Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Utah State University Department of Economics
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In a recent paper, Batabyal (1997) has analyzed the decision making process in arranged marriages. In particular, Batabyal shows that a marrying agent's optimal policy depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall of previous marriage proposals. In this paper, I continue this line of inquiry by focusing on the decision problem faced by a marrying agent who wishes to maximize the probability of getting married to the best possible person. Inter alia, I show that this agent's optimal policy calls for waiting a while, and saying yes to the first candidate thereafter.
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., "A Dynamic and Stochastic Analysis of Decision Making in Arranged Marriages" (1999). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 165.