a reasonable inference of intent. Additionally, the continued control of the incumbent government of the majority of its people and territory past the conclusion of the intervention can also be seen as a success. Given this, the success or failure of an intervention will be defined as either being able to achieve the publicly stated political and military goals before leaving the theater of operations or the continued control by the incumbent government over the majority of its people and territory.

Because the specific role of the outside power in waging a counterinsurgency on behalf of a foreign government is variable, it is important that these states have a better planning process in place to help overcome unforeseen obstacles. Additionally, because of the existence of an untold number of possible variables, there will have to be a “triage” to determine the order of importance in allocating available money, time, and manpower. Thankfully the subject of counterinsurgency has been much studied, and much work exists that discusses vital areas of importance for executing counterinsurgency operations, where variables can be chosen to test the hypothesis of
supposed change in methods or environment. It is hoped that this thesis may help with this conversation in the future.

While the exact nature of this relationship will be discussed later, a working assumption will be that in the present day, the intervening state(s) will want to minimize their long-term exposure in the conflict area to reduce their political, military, and social liability. Recent events have shown that Western states will have a large initial commitment, then attempt to reduce their footprint and act as a facilitator to their host. It is duly understood that many successful COIN interventions in the past have involved a long-term commitment, but considering recent (as of 2014), global economic issues and blowback from recent interventions, this would be overly optimistic and not within the realm of expected or likely behavior for most Western democracies.

The minutia of politics is often looked upon by those in the military as nothing more than a distraction from the all-important shooting war, but dealing with such intricacies is an inescapable reality in most democratic states. It seems that the political and social aspects of counterinsurgency operations, both on the home front and on the battlefield, are just as important (if not more so) as kinetic operations. It is possible that attempts by military leadership to label domestic issues as of secondary importance, or emphasize the importance of kinetic operations at the expense of other COIN elements, has prevented those concerns from being integrated into long-term efforts and strategy.

This is counterproductive, as internal politics in democratic states are key mechanisms when it comes to setting objectives, and allocating resources such as time
or money, and determining national interests. Treating the needs of the domestic political sphere, as well as the augmentation and strengthening of the foreign state institutions as a separate endeavor from military operations, has undermined the overall effectiveness of U.S. involvement in recent counterinsurgency operations. The relegation of these alternative spheres of influence to the sidelines reduces the ability of the intervening state to adapt to a dynamic COIN environment, as these other assets are rarely integrated with the main effort. For example, there were few attempts at using any sort of diplomatic or economic pressure on Iraq’s neighboring states prior to the invasion, or any acknowledgement that their cooperation could be valuable. By the time the U.S. Government realized post-invasion that they might have needed Syria’s cooperation in closing Iraq’s borders, the value of attempting to do so had diminished significantly.

Besides the intervening actor, the hosting state, and the insurgent forces, there are other actors who have the potential to affect conflict outcomes. Examples of these are neighboring states, as well as regional and international powers. How these groups perceive and respond to interventions in their regions or spheres of influence is an important and oft-overlooked area. It seems clear that Pakistan and Iran were important to the conflict in Afghanistan, as were Syria and Iran to the Iraq War. However, those relationships may not have received the emphasis they required.

The failure of the Iraqi Army in 2014, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in 1973-75, and the Afghan National Army after the coalition drawdown in 2012-2014, to
provide the operational space needed to continue the strengthening of the internal state in the absence of their intervening power, is just one aspect of the complicated nature of institution building. That many sectors of society refused to take part in elections in Iraq or opted to use traditional legal institutions instead of government provided ones is another.\(^2\) Legitimacy can be a delicate thing, and it appears that artificial institutions created with the assistance of the intervening state often fail when required to operate independently of that external support. How this affected the outcomes of past conflicts, as well as the uncovering of any potential future methods of avoidance or mitigation, will be an important topic of discussion in this paper.

The tendency to over-focus on combat related aspects of this type of conflict, and the role that armed conflict plays in the larger COIN doctrine, detracts from the importance of the diplomatic and political portions of COIN. This is not an attempt to discount the importance of properly trained, equipped, and applied military forces in conducting these types of operations, rather it is to shed light and further investigate factors that are often given a cursory glance or outright dismissed in public, media, and often academic perceptions.

The amount of attention given to non-decisive and often ultimately irrelevant exchanges of fire in a complex five-dimensional conflict (air, land, sea, space, and information operations) is counterproductive. Adding to this distraction is that often the

armed conflict portions of these campaigns are relatively successful. For example, during COIN operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaysia, Kenya, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Rhodesia the military forces involved were able to maintain operational space for their respective governments to proceed with the non-kinetic portions of COIN for years, even decades. Not while the U.S. was heavily involved in the Iraq War was there a moment where the insurgency was close to gaining control of the Iraqi government, or Iraqi territory. In Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan military was able to hold the Tamil Tigers at bay for almost 30 years. Another example of this was when Rhodesian military forces were able to effectively engage and hold off externally supported insurgent forces during The Bush War of 1964. In that conflict, it was political change that led to an election defeat that ended the conflict in the favor of the insurgents.³

Perhaps it is just that diplomacy, policing, and bureaucracies aren’t “sexy” enough to draw more attention to the vital role it is assumed they play. For these reasons the variables entertained here as relating to COIN will be focused on the other less visible aspects of COIN operations, in an attempt to contribute to a more holistic understanding of what a successful COIN operation requires.

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VARIABLE SELECTION

Several strategic and operational areas have been identified within the literature as strongly influencing the ability to conduct foreign interventions against insurgent groups. As previously noted, sections strongly related to kinetic, mostly military, tactical, or combat focused factors have been excluded from consideration. Three categories of similar or relating variables corresponding to those remaining factors have been chosen using David Kilcullen’s three pillar model of counterinsurgency, and the four elements of a successful counterinsurgency campaign as identified by Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw as guidelines to interpret their relevance to COIN operations.4 5

What is contained in the “pillars” of Kilcullen and the “elements” of Hoffman and Taw are numerous factors, variables, and niches covering both wide-ranging and sometimes redundant categories of kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of COIN.6 Also, while Kilcullen claims that each of these three pillars are of equal importance, the huge range of political, social, military, and economic factors relevant in a specific conflict may not be equal. A government may be a well-funded security apparatus that functions

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6 Some of the variables listed under Kilcullen’s three pillars are such diverse things as human security, institutional capacity, and social reintegration.
correctly, but has no judicial or legislative capacity. Should equal attention and funding be applied in such a situation? The answer is probably not.

Hoffman and Taw claim that successful counterinsurgency campaigns contain all of their elements (command and coordination, effective antiterrorist legislation/public trust initiatives, coordination within and between intelligence services, foreign collaboration among governments and security forces). These elements seem to be haphazard in their organizational level, and their own work even shows inherent weakness. While Kenya is listed as an example for several of their sections, it is left out under the “foreign collaboration” section.

What will be presented as “the variable groupings” for the purposes of this research is an attempt to combine the majority of those elements into three more comprehensible areas that would better allow those conducting such operations to identify weaknesses prior to becoming heavily involved. As Kilcullen noted in his conclusion, “models are systematic oversimplifications of reality,” and the models that were presented (in the conference paper cited earlier) are no different. Rather, it is hoped (by Kilcullen specifically in his conclusion) that it could be the basis of future research, and it is in that spirit that this proposal moves forward. From these selected pieces of research, several likely variables that correspond or correlate with those

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8 Ibid, 121.
presented by these authors have been chosen to structure this inquiry, with adjustment
due to finite time and resources.

*Domestic Factors Variable Group*

This group of variables contains items related to the domestic conditions in the
state that is conducting overseas operations. More specifically things such as popular
support, legislative support, policy trends in government, and economic pressures. How
the variables in this grouping interact with the conflict is mostly through how they
influence the type and duration of the commitment to the conflict. Having a
commitment whose continuance is based on outcomes rather than other guidelines
(such as arbitrary dates) is important in the successful execution of an external
counterinsurgency operation. Potential indicators for this variable include legislative
support, continued support through governmental change/turnover (indicating some
level of popular support), a sample of editorial and opinion articles in major national
newspapers, or polling data.\(^9\)

*Supplementary Actors Variable Group*

The other variable grouping that seems to play a strong role in many past COIN
attempts is any level of involvement by neighboring states. In Rhodesia, Vietnam,

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\(^9\) While polling data will only likely be available for more recent conflicts, it does present a much simpler,
and in all likelihood, more accurate view of public opinion than a sampling of newspaper articles or simple
political turnover, which could be easily related to another issue.
Afghanistan, and Iraq, there was little if any regional support for forces of the incumbent regime. Regional reaction to external interference during conflicts vary in level of opposition or support; from Chinese support of North Vietnam, and Pakistani support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, to Australian support of Malaysia against Indonesian forces. It would seem likely that regional support or opposition to external involvement has the potential to impact the success of any operation. Potential indicators for this variable are the existence of coalition-type support for operations, the level of bilateral governmental cooperation of nearby states (and the longevity of any such support), and intergovernmental organization support or related action (supporting or not supporting votes, sanctions, etc.). The lack of support for operations from states neighboring the location of the conflict would likely be important. The level of interest displayed by great powers in a conflict could also be an indicator. Many smaller conflicts during the 20th century were really proxy conflicts between greater powers such as the USSR or the United States, and their subsequent involvement greatly altered the path of conflict, as it did during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or Soviet approved Cuban interference in many Central and Southern African insurgencies in the 60’s.

*Host Country Institutions Variable Group*

The strength and resilience of the organic institutions of the government being assisted will likely be linked to both success and lack of success of COIN operations.
Newly formed institutions have had less than stellar results in Iraq. For example, the Iraqi Police and Iraqi National Police have all struggled with corruption and legitimacy issues. In 2014, the newly formed and U.S.-trained Iraqi Army was driven from the northern Iraqi provinces by Islamist insurgents without putting up credible resistance. As a result, large amounts of weapons and equipment were left behind for the insurgents. The ability of a newly created or co-opted institution belonging to the host country to continue to function through such issues, both during and after the external intervention, would be crucial to long term stability.

During these early stages of this project, it seems that this grouping stands out to a certain extent in initial comparisons to the other variables presented. This is because of its potential as a focal point for future COIN strategy, as an institution-building based method, rather than the common population or enemy-centric approach. The difficulty of preventing insurgent access to the population in a heavily urban environment cannot be understated, and as a result perhaps an institution focused approach is needed.

A process focused as such (on institutions) could allow a government to be less reliant on external help (allowing an assisting foreign state to operate with less domestic support of their own intervention), or the ability to overcome neighboring interference or opposition (as the apartheid Rhodesian government was unable to do) minimizing criticism based on the potential for a client-state relationship to emerge between the host state and the intervening nation. If analysis was to find, for example, that all or most successful examples of external counterinsurgency interventions show a focus on
building internal institutions or strengthening organic ones, which was validated by longevity or legitimacy, it would provide crucial direction in formulating future efforts.

An indicator for this variable will be the longevity of government institutions, such as courts, legislatures, or police and military forces post-intervention. This could potentially be shown by the transfer of power after an election (or the opposite) based on voting outcomes rather than violence, or steady levels of public participation across social groups in elections as a sign that the people feel that they can realize aims through the political process. Inversely, cleavages in voting patterns between major ethnic groups could be an indication that the government lacks legitimacy across the spectrum of eligible voters. In more authoritarian states, other “acts of consent” may replace election politics with popular mobilization.\textsuperscript{10}

CONFLICT CASE STUDY SELECTION

This research will be done through a comparison of the indicated variables from existing case studies of three conflicts: Iraq (GWOT era from 2003-2011), Kenya (1952-1960), and the Philippines (1899-1902). The mixing of an American (the Philippines), mostly American (Iraq, with some British and other western democratic state participation), and a wholly British endeavor (Kenya) is sure to create some controversy. However, the range of domestic political considerations faced by these two governments has many parallels and common difficulties. Much of the same can be said about the majority of Western democracies.

