The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
This paper asks whether the historical activities of the Antitrust Division have had an impact on employment (and, by implication, economic welfare) in the U.S. economy. Using data covering the period 1947–1981 (and earlier), we find a positive and statistically significant ceteris paribus relationship between unanticipated increases in Antitrust Division enforcement activities and the civilian labor force unemployment rate.
The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts” (with Robert D. Tollison), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147 (March 1991), pp. 38–52; reprinted in Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 165–177.