Document Type
Conference Paper
Journal/Book Title/Conference
NOCS '15: Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Networks-on-Chip
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Publication Date
9-28-2015
Funder
National Science Foundation
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a covert threat model for MPSoCs designed using 3rd party Network-on-Chips (NoC). We illustrate that a malicious NoC can disrupt the availability of on-chip resources, thereby causing large performance bottlenecks for the software running on the MPSoC platform. We then propose a runtime latency auditor that enables an MPSoC integrator to monitor the trustworthiness of the deployed NoC throughout the chip lifetime. For the proposed technique, our comprehensive cross-layer analysis indicates modest overheads of 12.73% in area, 9.844% in power and 5.4% in terms of network latency.
Recommended Citation
Rajesh JayashankaraShridevi, Dean Michael Ancajas, Koushik Chakraborty and Sanghamitra Roy, Runtime Detection of a Bandwidth Denial Attack from a Rogue Network-on-Chip. Proceedings of the 9th ACM International Symposium on Networks-on-Chips (NOCS), Article No. 8, September 2015, Vancouver, Canada.
Comments
© 2015. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in NOCS '15: Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Networks-on-Chip, https://doi.org/10.1145/2786572.2786580