Date of Award
5-2022
Degree Type
Report
Degree Name
Master of Science (MS)
Department
Economics and Finance
Committee Chair(s)
Lucas Rentschler
Committee
Lucas Rentschler
Committee
Scott Findley
Committee
James Feigenbaum
Abstract
Previous research has indicated that an ex-ante pledge of honesty reduces the likelihood that participants will lie during a lab experiment. We show that a bandwagon effect, occurring when participants know that others are acting dishonestly, can erode the positive effects of honesty oaths. Taxpayers do not make their reporting decisions in a vacuum. They have access to information concerning how others in the community are behaving and develop perceptions around this information. We add these realistic features to a tax evasion game involving an ex-ante honesty oath. Results indicate that social context can reduce the positive effects of honesty oaths on reporting behavior.
Recommended Citation
Krebs, Logan, "Oaths and Evasion: Variable Honesty in Tax Evasion Games" (2022). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports, Spring 1920 to Spring 2023. 1632.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1632
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