Date of Award
Master of Science (MS)
Economics and Finance
Matthew D. Meng
When bridging between experts and audiences, media firms often have their own biases which give them the incentive to manipulate information deliveries. This paper studies a cheap talk game in which media firms(moderators) can strategically design the delivery of experts’ messages to decision makers. A moderator is allowed to affect the delivery of messages by selecting experts and informing the decision-maker about the experts’ biases. I show that moderators can in equilibrium send partition-type messages to inform the receiver of experts’ biases, and moderation can improve communication informativeness.
Sun, Xianzheng, "Mediated Cheap Talk With an Uncertain-Biased Expert" (2023). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 1720.
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