Kenya is considered a successful example of a COIN campaign because British policy during the 1950’s called for a stable transition to Kenyan self-rule in a manner that maintained close Kenyan-British relations and did not allow them into the Soviet Sphere of influence. While the military campaign against the Mau Mau insurgents is usually thought to have been successful, the fact that the desired policy was implemented equates to an overall success irrespective of the outcome of the military campaign. The passage of almost a decade between the breaking of the insurgency in the mid-1950’s and eventual Kenyan independence strengthens this argument.

The Philippine-American war is also generally considered a successful COIN campaign because the U.S. supported Philippine government continues to exert control over the majority of its people and territory, long after the end of US intervention. It is
so much considered so that the majority of scholarly conversation pertaining to it is about why it was won, not if it was.\(^\text{11}\)

The Iraq War of 2003-2011 is slightly more complicated, but generally considered a failure. The original stated goals of the invasion were to stop the threat that the supposed Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed to the United States.\(^\text{12}\) After the invasion was completed and no operating WMD program was found, the conflict transitioned into an insurgency. The United States formally declared the end of their involvement in the Iraq War at the end of 2011. Since that time, the armed insurgency continues, the Iraqi government has lost control of several major cities, approximately 20% of their territory to former insurgent groups, and ceded de facto control of another large portion of territory to the Kurdish minority in Iraq.

When it comes to the intricacies of the relationship between the British executive and parliament, there are many parallels between that of the American executive and Congress. While many of the specifics are different, the broad implications of governmental rule by consent of the citizen, free and fair elections of leaders, parties, representatives, freedom of the press, and protected political opposition create similar implications for the governing bodies. The relevant differences between the American governments of 1899 and 2003 are no less than that between the British government of 1952 and the American government in 2003.


COIN campaigns in Kenya and the Philippines are used as examples of successful operations while the Iraq War is used as an unsuccessful example. This exercise will result in two possible outcomes:

**Outcome One**

The substance of the findings regarding the aforementioned variable groupings should show correlations between the two positive examples, and marked differences when compared with the negative case. A theoretical example: in the positive examples, the intervening state was able to maintain high levels of domestic support for continued intervention and funding across multiple changes in executive leadership, while in the negative example, the intervening state was unable to maintain this support. Such a result should provide a measure of support with regard to the legitimacy of these chosen variable groupings as affecting the outcome of COIN operations. If the expected differences between the positive and negative cases are observed, further analysis may then reveal what events or changes in strategy led to the failure and then lead to improvements in future external COIN involvement.

**Outcome Two**

If there is no distinction between the positive and negative examples of COIN intervention as they relate to the chosen variable groupings, or perhaps there was for one example but not the other, this would suggest that other variable clusters were
more closely related to the outcomes of the chosen conflicts. A theoretical example: In both the positive and negative conflict examples the intervening state was unable to maintain high levels of domestic support for continued intervention and funding across multiple changes in executive leadership.

**Direction and Thoughts**

With either outcome, further research into the methods employed and how they may have affected the chosen variables could give relevant insights into what caused success or failure. For example, if similar methods were used in all cases with different outcomes, it may point toward COIN methods that had been viable in the past, no longer being so. This could be based on changes in technology, the environment, or other variables that are unknown at this time. Such information should be helpful in determining where adjustments should be made in order to be more successful in the future.

At the moment, there is considerable debate on whether the United States, Great Britain, or a similar state operating within the confines of a democracy, has the ability to complete such a complex task. Perhaps this is because of evolving social sentiments, the greater ability of the average citizen to access information, as well as national identity perceptions that differ greatly from times in the past when many counterinsurgency operations were successful. The prevailing opinion seems to be that a commitment of time needed to be successful, as has been demonstrated in the past, is
not feasible under current economic and political conditions. Changes in the U.S.
political system such as the 17th amendment, and the effect of media on election cycles
may have made long-term foreign commitments more difficult than in the past.
Additionally, the complications of empire building and colonialism likely have
contributed to an “intervention fatigue” among British citizens making large-scale
involvement in new conflicts unpalatable. The addition of contemporary economic
issues (stock market crash of 1999, and the global recession of the early 2000’s) also
makes the expense of such commitments controversial.

As hazardous as they have proven to be, it is almost certain reality that soon
again large amounts of blood and treasure will be committed to future COIN
interventions, and to that end it is vital that more attention is paid to these abandoned
aspects of COIN which create the conditions for the kinetic portion to succeed. All this
being said, what has been done before, surely, can be done again.
LITERATURE REVIEW—UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM

An insurgency is not a phenomenon restricted to this time period, nor is it something that has not been encountered and successfully confronted by others. My initial assumption is that there is something different about either western democracies as they presently exist, the global environment in which they operate, or their approach to this type of conflict itself. Whatever the case, it seems that the most recent iterations of Western involvement in these types of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have suffered because of the lack of a strategic approach to counterinsurgency operations that would implement a full spectrum approach to the situation.

The weight of the existing research into counterinsurgency operations is narrow in focus and tactical in nature, usually dealing with specific goals and resources. Of the few that do attempt to use a wider lens, David Kilcullen’s *Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency* and Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw's *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency* are representative of what has been done right in this specific approach, as well as exhibiting some of the same weaknesses of more narrowly focused work, and some issues that are likely unique to studies attempting a wider reach. Kilcullen’s *Pillars* only seems to address holistic counterinsurgency at a theoretical level, leaving the specifics to later work, leaving potential for practical application untapped. In the Hoffman and Taw piece, each conflict was analyzed drawing from a large group of variables. However, the same set of variables was not
applied to each conflict, and the presence or absence of a specific variable in each case study was not explained. Such an ad-hoc approach makes it difficult to talk about the importance of a specific variable as being important to counterinsurgency generally, or as it has been and can be practiced, because there is little correlation across cases. This thesis removes this problem by applying the same groups of variables across each case.

Much of the remaining research into counterinsurgency is dissected into narrowly focused and dogmatic sectors, where narrow objectives and limited flexibility define what amounts to mere tactics for conducting COIN in specific environments, rather than a strategy that can be applied to planning and executing such an operation across a diverse series of geographical, ethnic, and political conditions. The most popular of these are discussed below, their specific weaknesses noted, and how a holistic approach focusing on the variable groupings presented in this thesis better address those weaknesses.

**Population-centric COIN**

The United States was not the only Western state involved in counterinsurgency operations during the 20th century; the British government was involved militarily in many insurgencies, as were the French. Several operations fought in the aftermath of the Second World War (Palestine, Kenya, Malaysia, among others) are often cited as examples of successful counter-insurgency operations. Often these examples are spoken of as models for modern counter-insurgencies. These campaigns have been
dissected and then repackaged today as the “truth” as it concerns COIN. The very framework on which much of modern day COIN operations are based on is an analysis of the Malayan Emergency. However, the traditional interpretation of the Malayan campaign as a linear progression from a failed enemy-centric campaign that was bailed out with a population-centric one is now being disputed.¹³

Without a doubt, the population-centric flavor of COIN tactics have received the lion’s share of the focus in COIN research, which is understandable as population-centric efforts have been usually hailed as successful in the conflicts from which they were derived, as in Kenya and Malaysia.

Drawing on such past experiences, and more recently Afghanistan, the “hearts and minds” of the people came to be seen as the core of the insurgency v. counter-insurgency relationship to the pop-centric COIN practitioner. Often, as seen in Iraq, the entire conflict evolves into a struggle for this “human terrain” because of this perception. Bob Dreyfuss recently explored this relationship, and the U.S. Military’s attempt to win this battle by supposedly adopting population-centric COIN methodology. Early on in Afghanistan senior U.S. military commanders realized that by using aggressive enemy-centric tactics they may have been creating enemies among the population faster than they could kill them, and as a result turned to tactics thought to

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sidestep this development, employing methods thought to win over the “hearts and minds” of the populous instead.\textsuperscript{14}

The end-game of this re-focus was realized in the release of a new manual on counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM 3-24), just in time for the surge of personnel and equipment into Iraq in 2007.\textsuperscript{15} The adoption of this manual was championed by US Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, an armor officer and Rhodes Scholar. Nagl and others sought to push an unwilling U.S. military toward creating and implementing doctrine based on tenants of population-centric warfare, something the military had been allegedly avoiding since Vietnam. This year and a half long operation was supposed to feature the implementation of the doctrine contained in the new manual, thereby significantly reducing the violence that was preventing the end of the conflict in Iraq.

From 2007-2008, large numbers of soldiers were redeployed from Forward Operating Bases outside Iraqi cities, into numerous Combat Outposts and Patrol Bases located in the hearts of the major population centers. This was supposed to create a more permanent presence among the Iraqi people that would deter violence. The numbers presented by Gen. David Petraeus (who led the coalition forces in Iraq at the time) during congressional testimony in late 2007 seemed to indicate that this operation


\textsuperscript{15} FM 3-2, US Army Combined Army Center. This was co-written by the US Marine Corps and is dually listed as MCWP 3-33.5.
was going to be successful, with violence down significantly across all categories.\textsuperscript{16} However, hindsight has shown us that few lasting gains were made.

While such an approach is not without its merits, it is representative of the usual lack of strategic foresight by the US Government, and the spotlight on military assets as the facilitator of COIN as practiced by the United States. The 2007 surge was supposed to play a pivotal part in reducing the violence and facilitating power-sharing between the Shia Iraqi government, and the Sunni Anbari tribes, which in turn was supposed to lead to longer term stability.\textsuperscript{17} Thousands of US troops flooded the streets of major Iraqi cities, and while there was a temporary drop of violence. However, more likely explanations for those temporary gains exist, including the Awakening movement in Anbar Province, and the decision by Muqtada Al-Sadr for his militia, the Mahdi Army, to cease offensive operations as he sought further integration with the Shia majority Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{18} Several high-profile missteps by Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Anbar province lead to local tribes resisting their presence (the Awakening movement). Luckily, local US military leaders were adept enough this time to recognize the importance of this and allowed these tribal leaders to raise militias to protect themselves and to combat Al-Qaeda in their villages.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{17} David Petraeus. “How We Won In Iraq.” \textit{Foreign Policy}, October 29, 2013.


A large part of the reasoning behind the 2007 surge was that the Iraqi people were supposedly not supporting the new Iraqi government because they were not being protected from the insurgent groups, or militias that dotted the landscape. This is something that had been oft repeated by Nagl, Petraeus, and the rest of the pop-centric COIN mafia. Indeed, Nagl even wrote that such a dynamic was the “key to success in counterinsurgency.” The desired result of that operation would have seen a protected population trusting the coalition forces, and that trust then being transferred to the Iraqi government.

Unfortunately, it is not even clear that such trust could be transferred, or that this violence was the reason behind the lack of support for the Iraqi government in the first place. Looking at this situation instead through the lens of the supplementary actor variable group used in this thesis would tell you that perhaps another actor is fueling these insurgent and militia groups, and that would have to be addressed before being able to lower violence. The biggest failure of Nagl and the rest of the writers of FM 3-24 was that they were unable to move past the failed view of the populous as an empty vessel, and pop-centric COIN as they envisioned it has no plan B. Eventually it became apparent that divisions and loyalties (sectarian, tribal, etc.) that pre-dated the Iraq War were fueling the dynamic in Iraq, which probably made their doctrine unviable at birth.

