Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Utah State University Department of Economics
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This paper presents interactive geometrical depictions of the Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules for cooperative games with three players. The program graphically demonstrates how the simplexes corresponding to a host of characteristic functions are "shrunk" to their corresponding cores, calculates allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules, and graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding cores.
Caplan, Arthur J. and Sasaki, Yuya, "Interactive Geometry for Surplus Sharing in Cooperative Games" (2005). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 310.