Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
18
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
2002
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
First Page
1
Last Page
26
Abstract
An information asymmetry exists in the market for organic produce since consumers cannot determine whether produce is organically or conventionally grown. Various methods may solve this problem including signaling, reputation, and certification. Signaling and reputation may not work well, because signals are noisy, and reputation may be difficult for a producer to establish. Certification of the farm and its growing methods shows the most promise. A survey instrument testing the efficacy of certification is presented along with empirical analysis suggesting that no notable difference existed between independent certification methods, although independent certification had significantly different effects than self-certification.
Recommended Citation
Hunnicutt, Lynn; Keith, John E.; and Ward, Ruby, "If You Can't Trust the Farmer, Who Can You Trust? The Effect of Certification Types on Purchases of Organic Produce" (2002). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 251.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/251