The government institutions involved in the struggle for power in Iraq suffered greatly because of the fragmented nature of Iraqi society, with existing divisions

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severely exacerbated by the methods Saddam Hussein had used to maintain power prior to the invasion. A counterinsurgency campaign should not be formulated based on a doctrine with such simplistic view of loyalties alone. Given a relationship between strong institutions and stability, had the Institutional Variable Group lens been applied to Iraq perhaps warnings would have been raised about the difficulty likely to be encountered in building such things in Iraq.

Finally, say the hearts and minds of the population were won during the surge. If the militias and insurgent groups had lost the participation of the people, but were still being externally funded, sheltered, trained, and equipped, they will still likely be able to function in the absence of that support, leaving as was noted before, no other route to victory in that doctrine.

The focus on what the military is doing, and how they are doing it, is further reinforced in *The Insurgents*, a book by Fred Kaplan that purports to tell the story of how senior military leadership, stuck in a conventional mindset, was preventing the rest of the military from adopting counterinsurgency tactics and winning the war in Iraq. Such assertions about the Iraq War seem spurious, as although there were high levels of violence at all times during Coalition involvement, there was never any real threat them being defeated militarily or ceding control of population centers to the insurgent forces. Such a point of view also ignores the role that other entities such as the National Security Council, the State Department, and the civilian side of the Department of

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Defense play in overall strategy (or lack thereof), and implementation of the war effort and the following occupation. It also ignores the possibility that no matter how effectively Coalition forces implemented COIN doctrine that they were doomed to failure because of mistakes made in preparation and planning at a higher level.

The biggest problem with the population-centric COIN as it is presented and implemented, is that it only taken into account variables at a tactical level. If conflicts were always isolated geographically and politically, this may not be a large issue, but in an environment as complex as the Iraq War there are other factors in play that are potentially more important that an imagined control of a population. Looking at the relationship between the population as only one aspect, with supplementary actor interference, and the institutional capability of the host as other important ones, as is done in the case studies viewed in this thesis, better allows the intervening force to determine if their relationship with the population can be important to success or not.

**Enemy-centric COIN**

Not everyone is as enamored of COIN, or population-centric COIN as the mainstream U.S. military has become. A biting critic of the current U.S. military structural pivot toward training and equipping to fight insurgencies or sub-state actors in general is retired U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile, a former professor at the United States Military Academy. His harshest criticism is reserved for the U.S. Army's newfound predilection for population-focused COIN. In *A Strategy of Tactics* Col. Gentile
discuss how this mindset has completely taken over U.S. Army doctrinal thought, at
the supposed expense of its strategic purpose and conventional abilities.

Gentile’s point about being able to defend against a "real" threat to Western
power requires strong conventional force is well taken, however it does not address
how forces engaged in one type of conflict (counterinsurgency in this example) for over
a decade should respond to such a challenge. Not being wholly focused on training to
fight a type of warfare that you have been involved in for more than a decade (and are
losing at) seems foolish. Additionally, conventional forces were employed in Iraqi using
mostly conventional methods during 2004-2006, which did little to control the rising
violence.

Also discussed are the many successful COIN campaigns that have been waged
using other methods (e.g. the enemy-centric COIN methods used against the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka) but Gentile fails to point out, or make the distinction, that these
methods were implemented internally by a government in their own country, having
that obvious advantage which allowed them to wage an almost 30 year COIN
campaign.\footnote{Gian P. Gentile. “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army.” Parameters 39, no. 3 (2009): 8-11. At the time, Gentile’s statements and written positions did not reflect that of the US Army, or the US Military Academy, and he is seen as a somewhat controversial figure to the US Army establishment.}

Col. Gentile later published a book more fully articulating his disapproval of the
focus that the U.S. Army had placed on population-centric COIN, and the perceived
difficulty and danger of operating solely in this mindset. However, there some flaws in his writing. First, COIN operations as a whole are dismissed as inherently population centric. Second, there is no acknowledgement of pop-centric COIN’s most glaring flaw; that even the most basic proven methods of population-centric COIN (as it is modeled on the insurgencies in Kenya and Malaya) would never have been allowed in Iraq. That is, the forced resettlement or separation of the people you wish to protect from the insurgent forces. In the absence of this, what methods should be used to obtain the goal of protecting the populous and gaining their trust? The third flaw is the same one that is committed by the majority of those who write on COIN today: that COIN operations are an inherently military entity.

Gentile does finally relent, and mentions various COIN successes during the Iraq War, finally noting that they did not lead to victory in the war itself without making a compelling argument that they were the reason for the eventual failure.

The military aspects of COIN are dissected at every level imaginable across popular culture and academia, with superficial acknowledgment of the importance of “other things” such as governmental legitimacy, power sharing, and rapprochement. Unfortunately very few chapters in these books and articles are devoted to these “others.” Even more jarring than this, is the lack of explanations of how enemy-centric COIN would have better-enabled coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to deal with

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the issue of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan, or the porous borders around Iraq allowing continual reinforcement and resupply of insurgent forces. The approach used in this thesis would much better prepare an intervening force for such conditions, as understanding the role that supplementary actors play is central this approach.

William F. Owen also feels that population-centric methods are not the only approach to COIN, and states that killing the enemy should be the primary focus of the military and that those who say otherwise are being misleading. In his 2011 article, *Killing Your Way to Control*, Owen states that the British Army’s mission in Afghanistan should be to kill the enemy in order to defeat them. He also asks why such a focus could not provide the needed security. While on a theoretical level he is correct, if you killed all of your enemies in an area you have provided security to that area, that doesn’t for a minute mean that such a method is the most effective way of accomplishing that goal based on inputs of time, money, and material. Owen also refers to prior COIN campaigns the British Army was involved in, where stated methods were the killing and capturing of the enemy. Having such a method in your “bag of tricks” is one thing, but he forgets that in Kenya and Malaysia there were comprehensive amnesty programs for enemy combatants, which is quite opposite the thinking that killing and capturing is the only way to deal with an enemy. One issue that both he and Gentile agree upon is that “the population is not the prize.”

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Owens biggest lapse is that he commits the same mistake that many others have made, which is describing a specific tactic used by an organization carrying out one part of a counterinsurgency operation as a counterinsurgency strategy, which it is not.

The use of the enemy-centric approach by intervening powers, as envisioned above by Owen and others, has often led to innovation on the part of the insurgents as they attempt to offset numerical and equipment disadvantages. Many insurgencies in the post-colonial era Middle East turned to the use of “terroristic” tactics, where civilians are targeted to induce fear. The blending of terror and urban insurgency by Sunni Iraqi and Shiite Hezbollah groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria illustrate this combination extremely well.25

The tendency of modern insurgents of turning to terrorism as a military strategy may be related to the increased ability of Western militaries to confront a conventional kinetic insurgency, while at the same time still failing to implement a holistic strategy that accounts for other important areas, such as fighting corruption or minimizing outside influence, areas that the three variable groupings chosen for this thesis would suggest is just as important. Such a shift presents a low-risk, high-reward scenario for insurgent groups by capitalizing on a failure to provide security to the people while minimizing their exposure to U.S and allied firepower in the field.

The blending of terrorism and insurgency could potentially be blamed for the force-centric focus on dealing with both behaviors that is prevalent today, as sometimes

it is hard to separate them from each other. This is because that the methods developed to deal with terrorism may not be as effective when applied to insurgency and vice versa, while a force or enemy centric approach is the default fallback position that is often used when confronted with armed violence.

While it is not relevant to say whether this is done to the detriment of counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism, there are specific consequences. The Hoffman and Taw article on a strategic framework for both which was cited earlier is an example of this mixture. Many of the elements they discuss do not necessarily match up well for external COIN operations because of the varying degree of control the intervening state has over internal governmental structure (in the country where the operation is being conducted), and therefore are better suited to an internal counter-terror focus. This is an important distinction because most democratic states are conducting external operations, while much of what Hoffman mentions when it comes to full spectrum COIN is more relevant to internally focused operations. The use of counter-terror tactics and the blending of insurgency and terrorism brings us to the next category of COIN.

**Actor-centric COIN**

Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen co-wrote and article about the conflict between the population and enemy-centric camps.\(^\text{26}\) Predictably they deduced that

neither side was completely right or completely wrong. Instead, they advocate looking at war (including counterinsurgency) through a context based lens, rather than an operational one. Here one would base their methods on the questions “whom are we fighting?” and “Why are they fighting us?” While useful at some levels, it doesn’t help when the answer to the latter question is merely because we are fighting them. Additionally, the lack of structure outlined there seems more paradigmatic rather than strategic. An alternate paradigm is useful, though, and could be useful in framing an existing strategy when the environment you want to apply it to is not properly understood.

Mark Moyar continues in the same vein in his book, *A Question of Command*, but focused on the important actors among, what would be to this thesis, the intervening power, and the entity that is hosting the counterinsurgency campaign. Here, the pivotal part of counterinsurgency is supposed to be the selection and education/training of the leaders of the various civil and military institutions involved in the conflict, rather than the defeat of the insurgents in enemy-centric, or the hearts and the minds of the people desired in population-centric COIN.

Such a view seems to ignore the interrelatedness of the development of these leaders, and the design of the structures that they inhabit. Moyar’s book while explaining what characteristics superior leaders have, fails to adequately show how to reliably find them. The examples given in some of the conflicts discussed (specifically

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Vietnam and Iraq) suffer from a spurious relationship with alleged institutional repeatability when it comes to producing quality leadership. It also fails to convincingly argue that having better military leaders always equals victory.

In some cases, yes, perhaps this institutional leadership approach would be effective, but doesn’t account for regional interference, or potential domestic issues for the intervening power which could cause an end to the involvement before such long term projects as leadership development can be conducted. Using the lens of the domestic support variable grouping, if it was determined that the commitment would not be of the length that would support such an undertaking, resources could then be allocated to areas better suited to shorter involvement.

Patrick Johnson of RAND writes about another approach that focuses on the “who” in counterinsurgency, leadership decapitation. This method is more based in counter-terrorism tactics, and comes to some interesting conclusions which are relatable to the greater actor-centric view. Johnson concluded that a successful application of this method resulted in faster, more successful, and lower intensity conflicts. While potentially useful in a situation that lends itself to small-scale intervention, this information is seemingly incongruent with the outcomes seen in COIN campaigns focused on the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, as well as counter-terror operations targeting Al Qaeda in Yemen. The leadership-centric operations focused on

these groups are almost a decade old, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban are both still functional. Additionally, it has been said that these methods have been fueling insurrections and making it more difficult for Western states to exert soft power because of the associated civilian casualties, resulting alienation of the international community, as well as specifically angering the Pakistani government with repeated violations of their airspace by armed drones.

In practice, such an approach ignores the importance accounting for and dealing with supplementary actors during a counterinsurgency campaign; something that would be less likely if using a holistic approach that included a supplementary actor variable grouping as a focus in planning and preparation. It also does not account for an insurgency that is decentralized and less dependent on individual leaders, perhaps being motivated instead by general dissatisfaction with governmental malfeasance and ineptness instead. Here is where the strength of the lens of multiple variable groupings appears over more narrow approaches. Instead of seeing the conflict as merely based on specific individual actors and wasting time attempting to cut all the heads off a hydra, resources would be allocated to addressing problems with Iraqi institutions that either undermined popular support or prevented them from being seen as a real alternative to competing power structures. The linkages between the supplementary actors involved in Iraq and the inherent weakness of the Iraqi governmental institutions are apparent. Knowing the relationship between the two and any potential difficulty in controlling or minimizing either would be a visible warning sign. In such a case, perhaps
a counterinsurgency based intervention would not be the best method of realizing the policy goals at stake.

