Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

Economics Research Institute Study Paper

Volume

22

Publisher

Utah State University Department of Economics

Publication Date

2002

Rights

Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.

First Page

1

Last Page

18

Abstract

We design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. This agency's objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo relative ranking of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in our proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that internalize the global environmental externalities. These results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for international transfers from developed to developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol.

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