Document Type


Journal/Book Title/Conference

Economic Research Institute Study paper


Utah State University

Publication Date



Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at

First Page


Last Page



Economic issues often dominate the election debates. The voters are urged to choose between seemingly opposing economic policies with supposedly different outcomes. The purpose of this note is to critically examine the validity of the very basic concept of voters' economic choice. For this purpose, two radically opposed models of government are developed and presented. The electorates, economic choices, and the outcomes within each model are outlined. The theoretical foundations of each model are examined within the confines of recent economic policies. The conclusion delineates several suggestions aimed at improving our existing political and economic system.