Other Ideas

In *America’s Dirty Wars*, Russell Crandall outlines various involvements in “dirty” wars (including insurgencies) by the United States, Britain, and France. While certainly not comprehensive, this is an extensive discussion of such involvement. In his conclusion Crandall notes that the United States (and by extension its allies) seem “overly willing to engage in dirty wars but rarely had the stomach to actually carry out the hard-nosed political policies necessary to achieve victory.” While perhaps an argument could be made for this conclusion today, this has obviously not always been the case, as the Philippine campaign of 1899-1902 has often been characterized as brutal. The possibility that the an intervening country may want to or care to conduct an enemy-centric COIN campaign, because of say, potential human rights issues, (if Crandall’s assertion is even true) could be a major problem in the future execution of a COIN campaign. Such considerations are important to consider, as the capability of the intervening state may vary, including diplomatic and economic capabilities beyond mere methodology preferences.

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That there was no plan for the occupation and transition of power drawn up before the Iraq invasion speaks volumes about the lack of strategic oversight, as does the lack of integration or preparation made with other regional powers. It seems proper to quote Sun Tzu at this point, in that “every battle is won or lost before it is fought.”

Paying only lip service to supplementary actors and institutional factors is not something that only COIN theorists do. Indeed, even Brian Linn has shown this tendency in his seminal book, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*. In this otherwise deliberate work, little attention is paid to the almost complete isolation that the Filipino rebels operated in and the effect that this had on the greater conflict. Unfortunately questions about how this may have enabled the United States to conduct a coercive and attritional campaign against the Filipino people remain unanswered.

The high priest of COIN himself, David Kilcullen, has not been immune to this terrible oversight. In *Counterinsurgency*, Kilcullen tends to ignore the importance of variables that are impossible or difficult to control, preferring to focus on even the minutiae of company level COIN operations. It is no surprise given this trend that these areas tend to become decisive in the long term. At the very least, the planning of a COIN campaign should be tailored to these variables in a way to account for them or minimize their effect. A variable you may not be able to fully control is probably a something for which you want to have a plan. Here COIN is discussed as merely a tactical problem and is a discussion is always of how to wage it at that level. Admittedly Kilcullen has often
talked about COIN as a full spectrum issue, but the writing itself deals very little with how to approach institution building or how to minimize the influence of external actors.

The sheer volume of post-colonial insurgencies has given the academic community a wealth of information to study. In an article published in *Historical Methods*, Christopher Paul and co-authors have created an analysis of these conflicts by using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. In this mixed-method approach, the authors try to determine the viability of 87 different factors in COIN operations. Their conclusion was that winning campaigns are comprehensive approaches, and their research showed positive correlation over dozens of factors that relate to insurgencies.

This is an excellent start and is affirmation of the idea that successful COIN campaigns are holistic and not over-focused on military operations. However, the sheer number of variables given presents difficulties in ascertaining specific areas in which to focus or improve. Additionally, it is not determined if these variables with a positive correlation are intermediate or dependent rather than independent when referring to success. It would be less than helpful to present an organization such as the American State Department or the British Army with almost one hundred different areas that they need to develop new capabilities in or improve existing ones as it pertains to

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counterinsurgency. The grouping similar or related variables as was done in the creation of the three variable groupings for this thesis simplifies this promising approach, making any potential implementation in the future easier.

Collectively, many of the existing approaches taken to counterinsurgency suffer from the same shortcoming; a tendency to focus on using one specific way of addressing a problem that appears repeatedly with varying conditions. The varied nature of almost every aspect of these conflicts makes applying such narrow methods difficult. A more effective approach would be to look at counterinsurgency as one part of a larger environment, as a single part in an interrelated whole. If you can understand how those issues affect each other, you can better influence each individual issue. In order to show this, the following analyses of conflicts involving counterinsurgency operations are looked at through the lens of three variable groupings that better represents the inputs these larger ecosystems exert on these specific conflicts and the related COIN campaigns.
THE MAU MAU UPRISING

The Mau Mau revolt during the 1950's was hardly the first uprising against colonial rule in Kenya; indeed, it was just the latest in a string of armed opposition dating back to the British entrance in the late 1890's. The circumstances surrounding this conflict could be considered standard as far as post-Second World War colonial-collapse conflicts went. The British colonial government supported a network of white landowners, who ran large arable farms on the best land, with the majority black African population left with less productive holdings, or to work for wages on white farms. This was similar to the dynamic in other colonies like South Africa or Rhodesia, and just like there the oppression of the black majority produced racial and social tension that spilled into violence.

However, as with most conflicts, the social and political cleavages in Kenya were not as simple as black Africans versus white Africans or European Settlers. Indeed, it is often cast as not only an independence movement, but a civil war between minority tribes, those Kikuyu who had gained power under British rule, and the greater Kikuyu tribe. By the late 1950's many Mau Mau leaders were dead or imprisoned, and the

31 G. H Mungeam. “Masai and Kikuyu Responses to the Establishment of British Administration in the East Africa Protectorate.” The Journal of African History 11, no. 1 (1970): 135. The Kikuyu opposition to colonial rule had been ongoing, if sporadic since that time. Interestingly, the co-option or placation of the Masai by the British also hearkens back to this time. The choice of the Masai over the majority Kikuyu would have long-term repercussions.

rebellion mostly subdued. It was in this period that a period of negotiations and political arrangements were made that sped up Kenyan self-rule while maintaining the Kenyan-British relationship and ensuring that the Soviet influence did not replace Western.

**British Domestic Variables**

The conflict and violence during the Mau Mau Uprising (alternately “The Kenyan Emergency”) occurred at a time when the British public was beset by many other international crises, including two that had much further reaching implications for Britain (the Cold War and the Suez crisis). Perhaps this is the reason that the happenings in Kenya never dominated the news. When a renewal of violence by members of the Kikuyu tribe began in the late 1940's, the initial response by the British colonial government was to write it off as merely criminal activity. It was not until the Governor of Kenya retired and was replaced in 1952 that his replacement began to characterize the violence as something more organized and rebellious in nature and then sounded the alarm to the colonial office in London.

As part of the original outline for potential indicators of the "host state institutions variable group," the online archives of the *The Times* were sampled for

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34 This was something that was anecdotally noticed during the sampling of the newspaper articles from 1949, that there were no results for kenya+insurgency, +uprising, +rebellion, etc, with many results for kenya+crime or +criminal."
content related to “Kenya” during the conflict years. In the absence of polling data, a sampling of newspaper archives complemented by a review of Parliamentary archives should show if there was significant opposition to political and military involvement in Kenya (given the hypothesis that domestic support of an external intervention is a factor in potential success). To conduct this sampling, twenty randomly selected newspaper articles were analyzed bi-yearly from 1952 to 1960. The interpreted results were coded as either, “1” supportive of involvement or policy in Kenya, “-1”: critical or questioning of involvement, methods, or policy in Kenya, and “0”: other if they presented both views, or were not overtly related to either a supportive or critical narrative. These results were mostly related to topic such as infrastructure projects, pension issues for crown employees in Kenya, mentions of Kenya in a manner that is unrelated to the Mau Mau rebellion, basic news reporting of the situation in Kenya that is not explicitly skewed one way or another, or any other administratively concerned line of questioning.

The London Times online archives were obtained through the Utah State University Merrill-Cazier electronic archive collection. The Times was selected because it had the largest circulation among national non-tabloid newspapers in Britain during the time period.
The results graphed in Table 1 show two sudden changes (Supportive during the second half of 1954, Critical during the first half of 1959). Historical events that may correlate with these jumps were Operation Anvil in 1954 where large numbers of alleged Mau Mau insurgents were killed and captured, several cases of abuse alleged against British forces in 1959, and political negotiations between the colonial government, European settlers and the African opposition in 1958-60. Interestingly, much of the criticism pointed towards British governmental policy in Kenya during the latter part of the conflict came from those sympathetic with the cause of European
settlers in Kenya who feared loss of control due to the British policy of Kenyan home rule.

Parliamentary records also provide an insight into the domestic perception of the Kenyan conflict in Britain. Indeed, it was frequently a topic of discussion with over 5,000 results for “Kenya” found in the Hansard parliamentary archives from 1952-1960.

To help add to the context presented by the newspaper sampling, a non-random sample of the parliamentary archives was analyzed in order to understand the main legislative points of disagreement over Kenya policy. The months chosen for this were July of 1953 and November of 1959. 1953 was the year that the head of the military mission to Kenya arrived on station, and the real beginning of the campaign against the Mau Mau. The last part of 1959 was the height of the negotiations between the African majority and the British government as to constitutional reform and the nature of the soon to be independent Kenyan state.

Analysis of the discussion related to Kenya found that the majority were of administrative nature (63%), a large percentage critical of the efforts in Kenya (35%), and small minority supportive (2%). This information is roughly congruent with the political situation at the time, with the Labour opposition seen as generally being much more opposed to maintaining colonial possessions that the Conservative government.36

November of 1959 brought about a similar amount of the discussion being related to mostly administrative items (76%) with the next most common opinion being supportive

(16%), and only a minority (8%) being seen as being critical. Much of the actual debate related to whether or not supposed British citizens (usually referring specifically to African Kenyans) were receiving their rights as British citizens, the treatment of those Kenyans in the detainments camps, and whether the high number of African Kenyan casualties was a result of potentially criminal action.\(^{37}\)

The raw information taken from this set of sources may initially make it look like that legislative sentiment had come to more fully support British policy and methods in 1959 than in 1953. While this does indeed seem to be the case, this is merely because the end result of British policy (under the Conservative government and especially after the ‘56 Suez debacle) for Kenya and most colonial possessions in general led toward self-rule for colonial possession, without allowing them to fall under Soviet influence. It is reasonable to assume that this increase in support was because the opposition Labour party’s support for decolonization now mirrored that of the government.\(^{38}\) The situation in Kenya just showed that the overall process was moving too slowly, and the planned date of 1975 was seen as untenable based on interpretation of the situation on the ground in Kenya by the British Governor-General Sir Evelyn Baring and the British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs Alan Lennox-Boyd.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{37}\) On the 8th of July 1953 Mr. Paget, a Labour MP from Northampton from 1945-1974 asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what he had to say about “the violent death of 51 of Her Majesty's subjects in Keya...” in regards to a report of 51 Mau Mau rebels being killed, and if it could be proved that they were “criminals taken with arms in their hands...”

British policy toward Kenya even prior to the Mau Mau rebellion was of eventual Kenyan home-rule. Indeed, then Governor of Kenya Philip Mitchell explicitly stated as much to the Kenyan legislature on June 13, 1952. General British policy at this time was heavily shaped by two issues; that it had been bankrupted by successive world wars, and the rise of the Labour party in 1945, and the policy of self-rule reflected this. The lack of financial resources and the Labour party's commitment to establishing a social welfare state began to accelerate the processes of decolonization that began with the Dominion system in the 1920's, and finally the Commonwealth system introduced in 1949. While the British conservative party felt that British power could be maintained for some time with external possessions, the failed Suez Canal intervention in 1956 spelled the end of this dissent.

