Seeing is Believing: Simulating Forest-Harvest Problems with Microsoft Excel in an Intermediate-Level Natural-Resource Economics Course

Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

Perspective on Economic Education Research

Volume

1

Issue

1

Publication Date

2005

First Page

44

Last Page

52

Abstract

We examine joint tradable permit markets as a self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g. smog and global warming). By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences.

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