Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
8
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
1998
First Page
1
Last Page
24
Abstract
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and I show that when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion by the players notwithstanding, the principal can always implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Recommended Citation
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., "On the Irrelevance of Collusion in Perfectly Correlated Environments" (1998). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 146.
http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/146