Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
95
Issue
1
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
1995
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
First Page
1
Last Page
49
Abstract
This paper concerns the objective alignment of individuals' material interests into groupings for collective action, and how these groupings vary with economic structure and in response to previous periods' policy choices. It establishes analytically the microeconomic basis for coalition alignments with respect to food price policy, then numerically simulates the comparative static effects of alternative food policies on coalition structure. A parsimonious household model applied to a heterogeneously endowed society demonstrates the inherent inextricability of price policy from land, population, and technology policies in food agriculture. Moreover, coalition alignments on particular policy debates are path-dependent.
Recommended Citation
Barrett, Christopher B., "The Microeconomics of Coalition Alignments: Some Insights on Food Price Policy" (1995). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 50.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/50