Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Journal of Banking and Finance
Volume
37
Issue
8
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
8-2013
First Page
3007
Last Page
3017
Abstract
Political involvement has long been shown to be a profitable investment for firms that seek favorable regulatory conditions or support in times of economic distress. But how important are different types of political involvement for the timing and magnitude of political support? To answer this question, we take a comprehensive look at the lobbying expenditures and political connections of banks that were recipients of government support under the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We find that politically engaged firms were not only more likely to receive TARP support, but they also received a greater amount of TARP support and received the support earlier than firms that were not politically involved.
Recommended Citation
Thomas, Diana W.; Blau, Benjamin M.; and Brough, Tyler, "Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks" (2013). Economics and Finance Faculty Publications. Paper 244.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/econ_facpubs/244