By 1959, a series of land and political reform initiatives that were formulated to address some land inequality issues as well as hasten Kenyan self-rule and universal franchise for Kenyans had been implemented. Much of the root of legislative dissatisfaction with British policy in Kenya, and indeed colonial Britain in general, had been about the glacial pace of disengagement at a time when the prevailing sentiment in Britain flowed toward withdrawal from overseas possessions. Much of the remaining legislative dissatisfaction seems based on prior issues of prisoner treatment in the


internment camps and political inequality, rather than with the expressed goals of the British colonial administration (stable transition to Kenyan self-rule).\textsuperscript{42}

The combination of several different domestic factors enabled a situation where the British government was able to pursue their policy of gradual disengagement from Kenya in accordance with a performance or goal oriented timeline, in order to ensure a stable transition to home-rule. These factors included governmental policies that supported the type of commitment given in Kenya, as well as ones directed as preventing communist encroachment in former colonial possessions. They also included a public somewhat favorable to these types of graduated withdrawals in overseas possessions.

\textit{Supplementary Actors in the Mau Mau Uprising}

The supplementary actor variable grouping refers to potential actors that are not directly involved in the conflict, but still have the potential to affect the conflict in question due to nature of their geographic location, or perceived self-interest in the outcome. For the Kenyan Emergency, the likely supplementary actors are regional neighbors, and potential external allies and enemies of the major belligerents (Britain and the Mau Mau).

\textsuperscript{42}On November 2 1959 MP Wedgewood Benn had this to say “In Africa, the word ‘extremist’ means a man who believes that the Africans are entitled to the same full social, political and economic rights as the white man.”
The specific timing of the Mau Mau Uprising had a significant effect on the lack of external interest in the conflict. The spread of independence movements throughout the colonial world, the challenges of self-governance for recent members of post-colonial states, existing regional conflict, and the emerging cold war all played a part in the relative isolation of this conflict.

To the south of Kenya Colony, as it was termed by the British at the time of the Mau Mau rebellion, was another British possession Tanganyika (modern day Tanzania). The relationship between the indigenous people here and the British colonial government was fraught with tension, but the rebellion in Kenya never spread south. There are numerous potential reasons for this, with the most likely perhaps being related to how the British gained the possession, the different tribal structure, or different British colonial policy in Tanganyika.

The British took Tanganyika from the Germans in the aftermath of World War One. Prior to the war, there had been an indigenous rebellion that was brutally put down by German colonial forces. This coupled with the "scorched earth" campaign waged by the Germans against the British during World War One, it seems more than plausible that British rule might have been considered an improvement.

Additionally, the plight of the Kikuyu might also not have been as appealing to the Sukuma and Tatoga tribes who were the largest tribes in Tanganyika. It is also possible that the local administration structure employed by Governor Donald Cameron
promised enough as to delay unrest. Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia were also preoccupied with their own internal independence movements, or engaged in conflict with each other, as was the case with Ethiopia and Somalia.

With the international community now reduced to two competing cleavages, and the threat of global nuclear war omnipresent, there was little international interest in the happenings in Kenya. Indeed, with Britain's traditional colonial rivals now aligned with them in NATO (France and West Germany), the Soviet Union busy in Europe (and not to enter into Africa until the 1970's.) Britain truly was able to operate in Kenya with no outside interference.

That Britain's potential rivals, and the people and governments of the surrounding countries were caught up in their own problems is certainly an important factor. As has been noted, it has often been part of counterinsurgency doctrine to deny the insurgents external support, and most importantly, any type of sanctuary that might be given by neighboring states. Past failed attempts at defeating insurgencies have often been unable to deny the insurgent groups "safe haven", as happened in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

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43 Donald Cameron. “Native Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika.” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 36, no. 146 (1937): 4-7. The article is a collection of his thoughts behind the formation of the local administration policy in Tanganyika based on his personal experiences.

Kenyan Institutions

By the mid-1950's, it had become obvious to members of the British colonial administration that barring an unlikely long-term addition of resources to Kenya, the current power structure in Kenya was untenable. As a result, political concessions, such as enacting open elections (guaranteeing black African control in a representative government rather than the white minority), were made that seem an obvious attempt to encourage the portion of the population that was not actively involved in the rebellion, and undermine those who were.

If the British were to maintain a friendly relationship with the coming black African Kenyan government as well as creating a stable situation post-exit, they would need to make political transitions at a rate that was conducive to maintaining that desired relationship. This relationship appears to have become much more important than the more arbitrary timeline that had been envisioned earlier (with self-rule to come sometime in the 1970's). As discussed prior, the British government had been long enacting policies directed at eventual self-rule in overseas possessions, and upon the recommendation of Colonial officials in Kenya, this timeline was significantly reduced.

By the early 1960's, in conjunction with an aggressive military campaign against the Mau Mau and land reform initiatives, political power was handed over to the majority black Kenyan population. This was done by implementing “one man-one vote” style voting reforms, which led to the creation of the Kenyan National Assembly in 1962. Since that time, this assembly has been resilient, acting as the sole legislative body in
Kenya, presiding over several constitutional changes, and electoral transfers of power for over forty years. This has not been without problems, as the legislature has often been seen as a subservient branch of government to the Executive.\textsuperscript{45}

The current Kenyan Defense Forces and Kenyan Police Service are both relics of British Colonial Rule, hailing from forces created with British assistance both prior to and immediately after Kenyan independence (the Kenyan Air Force and Navy).\textsuperscript{46} While being accused of both high levels of corruption, and human rights abuses, they have continued on in the same basic structure that they were under colonial rule, even maintaining the rank system. It seems likely that this was done because the vast majority of the colonial Kenyan police and military forces were black Africans, with British leadership relegated to senior positions in what was a typical structure for British colonial forces across the entire empire.

The present day Kenyan judiciary has its roots in the legal system enacted by the East Africa Protectorate in the late 1890's. Prior to independence, the position of Chief Justice was held by British members of the colonial government, with the first black African Chief justice coming only several years after the transition. Much like the other governmental institutions discussed, the framework that was created prior to

\textsuperscript{45} M. Tamarkin. “The Roots of Political Stability in Kenya.” \textit{African Affairs} 77, no. 308 (1978):300-01. That there have been periods of unrest and violence in Kenya post-independence is undisputable. What is relevant here is the institutional continuity of the National Assembly and that voting (with admitted bouts of post-election violence) has decided political change, without significant interference by their former colonial rulers.

independence continued in use after it was gained, with the only major change being the addition of black Africans in the highest positions. While enjoying longevity, relevance, and some level of authority (if not high levels of legitimacy), the Kenyan judiciary has long been the target of criticism related to judicial independence from the executive and allegations of corruption.  

Kenyan state institutions have collectively demonstrated longevity and increasing levels of legitimacy (as constituted by periodic reforms enacted by referendums) that they have been able to remain the vehicles for political transition, representation, national and internal defense, and criminal justice. While all of these institutions have experienced criticism based on corruption, human rights violations, and lack of independence, they have endured from colonial times.

Findings for the Mau Mau Uprising

The specific circumstances, social and political, surrounding the Mau Mau rebellion undoubtedly created an environment that allowed the conflict to play out the way it did. The dearth of supplementary actors particular to the Kenyan Emergency is something that is mostly unheard of in the muddled world of geopolitics and external counterinsurgency operations.

47 Julie Ouma Oseka. “Judicial Independence in Kenya: Constitutional Challenges and Opportunities for Reform.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leicester, 2012. 12-13. https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/27703. This dissertation reviews the Kenyan judiciary and discusses the changes made to it in the 2010 constitution that were meant to address issues of judicial independence.
In many past conflicts, the ability of insurgent groups to obtain weapons and training from third parties, or find safe ground where their enemies could not target (or could only do so intermittently or with great difficulty) them has been seen as vital in the outcome. The existence of insurgent sanctuaries and external support is generally considered to have greatly influenced the outcomes during the Vietnam War, the Rhodesian insurgency, and Afghanistan (2001-present).

The primacy of the struggle between the USSR and the United States in Eastern Europe on the international stage coupled with Britain receding from international prominence, effectively allowed Britain to operate unencumbered by outside interference in Kenya. This being the case, it is judged that supplementary actors had little involvement in the Mau Mau rebellion, this having a positive contribution to British success.

The 1950's were a time of great change for Britain domestically. Financial difficulties exacerbated by expensive world wars and newly implemented social programs were, among other things, accelerating the rate of the decolonization of the British Empire. While the rebellion in Kenya certainly was a topic of discussion, it seems that it never seemed to dominate the British national consciousness. For example, in July of 1953, a search of The Times digital archive returns almost three times as many results for “Soviet” than for “Kenya.” It seems likely that this relative lack of interest was due in part to other major events during this decade. The fact that Britain was concurrently involved in the Western-Soviet stalemate in Eastern Europe, the Malaysian
Emergency, The Korean War, and the disastrous Suez incident all during the same time period also is very likely to have distracted the attention of the general public from Kenya.

That is not to say that there was no conversation, as when the Conservative government returned to Whitehall, the Labor opposition was very vocal about issues with the internment camps and lack of civil liberties suffered by what they considered to be British citizens. However, even those MP's who spoke out in Parliament, and the citizens who wrote opinion pieces in The Times that questioned the methods being used by British forces in Kenya were not opposed to the overall policy of managed decolonization. Much of their dissent was based on what they perceived as heavy-handed tactics and high numbers of dead Kenyans relative to the numbers captured. It was not until it had become apparent that the new Kenyan government would be dominated by African Kenyans that a paternalistic criticism of the ability of African Kenyans to immediately take complete control of the government emerged.

In the case of the Mau Mau rebellion, domestic British issues seemed to have a significant impact on the direction the COIN campaign took in Kenya. Economic issues, existing policy precedent, the rise of the Labour party, and the final nail in the coffin—the public backlash over the failed Suez intervention, made it very easy for the government to continue with the policy of colonial disengagement. Such a policy made it much simpler for the British government to meet their objectives than if they had decided to maintain full control of Kenya.
The evidence presented shows that British domestic variables played a significant role in framing the goals and strategy for the conflict in Kenya, as well sustaining the chosen approach until the conclusion. The general acceptance for overall British policy in Kenya publically and in the government, provided an environment where the level of commitment was based on such performance measures as electoral, judicial, and land reform, negotiations between European and African Kenyans, and Kenyan involvement in the political process. Domestic conditions in the governmental, policy, and public realms enabled this.

The internal political and governmental institutions of Kenya have mostly managed to survive the transition from the colonial era to present times. The Kenyan police, Army, and Navy are all descended from British created and structured organizations and exist in much the same form as they did in the 1950's, the major changes only being racial integration.

The Kenyan judiciary is also a remnant of colonial-era government, also having experienced racial integration, and constitutionally mandated changes several times. It survived independence and constitutional change but has also suffered from concerns about executive branch influence. The legislature of Kenya is a direct descendant of the white dominated legislature that existed prior to independence. Concessions made by the colonial administration during the Mau Mau rebellion included voting reforms that

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48 Britain was also attempting to maintain good relationships with former colonies as a measure to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in those places. This created additional positive pressure to pursue a political transition in such a way to keep the British-Kenyan relationship alive. This was successful, as post-independence Kenya allowed British Military training to occur in Kenya, Military flyover rights, etc.
ensured future elections would lead to a Black majority legislature that reflected the actual population.

