Document Type
Conference Paper
Journal/Book Title/Conference
DAC '14: Proceedings of the 51st Annual Design Automation Conference
Publication Date
6-1-2014
Abstract
In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs's foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by "clouding" the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads. Copyright 2014 ACM.
Recommended Citation
Dean Michael Ancajas, Koushik Chakraborty, and Sanghamitra Roy, Fort-NoCs: Mitigating the threat of a Compromised NoC. IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference (DAC), pp. -6, June 2014, San Francisco, CA.
Comments
© 2014. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in DAC '14: Proceedings of the 51st Annual Design Automation Conference, https://doi.org/10.1145/2593069.2593144