Document Type
Article
Journal/Book Title/Conference
The Journal of Law and Economics
Volume
61
Issue
4
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Publication Date
11-2018
First Page
711
Last Page
738
Abstract
A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are strategically simple.
Recommended Citation
Martin Van der Linden, "Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures," The Journal of Law and Economics 61, no. 4 (November 2018): 711-738. https://doi.org/10.1086/700198
