Date of Award
5-2023
Degree Type
Creative Project
Degree Name
Master of Science (MS)
Department
Economics and Finance
Committee Chair(s)
Lucas Rentschler
Committee
Lucas Rentschler
Committee
Matthew D. Meng
Committee
Todd Griffith
Abstract
When bridging between experts and audiences, media firms often have their own biases which give them the incentive to manipulate information deliveries. This paper studies a cheap talk game in which media firms(moderators) can strategically design the delivery of experts’ messages to decision makers. A moderator is allowed to affect the delivery of messages by selecting experts and informing the decision-maker about the experts’ biases. I show that moderators can in equilibrium send partition-type messages to inform the receiver of experts’ biases, and moderation can improve communication informativeness.
Recommended Citation
Sun, Xianzheng, "Mediated Cheap Talk With an Uncertain-Biased Expert" (2023). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports, Spring 1920 to Spring 2023. 1720.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1720
Included in
Copyright for this work is retained by the student. If you have any questions regarding the inclusion of this work in the Digital Commons, please email us at .