The fact that the military, police, legislative, and judicial organizations that were founded under British colonial governance survived the transition to self-rule, constitutional change, and regional hubris is remarkable. It seems probable that Britain's ability to help create and then transition these institutions to Kenyan self-rule had a positive effect on their ability to undermine the cause of the insurgency, encourage political participation as a method to achieve goals, and then prevent Kenya from falling into the Soviet sphere post-independence or disintegrate politically. This is in line with the stated goals of the mechanism that the British used to pursue stable decolonization, The Commonwealth of Nations.49

In early 1899 a young Private from a Nebraskan Volunteer Infantry Regiment fired several rounds at what was thought to be several advancing members of General Emilio Aguinaldo's newly made Philippine Revolutionary Army, kicking off a war between the US troops and the Filipino revolutionary army. As part of the wider Spanish-American War, General Aguinaldo had been coordinating the rebel campaign with United States forces in the campaign against Spanish troops, but soon after the fall of Manila President McKinley announced that the United States was annexing the Philippines after negotiations with Spain.

Immediately after the true nature of the agreement between the United States and Spain was unintentionally leaked by an American officer, Aguinaldo announced that any attempt by the United States to take control would mean war. The Filipino revolutionary and various semi-affiliated forces were quickly engaged and pushed into retreat by the attacking American forces. Apparently, Aguinaldo quickly realized that his poorly equipped forces were no match for the weapons of the newly arrived American troops, and made preparations for a transition to a guerrilla war.

While the move to guerrilla tactics did impede American forces temporarily, Aguinaldo was captured by a combined force of U.S. aligned Filipino soldiers and U.S. troops in March of 1901. While several of Aguinaldo's generals and other guerrilla forces

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held out (most for a couple years, a few for almost a decade), the majority of the fighting was finished by late 1902.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{American Domestic Variables}

The idea of imperialism was a topic fraught with controversy during the dawn of the 20th century. Even in Congress there was considerable debate about external possessions at this point in American history, having suddenly become an important issue because the war with Spain necessitated dealing with Spanish possessions, most importantly Cuba and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{52} According to Timothy Deady, senior officers in the rebel army fully understood this, and part of their guerrilla strategy was to play off this uncertainty by inflicting enough casualties to the invading Americans prior to the 1900 election to alter its outcome.\textsuperscript{53} While these hopes did not come to fruition, as McKinley won his election, this was not mere miscalculation on the part of the Filipino rebel leadership, as to the level of contentiousness about American involvement in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} John M. Gates. “Philippine Guerillas, American Anti-Imperialists...” p. 52.
\end{itemize}
The archives of *The New York Times* were sampled in a similar manner as was done for the conflict in Kenya.\(^{55}\) Using the search term “Philippines,” twenty articles were randomly selected from the total results on a quarterly basis for the duration of the conflict. The results were coded as “1” if they were deemed supportive of US policy toward the Philippines or the intervention, “-1” if they were deemed critical of this, and “0” if they presented both views or were not overtly related to either a supportive or critical narrative.

Table 2, *New York Times* Archive Sample

\[\text{New York Times Archive Sample}\]

\[\text{Supportive} \quad \text{Critical}\]

\[\begin{array}{c|cc|cc|cc}
\text{YEARS} & 1899 & 1900 & 1901 & 1902 \\
\hline
\text{NUMBER OF ARTICLES} & 8 & 7 & 6 & 5 \\
\end{array}\]

\(^{55}\) *The New York Times* was selected because of its status as a high-circulation national newspaper that adhered more to an informational style of newspaper writing that was mostly unique in the United States at a time when “yellow” journalism was popular: Michael Schudson, *Discovering The News: A Social History Of American Newspapers*, page 5.
Much as what was observed with the results from the Kenya sampling, specific jumps in the number of results can be correlated with historical events. The high level of supportive results during the last quarter of 1900 occurred during the tail end of the successful re-election campaign of pro-interventionist President McKinley. Likewise, the lowest results for critical results came after McKinley’s reelection. It seems reasonable to assume that at that specific time, the debate over the intervention had either declined in importance relative to something else or was considered settled for the time being. The jump during the middle of 1901 happened after the capture of the leader of the Philippine opposition, General Aguinaldo. By the end of 1901, the majority of the reviewed samples were related to administrative issues, civil service opportunities in the Philippines, trade information, and missionary work.

For additional context the Congressional Record of the 56th Congress (first session) were analyzed to obtain a better understanding of the main points of contention between those in government who were supportive or critical of U.S. involvement in the Philippine conflict.\textsuperscript{56} The record of the 56th Congress, first session (Volume XXXIII, Part V) begins in April of 1900, during the reelection campaign of President William McKinley. Over half of the instances of discussion on the Philippines were related to administrative or non-partisan discussion (65%). Of the remaining instances, the majority were critical (21%), and the minority supportive (14%). The major point of contention was whether U.S. presence in the Philippines constituted an

act of Imperialism, ala Great Britain. This argument appeared to be split down party
tlines, with Democrats vocalizing almost all of the criticism, and Republicans voicing the
support. At some point in time between April 1900 and President McKinley's reelection,
it must have become either a lesser issue or the level of support for the intervention
grew, as he was re-elected by a healthy margin. The assertion that this conflict was
initially contentious but ultimately not of primary importance politically or socially,
when in fact economic issues and the gold standard vs. silver coinage argument was the
most important issue at the time. 57 58

While there was clear opposition among anti-imperialists and the Democratic
Party to U.S. involvement in the Philippines, it seems clear that the majority of the
American people either did not consider it the matter of primary importance, or
supported the involvement, and this opposition never seriously threatened the resolve
of the McKinley administration in conducting this war, and did not impact his re-
election. Indeed, there was plenty of either paternalistic or racist opinions voiced in the
newspaper sampling and the Congressional Record that Filipinos needed American
guidance before they could be trusted with self-governance.

The domestic political and public support for the policies of intervention (in
Puerto Rico, Cuba, as well as the Philippines) pursued by the McKinley government were
vital in allowing the continued execution of the counterinsurgency operation in the


58 Frank Freidel. “Dissent in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection.” Proceedings of
Philippines. If McKinley had lost reelection it is likely, based on the platform of the Democratic Party at the time, that had he lost the incoming president would have ended the commitment, and perhaps even turned power over to Aguinaldo and the Philippine Revolutionary Army.

**Supplementary Actors in the Philippine Insurrection**

Prior to the Spanish-American war, the Philippines had been under mostly Spanish control since 1565. After the Spanish were defeated, the 1898 Treaty of Paris ceded control of the Philippines from Spain to the United States for a sum of twenty million dollars. During this particular time period, European involvement in such far away areas as East Asia and Oceania was frequent. Germany, Britain, France, Japan, and other lesser powers all vied for influence and control in these areas.

Britain, at perhaps her zenith of Imperial power and reach, was deeply involved in the region and had strong reason to become involved in the aftermath of the Spanish regional exit. However, for reasons explained by Geoffrey Seed, Britain saw Germany as their biggest potential rival and were somewhat enthusiastic at the American emergence.59

That Germany had slightly interjected itself into the conflict between Spain and the United States in the Philippines all but ensured that Britain would come down on

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the American side, thus removing a potential agitator in the coming conflict.\textsuperscript{60} Perhaps it was Britain's tacit approval of the American intervention, but with the exception of the small incident of German interference during the ending stages of the Spanish-American War, the United States was left to do what they would in the Philippines. In circumstances tinged with the type of irony that has become all too common in the present, the only outside military assistance (the U.S. Navy controlled the surrounding ocean) the rebels were able to get was from the United States while they were allied against the Spanish before the Treaty of Paris, or ones they captured from American forces later on.\textsuperscript{61}

The inability of the Filipino rebels to cultivate external support through supplementary actors allowed the American forces to starve them of weapons and equipment. Whether it was outside indifference or the U.S. Naval blockade, rebel forces were unable to get outside help in re-equipping after their disastrous conventional campaign. Isolated by geography and lack of modern equipment, one by one the different rebel groups were isolated and defeated.


Filipino Institutions

During the latter stages of the war, and as “pacification” programs showed progress, U.S. Military political control of Filipino provinces was handed over to civilian rule, the organizational foundations of which became the local government system under the control of the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs after the war. At the same time, a judicial system and Supreme Court were created along the lines of the American system, with both Filipino and American members. Eventually, the courts were fully “Filipinized” when the constitution of 1935 was ratified by the Filipino legislature.\textsuperscript{62} The Philippine Bill of 1902 set forward a path for the creations of an elected legislature (as long as US authority was accepted-- for now), and would lead to the Jones act of 1916 which announced that the U.S.A. would gradually allow full self-rule and eventually independence for the Philippines.\textsuperscript{63}

The acceptance by the majority of the Filipino people of American control was the result of the “carrot and stick” approach of the Bill of 1902 and the subsequent iterations. Assured somewhat that independence would come, and mollified by increasing self-rule, these American created institutions were accepted by the majority of the people, and function to this day.\textsuperscript{64}


While the lineage of the civilian government of the Philippines is easy to trace, the Philippine military is slightly harder. While the present day Philippine Army is a direct descendant of the Philippine Scout branch of the U.S. Army in structure and practice, ideologically they claim to be the descended from the revolutionary army that fought the U.S. occupation. 65 This is a departure from a usually very cordial (and especially close in the post-9/11 COIN world) relationship with the United States Military cultivated over the decades-long occupation of the Philippines. It is also important to note that during the execution of the campaign, and this continued through the decade after, the Philippine military increasingly took the lead during operations over U.S. forces.

The national police forces are similarly descended from American created institutions during the war era (the Philippine Constabulary), but there was no identity issue to be easily discerned as there were with the Army. The Constabulary was merged with the Integrated National Police in the late 1970’s, and once again with the Philippine National Police in the 1990’s. 66

The currently existing civil government, military, and police forces that form the major political and defense institutions of Filipino society are directly descended from the organizations that were formed by the U.S. Civil and Military government during the


Philippine Insurrection and the years immediately following. That these institutions have shown such longevity and only marginally changed structure show how effectively the American civil and military forces were able to entice the majority of the Filipino population into accepting and incorporating a certain level of American presence into their society.

*Findings for the Philippine Insurrection*

While many in the United States supported the war with Spain for a variety of reasons, including that they saw Spain as an imperial power exploiting countries like Cuba, taking the “spoils” of that war did not prove as popular. Being election time, it seems likely that if President McKinley thought that the potential (and later actual) level of outcry would harm his chances, he probably would have altered course. Indeed, his opponent William Bryan made anti-imperialism a part of his platform. 67

The initial public and political backlash experienced in the wake of the Spanish-American war (based on the resulting interventions and entanglements in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam) eventually subsided as the United States transitioned from a regional power to a global actor. While a substantial anti-imperialist bloc did emerge in the north-east United States and among Democrats in the legislature, the whole situation subsided into a lesser issue as the “imperialistic” President McKinley

was re-elected by a large margin.\textsuperscript{68} His subsequent assassination by an anarchist did little to reverse the trend as noted interventionist and Vice President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt succeeded him.

That there was significant political and social opposition to the war in the Philippines is undeniable. The Filipino resistance knew of this and tried to exploit it by attempting to increase American casualties in the run-up to the U.S. Presidential election. Taking into account the political circumstances, and how little the furor ended up impacting the elections or the American involvement in the Philippines in general it is hard to say otherwise, other than that what outcry did exist, it did not cause policy to be altered. Adding to this is that the American government continued their occupation and control (in decreasing amounts) of the Philippines until 1946. Given the observed outcomes, the balance of public and political support points toward there being more support for the intervention than there was against it, leading to the McKinley re-election, and the continued pursuit of the counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines.

