Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
3
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
1997
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
First Page
1
Last Page
20
Abstract
Following the recent exchange between Ransom and Hallock, we examine the determinants of faculty salaries and find that once one controls for productivity indicators, seniority appears to have a significant effect on faculty salaries. Simply put, productivity pays and there is no evidence of university monopsony power. Faculty salaries are almost solely determined by academic discipline, rank, and productivity, as manifest by grantsmanship activity and the elicitation of competing offers from other universities. Perhaps surprisingly, once one controls for grants won and rank, both of which appear to be influenced by a faculty member's publication rate, published research appears to offer little or no salary returns.
Recommended Citation
Barrett, Christopher B. and Bailey, DeeVon, "Seniority and Productivity in the Academic Labor Market" (1997). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 114.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/114