Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
Public Finance Review
Volume
85
Publication Date
2012
First Page
789
Last Page
815
Abstract
The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day. The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.
Recommended Citation
“Corruption and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the US States” (with Monica Escaleras and Peter T. Calcagno), Public Finance Review 85 (July 2012), pp. 789–815.
