Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

Economic Research Institute Study paper

Volume

74

Issue

2

Publisher

Utah State University

Publication Date

1-1-1974

Rights

Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.

First Page

1

Last Page

14

Abstract

Private electric and telephone utilities in the United States are regulated on a rate of return on capital basis. For many years, students of regulation have argued that this type of regulation does not provide utilities with any incentive to be efficient in their provision of service. In 1962, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson provided analytical support for the proposition that such regulation tends to result in inefficient production. Averch and Johnson demonstrate that the firm subject to a regulatory constraint has an incentive to use more capital in production than would be the case if costs were to be minimized.

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