Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
Volume
23
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
2002
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
First Page
1
Last Page
35
Abstract
We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By "correlated" we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g., smog and global warming). By "self-enforcing" we mean mechanisms that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient, while joint emissions taxes are not.
Recommended Citation
Kaplan, Arthur J. and Silva, Emilson C.D., "An Efficient Mechanism to Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers and the Coexistence of Regional and Global Pollution Permit Markets" (2002). Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 256.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/256