Document Type
Article
Author ORCID Identifier
Stefani A. Crabtree https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8585-8943
Colin D. Wren https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4940-3997
Avinash Dixit https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8929-7503
Simon A. Levin https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8216-5639
Journal/Book Title
PNAS Nexus
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Publication Date
7-2-2024
Journal Article Version
Version of Record
Volume
3
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Issue
7
First Page
1
Last Page
11
Abstract
In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one's neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one's neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness. In our research, we find that while despotic leadership may lead towards high prosociality and high returns it does not exceed the effects of a local individual who can exert positive influence in the community. This may suggest that greater individual gains can be had by cooperating and that global hierarchical leadership may not be essential as long as influential individuals exert their influence for public good and not for public ill.
Recommended Citation
Crabtree, Stefani A.; Wren, Colin D.; Dixit, Avinash; and Levin, Simon A., "Influential Individuals can Promote Prosocial Practices in Heterogeneous Societies: A Mathematical and Agent-Based Model" (2024). Environment and Society Faculty Publications. Paper 1673.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/envs_facpub/1673
