Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

Economics Research Institute Study Paper

Volume

11

Publisher

Utah State University Department of Economics

Publication Date

2004

Rights

Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.

First Page

1

Last Page

28

Abstract

We examine the noncooperative provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the European Union, where regional governments are Stackelberg leaders and the central government is a Stackelberg follower-a federation with decentralized leadership. The center redistributes income and provides budget-balanced lump-sum matching grants after it observes the regions' contributions to the impure public good. Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments' policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region. Despite the degree of labor mobility, we show that the allocation of the impure public good and the interregional income redistribution policy are generally efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership.

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