The uncontroversial and integral role that the civil government of the Philippines (a relic of American involvement) continues to play shows that the Filipino people to a significant degree came to accept the role that the United States played in controlling their journey to self-rule, and eventually independence. Similarly, large parts of the current military and police forces (the Army, Navy, and National Police) of the

\textsuperscript{68} Thomas A. Bailey. "Was the Presidential Election..." p. 44-45.
Philippines are direct descendants of organizations created by American colonial administrators. While there is some attempt to identify with the forces that were defeated by the U.S. (in the Filipino Army), the continued close relationships maintained between the American Military and the Filipino Military would probably not exist if they (the U.S. Military) were not seen as a legitimate and accepted partner even after the Philippine-American War and subsequent occupation.

The complete lack of external interference in the Philippine-American War significantly enhanced the ability of the Americans to prevail against the Filipino insurgency. The rebels were unable to gain access to modern weapons, were not able to resupply after losses, and were not able to communicate with other rebel groups. Other regional and global powers did not attempt to interfere or alter the balance on the ground. In the conjunction with geographic isolation (the Philippines is an island chain) and the U.S. Navy’s control of the surrounding waters the forces on the ground were able to focus inward against the increasingly isolated and weakened insurgent forces.
THE IRAQ WAR (2003-2011)

After the attack on the World Trade Center in late 2001, the United States implemented a plan to combat global terrorism that they dubbed “the war on terror.” As a part of this series of campaigns, Afghanistan was invaded, and other states that the U.S. Government considered sponsors of terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and North Korea, among others) were targeted with sanctions and other forms of political pressure.

In a move that has been heavily criticized (though much of it has been in hindsight), the United States entered into a confrontation with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, over issues with UN-mandated restrictions on weapons and so-called “weapons inspectors” whose presence was accepted by Saddam at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. When additional claims were made by the United States that Iraq was maintaining and attempting to expand stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons (WMD’s or weapons of mass destruction), and evading the weapons inspectors, the situation devolved rapidly.

In March of 2003, a massive bombing campaign targeting Iraqi command and control infrastructure was begun by the United States and a Coalition of friendly forces, much to the chagrin of many other countries, including France and Germany—normally allies of the United States. Immediately after, a coordinated special operations and

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ground force assault started moving against Iraq’s armed forces. In less than a month’s time, the Iraqi armed forces had been defeated, and the majority of the Iraqi government either capitulated or went into hiding. It appeared that the invasion had been an amazing success, with the total destruction of the Iraqi military, and the capture of all of Iraq’s major cities at the cost of relatively few casualties among the American and Coalition forces.

Indeed, if this had been the end of it, the Iraq War would have gone down as one of the great American military feats of the modern era, along with Desert Shield/Storm and the invasion of Normandy. Twice, in the space of little more than a decade the United States had apparently defeated one of the largest militaries in the world, a feat that many said would be easier said than done. Unfortunately, things quickly began to unravel after these early successes.

In what will undoubtedly go down as one of the biggest “I told you so” moments in history, in 2002 the then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, told Congress that “several hundred thousand troops would be need to secure Iraq.” As things began to play out in the post-invasion Iraq, another 150,000 troops may well have been the difference. But that wasn’t the only thing that contributed to the mess that erupted, as soon after the invasion was complete, troop levels in Iraq were immediately drawn

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Days after the fall of Baghdad, mass looting and violence had broken out, and the American and Coalition forces available were too few to properly prevent it. Besides petty crime and vandalism, large quantities of weapons and explosives were stolen from abandoned Iraqi military bases, which would fuel the coming insurgency.

When the insurgency erupted, it was a mixture of former Iraqi military and paramilitary forces, and various Jihadi and Islamic extremist groups. While these patchworks of groups were often at odds with each other, they managed to inflict tens of thousands of casualties among U.S. and Coalition forces, and the Iraqi population. While the United States attempted to deal with them with a variety of tactics, increasing American domestic pressure to end to war finally caused them to withdraw from Iraq in 2011, claiming to have left a stable Iraqi government in place.

By 2014 around one third of Iraq, including her “second city” Mosul, had been lost and the Iraqi Army fallen back in disarray in the face of a network of insurgent groups led by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (formerly known as As Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, or the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), a group who had been fighting U.S. and new Iraqi Army forces since 2003.

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American Domestic Variables

That the War in Iraq has been a major foreign and domestic policy issue for the United States since the invasion of Iraq was announced is hard to dispute, having been a topic of public interest over much of the world, and has altered relationships between the United States and several continental European nations. In order to get part of the larger picture of domestic attitudes toward the war in Iraq, the same type of newspaper sampling that was done with the conflicts in Kenya and the Philippines was done with the Iraq War. For the Iraq War, the sample size was twenty articles at a bi-yearly rate for the duration of the U.S. involvement in the conflict.

Table 3, New York Times Archive Sample 2

![Graph showing support and critical articles over time](image)

73 Archives of The New York Times were chosen as they had the second highest circulation in the United States among daily high market newspapers. The Wall Street Journal (#1) was not selected because of its focus on business and economic issues.
Popular opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center roughly correlate with the declining opinion of the Iraq War as indicated by the *New York* Times sample. According to their published accounts, public opinion supporting the War in Iraq started above 70%, dropped to less than 50% by 2005, and slowly eroded to less than 40% by 2008.⁷⁴

That intervening in Iraq was a popular move in early 2003 is probably a reflection of the type of sentiment that swept over the United States after the World Trade Center attack in 2001. According to another PEW poll, during the beginning stages of the invasion of Iraq 74% of those polled thought the U.S. made the right decision by initiating hostilities.⁷⁵ By 2006 that same number dropped below 50%, and right before election time 2008 it had further fallen to around 40%.⁷⁶ This particular survey also had only 37% of respondents thinking that the U.S. had “mostly succeeded” in achieving its goals in Iraq.⁷⁷ There wasn’t just public support, but also political support for intervening

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⁷⁶ Ibid. 1.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 2.
in Iraq, as the majority of the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to support it.\textsuperscript{78}

The specific reason that turned public and political opinion against the Iraq War is not clearly stated, but likely had to do with a combination of economic pressure and that positive gains in the conflict were not visible. By the 2006 U.S. midterm elections, the majority of voters felt that national issues were more important than local, and of them, most felt that the war in Iraq was the most important issue.\textsuperscript{79} This trend continued up to the 2008 Presidential campaign when the most important issue for likely voters was the economy. The leading Democratic candidate and eventual victor, Barack Obama, said that he opposed the Iraq War from the start and that he would end that war if elected.\textsuperscript{80} The reason for the economy overtaking the Iraq War as the largest issue was likely related to a developing global financial crisis that cost the U.S. economy over 20 trillion dollars (Government Accountability Office study GAO-13-180).\textsuperscript{81}

Certain policy changes that came with the changing of the U.S. President also favored a withdrawal from Iraq. When Barack Obama criticized the war during his


campaign, it then became likely that the commitment to the policies that had led to the Iraq War would be stepped back from (the Global War on Terror) after his victory. Three years after he was elected President, Barack Obama withdrew the last combat troops from Iraq, and announced that the war was finally over. With such an easily traceable trajectory, it seems to not be a stretch to say that a combination of economic issues and the perceived lack of progress in Iraq let to public and political opinion moving against the Iraq War, which led to the eventual exit in 2011.

The change in public focus to economic issues during the latter part of the decade shifted the public’s focus from security issues, and chipped away at public support for external interventions. Additionally, the change in power that occurred in 2008, from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, undermined legislative support for the preventative engagement policies that set the conditions for the initial involvement in Iraq. These situations led to the length and type of the commitment given by the United States and their Coalition to be time or date related rather than performance or condition related. The eventual outcome of this was that transitions were made in the civil and military institutions of Iraq from U.S. control to Iraqi control before those institutions were capable of operating independently, or with lessened oversight.

Supplementary Actors in the Iraq War

Unlike the situations in Kenya and the Philippines, there was no shortage of supplementary actors with interest and the ability to significantly influence the conflict in Iraq. Not only was Iraq involved in conflicts with the United States, they had complicated relationships with many of their neighbors. While there were many different dynamics involved in this conflict that attracted regional attention, there were a few that were more influential than others.

First, Iraq was a Shia majority country that was ruled by a somewhat secular Sunni elite. In the 1980’s Iraq fought a bloody war (in which the U.S. supported Iraq) with their neighbor Iran. Since that time, Iran has wanted change the political dynamic in Iraq to where the Iraqi Shia majority would have more clout. Such a government would theoretically be friendlier to Iranian interests, which would not be farfetched given the role that Iran plays in the Shia world.83

The U.S. invasion of Iraq indirectly helped further Iranian interests by removing one of their strongest regional rivals from power (Saddam Hussein), and made it easier for them to exert influence among the previously marginalized Iraqi Shia. To further their goals in Iraq, Iran armed Shia militia groups that then targeted U.S. forces, while also providing training, equipment and safe havens for those same groups.84

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84 Brian Fishman... p. 8, 10.
Syria is another neighbor that has involved itself in the conflict. While perhaps not as overtly involved as Iran had been, in the early days of the insurgency the Syrian government openly allowed Syrian and foreign fighters with money to cross the border into Iraq.\textsuperscript{85} It has also been alleged that members of Syrian intelligence organizations have worked with AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) to facilitate attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq.\textsuperscript{86}

There was also significant opposition to the U.S. and Coalition invasion of Iraq among the international community, with the secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, saying that the war was not conducted in accordance with the U.N. charter, and therefor “illegal.”\textsuperscript{87}

With the Iranian and Syrian borders open, foreign fighters, money, and weapons flooded into Iraq, while those in Iraq often crossed the borders to get military training in Iran. Unlike in Kenya and the Philippines, the intervening forces inside Iraq were never able to geographically and financially isolate the insurgency they were fighting. To complicate matters further, insurgents were able to maintain safe havens in Syria and Iran as well as specific neighborhoods inside Iraq for internal political reasons (which would subsequently require periodic clearing operations).\textsuperscript{88}


Such problems fundamentally changed the nature of the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq as opposed to Kenya and the Philippines. The insurgents were never short of weapons or equipment, were able to maintain safe areas, and were connected to supporters and each other through modern communications networks. Subsequently the insurgents were never truly defeated.

_Iraqi Institutions_

One of the major issues that caused problems for the newly formed institutions that made up the new Iraqi government was that they had to compete with, and share power with, legacy social, political, and institutions. These were older institutions such as the Ba’ath Party, former Iraqi military and intelligence groups, tribal, religious identities, and of course, the Kurdish political parties in the north.

Another was that when U.S. and coalition forces took over control of the Iraqi government, two of the first things they did was bar former Ba’ath Party members from participating in the new government, and disband the Iraqi Army en mass. This released a large group of angry and now jobless people in the cities and fueled not just the fledgling insurgency, but also the rampant corruption and sectarianism that the Iraqi government later to become known for. Many military and police units even began
operating as partisan forces for politicians or political groups, rather than the Iraqi nation as had been envisioned.  

The competing loyalties and the lack of a functioning civil society (due to a decade of sanctions, the bombing campaign targeting infrastructure, and the invasion itself) led to two major problems, a sectarian struggle illustrated by the initial lack of faith in the Shia majority legislature by the Sunni minority, and large-scale corruption that deeply penetrated the Iraqi bureaucracy.

