Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

International Tax and Public Finance

Publisher

Springer New York LLC

Publication Date

3-17-2020

First Page

1

Last Page

37

Abstract

This paper introduces heterogeneous profit shifting costs induced by corrupt tax officials to the analysis of profit shifting of multinationals. Using a theoretically derived corruption weighted tax differential, we show that corruption increases profit shifting of European firms. We use our estimates to calculate the implied tax revenue elasticities for European countries and find that countries with otherwise similar tax rates face lower tax revenue elasticities when they are more corrupt. This means that corruption negatively affects the revenue gains that countries could have from increasing their tax rates.

Comments

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in International Tax and Public Finance. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09596-4

Available for download on Wednesday, March 17, 2021

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Finance Commons

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