Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

Economics Research Institute Study Paper

Volume

29

Publisher

Utah State University Department of Economics

Publication Date

2000

Rights

Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.

First Page

1

Last Page

32

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic model of environmental policy in a stylized developing country CDC) with a dual economy. This DC's economy is distorted because the government subsidizes the exports of the non-polluting sector of the economy. We analyze the employment and output effects of three different pollution taxes. These taxes incorporate alternate assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. We describe the taxes, we examine the dependence of these taxes on the extant distortion, and we stipulate the conditions that call for an activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. Inter alia, our analysis shows why some DC governments may not be serious about environmental protection.

Download

Share

COinS