Date of Award

5-2012

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science (MS)

Department

Political Science

Committee Chair(s)

Damon Cann

Committee

Damon Cann

Committee

Michael Lyons

Committee

Randy Simmons

Abstract

State judicial elections are becoming increasingly more expensive in terms of overall spending. The growing visibilities of these elections are expectantly followed with the support of special interest groups as well as individual contributions. This article focuses on judicial campaign contribution limits and there effectiveness in accomplishing their original goals. My research will address a variety of state judicial elections as well as Supreme Court cases involving the effectiveness of judicial campaign contributions have in accomplishing there purpose of reducing overall spending and preventing corruption. My hypothesis states that judicial campaign contributions are not effective in limiting the overall spending in a judicial election or in preventing corruption of individuals.

Comments

This work made publicly available electronically on June 4, 2012.

Share

COinS