Kant's Argument for Causality in the Second Analagy
Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
International Philosophical Quarterly
Volume
34
Publication Date
1-1-1994
First Page
465
Last Page
480
Abstract
In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that we must presuppose, a priori, that each event is determined to occur by some preceding event in accordance with a causal law. Although there have been numerous interpretations of this argument, we have not been able to show that it is valid. In this paper, I develop my own interpretation of this argument. I borrow an insight offered by Robert Paul Wolff. In Kant's argument, our need to presuppose that the causal determination of each event rests not upon our need to impose a 'necessary' and 'irreversible' temporal order upon representations of the states of an object, as Kant is usually interpreted, but upon our need to generate a comprehensive representation that includes a certain a priori conception of events in the world around us. Although the argument I attribute to Kant is valid, it cannot compel the Humean skeptic to accept the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event: Kant has not successfully responded to Hume in the Second Analogy.
Recommended Citation
Gordon Steinhoff, “Kant's Argument for Causality in the Second Analogy,” International Philosophical Quarterly 1994, v. 34, pp. 465-480.