Although Sunni’s eventually began participating in government, during the American withdrawal, the then Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri Al-Maliki allegedly began replacing Sunni members of government with Shia loyalists, perhaps confirming fears Sunni’s had about the Shia-dominated government from the beginning.

The corruption that emerged from this tangled web of loyalties had been extensively reported on during the last half of the War in Iraq, but the extent of it is truly bewildering. When hundreds of millions of dollars in development and reconstruction funds go missing it tends to be noticed eventually, but skimming and cronyism had been a part of post-sanction Iraqi society for so long that it had pushed

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well past the political and military level, down to public works projects. Eventually, all this corruption lead to a lack of confidence in national government institutions and increased reliance on alternate ones, such as tribal, religious, or partisan political groups.

Findings for the Iraq War

In June of 2014 roughly one thousand fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a Sunni extremist insurgent group, seized Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest cities. To do so they needed to defeat two divisions from the Iraqi Army with around 30,000 men armed with heavy weapons including artillery and tanks, a seemingly inconceivable task.

For the most part, the Iraqi military melted away, as rumors of senior officers deserting their posts spread through the ranks. With a month, a third of Iraq had

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fallen from the control of the Iraqi government, and a whole variety of groups joined the rampaging Islamic State. Sunni tribes angered at the actions of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government joined them, as did Baathist groups who were formerly loyal to Saddam’s regime. Foreign fighters who had flocked to the Civil War in Syria poured over the unprotected border into Iraq.

American forces in Iraq were unable to help create effective Iraqi governmental institutions during their involvement from 2003-2011 because, among other problems, they were unable to prevent or minimize corruption in the newly formed Iraqi government. This created an environment where the Iraqi public had little or no faith in their national government and often placed their support with alternate power structures, such as militias and tribal alliances. This failure directly led to the disintegration of the Iraqi Army, and the crumbling of the Iraqi State into what is effectively three different states; a Kurdish State, a Sunni/Islamic State, and a Shia State.

The insurgency in Iraq was never close to being defeated militarily, although the insurgency itself was never in a position to seriously challenge U.S., Iraqi, and Coalition forces while they were operating together. This failure occurred in part because there were numerous supplementary actors who were able to continue supporting the insurgency by providing fighters, weapons, training, equipment, and safe havens. On top of this, the Iraqi government, with U.S. and Coalition assistance, were never able to

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provide the people of Iraq (collectively) with functioning institutions that provided
goods, services, and a way to realize political and social needs. Instead they were given a
government that acted merely as a conduit for those in power increase their personal
wealth and influence, increasingly often along sectarian lines.

The final contributors to the failure of U.S. involvement in Iraq were several
changes that occurred domestically in the United States. First, the economy overtook
security as the most important issue among the voting public, which then changed the
political focus. Second, the policies that created the conditions for the invasion of Iraq
were not supported by the Democratic Party, which came to power in the 2008
elections.
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to better understand why Western democracies have been recently unsuccessful in conducting external counterinsurgency campaigns when they had been successful in the past. This was considered to be a worthwhile question because of how important the recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan carried out by the United States, Great Britain, and their allies became in international foreign policy considerations.

It seemed likely that if there were similarities between past successful external counterinsurgency campaigns, and then if you were to compare those successful campaigns with an unsuccessful one, it would be possible to isolate specific differences between the two. This information could be then be used for a variety of related purposes, including altering approaches to conducting such operations in the future.

To answer this question, three variable grouping were assembled containing non-kinetic factors that were considered to be important by members of the academic community closely involved in this type of research.97 “Kinetic” factors were excluded because of what was perceived to be a bias in the academic community in favor of focusing on military and combat related factors in counterinsurgency operations. Such a bias negatively affects the pursuit of counterinsurgency operations as a holistic endeavor. These final variable groupings chosen were labeled “domestic factors of the

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97 This specifically refers to the research done by Bruce Hoffman, David Kilcullen, and Jennifer Taw that has been cited in this thesis prior.
intervening state,” “supplementary actors involvement in the conflict,” and “domestic institutional factors of the host state.”

The widely differing and complex nature of each of the chosen conflicts (the Mau Mau Uprising, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Iraq War) mean that indicators for these variables would need to be tailored to each conflict. For example, during the era of the Iraq War, public opinion polls were routinely conducted by public and private organizations on a wide-ranging variety of topics, including the Iraq War. However, such things were not common during the Philippine Insurrection or the Mau Mau Uprising, so to gauge public opinion (as a part of Domestic Factors as a variable grouping) during those conflicts, newspaper archives were consulted in order to see what people were expressing about those conflicts. Government policy, and changes in those policies that were likely to affect the conflicts in question were also addressed as part of the Domestic Issues grouping.

Outcomes

In general, the findings most closely match “Outcome One” as was outlined on page 16. In both Kenya and the Philippines the evidence that was reviewed indicated that although there was dissent, there was also public support for involvement in those conflicts, and the policies that surrounded them (decolonization for Kenya, and expansionism for the Philippines). Additionally, the evidence reviewed showed there was also substantial political support for both conflicts among the legislature. In the
specific case of the Philippines, the conflict of supporters of the intervention and anti-imperialists was not seen as a major or decisive issue for the executive branch during the Presidential race of 1900 in the United States. Similarly, in Britain the Mau Mau Uprising did not seem to be an issue of major public concern, undoubtedly because there were several other major conflicts that Britain was involved with at the same time, including the emerging Cold War. Additionally, the policy preferences of the two major British Parties (Labour and Conservative) on Kenya and decolonization were not too far apart initially, and mostly similar by the mid-1950’s. The conditions allowed the intervention to continue until British civil and military officials were satisfied that there would be a stable Kenyan government that would be more friendly to Britain and the West than the Soviets.

For the Iraq War, there were significant differences in trends related to the domestic issues of the intervening state and the two earlier conflicts. For example, while there had been significant public and political support during the early stages, by 2008 both public and political support had evaporated, and the policy direction of a newly elected government undermined the pretenses for involvement in Iraq and other conflicts. Another way the domestic issues differed during this conflict was that the Iraq War was seen as a major public issue, until economic concerns surpassed it. All of these combined to make it unlikely for the U.S. to continue a commitment for the length of time needed to pursue other aspects of their counterinsurgency campaign.
In the case of the supplementary actor variable grouping, the case is clear; supplementary actors had little involvement in the Mau Mau Uprising and the Philippine Insurrection, and significant involvement in the Iraq War. While both the Americans and the British were able to operate unimpeded in Kenya and the Philippines, in the later conflict the United States faced constant interference by regional actors. A significant way this affected the conflicts differently was that in Kenya and the Philippines the intervening state either was able to isolate the insurgent groups from external support, or it was never an issue, while in Iraq the opposite was the case.

The institutional factors of the host state also had very clear-cut findings. The British and Americans formed and helped form national institutions in Kenya and the Philippines that were able to function effectively even when faced by public unrest (electoral violence in Kenya) and additional later insurgencies (in the Philippines), well beyond the end of their involvement. In Iraq, the American forces and government were unable to create similarly resilient institutions. While there were times that Iraqi institutions seemed to work, this broke down upon the removal of external support from the U.S. and their coalition.

As of early 2015, the State of Iraq that encompassed the 1932 borders exists as a nominal entity only. The northwestern region is under autonomous Kurdish control, and the northeastern and western parts are controlled by a former insurgent group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), which has declared the founding of an Islamic Caliphate in territory formerly controlled by Iraq and Syria.
Reflections

While the findings of the comparisons did show similarities in the successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the areas of the three variable groupings, and differences in those areas when compared to the unsuccessful example, there is plenty of room for improvement and revision for any future efforts in this area. While there did seem to be a minimal level of correlation between public opinion as a part of the domestic issues variable group, in hindsight it seems to be a less than optimal choice as an indicator. This is because it, itself, is subject to influence by other potential indicators such as economic stability. Perhaps a better approach would have been to look at public opinion, not as an indicator itself, but to assist uncover more appropriate indicators for a wider range of domestic variables.

The Future

While conducting research, several other similarities came to light that linked the successful interventions in the Philippines and Kenya. Both successful COIN campaigns had aggressive military campaigns that succeeded at targeting not just the insurgents in general, but perhaps more importantly, the leadership of the insurgents groups. This research has also reinforced the notion that you cannot succeed in external counterinsurgency operations without executing said campaign in a holistic way. Even in the Philippine experience the civilian Governor-General pushed to quickly take local control out of the hands of the military, and implement increasing levels of self-rule.
That being said, it seems completely necessary for there to be a military component, the exact nature of, or who should lead it (host state or intervening state?) being up for debate.

Another similarity between the counterinsurgency campaigns in Kenya and the Philippines was that there was no dominant domestic pressure (of a political or public nature) to shorten the intervention or end it based on anything other than progression of the campaign itself. This is sharply different than what occurred during the Iraq War, as timelines for U.S. involvement were created that were based on mostly arbitrary dates rather than the state of the counterinsurgency campaign itself.

Looking at the similarities between the British and American response during the Mau Mau Uprising and the Philippine Insurrection and then comparing such efforts to what was implemented during the Iraq War (whether by design or luck), and you notice obvious differences in approach. In Iraq, it seems that the conflict and potential conflict were looked at as if they existed inside a box removed from external pressure. It was also entered without giving proper due diligence to the potential of a protracted engagement. A more effective approach would be focused on regional engagement, isolation of the insurgency, institution building, leadership decapitation, massive rapprochement efforts, and liberal amnesty programs.

Perhaps during the Iraq War the military aspect of the COIN campaign should have been to secure the Syrian and Iranian border and conduct an extensive investigation into the trafficking streams that kept the insurgency rolling, rather than
full-scale involvement in city policing. As per Gian Gentile, part of the problem is that conventional pop-centric COIN assumes that you are fighting over the will of the people, that undecided middle group. In Iraq, as Gentile noted, it is supremely possible that this “terrain” never existed as an objective that could be won. It could be as simple as the fact that no one in Iraqi bought into the new system because the U.S. was never able to change the widely propagated narrative that the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to exploit resources, and that the U.S. troops in Iraq were an occupying force that was facilitating this.

The true extent of the challenges that would present themselves in Iraq must have been hidden from the view of those responsible for planning that war. If those organizations and individuals had taken the variable groupings presented in this thesis and used them as a lens to view the coming conflict in Iraq in its complete form, it seems somewhat likely that the war would never have happened. Or, if it had, the commitment would have been tailored to the environment in such a way that its execution would have differed greatly. And perhaps that is the true contribution of this thesis, that it may allow a much more complete picture of the potential challenges involved in external counterinsurgency campaigns, and thus reduce their likelihood in general.

Having a coherent and viable strategy to conduct external interventions is as relevant today as ever in the past. While the sting of failure in Iraq will temporarily dampen enthusiasm for such endeavors, it is supremely likely that such an operation
will be attempted before the end of the decade. Given the unraveling of the governments of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and the potential for such an event in Lebanon, it is also likely it will be attempted in the same region.

Before this almost guaranteed future attempt, it would behoove those involved in this attempt to do three things. First, they should only attempt to intervene at a level that can be sustained in the face of domestic public, political, and economic conditions. Second, they should craft their involvement around preventing or mitigating interference by supplementary actors. This involves securing porous borders and denying operational sanctuary for insurgents, which entails a strong diplomatic and intelligence-based effort. These plans need to be put into effect prior to execution. This could potentially mean tailoring levels of commitment based on the possibility of external interference or difficulty denying such activity. Third, the full effort of military, political, and diplomatic efforts should involve activities that build new institutions, strengthen existing ones, and then support the entire institutional capacity of the host state.


