Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
8
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
1998
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
First Page
1
Last Page
24
Abstract
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and I show that when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion by the players notwithstanding, the principal can always implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Recommended Citation
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., "On the Irrelevance of Collusion in Perfectly Correlated Environments" (1998). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 146.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/146