Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

International Tax and Public Finance

Publisher

Springer New York LLC

Publication Date

3-17-2020

First Page

1

Last Page

37

Abstract

This paper introduces heterogeneous profit shifting costs induced by corrupt tax officials to the analysis of profit shifting of multinationals. Using a theoretically derived corruption weighted tax differential, we show that corruption increases profit shifting of European firms. We use our estimates to calculate the implied tax revenue elasticities for European countries and find that countries with otherwise similar tax rates face lower tax revenue elasticities when they are more corrupt. This means that corruption negatively affects the revenue gains that countries could have from increasing their tax rates.

Comments

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in International Tax and Public Finance. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09596-4

Included in

Finance Commons

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.