Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures

Authors

Martin Van der Linden, Utah State UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Journal/Book Title/Conference

The Journal of Law and Economics

Volume

61

Issue

4

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Publication Date

11-2018

First Page

711

Last Page

738

Abstract

A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are strategically simple.

Recommended Citation

Martin Van der Linden, "Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures," The Journal of Law and Economics 61, no. 4 (November 2018): 711-738. https://doi.org/10.1086/700198